Editorial: Long roads to Tokyo
…
Landis: ‘Majors free to use Negroes’
Clubs free to employ colored players to any extent they require
…
Völkischer Beobachter (December 4, 1943)
Die drei Weltgangster tagten in Täbris
Noch keine Einigung über den ‚Aufruf an die Völker Europas‘
dnb. Lissabon, 3. Dezember –
Wie aus Kreisen der Reuter-Vertretung in Lissabon verlautet, wurde die Konferenz zwischen Stalin, Churchill und Roosevelt im sowjetrussischen Okkupationsgebiet des Irans heute beendet. Die Konferenz, die mit gigantischen Sicherungsmaßnahmen hinter Stacheldraht und Minenfeldern stattfand, hatte am 28. November begonnen.
An dem Kommuniqué, dessen Mittelpunkt der bereits gemeldete naive Propagandabluff eines Aufrufs an das deutsche Volk und seine Verbündeten bilden soll, sich bedingungslos der Willkür Stalins, Roosevelts und Churchills auszuliefern und sich von ihren Regierungen zu trennen, wird noch gearbeitet, da die widerstreitenden Interessen der Konferenzteilnehmer die Abfassung des Kommuniqués offenbar schwierig gestalten.
Es ist überaus bezeichnend, daß die drei plutokratisch-bolschewistischen Weltgangster die nordwestpersische Stadt Täbris als Schauplatz für ihren Weltpropagandabluff gewählt haben. Offenbar ist es Churchill und Roosevelt nicht gelungen, den Genossen Stalin an einen Platz zu locken, der nicht unmittelbar unter bolschewistischer Herrschaft seht. Stalin seinerseits hat die beiden westlichen Kumpane nach Täbris beordert, jener unglücklichen Stadt im iranischen Teil von Aserbeidschan, die vor zwei Jahren von den Bolschewisten besetzt wurde und unter dem Terror der GPU seitdem Furchtbares erlitten hat.
Diese Ortswahl ist symbolisch. Sie beweist, wer in diesem sauberen Triumvirat den Ton angibt. Daß auch der großmäulige Roosevelt den weiten Weg bis in diesen Winkel Vorderasiens machen mußte, um von dem Tyrannen des Moskauer Kreml Wahlhilfe für seine vierte Präsidentschaftsperiode zu erbetteln, ist von besonderer Pikanterie.
Noch knobeln die drei an ihrem Kommuniqué, das bekanntlich der Höhepunkt des Nervenkrieges gegen die Festung Europa und Ostasien werden soll. Gewitzigt durch die Panne von Kairo, wo Reuter die Katze zu früh aus dem Sack ließ, hofft man diesmal den Knalleffekt besser zu erzielen. Aber die drei großen Gauner sind nun einmal schlechte Regisseure. Sie verraten mit ihrem Zögern nur die widerstreitenden Interessen, die sie für ihren Hausbedarf verfolgen, und bringen sich um den gewünschten Überraschungserfolg. Allzu genau weiß die ganze Welt, welche Zwecke das Manöver verfolgt. Es geht ihnen einzig und allein darum, durch gespielte Siegeszuversicht und plumpe Drohungen und Lockungen die Völker Europas und Ostasiens darüber hinwegzutäuschen, daß sie keine Mittel und Wege wissen, den militärischen Sieg sicherzustellen.
Die jüdischen Trompeten von Jericho sollen erreichen, was weder die Luftgangster der Plutokratien noch das Kanonenfutter der Sowjetsklaven zuwege bringen!
vb.
Psychiater vor!
Illusionsepidemie ‚Kairo‘
dr. th. b. Stockholm, 3. Dezember –
Um den geistigen Zustand zu begreifen, in den die britische Agitation die britische Bevölkerung und die übrige Welt – letztere allerdings mit sehr geringem Erfolg – nach der Zusammenkunft in Kairo zu versetzen versucht, müßte man ein Psychiater sein. Die Illusionsepidemie greift rasend um sich und droht völlig zu vernichten, was die Briten einst stolz als einen Hauptfaktor ihrer Politik bezeichnet haben: den gesunden Menschenverstand.
Um den Umfang dieser Epidemie zu erkennen, braucht man aus den spaltenlangen Berichten der schwedischen Korrespondenten nur den einen Satz herauszugreifen:
Bald werden über England wieder die Lichter angezündet werden.
Es verlohnt sich nicht, sich mit dieser Wirkung der Konferenz von Kairo näher zu befassen. Wenn Churchill und Roosevelt ihre eigenen Völker bluffen wollten, so ist ihnen das zweifellos gelungen. Sie mögen das als einen Erfolg verbuchen, und zwar als den einzigen Erfolg, den sie bisher im Kriege gegen Japan erzielen konnten. Daß aber die Riesenbluffs auf die Völker Europas und Ostasiens irgendwelchen Eindruck erzielen würden, könnten nur Narren glauben. Die Vernichtungsansage an das japanische Volk, dem man alles rauben wolle, was es sich seit der Meijizeit in harter Arbeit und in harten Kämpfen erworben habe, um überhaupt leben und atmen zu können – das konnten sich Churchill und Roosevelt von vornherein sagen – werde die gleiche Wirkung haben wie die Vernichtungsansage an das deutsche Volk, die vor einem Jahr in Casablanca beschlossen wurde.
Besorgte Fragen
Ruhige und kühle Beobachter, wie der bekannte Militärschriftsteller der Vereinigten Staaten Hamson Baldwin, haben das bereits jetzt erkannt. Baldwin stellt in der New York Times die besorgte Frage, ob es richtig gewesen sei, bereits jetzt dem japanischen Volk ein so düsteres und dürftiges Schicksal anzukündigen. So schreibt er:
Noch lebt der Staat im japanischen Kaiserreich und Hunderttausende von Japanern haben sich in den Gebieten angesiedelt, die Japan wieder verlieren soll. Der japanische Kampf- und Widerstandswillen wird damit nur gestärkt werden.
Hinter dem lauten Wortgetöse im Anschluß an das Reuter-Kommuniqué über die Konferenz in Kairo steht aber in Wirklichkeit die wachsende Sorge, sich auf ein Abenteuer festgelegt zu haben, zu dem die eigenen Kräfte niemals ausreichen. Helfen soll, wie auch in Europa, die Sowjetunion.
Die Sowjets und Japan
Das wichtigste an der Konferenz in Kairo, so heißt es in einem Bericht aus Neuyork, sei zweifellos, daß man militärische Hilfe durch die Sowjets auch gegen Japan suche. Stalin werde gebeten werden, gegen Japan aufzumarschieren, und man sei auf amerikanischer Seite bereit, ihm im Stillen Ozean die Gebiete und die Häfen anzubieten, die Rußland im russisch-japanischen Krieg verloren habe. Nur aus diesem Grunde habe man sich bereit erklärt, Korea die Freiheit wiederzugeben, das eine ganz besondere strategische Rolle spielen könnte, wenn sich die Sowjets der angelsächsischen Koalition gegen Japan anschlößen. Korea sei überdies die Rolle eines Pufferstaates zwischen den bolschewistischen und angelsächsischen Interessen in Ostasien zugedacht.
Es ist natürlich so, daß die Teilnahme der Sowjets am Krieg gegen Japan von Roosevelt nur deshalb in die Debatte geworfen wurde, um damit die sicher zu erwartende Ablehnung des Zustandekommens der zweiten Front in Europa zu begründen. Ohne ein Druckmittel wollte sich Roosevelt wahrscheinlich nicht mit Stalin in Täbris an einen Tisch setzen. Sein Druckmittel ist aber nicht mehr wert als das der Briten, die das Ausbleiben, der zweiten Front damit zu begründen versuchten, daß sie gar nicht mehr nötig sei, da ja Deutschlands Tage ohnehin gezählt seien.
Auf die arrogante Entschließung –
Tokios Antwort: ‚Niemals!‘
dnb. Tokio, 3. Dezember –
Die arrogante Entschließung von Kairo entsprang an erster Stelle dem besorgten Wunsch, Tschiangkaischek zu beruhigen, der ständig mehr Boden bei seinem nutzlosen Widerstand gegen Japan verliert, so stellt man, wie Dōmei berichtet, in Tokio fest.
Die Tatsache, daß Roosevelt und Churchill sich die Mühe machten, eine Konferenz mit Tschiangkaischek zu veranlassen, sei nur ein weiterer Beweis für ihre Besorgnis über Japans neue Chinapolitik und über die dramatische Erhebung Ostasiens, die auf einer Basis der Gegenseitigkeit erfolgte, um es von der jahrhundertelangen anglo-amerikanischen Ausbeutung und Unterdrückung zu befreien.
Kairo könne nur als ein schlechter Scherz angesehen werden. Es beweise nur, wie besorgt die Anglo-Amerikaner seien, Tschiangkaischek in ihrem Lager zu behalten. Es bestehe kein Zweifel, daß die Konferenz in Kairo einzig und allein diese Absicht verfolgte.
Gutunterrichtete Kreise betonten weiter, daß, gleichgültig was auch die Anglo-Amerikaner tun mögen, Ostasien nie wieder unter ihr altes imperialistisches Regime zurückkehren wird. Die ungeheure Kampfkraft Japans, die alle anderen ostasiatischen Nationen geschlossen hinter sich wisse, werde Großostasien gegen alle anglo-amerikanischen „Regressions-Versuche“ verteidigen.
Interessant und belustigend sei die Tatsache, daß Churchill und Roosevelt völlig vergessen haben, die rücksichtslose imperialistische Herrschaft, die in ihren früheren Gebieten und Kolonien während der letzten Jahrhunderte ausgeübt wurde, überhaupt zu erwähnen. Das sei ein weiterer offensichtlicher Beweis für die anglo-amerikanische Denkungsart, die entweder zu naiv oder zu veraltet sei. Wenn Tschiangkaischek gewillt sei, auf diesen anglo-amerikanischen Bluff hereinzufallen, und wenn er weiter Ostasien verrate, werde er von seinen Landsleuten restlos beiseitegelegt werden, noch ehe seine sogenannten anglo-amerikanischen Verbündeten ihn im Stich ließen.
Englische Kritik an Kairo
dnb. Stockholm, 3. Dezember –
Mit dem Kommuniqué über das Treffen in Kairo ist ein fundamentaler Mißgriff begangen worden, erklären jetzt sogar schon englische Kommentatoren nach einer Meldung in Aftonbladet. Der Mißgriff bestehe darin, daß man erklärt habe, die Japaner auf ihre Inseln zurücktreiben zu wollen. Dieses sei etwas, was die Japaner nur noch stärker zusammenschweißen werde zu einem noch härteren Kampf um ihr Leben. Gleichzeitig vermisse man ein „positives Programm“ für die ostasiatischen Staaten.
Zu den Stimmen über die Bluffkonferenz gesellen sich auch zwei britische. Reuters hat zwei namhafte englische Politiker interviewt und nach ihrer Meinung über das Ergebnis von Kairo befragt.
Die Meinung Greenwoods
Der stellvertretende Führer der Arbeiterpartei, Arthur Greenwood, gab seiner Meinung dahin Ausdruck, daß der Krieg in China „jetzt ein Krieg zwischen allen freiheitsliebenden Völkern und jenen sei, die die Freiheit ausmerzen“ wollten. Nach seiner Meinung kann der Krieg erst dann beendet werden, wenn „Hitler aus Europa verschwunden und jeder japanische Soldat vom chinesischen Boden vertrieben ist.“
Unbeirrt durch die Tatsachen, welche die Konferenzphrasen von Kairo überdecken, sprach Greenwood das große Wort:
Die britische Arbeiterschaft blickt auf ein neues China, das seinen rechtmäßigen Platz in den Ausschüssen des Fortschrittes der Welt einnimmt.
John Lawson, Mitglied der parlamentarischen Delegation, die kürzlich in China weilte, sieht die Dinge aus der Kenntnis der Lage wesentlich nüchterner an. Er sagt:
Es ist ganz klar, daß wenig getan werden kann, bis wir Panzer, schwere Geschütze und moderne Ausrüstungen den Chinesen bringen können.
Die Konferenz in Kairo wäre also überflüssig gewesen, wenn England und die USA imstande wären, Tschungking mit Waffen und Material zu unterstützen. Sie haben zwar Tschiangkaischek und Frau Gemahlin mit Versprechungen heimgeschickt, aber sie haben nicht verraten, wie sie das von Japan versperrte Tor nach Tschungking aufbrechen wollen.
U.S. State Department (December 4, 1943)
The agreed text of the communiqué
December 4, 1943
To be released to the Press,
8:00 p.m. Moscow Time,
December 6, 1943
Declaration of the Three Powers
WE – The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.
As to war – Our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken [operations to be undertaken] from the East, West and South.
The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.
And as to peace – we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace [our concord will win an enduring peace]. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations, to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.
With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.
No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.
Our attack will be relentless and increasing.
Emerging from these friendly [cordial] conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.
We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.
Signed at Tehran, Iran, December 1, 1943
F. D. ROOSEVELT
J. STALIN
W. CHURCHILL
Text agreed to by the PM & the Marshal WAH
740.0011 EW 1939/32185: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State
London, December 4, 1943
8476.
Announcement by Moscow radio of Tehran conference is carried in late editions of this morning’s London papers, but last not received in time for editorial comment. Speculative stories during past two days had been largely based on German press and radio campaign to prepare enemy populations for anticipated news of meeting. Senator Connally’s speech at Fort Worth was also widely reported.
BUCKNELL
740.0011 EW 1939/32362a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
Washington, December 4, 1943 — midnight
Confidential (part restricted)
1342–1344.
Morning press in the United States headlined stories from London that the Moscow radio had announced in an official Soviet news agency broadcast for provincial Russian papers that:
A few days ago, in Tehran, a conference took place between the leaders of the three Allied powers, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin. Diplomatic and military representatives took part in the conference.
At the conference, questions on the conduct of the war against Germany were discussed as well as a number of political questions.
Corresponding decisions were adopted which will be made public later.
No word having been received in this country of the conclusion of the conference and there being nothing to announce in the United States, the publication in Moscow has created a furor in the press. OWI Director Elmer Davis has requested the Department to ascertain the circumstances of the announcement and particularly whether this was a violation of any release date agreed upon by the conferees. We had all assumed that an arrangement would be made for simultaneous publication in the USSR, Great Britain and the United States but so far have no definite information about such an arrangement. Any information you are able to send us about the Moscow broadcast will assist greatly.
HULL
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt (in the chair) | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 4, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret
The President said that he must leave Cairo on Monday morning. It was therefore necessary that all reports of the Conference should be signed by Sunday night. Apart from the question of Turkish participation in the war, which he felt should be brought about at some date between 15 February and 1 April, the only outstanding problem seemed to be the comparatively small one of the provision of about 20 landing craft or their equipment. It was unthinkable to be beaten by a small item like that, and he felt bound to say that it must be done.
The Prime Minister said that he did not wish to leave the Conference in any doubt that the British Delegation viewed the early separation of the SEXTANT Conference with great apprehension. There were still many questions of first-class importance to be settled. Two decisive events had taken place in the last few days. In the first place, Marshal Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet would make war on Japan the moment Germany was defeated. This would give us better bases than we could ever find in China, and made it all the more important that we should concentrate on making OVERLORD a success. It would be necessary for the Staffs to examine how this new fact would affect operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The second event of first-class importance was the decision to do OVERLORD during May. He himself would have preferred the July date, but he was determined nevertheless to do all in his power to make the May date a complete success. OVERLORD was a task transcending all others. A million Americans were to be thrown in, and 500,000-600,000 British. Terrific battles were to be expected on a scale far greater than anything that we had experienced before. In order to give OVERLORD the greatest chance of success, it was necessary that Operation ANVIL should be as strong as possible. The critical time would come at about the thirtieth day, and it was essential that every possible step should be taken by action elsewhere to prevent the Germans from concentrating a superior force against our bridgeheads. As soon as the OVERLORD and ANVIL forces got into the same zone, they would come under the same Commander.
Reverting to ANVIL, the Prime Minister expressed the view that it should be planned on the basis of an assault force of at least two divisions. This would provide enough landing craft to do the outflanking operations in Italy and also, if Turkey came into the war soon, to capture Rhodes. But he wished to say at once that, in the face of the new situation, Rhodes had no longer the great importance which he had previously attached to it.
Admiral King intervened to remark that a two-division lift for ANVIL was in sight.
The Prime Minister, continuing, said that operations in Southeast Asia must be judged in their relation to the predominating importance of OVERLORD. He was astounded at the demands for BUCCANEER which had reached him from the Supreme Commander. Although there were only 5,000 Japanese in the island, 58,000 men were apparently required to capture it. As he understood it, the Americans had been fighting the Japanese successfully at odds of two and a half to one. In the face of Marshal Stalin’s promise that Russia would come into the war, operations in the Southeast Asia Command had lost a good deal of their value; while on the other hand their cost had been put up to a prohibitive extent.
The Prime Minister concluded by observing that there were still very large differences of opinion between the British and American Delegations, and that it was of the first importance that these differences should be cleared away.
Sir Alan Brooke said that at all the previous Conferences there had been a number of military meetings, as a result of which reports had been submitted from time to time to the President and Prime Minister. The last stage of the Conference had always been the submission of a final report, followed by an examination of ways and means. SEXTANT had been a very different affair. In the first place there had been meetings with the Generalissimo. Then after a short interval, the principal members of both delegations had gone to Tehran where there had been a number of Plenary Conferences on political as well as military matters. Thus the Combined Chiefs of Staff had so far had very few opportunities of discussion at SEXTANT. The following matters were still outstanding: First, an examination of the landing craft position, without which it was impossible to say what operations could or could not be undertaken; second, the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan, which in its turn was affected by the decisions to undertake operations in Upper Burma next March. The plan was also seriously affected by Marshal Stalin’s promise to make war on Japan as soon as Germany was finished. It seemed essential that these problems should be resolved before the Combined Chiefs of Staff separated. The Mediterranean was of the greatest importance. It would be fatal to let up in that area. We should go on hitting the Germans as hard as we possibly could, and in every place that we could. Finally, the question of ANVIL was still under examination and it was essential to decide how the necessary resources could be provided.
Sir Andrew Cunningham observed that, on a preliminary examination, our naval resources in cruisers, escort carriers, destroyers, and escorts were not adequate to undertake more than two amphibious operations at the same time, namely OVERLORD and ANVIL. It might be possible to arrange for some of the naval forces employed in BUCCANEER to get back in time for ANVIL, but a large proportion of them would have to remain in the Indian Ocean.
Sir Charles Portal said that, according to his information, there was only one good airfield in the Andamans. This was capable of operating squadrons of heavy bombers. There was another site which had been cleared by blasting the top off a hill, and a few strips might be made on the beach. Thus the value of the Andamans as a base for long distance bombing was strictly limited.
General Marshall expressed agreement with General Brooke’s observations. There was no question that there were a number of important points to be settled. It was impossible to say how long this settlement would take; and thereafter there would be the business of surveying ways and means.
The Prime Minister said that he himself would at any rate be leaving on Tuesday. Would it not be possible for the Staffs to stay for two or three days and work out their problems together?
Admiral Leahy said that two or three days would not suffice for what they had to do, since the detailed problems to be worked out would take at least one or two weeks.
Admiral King remarked that the staffs were unlikely to reach agreement on certain problems which could only be resolved by the President-Prime Minister level.
The Prime Minister said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo under the impression that we were going to do BUCCANEER. The new facts were, firstly, that the Soviet had declared themselves ready to go to war with Japan immediately Germany collapsed; secondly, that it had been decided to do OVERLORD in May; and, thirdly, that ANVIL was also to be undertaken. He added that he was very anxious lest the Russian promise should leak out.
The President agreed, and added that it was impossible to tell the Chinese. Continuing, he said that 18-20 additional landing craft must be provided by hook or by crook. As for the BUCCANEER assault, he thought that 14,000 instead of 58,000 men would be ample. The Supreme Commander in the Far East should be told that he must do his best with the resources which had already been allocated to him. It should be possible for the staffs to settle their problems in principle, leaving the details to be worked out afterwards. They appeared already to have reached agreement on the objectives.
Sir Alan Brooke demurred. Many questions, such as shipping, landing craft, and naval resources would have to be examined in detail, as would the relation between ANVIL and BUCCANEER. The former was being examined on the basis of a two-division assault, whereas it might be found that the proper strategy was to divert landing craft from BUCCANEER to the Mediterranean and to increase this to say a three-division assault.
Admiral King said that landing craft and assault shipping for a two-division assault was already in sight, subject to certain complications. He added that, so long as the target date for OVERLORD was 1 May, it had been necessary to arrange for landing craft to be in the U.K. by 1 March. Consequently, the intention had been to send all new construction of landing craft after that date to the Pacific. Now that it had been decided to postpone OVERLORD by 2-4 weeks, this new construction would come to the U.K. Nothing would be sent to the Pacific.
The Prime Minister observed that this was a fruitful contribution.
Some discussion followed on the subject of LSI(L)s. Would it not be possible, asked the Prime Minister, to adapt merchant ships for this purpose instead of building special vessels?
Admiral King said that conversions of this character were in progress. The U.S. Navy used ships of 6,000–10,000 tons for this purpose, the monster liners being reserved for transportation of large bodies of troops across the Atlantic.
Some discussion followed about the increase of Japanese fighter strength in Southeast Asia, and, in connection with this matter, Admiral King pointed to the interrelation between the attack on Rabaul and BUCCANEER. The Japanese air force was going to be in difficulties at two widely separated points. Admiral Leahy suggested that if it could be decided:
a. that ANVIL should go ahead on the basis of a two-division assault; and,
b. that Admiral Mountbatten should be instructed to do the best he could with the resources already allocated to him;
the picture would begin to be filled in. Of course, if Admiral Mount-batten said that he could do nothing, some of his resources could be taken away from him for other purposes.
The Prime Minister suggested that BUCCANEER might be left until after the monsoon; in fact this solution of the problem might be forced upon us by facts and figures.
Admiral King said that there was a definite commitment to the Generalissimo that there should be an amphibious operation in the spring.
The Prime Minister recalled that at the Plenary Meeting with the Generalissimo, the latter had said that it was essential that an amphibious operation should be undertaken simultaneously with TARZAN. He (the Prime Minister) had said quite firmly that he could not agree. The Generalissimo could be under no illusion about this.
The President suggested the following plan of action:
a. Accept OVERLORD and ANVIL as the paramount operations of 1944.
b. Make every effort to get the additional 18-20 landing craft for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.
c. Let Admiral Mountbatten be told that he could keep what he has got, but is going to get nothing else; and that he must do the best that he can.
Sir Charles Portal remarked that ANVIL had only come seriously into the picture last week. At the present, nobody knew whether a two-division assault would, or would not, be enough. It was merely a yardstick for the planning staffs to work on. It might well be that the proper strategy would be to get a lift for at least another division out of the Southeast Asia Command.
Sir Alan Brooke said that for OVERLORD the assault was only 3½ divisions; and for ANVIL only a two-division assault was at present contemplated. Surely it would be better to employ all the BUCCANEER resources to strengthen up the European front.
Admiral Leahy entirely agreed with the idea of strengthening up the European front, but observed that BUCCANEER had been decided on a higher level than the Chiefs of Staff.
The Prime Minister pointed to the great military advantages that were to be gained by operations in the Aegean. If Turkey entered the war, there would be great political reactions. Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary might all fall into our hands. We ought to make these German satellites work for us.
Mr. Eden thought that Russia would probably agree to postponing the date for the Turkish entry into the war from 31 December 1943 to about 15 February 1944. As for Rumania, the Russians had, in the first place, refused to have anything to do with the feelers put out by Maniu, except on the basis of unconditional surrender. Maniu had now said that he was prepared to send a representative to negotiate on that basis. It was true that he did not represent the Government of Rumania, but there was always the possibility of a coup d’etat.
The Prime Minister pointed to the great advantages that were to be gained by Rumania’s entry into the war. If we could get a grip on the Balkans, there would be a tremendous abridgement of our difficulties. The next Conference might perhaps be held at Budapest! All this would help OVERLORD. He himself was not apprehensive about the landing; but the critical period would be at about the 30th day. It was therefore essential that the Germans should be held at every point, and that the whole ring should close in together.
There followed some discussion of the conduct of the political conversations with President Inonu.
The President, summing up the discussion, asked whether he was correct in thinking that there was general agreement on the following points:
a. Nothing should be done to hinder OVERLORD.
b. Nothing should be done to hinder ANVIL.
c. By hook or by crook we should scrape up sufficient landing craft to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey came into the war.
d. Admiral Mountbatten should be told to go ahead and do his best with what had already been allocated to him.
The Prime Minister suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from BUCCANEER in order to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL.
The President said that he could not agree with this. We had a moral obligation to do something for China and he would not be prepared to forego the amphibious operation, except for some very great and readily apparent reason.
The Prime Minister said that this “very good reason” might be provided by OVERLORD. At present the assault was only on a 3½ division basis, whereas we had put 9 divisions ashore in Sicily on the first day. The operation was at present on a very narrow margin.
Field Marshal Dill thought it was impossible for us to be strong at both OVERLORD and ANVIL.
Admiral Leahy agreed that, from the military point of view, there was everything to be said for strengthening up OVERLORD and ANVIL at the expense of other theaters; but there were serious political issues at stake.
General Marshall agreed with Field Marshal Dill and Admiral Leahy. He pointed out, however, that the difficulties in abandoning or postponing BUCCANEER were not merely political. If BUCCANEER was cancelled, the Generalissimo would not allow Chinese forces to take part in TARZAN. There would be no campaign in Upper Burma, and this would have its repercussion on the operations in the Pacific. There would be a revulsion of feeling in China; the effect on Japan would be bad, and the line of communication between Indochina [India and China?] would be at hazard.
The Prime Minister observed that he had never committed himself to the scale or timing of the amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater. Perhaps it might be advisable to revert to Akyab or Ramree.
The President said that the Generalissimo was anxious that we should secure a base from which the supply line from Bangkok could be bombed.
Admiral King, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that he had no fear of the Japanese being able to retake the Andamans once we had occupied them. He added that any increase in the scale of BUCCANEER was out of the question.
The meeting concluded with an injunction from the President and Prime Minister to their respective staffs to meet together and try to reach agreement on the points at issue in the light of the discussion which had taken place.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ
Cairo, 4 December 1943
Fan 282
Secret
Priority
With reference to letter from Giraud suggesting he attend SEXTANT, you should reply on following lines:
General Giraud’s offer to come to Cairo very much appreciated by Combined Chiefs of Staff, who feel, however, that it is unnecessary to ask the General to undertake the journey, since discussions on global strategy are of the broadest possible nature and the details of operations in France are not under consideration. Please inform him that the Combined Chiefs of Staff believe that your presentation here included an accurate and sympathetic explanation of his views.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have the interest of France and of the French Armed Forces much at heart.
The President’s Secretary to the President’s special assistant
Washington, 4 December 1943
For Mr. Hopkins from Mr. Early.
All press and radio here headline today Moscow radio reports received via London that Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin had met in Tehran few days ago and discussed questions related to war against Germany and including political war issues. The reports added that the conferences have been concluded and detailed statement is expected momentarily. This comes from the government-controlled Moscow radio and further complicates the situation resulting from the British Reuters premature disclosures concerning Cairo conference. If mechanically possible and in face of these developments, I urge quickest possible release and publication of Tehran communiqué. Regards.
740.0011 EW 1939/32176: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State
Moscow, December 4, 1943
U.S. urgent
2113.
The Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill conference in Tehran is reported in the Moscow newspapers for December 4 in the following TASS dispatch datelined Tehran December 3.
A few days ago, in Tehran, a conference took place between the leaders of the three Allied powers, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin. Diplomatic and military representatives took part in the conference.
At the conference, questions on the conduct of the war against Germany were discussed as well as a number of political questions.
Corresponding decisions were adopted which will be made public later.
HARRIMAN
The Director of the Office of War Information to the Director of the London Bureau of the Office of War Information
Washington, December 4, 1943
Secret
Rapid
Please transmit following to Bracken: Now that the Russians have set us both back on our tails perhaps we can get together on some measures to prevent repetition of these deplorable incidents. I have asked State Department to make inquiries in Moscow as to how this Russian thing happened and whether it broke an agreed release date, on which latter point I am not yet informed. Meanwhile I am meeting with Price and Early and hope we can agree on some ideas for improved arrangements which will be forwarded for your comment. Eventually we may perhaps be able to agree with information agencies of other governments on program which can be made as a united recommendation to our principals. Regarding Connally, he does not appear to have said anything more than was contained in Reuters Lisbon story and other speculations earlier in the week. I share your wish that all rumors and conjectures on such meetings could be silenced but doubt if it could be done by domestic censorship in either country since we cannot control the enemy. All we can hope to do is to refrain from giving his speculations confirmation. Hope that we shall be able to concur in recommendations which will avert these painful episodes in future. End message to Bracken; remainder for Carroll. Sorry you have had to be in the front line and take the heat in this matter but believe Russian performance will measurably reduce inflammation of Anglo-American relations. Also may have salutary effect of persuading our betters to consult their hired experts on such matters hereafter.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman | |
| Colonel McFarland | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 4, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Conclusions of CCS 133rd Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 133rd Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Integrated command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area (CCS 400/1 and 400/2)
Sir Charles Portal said that he had not had time to study the United States Chiefs of Staff paper thoroughly but felt from a brief consideration of it that the points put forth by the British Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum on this subject had not been fully appreciated. He would like to discuss the matter quite frankly. He would like to make three points. Firstly, he fully conceded the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to organize their own air forces as they saw fit. Secondly, in spite of this he would like to go on record as advising most strongly against the arrangements proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff since, in his view, they would not attain the objects desired, were quite unnecessary, and would prove inefficient. Finally, he would like to make it quite clear that, if in spite of his advice, the United States Chiefs of Staff made the reorganization they proposed, he, for his part, would do his utmost to ensure that it worked as smoothly as possible.
From paragraph 2 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper, it was clear that the U.S. had sufficient personnel and equipment for each AAF group station to be organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods. He had not appreciated this point.
The points which the U.S. reorganization was aimed to achieve were better coordination of the air operations based on Italy and the United Kingdom, the ability to take advantage of varying weather in the two theaters, and the ability of one man to decide on the movements of groups of aircraft from one theater to another.
He would like to point out that after two or three years of experience in the operation of bombers, he considered that it was impossible to coordinate bomber operations from two theaters or work rigidly to a given program. The technical difficulties of getting some 2,000 aircraft in the air at a time required days of planning done by a committee which brought together all the best available knowledge. The final decision to launch the operation had to be taken within four or five hours of its taking place. No amount of unity of command or drive could overcome the inherent difficulties in the operation of large bomber forces.
In his view the insertion of an overall air commander for Europe would merely insert another link in the chain of command.
With regard to the moving of groups, a quick decision was not always the right decision, and the views not only of the bomber commander but also of the theater commanders concerned must be considered. To give the power to move groups to one man who could take his decisions without consultation with others concerned might result in faulty decisions being taken and even in the movements of groups having to be countermanded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The new proposals would, he believed, tend to break up the close integration which had been achieved between the Royal Air Force and the Eighth Bomber Command. The Air Ministry had a large staff fully integrated with all the RAF commands in England, and here the operations of the various U.S. and British commands were coordinated. This was done under his own direction and he exercised his functions under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. To insert another commander over the U.S. Air Forces would rupture the present relations between the 8th Air Force and the Air Ministry.
The U.S. proposals would also result in the elimination of the present system of dual responsibility of the Chief of the Air Staff to the British Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It must be remembered that the United Kingdom was in the front line and the operations of the bomber forces from the U.K. were of vital moment to the life and industry of England. When the use of “Window” had been advocated, it had had to be debated in consultation with the British Government over a long period. If a supreme commander were appointed, he might take action of this nature on his own initiative since he would have no responsibility to the British Government.
From the Naval point of view the Commander of the Strategic Air Force would be divorced from that close contact now existing between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. If, for example, the German Fleet put to sea, the quickest possible action was required and aircraft of many different forces had to be brought to bear. For quick action in a case like this, coordination by the Chief of the Air Staff was, in his view, essential.
The question of additional staffs must also be considered. If the supreme commander for OVERLORD had only one air commander under him to deal with, then he, the supreme commander, did not require an air staff. If, however, there were two air commanders under him, the supreme commander must be provided with such a staff in order to integrate the two air commands. The Commander of the Strategic Air Force would also require a large staff which would be duplicating the staff already in existence in the Air Ministry. He (Sir Charles Portal) could not undertake any commitment to provide additional staffs.
With regard to the power of the Strategic Air Commander to move forces from one theater to another, he considered that no theater commander would advocate a system where he might, without consultation, be bereft of a large part of his air forces. His own proposal to deal with this matter was, briefly, that his (the Chief of the Air Staff’s) own operation headquarters should be used by the 15th Air Force as it was used at present by the 8th Air Force, under himself, acting for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would then indicate or recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the targets for the 8th and 15th Air Forces and would move these forces as might be necessary after consultation with the theater commanders concerned.
He did not claim that he could vote against the U.S. proposal, but he did feel that he must most strongly advise against it. He would, however, if the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on adhering to their proposal against his advice, move heaven and earth to make the new organization work.
In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Sir Charles Portal said that he would certainly allow General Eisenhower to use the 15th Air Force in his theater as might be necessary since he conceded the principle that a theater commander had a right in an emergency to use such forces as were in his theater provided that he informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of his action.
With regard to coordination between the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, he felt that only one man must have authority over both or the interest of one must be subordinated to those of the other. For his part, he could not undertake to subordinate the operations of the RAF to those of the 8th Air Force.
In reply to a question by General Marshall, he said the present position with regard to operations of the 8th Air Force was as satisfactory as was possible without the full resources envisaged in the bomber plan. General Eaker had only some 75 percent of his full resources and was, as he had pointed out in his paper, therefore achieving only some 54 percent of the results expected. The program was, in fact, some three months behind. He realized the reasons which had caused this and would like to say that he felt that the 8th Air Force had done everything that was possible in the circumstances. General Eaker had done his utmost to keep the plan to schedule. In spite of his smaller resources, he had penetrated deep into Germany and had accepted the consequent losses. Air operations in Europe and in the Pacific could not be compared. In no other part of the world were our bomber forces up against some 1,600 German fighters over their own country.
General Arnold said that the proposals he had put forward were designed in part to overcome the lack of flexibility in the operations of the U.S. bomber forces in Europe. They had not changed their technique. He had sent a series of inspectors to the United Kingdom to try to probe into the reasons for this. In other theaters 60 or 70 percent of available aircraft were used in operations. In the U.K. only some 50 percent were used. Even on this basis some 1,900 sorties had been launched during the month of September. There were approximately 1,300 bombers supplied to the U.K. This gave 800 with the units and a 50 percent reserve. In addition, two crews were provided. In spite of this, only once in the last month had 600 aircraft taken part in operations on one day.
He could see no reason why at least 70 percent of the planes available should not be regularly employed. The failure to destroy targets was due directly to the failure to employ planes in sufficient numbers. A sufficient weight of bombs was not being dropped on the targets to destroy them, nor was the proper priority of targets being followed.
With regard to the transfer of groups in the U.K., aircraft were flying on an average some five sorties per month whereas in North Africa six sorties per month were being achieved. The question of flexibility between the two theaters was, therefore, of the utmost importance. Transfers of groups must be made as proved necessary and a decision to make the transfer must be taken in 24 to 48 hours. The appointment of a Strategic Air Commander would not break up the close integration between the 8th Air Force and the Royal Air Force. Interchange of ideas must and would continue. The commander to be appointed would be responsible mainly for operations. Administration and supply would be handled by the theater commanders. Training, technique, and operational efficiency must all be improved. Only a new commander divorced from day-to-day routine could achieve this.
At present, the necessary drive and ideas were coming from Washington. He believed that more aircraft were being sent to the U.K. than were being effectively used and that unless better results could be achieved no more planes should be sent.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out the difficulties inherent in the operation of huge numbers of aircraft. The joint U.S. and British staffs had yet to learn fully their lessons on this point. If a commander were appointed who insisted on keeping the bomber force rigidly to the program, it would undoubtedly be found that, in fact, less sorties would be flown, and he, for one, could never permit his own fighters to escort bombers on a mission which he did not believe to be sound. It was not always right nor was it possible to keep rigidly to a plan laid down in advance.
General Marshall said that it had always proved the case that a combat commander was loath to release any forces in his possession lest they should not return to him. As far as the air forces were concerned, there was required a commander for the strategic air both in Italy and in Europe who, by reason of his position, was not affected by this very human weakness. He realized that the U.K. was in the front line and that this entailed certain complications. He believed that the technique of precision daylight bombing was not being completely carried out in Europe. The U.S. daylight bombers were being operated from bases all over the world and in some of these places were achieving twice the results obtained in the U.K. Flexibility of thought and imagination were required. A huge force could not be allowed to collect in the U.K. unless it was employed to the maximum possible extent. Whether the 8th and 15th Air Forces were integrated or not, he still believed that a commander in England was required who could give full consideration to the many problems involved and impart the necessary drive. He suggested that action be deferred in order to afford additional time to consider the views put forward by Sir Charles Portal and General Arnold.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 400/1 and 400/2.
Mediterranean Command arrangements (CCS 387/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration on [of?] CCS 387/1 pending receipt of a memorandum on the same subject by the British Chiefs of Staff.
Overall plan for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that CCS 417 would serve as a basis for further work but that it required recasting in certain respects. Paragraph 2c would, for instance, require revision in the light of the statements made by Marshal Stalin at EUREKA. He (General Brooke) was in agreement with the general concept set out in paragraph 4 that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific. He was frankly disturbed with regard to present ideas on operations in Southeast Asia. The Supreme Allied Commander had recently put forward his views which he had stressed while present at SEXTANT, that once the operations in North Burma were undertaken, either they would have to be continued to complete the capture of the whole of Burma or, alternatively, our forces would have to withdraw when the monsoon stopped. The Supreme Allied Commander had also put forward his requirements in order to continue the campaign at the end of the monsoon. He feared that Burma might become a huge vacuum and if this were the case, it would not fit in with the strategic concept set out in the plan under consideration, i.e., that the main effort should be made in the Pacific.
Admiral Leahy said that he had always regarded operations in Burma as a diversionary effort.
Sir Charles Portal said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could not agree to an initial campaign in Burma without considering the implications of a large further effort or a retirement. It was now considered that the major effort must be made in the Pacific and large operations to recapture North Burma would not be in accordance with this concept.
Admiral Leahy said that as he understood the position, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had not yet considered the provision of the additional requirements necessary to continue the campaign.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the paper should be returned to the Combined Staff Planners for further study in the light of a further assumption with regard to the necessity of continuing the reconquest of Burma if once the campaign were launched.
Admiral King agreed with this suggestion.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that it would obviously help the Combined Staff Planners in their further study if it could be agreed to accept paragraph 4 of the report. There were many logistic implications which would have to be taken into consideration.
Sir Charles Portal said that he felt that paragraph 6b, of Annex III, was politically unacceptable since British heavy bombers must, to a large extent, be employed to fight the enemy rather than being used as transport aircraft.
General Arnold said that he quite appreciated this point.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the following additional subparagraph 2d should be inserted in the enclosure to CCS 417:
The possibility that a full campaign in Burma may have to be carried out following on the TARZAN operation.
b. That the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to reexamine and amend CCS 417 in the light of the above, before resubmission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Operation RANKIN (CCS 320/4)
Admiral Leahy said that he understood that the proposal in CCS 320/4 had been mentioned by the President to the Prime Minister. He considered that it would have to be examined by the political agencies concerned in both countries.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the proposals would entail a crossing of the lines of communication. This did not appear acceptable from the military point of view.
General Marshall said the logistic implications had been briefly examined and found to be difficult but possible. They were most serious when the forces were most deeply committed, i.e., in RANKIN Case “A” and least serious in RANKIN Case “C.” It had been felt necessary to put forward this paper since at present COSSAC was planning on a different basis and an early decision was required in order to be prepared when the need arose.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that paragraph 3 should be amended to read, “That COSSAC be at once directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.” This amendment was accepted.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to accept CCS 320/4 as modified (subsequently circulated as CCS 320/4 (Revised)).
Review of conditions in Europe
Sir Alan Brooke said that Sir John Dill had suggested, and he himself fully agreed, that since some six weeks were required to prepare for Operation RANKIN, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should either fix a date for planning for this operation or review at monthly intervals the state of Europe in order that they could decide the date on which the operation might have to be mounted. Plans were kept up to date by COSSAC but six weeks were required to take up the necessary shipping.
After a brief discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to instruct the Combined Intelligence Committee to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to RANKIN and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Occupation of Europe
The Combined Chiefs of Staff briefly discussed the occupation and administration of Europe after the defeat of Germany.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that each occupying power would be responsible for an area and that broad directives would be given by a centralized body. Occupation forces should be kept to a minimum and the maximum use made of the threat of air power and action by armored and mobile forces.
Sir Charles Portal said that the administration must, wherever possible, be undertaken by the Germans with the necessary degree of military control by ourselves. A European Advisory Commission had already been set up in London.
General Marshall said that there might be difficulties due to the different methods adopted, for example, by ourselves and the Russians in administering adjacent territories.
Results of the plenary session held at 1100, 3 [4] December 1943
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the conclusions of the plenary session held that morning.
General Ismay presented a brief note setting out the general sense of the meeting on the main points considered.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the relationship of BUCCANEER to Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL and the naval, shipping, and landing craft requirements for these operations.
Admiral King pointed out that since Operations OVERLORD and BUCCANEER had been planned for some time, the requirements for these were presumably available. The deficiency would lie in the resources necessary for Operation ANVIL. If necessary, he would do his utmost to provide the resources required for this operation, particularly in aircraft carriers.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively, should draw up a paper setting out a draft of matters of high policy regarding the European Theater and the Southeast Asia Command; these papers to be exchanged this evening and considered at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff tomorrow at 1100.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 4 December 1943
Secret
CCS 320/4 (Revised)
Operation RANKIN
Reference: CCS 320 Series
In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation (paragraph 11, CCS 320/2) that under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the territories to be occupied should be divided into two spheres, the British sphere, including northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark, and the U.S. sphere, generally southern Germany and France, with Austria a U.S. sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. It is understood that planning by COSSAC is now proceeding on this basis.
The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be changed as follows:
a. U.S. sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as far east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The boundary of this area is to be as follows: Southern boundary of the Netherlands; thence to Düsseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine to Mains [Mainz]; thence due east to Bayreuth; thence north to Leipzig; thence northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive); thence to Stettin (inclusive).
b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the American western boundary.
The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 4 December 1943
Secret
CCS 400/2
Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and in the Mediterranean
The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the subject matter presented in the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff, CCS 400/1, and concluded that the advantages to be gained by a more effective exploitation of U.S. daylight precision bombing capabilities, through unification of the command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces, outweigh the disadvantages anticipated by the British Chiefs of Staff.
We do not consider that the occasional transfer of aircraft from one theater to another will occasion any significant wastage of manpower or facilities, as each AAF group station is organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods.
Neither do we consider that there should be any slackening in the existing close coordination of operations between the U.S. Strategic Air Forces and the RAF, as the headquarters of the former will remain in the U.K. in unaltered contact with the intelligence and other services provided by the latter. In fact, this coordination should be broadened by drawing the 15th Strategic Air Force into a unified command.
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, after giving careful consideration to the alternative arrangement suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, have concluded:
a. That control of all U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean area, including the control of movement of forces from one area to another, should be vested in a single command in order to exploit the flexibility of U.S. heavy bomber capabilities most effectively and that these forces should be employed primarily against POINTBLANK objectives or such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may from time to time direct.
b. That such a command should likewise be charged with the coordination of these operations with those of the RAF Bomber Command.
c. That the responsibility for overall base services and administrative control of these Strategic Air Forces should remain with the appropriate commanders of U.S. Army Forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area.
d. That provision should be made to assure the assignment of resources, supplies, and other services between tactical and strategic operations so as to bring the required support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.
e. That the headquarters of such U.S. Strategic Air Forces should be established in the United Kingdom because of the facilities available, the existing weight of the respective bomber forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with the RAF.
f. That the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, should continue to have direct channels of approach to the U.S. Strategic Air Force Commander in order to provide direct technical control and insure that operational and training technique and uniformity of U.S. tactical doctrine are maintained.
A directive to implement the above, attached as Enclosure, is therefore being issued to the following:
- Commanding General, USSAFE
- Commanding General, ETOUSA
- Commanding General, NATO
Enclosure
Draft directive by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
To: Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.
- The Commanding General, ETOUSA.
- The Commanding General, NATO.
Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command designated “The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe,” consisting initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth U.S. Army Air Forces. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the United Kingdom. An officer of the U.S. Army Air Forces will be designated Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.
The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF will continue to act as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, pending transfer of the USSAFE to the command of the SAC, and will be responsible under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for coordination of all POINTBLANK operations. Under his direction, the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be responsible for the determination of priorities of POINTBLANK targets to be attacked by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and for the technique and tactics employed and is authorized to move the units of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces between theaters within the limits of base area facilities and available [sic] for his forces.
The Commanding General USSAFE will keep the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean Theater informed of his general intentions and requirements. As far as possible, consistent with the performance of his primary mission, the Commanding General USSAFE will coordinate his operations with those of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.
The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the European and North African Theaters of operations will continue to be responsible for the administrative control of the U.S. Army air units in their respective area, including the provision of base services. The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in the Mediterranean will provide the necessary logistical support to the Fifteenth Air Force in performance of Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.
Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, USSAFE of the action taken.
The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with the provisions of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (Fan 254).
The Assistant Secretary of War to the President’s special assistant
Cairo, 4 December 1943
Memorandum for Mr. Harry Hopkins:
There is an increasing indication that the British are not now inclined to go along with the arrangement I made with Eden. They are placing the blame on the War Cabinet.
It is important that the arrangement we agreed to stick, but it will not be done unless we take a strong position. Until they come through as originally outlined, I propose not to send from Washington any military men to operate either on the European Commission or any transferred Combined Civil Affairs Committee in London. I believe that Winant’s appointment should go through, but as soon as I indicated that we would strengthen the London Committee with a good staff, they reverted to their former position, and that position is basically wrong. The plan we should adhere to is attached.
Sincerely,
JOHN J. McCLOY
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, December 4, 1943
Memorandum for the President From the Secretary of State:
Lisbon’s 2906 of December 2 reports that the following developed from a further conversation between Salazar and Kennan yesterday:
While maintaining neutrality Salazar is unwilling to grant our desires outright.
He is presently unwilling to extend the British further facilities for their or our use but is prepared to do so when he can be shown that the general military situation has changed in a manner to diminish the German menace to Portugal as compared with last August. He will go the limit to extend us immediate use of existing British facilities if an appearance can be maintained of adherence to the British agreement.
He demonstrated willingness to examine arrangements to allow us forthwith to proceed to constructing an airport on Santa Maria Island for Portugal, with a view to Anglo-American use when completed.
Lisbon’s 2911 of December 2 furnishes the following additional comment:
The Prime Minister agrees definitely to our full use of Terceira under a suitable formula reconciling such use with the British agreement, but he wishes to know what formula will be used. In his view a nominal marking of the planes as British would suffice.
When Kennan appraised him of our plans for sharing in antisubmarine patrol activity in Terceira, Salazar raised no objection and displayed no surprise but remarked that this must also be under a formula reconciling activities with the British agreement.
Dr. Salazar indicated that he would consider our proposal to construct in Santa Maria a new airport, and Kennan’s impression was that he would consider the proposal benevolently. He felt he could not grant us these facilities outright now. His thought evidently is that we should construct the airfield for Portugal and on completion, if it could be demonstrated that we and the British require such facilities beyond those already granted in the British agreement and that to grant them would not augment Portugal’s risk, the field would then be made available under the existing agreement and utilized by us as in the case of Lagens and Horta. As long as some formula covered Salazar’s position, it would be immaterial that the United States should make ninety-five percent use of the field. This is not a specific proposal, but is the trend of Salazar’s thought.
He mentioned an extraordinary display of curiosity by the German Minister respecting American use of the Azores, which led the Prime Minister to suspect that our use of the Islands might constitute a turning point in German policy vis-à-vis Portugal. He wishes to be able, as in the case of Terceira, officially to deny to the Germans that he has accorded us any special facilities in the Azores.
In wishing to make the new airfield available under section eight of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, the interpretation of article eight was his own and did not, according to the British Ambassador in Lisbon, result from any understanding with the British.
Since his last conversation with Kennan, Salazar has ascertained for himself that Flores is unsuitable for aviation, but he admits the advantages of Santa Maria. Should our views concerning Santa Maria undergo any early change, or should we have any specific additional desires along these lines, he wished us to inform him immediately.
As Ponta Delgada remains, according to the Prime Minister, the only insular port the Portuguese Navy can now call its own and is also the seat of Portuguese administration, he wishes to avoid granting facilities at this time in San [São] Miguel Island. Kennan said we needed a port with nearby airfield for the use of carrier-based planes and suggested an informal arrangement for utilizing Ribo [Rabo] de Peixe field. The Prime Minister seemed dubious, and pointed out that under the British agreement that field was to be reserved for the Portuguese fighter forces in the Islands. He thought the British and our naval authorities had underestimated the potentialities of Horta, and felt we could have all facilities we require for such aircraft in Horta. We might station an American tanker and repair ship in Horta, for example, if we wished.
The Prime Minister did not wish to relate these questions to any hypothesis [as] to eventual Portuguese cobelligerency against Japan. He instinctively thought there was agreement concerning Timor between Germany and Japan and feared the Timor question might complicate his relations with Germany. In this regard he is extremely anxious to have an answer to his overtures for Portuguese participation in liberating Timor. Our Legation in Lisbon thinks it could be useful for us to be helpful in this regard.
The Legation recommends that our military authorities reach agreement with the British as to the formula to be used to cover our activities at Lagens, and that the Legation should communicate this to Dr. Salazar.
The Legation also recommends that we immediately draft a preliminary proposal for the airport construction on Santa Maria, and that this be communicated to the Legation. The proposal should be in broad, concise terms, leaving details for subsequent agreement. It should embody provision for immediate survey by our technicians and should establish most-favored-nation treatment for us respecting later use by commercial aviation. The Legation suggests that this matter be taken care of in a preliminary exchange of notes to permit us to go ahead with technical planning and survey.
With regard to Salazar’s anxiety respecting Germany, the Legation points out that the agreement with the British specifically signifies a desire that Portugal remain neutral, and that if this is our attitude the extent to which Salazar has gone represents real progress of which we should take advantage. The Legation desires to know precisely the extent to which our military and naval authorities desire to make use of the opportunity.
My heartiest congratulations and felicitations on magnificent achievements of yourself, Prime Minister and your other associates.
CH