Agreements ‘circumvented English blockade’ and saw war secrets go to firms in Germany
By Charles B. Degges, United Press staff writer
…
U.S. State Department (September 13, 1944)
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | ||
| Miss Tully |
The memorandum below was prepared by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. Since this memorandum does not indicate that White himself was present, it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, between September 13 and the date on which White’s memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date “9/25/44” at the end (presumably the date of typing):
Mrs. Roosevelt asked the Secretary to tea. As soon as he arrived he was ushered in to the President. Miss Tully was also present. (When he came in, the President turned to Fala, his dog, and said, “Say hello to your Uncle Henry.”)
The President said that in his conversation with Churchill, Churchill had been very glum. The President said that he had asked Churchill: “How would you like to have the steel business of Europe for 20 or 30 years?” The President said that Churchill seemed much excited over the possibility.
The President said to the Secretary: “I have asked you to come up here so that you could talk to the Prof. [Lord Cher well].” He said that they were doing shipping that night and therefore were to have Admiral Land but added, “You might as well come too.” The Secretary asked how freely he could talk with the Professor and the President replied, “You can talk about anything you want.” The Secretary inquired: “Anything?,” and the President said, “Well, let me look at that book.” [The book he referred to was the collection of memoranda on Germany prepared in the Treasury which the Secretary had given to him in Washington.] The President went over the whole section and said, “I wouldn’t discuss with him the question of the zones to be occupied by our armies. That’s a military question. Nor would I discuss the question of partitioning as that’s a political question. But you can talk about the fact that we are thinking of internationalizing the Ruhr and the Saar, including the Kiel Canal. If Holland has a lot of land inundated by Germany we can give her a piece of Western Germany as compensation.”
The President went over the whole of the first section of the book, item by item, and then said: “I have sent for Eden. Churchill, Eden, yourself and I will sit down to discuss the matter.” (The Secretary expressed the view that the President gave him the impression that he was bringing Eden to Quebec largely because of the report he (the Secretary) gave him upon his return from England about Eden being tough on the question of a policy toward Germany.)
The President said, “Don’t worry about Churchill. He is going to be tough too.” As the Secretary was leaving, the President said to Miss Tully, “Put that book right next to my bed. I want to read it tonight.” [The book he referred to was the book I described above.]
740.0011 PW/9-1344: Telegram
London, September 13, 1944
Confidential
US urgent
niact
Neter 17. From Schoenfeld.
Foreign Minister van Kleffens requests following message be sent to the President. He has asked this mission to serve as channel of transmission since Netherlands Government has no direct code communication with Quebec.
On learning that Pacific strategy will be discussed at Quebec conference Netherlands Government request in view of their vital interest in that question that following statement with regard to operations in Japanese occupied territory be transmitted to the President. Same statement is being sent to Mr. Churchill through British Foreign Office. Minister for Colonies van Mook and Vice Admiral Helfrich are proceeding [to] America. Netherlands Government trust President and Prime Minister will find it possible to give them an opportunity to elucidate Netherlands point of view. (Statement begins)
Success of main strategy against Japan in severing communications between Japan and occupied area covering Burma, Malaya, Philippines, British Borneo and NEI will cut off Japanese forces in that area from arms and munitions but will not compel them to surrender or to withdraw supposing this to be possible. Area as a whole has sufficient food and other materials and facilities for maintenance and it may be assumed that Japanese forces have sufficient stocks of arms and munitions. Experience points to probability that Japanese stay on for irregular warfare even after defeat or surrender Japan. Facts in recovered territory in the area show that isolated Japanese forces become more ferocious and destructive as isolation becomes more irremediable. If liberation occupied areas is delayed suffering and destruction of large populations will increase beyond all measure and prisoners of war and internees can be considered lost. Since voluntary evacuation of the area by Japanese forces cannot be expected active liberation as soon as possible seems urgent both from this point of view and with regard to future rehabilitation. This action should primarily be directed towards most important territories with most civilized and numerous population and greatest economic value. Among these Java seems to offer best base for further operations because of central situation, sufficient food production and accommodation, ample skilled and unskilled labour, well developed system of roads and harbours, good airbases and healthy mountain regions for rehabilitation. Even in case of widespread destruction repairs for Allied operational purposes are easiest to effect in Java. The occupation of Java would deprive the Japanese of their main regional source of supplies and labour.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell | |
| Admiral Leahy | Minister of War Transport Leathers | |
| Vice Admiral Land | Lord Moran | |
| Vice Admiral McIntire |
Leahy noted in his diary:
The subjects discussed at dinner were generally international politics, economics and shipping; and the peace terms that should be imposed upon Germany when that country surrenders to the Allies.
Moran’s diary account is considerably fuller:
… How to prevent another war with Germany was the only subject of conversation. The Americans were all for drastic action, maintaining that Germany should not be allowed ships or the yards in which to build them; what they needed could be carried in our ships. Morgenthau wanted to close down the Ruhr to help British exports, especially steel. The P.M. was against this. He did not seem happy about all this toughness.
“I’m all for disarming Germany,” he said, “but we ought not to prevent her living decently. There are bonds between the working classes of all countries, and the English people will not stand for the policy you are advocating.”
I thought he had done when he growled: “I agree with Burke. You cannot indict a whole nation.”
If the P.M. was vague about what ought to be done with Germany, he was at least quite clear what should not be done. He kept saying: “At any rate, what is to be done should be done quickly. Kill the criminals, but don’t carry on the business for years.”
Morgenthau asked the P.M. how he could prevent Britain starving when her exports had fallen so low that she would be unable to pay for imports. The P.M. had no satisfactory answer. His thoughts seemed to go back to the House of Commons and what he knew of the English people. In five years’ time, when passions would have died down, people, he said, would not stand for repressive measures. He harped on the necessity for disarmament. At that point one of the Americans intervened: he thought that Germany should be made to return to a pastoral state, she ought to have a lower standard of living. During all this wild talk only the P.M. seemed to have his feet on the ground. The President mostly listened; once he remarked that a factory which made steel furniture could be turned overnight to war production.
After three hours’ discussion there seemed to be an absolute cleavage between the American point of view and that of the Prime Minister. The Prof., however, sided with the Americans. At last Roosevelt said: “Let the Prof, go into our plans with Morgenthau.”
On September 20, 1944, Morgenthau told Hull and Stimson that at this dinner meeting Churchill was violently opposed to the policy on Germany which was presented to him. He quoted Churchill as inquiring with annoyance whether he had been brought to Quebec to discuss such a scheme and as stating that it would mean that England would be chained to a dead body, i.e., Germany.
Morgenthau, writing of the September 13 dinner meeting three years later, recalled that Churchill had been irascible and vitriolic when, at Roosevelt’s request, Morgenthau had explained the Treasury proposal. Churchill, he said, turned loose “the full flood of his rhetoric, sarcasm and violence”, stating that he looked on the Treasury plan “as he would on chaining himself to a dead German.” Roosevelt, Morgenthau recalled, sat by, saying very little.
The most detailed description of the dinner conversation which has been found was written by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. No source on the meeting (including White’s memorandum itself) states that White was present, and it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, in the period between September 13 and the date on which White’s memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date “9/25/44” at the end (presumably the date of typing):
Though shipping was supposed to have been the subject for discussion the subject of shipping was not mentioned the entire evening except briefly when the question was raised as to the advisability of taking away all of Germany’s shipping.
The discussion quickly turned to Germany. Churchill (apparently without reference to anything said previously) said something along the line of “What are my Cabinet members doing discussing plans for Germany without first discussing them with me? I intend to get into the matter myself.”
The President said he had asked Secretary Morgenthau to come up for the purpose of discussing Germany and that he (Morgenthau) was to talk to Cherwell the following day.
Churchill asked: “Why don’t we discuss Germany now?” The President then asked the Secretary to explain the program he had in mind for Germany. The Secretary described that part of the Treasury proposal dealing with the Ruhr, Churchill indicated that he was strongly opposed to such a program. He said that all that was necessary was to eliminate the production of armament. To do what the Treasury suggested was “unnatural, unchristian and unnecessary.” Churchill didn’t believe that it would be very much of an aid to the United Kingdom even if the United Kingdom did get the steel business that formerly went to Germany.
Admiral Land, on the other hand, wholly supported Secretary Morgenthau’s proposal, thumping vigorously on the table to emphasize his remark. Admiral Land told the Secretary after the dinner that the President had been talking with him more or less along those lines for a long time but this was the first time that he (Admiral Land) had a chance to say what he felt. He had long been waiting for the opportunity and, encouraged by the Secretary’s statement, he had vigorously expressed himself.
When the question arose about taking away German ships, Churchill was opposed. Admiral Land said, “Why not? It is no more cruel to take away ships than their steel plants.”
Churchill said at one point: “If you [the United States] do not do something for Britain then the British simply will have to destroy gold and do business largely within the Empire.” Lord Cherwell pooh poohed this idea of the Prime Minister’s.
Admiral Leahy seemed on the whole to be unsympathetic to the Treasury’s program and to side with Churchill. Admiral Leahy thought the only way to assure peace in the future was for the United States, the United Kingdom and possibly Russia if she behaves herself to “crack down” on any country which stepped over the boundary line of any other country.
The President said very little in reply to Churchill’s views. Secretary Morgenthau several times interjected into Churchill’s comments that his program did not recommend that Germany be permitted to starve as seemed to be the implication in Churchill’s remark.
At another point when discussing the need for an international police air force Churchill said that the United States, United Kingdom and Russia would have to rotate the job “as our air people get dirty when they associate with the Russians.”
At one point in the discussion Churchill said to the President: “Is this what you asked me to come all the way over here to discuss?”
The conversation then got on to India and stayed on India for about an hour. Churchill talked rather angrily at length about the difficulties the British were confronted with in administering India and on the lack of understanding in the United States about the Indian problem. He spoke of the high birth rate, the high death rate, the ignorance and the carelessness of the Indian people to poverty, disease, etc. Churchill said, “I will give the United States half of India to administer and we will take the other half and we will see who does better with each other’s half.”
However, the President came back to the German problem several times very nicely and did not recede from his position. He reminded Churchill that Stalin at Tehran had said: “Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned into the manufacture of armament.”
Lord Cherwell seemed to be in sympathy with the Secretary’s point of view. Later when talking it over with him he said that he didn’t think that Churchill at all got the major point the Secretary was trying to make. The Secretary asked him if he didn’t think the real difficulty with Churchill was that he wanted a strong Germany to stand between “the white cliffs of Dover” and Communist Russia. Cherwell agreed that that was it. Lord Leathers of the Shipping Board apparently disagreed with the Secretary’s point of view.
On leaving, Lord Cherwell said that he expected to talk with the Secretary about lend-lease assistance for the period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan. The Secretary told him that he had been asked by the President to come to talk about Germany but after [that?] he would be glad to discuss lend-lease aid the following morning after they had had their conversation about Germany.
The Secretary had an opportunity to tell the President that he believed the Russians were holding back on their cooperation with the United States because they were suspicious of the American and British attitude toward Germany. Russia feared we and the British were going to try to make a soft peace with Germany and build her up as a possible future counterweight against Russia. The President replied, You are right, and I want you to read a telegram I just received from Harriman.” Admiral Leahy later gave the Secretary the telegram which Harriman sent to Harry Hopkins urging the President to call him (Harriman) home to report on the trend in Russia on non-cooperation with the United States.
Wednesday, September 13
At 11:45 a.m., the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Brigadier General A. J. McFarland, Captain E. D. Graves, Field Marshal Brooke, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Field Marshal Dill, General Ismay, Major General Hollis, Major General Lay cock) came to the Citadel for a plenary meeting with the President and Prime Minister Churchill. The President’s Naval Aide, Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, was also in attendance. The Combined Chiefs of Staff reported the results of their conferences to date and their schedule for further meetings. The President and the Prime Minister made informal comments about some of the decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs and outlined various measures that they wished to have studied and made the subject of further reports.
The President and Prime Minister Churchill lunched together at the Citadel at 1:00 p.m. Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill had lunch at Spencerwood as guests of Lady Fiset.
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. and Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, Construction Corps, USN (Retired), Chairman of the War Shipping Administration, arrived in Quebec during the afternoon. Admiral Land was accompanied by Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Mr. John Maclay, Mr. Granville Conway and Mr. Richard Bissen [Bissell?]. Secretary Morgenthau was accompanied by Mr. Harry D. White. The President conferred with Secretary Morgenthau at length after his arrival.
The President, Mrs. Roosevelt, Miss Tully and Miss Thompson had tea together in the President’s quarters at 5:00 p.m.
At 7:00 p.m., speaking from the Chateau Frontenac, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill made a broadcast to the people of Canada.
8:00 p.m.: Dinner at the Citadel – The President, Prime Minister Churchill, Lord Cherwell, Lord Moran, Lord Leathers, Admiral Land, Admiral Leahy, Secretary Morgenthau and Admiral Mclntire. Conference discussions followed dinner and lasted until 11:15 p.m. The President retired shortly afterwards.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King held a reception at the Chateau Frontenac this evening for members of the Conference delegations. Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill, the Lieutenant-Governor and Lady Fiset were also in the receiving line.
Lot 60–D 224, Box 59: Stettinius Diary
Twenty-first Day, Wednesday, September 13, 1944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meeting with Mr. Hull
As soon as the Joint Steering Committee ended, I immediately went to Mr. Hull’s office to report to him the serious development of the morning. He immediately grasped the great significance of it and took it very well. He thinks we should take our American group into our confidence on the question and direct our efforts toward trying to save the document by some formula which would result in this question being referred to the general conference where the pressure on the Soviets might be so great that they would have to change their position. He suggested a recess for the Chinese discussions but I explained that the Soviets were also adamant on that. He suggested that we try to handle the question by stating very general principles only.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Talk with Ambassador Gromyko
I called Gromyko on the phone about 4:30 and suggested to him that the Formulations Group get together immediately to try to find some solution to the voting question problem. He agreed to send Sobolev to such a meeting.
The Formulations Group convened promptly and continued in session for several hours. They worked out an informal compromise solution which would allow a great power a veto in case of enforcement action but not in the pacific settlement of disputes. The representatives of all three countries in the Formulations Group seemed to feel that this formula was satisfactory.
Miscellany
During the day I addressed a memorandum to the Secretary asking for definite instructions with regard to the provision with respect to a qualification for non-permanent members for the Council, which the British are fighting for so strongly. The provision is “due regard being paid to the contribution of members of the organization toward the maintenance of international peace and security and toward the other purposes of the organization.”
It was interesting to receive a cable from Harriman saying that the British colleague in Moscow had not received instructions to see Molotov relative to attempting to persuade him to have the Soviets reverse their position on voting. Cadogan had told me several times that such instructions would be sent to Clark Kerr. Apparently, the Foreign Office in London has not acted on his recommendation.
500.CC/9–1744
Washington, September 13, 1944
Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
Decisions with respect to the following matters should be taken by ___________ majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Security Council:
a. All decisions coming under Section VIII-B, entitled “Determination of Threats to the Peace, Acts of Aggression, or any Breaches of the Peace, and Action with Respect Thereto,” and under Section VIII-C, entitled “Regional Arrangements.”
b. All matters relating to [disarmament] and regulation of armaments.
c. Recommendations to the General Assembly with regard to admission of new members, suspension and restoration of rights of membership, and expulsion of members.
d. Establishment by the Security Council of its subsidiary bodies or agencies.
Decisions under Section VIII-A, entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” should be taken by ______ majority including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the council, but excluding the votes of such member or members of the council as are parties to the dispute.
All other decisions should be taken by ________ majority vote.
Völkischer Beobachter (September 14, 1944)
‚Ein Wille mehr und das Unheil ist gebannt!‘
…
Von unserem Berichterstatter in Portugal
b. Lissabon, 13. September –
In einem Kommentar zu den vielfachen Problemen, womit sich Roosevelt und Churchill erneut in Quebec befassen müssen, meint der Korrespondent Lewis Sebring von der New York Herald Tribune, große Teile des nordamerikanischen Volkes lebten in der Vorstellung, daß der Krieg weit eher zu Ende gehe, als es wirklich der Fall sein werde.
Aber nur militärische Schein Autoritäten wagten ein Kriegsende in Europa noch in diesem Jahr Voraussagen. (Churchill wollte bekanntlich nach seiner im Juni auf der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft in London gemachten Prophezeiung schon Mitte Oktober als Sieger in Berlin einziehen. Schriftleitung.) Er, Sebring, sei kein militärischer Fachmann, aber er habe persönlich das Urteil eines hohen nordamerikanischen Generalstabsoffiziers gehört. Es lautete: Wenn die Alliierten den Krieg in Europa 1944 nicht siegreich beenden können, wird eine neue Lage entstehen, deren Entwicklung und Ende nicht vorauszusagen ist.
In diesem Urteil spiegelt sich die Überlegung wider, daß der nordamerikanisch-englische Angriff auf die normannische Küste und die nachfolgende Frankreichoffensive mit einem Materialvorrat unternommen wurden, der das Ergebnis einer mehr als zweijährigen Produktion der anglo-amerikanischen Rüstungsindustrie darstellt. Wenn trotz dieser zeitweiligen Überlegenheit an Waffen die Entscheidung gegen Deutschland nicht erzwungen werden kann, so entsteht logischerweise eine neue Situation für die Alliierten, weil nach dem Verbrauch ihrer angesammelten Mengen an Panzern, Flugzeugen, Kanonen, Tanks, Waffen, Treibstoff und dem Ausfall ihrer besten Kampfdivisionen die Initiative automatisch an Deutschland fallen muß, das in der Zeit der feindlichen Offensive seinerseits alles für einen eigenen Angriff vorbereitet.
Damit ist eines der Konferenzprobleme von Quebec gegeben.
Wie wir zuverlässig erfahren, ist sowohl Roosevelt als auch Churchill von dem Ergebnis der Frankreichoffensive weder militärisch noch politisch befriedigt. Die deutsche Absetzstrategie verhinderte die vorgesehene Vernichtung der im Westen kämpfenden deutschen Divisionen, wodurch die Zeittafel von Teheran mit ihrem Schlussstück in Zeitnot gerät. Wenn sich im Oktober herausstellt, daß das Teheran-Schema nicht aufgeht, muß ein neuer Plan an seine Stelle gesetzt werden. Deshalb ist auch vorgesehen, die Beschlüsse Roosevelts und Churchills über den europäischen Krieg im Anschluss an Quebec genau wie 1943 auf einer neuen Konferenz mit Stalin zu besprechen.
Daraus geht hervor, daß gewisse Informationen aus London und Washington nicht zutreffen können, daß in Quebec lediglich die Zukunft des Pazifikkrieges erörtert werden soll. Es läge keine Veranlassung vor, darüber mit Stalin zu konferieren, weil die Sowjetunion theoretisch in diesem Kriege lediglich interessierter Zuschauer ist. In Bezug auf den Pazifikkrieg erinnert Sebring, der dort zweieinhalb Jahre als Kriegskorrespondent für die New York Herald Tribune tätig war, an folgende Zeitspannen:
Nach dem japanischen Angriff auf Pearl Harbour brauchten die Nordamerikaner acht Monate, um ihrerseits mit ihrer ersten Marinedivision Guadalcanal angreifen zu können. Seitdem sind mehr als zwei Jahre vergangen, während denen weitere Vorstöße der Nordamerikaner stattfanden. Trotzdem, so meint der nordamerikanische Journalist weiter, ständen die US-Truppen immer noch an den äußersten Rändern des japanischen Reichs. Eine Entscheidung im pazifischen Krieg könne nur nach Rückeroberung von Niederländisch-Indien und nach dem Eindringen in das japanische Mutterland selbst errungen werden. Der Aufbau einer Streitmacht für diese ungeheure Aufgabe bedinge Zeit. Die offizielle Meinung im Hauptquartier des Admirals Leahy Und des Generals MacArthur gehe dahin, daß dafür mindestens ein Jahr notwendig ist.
Sebring, der Einblick in die Planungen der beiden genannten US-Kommandeure hat, schreibt: „Niemand, der nicht persönlich mit den Plänen für eine pazifische Offensive vertraut ist, kann sich eine Vorstellung von den hinter der Bühne vorgehenden Dingen machen. Die Vorbereitungen für den europäischen Feldzug dauerten zwei Jahre, und der Pazifik ist ein noch schwierigeres Gebiet, weil größere Entfernungen in Rechnung gestellt werden müssen. Wir werden weiter japanische Außenposten angreifen und dabei kleine Erfolge erzielen die von schreienden Schlagzeilen in den Zeitungen, begeisterten Radiokommentaren und einem gefährlichen Überoptimismus begleitet werden. Aber ich selbst habe strategische Pläne gesehen, an deren Spitze das Jahr 1946 stand, und ich zweifle keinen Augenblick daran, daß es weitere Pläne gibt, die mit der Jahreszahl 1947 beginnen.
Die Nachschübe, die für eine große Offensive im Pazifik nötig sind, gehen über alles hinaus, was sich die Amerikaner zu Hause vorstellen. Der Aufbau einer solchen Offensive wird das ganze Jahr 1945 beanspruchen. Vielleicht können wir Ende 1945 oder Anfang 1946 einige ernsthafte Angriffe beginnen. Aber niemand, der die Tatsachen kennt und sich die Mühe macht, über sie nachzudenken, kann optimistisch in Bezug auf das Kriegsende sein. Amerika muß seinen Gürtel noch beträchtlich enger schnallen, ehe dieses Ende in Sicht ist.
Lissabon, 13. September –
Angesichts der wachsenden Erkenntnis in England und den USA, daß Deutschland nicht zu überrennen ist, mehren sich die Zeichen eines großangelegten Versuchs, sich ähnlich wie 1918 den Sieg auf betrügerische Weise zu erschleichen. Einzelne Publizisten, wie jetzt der britische Wirtschaftler Sir Walter Leyton im News Chronicle, entfernen sich deshalb von den Hasstiraden eines Vansittart, um mit sanfteren Tönen das deutsche Volk ins Verderben zu locken. Aber nur der Ton ist milder, in der Sache bleibt das Ziel Deutschlands Vernichtung.
Nach den Erfahrungen mit dem Wilson-Betrug von 1918 gibt es allerdings wohl kaum einen Menschen in Deutschland, der nicht sogleich sieht, welches Spiel in Wirklichkeit von unseren Feinden auch dann getrieben wird, wenn man sich befleißigt, den Ton zu mäßigen. Begleitmusik zur Quebec-Konferenz!
Führer HQ (September 14, 1944)
Im Westen brachten unsere Truppen südlich Dünkirchen sowie nördlich Brügge und Gent britische Angriffe zum Scheitern. Feindliche Brückenköpfe über den Albert- und Maas-Schelde-Kanal wurden im Gegenangriff beseitigt oder weiter eingeengt. Zwischen Maastricht und der Reichsgrenze im Raum von Eupen leisten unsere Truppen dem nordamerikanischen Großangriff erbitterten Widerstand. Ein aus Aachen hinaus nach Südwesten geführter Gegenangriff warf den Feind wieder zurück. Bei diesen Kämpfen wurde eine größere Anzahl feindlicher Panzer und Sturmgeschütze abgeschossen.
Auch in Nord Luxemburg und im Nordteil des Brückenkopfes von Metz verliefen eigene Gegenangriffe erfolgreich. Beiderseits Nancy ist der Feind mit stärkeren Kräften über die Mosel im Vordringen nach Osten. Südöstlich Nancy wurde er an der Meurthe und am Südrand von Lunéville abgefangen.
Die von allen Seiten angegriffene Besatzung von Neufchâteau hat sich den Weg nach Osten im Angriff wieder freigekämpft. Die Stadt selbst wurde dem Feind überlassen, der auch südwestlich Mirecourt weiter vordringt. Unsere Sicherungskräfte wichen im Raum südöstlich Langres bis zum oberen Doubs langsam vor starkem feindlichem Druck nach Norden aus. Bei den harten Kämpfen um Vesoul waren die Verluste der 7. amerikanischen Armee besonders schwer.
Der erbitterte Abwehrkampf unserer Stützpunkte und befestigten Häfen an der Kanal- und Atlantikküste geht weiter. Die Besatzungen von Calais und Boulogne wiesen mehrere feindliche Angriffe blutig ab. Im Festungsbereich von Brest kämpfen die massierten Artilleriefeuer und rollenden Luftangriffen ausgesetzten Verteidiger, vorbildlich auch durch Heeresartillerie unterstützt, weiter in unerschütterter Pflichterfüllung. Sie wiesen im Westabschnitt mehrere Angriffe in sofortigem Gegenstoß ab. Die Besatzung unserer Stützpunkte an der Girondmündung warf angreifenden Feind unter erheblichen Verlusten für ihn wieder zurück.
In Italien scheiterten nördlich Lucca und Pistoia feindliche Vorstöße ebenso wie starke, von Schlachtfliegern unterstützte Angriffe gegen unsere Truppen nordöstlich Florenz. Im Ostteil der Front dehnte der Feind seine Großangriffe auf weitere Abschnitte aus. Trotz starker Artillerie- und Schlachtfliegerunterstützung blieben sie fast überall in unserem Abwehrfeuer liegen. Kleine Einbrüche wurden abgeriegelt.
Im Südteil von Siebenbürgen wiesen deutsche und ungarische Truppen Angriffe der Sowjets und rumänischer Einheiten ab. Zur Verkürzung der Front wurde der Südteil des Szekler Zipfels planmäßig und vom Feind ungehindert geräumt.
In den Einbruchsstellen bei Sanok und Krosno trat unsere Abwehr den fortgesetzt angreifenden Sowjets weiter erfolgreich entgegen.
Östlich Warschau stieß der Feind aus seiner Einbruchsstelle nach Praga hinein, wo erbitterte Straßenkämpfe entbrannten. Nordöstlich Praga wehrten Truppen der Waffen-SS und ungarische Verbände sämtliche Angriffe der Bolschewisten erfolgreich ab und vernichteten 45 Panzer. Nordwestlich Lomscha sind harte Kämpfe um einen eigenen Narewbrückenkopf im Gange.
In Estland scheiterten südlich des Wirzsees zahlreiche feindliche Angriffe unter hohen blutigen Verlusten für die Sowjets.
In Finnland versuchte der Feind auch gestern wieder, unsere Absetzbewegungen zu hemmen. Er wurde durch Gegenangriffe zurückgeworfen.
Feindliche Bomber- und Jagdfliegerverbände griffen gestern Westen und Süden des Reiches bis nach Mitteldeutschland hinein an. Terrorangriffe richteten sich vor allem gegen die Städte Stuttgart, Darmstadt, Osnabrück und Auschwitz. In der Nacht warfen einzelne feindliche Flugzeuge Bomben auf Berlin. Luftverteidigungskräfte vernichteten 81 anglo-amerikanische Flugzeuge, darunter 58 viermotorige Bomber.
In den harten Kämpfen nordöstlich Warschau hat sich die königlich ungarische 1. Kavalleriedivision unter Führung von Generalmajor Ibranyi durch Standfestigkeit und schneidig geführte Gegenstöße besonders ausgezeichnet.
Bei den Kämpfen in den Ostkarpaten haben sich die 5. und die 7. Kompanie des Grenadierregiments 97 unter Führung von Leutnant Lübben und Oberleutnant Erb hervorragend bewährt – Der königlich ungarische Oberleutnant Brambring in einem ungarischen Grenzjägerbataillon hat sich durch besondere Tapferkeit hervorgetan.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (September 14, 1944)
On the Channel Coast, mopping-up continues. Allied troops have taken a strongpoint in the vicinity of NIEUPORT-BAINS.
In northeastern BELGIUM we have enlarged our bridgeheads over the ALBERT CANAL at GHEEL and to the southeast more enemy counterattacks against our bridgeheads brought no result. Mopping-up in the area of HECHTEL has been completed and elements have reached the ESCAUT CANAL.
Other Allied troops, after crossing the ALBERT CANAL have pushed on to cross the DUTCH FRONTIER. The frontier has also been crossed further south near MAASTRICHT.
In LUXEMBOURG, our forces have made gains in the area northeast of the capital.
The bridgehead over the MOSELLE River continues to be strengthened in face of heavy enemy resistance and we now hold high ground in one area on the west bank.
In BRITTANY, progress is being made at BREST against stubborn defenses which included small arms, mortars, machine guns and some artillery. A fort about two miles east of the town has been taken. Fighter-bombers supported yesterday’s attack.
Attacks on the SIEGFRIED LINE and against strong points near NANCY and METZ were made yesterday by fighter-bombers. Other fighter-bombers hit rail targets in the NANCY area, destroying and damaging a number of locomotives and railway trucks.
Communications and transportation targets on railways and waterways of HOLLAND were bombed and strafed by medium, light, and fighter-bombers. Hits were scored on the causeway between WALCHEREN and SOUTH BEVELAND. Fortified positions at BOULOGNE were targets for other medium and light bombers.
Coastal aircraft attacked an enemy convoy in the anchorage off DEN HELDER Tuesday night. Five vessels were left on fire and a sixth apparently sinking. Shore installations were also hit. Other formations attacked shipping between the HOOK of HOLLAND and AMELAND. Two coastal aircraft are missing.
U.S. Navy Department (September 14, 1944)
Carrier aircraft of the Pacific Fleet swept over the Central Philippines and inflicted crippling damage on enemy air forces shipping and ground installations during a three-day strike, September 11 to 13 (West Longitude Date). More complete information shows that the following damage was done to the enemy on Panay, Cebu, Negros and Leyte Islands.
AIRCRAFT DESTROYED: 156 shot down in combat and 277 destroyed on the ground. This is a revision of planes previously announced lost by the enemy in the Central Philippines. As of sundown on September 13, 501 enemy aircraft had been destroyed in the Philippines by our carrier aircraft.
SHIPS SUNK: Two large cargo vessels, one medium transport, two destroyer escorts, 35 small ships.
SHIPS DAMAGED: Five cargo vessels, one medium oiler, 36 small ships, two motor torpedo boats, many sampans. These ship losses are in addition to those previously reported.
DAMAGE TO GROUND INSTALLATIONS: Several airfields were bombed and strafed by our planes. Oil storage facilities, ammunition dumps, warehouses, barracks and buildings were set afire.
Enemy air opposition the first day was considerable and was reinforced during the first night so that its strength on the second day was also formidable. Enemy planes rose to intercept our aircraft, but no attempts were made to attack our surface ships. On the third day, enemy airpower was nonexistent and anti-aircraft fire was meager. Our losses in planes and flight personnel were relatively light.
Carrier aircraft hit enemy positions at Angaur, Peleliu and Ngesebus Islands in the Palau Group on September 12 with 90 tons of bombs and 165 rockets. Damage was inflicted on coastal gun positions, warehouses and a lighthouse at Angaur.
On September 12, Navy search planes of Fleet Air Wing Two, attacked and damaged a large sampan and two large troop laden landing craft near Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands.
Pagan Island was bombed twice on September 12, one attack being made by a Thunderbolt of the 7th Army Air Force, the other by a Liberator. Buildings and gun positions were hit. There was no anti-aircraft fire.
A single Liberator of the 7th Army Air Force bombed buildings on Marcus Island on September 11. The plane which returned was damaged by anti-aircraft fire. Other 7th Army Air Force Liberators bombed Marcus Island on September 12.
Mitchell bombers of the 7th Army Air Force flew through meager anti-aircraft fire to bomb Nauru on September 12.
The 4th Marine Aircraft Wing sent Corsair and Dauntless dive bombers over Wotje on September 11 and again on September 12 to bomb gun positions and communications facilities. Dauntless dive bombers struck at Mille on September 11, hitting bivouac areas. Meager anti-aircraft fire was encountered at both targets.
U.S. State Department (September 14, 1944)
Moscow, September 14, 1944
[Translation]
I have received your message regarding the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks.
I also hope that these important discussions may end successfully. This may be of serious significance for the further strengthening of cooperation of our countries and for the whole cause of future peace and security.
I must say that for the success of the activities of the International Security Organization, of great significance will be the order of voting in the Council, having in mind the importance that the Council work on the basis of the principle of coordination and unanimity of the four leading powers on all questions, including those which directly relate to one of these nations. The initial American proposal that there should be established a special procedure of voting in case of a dispute in which one or several members of the Council, who have the statute [status?] of permanent members, are directly involved, seems to me correct. Otherwise, will be brought to naught the agreement achieved among us at the Tehran Conference which is proceeding from the principle of provision, first of all, the unanimity of agreement of four powers necessary for the struggle against aggression in the future.
Such a unanimity proposes [presupposes?], of course, that among these powers there is no room for mutual suspicions. As to the Soviet Union, it cannot also ignore the presence of certain absurd prejudices which often hinder an actually objective attitude toward the USSR And the other nations also should weigh the consequences which the lack of unanimity among the leading powers may bring about.
I hope that you will understand the seriousness of the considerations expressed here and that we shall find a harmonious solution of this question as well.
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/21
Washington, September 14, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-SECOND DAY
Meeting of the Joint Formulation Group
The joint formulation group met this afternoon and made a number of refinements in and additions to the draft proposals as follows:
a) Introductory statement
An introductory statement was added to the effect that an international organization should be created under the title of the United Nations and that its charter should contain provisions to give effect to the proposals.
b) Voting procedure in the assembly and in the Economic and Social Council
The provisions on voting in the assembly and in the Economic and Social Council were amended to read that in either case the vote should be by a majority of those states present and voting. This would apply in the assembly in the case of either a ⅔ majority or a simple majority.
c) Representatives in the assembly
It was agreed to add to the provision concerning the composition of the assembly a statement to the effect that the states members should have “a number of representatives to be specified in the Charter.”
d) Disarmament
The British insisted that the word “disarmament” should be placed in brackets wherever it occurs in the draft proposals to indicate that they have not as yet agreed to its use in the document.
e) Availability of air force contingents
Agreement has not as yet been reached to accept either our alternative or the British alternative concerning national air force contingents. However, the British and Russian representatives agreed to our proposal to eliminate an inner bracket in the American alternative and to alter the statement to read that “the strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action should be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to above.”
f) Transitional arrangements
It was agreed that the present section of Chapter VIII relating to Interim Arrangements should become a new Chapter XII to be designated Transitional Arrangements but should for the time being remain in brackets.
g) Non-intervention in domestic matters
With reference to the present bracketed paragraph of the chapter on Principles which states that the organization should refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of any state, the British proposed the addition of a new paragraph to the section on Pacific Settlement to the effect that the present provisions of this section should not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned. Both the Soviet and the American representatives regarded this addition favorably but reserved their positions on it pending consideration.
Meeting of the American Group
The American group, at its regular 9:30 meeting, considered the tentative proposal on voting in the council formulated on Wednesday. Suggested modifications by individual members will be considered on Monday.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell | |
| Mr. White | Mr. MacDougall |
[Undated]
This was the meeting which the President had suggested the Secretary have with Lord Cherwell. Lord Cherwell had asked to bring along Mr. MacDougall.
The Secretary asked Cherwell which of the two subjects before them for discussion would he like to take up first. Cherwell replied that he would like to take up the lend-lease program first since he thought that would be simpler to dispose of than the question of policy toward Germany. Cherwell went into some detail on the need for getting to work quickly on a lend-lease program for England during the period after the defeat of Germany and before the defeat of Japan. He outlined British views of what would be appropriate for England to receive in the way of lend-lease aid. He described England’s need for increasing her exports and relaxing on the home working front. He expressed the view that a cut of 27 percent in our lend-lease to the British Empire would appear reasonable to the British. In general, he repeated the gist of what was in the memorandum of the State Department to the President.
When he got through, the Secretary said that he had heard all that before from the Exchequer and others when he was in England. He then told Cherwell about his conversation with the Exchequer and with the President and said that it was now up to Churchill. If Churchill thought that the idea of forming a committee to handle the whole problem was a good one, it was up to Churchill to suggest it to the President.
The Secretary also said that he didn’t like the approach of determining the amount of lend-lease aid that Britain was to get that Cherwell presented. In his (the Secretary’s) opinion, the question should be approached from the point of view of just how much munitions the British need in the role that they are to play in the Pacific. The Secretary thought that food shipments could be handled all right but he felt that commercial goods could not appropriately go into exports.
In any case, the Secretary stressed the need for its being handled by a joint committee of British and Americans. Cherwell liked the idea of the committee and asked whether the Secretary would head it up. The Secretary replied that he didn’t know; that that was up to the President. The Secretary told Cherwell that the President had given him (Morgenthau) for his comment a memorandum prepared by the State Department and that the President might want somebody from State Department or possibly the Treasury to head up the committee. Cherwell suggested that White and MacDougall attempt to draft a directive setting up such a committee so that if the Prime Minister and the President did agree on the idea, they might get it out then and there. The Secretary agreed.
The Secretary then took up the question of Germany. He handed Cherwell the book on Germany to read and explained that it was compiled on a day’s notice. Cherwell read hurriedly through the first part and expressed skepticism as to whether Organized Labor in the United States would approve a program so drastic in character. Secretary Morgenthau thought that it would. Cherwell commented that he didn’t understand why Churchill had taken so contrary a position on the program the evening before. He (Cherwell) was surprised at Churchill’s attitude and thought possibly that it was due to the fact that Churchill did not wholly understand what the Secretary was driving at.
The Secretary told Cherwell that Secretary Hull was in general agreement with the views expressed by the Treasury and that he was of the opinion that Eden would be likewise. He said that the question came down to a choice of: “Do you want a strong Germany and a weak England or a weak Germany and a strong England?” The Secretary said that he preferred to rely on a strong England and a weak Germany.
Cherwell thought that the proposal could be dressed up in a way to be more attractive to the Prime Minister and the Secretary said that he would be very glad to have Cherwell try it.
After the Secretary and Cherwell left to see the President and Churchill to report on the morning’s conversation, I talked at length with MacDougall on the merits of the Treasury’s proposed program and MacDougall appeared to be in agreement. Later MacDougall, a Mr. Weeks of the British Government, and I met to draft the directive suggested by Cherwell.
When the Secretary returned with Cherwell from the President and the Prime Minister, he reported that both Churchill and the President had liked the idea of creating a committee. They wanted to set up one on an informal and ad hoc basis, to formalize it after the election.
The Secretary told me after the others had gone that when it came to the question of who should be the chairman of the joint committee that Churchill had said, “Plow about Harry Hopkins?” But the President had replied, “No, I want Morgenthau to be chairman.”
H. D. WHITE