Prisoners of Nazis in Tunisia given ‘jumping rations’
Food infested by bugs, British and Americans report after fall of Tunis releases them; few received proper treatment
By John Lardner, North American Newspaper Alliance
…
Völkischer Beobachter (May 17, 1943)
Die iberoamerikanischen Staaten unter Roosevelts Druck –
Schlechte Beispiele „kontinentaler Politik“
rd. Berlin, 16. Mai –
In den südamerikanischen Staaten, die sich in den Krieg der USA.-Juden einspannen ließen, zeichnen sich immer deutlicher die „Segnungen“ ab, die der Abbruch der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zu Europa und die Unterwerfung unter den Dollarimperialismus für diese Länder mit sich gebracht haben.
In Bolivien steht nach wie vor die Forderung nach einem Zugang zum Meer auf der Tagesordnung. „Associated Press“ berichtet aus La Paz – die dortige Presse beschäftigt sich stark mit der Zurückweisung dieser „ewigen Ziele der nationalen Politik“ durch den chilenischen Außenminister Fernandez – die Zeitungen stellten sich einhellig hinter die Erklärung des bolivianischen Staatspräsidenten Penaranda, wonach Bolivien einen Zugang zum Meer erlangen müsse. Verschiedene bolivianische Kreise bilden sich jedenfalls ein, die in Amerika angeblich vorhandene „Stimmung kontinentaler Harmonie“ biete eine günstige Gelegenheit zu Verhandlungen über diesen Punkt.
Aus Uruguay liegen Nachrichten vor, die diese „kontinentale Harmonie“ allerdings in weniger rosigem Licht erscheinen lassen. Dort sieht man die Hoffnung auf die „panamerikanische Zusammenarbeit,“ die dem Land an Stelle des traditionellen Handels mit Europa die wirtschaftliche Sicherheit garantieren sollte, immer mehr schwinden, besonders nachdem der USA.-Vizepräsident Wallace erklärte, die amerikanischen Völker müßten ihren Gürtel enger schnallen. Dieses Wort trifft auf Uruguay in besonderem Maße zu. Mehrere Tage lang fehlten der Bevölkerung die notwendigsten Nahrungsmittel: Kartoffeln, Fleisch, Gemüse und Brennstoffe waren nicht zu erhalten. Die gedrückte Stimmung wird noch verstärkt durch die Schwäche der Regierung, die bei der Ablehnung eines Regierungsvorschlages zur Ernennung von hohen Verwaltungsbeamten durch die Opposition offen zutage trat.
Chile, das sich einerseits den bolivianischen Forderungen nach einem Pazifikhafen widersetzt und damit nach Ansicht Boliviens und der USA. die „kontinentale Harmonie“ stört, bekommt anderseits deutlich zu spüren, was sich die USA. unter diesem Schlagwort vorstellen: rücksichtslose Ausbeutung zugunsten der Wall-Street-Juden, als Dank dafür aber – leere Versprechungen einer wirtschaftlichen Hilfe und die Aufforderung an den Staatspräsidenten, zum Befehlsempfang in Washington zu erscheinen.
Unter dem Druck dieser Tatsachen versucht man in Chile wie auch in anderen Ländern Ibero-Amerikas, durch gegenseitige Hilfe wenigstens einen Teil dessen zu beschaffen, was der „große Partner im Norden“ nicht liefern kann oder will. So wurde in Santiago de Chile mitgeteilt, die Regierung habe im Prinzip nichts gegen die Aufhebung der Zollgrenzen mit Argentinien einzuwenden. Diese Verlautbarung zeigt deutlich, daß die südamerikanischen Staaten, die sich von den USA. ins Schlepptau nehmen ließen, unter dem nordamerikanischen „Schutz“ mehr denn je auf sich selbst angewiesen sind.
Die USA. rächen sich –
Wettbewerb im Naben Osten
Von unserer Stockholmer Schrittleitung
dr. th. b. Stockholm, 16. Mai –
Die Amerikaner sind dabei, ihre von den Briten gewonnene Stellung in Iran weiter zu stärken. Während die militärischen und zivilen Vertreter Großbritanniens im Raum des Mittleren Ostens in Kairo ihre Konferenz abhalten, in der die Versorgungslage in Iran und die Pläne zur weiteren Ausbeutung des Mittleren Ostens für die britische Kriegführung nach den bisher vorliegenden Meldungen eine ausschlaggebende Rolle spielen soll, „rächen“ sich die Amerikaner und die Sowjets, da sie zu dieser Konferenz nicht eingeladen wurden, dadurch, daß sie eine eigene Konferenz in Teheran abhalten.
Der stellvertretende Chef der Operationsabteilung des nordamerikanischen Kriegsministeriums, Generalmajor Thomas, hat den Zeitpunkt gut abgepaßt, um mit dem Stabschef für die nordamerikanischen Armeeluftstreitkräfte in Teheran einen kurzen Besuch abzustatten. Sie wurden von dem sowjetischen Botschafter freudig empfangen, der sie sofort zusammen mit zahlreichen hohen Sowjetoffizieren zu sich einlud.
Teuer bezahlte Terrorangriffe –
112 Feindflugzeuge in 2 Tagen!
dnb. Berlin, 16. Mai –
Nachdem die britisch-nordamerikanischen Luftstreitkräfte in den ersten zehn Tagen des Monats Mai mit Ausnahme eines Angriffs auf westdeutsches Gebiet in der Nacht zum 5. Mai keine nennenswerten Aktionen über Westeuropa durchführten, bekamen sie bei ihren Unternehmungen während des 13. und 14. Mai die Schlagkraft der deutschen Luftverteidigung in den besetzten Westgebieten und im Reichsgebiet in voller Stärke zu spüren.
Wo auch immer die feindlichen Verbände die Küste Westeuropas überflogen, gerieten sie sofort in das dichte Netz der deutschen Flak- und Jagdabwehr. Dabei bewährten sich die deutschen Jagdverbände am Kanal und bei Nacht auf der Lauer liegende Nachtjägerstaffeln in gleichem Maße, ebenso wie die wachsamen Batterien der Flak- und Marineartillerie. Den feindlichen Bomber- und Jagdverbänden gelang es in keinem Fall, die deutschen Luftverteidigungskräfte zu überraschen, vielmehr wurden die britisch-us.-amerikanischen Bombenflugzeuge samt ihrem Jagdschutz schon weit vor Erreichen ihrer Ziele von der deutschen Abwehr erfaßt und die bereitstehenden Verteidigungsverbände frühzeitig gegen den meist in großen Höhen anfliegenden Feind angesetzt.
Auch das Auftauchen des von der us.-amerikanischen Luftwaffe mit riesigen Vorschußlorbeeren angekündigten Jägers vom Muster „Thunderbolt“ konnte die britisch-nordamerikanischen Bomber bei ihren Tagesunternehmungen nicht vor empfindlichen Niederlagen bewahren. „Focke-Wulf“- und „Messerschmitt“-Jäger zeigten sich auch dieser neuen Konstruktion des Feindes überlegen, wofür der Abschuß von fünf „Thunderbolt“-Jägern bei einem einzigen Angriffsversuch des Feindes am 14. Mai gegen Westeuropa einen deutlichen Beweis lieferten. Die Tagesunternehmungen des Feindes am 14. Mai gegen Westeuropa und das norddeutsche Küstengebiet, die überwiegend von Verbänden der us.-amerikanischen Luftwaffe durchgeführt wurden, brachten dem Feind den Verlust von insgesamt 30 Flugzeugen, darunter 14 viermotorigen Bombern. Allein diese 14 USA.-Bomber bedeuten für den Feind den Ausfall von mindestens 100 Mann fliegenden Personals. Sieben deutsche Jagdflugzeuge sind von den Luftschlachten über dem Kanal und dem deutschen Küstengebiet nicht zurückgekehrt. Die Bilanz dieser beiden Tage ergibt das Bild einer einzigen empfindlichen Niederlage für die britisch-nordamerikanischen Luftstreitkräfte, die in dieser Zeit allein über Westeuropa und dem Reichsgebiet mindestens 112 Flugzeuge verloren, von denen wiederum mindestens 82 mehrmotorige Bomber waren.
Allied HQ, North Africa (May 17, 1943)
Last night, May 16, the seaplane base at Lido di Roma was attacked by Wellingtons of the Strategic Air Force. Bursts were seen among parked aircraft.
On the night of May 15-16, Trapani was attacked by Wellingtons. A large explosion was observed and many other bursts were seen on various targets. Patrols were carried out by the Coastal Air Force in the course of which two enemy aircraft were encountered and shot down.
Three of our aircraft are missing from all these operations.
U.S. Navy Department (May 17, 1943)
Communiqué No. 379
South Pacific.
On May 15, during the night, Avenger (Grumman TBF) torpedo bombers attacked four Japanese cargo vessels in the Buin area. One enemy ship was set on fire.
Pacific and Far East.
U.S. submarines have reported the following results of operations against the enemy in the waters of these areas.
- One destroyer sunk.
- One large cargo ship sunk.
- One medium‑sized cargo ship sunk.
- One medium‑sized transport sunk.
- One small passenger‑freighter sunk.
- One small escort vessel sunk.
- One large tanker damaged.
These actions have not been announced in any previous Navy Department Communiqué.
Communiqué No. 380
North Pacific.
Operations against the Japanese on Attu Island are continuing.
U.S. State Department (May 17, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | China |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | Foreign Minister Soong |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | Major General Chu |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Horne | Admiral Noble | |
| Major General Fairchild | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Major General Streett | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Captain Lambe | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Brigadier Porter | |
| Colonel Smart | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Freseman | Brigadier Macleod | |
| Commander Long | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Commander Coleridge | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
May 17, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret
Visit to Annapolis
Admiral King invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to visit Annapolis on Sunday, 23 May, leaving Washington at approximately 9 a.m.
Conclusions of the Previous Meeting
Sir Alan Brooke said that with reference to Item 5 of the 85th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff, in telegraphing to the appropriate British authorities in the Far East, had thought it wise to add to the last sentence of the draft telegram the words “including airfields necessary for maintaining air superiority.”
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the conclusions of the 85th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes.
b. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff, in telegraphing the British authorities in the Far East, had added to the last sentence of the draft telegram contained in the conclusion to Item 5 of CCS 85th Meeting the words “including airfields necessary for maintaining air superiority.”
At this point Dr. T. V. Soong and General Shih-ming Chu entered the meeting.
Situation in China
Admiral Leahy asked Dr. Soong to give the Combined Chiefs of Staff the benefit of his views on the Chinese situation, with particular reference to Chinese needs and the opening of a land route to China.
Dr. Soong said that it must be remembered that China had been in a state of siege for five years. The Japanese had seized the Chinese coast, then Indo China and finally, with the occupation of Burma, the investment had been completed save for the air route. The resultant economic pressure, deterioration of morale and lack of supplies made the situation very grave. After Casablanca Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been informed in a message from the President and Prime Minister, firstly, that the U.S. Air Force under General Chennault would be strengthened with a view not only to attacking the Japanese in China but also Japan itself, and secondly, that a combined all-out assault on Burma by naval, ground and air forces would be undertaken at the conclusion of this year’s monsoon. These assurances were naturally very welcome to the Generalissimo.
It was appreciated that the existing air route, with a capacity of only a few thousand tons per month, would not permit the implementation of a strong air offensive from China and, at the same time, the supply of the Chinese troops in Yunnan. The Generalissimo had therefore asked the President that for the next three months all supplies carried by the air route should be those for General Chennault’s air force. The General had worked out a plan for attacking the Japanese air forces, their lines of communication, and most important of all, for providing air support for the Chinese ground forces. So far, these forces had received no air support, and this was vitally important. The Japanese not only had better lines of communication but also better equipment, and were assisted by their air. Recent Japanese attacks in the neighborhood of Ichang had enabled them to capture territory on the south of the Yangtze. This provided them with an excellent line of communication via the Yangtze; and unless they were dislodged, it would enable them to attack Chang Sha and Chungking itself, since their logistic situation was far more favorable than that of the Chinese, whose lines of communication, now that the use of the Yangtze could be denied them by Japanese air power, were over most difficult mountainous country. Air power, and air power alone, would be of any value in the present situation, and it was for this reason that the Generalissimo asked that, for three months, supplies to General Chennault’s air forces should take priority over everything else so that these could be used in support of the Chinese Army.
The situation was, frankly, very bad. General Chiang Kai-shek’s military views had been guided over a period of years not only by United States and British advisers but by a series of outstanding German and Russian general officers. General Chiang Kai-shek was the Supreme Commander in the Chinese Theater of War, and for this theater he was responsible. On him depended the safety of China. His military views, therefore, must, unless he were absolved of this responsibility, be given overriding consideration.
With regard to the first promise made by the President and Prime Minister, i.e., the strengthening of General Chennault’s air forces, the Generalissimo regarded this as all-important. Japan had changed her policy vis-à-vis China. She had now given the puppet government in Nanking many concessions, including the control of currency. She had restored factories in the occupied area. This new policy of conciliation was far harder for the national government to combat than her previous line of action and called for strong positive steps.
With regard to the second promise, i.e., that the United Nations would undertake a full-scale offensive in Burma towards the end of 1943 the official record of the meeting held in Calcutta between the British, American and Chinese representatives gave a clear picture of the situation.
This discussion was regarded as one to insure that the decisions reached at Casablanca and Chungking should be perfectly clear to all concerned. General Ho had outlined the action to be taken by the Chinese forces. All had agreed that the provision of naval forces was essential and that success would be impossible without them. The importance of air superiority had been emphasized and General Arnold had pointed out that, even if the Japanese Air Force were as strong as believed by the Chinese representatives, the British/American air force would be considerably stronger. The Chinese representatives had agreed to provide three extra airfields at the China end and additional facilities to match those provided by the British at the Indian end. Field Marshal Wavell had said he had not had time to work out details. He must consider the needs of his own troops in the area who were dependent on difficult lines of communication. The Generalissimo might be assured that he would do his utmost to meet his request. He was confident that it would be possible to carry up to the airfields as much as the ferry service could carry forward.
From all this it was clear that the Burma plan for 1943 was a definite U.S./British commitment and he must therefore ask for its fulfillment and would be interested to know further details of it.
As a background to this request the Chinese situation must be borne in mind. Inflation had taken place; there was economic distress; China had borne long years of war; and the Japanese were adopting the policy of loheedling rather than terrorizing the people. Throughout the Chinese Army and indeed the people, the plan to retake Burma hi 1948 was an open secret. If not undertaken, they would believe themselves abandoned by the Allies and suspect that the latter did not intend to achieve the unconditional surrender of Japan by force of arms.
Prior to the Casablanca Conference other plans had been suggested for limited operations and General Stilwell, who had a profound knowledge of China, had in January proposed the launching of an offensive by Chinese troops in North Burma at the beginning of March, with the object of opening an all-land route to China. The Generalissimo, however, both then and now, was in disagreement with this plan believing it to be logistically impracticable since, while the Allied forces would be operating from very limited lines of communication from Ledo onwards, the Japanese would have the use both of the Irrawaddy River and the railroad. The Generalissimo felt that even if this plan achieved initial success, we should eventually be faced with the Japanese being able to maintain stronger forces at the ends of their good lines of communication than could we.
With regard to the state of preparedness of the Chinese troops, everything possible had been done to fulfill their commitment for a full-scale attack on Burma, and forces had been drawn from many parts of the area, some having marched 2,000 kilometers. The troops required for the full Burmese operation were now all available within one week’s march of Kunming. The promised airfields in China had been built, and though painfully constructed by manual labor, the preparations at the Chinese end were further forward than those in India. General Chen Cheng, considered by General Stilwell as the ablest Chinese commander under the Generalissimo, had been placed in command of the Chinese forces in Yunnan. The general situation in China was bad. The Yangtze had been cut; Chang Sha, and Chungking which was of immense economic, moral and military importance, were threatened. The Chinese would do everything possible to meet their share of the operation. He hoped to be informed of the availability of the Allied forces. He asked only that the decisions taken at Casablanca with regard to the offensive in Burma be implemented.
Admiral Leahy thanked Dr. Soong for his most interesting talk on the situation in China. He asked how many Chinese troops would be available for the Burma operation.
Dr. Soong said that there would be 32 divisions, though these would not be at full strength and would amount to the equivalent of some 22 full-scale divisions, i.e., about 220,000 men. In addition, there were the Chinese forces training at Ramgarh and further troops held in readiness for holding operations to prevent the Japanese attacking Kunming from the south.
In reply to a question by General Marshall, Dr. Soong said that the operations near Ichang were being undertaken by the 5th and 6th Armies. These forces were short of artillery since the Chinese had received no additional guns except Polish artillery captured by the Russians. In spite of the general lack of artillery, the Chinese ground forces would be able to undertake their part in the proposed operations, and their degree of readiness was evinced by the fact that in January General Stilwell had been prepared to launch an offensive in March.
Admiral Leahy asked General Chu if he wished to add anything to Dr. Soong’s statement.
General Chu stated that he had nothing to add at this time but would be available later if the need should arise.
Portuguese Islands (CCS 226)
Admiral Leahy suggested that paragraph 7 of CCS 226, with a short preamble explaining the vital military needs for these islands as aids to maintaining the security of our Atlantic communications, should be used as a basis of a recommendation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister.
Admiral Pound presented a chart showing the vital role which the Portuguese Islands would play in maintaining the security of our sea routes.
Admiral Leahy suggested alternatively that it might be wiser to delay the approach to the Portuguese Government until such time as sufficient forces were available in the U.K. to seize the Islands in the event of Portuguese refusal. If necessary, a European front in Portugal could be opened.
Admiral King suggested that since all were agreed on the strategic importance of the Islands and since time was of the essence, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should make plans and agree, during the course of the Conference, that the Islands must be seized by force if diplomatic action failed.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed that this possibility should be examined and a decision taken as to whether the operation was better undertaken by U.S. or British forces and as to the strength of the forces required. With regard to the opening of a second front in Portugal, he saw certain advantages in this course, but it must be considered in relation to projected operations in the whole of the European Theater.
Admiral King then explained that his proposal had been that the possibility of seizing the Islands without diplomatic negotiations should be considered since this course might render it easier for the Portuguese to say that action had been taken against their will and therefore action in defense of Portugal itself might be avoided. The time factor was vital. More and more traffic would be routed through the Mediterranean. The Portuguese Islands were very important to the security of the U.S.-U.K. sea lane, but vital to the U.S.-Mediterranean route.
In reply to a question by General Marshall, Sir Dudley Pound said that he could see no advantage in postponing action with regard to the Islands. They were vitally important at all times of the year but more particularly so in the winter. The use of the southern route, with its better weather, was important and only escort carrier air protection could be given unless we held the Azores.
Discussion then took place on the strength and source of forces required in the light of possible resistance.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to recommend to the President and the Prime Minister:
i) That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be accomplished as soon as possible and, in any event, early enough for them to be utilized by the United Nations during the winter of 1943–1944.
ii) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese Government.
b. Agreed:
i) That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings, and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view.
ii) That as soon as these plans have been approved preparations should be made to implement them in case diplomatic efforts should fail.
c. Directed that the secretaries, in consultation with the Chief of the British Air Staff, should prepare for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft letter for submission to the President and the Prime Minister which would include the above recommendations and proposals.
Agreed Essentials in the Conduct of the War (CCS 85th Meeting, Item 2 a (1)) (CCS 232)
The Committee considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners. The British Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum suggesting certain amendments to the paper. In the course of discussion on paragraph 2 b of the paper, on the desirability of relating the extension of unremitting pressure against Japan to the agreement that the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe must be brought about at the earliest possible date, Admiral Leahy said that he believed that this British suggestion would not be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff. The defeat of Japan was a matter of vital importance to the United States. A situation might arise in which an extension of effort against Japan, if necessary, even at the expense of the European Theater, would be essential to maintain the integrity of the United States and her interests in the Pacific.
Admiral King pointed out that the so-called adequate forces for the Pacific had always been a matter susceptible to differences of opinion. It must be remembered that while the Casablanca Conference dealt only with operations in 1943, the present deliberations aimed at deciding on the strategy to be adopted to bring the war as a whole to a successful conclusion. In his view, CCS 155/1 did, in fact, visualize the extension of pressure against Japan.
Admiral Leahy said that operations in the Pacific had actually been extended since Casablanca and there was no doubt that adequate forces for further extension were available. The only shortage was of shipping. If an unfavorable situation arose in the Pacific, all would realize that whatever agreements were in existence, the United States would have to divert forces to meet this eventuality.
Sir Alan Brooke said that shipping alone prohibited an equal effort in the Pacific Theater. He was convinced that it was not possible to achieve the defeat of both Germany and Japan at the same time, and the maximum effort must be made against one or the other. There was no possibility of holding Germany while concentrating on Japan, and therefore it was essential that the defeat of Germany should first be accomplished. This would be the best method of ending the war as a whole at the earliest possible date.
With regard to paragraph 3 b, it was generally agreed that this paragraph should be recast in order to clarify its intention.
With regard to paragraph 3 d, General McNarney agreed on the importance of both the air offensive against the Axis Powers and of relieving pressure on the Russian Front, but considered that concentration of air effort was essential. The British proposals left the way open to a dispersal of air forces from Norway to Greece which, while it might take pressure from the Russians, would not be the best application of our air power.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to the following changes in CCS 232:
i) In the third line of paragraph 3 delete the word “fixed” and substitute the word “first” therefor.
ii) Delete the captions “Priority Group 1” and “Priority Group 2” immediately preceding paragraphs 3 a and 3 6, respectively.
iii) Delete the words “in the Atlantic and Pacific” from paragraph 3 c.
b. Agreed that paragraph 2 b, 3 b, 3 d, and 3 f of CCS 232 should be considered further.
c. Directed the secretaries to publish an amended version of CCS 232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement. (Subsequently published as CCS 232/1.)
Agenda for the Remainder of the Conference (CCS 233)
The Committee had before them a note by the Combined Staff Planners setting forward a tentative agenda for the remainder of the conference.
With regard to Item 6, Sir John Dill reminded the Committee of the importance of discussing the action being taken with regard to rearming Turkey in relation to our plans for the conduct of the war in Europe.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to the agenda for the remainder of the conference shown in CCS 233, with the following exceptions:
i) Delegate paragraph (1), discussion on Global Strategy.
ii) Delete reference to the report of the Kauffman-Mansfield Committee under the heading of U-boat Campaign in paragraph (4).
iii) Insert a new item immediately following paragraph (5) entitled “Turkish Situation, General Discussion.”
(Revised agenda subsequently published as CCS 233/1.)
b. Agreed that the papers being prepared by the U.S. and British Planners on “The Defeat of Germany” would, in order to save time, be circulated as CCS papers without receiving prior approval of their respective Chiefs of Staff.
c. Agreed that, if necessary, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would meet in an afternoon conference on Friday, 21 May, to consider papers receiving their attention which have no special reference to the subject matter of the TRIDENT Conference.
At this point the following left the meeting:
- General Somervell
- Admiral Home
- General Fairchild
- General Streett
- Admiral Cooke
- General Wedemeyer
- Colonel Smart
- Commander Freseman
- Commander Long
- Admiral Noble
- Lt. General Macready
- Air Marshal Welsh
- Captain Lambe
- Brigadier Porter
- Air Commodore Elliot
- Brigadier Macleod
Operation HUSKY
Sir Alan Brooke informed the Committee of certain information which pointed to the desirability of advancing the date of Operation HUSKY.
The Committee discussed the advisability of asking General Eisenhower to consider the mounting of an earlier operation against HUSKY -land but it was pointed out that General Eisenhower had already given his views on this matter and had received all the available information referred to above. It was generally agreed that any specific action to draw General Eisenhower’s attention to this information might suggest a lack of confidence in his judgment, which most certainly did not exist.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that they should take no action on this matter.
Operation UPKEEP
Sir Charles Portal outlined Operation UPKEEP and the results which it was hoped had been attained.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of this statement.
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | ||
| Mr. Baruch |
Baruch’s memorandum to Watson indicates that the supply of magnesium was one of the questions raised during the luncheon. The possibility of settling refugees in North Africa also appears to have been discussed at this meeting.
Leahy-Soong meeting, afternoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | China | |
| Admiral Leahy | Foreign Minister Soong |
Soong sought to obtain assurances for the carrying out of the Burma operation and immediate and exclusive shipment of aircraft material to China.
The Pittsburgh Press (May 17, 1943)
Lewis denounced by WLB
Accused of aiding enemy UMW chief faces Roosevelt call
…
The coal enigma –
Joker showed in showdown
Something has to give, observers say
By Fred W. Perkins, Press Washington correspondent
…
Holy city spared –
Big RAF planes fly over Rome
Bomb big base close to Italian capital
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer
…
‘Invasion army’ enlarged by thousands of Yanks
London, England (UP) –
Thousands of highly-trained U.S. troops, including crack specialist units whose specialty cannot be disclosed arrived recently in Britain to swell the Allied armies awaiting the invasion of Europe.
The circumstances of this troop movement is a military secret, but it can be said to have formed a vital part of United Nations strategy, and it was carried out in a manner calculated to increase Axis jitters.
Total rises to 232 –
U.S. subs bag six Jap ships
Seventh, large tanker, damaged in Pacific
…
More Yanks reach Attu, Tokyo says
Japan charges Americans use poison gas in Aleutians attack
By the United Press
…
Navy’s ships and men to be doubled by 1944
Boston, Massachusetts (UP) –
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said today that ships and personnel in the Navy would virtually be doubled over 1942 by the end of this year.
At a press conference before an address before the Advertising Club of Boston, Mr. Knox said that the 1.5 million men in the Navy at present would be increased to 2.5 million, including all branches of the service.
Mr. Knox said he was positive that production of ships would be double.
He expressed pleasure at the turn the submarine situation is taking. He said:
March was a bad month, April very good and May so far good.
‘A’ drivers can hoard –
Extra gas out for vacations
‘B,’ ‘C’ cars still must stick to essential trips
…
9 Army fliers die in crash
Ephrata, Washington –
Four Army officers and five enlisted men lost their lives here yesterday when a giant four-motored bomber collided with a sister ship while preparing to take off. Five other men escaped injury.
Franklin hero awarded Air Medal posthumously
Franklin, Pennsylvania – (special)
Sgt. Glenn A. Campbell of Franklin, killed when his bomber crashed during a battle with the Japanese over Timor Island, has been posthumously awarded the Air Medal by Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, commander of the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific.
The 23-year-old turret gunner was the son of Mr. and Mrs. C. M. Campbell. His plane crashed into the sea before it reached its base and Campbell, although wounded, kept his gun blazing until the plane sank.
He was officially credited with having shot down four Japanese planes.
AWOL soldier poses as actor Jackie Cooper
Miami Beach, Florida (UP) –
Pvt. Ewen J. McMahon of Los Angeles, who went AWOL and spent several days impersonating movie actor Jackie Cooper at Greater Miami nightspots, was today in custody of military police, none the happier from taking bows and signing autographs.