Aldrich urges elimination of money pact
Submits plan for post-war recovery
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Anti-fourth-term sentiment reflected in G.I.s’ letter
Hershey’s plan to keep Army mobilized ridiculed as his ‘latest morale booster
Washington –
Despite Democratic reports to the contrary, some overseas soldiers are not going to vote for a fourth term, Rep. John Jennings (R-TN) predicted today in making public a letter he received, ridiculing the Hershey plan to keep the Army mobilized after Germany is defeated.
The letter was dated Aug. 23 and addressed from “somewhere in Europe.” It was signed by 10 enlisted men privates, corporals and sergeants. Two are from Tennessee, one being from Mr. Jennings’ hometown of Knoxville.
The letter said:
Everywhere in the bloodstained hedgerows of France, the foxholes of Italy, the damp darkness of the jungle and in the shrapnel-torn skies of the world, tired, grim American soldiers stood up to cheer the latest morale booster of our beloved friend, Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey. I quote from The Stars and Stripes of Aug. 23, 1944:
We can keep people in the Army about as cheaply as we could create an agency for them when they are out.
Right now, we think that Gen. Hershey could be voted the man with whom we should like most to share a slit-trench in the frontlines, for we believe him to be a man of vision; a man of understanding, especially of the wants, hopes and dreams of the common soldier.
It is this keen understanding, and the General’s well-known ability of expression and timing that will swing President Roosevelt back into the White House with the certain vote of every mother, father, sweetheart and wife who has a man serving overseas. That is why I urge you to support Mr. Roosevelt – he has such men around him to guide and counsel him in his moments of decision.
As you can see, I can hardly control my enthusiasm, for we love it here and will love it even more so after the war is won. We love the simple life of ease and quiet dignity, far from the clamor and turmoil of America and home.
Our only wish is that we can have an end to this dreadful talk of demobilization, that awful specter of returning home over the storm-tossed waters of the gray Atlantic. We want to stay here forever and forever among our pleasant European friends (Yeah, friends).
We are certain that none of us would ever consider returning home to America and taking work away from the poor fellows who have so nobly stood up under the strains of gasoline rationing, cuffless trousers and union scales. Never, not in a thousand years! And we know that they feel pretty much the same way about us, for they would never deprive us of the wonderful opportunity we now have here. Never, not in a thousand years would they come over here and take away our work.
They are content with their work-a-day world, and dull evenings at home with wives and children. Indeed, we are grateful to note in Fortune Magazine’s poll that some 44 percent of the folks back home have swung around to the General’s point of view and are unwilling to have us begin our reluctant trek home.
In fact, we have heard several soldiers state that they wish to have a list of those persons in that 44 percent of which Fortune Magazine writes, so that we could send them an old unexploded hand grenade or some nice unused mustard gas.
Millett: Gobs of love Navy’s rule
Sailors learn how to write letters
By Ruth Millett
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Kay Williams asks final divorce decree
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Four-way struggle for pennant resumes in American League
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College football –
Midwest gets 4-game start
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U.S. State Department (September 15, 1944)
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/22
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, September 15, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-THIRD DAY
Because Sir Alexander Cadogan was called to Quebec to confer with Prime Minister Churchill (on matters other than the Dumbarton Oaks conversations), no official meetings were held today.
Various members of the American group took advantage of the suspension of meetings to confer with one another and examine latest drafts of various documents.
Members of the secretariat took advantage of the delay to catch up with preparation of minutes and other papers. The latest draft of the document, based upon changes agreed to by the joint formulation group at its meeting yesterday afternoon, was copied and distributed to participants in the conversations.
Marshal Stalin’s reply to the President’s message on voting procedure was received. I sent a wire to the President quoting the exact text of the formula now under study.
At 4:00 p.m., Messrs. Long, Hackworth, Pasvolsky and I met with you for a 40-minute roundup discussion on the open questions.
Roosevelt conversation with the Archduke Otto of Austria, 5:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Archduke Otto |
Roosevelt had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons the Archdukes Otto and Felix, her lady in waiting, and Miss Tully. The following paper is a translation made in the Department of State of a memorandum prepared by the Archduke Otto regarding his conversation with Roosevelt on this occasion:
Right at the beginning Roosevelt remarked that today they had been working over the maps and had noted (namely, he and Churchill) that Austria and Hungary would of all countries undergo the least territorial changes. The situation was unclear only where Transylvania was concerned because there were differences of opinion between the Russians and the Rumanians in that respect, and “we don’t know much about it.” Immediately following this he remarked “that our main concern is now how to keep the Communist out of Hungary and Austria.” This was extremely important to them, especially Hungary.
The remainder of the conversation was rather disjointed, as is the custom with R., and each problem was touched upon repeatedly. The following is a summary of what was said on the various points:
HUNGARY. This was evidently one of the cardinal issues of the conversation. R. kept coming back to this problem time and again. Apart from the President’s personal sympathy for Hungary, the main reason for this is probably the hope of making Hungary a bulwark against Russia. He stressed that he wished Hungary would make an unconditional surrender only to the Americans and British. If this were done, Hungary could be saved from communism. Hungary would surely receive mild terms. Military operations are now being planned which are designed to make it possible for the Hungarians to establish liaison with the civilized Allies. In the course of the discussion, R. took up the idea of having the Hungarian envoys act as transmitters of his proposal for Hungary. Specific mention was made of Apor, whom he would approach through Myron Taylor. His former sympathy for Horthy had been forfeited through the latter’s weakness and senility. He was very receptive to the idea that we might perhaps be helpful to him with respect to Hungary’s surrender. It was also agreed that I would immediately send him a message for the Hungarian government. He also asked in detail about Béla Kun, concerning whose atrocious deeds he was well informed. Attempts had also been made to prejudice him very strongly against Mihály Károlyi, but obviously he does not know much about him.
RUSSIA. It is evident that the relationship between R. and the Russians is strained. While the President emphasized that he liked Stalin personally – although he said a little later that he was “untrustworthy” and deceitful (my personal impression: the praise of Stalin was merely a gesture to put a little damper on our joy, and so was not genuine) – the President was bitterly critical of the men around Stalin. All the men around Stalin were old Bolsheviks whom one could not trust. There was a general interest in keeping the Russians away as far as possible. R. seems to have been particularly disgusted by Russia’s handling of the Bulgarian question. It is obvious that the Anglo-Saxons were tricked by the Russians. From all of R.’s remarks it is quite evident that he is afraid of the Communists and wants to do everything to contain Russia’s power – naturally short of war.
POLAND. R. is in an ill humor about Poland. Apparently there is a disposition to yield there. Sharp criticism of the Warsaw revolt, which was launched without consulting the Allies.
AUSTRIA. Austria’s independence will be restored and efforts will be made to protect the country from Bolshevism. The question whether Austria would want to form a federation with South Germany was raised at the Conference, but R. said that this should be left to the Austrians themselves. He thought that the Austrians would not care for that. When he asked for my opinion, I said that Austria would primarily wish to associate with the Danube countries, especially Hungary, but if Hungary were to fall into the hands of the Russians, Austria might consider a union with Catholic South Germany on the condition that Vienna would be the capital. German, R. remarked at this point, would be divided into three parts, North, West, and South Germany. R. apparently had no knowledge of the Hull Declaration. He shared our opinion that an uprising would be far too premature at this time. The question of the Austrian underground did not seem to interest him greatly. He seems to think that the underground is so strong that nothing needs to be done for it except supply it with arms at the last moment. South Tyrol was discussed with him. He is sympathetic to our efforts. It is not clear, however, whether anything has been done in this respect. He has reports from Italy about the present Italian government: they are relatively unconcerned about any territorial questions regarding Austria, they are interested in only one thing: they want to keep Trieste. He has proposed, and the proposal seems to have been accepted, that Trieste, Pola, and Fiume become free ports under international guarantee and administration. (The same régime, by the way, is also planned for the German ports.)
VATICAN. Understanding for the power of the Holy See. An interesting item is a report by Myron Taylor that Stalin had offered Rome, as the price of an understanding, to bring about a merger of the Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
YUGOSLAVIA. R. stresses once more, as in previous conversations, that Yugoslavia is in his view an unnatural state. It should be transformed into a federation. Whether that would be done he did not say. Said: Poor Peter is in a very bad shape.
MISCELLANEOUS. Marked sympathy for Leopold of Belgium. – In view of Brazil’s weakness he will propose to the United Nations the establishment of American or United Nations bases in Dakar or the Cape Verde Islands. – Is very angry at Argentina. – Beneš or Czechoslovakia was not mentioned at all. – Made the remark that Stalin had harassed Churchill constantly at Tehran.
Morgenthau-Leahy conversation, about 5:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | ||
| Admiral Leahy | ||
| Miss Tully |
Morgenthau’s diary entry reads as follows:
While I was waiting for the President between five and six, I was sitting there talking with Grace Tully and Admiral Leahy joined us. He said that they had only settled that afternoon what part of Germany the English would go into, and what part the USA should go into. In the morning when I arrived at twelve, the President was sitting alone in his room with three different colored pencils and a map of Europe, and he then and there sketched out where he wanted us to go and where he wanted the English to go, and by that I mean our Armies. He had before him a map of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which he said was terrible. According to Admiral Leahy, this afternoon the President showed Churchill his map, and got what he wanted. When I let Leahy read the memorandum on the Ruhr and the Saar, he was very happy because he said that the English were going to occupy the Ruhr and the Saar and they would have to carry this thing out.
The Secretary of the Treasury to the President
Quebec, September 15, 1944
Memorandum for the President
In regard to proposal for Lend Lease to France, my recommendation is that for the time being we postpone taking any action.
H M Jr.
Approved: F D R
The Under Secretary of State to President Roosevelt
Washington, September 15, 1944
Supplementing yesterday’s wire on voting procedure, it may be helpful for you to have before you the exact text of the formula which is now being studied by the three governments as a possible solution.
You will note the size of the majority vote is left blank. The Russians want 51 percent and the British want two-thirds.
The result of adopting this procedure would be that consideration and recommendations with regard to pacific settlement of disputes referred to in numbered paragraph three above would be taken without the vote of the party to the dispute even if that party happens to be a permanent member of the council and that consideration and decisions as to enforcement action of any kind would require the unanimous consent of all the permanent members of the council, whether or not one of them is involved.
In view of the fact that this, if accepted, would represent a substantial concession to the Soviet point of view, we feel that we would be justified in trying to obtain their consent to the two-thirds majority vote.
Could we have your views as soon as convenient, both as regards the formula in the text and the size of majority vote?
E S
Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, about 6:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau |
Morgenthau’s diary entry reads as follows:
…I got in about six o’clock and stayed until after seven-thirty… He was completely relaxed, and the conversation was entirely on the week’s work.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Late in the afternoon in my discussion with the President, to my surprise he told me that Leahy had been favorable to my plan. The President said that he had withheld bringing up this question of where our Armies should go because he wanted to get Churchill in a good humor and he wanted everything else settled.
… I asked him what he meant about the suggestion of having the United Nations meet the end of October, and he said that he felt it had taken much too long to bring up the League of Nations after World War I, and he wanted to do this in October. So I said, “Well, it makes good window dressing for the campaign,” and he said, “Yes.” His idea is to have it about the 27th of October and run through and after election.
During my conversation with the President – I think it was in the morning – I said, “Look, Mr. President, now that we have this Ruhr and Saar stuff straightened out, the thing should be presented to Stalin, and I think if Stalin knew how we felt you would find he would act much better.” The President said, “Well, I will have Harriman come back and explain it to him, and let him go back and sell it to Stalin.” “Listen,” I said, “Harriman can’t do this. You ought to send me.” I said, “I get along very well with the Russians, and you could check with Stalin as to whether I do or whether I don’t.” The President said, “Oh, I have far too important things for you to do around Washington. I can’t spare you for a thing like this.” I said, “Well, it would only be a matter of 10 days.” He thought a minute and said, “Well, it might take two weeks,” and he seemed to like the idea…
The other amazing thing that happened was he turned to me, when Grace Tully brought in a telegram in the afternoon addressed to her asking her to try to find out what happened on the French Lend-Lease, and said, “You let Harry know that we are not going to do it,” …
Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting, 7:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell |
Morgenthau and Cherwell discussed the words “or sold for profit” which had been inserted in the record of the Roosevelt-Churchill discussion of lend-lease on September 14.
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mrs. Churchill | ||
| Foreign Secretary Eden | ||
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
The Secretary of War to the President
Washington, September 15, 1944
Memorandum for the President
Since the meeting with you on September 9 attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself, I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany. There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other memoranda. I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory – this is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.
The point of difference is not one of objective – continued world peace – it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.
If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.
The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims – it would be a crime against civilization itself.
This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive many millions of people of the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suspect the validity of our spiritual tenets and question the long-range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.
The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people’s lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.
I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England’s need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.
The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.
I plead for no “soft” treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.
I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944, the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.
HENRY L STIMSON
Secretary of War
Lot 60–D 224, Box 59: Stettinius Diary
Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State
Twenty-third Day, Friday, September 15, 1944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conversations with the Secretary
As soon as I heard that the cable from Stalin on voting had been received I called the Secretary. I explained to him that while Stalin did not back away from the expressed Soviet opinion he did not close the door. The Secretary seemed encouraged. I sent him a copy of the text as soon as we received it.
Mr. Hull had just talked to the President, who had confirmed that the meeting in Quebec was breaking up tonight and that Eden was flying back to England tonight. Mr. Hull said Cadogan would return directly to Washington.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meeting with the Secretary
I met with the Secretary in his office this afternoon to bring him up to date generally. He was very disturbed because Mr. Long had been in and given him the impression that there was a great amount of dissension and differences of opinion among members of the American delegation. I told him this was completely wrong and suggested that we have Long in to go over the ground with him. We then had a forty-minute meeting with Long, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky present. Mr. Long backed down completely from his position when I explained clearly that yesterday I had canvassed the American group as to their position on the compromise formula and that with the exception of reservations by Bowman and Cohen, they were all united that it was the thing to do, if it was acceptable to the Russians. Pasvolsky, Hackworth and I all then expressed the opinion that there was nothing to be excited about. Long seemed apologetic for having brought the matter up.
Pasvolsky expressed his view that the Russians may accept this formula and that it would be acceptable to us. I made it completely clear to the Secretary that the three Governments had received it only for study on an informal tentative basis and that no one had made a commitment on it.
The Secretary was very definite that we could not exclude the Associated Nations from original membership as it would result in a very bad effect in Latin American relations. The Secretary, answering my memorandum of the 13th, indicated definite opposition to the British proposal of qualification based on contribution made, on the election of non-permanent members of the Council.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Log of the President’s Visit to Canada
Friday, September 15
At 12:00 o’clock, Noon, the President met in conference with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan.
At 1:00 p.m., the President lunched at the Citadel together with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Cadogan, Mrs. Churchill and Mr. Law. Prime Minister King dropped in on the group after lunch and joined in conference discussions that lasted until 3:00 p.m.
The President had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons Archduke Otto and Archduke Felix and her Lady in Waiting, Countess Kerssenbrock, and Miss Tully in his quarters at the Citadel at 5:00 p.m.
At 6:00 p.m., Secretary Morgenthau called on the President and was in conference with him until 7:15 p.m.
Dinner at the Citadel was at 8:00 p.m. The President dined with Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan. After dinner the motion picture Wilson and a Navy film of the recent air fighting at Saipan were shown at the Citadel. Mrs. Churchill attended with the President but Prime Minister Churchill could not attend because of a scheduled British conference. This was a lengthy motion picture program and was not concluded until past midnight. The President retired immediately after the movies.