Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshall Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Major General Lay cock | |
| Rear Admiral Bieri | Captain Lambe | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Brigadier Sugden | |
| Major General Sutherland | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Major General Handy | Brigadier McNair | |
| Major General Fairchild | Colonel Cornwall-Jones | |
| Brigadier General Hansell | ||
| Colonel Roberts | ||
| Captain Freseman | ||
| Commander Long | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman | |
| Colonel McFarland | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 6, 1943
Secret
Approval of conclusions of CCS 135th and 136th meetings
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 135th and 136th CCS meetings and also the minutes of the 4th Plenary Session held at the Kirk Villa. The detailed records of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia Command alternative to BUCCANEER (CCS 427)
Admiral Leahy suggested that the report by the Combined Staff Planners (CCS 427) should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the Appendix would require revision in the light of the decisions taken.
Admiral Leahy agreed with this view.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 427.
b. Agreed that the forces to be left in the Indian Ocean or to be withdrawn for the European Theater should be decided later.
Control of Strategic Air Forces in NW Europe and in the Mediterranean (CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2)
At the request of General Arnold, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2 until their meeting on Tuesday, 7 December.
Overall plan for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417 and 417/1)
Admiral Leahy said that he felt no final decision could be taken on these papers pending decisions on operations to be undertaken in Burma and the Bay of Bengal.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it would assist the Combined Staff Planners in their further studies if the overall plan for the defeat of Japan could be accepted in principle as a basis for further work.
General Marshall said that he considered that in their further study, the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to prepare a plan of campaign for the China Theater proper, together with an estimate of forces required. He did not agree with the amendment suggested in paragraph 4 of the Enclosure to CCS 417/1 and preferred the original wording of paragraph 14 of CCS 417.
Sir Andrew Cunningham asked if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were prepared to approve the general concept that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.
Admiral King said that he agreed with this concept in principle.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved in principle CCS 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a plan of campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.
Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944 (CCS 397 (Revised))
Admiral King said that he considered that this paper should be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff less any references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944 set out in CCS 397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.
Operations in the Southeast Asia Command (CCS 427)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard to decisions covering operations in the Southeast Asia Command, as follows:
a. Delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD.
b. Make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,
c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the airlift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29s to be brought to bear on the enemy.
d. The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.
Draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426). Certain additions and amendments were considered and agreed.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 426/1).
Relation of resources to plans
It was pointed out that though no final decision could be taken on operations in Burma pending replies to the messages sent to the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation with the shipping authorities, might well proceed with their examination of the extent to which the resources of the United Nations would meet the requirements in the light of decisions already taken. In this examination they should take into account the fact that the amphibious resources previously allocated to BUCCANEER would now be available for operations in Europe.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to instruct the Combined Staff Planners to proceed as proposed above.
Messages to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo
General Marshall read out draft messages which he had prepared which might be sent by the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo. General Marshall undertook to circulate copies of these messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Future business
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet on Tuesday, 7 December 1943, and to include on their agenda the discussion of the Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean, and Facilities for U.S. Forces in the Azores.