Editorial: ‘Inexcusable’
…
I DARE SAY —
Something NOT for the boys, maybe, is Moss Hart’s Winged Victory
By Florence Fisher Parry
…
Landis refuses to change ruling on Phils’ prexy
Judge announces after six-hour open hearing that ban on Cox will stand
…
Völkischer Beobachter (December 6, 1943)
Tokios Antwort auf Kairo –
Japan versetzt der USA.-Flotte neue schwere Schläge
3 Flugzeugträger, 1 Schlachtschiff, 1 Kreuzer versenkt
…
Der ‚psychologische Hammerschlag‘ ging daneben –
Europa erkennt den großen jüdischen Bluff
Wien, 5. Dezember –
Das große Bluffschaustück, das uns der Feind in Ägypten und Iran vor zuführen gedachte, ist zu einer lächerlichen Komödie geworden. Die Akteure haben sich bei dem „psychologischen Hammerschlag auf die deutsche Kriegsmoral“ auf die eigenen Finger gehauen. Erst mehrere Tage nach Beendigung der Konferenz in dem von den Sowjets besetzten Iran erhielt die Welt aus dem alliierten Lager überhaupt erst Kunde davon, daß diese Konferenz statt gefunden hat. Dabei gab Reuter nicht einmal eine eigene Meldung, sondern übernahm wortwörtlich die deutsche Meldung.
Auch- über die Nennung des Tagungsortes bestand im Feindlager keine Einigkeit. Während Reuters Täbris nannte, meldete der Sender Moskau Teheran. Aus den USA verlautete überhaupt nichts darüber. Dort hüllt man sich in Schweigen und ist sehr böse darüber, daß die englischen und sowjetischen Meldungen Roosevelt das Konzept verdorben haben. Von Roosevelt stammt nämlich die Idee, die Welt mit einer Bluffsensation zu überraschen. Er wollte die große Propaganda-bombe gegen Deutschland plötzlich in die Luft gehen lassen und muß nun voller Wut feststellen, daß die Bombe vorzeitig zerplatzt ist.
Die ganze „psychologische Wirkung,“ auf die es die jüdischen Agitationsstrategen Roosevelts angelegt hatten, ist verpufft. Es ist daher nicht mehr als ein Rückzugsgefecht, wenn Reuters aus Washington meldet, die Meldung des Moskauer Rundfunks über den Abschluß der Besprechungen in Teheran habe die Erwartungen in Washington noch erhöht, daß „große psychologische Schläge gegen Deutschland bevorstehen, um den Krieg in Europa zu beenden.“
Roosevelts Agitationschef Elmer Davis bleibt nun nichts weiter übrig, als in London und Moskau Beschwerde einzulegen, weil man dort in der Nachrichtengebung entgegen dem Plan des Weißen Hauses vorgeprellt ist. Die Engländer haben einen gehörigen Rüffel einstecken müssen, mit den Sowjets geht Elmer Davis natürlich wesentlich sanfter um. Er gibt nur zu verstehen, daß die frühzeitige Nachrichtenübermittlung des Moskauer Rundfunks zur Konferenz in Iran „für die amerikanischen Informationsstellen wie ein Blitz aus heiterem Himmel“ kam.
Weit wichtiger als dieser Nachrichten krieg am Rande der großen Bluffaktion ist der Satz in der Moskauer Meldung, daß das Konferenzkommuniqué „noch heraus gegeben werde.“ Das ist immerhin kennzeichnend. Denn wenn man sich einige Tage nach Konferenzschluß noch nicht auf die Formel geeinigt hat, läßt das eindeutig darauf schließen, daß es mit der vielgerühmten „Einigkeit der Alliierten“ nicht weit her ist. Offenbar sucht man nach einem möglichst guten Abgang von der Bühne, nachdem man erkannt hat, daß mit Bluffmätzchen die deutsche Moral nicht erschüttert werden kann. Vermutlich sollten die Terrorangriffe, die die britische und nordamerikanische Luftwaffe gegen deutsche Städte unternahm, eine Probe aufs Exempel sein. Das Ergebnis muß aber wohl ebenfalls höchst unbefriedigend gewesen sein, nachdem man hat feststellen müssen, daß die deutsche Moral nach wie vor ausgezeichnet ist, und daß das deutsche Volk weder durch Drohungen noch durch Terrorakte mürbe gemacht werden kann.
Die reichlich abgegriffenen Drohungen, wie etwa die der News Chronicle, daß das deutsche Volk „auf jeden Fall unter drückt und ganz kurz gehalten werden müsse“ und die Schreckensmär der New York Herald Tribune, daß man im Washingtoner Kongreß und sonstigen politischen Kreisen annehme, Roosevelt, Churchill und Stalin arbeiteten an dem „Kapitulation- oder Todesultimatum“ an Deutschland, verfehlen so völlig ihre Wirkung, um so mehr, wenn New York Herald Tribune mit der grotesk wirken den Behauptung operiert, daß „Italien glücklicher nach der bedingungslosen Kapitulation” sei.
Neuer Druck auf die Türkei
Wenn jetzt davon die Rede ist, daß Roosevelt auf der Heimreise den türkischen Außenminister Menemencioglu sprechen werde, dann zeigt das, daß der USA.-Präsident auch kein besseres Rezept weiß, den europäischen Krieg zu beenden, als daß die Türken in den Krieg hineingezerrt werden sollen. Eine solche Aussprache Roosevelts mit Menemencioglu wäre weiter ein Beweis dafür, daß der Feind die Schwäche seiner Mittelmeeropposition erkannt hat und keine Möglichkeit sieht, die Südostflanke Europas aufzureißen. Die Türkei wird sich also nach den Konferenzen von Kairo und Teheran einem neuen Druck der Kriegsbrandstifter ausgesetzt sehen, der darauf berechnet ist, das türkische Volk aus seiner strikten Neutralität herauszudrängen.
Schlußstrich für die kleinen Staaten
Die Ansicht griechischer Kreise über die Konferenz von Teheran faßt die Saloniker Zeitung Nea Evropi dahin zusammen, daß Teheran den Schlußstrich unter die Auslieferung der kleinen Staaten, insbesondere aber der Emigrantenkomitees an den Bolschewismus setze. Bezüglich des ehemaligen griechischen Königs habe Churchill ja bereits entsprechende Erklärungen abgegeben, als er im Unterhaus mitteilte, England sei beileibe keine Verpflichtungen hinsichtlich der Wiedereinsetzung des Königs nach dem Kriege eingegangen. Auch der ehemalige König des einstigen Jugoslawiens habe seine Befehle erhalten, indem man ihn aufgefordert habe, die Banden Mihailowitschs aufzulösen und sie dem Kommunistengeneral Tito unterzuordnen. England gebe damit endgültig die beiden Balkanstaaten auf, nachdem es sie mit seinen Versprechungen und Garantien in den Krieg hineingetrieben habe. Es sei offensichtlich, daß sich England den sowjetischen Wünsche völlig unterworfen habe.
Täuschung nicht möglich
Zu Teheran schreibt die Bukarester Viatza: Eines sei gewiß: ganz Europa denke mit Entsetzen an seine geplante Bolschewisierung, so umgänglich und demokratisch man die Bolschewisten auch immer darstellen möge. Schließlich könnten auch die Erklärungen, die kürzlich in den USA und in England, abgegeben worden seien – das Blatt beruft sich dabei auf die Erklärungen von Smuts und Berle – die Befürchtungen über die aggressiven Absichten der Sowjets gegen ihre Nachbarländer und selbst gegen die Exilregierungen nur verstärken.
‚Ein Gang nach Kanossa‘
Die Konferenz von Teheran war für Churchill und Roosevelt ein Gang nach Kanossa, schreibt die in Pamplona erscheinende. Zeitung Diario de Navarra zu der Konferenz von Teheran. Stalin habe mit satanischer Bosheit darauf bestanden, daß die Konferenz nicht außerhalb seines Machtbereichs stattfinde, und die beiden angelsächsischen Staatsmänner hätten wohl oder übel den Kanossagang antreten müssen, um den roten Zaren persönlich zu sprechen. Diese Nachgiebigkeit der plutokratisch und kapitalistisch regierten Länder aber beweise, welche Macht Stalin heute den Anglo-Amerikanern gegenüber bereits besitze. Es sei daher kaum abwegig anzunehmen, daß es auch Stalin gewesen sei, der Churchill und Roosevelt seine Pläne und Ziele einfach diktiert habe.
Fallschirmjäger an der süditalienischen Front –
Einzelkämpfer gegen Truppenmassen und Material
Von Kriegsberichter Hans Georg Schnitzer
…
Englands Gegenangebot –
Bombenterror nicht kriegsentscheidend
Von unserem skandinavischen Vertreter
k. a. Stockholm, 5. Dezember –
Der Außenpolitiker von Dagsposten Rüdver Essen, beschäftigt sich im Helsingborg Dagbladet mit der Frage, ob der englisch-amerikanische Bombenterror von kriegsentscheidender Bedeutung sei. Die Frage dürfte bei den jüngsten Besprechungen Churchills und Roosevelts mit Stalin von besonderer Bedeutung gewesen sein.
Rüdver Essen weist darauf hin, daß der These nie widersprochen worden ist, die Terrorangriffe auf Berlin seien durch Stalin auf der Moskauer Konferenz erzwungen worden. Der Bombenterror gegen die deutsche Reichshauptstadt sei wahrscheinlich ein britisches Gegenangebot auf die kategorische sowjetrussische Forderung gewesen, endlich die zweite Front im Westen zu errichten. Sollte Stalin bei den jetzigen Besprechungen die Auffassung nicht teilen, daß die Bombenangriffe auf deutsche Städte nicht entscheidend seien, dann werde es für die Westmächte immer schwieriger, diese ihre Fiktion aufrechtzuerhalten.
Die Hauptfrage sei, ob der angelsächsische Bombenterror eine Kriegsentscheidung herbeiführen könne. Die Antwort darauf sei, daß auch die schweren Angriffe auf Berlin in keiner Weise dieses Ziel als erreichbar. erscheinen ließen. Es sei zwar möglich, mit Massen von Spreng- und Brandbomben vielleicht Hunderttausende von Zivilpersonen zu töten und ihre Häuser zu zerstören, aber es sei sehr schwierig, wirklich kriegswichtige und -entscheidende Anlagen zu treffen. Das absolute Maximum an Wirkung, das der Terrorkrieg erreichen könne, sei die Räumung der deutschen Großstädte von der Zivilbevölkerung. Schließlich dürfe man die deutschen Vergeltungsdrohungen gegen die britischen Inseln ja nicht als Bluff betrachten.
Die Schlußfolgerung sei also die, daß man von dem englisch-amerikanischen Terrorkrieg aus der Luft keine Kriegsentscheidung erwarten könne. England, das mit diesem Terror als Mittel der Kriegführung als Ersatz für die unmöglich gemachte Hungerblockade als erster begonnen habe, sollte eigentlich am wenigsten von allen europäischen Ländern ein Interesse daran haben, diese Art der Kriegführung hervorzurufen. Aber was einmal geschehen sei, sei geschehen.
U.S. State Department (December 6, 1943)
740.0011 EW 1939/32218
The Soviet Ambassador to the Secretary of State
Washington, December 6, 1943
Confidential
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to ask you to transmit the following communication from Mr. V. M. Molotov to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins in answer to the latter’s telegram addressed to Mr. Molotov and handed to him by Mr. Hamilton on December 3, 1943.
Personal and secret to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins from V. M. Molotov
Just like you I cannot but express my satisfaction regarding our work together at the Tehran Conference and the possibility of continuation of this work in the future.
The meeting of Premier Stalin with President Roosevelt is of the greatest importance for drawing closer together the peoples of our countries in the interests of the cause of speeding up our common victory and post-war collaboration.
Best wishes.
Accept [etc.]
A. GROMYKO
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshall Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Major General Lay cock | |
| Rear Admiral Bieri | Captain Lambe | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Brigadier Sugden | |
| Major General Sutherland | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Major General Handy | Brigadier McNair | |
| Major General Fairchild | Colonel Cornwall-Jones | |
| Brigadier General Hansell | ||
| Colonel Roberts | ||
| Captain Freseman | ||
| Commander Long | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman | |
| Colonel McFarland | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 6, 1943
Secret
Approval of conclusions of CCS 135th and 136th meetings
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 135th and 136th CCS meetings and also the minutes of the 4th Plenary Session held at the Kirk Villa. The detailed records of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia Command alternative to BUCCANEER (CCS 427)
Admiral Leahy suggested that the report by the Combined Staff Planners (CCS 427) should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the Appendix would require revision in the light of the decisions taken.
Admiral Leahy agreed with this view.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 427.
b. Agreed that the forces to be left in the Indian Ocean or to be withdrawn for the European Theater should be decided later.
Control of Strategic Air Forces in NW Europe and in the Mediterranean (CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2)
At the request of General Arnold, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2 until their meeting on Tuesday, 7 December.
Overall plan for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417 and 417/1)
Admiral Leahy said that he felt no final decision could be taken on these papers pending decisions on operations to be undertaken in Burma and the Bay of Bengal.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it would assist the Combined Staff Planners in their further studies if the overall plan for the defeat of Japan could be accepted in principle as a basis for further work.
General Marshall said that he considered that in their further study, the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to prepare a plan of campaign for the China Theater proper, together with an estimate of forces required. He did not agree with the amendment suggested in paragraph 4 of the Enclosure to CCS 417/1 and preferred the original wording of paragraph 14 of CCS 417.
Sir Andrew Cunningham asked if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were prepared to approve the general concept that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.
Admiral King said that he agreed with this concept in principle.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved in principle CCS 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a plan of campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.
Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944 (CCS 397 (Revised))
Admiral King said that he considered that this paper should be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff less any references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944 set out in CCS 397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.
Operations in the Southeast Asia Command (CCS 427)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard to decisions covering operations in the Southeast Asia Command, as follows:
a. Delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD.
b. Make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,
c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the airlift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29s to be brought to bear on the enemy.
d. The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.
Draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426). Certain additions and amendments were considered and agreed.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 426/1).
Relation of resources to plans
It was pointed out that though no final decision could be taken on operations in Burma pending replies to the messages sent to the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation with the shipping authorities, might well proceed with their examination of the extent to which the resources of the United Nations would meet the requirements in the light of decisions already taken. In this examination they should take into account the fact that the amphibious resources previously allocated to BUCCANEER would now be available for operations in Europe.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to instruct the Combined Staff Planners to proceed as proposed above.
Messages to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo
General Marshall read out draft messages which he had prepared which might be sent by the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo. General Marshall undertook to circulate copies of these messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Future business
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet on Tuesday, 7 December 1943, and to include on their agenda the discussion of the Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean, and Facilities for U.S. Forces in the Azores.
The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
New Delhi, December 6, 1943
Secret
Seacos 38
Following for COS from Mountbatten
Your 051430 Dec. para 2 we have examined proposal very carefully and consider that no small amphibious operation can be carried out for the following reasons:
a. In view of enemy’s powers of concentration our seaborne air requirements will be the same whether the operation is large or small.
b. BUCCANEER was selected as objective for amphibious operation because it was the only worthwhile operation which could be carried out with the forces allotted.
c. There is no other objective which could be seized and held with the landing craft and assault shipping likely to be available under your para 1.
I am totally opposed to landing troops and withdrawing them since the psychological effect of such withdrawal is considerable and in this theater I regard this aspect as of the greatest importance.
Possibility remains of hit and run operations by carriers with a view to containing enemy air and possibly surface forces. This may reduce pressure on the SW Pacific and is being examined. Least force which would be necessary for operation of this type is Fleet carriers 2, Unicorn 1, Escorts 3.
The utility of extending inshore operations on the Arakan coast is being examined but they cannot be represented as amphibious operations or be considered to be of great significance. Such operations in order to be in any degree effective would require 12 LCI (L), 15 LCT (5), 6 LCS (M), 3 LCA Flotillas, 2 LCM Flotillas, 1 LCP Flotilla. Some of these forces might however be more profitably employed in some other theater other than SEAC.
Cancellation of BUCCANEER must inevitably lead to collapse of TARZAN since Generalissimo has only agreed to reduction in “hump” tonnage and cooperation on [of] Yunnan force if amphibious operation is staged at the same time. I have carried out a rapid examination of what could be done in the light of these circumstances and assuming that we could get the additional 25 first line transport aircraft promised by General Arnold in China a rough forecast is as follows:
a. That TARZAN in its original form will not be possible. In particular there will not be enough transport aircraft to fly in the 60th Parachute Brigade and the 26th Infantry Division to Indaw or to maintain them by air.
b. It will still be possible to employ all the LRPG’s but in conjunction with
c. An advance by 4th Corps down the Kabaw Valley and through the Chin Hills on to the Kalemyo Kalawa [Kalewa] area.
d. The Arakan operations would remain as in TARZAN**.**
e. The Ledo force would still be available to advance if the Generalissimo gave permission and they prove capable of doing so.
It is realized that this new operation the code for which is given in my immediately following telegram will not enable me to achieve the QUADRANT Directive of opening up the land route to China but it has certain merits.
a. It enables the LRPGs to operate thus confusing the Japanese and helping to inflict casualties.
b. It will still produce a considerable amount of air fighting.
c. The capture of the Kalemyo Kalewa area will give us a starting point from which to begin land operations against Mandalay.
d. It does not necessarily commit us to further operations in the center of Burma.
The original plan was based on the high fighting qualities believed to be possessed by the Ledo Force. If, however, they fail to advance in accordance with the general program the fly in to Indaw would have to be cancelled even after the starting of TARZAN so as to avoid leaving the 26th Division entirely isolated in Central Burma.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
CCS 270/13
Use of facilities in the Azores by U.S. aircraft
Although the United States Chiefs of Staff have noted the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff (CCS 270/12), dated 3 December 1943, it is considered necessary to defer its consideration until more detailed reports and recommendations are available from such sources as the U.S. Army-Navy Reconnaissance Party in the Azores, the Air Ministry Officers now at Lagens Field, Terceira, the Air Transport Command, AAF, and the Transport Command, RAF.
Whatever decisions may be reached concerning the future extent, nature, and control of U.S. and British anti-submarine and in transit aircraft operations in the Azores, it is apparent that the expansion, completion, and maximum possible use of Lagens Field are matters of urgency. In order to render all possible assistance in the early completion of Lagens Field and to maintain U.S. anti-submarine, ferried, and transport aircraft operations, it is proposed to send appropriate U.S. construction, communications, meteorological and maintenance material and equipment, supplies, and personnel to Terceira on the first possible convoy. The United States Chiefs of Staff have been advised by representatives of the United States in Lisbon that Dr. Antonio Salazar, Premier of the Portuguese Government, has replied favorably to questions regarding this procedure.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
CCS 270/14
Development of facilities in the Azores
Reports from Lisbon indicate that, provided the U.S. are prepared to work under British cover, they will be able to obtain all the essential facilities in the Azores they require for the prosecution of the war.
As regards U.S. operational facilities at Lagens, we would suggest that a formula on the following lines might be acceptable to the Portuguese Government. They might be informed that American operational units in the Azores would be on loan to HMG operating under the command of a British officer from a base under British control.
As regards transit facilities, we recommend that we should await the outcome of Dr. Salazar’s consideration of the American proposal that the U.S. should construct an aerodrome on Santa Maria on behalf of the Portuguese Government. If this is unfavorable, as it may be in view of Dr. Salazar’s insistence on retaining the framework and principles of the British agreement, the British should then ask for authority to construct an aerodrome and should use American material and assistance under British cover.
The formula we would suggest for American transit aircraft would be that aircraft in transit through the Azores are controlled by British Air Transport Command. The second airfield, when constructed, would be under British Command, and aircraft using it would fulfill the same conditions as those using Lagens.
In any case the first step would be a survey of Santa Maria which could be done ostensibly by the British, but with the assistance of the four American officers who remained behind in Terceira, pending further instructions, after completion of work by American survey party recently in that island.
We do not foresee any requirements for two B-24 squadrons in the Azores, or, in fact, for two American squadrons of any type. Our requirement is a total of three squadrons of which two should be British squadrons, and we prefer to retain the two Fortress squadrons now at Terceira. We recommend that the third squadron should be an American B-24 squadron, which would replace the Hudsons now in the Azores. If this is agreed, we could also make the point to Dr. Salazar that the majority of operational units would be British and all under British command.
Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and the First Sea Lord
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
CCS 415/3
The provision of merchant shipping for the British Fleet for the war against Japan
The Combined Chiefs of Staff are requested to approve that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and the First Sea Lord.
Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
CCS 401/2
VLR airfields (B-29) in the China-Burma-India Area
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the following interpretation of paragraph 3 of CCS 401/1:
If the necessary work in India is to be completed by the desired date of April first, it is essential that United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta by the 15th of January and, in addition, that certain resources be diverted from Ledo, which would result in delaying progress of road construction for a period of six weeks to two months.
Certain preparatory work in advance of arrival of American units and equipment can be done without interfering with SEAC projects, which, with arrival of necessary resources from the U.S. by January 15, will permit completion of the airfields by May 15.
H. REDMAN
F. B. ROYAL
Combined Secretariat
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:15 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | ||
| Colonel Roosevelt |
The principal topic of conversation was the language of the proposed communiqué to the press respecting the conversations with Inönü.
The Shah of Iran to President Roosevelt
Tehran, December 6, 1943
Dear Mr. President, Your Minister duly delivered the framed photograph which Your Excellency was good enough to present to me, just before your departure, as a souvenir of your memorable visit to Tehran.
This handsome gift, a very good likeness, stands in a prominent place in my study and will always remind me of your great personality and the interesting conversation we had together on November 30.
Your Excellency’s kind letter of December 1 has also been gratefully received. The cordial sentiments therein expressed are entirely reciprocated, and I look forward to an ever-increasing cooperation between our two countries in the arts of peace to our mutual advantage.
Let me assure Your Excellency that the friendship of the American People is very precious to us; my constant desire will be to foster closer ties between Iran and the United States of America which have already been brought so near to one another in the common struggle for freedom.
It is indeed a matter for gratification that the momentous Tehran Conference was a success. We have to be particularly grateful to Your Excellency for your share in obtaining approval of the satisfactory communiqué issued yesterday regarding Iran, in the drafting of which Mr. Dreyfus, Your able and distinguished representative, has taken an outstanding part.
The kind invitation to visit Washington, extended by Your Excellency, is much appreciated and I hope to be able to avail myself of it and to have the pleasure of seeing You again as soon as circumstances permit.
With the assurance of my friendship and highest consideration, I remain dear Mr. President
Yours sincerely
MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI
Quadripartite meeting, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | ||
| Colonel Elliott Roosevelt | ||
| Turkey | Soviet Union | |
| President Inönü | Mr. Vinogradov |
The meeting discussed and agreed upon the language of the communiqué to be issued to the press respecting the conversations with Inönü.
Roosevelt-Hughes meeting, 4:45 p.m.
From Roosevelt:
When I was in Cairo I had a very nice visit from the Very Reverend Arthur Hughes. We talked about the Italian priests and also the Italian nuns who are interned or detained in Egypt and in Ethiopia, and the day I left I called the whole matter to Churchill’s attention and pleaded with him that these perfectly innocent people should be released, or at least allowed to do their work. I have not had any answer from the British as yet.