Television is still ‘four-motored gadget’
Network leader reveals status
By Si Steinhauser
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Program to curb cartels proposed
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U.S. State Department (September 14, 1944)
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 5:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell | |
| Foreign Secretary Eden | ||
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
The following diary entry relating to this meeting is reprinted from Eden:
Alec [Cadogan] turned up and we went round together to see Winston. He was with FDR and [Mr. Henry] Morgenthau [United States Secretary of the Treasury] and Prof. [Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General] in conference about Lend Lease. They seemed glad of interruption and we talked of many things, Russians, Poles, Dumbarton Oaks, etc. until time to dress for dinner.
White, who was not present at the meeting, recorded in an undated memorandum that Morgenthau had mentioned to him on September 15, 1944, “the following bits of conversation which had taken place at a brief meeting with the President” on the afternoon of September 14:
In the afternoon the President delayed initialing the memorandum on the creation of the lend-lease committee which had been drafted by Cherwell, Weeks and White by interrupting with stories. Churchill was nervous and eager to have the memorandum initialed and finally he burst out: “What do you want me to do? Get on my hind legs and beg like Fala?”
Roosevelt-Mackenzie King conversation, early evening
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Canada | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
From notes of the conversation by Mackenzie King:
I told him [Roosevelt] something of the meeting we had had this afternoon and that Churchill would be speaking to him about our desire to have our Chiefs of Staff confer with his Chiefs of Staff. He said: By all means. We were allies. That would be expected. I then said to him that as he knew we were prepared to participate in the war in the Pacific against Japan but that we felt it must be in the Northern or Central regions. The President said he thought we should have a token representation but indicated that nothing might be needed for some time. He spoke of some extremely Northern region and indicated that toward the end, the Japanese might have to be driven out of the northern end of China. There was a hint that our men might be useful there. The President said I think Canada should have a token force to march into Berlin. I said I thought they would appreciate that and that it would be expected; that part of our army would be associated with the American and British armies. It was in this connection that the President referred to token forces in the other connection. The President made some reference to Russia and I asked him direct what part Russia would likely play. He repeated to me what had been said the other night and added that he could only say that Stalin had given that word himself.
Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Canada |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Lord Cherwell | ||
| Mr. Law | ||
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
The only information found on the discussion at this dinner meeting is that contained in an undated memorandum by White (who was not present) recording what Morgenthau had told him on September 15, 1944, about “bits of conversation” which had taken place on September 14. At least part of the material in the following three paragraphs of this memorandum relates to the Roosevelt-Churchill dinner on September 14, but since Leahy is not known to have been present, part of it may also relate to other conversations or meetings.
Churchill and Eden were afraid that Russia would go into Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece and never get out so the British are planning to land troops in Greece. Secretary Morgenthau had commented: “You have got a million troops in the Middle East.” And Eden said: “Oh, no, we have got only a couple of brigades there.”
Admiral Leahy reported to the President that they couldn’t move American troops across the part of the English troops in Germany and the President replied, “Nonsense. It could be done.”
England and Canada were eager to get into the war with Japan. The President said to the Secretary that he knew now why the British wanted to join in the war in the Pacific. All they want is Singapore back.
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State
Twenty-Second Day, Thursday, September 14, 1944
Restricted
Conversations With Sir Alexander Cadogan
Cadogan called me right after midnight to say that while the Prime Minister had given him twenty-four hours of grace yesterday, in view of Eden’s arrival he now felt obligated to go to Quebec immediately and assumed that under the circumstances Mr. Hull could now have no objections. I told him that I felt that any decision he made now should be entirely his own. He said he did not think it would interfere too much with the Conversations inasmuch as little could probably be done in the next day or so in any event pending an evaluation by our respective Governments on the informal compromise formula on voting.
Cadogan called me again at 10 o’clock in the morning saying he had just received a further telegram asking him to go there, and he was planning to leave later in the morning by special plane and that he would return tomorrow. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conversation With Mr. Hull
I called Mr. Hull early in the morning and told him of Cadogan’s midnight call about going to Quebec. Mr. Hull again said that he thought it was a mistake for Cadogan to go and for that conference to get into political matters but that he agreed that we would not make a further point of the matter.
… [Mr. Hull] said he had not heard from the President about going to Quebec and did not feel in any event that he should go. This comment was made after I had reminded him of the President’s promise to send for him or someone else in the Department if the conference went into political matters.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conversation With Harry Hopkins
Harry Hopkins called me just before 11:00 in the morning and I reported to him the recent development, particularly on the voting question. I also told him that Cadogan was going to Quebec this morning and that Eden was arriving there late this afternoon. I told him about our proposed press statement.
He then told me it was expected that the Quebec conference would break up Monday [Friday?] night and that probably the Prime Minister and the President would go to Hyde Park Sunday night and that if Eden went probably Hull would be invited up. He told me he was not going to Quebec but would go to Hyde Park. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lot 60–D 224, Box 59: Stettinius Diary
Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State
Twenty-second Day, Thursday, September 14, 1944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conversation with Gromyko
At 10:20 I called Gromyko to tell him Sir Alexander had been ordered to Quebec to spend the evening there and that he hoped to be back tomorrow. I suggested that as a consequence we call off the 10:30 Joint Steering Committee meeting unless he had something he particularly wanted to bring up. I suggested that we not meet again until Cadogan returned unless he wanted to talk to me privately.
I then told Gromyko that I had talked to Hull relative to the informal formula which had been developed late yesterday and that while Mr. Hull was not in a position to give it final approval that it looked good to him and that he thought it had in it the basis of agreement. I explained to Gromyko that we could not approve it in any final way until we had discussed it with the President. I then said that as our curbstone opinion of it was favorable, I wondered if he would not think it appropriate to sound out his own Government on it tentatively. I also told him that Cadogan could not yet speak but probably would be able to on his return, after talking to Eden in Quebec. During the conversation we decided it would be well for the Formulation Group to continue working on the other points which had not been couched in final language. I then told him that I would have to say something to the press this morning and that I was thinking something along the line that we are making good progress but that it would take a few more days to complete the talks. Gromyko promised that he would consult his Government on the possible compromise.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conversation with Mr. Hull
I called Mr. Hull early in the morning and told him of Cadogan’s midnight call about going to Quebec. Mr. Hull again said that he thought it was a mistake for Cadogan to go and for that conference to get into political matters but that he agreed that we would not make a further point of the matter.
I then inquired what he thought of the informal formula which had been worked out late yesterday and which Mr. Dunn had taken to him last night. He thought off hand that it looked good but said that he would have to consider it from the complete setting before he could give final judgment and also talk to the President on it. He said he had not heard from the President about going to Quebec and did not feel in any event that he should go. This comment was made after I had reminded him of the President’s promise to send for him or someone else in the Department if the conference went into political matters.
I asked the Secretary’s advice as to whether we should immediately inform the President of the voting development and the compromise which we had been studying informally. He thought we should do so and I arranged promptly to send such a wire to the President in Quebec.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conversation with Harry Hopkins
Harry Hopkins called me just before 11:00 in the morning and I reported to him the recent development, particularly on the voting question. I also told him that Cadogan was going to Quebec this morning and that Eden was arriving there late this afternoon. I told him about our proposed press statement.
He then told me it was expected that the Quebec conference would break up Monday night and that probably the Prime Minister and the President would go to Hyde Park Sunday night and that if Eden went probably Hull would be invited up. He told me he was not going to Quebec but would go to Hyde Park. He thought Churchill had gotten a little stiff about Cadogan and that his visit and also Eden’s did not have too much significance in view of the quick termination of the meeting. He thought our idea of sending a wire to bring the President up to date was excellent.
Then, to my amazement, Hopkins told me that an answer had been received at the White House from Stalin before the President had left for Quebec. He was not familiar with what it contained but promised to get it for me but he did say that the President thought it said “No” with a loud bang but that he personally had not had the same impression.
Later Hopkins called me back to say that he could not find the Stalin wire in the map room and that it had been taken to Quebec. He said he had sent a message up there to get it and would let us have it as soon as he had an answer. We received the message later in the afternoon.
Conversation with Mr. Hull
Later in the morning I called Mr. Hull to tell him I had heard that the Quebec conference would be over on Friday and that the two top men would probably go to Hyde Park alone for several days and that possibly Eden and he would be invited there. I told him Hopkins was going to Hyde Park. I also informed him that Cadogan was definitely leaving on the 11:30 plane and that we were going to put out a press release stating that we were getting along well, that our papers are being reviewed by our Governments, that Cadogan was being called to Quebec on other matters and that it would, therefore, take us a few more days to finish up.
I then told the Secretary how upset I was to discover that a reply from Stalin on the voting procedure had been received by the White House several days ago and that we had never been told about it. The Secretary said he was used to this type of thing and I replied that I guessed I was young and inexperienced. I explained that we did not yet know whether the reply referred to the Secretary’s talk with Gromyko or to the wire which the President had sent to Stalin.
Meeting with Mr. Hull
I called on Mr. Hull at 3:30 to tell him about the contents of the message from Stalin, which was on the “X” matter and which was discouraging. It said that while they were not going to press it further at Dumbarton Oaks, they are going to bring it up later, perhaps at the general conference. Mr. Hull was discouraged over the reply and said that if it were brought up at the general conference a showdown would have to take place at that time. He agreed completely with my thought that no matter what happened on the voting issue we would have to produce some memorandum of agreement in these Conversations, perhaps leaving certain open items for consideration at the United Nations conference. We agreed that if the Soviets continued to be sticky about questions such as the “X” matter that it was going to be difficult to work things out.
The Secretary agreed with my plan of recessing tomorrow and Saturday and thought, if possible, that it would be good for me to get away to the country for a day or two.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General
Today was the low point of the Conversations. It looks as if an impasse has been reached and we cannot tell whether we will be able to work out of it to a successful conclusion or whether the conference will blow up. I am much encouraged by remarks made by old hands at international negotiations, such as Joe Grew and Ed Wilson, who said there never has been a conference which did not look as if it had completely broken down at one stage or another.
Log of the President’s Visit to Canada
Thursday, September 14
The President’s personal flag was hoisted at the Citadel this morning. It had been intended to hoist his flag when that of the Governor-General was hauled down yesterday morning following his departure from Quebec but it was found that we had no President’s flag on hand and that one would have to send up from Washington.
The President attended two separate conferences this forenoon. The first one, at 11:00 a.m., was with Prime Minister Churchill and Mr. Richard Law, the British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The second, at 11:30 a.m., was with the Prime Minister, Secretary Morgenthau and Mr. H. D. White, an Assistant [to the] Secretary of the Treasury.
The President lunched at the Citadel at 1:00 p.m. with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. White, Mr. Law and Commander Thompson.
During the afternoon Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill visited the Canadian Women’s Army Corps barracks at Quebec.
The Right Honorable Sir Anthony Eden, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Quebec from London this afternoon. The Honorable Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and British Representative at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, arrived in Quebec from Washington this afternoon. Both Mr. Eden and Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan came for conference discussions.
The President, Mrs. Roosevelt, Miss Tully, Mrs. Brady and Miss Thompson had tea in his quarters at 4:45 p.m. Mrs. Roosevelt and Miss Thompson left Quebec, by train, for Hyde Park after the tea.
At 5:30 p.m., the President met with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau and Lord Cherwell for discussions.
Dinner at the Citadel was at 8:00 p.m., with the President, Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Law, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Cadogan attending. After dinner a motion picture, Hail the Conquering Hero, was shown at the Citadel for the party.
The President retired immediately after the movies.
Führer HQ (September 15, 1944)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Am Albert- und Maas-Schelde-Kanal wurden feindliche Brückenköpfe» durch erfolgreiche Gegenangriffe unserer Truppen weiter eingeengt. Zwischen Maastricht und Aachen setzten die Nordamerikaner ihren von’ starken Panzerkräften unterstützten Großangriff fort; Maastricht ging verloren. Südlich und südöstlich Aachen gelangen dem Gegner Einbrüche in Vorfeldstellungen der Westbefestigungen. Die schweren Kämpfe, bei denen am gestrigen Tage 40 feindliche Panzer abgeschossen wurden, dauern mit unverminderter Heftigkeit an. Auch im Raum von Nancy und vor der Burgundischen Pforte wird weiterhin erbittert gekämpft.
Von den befestigten Häfen und Stützpunkten an der Kanal- und Atlantikküste werden auch gestern schwere, aber erfolgreiche Abwehrkämpfe gemeldet. Vor dem brennenden Brest, vor Boulogne und am Kap Gris Nez erlitten die Angreifer besonders hohe Verluste.
Seit mehreren Tagen liegen die Hafenstädte an der englischen Südostküste im schweren Feuer deutscher Fernkampfbatterien.
Sicherungsfahrzeuge eines deutschen Geleits versenkten nördlich der westfriesischen Insel Texel ein britisches Schnellboot.
In Italien setzte der Gegner im Adria-Abschnitt seine Versuche fort, unsere Stellungen am Apennin noch vor Eintritt der Schlechtwetterperiode zu durchbrechen. Unter rücksichtslosem Einsatz von starken Infanterie- und Panzerkräften rannte er bis in die späten Abendstunden gegen unsere Abwehrfront an. Im Verlauf der harten Kämpfe konnte der Gegner bis auf einen Einbruch bei Coriano nur geringen Geländegewinn erzielen. Auch nördlich Florenz scheiterten alle von starker Artillerie unterstützten Angriffe, örtliche Einbrüche wurden in sofortigem Gegenstoß bereinigt.
Im südlichen Siebenbürgen und im Nordteil des Szekler Zipfels wurden zahlreiche sowjetische Angriffe zerschlagen.
Bei Sanok und Krosno scheiterten erneute Anstrengungen der Bolschewisten, unsere Front zu durchbrechen. Eine Einbruchslücke wurde im Gegenangriff geschlossen.
An der Weichsel nördlich Sandomierz beseitigten Grenadiere und Pioniere, unterstützt von Heeressturmartillerie und Werfern, in mehrtägigen harten Angriffskämpfen einen feindlichen Brückenkopf und vernichteten die Masse von zwei verstärkten sowjetischen Schützendivisionen. Zahlreiche Gefangene wurden eingebracht und 161 Geschütze sowie zahlreiche sonstige Waffen erbeutet.
Im Kampfraum von Warschau ging Praga nach harten Häuserkämpfen verloren. Nordöstlich der Stadt wurden heftige feindliche Angriffe abgewiesen. Nordwestlich Lomscha setzten sich unsere Truppen nach schweren Kämpfen auf das Nordufer des Narew ab.
Im Nordabschnitt der Ostfront traten die Bolschewisten mit über 40 Schützendivisionen und zahlreichen Panzer- und Schlachtfliegerverbänden auf breiter Front zum erwarteten Großangriff an. Trotz des überlegenen feindlichen Einsatzes an Menschen und Material vereitelten unsere Truppen in harten Kämpfen, von der Luftwaffe hervorragend unterstützt, alle Durchbruchsversuche der Sowjets. Einbrüche wurden in sofortigen Gegenangriffen aufgefangen und abgeriegelt.
Deutsche Kampf- und Schlachtfliegerkräfte bekämpften bei Tag und Nacht mit gutem Erfolg sowjetische Marschkolonnen und Verkehrsziele an der Ostfront. Sie zerstörten vor allem im Kampfgebiet der. Karpaten und bei Modohn zahlreiche Panzer und Geschütze und über 100 motorisierte Fahrzeuge des Feindes. In heftigen Luftkämpfen und durch Flakartillerie der Luftwaffe wurden am gestrigen Tag 99 sowjetische Flugzeuge abgeschossen.
An der Kandalakschafront wehrten unsere Nachtruppen auch gestern wieder mehrere sowjetische Angriffe ab.
Bei dem Einsatz mit Kampfmitteln der Kriegsmarine hat sich der Leutnant der Marineverwaltung Vetter als Führer einer Sprengbootgruppe besonders ausgezeichnet.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (September 15, 1944)
Communiqué No. 160
Allied troops in northeastern BELGIUM have reached the line of the LEOPOLD Canal north of MALDEGEM. Mopping-up continues in the area south of our bridgehead over the ESCAUT Canal.
Further south, Allied troops have taken several small towns inside GERMANY and are meeting increasing resistance from prepared enemy positions.
South of AACHEN, enemy resistance is strong. East of ST. VITH, we have pierced an outer section of the SIEGFRIED defenses on a six-mile front. Other units encountered extensive roadblocks and pillboxes but progress was maintained.
In the MOSELLE valley, strong enemy counterattacks against our bridgeheads were contained. Further advances have been made in the area south of NANCY, where Germans are putting up a stubborn defense with heavy mortar, small arms, machine gun and sporadic artillery fire.
The enemy garrison at BREST has rejected demands for surrender and fighting continues in the city where fires are burning and loud explosions have been heard. Enemy guns in the area were attacked yesterday by fighter-bombers. Scattered enemy fire was also encountered on the CROZON Peninsula, south of BREST, where strong points were attacked by medium and light bombers.
Fighters and fighter-bombers provided support for ground forces and attacked transportation in HOLLAND.
Strongpoints near BOULOGNE were targets for medium and light bombers.
U.S. Navy Department (September 15, 1944)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 117
U.S. Army and Marine assault troops established beachheads in the Palau Islands on September 14 (West Longitude Date) with the support of carrier aircraft and surface combat ships of the Third Fleet under the command of Adm. Halsey. Enemy defenses are being heavily bombed and shelled at close range.
Amphibious operations against the Palau Islands are being directed by VAdm. T. S. Wilkinson, USN, Commander Third Amphibious Force.
Expeditionary troops are commanded by Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith. USMC.
The landings are continuing against stiff ground opposition.
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 118
U.S. Marines are developing a beachhead in the southern portion of Peleliu Island in the Palau Islands, and are closing in upon the principal airport in the island group. The beachhead extends for approximately one and a half miles along the southwestern shore of Peleliu. Several enemy counterattacks, employing tanks, were thrown back during September 14 (West Longitude Date) by our ground forces assisted by strong air support and naval gunfire. Our casualties during the first day of the assault were light, although the landing beaches have been under sporadic mortar and artillery fire.
The landings on Peleliu Island were supported by carrier‑based aircraft which bombed, strafed, and launched rockets against enemy installations immediately behind the landing beaches on September 14. Gun emplacements and other defense installations on the northern end of the island were also heavily bombed. We lost one plane and four flight personnel in these attacks.
The fast carrier task force covering and supporting the landings by far ranging operations throughout the Western Pacific are commanded by VAdm. Marc A. Mitscher, USN.
The amphibious assault troops engaged are under the command of Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, USMC, Commander, Third Amphibious Corps.
The initial landings were made by the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William H. Rupertus, USMC The ships in direct support are commanded by RAdm. George H. Fort, USN.
Ventura search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four bombed Shumushu Island on September 12, setting buildings afire. Anti-aircraft fire was ineffective. Seven enemy fighters rose to intercept our force but did not press home the attack. During the night of September 13‑14, 11th Army Air Force Liberators bombed installations at Paramushiru. All returned undamaged to their base.
Three Liberators of the 7th Army Air Force bombed Iwo Jima on September 13, dropping 52 tons of bombs on the airfield and adjacent installations. Large explosions visible for many miles were observed. Enemy aircraft made no attempt at interception. All planes returned safely.
Pagan Island installations were bombed by Thunderbolts of the 7th Army Air Force on September 13. Moderate anti-aircraft fire was encountered. On the same day, fighter planes of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing hit gun positions on Rota, encountering meager anti-aircraft fire.
Corsairs and Dauntless dive bombers of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing made further neutralization raids on the Marshall Island Atolls of Mille, Jaluit, and Wotje on September 12 and 13.
Liberators of the 7th Army Air Force flew through moderate anti-aircraft fire to bomb Marcus Island on September 13.
U.S. State Department (September 15, 1944)
King-Cunningham meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Admiral Noble | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Captain Grantham | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Captain Hughes Hallett | |
| Captain Fife | ||
| Captain Stroop |
Minutes
September 15, 1944
Top secret
Naval facilities in Australia and forward areas
Admiral Cunningham asked if the U.S. Navy planned on evacuating their facilities at Brisbane and Sydney. If the United States Navy has moved out, he would like to make arrangements directly with the Australian Government to use evacuated facilities. It was particularly desirable to get repair facilities for fleet units and aviation facilities ashore for a fleet air arm. He pointed out that Australia would be used chiefly as a rear base and that the British Naval units would operate from more advanced bases depending upon the situation.
Admiral King stated that in general the U.S. Navy was moving out of Australia but that no “roll-up” plan had been received either from the Commander of the Seventh Fleet or the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area. Admiral King directed that Commander, Seventh Fleet, be ordered by dispatch to prepare a “roll-up” plan and forward it to the Navy Department. He wished, particularly, to know about the plans to roll up Sydney and Brisbane. Admiral King also said that he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff should inform the Commander, Southwest Pacific Area with regard to the situation and the tentative requirements for basing British Naval units in Australia.
The First Sea Lord requested that the U.S. Navy act as the Royal Navy’s “agent” with the U.S. Army Air Force to have certain aviation facilities no longer required by them made available to the Naval Air Arm of the Royal Navy, where such facilities could be usefully employed.
Admiral King pointed out that Espíritu Santo was highly developed as a U.S. base and was probably the most forward location for the British Fleet to use as a rear base. He outlined the future Pacific plans and said that no other forward base could be made readily available.
The First Sea Lord said he wanted a good rear base (probably Sydney) and that all the British Navy would require in the forward area was a suitable anchorage. The Fleet would exist on their train and supply ships.
Admiral King suggested that Majuro, which had a large anchorage, might also be useful to the British Fleet.
The First Sea Lord asked if any U.S. naval landing craft bases were available in Australia.
Captain Fife pointed out that Milne Bay and Buna Roads had been used as our chief bases for landing craft until after the Manus landing. He stated that Brisbane had also been used as a rear base for landing craft during the early part of the New Guinea campaign.
Admiral King said that steps were being taken to clear a deep draft channel through Torres Strait. A new survey was being made and it was expected that a better and shorter channel which could accommodate a battleship would soon be available.
The First Sea Lord said that he thought the discussion up to this point would serve as a basis for detailed plans to be agreed upon by the Washington Planners.
Use of Avenger aircraft on British carriers
The First Sea Lord stated that the British Navy had found the Barracuda inadequate for carrier operations and that it was highly desirable to have additional Avengers allocated for use on British carriers.
Admiral King said that the production of Avengers was short of requirements and would continue to be so, that the details of the allocation of U.S. Navy-produced aircraft were arranged by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), and that he, Admiral King, would make sure that the question of additional Avengers for the British Navy would be taken under the most careful consideration, particularly, in view of the British Fleet participation in Pacific operations. He was not, however, optimistic with regard to availability of additional Avengers for at least another six months.
Release of LSTs from “OVERLORD”
The First Sea Lord said that they were having difficulty getting SHAEF to release landing craft for transfer to other theaters and it was desirable to have some released soon for use in the Burma operations.
Admiral King said that this was a matter he wanted settled too, and directed that the situation be followed up with regard to release of landing craft and that Admiral Stark should be informed of the requirements of other theaters so that he can obtain releases as quickly as feasible.
Admiral Cooke said that he believed SHAEF had a certain amount of “velvet” and suggested that it would be well for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to put pressure upon SHAEF to get landing craft released.
Admiral King suggested that Admiral Ramsay might also be responsible for holding landing craft in OVERLORD, but The First Sea Lord did not concur in this.
Admiral King and The First Sea Lord then directed the Combined Planning Staff to prepare a draft dispatch for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF on release of landing craft for transfer to other theaters.
Captain Hughes Hallett pointed out that landing craft were originally made available in the theater for combatant operations only and were not to be kept as a convenience for incidental shipment of supplies after the assault and combatant phases were over.
Escort carriers
The First Sea Lord said that the British Navy had received the U.S. Navy’s request for transfer of excess escort carriers for use in connection with ferrying aircraft. He said that all of the British escort carriers would be in use constantly until at least the summer of 1945.
Admiral King said that the U.S. Navy would be glad to get CVEs whenever they could get them.
The First Sea Lord said that he would definitely try to get some released but held out small hopes. However, he would make a particular note of this point.
Mosquito aircraft on carriers – highball
This matter was discussed previously by The First Sea Lord and Admiral King. Motion pictures of this are to be sent from London to be available to the Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
Bonaventure and “X” Craft
The First Sea Lord described in general the use of Bonaventure and “X” Craft. He said that they were available and had been offered for use in the Pacific Theater if it was thought they could be used.
Admiral King said that he thought Bonaventure and the “X” Craft might be of some use and suggested that they be moved to the Pacific Theater with the balanced British Fleet.
The First Sea Lord said that Bonaventure and the “X” Craft would be moved out to the Eastern Fleet, probably to an Australian port first, where they would await an opportunity to be used from a forward base.
Zones of occupation
It was pointed out that this matter required settlement on a higher level and it was probable that a decision might be reached soon.
The First Sea Lord said he had taken exception to the scheme which proposed a German Disarmament Commission which consisted of three generals. He said he believed there should be a committee of nine: 3 generals, 3 admirals, and 3 air officers, each responsible in his own zone for disarmament but who would act as a central committee to decide general questions.
Admiral King said that the U.S. Navy would take over such ports as they were using, providing a Port Director and staff. However, he did not want any elaborate organization set up.
With regard to minesweeping, The First Sea Lord said that he expected the Germans would be required to sweep their own mines. He considered this a part of the disarmament of Germany.
Both Admiral King and The First Sea Lord agreed that further investigation is needed of the desirability of having separate organizations for naval disarmament and control of bases and ports but that this may be a logical solution. Both agreed that if the British are to control northwest Germany, the British will invite the U.S. Navy to participate in naval disarmament in this zone.
Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 15, 1944, 10 a.m.
Top secret
Approval of the minutes of the 174th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend an alteration to the conclusion of Item 5 of the minutes. It was suggested that this should read:
Agreed to recommend that for planning production and for allocation of manpower the date for the end of the war against Japan…
Sir Alan Brooke said that this proposal was entirely acceptable.
Continuing, Admiral Leahy said there was one other alteration which should be made in the final sentence to General Arnold’s statement in Item 6. The number of B-29s which had been diverted to tankers should read 20 and not 40.
Sir Charles Portal said that on page 7 of the minutes his statement, as to the date on which the ground echelons for the aircraft from Europe for use in the war against Japan would have to be taken out, should read “by” December and not “in” December.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to amend the conclusion to Item 5 of CCS 174th Meeting to read as follows:
Agreed to recommend that the date for the end of the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.
b. Approved the conclusions of the 174th Meeting as amended above. The detailed record of the meeting was approved subject to the amendments agreed during discussion and to later minor amendments.
Final report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 680)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed and accepted certain amendments to the report.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as amended in discussion (Subsequently circulated as CCS 680/1).
Communication of the results of “OCTAGON” (CCS 681; 681/1)
Admiral Leahy suggested the insertion in the draft letter to Marshal Stalin in CCS 681 of a final paragraph (paragraph 6) to read: “Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific Theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.”
Sir Alan Brooke accepted this amendment.
With reference to the two draft messages to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in CCS 681/1, Sir Alan Brooke said that on balance he preferred the shorter draft in Enclosure “B.”
Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had certain deletions to suggest to the longer draft in Enclosure “A” which he would like to put forward.
Admiral Leahy read out these suggestions.
Sir Alan Brooke said that these amendments were acceptable.
Continuing, Admiral Leahy proposed that a new sentence should be added to the draft in Enclosure “A” to read as follows: “We have agreed on future operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, including the opening of a seaway into China.”
Sir Alan Brooke said that this amendment was acceptable.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Subject to the amendments agreed in discussion, approved draft messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek reporting the results of the OCTAGON Conference. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 681/2.)
Redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe (CCS 679)
Sir Alan Brooke said that the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff contained in CCS 679 was acceptable. He would like the words “the combined shipping authorities” inserted after the words “Combined Military Transportation Committee” in paragraph 3.
Admiral Leahy accepted this amendment.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 679 subject to insertion in the third line of paragraph 3 of the words “combined shipping authorities” after the word “Committee.”
Combined personnel movement problem arising the first year after the defeat of Germany (CCS 675/2)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by Lord Leathers and General Somervell indicating the magnitude of the combined shipping movements which might be required during the first year after the defeat of Germany.
Sir Alan Brooke said that Lord Leathers had explained to him that the paper was designed merely to show the magnitude of the problem rather than to give entirely accurate figures.
General Somervell confirmed that this was the case.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of CCS 675/2.
Operation “HIGHBALL” (CCS 682)
Sir Charles Portal and Sir Andrew Cunningham gave a description of Operation HIGHBALL. They undertook to send the United States a film on this operation.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note:
a. That Operation HIGHBALL would be available in the Eastern Theater at the end of November 1944.
b. That the British Chiefs of Staff would send an informational film and technical data to the United States Chiefs of Staff.
Release to the press of information on “MULBERRY” (Scaf 79)
Sir Alan Brooke said that it had been suggested that information with regard to MULBERRY should be released to the press. General Eisenhower was not, however, prepared to make such a release unless he was instructed to do so by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral King said that base facilities in the Pacific were limited and it might well be that MULBERRY would be required in that theater, in which case it would be obviously disadvantageous if the Japanese were informed as to their potentialities.
Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed with Admiral King that if there was any chance of using them in the Pacific it was far wiser to release nothing to the press on MULBERRY for the present.
Sir Alan Brooke said that in view of the potentialities of MULBERRY for the war against Japan he agreed that security on these should be retained.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that security implications affecting other theaters precluded the release of information on MULBERRY.
Possible statement to be made to the press by the President and Prime Minister
General Marshall suggested that there might be advantages in a statement being made, possibly by the President and Prime Minister, to the effect that the only difficulty encountered at the Conference was the problem of providing employment for all the Allied forces who were eager to participate in the war against Japan. The difficulty had arisen as a result of the keenness of the competition to employ the maximum possible forces for the defeat of Japan. This was a fact and issued to the press should help to undermine Japanese morale.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that General Ismay would prepare a suitable statement for consideration.
Progress of the campaign in the Pacific
Admiral King outlined the extremely successful operations recently undertaken by Admiral Halsey’s Task Force 38 and the Fifth Air Force against the Japanese in the Leyte area, where some 500 Japanese aircraft had been destroyed. In view of the success of these operations it had been decided, after consultation with Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, to advance the date of subsequently planned operations by about two months.
General Marshall said that he felt that the success of recent operations, particularly against the Japanese air, and the decision to advance the dates for future operations would have a decisive effect on what the Japanese could do in Burma.
General Arnold pointed out that the Japanese Air Force was no longer fighting with the will to win. The pilots lacked determination and even in the Philippines it seemed that the Japanese Air Force had neither the will nor the wherewithal to act offensively.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of Admiral King’s remarks on the progress of the campaign in the Pacific.
Hour of next meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed tentatively to meet at 1000 on Saturday, 16 September.
Memorandum by the British CS
Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 684
“RANKIN” planning in the Mediterranean Theater
We have noted the request from General Wilson in his telegram (Medcos 181) for a firm directive on his responsibilities for RANKIN in the Mediterranean.
We ask that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to the immediate dispatch of the enclosed message to General Wilson.
Enclosure
CCS to SACMED
Top secret
Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.
Reference Medcos 153 and 181.
Your planning for RANKIN in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations should proceed on the following basis.
Areas of occupation
You should plan to seize immediate control of countries in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations as follows:
a) Austria with four divisions and small tactical air force. Instructions have already been issued in Fan 410 and Fan 411.
b) Greece with approximately a division of British troops and small air forces. Instructions have already been issued in Fan 409.
c) The Dodecanese with approximately 2,400 men.
d) Venezia Giulia with approximately one division.
It is not intended that you should station forces in Yugoslavia or Albania beyond guards which may be required in connection with distribution of supplies. No immediate action by you will be required in Hungary or Romania.
It is not the present intention to send any British troops to Bulgaria.
It is intended in due course to offer British naval assistance in the administration of the Danube and in particular in the clearance of mines. On no account however will any British naval forces enter the Danube except after prior agreement with the Russians.
Availability of forces
In estimating what forces are available for the above operations, you should bear the following considerations in mind:
a) As stated in Cosmed 127, United States forces will be withdrawn as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.
b) It will probably be the policy to withdraw Dominion forces as early as possible after the defeat of Germany for repatriation at an early date. Pending repatriation they should not be employed on occupational duties in Austria, Greece or Dodecanese or for internal security duties in Middle East until after discussion with Dominion Governments, which is being initiated forthwith.
c) The four British Indian divisions in your command will be withdrawn as early as possible and should not be used for RANKIN operations.
d) French and Italian divisions will not be used.
e) The internal security commitment in the Middle East after the defeat of Germany will require three divisions from forces at present in the Mediterranean and Middle East.
After making allowance for the above considerations, we calculate that you should have sufficient forces to meet the commitments in paragraph 2 above and still retain a small reserve for contingencies.
All the above applies to RANKIN only, i.e., the immediate seizure of control in enemy and enemy occupied territories. Direction upon the final occupation of Europe after the establishment of control will be issued later.
The Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union to the Commanding General, Strategic Air Forces in Europe
Moscow, 15 September 1944
Top secret
Priority
MX 20970. To USSTAF for General Spaatz information copies to AGWar for General Arnold and Escom for General Walsh from Deane. Copy sent direct to Walsh.
Soviet Government informed British Government that they were prepared to cooperate with British and Americans in organizing aid to Warsaw provided this aid is rendered in accordance with a prearranged plan.
General Marshall has directed me and the President has directed Mr. Harriman to assist in working out a plan with the Russians and British. Burrows and I informed the Red Army General Staff that we wish to meet with them at once to work out a plan in which all three countries participate. So far there has been no Soviet reply. With the Red Army in Praga, the battle for Warsaw is reaching its critical and conclusive stages. In all probability American participation in relief of Polish insurgents will be limited to Frantic 7; however, both the Ambassador and I feel that it would be a great mistake to start reduction of Escom bases until the Warsaw situation has been clarified. It may develop that an additional American dropping mission will be a critical necessity and if so the facilities in Russia should remain available. The Ambassador feels that politically we would be in a most disadvantageous position if we had made additional missions impossible before the battle for Warsaw is decided or if we even gave the Russians the impression that we had abandoned the insurgents in Warsaw by initiating preparations to reduce Escom such as ordering trains.
In view of the above recommend that no firm date be set at this time for Escom reduction.
Prime Minister Churchill’s Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff
Quebec, 15 September, 1944
Admiral Leahy, I send you herewith a draft which I suggest we might send to the President and Prime Minister on the idea that General Marshall put forward at the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting this morning.
Will you let me know if you approve and I will send a copy to the Prime Minister at once: but naturally I should be grateful for any amendments or improvements that you think necessary.
H. L. ISMAY
[Enclosure]
Draft minute to the President and Prime Minister
Quebec, 15.9.44
The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire to place on record that the main difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for the deployment against Japan of the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy. In colloquial language, it was a case of “standing room only,” even before the curtain rang up on the Conference.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have not included any recommendation on this subject in their Final Report, but they submit that it would have an excellent effect on world opinion in general, and a correspondingly depressing effect on Japan, if the above ideas, clothed in your own language, were included in a communiqué about the Conference (if one is issued), and, also, at the Press Conference which will be held on its conclusion.
Memorandum by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces and the British Minister of War Transport
Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 675/2
Memorandum by the U.S. transportation, British movement, and combined shipping authorities
The attached Appendix “A” indicates the magnitude of the combined personnel movements which may be required during the first year after the defeat of Germany (assumed at 1 Oct. 1944) on the basis of tentative redeployment plans.
The attached Appendix “B” indicates the probable combined resources estimated to be available during the period under consideration.
Owing to changes in plans under way and in prospect a precise analysis of this problem cannot be made until the entire matter has been studied by combined agencies based on decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on strategy and priorities.
It is therefore recommended that the Combined Administrative Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Staff Planners, the Combined Military Transportation Committee, and the combined shipping authorities, study and report on this problem in the light of decisions to be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Appendix “A”
Analysis of the combined personnel movement problem
Subsequent to a 1 October defeat of Germany and for 1 year thereafter
| British | U.S. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Operational Requirements | ||
| a. Replacements (reinforcements) for forces already engaged in the war against Japan on 1 October. | — | 693,000 | |
| b. Buildup from U.S. for war against Japan. | — | 826,000 | |
| c. Redeployment for war against Japan. | 1,052,000 | 804,000 | |
| d. Additional replacements (reinforcements) to support increased strength due to b and/or c. | 385,000 | 213,000 | |
| e. Replacements or readjustments in garrisons, of non-operational areas. | 265,000 | 10,000 | |
| f. Rotational programs for forces engaged in the war against Japan. | 150,000 | 280,000 | |
| g. Intra-Area movement accomplished by retained ships. | 250,000 | 768,000 | |
| Subtotal | 2,102,000 | 3,594,000 | |
| 2. | Demobilization and Repatriation Without Replacement | ||
| a. British and U.S. Forces. | 678,000 | 1,720,000 | |
| b. Dominion, Colonial and other personnel. | 251,000 | 28,000 | |
| Subtotal | 929,000 | 1,748,000 | |
| 3. | Prisoners of War | ||
| a. Allied prisoners of war. | 53,000 | 102,000 | |
| b. Enemy prisoners of war. | 466,000 | 243,000 | |
| Subtotal | 519,000 | 345,000 | |
| 4. | TOTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SERVICES | 3,550,000 | 5,687,000 |
Appendix “B”
Total availability of personnel shipping by categories (as of 1 Oct 1944)
| British | U.S. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Categories | No. of Ships | Capacity | No. of Ships | Capacity |
| 1. Ocean Going | 84 | 302,000 | 220 | 492,000 |
| 2. Limited Capability | ||||
| (a) Indian Ocean type | 31 | 48,000 | — | — |
| (b) Miscellaneous | 6 | 6,000 | 45 | 35,000 |
| Subtotal | 37 | 54,000 | 45 | 35,000 |
| TOTAL TROOPSHIP LIFT | 121 | 356,000 | 265 | 527,000 |
| NOTES: | British | U.S. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Estimated lift on 1 October 1945, after allowing for additions and losses based on current CCS rates | 376,000 | 708,000 | |||
| 2. Additional trooplift may be realized by use of cargo ships temporarily fitted to carry a few hundred troops each. | |||||
| 3. An indeterminable lift may be obtained from captured enemy vessels. | |||||
| 4. Lift of LSIs and APAs is not included in above inventories but advantage will be taken of their lift whenever operational schedules permit. | |||||
| 5. Lift in U.S. Navy vessels as estimated and included in the above table for normal troop movement is subject to wide variation dependent upon possible utilization of Navy troopships for operational requirements. | |||||
| 6. No British cross-Channel type of shipping is included nor has any allowance been made for possible conversions for the naval fleet train or hospital ships. |
Note by the Secretaries of CCS
Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 681/1 (OCTAGON)
Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of “OCTAGON”
The two enclosed draft messages, differing in the degree of detail included, are circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat
Enclosure “A”
Top secret
Draft message from the President and the Prime Minister to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.
My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by General Stilwell, a decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible, it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.
Top secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and resources against Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in Southeast Asia.
-
First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To this end we have devised courses of action and are taking vigorous steps to expedite the redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of Germany.
-
Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral Mountbatten in North Burma to provide additional security for intermediate air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. The detailed operations will involve overland and airborne advances by the British from Imphal to seize Kalewa, thence the Yeu-Monywa area with exploitation toward Mandalay. At the same time, the Chinese, British and American forces now in the Myitkyina area will push on to Indaw-Katha-Bhamo, thence toward Mongmit-Mogok. Concurrently, your Chinese armies now engaged west of the Salween should drive vigorously toward Hsenwi and Lashio. All these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, and by adequate air supply. Small-scale amphibious operations on the Arakan coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Ledo Road with accompanying pipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your forces.
-
Third: Without prejudice to the North Burma operations to protect the air ferry line and establish overland communications, Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to continue planning and preparations for a large scale amphibious and airborne operation in South Burma to be undertaken as soon as developments in the European Theater will allow the necessary resources to be made available.
Enclosure “B”
Draft message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang
September 1944
Top secret
From Naval Aide to the President.
My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by Aettsna, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible, it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.
Top Secret and Personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We have just concluded a short conference at Quebec and hasten to inform you of the broad conclusions we have reached.
We have agreed that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible moment, and that to achieve this ultimately we may well have to invade Japan itself.
We have agreed that in the west our object should be the recapture of Burma at the earliest date. We attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of operations in Upper Burma in order to secure the air supply route, including the air staging posts at Myitkyina, and to open overland communications with you. It is therefore intended to pursue with the utmost vigor the present operations in Upper Burma. Reinforcements, including airborne forces, are being dispatched.
In addition, we are planning a major amphibious operation to take place in the Bay of Bengal next year. The date when it can be carried out will depend on the time when we find it possible to release the necessary resources from the European Theater.