Cairo Conferences (SEXTANT)

The President to the Ambassador in Turkey

Cairo, December 2, 1943
Secret

Will you tell Inonu at once that I am delighted that he can come to see me? Assure him that he is being invited to a “free discussion as between equals.” Please tell the President that I am especially happy to have the occasion to talk with him. Will you tell him that transport planes will be available Adana on the morning of December 4? For your information British are advising their Ambassador in similar sense. Will you be sure to have an adequate American Interpreter with you?

The President’s special assistant to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, temporarily at Tehran

Cairo, December 2, 1943

Secret
Triple priority

President has wired Steinhardt today to the effect that he is delighted Inonu can come to Cairo and to assure Inonu that he is being invited to a “free discussion as between equals.” Steinhardt also directed inform Inonu that President especially happy to have the occasion to talk with him and that transport planes will be available Adana morning December fourth.

Will you see Molotov at once to make certain that Russian representatives are here morning December fourth? We understand that Soviet Ambassador Ankara is coming. Please advise.

HOPKINS

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Captain Randolph Churchill
Admiral Leahy Section Officer Oliver
Major Boettiger

Admiral Leahy’s summary:

During the dinner Roosevelt and Churchill compared their reactions to Stalin and reviewed the military and political discussion with our Russian ally that had just ended. The Prime Minister clearly indicated that he was inclined toward the American point of view on matters that up to then had produced much controversy between the U.S. and British staffs, particularly on the timing of the cross-Channel attack on Germany.

The Pittsburgh Press (December 2, 1943)

BIG THREE MAP HITLER’S DOOM; JAPAN TO LOSE HER EMPIRE
Program to crush Tokyo’s power is drafted at parley in Africa

Joseph Stalin, President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were reported drafting the obituary of Nazi Germany in Tehran today in a conference paralleling that in Cairo where plans were agreed upon for stripping Japan of her empire and forcing her unconditional surrender.

Unofficial reports circulated that the leaders of Russia, the United States and Great Britain were framing an ultimatum to Germany demanding immediate capitulation on pain of progressively severe terms.

Congressional quarters in Washington accepted as completely factual the reports that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had proceeded to Tehran to meet Stalin after their meeting in Cairo with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China.

A subsidiary conference in Cairo on Mediterranean strategy under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower gave rise to reports of plans for a new invasion of Southern Europe, perhaps in the Balkans.

Stalin attends new session

By Edward W. Beattie, United Press staff writer

London, England –
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin were reported conferring in Tehran today and observers believed they were mapping a post-war program to “quarantine” Germany and saddle her manpower, raw materials and production for rebuilding stricken Europe.

Through such a program, observers were convinced, the “Big Three” Allied Western powers plan to punish Germany and smash her ability to make future wars as completely as Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek plotted the crushing of Japan in Cairo.

No confirmation

There was no official confirmation of the whereabouts of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill since their departure from Cairo for an “unknown destination” following the Anglo-American-Chinese Conference, but a dispatch in a Lisbon newspaper reported they had already begun conversations with Premier Stalin in Tehran, capital of Iran. The Ankara radio also said that Stalin and Mr. Roosevelt were in Tehran.

Laurence Steinhardt, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, was also reported by Lisbon to have flown to Tehran. There has been widespread speculation that the Allies may prevail upon Turkey to grant them bases for an Anglo-American invasion to liberate the Balkans in conjunction with a Soviet drive from southern Ukraine.

If later developments confirm Stalin’s presence at a conference with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, it will be the first time in 31 years that the Soviet leader has left the borders of Russia.

Terms for Nazis

“Second-front” considerations were expected to play little part in any Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting, since it can be assumed that Anglo-American plans for an invasion of Western Europe at the earliest possible moment are already well advanced.

The three heads of state will probably fix the approximate terms for Germany’s unconditional surrender and post-war treatment so that the Allies will not be caught without adequate plans in the event of Germany’s sudden and unexpected collapse from within, as they were when Italy surrendered.

The conferees may frame an ultimatum demanding Germany’s immediate capitulation on pain of increasingly severe terms if the Germans persist in their policy of scorched-earth retreats.

Plans for new war?

The German plan appears to be to denude occupied Europe of all its able-bodied manpower by murder, maiming and sterilization to delay its recovery and give Germany a head start in preparations for a new world war 10-15 years hence.

To speed the rehabilitation of occupied countries and at the same time prevent Germany from preparing for another war, Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Premier Stalin were expected to seek to “quarantine” the Reich by a strict system of controls that will occupy all her manpower, materials and production in repairing the destruction the Germans have wrought.


Chiang meets with leaders

By Henry T. Gorrell, United Press staff writer

Allies to wrest spoils of war from Japan

japmap

Chiangs back home after long flight

Chungking, China –
Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek have returned from the Cairo Conference in a 42-hour flight of two long hops, it was announced officially today.

The Chiangs flew from Cairo to Karachi in 18 hours and on to Chungking, stopping only an hour in Karachi for refueling.

Cairo, Egypt –
The broad outline of a program to strip Japan of the vast empire she has acquired since 1895 and force her unconditional surrender was believed today to have emerged from an historic conference among President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Though the full force of the multi-sided Allied offensive will probably not hit Japan until after the defeat of Germany, there was every indication that the signal has been given for the preliminary moves that will lead to the crushing for all time of Japanese military power.

Military moves mapped

The presence at the tri-power conference of Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, newly-appointed Supreme Commander for Southeast Asia, and Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, American commander in the China-Burma-India Theater, along with the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff and high Chinese officers, pointed to the mapping of strategy for future military moves.

The conclusion of the five-day meeting, at which the Pacific counterpart of the Atlantic Charter was drafted, was announced early today after the three principals had departed for parts unknown. The locale of the conference was given only as “somewhere in North Africa.”

A communiqué, heralding a future offensive to beat the Japs to their knees, said:

The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air.

Early drive foreseen

Observers believe the conference presaged imminent, closely-coordinated drives designed to divide the Jap fleet and shatter the shaky supply lines which maintain the outposts of the enemy empire.

In Washington, Secretary of War Stimson said at his press conference today that the news from the North African meeting was highly encouraging, and that military measures had been agreed upon which would be disclosed in future operations. He said, however, that present operations against the Japs disclose that the fight in the Pacific Theater will be long and costly, though victory is certain.

The President, Mr. Churchill and the Generalissimo opened their meeting Nov. 22. They were flanked by the top men of the U.S., British and Chinese Armed Forces.

Objectives outlined

For five days, the galaxy of Allied chieftains conferred and then an announcement set forth the objectives of the Allies:

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

To achieve these ends, the A-B-C combination mapped the ways and means of defeating Japan.

Mme. Chiang present

Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill promised Chiang to throw into the war against Japan all their resources consistent with their determination to defeat Germany as soon as possible.

Though ill, Mme. Chiang flew thousands of miles to attend the conference with her husband.

The list of participants in the intense round of conferences, consultations, luncheons and dinners comprised a military who’s-who of the United States, Britain and China, with such notable exceptions as Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, who are already directing offensives against Japan.

Diplomats, too

Diplomatic as well as military talent was abundant. W. Averell Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, U.S. and British Ambassadors to Russia, came to Africa for the meeting. So did U.S. Ambassador to Britain John G. Winant and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.

After the three-power meeting, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower presided over a lengthy conference confined to the Mediterranean Theater, where he is the Allied commander.

Concerning the North African conference, it was announced:

  1. Allied military leaders decided on future military operations against Japan.

  2. The United States, Britain and China will bring unrelenting pressure on their “brutal enemies” by land, sea and air.

  3. The Allies, fighting to restrain and punish Jap aggression, will strip Japan of its conquests, not only those in this war, but those dating back to 1895 when Formosa was taken from China.

  4. The Allies will persevere in the “serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.”

The conference was attended by an amazing gathering of Allied leaders. These included:

MILITARY:

  • Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff
  • Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet
  • Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Air Forces
  • Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
  • Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, chief of the U.S. Army Service Forces
  • Gen. Eisenhower
  • Gen. Stilwell
  • Gen. Chennault
  • Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, military aide to the President
  • RAdm. Wilson Brown, the President’s naval aide
  • RAdm. Ross T. McIntire, Surgeon General, USN, and personal physician to the President
  • Adm. of the Fleet Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, British First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
  • Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff
  • Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, British Chief of Air Staff
  • Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to Mr. Churchill as Minister of Defense
  • Lt. Gen. Sir Thomas S. R. Webster, quartermaster to the British Army Forces, a recognized authority on supply and quartering of troops
  • Lord Louis Mountbatten
  • Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington
  • Gen. Shang Chen, commanding officer of Generalissimo Chiang’s headquarters and director of the General Office of the Chinese Military Council
  • Lt. Gen. Chow-Ching-tou, Chinese Air Force, director of the National Aeronautical Affairs Commission
  • VAdm. Yang Hsuanchen, director of the Second Department of the Military Operations Board of the Chinese National Military Council.

POLITICAL:

  • Harry Hopkins
  • W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to Russia
  • Laurence A. Steinhardt, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
  • John J. McCloy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of War
  • Lewis W. Douglas, deputy administrator of the U.S. War Shipping Administration
  • Mr. Eden
  • Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Russia
  • Lord Leathers, British Transport Minister
  • Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Foreign Under Secretary
  • Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Secretary General of the National Supreme Defense Council.

Began Nov. 22

The official revelation that the conference was held was made in a communiqué that said the meetings started Nov. 22. It foretold the doom of the sprawling, blood-soaked Jap Empire in a grim and almost contemptuous manner and contained a hint to Germany of what was coming next for her.

The announcement said:

The three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Thus, the nation that started on its career of conquest in 1895 with the seizure of Formosa and the Pescadores, seized vast Manchuria in 1931, attacked China in 1937 and in 1941 embarked on its seizure of the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, the Dutch East Indies and the Pacific Islands, is to be whittled down to size and left possessor only of its own islands.

It was deemed significant that Lord Mountbatten, aside from the three principals, seemed a dominant figure at the conference. It was believed that not only had the Allied leaders decided on imminent closely-coordinated drives to divide the Jap fleet and cut Japan’s supply lines, but that there might soon be a great thrust against the Malay Peninsula.

Italians ‘hopeful’ over conferences

Berne, Switzerland –
In those circles of northern Italy loyal to the government of Pietro Badoglio, hopeful eyes are turned today toward the reported Middle Eastern conference of Allied leaders.

These circles are hoping that the meetings will serve to alter radically the Italian situation and lead to Balkan operations which would relieve Italy of the horrors of war.

With a touch of wishful thinking, these Italians are convinced that Russia will now “authorize” Balkan operations, providing the Russian Army takes an active part in them. Such troops would pass through the Dardanelles – with the sanction of Turkey.

Drive into Burma believed drafted

London, England (UP) –
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and their military advisers probably completed in North Africa broad plans for an Allied advance into Burma to reopen the best land route to China, well-informed military observers said today.

The presence at the conference of Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander for Southeast Asia, and Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, American commander in China, Burma and India, was taken as an indication that the next step in the long-range campaign to smash Japan will be an offensive to reopen the Burma Road.

Only through opening that backdoor to China can sufficient men, armor and supplies be moved into the country to recapture the “Bomb Tokyo” airfields of eastern China and mount an all-out air and possibly an eventual land offensive against the Jap home islands.

Japs say parley linked to ‘defeats’

By the United Press

Enemy propaganda took the line today that the meetings of Allied leaders had a twofold purpose – to start a new offensive in the “nerve war” and to cover up alleged defeats in the Pacific.

The vague guesses broadcast by Berlin and Tokyo radios dwelt largely on the theme that the Allies now found it necessary to make other plans in view of setbacks.

Tokyo argued the meetings resulted from the big naval victories Japan claims to have won in the Pacific.

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Allied leaders hold parleys in armed camp

Cairo, Egypt (UP) –
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek held their historic conference in an armed camp.

The conference headquarters was described as “a complete defense unit.” Within its barbed-wire perimeter were air-raid shelters, slit trenches, ack-ack batteries, barbed-wire enclosures, military guards and fire watchers.

It was built to withstand surprise assault by land or air. It bristled with arms and mystery.

Roosevelt arrives

Only the conferees and their guards were allowed inside. Correspondents were outside the barbed wire.

President Roosevelt motored to the scene through a lane of U.S. soldiers spaced 20 yards apart – but no one will be able to tell his grandchildren that he saw the President arrive. Everyone was facing out – back to the road – watching for any suspicious person.

Prime Minister Churchill came part of the way by warship. He requested that the officers put on no extra “spit and polish” for him and the crew wore dungarees.

Relax on Thanksgiving

It wasn’t until Thanksgiving Day that the American, British and Chinese leaders were able to sit back, after three solid days and nights of joint efforts, and have their pictures taken.

President Roosevelt waved an expansive hand toward the center chair and said to Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek:

You are the guest of honor – and after all, this is your first conference.

Chiang smilingly declined the honor and took a chair on the President’s right.

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British ‘break’ news release; U.S. angered

‘Premature’ disclosure of parley news brings rebuke
By Joseph Laitin, United Press staff writer

Washington –
Government officials, angered by repeated premature British disclosures of Allied news involving the United States, promised today to exert every effort to ensure American newspapers and news services an even break from now on.

Reuters, a British news agency, broke the news of the three-power Cairo Conference Tuesday morning, about 33 hours ahead of the official release time. Officials charged this was in violation of an Allied agreement not to publish the news until 7:30 p.m. Wednesday night to protect the safety of the conferees.

Held in confidence

American editors, it was pointed out, had the official communiqué on their desks and were holding it in confidence at the time the Reuters dispatch was circulated.

Rep. Frank Carlson (R-KS) today told the House that Congress should investigate the “slipshod and bungling manner” in which the conference was announced.

He added:

This is not the first time. What about the Tokyo raid? What about the Patton incident?

Rep. Clare Hoffman (R-MI) asserted that the people of the United States are being neglected because “the President of the United States wants to be President of the world.”

Defended by Democrat

Democratic Leader Rep. John W. McCormack (D-MA) replied that the President is a “strong and courageous” man now “abroad in line of duty.”

McCormack said:

In future generations when the country faces such a crisis, I hope we have another man as strong and courageous, and I don’t care whether he’s Republican or Democrat – Protestant, Catholic or Jew.

Director Elmer Davis of the Office of War Information placed partial blame on British censorship which allowed the Reuters story to be sent out from London although it did forbid its publication in the British Isles.

Price pledges aid

Director Byron Price of the U.S. Office of Censorship said he would back Mr. Davis to the hilt. Asserting that “the circumstances speak for themselves,” Mr. Price said that:

Censorship is doing all it can and is anxious to see American newspapers and radio stations get at least an even break on such stories in the future.

Mr. Davis sarcastically rejected Reuters’ explanation that the “scoop” was the result of enterprise by its Lisbon bureau chief.

He said it was a kind of “enterprise” that any American news editor could have “indulged” in if he so desired, considering that the official communiqué was available to editors at the time.

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U.S. people entitled to news, paper says

Bayonne, New Jersey (UP) –
The Bayonne Times published the official announcement of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek yesterday, in advance of the official release time, explaining that “the people of the United States are as fully entitled to news as any other country in the world.”

The story was headlined:

Everyone In the World Except U.S. Knows FDR, Churchill, Chiang Meet

The Times said:

This release has been violated not alone by foreign and domestic news agencies, by various diverse means, but by the Office of War Information itself, which has kept the news from the American people but has broadcast it to foreign lands. We prefer to do this openly instead of publishing rumor stories credited to the usual “well-informed circles.”


Sydney, Australia (UP) –
The Daily Mirror yesterday published a full report of the Cairo Conference – 23 hours before the official release date. The story was withdrawn from later editions, the newspaper explaining that it had made a mistake.

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Editorial: The Cairo Pact

The Cairo Three-Power Pact pledges destruction of the Japanese Empire and the rise of free China as the major Far Eastern nation. If it provides the united military power to make that pledge a fact, Japan will be confined permanently to her own islands.

This recognizes that the old era of foreign domination is past; that the key to the future is Western cooperation with China, and no imperialist deals with Japan. On that basis, Pacific peace is to be built.

All of which is a great victory for American policy. The inclusion of China in the four-power Moscow Pact, which is now implemented by the American-British-Chinese agreement, is due chiefly to Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt.

Indeed, this agreement underwrites the Roosevelt assurance to Congress last September:

The United Nations will never again let her [Japan] have authority over the islands which were mandated to her by the League of Nations… And the same thing holds good in the case of the vast territories which Japan has stolen from China starting long before this war began.

Thus, Japan’s loot of half a century is to be reclaimed. Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores go back to China. Korea, after a necessary period of help, is to be independent. The morale effect of these pledges on the Chinese, staggering from almost seven years of war, is obvious. It will be harder now for Jap propagandists to poison China.

Of course, the Cairo communiqué leaves many questions unanswered. United Nations agreement is not yet complete. Will Britain return Hong Kong to China? What becomes of French Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies when the Japs are driven out? Are they to be trained for independence on the Philippine model, under their former rulers or under United Nations trusteeship? And the strategic mandated islands, are they to be under American or international guardianship?

Where does Russia come in? This four-power conference is being held in two sections, with Marshal Stalin absent from the Pacific sessions because Russia and Japan are nominally at peace. But his representative, Andrey Vyshinsky, attended unobstructively. That indicates Russian concurrence. Moreover, the return of Manchuria to China could not be guaranteed without Stalin’s tacit consent – probably leaving important Russian claims there to be negotiated by Moscow and Chungking directly.

When Russia is freed of the Nazi menace, she doubtless will become an active partner in the alliance against Japan – for neither Russia nor the present Pacific Allies can risk a Far Eastern settlement in which Russia has no part.

Also, the Cairo communiqué leaves open the complicated questions as to Japan’s future, when shorn of her conquests and disarmed. Is there to be Allied military occupation, short or long? Must the Emperor go? Is the Allied formula for free elections by the people, and civil liberties, to be applied? What about reparations, or Jap labor to rebuild liberated areas? Will a law-abiding small Japan have equal rights to markets, materials, trade and membership in the international organization, as hitherto promised by the Allies to all peaceful nations?

But it would be out of focus to expect answers to all the questions which will arise with Pacific victory, when we are so far from victory. On the political side, this conference was content to agree on the general goal while wisely it concentrated most on immediate military means. For Americans should be under no illusion – as certainly the Chinese are not – that any of the fine political pledges are of value unless enforced by much more Allied military power than has been put into the Pacific War so far.

Two years after Pearl Harbor and Singapore, Japan holds virtually all of her conquests, still keeps us 3,000 miles from Tokyo. The Cairo Pact is a sign that the Allies at last are ready to fight a major Pacific war. The test of the Cairo military threats is how soon and how hard and how continuously Adm. Nimitz, Gen. MacArthur, Lord Louis Mountbatten and Generalissimo Chiang can strike at the vitals of the Jap octopus.

Action counts now.

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Editorial: Everybody knew it

That great “secret” is out.

Nobody would have suspected it, but President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek have been meeting in Cairo.

The three now are meeting, or are about to meet, Premier Stalin of Russia.

It had been a very “hush-hush” affair. Nobody was supposed to say anything about it. And nobody did, or practically nobody. Only those who knew it. And the only ones who knew it were all the government people in Washington, all the newspapermen, nearly every taxi driver, the hotel chambermaids, officials, non-officials, motorists, pedestrians, retailers, wholesalers, consumers, workers, non-workers and maybe a few others.

They say even the birds and the bees knew it, but perhaps that is “wholly unconfirmed.”

Still, it was a secret. Elmer Davis, boss of the Office of War Production, said so. Reuters, a British news service, was among those distributing news of the meeting, but Mr. Davis said that was “reprehensible.”

However, Reuters, which spread the story to America, was forbidden to publish it in England, so Mr. Davis’ OWI obligingly rebroadcast it to England, not to mention ‘steen other countries, but didn’t breathe a word of it in this country.

Now you tell one.

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Screenshot 2022-06-20 213810

Simms: Cairo parley stressed need of Reds’ help

Allies’ desire for bases in Siberia emphasized by decisions
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

Washington –
The momentous decisions of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo, reemphasize the compelling necessity for an understanding with Marshal Stalin.

To carry out the Cairo manifesto, it is clear that two things must be done. First, Nazi Germany must be smashed and the war in Europe brought to an end and, second, Russia must give us bases in Siberia from which to get at Japan proper. In short, she too must come into the war against Nippon.

Japan, it was decided in Cairo, must be shorn of all the territory grabbed since 1895, including Manchuria, Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Philippines, the East Indies, the Pacific mandates, Indochina, Burma, Malaya and the rest.

That is a large order. It means reducing Japan to a third-rate power. To do so will be far from the cinch some predict after we lick Hitler and concentrate on the Far East. Nothing thus far indicates it will be an easy task.

Two alternatives

There are two alternatives. One – almost as long as bloody as the island route – is to retake Burma and build communications capable of supplying Chinese battlefields comparable to those in Europe and fight our way back to Shanghai. The other is for Russia to come in and provide us with more convenient bases in the Siberian maritime provinces.

But we would have to wait, of course, for possible Russian aid in Asia until the fighting in Europe is ended. Russia cannot afford a war on two fronts 5,000 miles apart. And as long as we ourselves are up to our necks in Europe, we are not in any position to take over and defend Siberia on our own.

Benefits for Russia

China excepted, Russia stands to gain more than any other power by the total defeat of Japan. Sooner or later, one must give way to the other in Northeast Asia. Both sides have long admitted this. They have already fought three wars over it – one declared, one undeclared and one diplomatic – only to reach the present stalemate.

Three-quarters of Soviet territory lies in Asia. Russia must have a dependable outlet to the Pacific, or Siberia will suffocate. A strong Japan blocks that outlet.

Korea was used as a springboard to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. These territories constitute a springboard to eastern Siberia. Thus, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek announced that Korea and Manchuria would be taken from Japan, they were helping Russia as much as themselves.

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The calendar of events at conference in Cairo

Cairo, Egypt (UP) –
The timetable of events at the three-power conference:

Sunday, November 21: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and party arrive by air from China, followed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his party about teatime. Chiang visited Churchill, who later invited British Chiefs of Staff to dinner, which was followed by informal talks.

Monday, November 22: President Roosevelt arrived by plane. Mr. Churchill received Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow, and visited the President and Chiang. Churchill lunched with the President and stayed on for dinner. The President and Churchill had a post-war discussion with American and British military staffs. Military leaders met at 11:00 a.m. EET and the first conference session was held at the time. Military, naval and air force delegates conferred nearly one hour.

Tuesday, November 23: Churchill met Andrey Vyshinsky on his way from Moscow to Algiers to represent Russia in the Italian Advisory Council. Churchill lunched at the President’s villa. Chiefs of Staff met at 3:30 p.m. with Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Allied commander in Southeast Asia; Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, commanding U.S. forces in China, Burma and India, and Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, commanding the U.S. 14th Air Force based in China, attending.

Wednesday, November 24: American, British and Chinese Chiefs of Staff met at 9:30 a.m. The first conference was held at 11:00 a.m. at the President’s villa. Chiefs of Staff and political leaders attended. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, U.S. envoy in Algiers Robert Murphy and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent British Foreign Under Secretary, arrived.

Thursday, November 25: Separate American and British staff meetings were followed in the afternoon by a general meeting seemingly ending the first phase of military conferences. At 6:00 p.m., the President and Churchill attended a Thanksgiving Day service. The President was host at dinner, with Churchill and American and British leaders as guests.

Friday, November 26: A big joint American-British conference was held at 2:30 p.m., with more than 30 military leaders including Gen. George C. Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff; Gen. Sir Alan Brook, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Gen. Eisenhower; Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, commanding Allied air forces in the Mediterranean; Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commanding Allied forces in the Middle East, and Air Chief Marshal Sir W. Sholto Douglas, commanding British air forces in the Middle East.

Mr. Eden conferred long with John G. Winant, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain.

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Völkischer Beobachter (December 3, 1943)

Der erste Akt des großen Blufftheaters –
In Kairo die Kapitulation des siegreichen Japans verlangt

Tschiangkaischek wird wieder mit leeren Worten vertröstet

vb. Wien, 2. Dezember –
Der erste Akt des neuen großen Agitationstheaters, zu dem Bolschewisten und Plutokraten in verbesserter Neuauflage der Moskauer Konferenz sich zusammengefunden haben, ist vorübergerauscht. Die Konferenz in Kairo, mit größter Heimlichkeit inszeniert, durch eine voreilige Meldung des Reuter-Büros aber seit einigen Tagen ein offenes Geheimnis, wurde am Mittwoch­ abend zu Ende gebracht, und ein gemeinsames amtliches Kommuniqué soll nun den Eindruck erwecken, als ob dort weltbewegende Dinge beschlossen worden seien.

Bei näherem Zusehen freilich entpuppt sich dieses Dokument als ein Gemisch von aufgeblasenem Schwindel, Selbstbetrug und dem Ausdruck der eigenen Unsicherheit, die durch die großsprecherischen Phrasen um so peinlicher hindurchleuchteten. Das Kommuniqué stellt zunächst fest, daß Roosevelt, Churchill und der „Generalissimus Tschiangkaischek“ gemeinsam mit ihren militärischen und diplomatischen Beratern eine Konferenz „in Nordafrika“ abhielten. Schon diese Präambel wird der Wirklichkeit nicht vollkommen gerecht. Wichtiger als der Generalissimus Tschiangkaischek war in Kairo wie in Tschungking ohne Zweifel die Frau Generalissimus, die ebenfalls an den Besprechungen teilnahm. Es ist bekannt, daß diese amerikanisch erzogene Dame im Laufe der Jahre geradezu zum bösen Geist Chinas geworden ist und durch ihren unseligen Einfluß Tschiangkaischek in die Ausweglosigkeit seiner heutigen Lage hineinmanövriert hat. Die Tournee, die sie vor einigen Monaten als Bittstellerin durch die USA unternahm, hat den Tschungking-Chinesen außer Komplimenten für ihre „erste Lady“ nichts eingebracht. So begab sich nunmehr Tschiangkaischek gemeinsam mit seiner Gemahlin persönlich zu den großen demokratischen Freunden – um ebenfalls freundliche Worte zu finden, aber sonst nichts.

Denn wenn das Kairoer Kommuniqué in seinem Schlußsatz erklärt, die Anglo-Amerikaner und die Tschungking-Chinesen seien entschlossen, auch weiterhin die schweren und langen Operationen durchzuhalten, die erforderlich sind, um eine bedingungslose Kapitulation Japans zu erzwingen, so ist die Ankündigung weiterer langer Leiden für die Chinesen die einzige Realität, die dieser Satz enthält. Die Vorstellung einer Kapitulation Japans, das die Plutokraten in raschem Anlauf aus dem gesamten ostasiatischen Bereich hinauswarf, das Tschiangkaischek selbst in den äußersten Winkel seines Landes drückte und einer neuen lebensfähigen Regierung die Bahn freimachte, das den Völkern Ostasiens die Freiheit erkämpfte und eine neue Ordnung in seinem Raum aufrichtete – die Vorstellung einer Kapitulation dieses siegreichen und selbstbewußten Volkes vor seinen aus Ostasien hinweggefegten Gegnern ist einfach grotesk. Die letzten Siege der japanischen Luftwaffe über die amerikanische Flotte bei Bougainville und den Gilbertinseln sind der einzig passende Kommentar zu den Tiraden aus Kairo.

Nach demokratischem Ritus

Mit größter Gelassenheit wird man daher in Japan vernehmen, daß die Anglo-Amerikaner der Großmacht des Fernen Ostens die völlige Erdrosselung und die Zurückführung auf seinen nationalen Besitzstand vom Jahre 1895 androhen. Denn nicht nur der Gewinn Japans aus dem ersten Weltkriege soll ihm abgenommen werden, sondern „auch alle Gebiete, die Japan den Chinesen genommen hat, wie die Mandschurei, Formosa und die Pescadoresinseln.“ Auch Korea wird „zu gegebener Zeit“ Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit verheißen – nach dem guten demokratischen Rezept, immer dort „Versklavung von Völkern“ zu entdecken und zu bekämpfen, wo nicht die eigene Fahne weht, wie beispielsweise in Indien. Selbstverständlich beteuern die Väter des Kommuniqués, auch, das gehört zum demokratischen Ritual, daß sie „für sich selbst keinen Gewinn begehren und keinen Gedanken an eine territoriale Expansion hegen.“ Immerhin ist recht auffallend, daß von der Wiederherstellung des holländischen Besitzes in Ostasien mit keinem Wort die Rede ist, was darauf schließen läßt, daß Briten und Yankees nach bewährten Beispielen der englischen Geschichte davon träumen, sich auch hier am eigenen Bundesgenossen zu bereichern, wie die Briten es auch als selbstverständlich betrachten, daß das chinesische Hongkong nach dem Kriege wieder seine Rolle als Ausbeutungszentrum in China übernimmt.

Welche strategischen Möglichkeiten aber bestehen, um das Rad der asiatischen Geschichte in dieser Weise zurückzudrehen, darüber äußert sich das Kommuniqué mit vielsagender Zurückhaltung. Es heißt lediglich, daß die militärischen Sachverständigen ein Einvernehmen über die künftigen militärischen Operationen gegen Japan erzielt hätten. Zu Lande, zur See und in der Luft solle ein pausenloser Druck auf den Feind ausgeübt werden. Nun, das hörte man schon vor einem Vierteljahr in Quebec, ohne daß den Ankündigungen größere Taten gefolgt wären, diesmal wird es kaum anders sein. Was hinter dem großen Bluff an militärischen Möglichkeiten steckt, geht nämlich mit geradezu peinlicher Deutlichkeit aus dem Kommentar hervor, den Reuter zu dem Kommuniqué in die Welt funkt. Auch in diesem Machwerk ist an der Oberfläche alles Kraft und Selbstbewußtsein.

Die drei Baumeister des Krieges haben entscheidende Entschlüsse gefaßt. Der Plan für den Sieg im Pazifik ist fertiggestellt.

Smuts, der nirgends fehlen darf, ist mit der Empire-Strategie beauftragt worden, „währen Churchill den Verlauf der Operationen in weltweitem Maßstabe ausarbeitet.“

Ein Bluff unter vielen

Eine „kombinierte Strategie für eine Riesenoffensive“ ist der Stein der Weisen, der in Kairo entdeckt wurde. Zum Schluß aber folgt die kalte Dusche für Tschiangkaischek:

Man glaubt in Kairo, daß alle drei Alliierten grundsätzlich die Auffassung teilten, der Krieg gegen Deutschland müsse zunächst abgeschlossen sein, ehe man den Pazifikplan durchführen kann. Da liegt der Hase im Pfeffer. Nicht einmal der Mann, der diesen Satz geschrieben hat, glaubt, daß Tschiangkaischek mit diesem Programm einverstanden ist. Aber er weiß und mit ihm weiß die ganze Welt, daß die Anglo-Amerikaner nicht gleichzeitig in Europa und Ostasien mit voller Kraft zu militärischen Großoperationen imstande sind. Vor wenigen Tagen mußte der englische Produktionsminister Littleton im Unterhaus mit unbritischer Bescheidenheit erklären, leider habe man Leros und Samos nicht verteidigen können, weil der italienische Kriegsschauplatz Englands Kraft zu sehr in Anspruch nehme. Auch der Empirestratege Smuts wird das Rätsel nicht lösen, woher dann die erforderlichen Divisionen und der erforderliche Schiffsraum für die „Riesenoffensive“ gegen Japan kommen sollen.

Mit diesem Reuter-Kommentar sinkt das Kairoer Kommuniqué zu dem zusammen, was es tatsächlich ist, zu einem reinen Bluff. Tschiangkaischek ist wieder einmal der von seinen Freunden Betrogene, aber wie bisher sucht der Betrüger sich selbst und sein Volk zu betrügen, das mit erneuter Hoffnung auf eine Linderung seiner fürchterlichen Notlage zu neuen Kraftanstrengungen aufgepulvert werden soll. Nicht anders als die Tschungking-Chinesen werden die Yankees dumm gemacht. Statt der Geständnisse von seinen neuen schweren Niederlagen bietet Roosevelt ihnen die Verheißung kommender Siege – einen faulen Wechsel, der ebenso wenig eingelöst werden wird, wie die von Casablanca und von Quebec.

Filmtheater Kairo

So ist die Kairoer Konferenz weniger ein politisches Ereignis als eine große Revue. In dieser Hinsicht freilich wird sie den höchsten amerikanischen Anforderungen gerecht. Die Reporter der britischen und amerikanischen Presse schildern spaltenlang die riesige Staffage und die Kulissen, die in Kairo aufgebaut wurden. Ein Gelände von mehreren Quadratkilometern wurde von Stacheldraht und durch Minenfelder gesichert, um das kostbare Leben der „großen Drei“ gegen Anschläge zu sichern. Alle Personen mußten mehrere Posten und Wachen passieren, ehe sie in das Allerheiligste des Beratungsraumes Vordringen konnten. Roosevelt hatte eigens hunderte seiner G-Männer mitgebracht, die drüben in den USA Bekämpfer – oder je nach Bedarf (auch als Komplicen der Gangster) – einen Namen haben und ein unentbehrliches Requisit für Hollywood darstellen. Wo immer sich Roosevelt, Churchill oder Tschiangkaischek zeigten, wurden sie von einem Schwarm Polizisten auf Motorrädern in Kübelwagen begleitet. Schilderungen dieser Art nehmen kein Ende.

Dagegen treten fast die militärischen Hauptpersonen der großen Handlung in den Hintergrund, obwohl auf ihre Anwesenheit in den Schilderungen aus agitatorischen Gründen das nötige Gewicht beigemessen wird. Wieviel Generale und Stabsoffiziere anwesend waren, entzieht sich vorerst einer genauen Feststellung. Die Angaben der Yankees und Briten schwanken zwischen fünf runden Dutzenden und einigen Hunderten. Wenn Offensiven durch Generale und Generalstäbler entschieden würden, so wären die großen Projekte von Kairo der Durchführung sicher. An den Fronten freilich pflegen ja die Waffen und die Tapferkeit den Ausschlag zu geben.

In einem Punkt jedenfalls war die Konferenz für alle Teilnehmer ein voller Erfolg: am Abend des 25. November gab Roosevelt ein großes Festessen, dessen Speisenfolge das Reuter-Büro von der bescheidenen Gemüsesuppe am Anfang bis zu den Orangen und dem Teegebäck am Schluß Gang um Gang aufzählt, selbstverständlich ohne die Cocktails zu vergessen. Die englischen Leser, denen diese Genüsse nur auf so weite Distanz gezeigt werden, werden nicht ohne Neid vernehmen, wie gut es den Herren in Kairo gegangen ist. Auch sie wären ohne Ausnahme sicherlich bereit gewesen, als unvermeidliche Dreingabe die Hymnen und Märsche über sich ergehen zu lassen, die eine amerikanische Kapelle den Gästen zur Würze des Mahles darbot.

Man versteht es, daß nach der gesegneten Tafel ein Dankgottesdienst fällig war. Tschiangkaischek, der bekanntlich Christ ist, nahm daran sicherlich keinen Anstoß. In Teheran, zusammen mit Stalin, dürfte ein derartiger Schluß des Programms auf Schwierigkeiten stoßen.

U.S. State Department (December 2, 1943)

President Roosevelt’s log of the trip

Thursday, December 2 (at Cairo)

. . . . . . .
2:35 p.m. (Cairo Time). The President’s plane arrived at Cairo West Airfield. We changed our clocks and watches (set them back 1½ hours) to conform to Zone Minus Two time. Air distance traveled from Tehran to Cairo (our route), 1,290 miles. The President disembarked and left the airport immediately via auto and proceeded to Ambassador Kirk’s villa in the Mena district of Cairo.
3:30 p.m. Ambassador Kirk called on the President.
4:00 p.m. The President summoned Lieutenant (jg.) Rigdon and worked on official mail that had been received on our arrival here. There were no Congressional bills or executive orders in this particular pouch.
8:30 p.m. The President had dinner at his villa and had as his guests the Prime Minister, Mrs. Oliver, Admiral Leahy, Major Boettiger, Captain Randolph Churchill and Mr. Hopkins.
The President received word this evening, from Ambassador Steinhardt at Ankara, that President Inonu would come to Cairo Saturday, December 4, for a conference with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We left Ambassador Harriman and Mr. Bohlen at Tehran. They were to remain there for a few days longer and then proceed on to Moscow.
The news story concerning the Cairo Conference (Nov. 22-26) broke officially this morning.
. . . . . . .

U.S. State Department (December 3, 1943)

The British Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Cairo, December 3, 1943

Secretary of State

I spoke to you yesterday about our desire for a very much closer co-operation with the Americans in the Balkans, both as regards policy and execution of policy. Both Mr. Stevenson and I are in full agreement on this point, and I cannot do better than attach a copy of a paper he has written on the subject, which is on the Agenda for the Middle East Defence Committee this morning. I understand that most members of the Defence Committee have already signified in advance their warm approval of these proposals.

R. A. LEEPER
Cairo, 3 December 1943

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in Egypt

Co-ordination of OSS and SOE

  1. General Donovan has demanded a very largely increased share in special operations in the Balkans. We should welcome this demand, provided that an agreed policy is carried out.

  2. At present the OSS organisation as a whole is answerable only to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and is entirely independent of the State Department. On the other hand, SOE carries out a policy agreed between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office.

  3. There is definite danger that General Donovan’s organisation will not necessarily pursue the same policy as SOE. Such a development would obviously lead to incalculable difficulties, and should be avoided if possible.

  4. The best, if not indeed the only, way of doing this would be:
    (a) to concert our Balkan policy with the United States Government:
    (b) to integrate the carrying out of that policy, so far as special operations are concerned, at all executive levels.

  5. (a) would presumably be done on the highest political level.
    (b) would mean:

(i) that SOE and OSS should be two separate, but not independent, organisations:

(ii) that by means of working committees the closest possible integration should be achieved in operational policy and control between the two organisations:

(iii) that by some similar means the closest contact should be established between PWE and the moral operations section of OSS:

(iv) that not only OSS but the United States State Department should be represented on the Special Operations Committee at GHQ Middle East, the State Department representative being the United States Ambassador to Greece and Yugoslavia:

(v) that the United States State Department should be represented by the United States Ambassador on the Middle East Defence Committee:

(vi) that operational control of all special operations should remain in the hands of the C. in C. Middle East who would be advised, as now, by the Special Operations Committee and, when necessary, the Middle East Defence Committee.

  1. It is suggested that advantage should be taken of the present conference to obtain an agreed decision on the lines of paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

(Intd.)
RCSS

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President Roosevelt to President al-Khouri of Lebanon

Cairo, December 3, 1943

Great and Good Friend, It has afforded me very particular satisfaction and pleasure to receive today in Cairo, from the hand of my representative in Lebanon, Mr. Wadsworth, the letter whereby you inform me that, called by the suffrage of Parliament, you assumed on September 21, last, the Presidency of the Lebanese Republic.

I should welcome the opportunity to convey in person my congratulations to you and to the Lebanese people; for the events of recent weeks in your country have been followed in mine with very special attention and sympathy.

The pressure of other events, however, render[s] such visit impractical at this time. I, therefore, with this reply, cordially reciprocate the sentiments of friendship you express, a friendship which unites our two peoples in the great struggle to uphold the principles to which the United Nations are dedicated.

Your good friend,
FDR

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Dill
General Marshall Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral King General Riddell-Webster
General Arnold Captain Lambe
Lieutenant General Somervell Brigadier Sugden
Vice Admiral Willson Admiral Mountbatten
Vice Admiral Willson Air Commodore Elliot
Rear Admiral Cooke General Brooke
Rear Admiral Bieri Air Chief Marshal Portal
Rear Admiral Badger Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Sutherland Brigadier McNair
Major General Handy Colonel Cornwall-Jones
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Roberts
Captain Doyle
Captain Freseman
Commander Long
Secretariat
Captain Royal Brigadier Redman
Colonel McFarland Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 3, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret

Approval of decisions of CCS 131st and 132nd meetings

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 131st meeting and the conclusions of the 132nd meeting, subject to the insertion of the words “via the Supreme Commander, SEAC” after the word “Generalissimo” in the conclusion of Item 1 of CCS 131st meeting. The detailed reports of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Implications of military conclusions of the EUREKA Conference (CCS Memorandum for Information No. 165)

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider the military conclusions reached at the EUREKA Conference as set out in the enclosure to CCS Memorandum for Information Number 165, and consider the implications of these decisions and the action necessary. The military conclusions were then examined in turn.

  1. Partisans

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that a directive should be issued to General Eisenhower on the lines of this conclusion. There were certain points which should be covered. He understood that General Eisenhower had set up, or was setting up, a commander with a joint staff to deal with the whole question of supplies to Yugoslavia on a regular basis. There was also the question of the supply of equipment. He understood from General Eisenhower that captured Italian equipment was running short. It might be better to give this equipment to the Partisans who already had weapons and ammunition of Italian make and would use the equipment to good advantage, and to arm Italian troops where necessary with Allied weapons.

Admiral King suggested that these points might form a part of the general directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean area.

After further discussion, it was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should, as soon as possible, produce a short directive to the Supreme Commander dealing with the question of supplies to the Partisans.

  1. Turkey

Sir Alan Brooke said that all the necessary preparations were going forward in anticipation of Turkey entering the war.

Admiral King said he felt that there were implications in this decision which should be considered. For instance, how many squadrons of aircraft and how may anti-aircraft regiments would be required to support Turkey?

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the details of the commitments were set out in CCS 418.

Admiral King said that he considered that paper, at least in part, out of date. For instance, a target date of 15 July was regarded as a possibility for OVERLORD.

CCS 418, “Entry of Turkey into the War” was later considered in closed session.

  1. Russian declaration of war on Bulgaria

It was generally agreed that there were no particular implications to this conclusion.

  1. OVERLORD and operations against the South of France

Sir Alan Brooke felt the first step in considering the implications of this conclusion should be that the whole landing craft situation must be examined in order to discover from where the necessary landing craft for the South of France assault could be obtained. He suggested that the Combined Staff Planners should examine this at once on the basis that the OVERLORD operation took place during May and that a two-divisional assault took place against the South of France.

Admiral King pointed out that the decision at EUREKA was only that the operation against the South of France should be undertaken in as great a strength as the availability of landing craft permitted and that there was no decision as to the strength of the assaulting force.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he regarded a two-divisional assault as the minimum which could be accepted. The attack must be planned with sufficient strength to make it successful.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that the Combined Staff Planners must be given an agreed basis on which to consider the landing craft situation. The British Chiefs of Staff felt and hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed with them, that an assault with less than two divisions would be asking for failure. He reminded the Committee that the plan which had been considered at EUREKA envisaged something in the neighborhood of a two-divisional assault with an advance up the Rhone by some ten divisions. If undertaken with less strength, the operation could only be in the nature of a diversion. It appeared that in order to carry out a successful operation in the South of France, other operations would have to suffer. Unless the Planners were given an indication from the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the strength of the assault, they would probably do no more than report that this operation was impossible of successful accomplishment.

Admiral Leahy felt that the Planners should be told that this operation should be carried out without interference with Operation OVERLORD.

Admiral King said that the problem might be approached in two ways: The Planners could be directed to study and report on the lift possible with the landing craft available; the other method was to begin with an arbitrary number of divisions and determine whether resources could be made available for a lift of this size.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that in considering the availability of resources, all other operations must be taken into consideration except OVERLORD. He considered that if no strength was set, the Planners could not examine the availability of resources properly. He suggested that they be told, firstly, to report on the required strength for the assault and, secondly, to put forward proposals from where the landing craft resources to lift this assault force could be made available.

Admiral King said that he believed there was no record in the EUREKA discussions with regard to a two-division assault. As far as his recollection went, the paper, which had been hastily prepared, showed that without interfering with other operations, there was an amphibious lift for some 37,000 personnel.

General Marshall pointed out that the conclusion at EUREKA implied a definite limitation of resources. What was required was a report on the landing craft necessary for a successful operation against the South of France without affecting Operation OVERLORD. This operation could not be planned on a lavish scale.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that one hypothesis might be that the necessary resources could be found by giving up the Andaman operations.

It was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be directed in collaboration, as necessary, with the Combined Administrative Committee, to examine the agreed operation against the South of France on the following premises:
a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions, and;
b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of OVERLORD.

This report to include a statement showing where the necessary resources particularly in assault shipping and landing craft might be found.

  1. Coordination with the Russian Staff

It was generally agreed that coordination of effort with the Russian Staff should be achieved through the U.S. and British Missions in Moscow.

It was suggested that it might be desirable that experts should be sent to Moscow from Washington and London in order to deal with the problem of deception.

Draft agenda for the remainder of SEXTANT Conference

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the future subjects for discussion might be grouped in blocks under main headings. He presented, for consideration, a draft agenda set out on this principle.

Admiral Leahy then explained that he believed the United States Chiefs of Staff would have to leave Cairo on the morning of Monday, 6 December, or possibly on the morning of Sunday, 5 December.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that it would be a calamity if the Combined Chiefs of Staff broke up without fully agreeing on all the many points still to be resolved.

Admiral Leahy said he saw no hope of postponing their departure after these dates.

General Marshall then suggested an agenda designed to deal only with the essential points before the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That all but the most essential items should be excluded from the SEXTANT Agenda.

b. That the following should be the order of priority in which they should be dealt with:

  1. Entry of Turkey into the war.
  2. Integration of the U.S. Air Command – directive to Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
  3. Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
  4. RANKIN – discussion only.
  5. Operations against the South of France.
  6. Relation of resources to requirements.
  7. Final Report.

At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session.

Entry of Turkey into the war (CCS 418)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 418 as amended during the course of the discussion. (Subsequently published as CCS 418/1)

Progress reports

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that all progress reports submitted for the SEXTANT Conference should be taken as having been noted by them. This is not to be taken as meaning that any recommendations that there may be in different progress reports have been accepted. Should such acceptance be needed, the recommendations in question must be put forward separately.

Combined Bomber Offensive

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged.
b. That General Eaker should not be urged to catch up the three months of arrears.

c. That General Eaker should be told to expand his operations to the extent possible with the aircraft and crews available.

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Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 3 December 1943

Secret
CCS 397 (Revised)
References: a. CCS 242/6
b. CCS 319/5
c. CCS 417

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944

We are agreed that every effort should be exerted to bring the USSR into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans should be prepared in that event.

We are agreed that plans should be prepared for operations in the event that Germany is defeated earlier than the fall of 1944.

A schedule of proposed operations and projected target dates for planning purposes is given in the appendix to the enclosure. The operations envisaged are based on a concept of obtaining strategic objectives and bases from which to conduct further operations to force the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest practicable date. The operations are in consonance with the over-all objective and over-all strategic concept agreed upon at QUADRANT and reaffirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in CCS 380/2, and with the provisions of CCS 417 (Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan).

General. In addition to the specific objectives hereinafter indicated, supporting operations should be conducted. Both the specific and supporting operations will be designed to destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date; to secure maximum attrition of enemy air forces; to intensify air, submarine, and mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication; to establish air and sea blockade of the main Japanese islands; to continue efforts to keep China in the war; and to enable us to launch land and carrier-based air operations against Japan.

North Pacific. Plans for the North Pacific involve the augmentation of base facilities and defensive installations in the Aleutians in preparation for entry into the Kuriles and Soviet territory in the event of Russian collaboration. Naval surface and submarine action, including raids on the Japanese fishing fleet will be carried out. Preparations will be made for executing very long-range strategic bombing against the Kuriles and northern Japan.

Central, South and Southwest Pacific. The advance along the New Guinea-NEI-Philippine axis will proceed concurrently with operations for the capture of the Mandated Islands. A strategic bombing force will be established in Guam, Tinian, and Saipan for strategic bombing of Japan proper. Air bombardment of targets in the NEI-Philippine Area and the aerial neutralization of Rabaul will be intensified.

China. Our efforts in the China area should have as their objective the intensification of land and air operations in and from China and the build-up of the USAAF and the Chinese army and air forces. It shall include also the establishing, without materially affecting other approved operations, of a very long-range strategic bombing force at Calcutta, with advanced bases at Chengtu to attack vital targets in the Japanese “inner zone.”

Southeast Asia. In the Southeast Asia Area operations should be carried out for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. Operation BUCCANEER will be conducted. Within the means available additional offensive operations including carrier borne raids, should be conducted by sea, air, and ground forces for the purpose of maintaining pressure on the enemy, inducing dispersion of his forces, and attaining the maximum attrition practicable on [of?] his air and naval forces and shipping. The preparation of the bases in India required for approved operations in the SEA and China Theaters should continue.

As more carriers become available, the operations set forth should be supplemented, between scheduled operational dates as practicable, with massed carrier task force strikes against selected vital targets.

The completion of these operations will place the United Nations in positions from which to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at our disposal after Germany is defeated.

[Enclosure]

A schedule of operations for 1944 is set forth in the appendix. Target dates which have been determined after careful consideration of prospective means and of time and space factors, are presented for planning purposes only. We are convinced that the sequence of operations must be flexible; we must be prepared to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation. The four primary developments which may permit short cuts are:

a. Early defeat of the Japanese Fleet.

b. Sudden withdrawal of Japanese forces from areas (as from Kiska).

c. Increase in our means such as by acceleration of the assault shipbuilding program and by an earlier defeat of Germany than 1 October 1944.

d. The early collaboration of the USSR in the war against Japan.

We have directed that further study be conducted and plans made and kept up to date for the conditions assumed in c and d.

We have directed that special attention be given to the optimum employment of the enormous air forces which will be released upon the defeat of Germany.

We have directed that a study be made for the optimum use, timing, and deployment in the war against Japan of very long-range bombers.

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Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 3 December 1943

Secret
CCS 418/1

Entry of Turkey into the war

The object of this paper is to discuss the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war, and the extent of our commitments likely to be involved.

Turkey’s role in the war

We consider that our object in the Balkans should be to bring about the surrender of Bulgaria and open a short sea route to Russia.

The surrender of Bulgaria is most likely to be achieved by:
a. Air action.
b. Russian diplomatic and subversive action.
c. The psychological effect of Turkey becoming an active ally of the United Nations.

We do not propose that Allied forces should be concentrated in Thrace to cooperate with the Turks. In Thrace, therefore, the Turks must be persuaded to stand on the defensive and to concentrate their forces for the protection of the Straits. To assist them we would continue to bomb the Bulgarians.

The opening of a short supply route to Russia through the Dardanelles would achieve a considerable economy in shipping, but might also enable us to take the strain off the Persian supply route. The Turks should be called upon to provide us with the bases from which to protect the convoys.

Commitments involved

The commitments which would be involved in the above policy can be considered under two headings:

a. Minimum air and anti-air assistance to the Turks, who make a great point of the necessity for protecting their main cities, communications and industries from German air attack.

b. Action, within the capacity of the forces that can be made available, for opening the Aegean Sea, the capture of Rhodes and the other Dodecanese Islands.

Assistance to the Turks
We can provide a reasonable scale of air defense for Turkish key points.

Opening the Aegean
In addition to 6a above, we can find the necessary air forces to provide air cover for convoys in the Aegean and the Marmora, without any serious effect on operations elsewhere.

The naval forces required for escorting and minesweeping for a fortnightly convoy cycle would have to be provided from outside the Mediterranean.

With the above naval and air forces it should be possible to pass occasional convoys through the Aegean without first capturing Rhodes. In these circumstances, however, the losses in ships might be considerable, and for the passage of regular convoys it would be necessary to capture Rhodes and highly desirable to clean up Kos, Leros, Samos, Khios, Mytilene and Lemnos. From the military point of view, it would be an immense advantage if the Turks could cooperate in the assaults on the islands other than Rhodes.

The forces required for the capture of Rhodes over and above those now in ME Command would be:
a. Naval forces for the assault.
b. One British division.
c. The assault shipping and craft for one division, two brigades assaulting.
d. Two parachute battalions and the necessary air lift for them amounting to 90 transport aircraft.

As far as can be foreseen at present the land and air forces for this operation could be found from resources in the Mediterranean Theater.

There are two possible sources for the necessary assault shipping and craft: the Mediterranean Theater, and the Southeast Asia Theater.

The two parachute battalions and the 90 transport aircraft could only come from the Central Mediterranean and their release would depend on the requirements of the situation in Italy, and the preparations for operations against Southern France.

From the point of view of the weather it might be possible to stage an assault on Rhodes towards the end of February, but other factors are likely to affect this date.

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The President to the Secretary of State

Cairo, 3 December 1943
Secret

In reference your message transmitted as White 67, in view of the fact that the Russians have appointed the Russian Ambassador as Soviet Representative on the Advisory Council [Commission] in London, I suggest that you announce Winant’s appointment.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

My conferences with the Generalissimo were very satisfactory and I liked him. He is delighted with the results of the Moscow Conference.

In Tehran things went on the whole very well and better than I expected. Marshal Stalin and I worked together toward objectives which turned out to be very similar. I will bring you the minutes of all that was said and done. Molotov sent you his very warm personal regards.

Churchill and I are to see President Inonu here in Cairo and then I will head westward.

The President to the Secretary of State

Cairo, 3 December 1943

Personal and secret from the President.

I think it best not to appoint International Civil Aviation Committee until I get back because I think you and I should agree on some general principles to lay before them before they meet.