War of nerves aimed at Japs
Next move may be made by Russia
…
Youngstown Vindicator (July 28, 1945)
Japs planned harsh terms for losers
Nipponese leaders boasted of ruthless powers they would take
…
U.S. State Department (July 28, 1945)
Truman-Attlee meeting, 9:15 p.m.
Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Attlee | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Bevin | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Sir Alexander Cadogan |
Byrnes: “Soon after their arrival, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin called on the President and the four of us discussed the work of the conference. The President mentioned the Soviet demand for East Prussia and indicated on a map the changes in the boundary lines of Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union that thus would be effected. Mr. Bevin immediately and forcefully presented his strong opposition to those boundaries.”
Leahy: “Prime Minister Attlee and his newly appointed Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, arrived shortly after 9 P.M. and called on the President. Byrnes and I were present and the conversation quickly centered on the possibility of settling the Polish boundary question and reparations.”
Tenth plenary meeting, 10:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Attlee | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Bevin | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Davies | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Bohlen | Major Birse | |
| Mr. Cohen | ||
| Mr. Thompson |
Thompson Minutes
Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m.
Top secret
MR. MOLOTOV read his reports of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers held on July 27 and July 25 (attachment no. I).
THE PRESIDENT inquired if the list of questions drawn up by the Foreign Ministers was agreed to.
There was no objection.
STALIN suggested that they add the question of the disposition of the German fleet. He inquired how much time they had at their disposal at the meeting and suggested that they meet for one hour.
This was agreed to.
STALIN went on to say that the Russian Delegation had received a new proposal from Japan. Although the Soviet Delegation had not been informed when the document was drawn up against Japan they, nevertheless, were informing the other countries of this approach.
The translator then read the communication from Ambassador Saito which was marked strictly confidential and which was to the following effect: At our last meeting on July 13 the Ambassador had had the honor to submit the proposal of the Japanese Government to send Prince Konoe to Moscow. He had received the reply of the Soviet Government which did not see the possibility of giving a definite reply to the approach because no definite proposal had been made. In order to make the matter more precise he was communicating the following. The mission of Prince Konoe was to ask the Soviet Government to take part in mediation to end the present war and to transmit the complete Japanese case in this respect. He would also be empowered to negotiate with respect to Soviet-Japanese relations during the war and after the war. Simultaneously, he wished to repeat that Prince Konoe was especially charged by His Majesty, the Emperor, to convey to the Soviet Government that it was exclusively the desire of His Majesty to avoid more bloodshed by the parties engaged in the war. In view of the foregoing he hoped that the Soviet Government would give favorable attention to his request and would give its consent to the arrival of the mission. He added that the Soviet Government was aware of the position which Prince Konoe occupied in Japan.
STALIN said there was nothing new in this except that it was more definite than the previous approach and that it would receive a more definite answer than was the case the last time, and that the answer would be in the negative.
THE PRESIDENT thanked Marshal Stalin. The President added that he understood the Soviet Delegation had two questions to take up this evening.
MOLOTOV said these were [the] questions of Italy and the satellite states and the question of reparations from Austria and Italy. He added that besides the questions covered in the report of the Foreign Ministers it would be desirable to discuss the disposition of the German fleet and the western boundaries of Poland.
THE PRESIDENT stated that they could discuss any question and that he would be prepared to express his opinion on any matter raised.
ATTLEE expressed regret that domestic occurrences in Great Britain had interfered with the work of the Conference and said that he was prepared to stay as long as necessary to complete the work of the Conference.
Admission of Italy and the Satellite States into the United Nations Organization
MOLOTOV said that this question had already been discussed at a previous meeting of the Big Three. The Foreign Ministers had held different opinions as to the results of this discussion. His own impression was that the proposal had been agreed to by the Big Three with respect to Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, subject to an amendment substituting the word “for” for the word “with.” The proposal had then been referred to the Foreign Ministers meeting for the final draft. In the Foreign Ministers meeting, however, the British representatives had proposed a new amendment.
STALIN said that this amendment had been rejected at the Big Three meeting. The question was whether to describe those satellite governments as “responsible” or to “recognize” them. The opinion of the Soviet Delegation was that the word “responsible” would offend the governments of those countries. If they said “recognize” it would not offend them and each of the governments represented at this conference could recognize them when it thought they were responsible. This had been accepted in principle by the Big Three, then the Foreign Ministers had gone to a meeting and had rejected it. This was not right.
MR. BYRNES said that at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers it was stated by Mr. Molotov that he was under the impression that the United States had agreed to the amendment offered by Marshal Stalin or offered by the Soviet Delegation and approved by Stalin. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had stated that this was correct. The President had agreed in principle with the amendment offered by the Soviet Delegation. The President did suggest that the question be examined by a drafting committee and he had had in mind changing one word, namely, the substitution of “examine” for “consider.” Therefore, there was no disagreement between the Soviet Delegation and the United States Delegation. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had stated to the Foreign Ministers meeting, however, that when the President had agreed, his recollection was that the Prime Minister did not agree. The Prime Minister had advised him at the conclusion of the meeting that he did not agree.
MR. BYRNES said that he had advised the meeting of Foreign Ministers that the United States had offered its proposal originally in order to give some confidence to Italy. We had asked only for a declaration that the Three Powers support the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. The British Delegation had asked that we include neutrals and we had agreed. Then the Soviet Delegation expressed opinions with regard to the Franco Government of Spain and in the hope of getting an agreement we had added to the declaration that we would not support the entry of the Franco Government into the United Nations Organization. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked for the inclusion of the paragraph concerning Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland and we had agreed to that. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked that the paragraph regarding Italy be modified to accord with the language used in reference to the other satellite states and we had agreed to that. Unfortunately, we had found that if we agreed with the Soviet Delegation, the British Delegation did not agree; if we agreed with the British Delegation, the Soviet Delegation disagreed. It was now up to the Soviet and British Delegations to see if they could get together. If not, we would withdraw our modest request for the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization.
CADOGAN observed that the paper related to the entry of Italy and the other states into the United Nations Organization. There were two doubtful points. Otherwise, they were agreed. Marshal Stalin had referred to one in regard to which he thought there was no difficulty. The original text had said “responsible” governments and the Soviet Delegation proposed substituting the word “recognized.” Cadogan thought that several days ago they had been prepared to agree to that. A more formidable difficulty was the proposal of the Soviet Government for an addition to paragraph three. Mr. Churchill had explained that while he was prepared to agree to consider the recognition of these governments, to put this in a declaration might be misleading, because the British could not in fact re-establish diplomatic relations with countries with which they were technically still at war. Cadogan said he had suggested a compromise but that this had not been satisfactory to the Soviet Delegation.
STALIN said he understood Cadogan’s remarks to mean that he agreed to substitute the word “recognized” in place of the word “responsible.” Cadogan replied in the affirmative.
THE PRESIDENT said that this was satisfactory to us.
STALIN then continued that there was no difference in the position toward the arrangements for Italy on the one hand and the other satellite states on the other, because none of these countries had democratic governments except Finland because they had held no elections. Mr. Churchill had referred to the fact that Great Britain had recognized Italy 90%. Stalin pointed out that the proposal did not provide for the establishment of full diplomatic relations but only that they consider the question. He did not understand the distinction made between Italy and the other satellites.
BEVIN suggested that the difference was that they knew about the Italian Government but that they did not know anything about the other governments.
STALIN said it was not proposed that they recognize them; until such time as they did recognize them they could obtain information. Bevin inquired why they were being asked to commit themselves first.
STALIN rejoined that the Russians had also known little about the Italian Government when they had established diplomatic relations with them, perhaps even less than the British knew about the other satellites. He pointed out that with respect to Italy the first step was the resumption of diplomatic relations, which occurred six to eight months after their surrender. The proposal to admit Italy into the United Nations Organization was a second step. The task now was to give the other satellite governments the hope that eleven months after capitulation relations with them would be resumed. If they agreed to ease the situation of Italy, something should be done for the other satellites.
ATTLEE repeated that it was impossible for them to enter into diplomatic relations with countries with which they were not at peace and the proposed statement would give the impression that they would do what was impossible. The proposed British amendment stated what was possible.
STALIN then suggested that they might favor “to consider each separately the question of establishing of a complete or partial diplomatic relation.” He was willing to accept the American proposal to substitute “examine” for “consider.”
ATTLEE replied that the change of words did not alter the substance of the matter. One question in Parliament would bring out the real difficulty.
STALIN said that in any event the British would study the matter. He thought that the British Delegation could accept the proposal and lose nothing.
BEVIN said that Parliament would ask what they meant by what they had done and he wanted to be perfectly straight with the British people. If he were going to recognize these governments, he would recognize them and he did not want to clothe things with words. He would rather take the latest American view and leave the whole question to a later date.
STALIN said he agreed.
Italian Reparations
THE PRESIDENT said that as he had stated on the first day that this question had been discussed that we had found it necessary with the Government of Great Britain to contribute 500 million dollars for the feeding and rehabilitation of Italy. We recognized that probably that much more would be needed to keep Italy from starving to death. As he had made it plain at this conference, the United States did not intend to provide money for the payment of reparations. If there were war plants that the Soviet Government needed, we agreed that they should take them, but contributions made to support Italy should be a first claim on exports.
STALIN said that it was possible to agree not to exact reparations from Austria, as this could be understood but the Soviet people would not understand if this were the case with Italy. Italy had sent armies to the Volga. Austria did not have her own armed forces, whereas Italy did have.
THE PRESIDENT said that if any reparations could be obtained from Italy he was perfectly willing, but the United States could not spend money to rehabilitate Italy just to enable Italy to pay reparations to other countries.
STALIN said he quite understood this. He referred to the moral right of the Soviet Union to reparations as being based on the fact that for three and one-half years its territory had been occupied and much devastation caused. THE PRESIDENT had said that if there were some equipment available in Italy it could be used for reparations. He did not want to ask too much. It was necessary to find out what sum this would constitute. In the cases of Rumania, Hungary and Finland it had been 300 million dollars. He inquired what sum Italy could pay. Perhaps the President was not ready to answer. He repeated he wanted to know what sum this would amount to.
THE PRESIDENT said he was not able to answer now.
STALIN said that the answer could be postponed.
BEVIN inquired if this were on the assumption that the supplies furnished by the United States and Great Britain would be protected.
STALIN said that he did not wish to ignore the interests of America.
ATTLEE said he agreed with the President and said that they had full sympathy for the Russian people in the suffering they had undergone. He pointed out that Britain had also suffered from attacks by Italy. Britain also had ravaged lands and they could imagine the feelings of the British people if Italy had to pay reparations which actually came from Britain and America. The fact was that Italy had to receive help in order to live. If military equipment, there was no objection.
STALIN said he agreed to take reparations in the form of equipment.
BEVIN asked “military equipment?”
STALIN replied “yes, military equipment.”
ATTLEE inquired if this would be once-and-for-all removals and not levies on war production.
STALIN replied: “Yes, once-for-all removals.”
BEVIN inquired if this meant military equipment having no peace time value.
STALIN replied that military factories could be used for any purpose. It was the same as equipment taken from Germany.
ATTLEE said it should be equipment having no peace time usefulness.
STALIN replied that all equipment could be adjusted for peace time production. The Soviet Union was adjusting theirs now. There was no such equipment which would have no peace time use.
BEVIN observed that it was so difficult to tell what the Russians would take away.
STALIN said of course they could not say now. He wanted only a decision in principle.
THE PRESIDENT said he thought that Marshal Stalin wanted a decision in principle that Italy would pay reparations.
STALIN observed that the sum of reparations asked could be reduced.
THE PRESIDENT said he thought they were not far apart on the principle. He only wanted to protect the help we were giving.
STALIN said he agreed and that the Russians did not want to touch the advances the United States was making to Italy.
BEVIN inquired if it were not then a question of priorities. The first priority should be given to what Great Britain and the United States had supplied, reparations would be next.
STALIN said he wanted to give no bonus to aggressors without their paying a small part of the damage they had caused.
THE PRESIDENT said he agreed to this.
STALIN remarked to Attlee that he should not forget what Italy had done to Britain.
ATTLEE replied that they would not forget.
It was agreed to meet the next day at 4:00 p.m.
The meeting adjourned.
Cohen Notes
Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m.
MR. ATTLEE and MR. BEVIN now head the British delegation.
MR. MOLOTOV reports on the last two meetings of the foreign secretaries.
At the July 26 [25] meeting of the foreign secretaries the following points were considered:
-
The Secretary of State Byrnes proposed that the question of inland waterways be discussed and that the matter be referred to a subcommittee. It was so agreed.
-
Secretary Byrnes brought up the question of the removal of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Cadogan suggested that a procedure for collaboration to secure their orderly transfer be worked out. A subcommittee was appointed to consider this.
-
Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan suggested that the subcommittees for the drafting of protocol and communiqué at the conclusion of the conference be appointed. It was agreed to set up two committees for this purpose.
In the meeting of the foreign secretaries on July 27 the following questions were considered:
-
The foreign secretaries made up a list of the pending questions on which final decision had not yet been made.
-
There was further discussion of the paper regarding the admission of Italy and the other satellites and Spain into the United Nations. Secretary Byrnes stated that if the Soviets and British could not agree he would withdraw the paper from the agenda. Mr. Cadogan suggested an amendment to the effect that the conclusion of peace with responsible governments would make possible the resumption of diplomatic relations.
Mr. Molotov stated the amendment was not acceptable. It was agreed to refer the question to the Big Three.
-
Reparations from Germany. Soviet delegation considered committee report unsatisfactory. It was agreed to refer the question to the Big Three. Molotov pointed out that Mr. Pauley had withdrawn the Crimea decision as a basis for discussion. Mr. Molotov asked Mr. Byrnes for an explanation of the American position. Mr. Byrnes explained that the Crimea figures were taken only as a basis for discussion and that the destruction wrought by the Allied armies as well as further study had indicated that that basis was impractical.
-
Reparations from Austria and Italy. Molotov stated the committee report was unsatisfactory. Byrnes stated reparations from Italy impossible except for removal of war equipment not usable for peace purposes. It was agreed to report the differences to the Big Three.
-
German economic principles. Secretary Byrnes suggested the discussion be postponed.
-
European oil supplies. Discussion was deferred because committee was waiting for further information.
-
Economic collaboration. In the solution of urgent economic problems (European), a report of subcommittee was approved for submission to the Big Three and was read.
TRUMAN: The last document was agreed to by the foreign secretaries? It is satisfactory to me.
ATTLEE: To me also.
TRUMAN: Shall we take up Poland?
STALIN: We have also the German fleet and Italy to discuss. How much time have we? An hour?
TRUMAN: ‘Til 12:00.
STALIN: I wish to make a statement. Last night the Russian delegation was given a copy of the Anglo-American declaration to the Japanese people. We think it our duty to keep each other informed. I inform the Allies of the message that I received from the Japanese Emperor through the Japanese ambassador. I sent a copy of my answer to this peace plea which was in the negative. I received another communication informing me more precisely of the desire of the Emperor to send a peace mission headed by Prince Konoye who was stated to have great influence in the Palace. It was indicated that it was the personal desire of the Emperor to avoid further bloodshed. In this document there is nothing new except the emphasis on the Japanese desire to collaborate with the Soviets. Our answer of course will be negative.
(The foregoing was the gist of the translator’s remarks, but they were not heard clearly and, consequently, they may be inaccurate as to detail).
TRUMAN: I appreciate very much what the Marshal has said.
If Mr. Molotov will now bring up the questions that he wants answered, I will endeavor to give my answers.
MOLOTOV: These are reparations, the admission of Italy, and the satellites, the German fleet and the western Polish boundary.
TRUMAN: We may discuss any question you wish. I will give my opinion.
ATTLEE: I regret our domestic situation has caused delay in the Conference. We are willing to sit as long as necessary.
STALIN: First question is the admission into the United Nations of Italy and the other satellites. This was discussed by the Big Three. The foreign ministers had different impressions of what was agreed. I thought it was agreed as to satellites as well as to Italy. Mr. Churchill’s suggestion of substituting “for” in place of “with” was accepted. Then draft was submitted to foreign secretaries for final polishing. Then Cadogan suggested new amendment. He suggested describing governments as “responsible.” “Responsible” – would suggest that these governments are now irresponsible. The Big Three have agreed on this question. It is not right for the foreign secretaries to change our decision.
BYRNES: At the meeting of foreign ministers, Molotov said he understood the United States had agreed to Soviet delegation amendment. In behalf of United States I said that was correct in that the President had agreed in principle. The President said he thought it should be submitted to drafting committee. He had in mind changing only a word. The word “examine” should be substituted for “consider” so there was no difference between the United States and the Soviet delegation. I stated that when the President agreed Mr. Churchill did not agree. I advised the foreign ministers that the United States had offered this proposal originally to give some comfort to Italy. We asked only for a declaration for the support of Italy’s admission into the United Nations on the conclusion of peace. The British ask that we include neutrals. We agreed. Soviet delegation asked express rejection of Franco’s admission. We agreed. Then Soviet asked inclusion of paragraph covering other satellites. We agreed. Then we were asked to modify language on Italy to conform to language on other satellites. We agreed. Unfortunately, we find when we agree with the Soviets the British disagree and when we agree with the British the Soviets disagree. If the British and Soviets can get together it is satisfactory to us. If they can’t agree we will withdraw our proposal. (Attlee asks Cadogan to state British position.)
CADOGAN: So far as I understand it, the text would be agreed except for two doubtful points. The Marshal refers to one. Stalin proposes “recognize” instead of “responsible”, governments. We agreed. The more formidable objection in the proposal is that we consider in the near future the establishment of diplomatic relations with satellites. Mr. Churchill explained we could agree to consider that but it would be misleading because we cannot constitutionally establish diplomatic relations with countries with which we are still at war. I suggested compromise. It is not satisfactory. I suggested a further compromise and it is not satisfactory to the Marshal.
STALIN: There is no difference between Italy and the other satellites. In none of the countries but Finland has there been an election. Italy was recognized by the Soviets, the United States and Great Britain, at least 90 percent. I cannot understand this difference.
BEVIN: We know about the Italian government, but we don’t know about the others.
STALIN: We are not asking an undertaking to recognize, only asking you to consider. We knew very little about Italy. We first recognized Italy. Now we propose to consider her admission to the United Nations. We should at least start with the first phase with the other satellites. That is recognition, when we are considering the second stage with Italy.
ATTLEE: The Soviets’ suggestion was not constitutionally possible for us.
STALIN: Say, then, that you will consider the establishment of complete or partial relations.
ATTLEE: I don’t think that the suggestion will meet the case.
STALIN: Take the American proposal. Say “examine” instead of “consider.” You will help yourselves with the satellite countries.
BEVIN: But I must be perfectly straight with the House of Commons. I do not quote things in words of doubtful meaning. I will take the last suggestion of the American delegation and leave the whole matter to later consideration.
TRUMAN: We now pass to Italian reparations. I stated that we found it necessary to go with the British government to contribute five hundred million dollars to the feeding of Italy. It will probably require that much more to get them through the winter. The United States does not intend to contribute money to pay reparations. War equipment may be transferred but we want it understood that our contribution to feed Italy is the first lien on her supportable surplus. That is all I have to say.
STALIN: We can agree not to exact reparations from Austria which had no separate army, but Italy sent her army to devastate our country.
TRUMAN: We don’t object to reparations, but we are not going to send the money to pay them.
STALIN: I understand the point of view of the President but I want him to understand mine. What gives the Soviet the moral right to reparations is the occupation and devastation of her land by Italy.
TRUMAN: I am in entire sympathy with the Russian point of view.
STALIN: The President says war equipment may be used for reparations. I do not ask much. It will be necessary to find what sum this equipment would come to. Hungary or [and?] Finland, [and?] Rumania agreed to pay 300 million dollars. I want to know the sum the Italian equipment represents.
BEVIN: This would not come out of what the American and British people have delivered to Italy.
STALIN: I don’t want to ignore the interest of America.
ATTLEE: I agree with the President. I have sympathy with Russia’s suffering. We have also suffered from Italy. You can imagine how our people would feel if having suffered at the hands of them, they felt they had to assist Italy to pay reparations.
STALIN: We quite agree to accept equipment as reparations.
ATTLEE: That would be once and for all, removal of war plants but not levy on the product. May I ask is this equipment military equipment, not peacetime?
STALIN: Have you in view the equipment of military nature which could be used for any purpose?
ATTLEE: I was suggesting machinery that has no peacetime utility.
STALIN: War equipment can be adjusted for peacetime production. There is no equipment which has no peacetime utility. Ammunition plants are producing motor cars, etc.
BEVIN: It is so difficult to define what you can take away without affecting the economic life of a nation.
STALIN: We want recognition of the principle.
TRUMAN: I think I understand that the Marshal wants the recognition of the principle.
STALIN: I agree that the amount should be reduced.
TRUMAN: We are concerned about our advances to keep Italy going.
BEVIN: Does that not resolve itself into the question of priorities? First claim is for advances, then reparations.
STALIN: We can’t let the aggressors inflict damage without holding them responsible for some compensation.
TRUMAN: I agree with that.
STALIN: England should not forget that they fared very badly at the hands of Italy.
ATTLEE: I do not understand whether [when?] we should meet in plenary session.
TRUMAN: Since foreign secretaries are not meeting tomorrow let us meet at 4:00 p.m.
Adjourned.
Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference
Saturday, July 28:
This morning the President presented an autographed photograph to Major General Floyd L. Parks, USA.
0930: The President conferred with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1930: Secretary Forrestal and Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke, USN, were dinner guests of the President this evening.
Prime Minister Attlee and British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin returned to Babelsberg from London this afternoon. Their party having been defeated in the recent British election, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden remained in England.
2115: Prime Minister Attlee, Mr. Bevin, and Sir Alexander Cadogan called at the Little White House and conferred briefly with the President and Secretary Byrnes.
2215: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof. The tenth meeting of the conference was called to order at 2230. The new Big Three posed for still and motion pictures before the meeting. Tonight’s meeting was adjourned at 0005, or five minutes past midnight.
The President returned to the Little White House at fifteen minutes past midnight, at which time he was handed a telegram from Washington informing him that the Senate had ratified the United Nations Charter. The President immediately dispatched the following statement to the press: “It is deeply gratifying that the Senate has ratified the United Nations Charter by virtually unanimous vote. The action of the Senate substantially advances the cause of world peace.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
L’Aube (July 29, 1945)
Reprise à Potsdam avec MM. Attlee et Bevin
qui sont arrivés hier soir à Berlin sans Churchill ni Eden
…
U.S. State Department (July 29, 1945)
Truman-Molotov meeting, noon
Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| President Truman | Foreign Commissar Molotov | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Mr. Golunsky | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | ||
| Mr. Bohlen |
Bohlen Minutes
Potsdam, July 29, 1945, noon
Top secret
MR. MOLOTOV said that Marshal Stalin had caught cold and that his doctors would not let him leave his house. Therefore, he asked that the President excuse him for not coming to the agreed meeting and it would also be impossible for the Marshal to have a meeting this afternoon.
After a suitable expression of regret at the Marshal’s indisposition, etc., THE PRESIDENT said he would ask Mr. Byrnes to take up the points he had had in mind to discuss with Marshal Stalin.
THE SECRETARY said that there were two principal questions, in his opinion, which remained outstanding and if they could reach a decision on those it would be possible to consider winding up the Conference. These questions were:
- The Polish western boundary.
- German reparations.
THE SECRETARY said that if we were able to get an agreement on reparations along the lines of his proposals to Mr. Molotov that the United States was prepared to go further to meet the Soviet wishes in regard to the Polish western frontier and would make the following proposal in that regard. (He handed Mr. Molotov a copy of the proposed United States suggestion with regard to the Polish western frontier, copy attached).
After it had been translated, MR. MOLOTOV said that this would not put under Polish administration the area between the Eastern and Western Neisse. He said the Poles were most insistent upon receiving this and he recalled that Mr. Mikołajczyk had made a most convincing and definite argument before the three Foreign Ministers as to the vital importance of this area for Poland.
THE SECRETARY pointed out that this was true, but that since the final determination of the boundary would await the peace settlement, it did not follow that Poland might not receive this additional area if the peace conference so desired. He then said that as the President had frequently remarked, it had been agreed at Yalta and elsewhere that there would be four occupying powers in Germany, but that we now had a situation when there was in fact a fifth – Poland – which had been assumed without consultation or agreement with the United States, French, or British Governments.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that this was no one’s fault; it was an extraordinary condition, since all Germans had fled the region.
THE PRESIDENT then remarked that he had thought that this suggestion would be agreeable to the Soviet Delegation, since in his opinion it represented a very large concession on our part and he hoped Mr. Molotov would submit it to Marshal Stalin.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that he would, of course, do so but he thought he could say here that Marshal Stalin was most insistent that this region as well should be placed under Polish administration.
THE SECRETARY pointed out that for the purpose of the occupation of Germany we had, of course, thought that all of this area would be the responsibility of the Soviet occupying forces.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that even though the Poles were administering this, Soviet troops were still in the area. He repeated, however, that he would submit the proposal to Marshal Stalin.
THE SECRETARY then inquired whether Mr. Molotov had had an opportunity to really think about his proposal in regard to reparations, namely, that each country look to its own zone for reparations and then exchange reparations between zones.
MR. MOLOTOV said that the Secretary’s proposal was acceptable in principle but that the Soviet Delegation would like to have clarity on certain points, in particular, the amount of equipment which would be turned over from the Ruhr to the Soviet Union. He said they had spoken of equipment to the amount of two billion dollars or five or six million tons.
(Mr. Molotov did not specify exactly what he meant by five or six million tons, whether productive capacity or actual weight of equipment).
THE SECRETARY explained that our experts felt that it was impossible to put any specific dollar value or tonnage on the equipment which would be available for reparations from the Ruhr, but that our proposal was to offer the Soviet Union 25% of the total equipment considered as available for reparations from the Ruhr.
MR. MOLOTOV said that 25% of an undetermined figure meant very little and that they wished to have a fixed sum or quantity agreed upon.
THE SECRETARY replied that at Yalta Mr. Maisky, who was the only one who would mention figures, had suggested in his proposal a total of twenty billion for reparations from Germany, of which ten billion would go to the Soviet Union. He said that from further study and the discussions here it had been made clear that these figures had no relation to reality and that this was a very good illustration of the danger of attempting to fix sums prematurely. He added that if we were to do that now, in the absence of sufficient data, six months from now if the figure turned out to be incorrect the Soviet Government might charge we were going back on the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference.
There was further discussion on this point, with MOLOTOV maintaining his position that some fixed sum be set otherwise the percentage would be meaningless, and THE SECRETARY maintaining from our point of view that it would be impossible to give any fixed figure. There was an extended discussion as to the Soviet share of reparations, with the Secretary maintaining that according to our calculations 50% of the national wealth of Germany lay in the Soviet zone, and with Mr. Molotov stating that according to their calculations only 42% lay in the Soviet zone.
MR. MOLOTOV said that under their figures the Russians would be entitled to obtain some reparations from the British, American and French zones in order to complete the 50%.
THE SECRETARY said that in his opinion percentage figures fixed at Yalta were no more agreed to except as a basis of discussion than had been the actual amounts of reparations.
THE PRESIDENT stated that what they were trying to do here was to fix a workable plan for reparations and that he desired to see the Soviet Union receive 50% of the total.
MR. MOLOTOV expressed his appreciation at the President’s statement.
THE SECRETARY reviewed his argument in favor of his proposal, pointing out that it would do away with almost certain points of friction in the future.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether we still intended to have some central German administration, not a government, but some central organization through which the Control Council could operate in matters affecting finance, transport, foreign trade, etc. on which it had been agreed to treat Germany as an economic whole. He pointed out that if reparations were not treated as a whole, what would happen to overall treatment of economic matters.
THE SECRETARY pointed out that under his scheme nothing was changed in regard to overall treatment of German finance, transport, foreign trade, etc. The Secretary subsequently repeated this statement in reply to a further observation of Mr. Molotov that the reparation proposal would affect the overall economic administration of Germany. The Secretary then said there was one other subject he had forgotten to mention, namely, that of the division of the German navy and merchant fleet.
THE PRESIDENT stated that in his opinion they had reached agreement on that, namely, that Russia was to get one-third of the navy now and that the merchant fleet was to be utilized in the war against Japan, with one-third earmarked for the Soviet Union.
THE SECRETARY thought it would be well to embody that agreement in writing and suggested the formation of a sub-committee for that purpose. He added that part of the agreement had been Mr. Churchill’s suggestion that a large part of the submarines be destroyed.
MR. MOLOTOV said what they desired was one-third of the navy and one-third of the merchant fleet. He said that the Soviet Union was also interested in shipping for the Far Eastern war and that, of course, they would be used for that purpose.
THE PRESIDENT said it was his understanding that the merchant fleet should be used for the prosecution of the war against Japan.
THE SECRETARY said that the Russian portion should be earmarked and used in the Pacific.
MR. MOLOTOV repeated that the Soviet Union would use these ships in the Pacific.
THE SECRETARY said in addition to that question, it would be important to clarify the question of replacement. For example, if the Soviets did use them in the war and they were sunk, it would be necessary to consider the question of their replacement.
Reverting to the subject of reparations, MR. MOLOTOV said he wished to have the Secretary’s proposal clearly in mind; as he understood it the Soviet Union would look to its own zone for a fixed amount of reparations and would receive as reparations 25% of the equipment from the Ruhr available for reparations.
THE SECRETARY replied that this was not quite accurate, since in the first place the Soviet Union would take what it wished from its zone, and second, the 25% to go to the Soviet Union from the Ruhr would be exchanged for food, coal and other products needed in western Germany from the Soviet zone.
MR. MOLOTOV said they [the United States?] had understood that all the equipment which the Soviets might receive from the Ruhr would have to be balanced off by exports from the Soviet zone. He said he had understood that only part would be so covered and that in any event it was a matter for discussion as to how much and what the Soviet zone could offer in return.
THE SECRETARY added that there had been another possibility, namely, instead of 25% from the Ruhr alone, the Soviets could receive 12½% of equipment available for reparations from the French, British and American zones taken together.
MR. MOLOTOV returned to the question of a fixed sum and inquired whether the Secretary could give him even a rough estimate of what we thought might be available to the Soviet Union.
THE SECRETARY repeated that he was unable to do this[–]that all our experts agreed that it was impossible to place any value on the equipment available for reparations for the following reason[s]:
- It was difficult to agree on a standing valuation to be placed on the equipment; and,
- The Soviets would undoubtedly have preferences as to the type of machinery which would affect the valuation.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that they were interested in heavy metallurgical machinery, machine-building and chemical installations. He added that they had proposed using 1938 prices.
THE SECRETARY answered that our experts thought it was impossible at this stage to fix any value; it would require long study on the spot and therefore we preferred the percentage basis. During the course of this discussion the Secretary remarked that at Yalta at one point Mr. Maisky had suggested ten billion in reparations for the United States and that our experts considered that there were only three or four billion dollars in all of possible reparations in western Germany. What, therefore, would Mr. Molotov say if we should ask for an additional six billion from the Soviet zone to make up the figure mentioned by Mr. Maisky. The Secretary added that he was merely citing this illustration to show the danger in agreement on any fixed sum.
MR. MOLOTOV said that in conclusion he had one other matter that the Marshal wished him to take up and that was the immediate cause of the Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war. He said that the Soviet Government considered that the best method would be for the United States, England and the other allies in the Far Eastern war to address a formal request to the Soviet Government for its entry into the war. He said that this could be based on the refusal of the Japanese to accept the recent ultimatum to surrender and made on the basis of shortening the war and saving of lives. He added, of course, that the Soviet Government was assuming that the agreement with the Chinese would be signed before the Soviet Union entered the war.
THE PRESIDENT said that he would, of course, examine carefully this Soviet request.
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation
[Babelsberg, July 29, 1945]
In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimean Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.
The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, to west of Stettin to the Oder and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the eastern Neisse River and along the eastern Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.
Truman-Attlee meeting, 4:30 p.m.
Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Attlee | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Bevin | |
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
According to Truman, at this meeting the British participants were informed of the suggestion made by Molotov earlier in the day concerning a formal request to the Soviet Government to enter the war against Japan.
President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee
Babelsberg, July 29, 1945
My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In accordance with my letter of July 25, I enclose a copy of a memorandum directive on the issuance of Lend-Lease munitions, which I have today sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This directive eliminates the delivery of Lend-Lease material for the occupation of Axis countries. In other respects I believe it adequately covers your expressed desires.
I have noted the suggestion in the letter of July 24, that postwar economic arrangements be discussed in Washington, say in September. Mr. W. L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, will be in London shortly for the UNRRA Council meeting, and I have instructed him to engage in informal conversations with your people about these matters. When he has reported to me in Washington, we shall be able to decide upon arrangements for further discussions with your representatives.
Very sincerely yours,
[HARRY S. TRUMAN]
[Enclosure]
The President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
[Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945
Top secret
Memorandum Directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Referring to my memorandum of 5 July, 1945, quoted herewith following:
Approval of the issue to Allied Governments of Lend Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment will be limited to that which is to be used in the war against Japan, and it will not be used for any other purpose.
It may be given the following interpretation:
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Issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to all Allied Governments, including Latin American countries is authorized when in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it is to be used in direct support of redeployment of American troops, or Allied troops in connection with their redeployment in support of the war against Japan.
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Supply of Allied service units that are directly serving United States forces in any area with subsistence, supply, and equipment (except arms and ammunition) is authorized.
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Until the receipt of further instructions issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to the USSR is authorized in accordance with my directive of 11 May, 1945, when in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it can be considered as for use in the war against Japan.
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Until the receipt of further instructions issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to the British Empire is authorized for the direct support of redeployment of American troops, and of British troops in connection with their redeployment in support of the war against Japan, taking into account commitments for approved combined operations against Japan. In accordance with my memorandum of 17 July, 1945 to the Prime Minister, and subject to the elimination of the requirements for occupational forces in Axis countries, such issue should be generally in accord with schedules of requirements and other terms arrived at by British and American supply representatives in October-November 1944, subject to changing strategic demands as well as to usual supply, procurement, and allocation considerations and procedures.
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Replacement and maintenance on a military Lend-Lease basis of French units which have already been equipped by the U.S. under the North African Rearmament Program, Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and Air Forces Program is authorized for subsistence until August 31, 1945, and for other items of equipment and supply until September 30, 1945.
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Supply of maintenance items for U.S. equipment now in the possession of Allied armies may be issued for purposes other than those specifically approved in this memorandum against payment under such terms and conditions as may be determined by the State Department and Foreign Economic Administration in accordance with established procedure.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
Proposal by the Soviet Delegation
[Babelsberg, July 29, 1945]
[Translation]
Proposal of [on?] Reparations From Germany
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Exactions of once-for-all removals from the national wealth of Germany in payment for reparations (plants, shops, equipment, materials, etc.) will be made by each government in its zone of occupation within two years after capitulation.
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Removals must be made with a view to the quickest restoration of the economy of those countries which have suffered from German occupation. The necessity of an over-all reduction of the war potential of Germany must also be taken into account.
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Because of the enormous losses of the Soviet heavy industry and also because of the small quantity of German enterprises of this kind in the Soviet zone of occupation and because of the insufficiency of the total resources of this zone, the USSR must receive in addition to the removals made in her zone, also from 5½ to 6 million tons on a special list of equipment in complete and workable condition on the reparations account from the Western Zones and predominantly from the Ruhr District. This equipment will be used for the restoration of the various branches of Soviet industry which have suffered from the enemy, and in the first instance for the metallurgical, chemical, and machine building industries. These removals must begin immediately upon the acceptance of this decision and will terminate not later than May 10, 1947. For this purpose a special agency will be created by the Allied Commission on Reparations.
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The USSR will also receive corporation shares valued at $500,000,000 of industrial and transport companies which have remained in the Western Zones and which have the greatest significance from the point of view of an over-all reduction of the military potential of Germany.
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Exactions of annual deliveries of goods from the current production will not be made on a zone basis but on an over-all German basis. The Allied Commission on Reparations will arrange a general plan for receiving and allocating these deliveries among the nations which have the right to them. The total sum of these deliveries will amount to 8 billion dollars and will be for a period of 10 years. The USSR share in these deliveries will amount to 50% of the total sum.
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The following goods will be accepted in the form of possible deliveries; coal, brown coal, metals, metal products, cement, building materials, scrap metal[,] timber, potash, paper, sugar, chemical and glass products, machines, river boats, medical instruments, agricultural products, cattle, etc. As a basis for computation, the 1938 price – valued in dollars – will be accepted with an increase of 10%.
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The Allied Commission on Reparations will arrange the plan of allocating the external assets and claims of Germany among the nations which have a right to receive reparations.
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In regards to that part of reparations which must be covered by once-for-all removals, the USSR will take upon herself, and for her own account, the settlement of the reparations claims of Poland. The United States of America and Great Britain will do the same in regards to France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and Norway.
Forrestal-Bevin conversation
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Mr. Forrestal | Foreign Secretary Bevin |
Forrestal’s diary entry: “From there went to see Ernest Bevin and found Bevin in very good form. He said in answer to my question that the only industries they proposed to nationalize were power, railroads, mines, and textiles up to the spinning mills. He indicated he had no use for Laski. He spoke highly and appreciatively of Anthony Eden. He said he was quite familiar with tactics of the Communists because he had had to deal with them in his own labor unions in England.
“I asked him a question about the Emperor in Japan, whether he thought we ought to insist on destruction of the Emperor concept along with the surrender. He hesitated and said this question would require a bit of thinking, but he was inclined to feel there was no sense in destroying the instrument through which one might have to deal in order to effectively control Japan. He then made a rather surprising statement – for a liberal and a labor leader: ‘It might have been far better for all of us not to have destroyed the institution of the Kaiser after the last war – we might not have had this one if we hadn’t done so. It might have been far better to have guided the Germans to a constitutional monarchy rather than leaving them without a symbol and therefore opening the psychological doors to a man like Hitler.’
“He said he was determined to get going what he called the three historic axes of European trade – the Baltic axis, that is to say, the old Hanseatic League; the Antwerp axis, and the Genoa axis. He said these three were the classic foci of European trade for hundreds of years back, that if they could be restored to activity, it would do much to bring about revival of commerce in Europe.
“I asked him how he was going to deal with Southeastern Europe, that is, the Balkans, which would be under the control of Russia, and he said he didn’t think the Balkans amounted to much in the way of business. I differed with this.”
Despres-Minc conversation
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Poland | |
| Mr. Despres | Mr. Minc | |
| Mr. Rajchman |
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2945
Memorandum by the Adviser on German Economic Affairs
[Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945
I conveyed to Mr. Minc Mr. Clayton’s regret that he was unable to accept the Minister’s invitation to visit the Silesian coal fields, explaining that Mr. Clayton was heavily engaged with other matters as the conference drew toward a close. I then told Mr. Minc that we thought it would be useful for him to talk to the American military authorities in Berlin, who were now transporting coal from the Ruhr to meet their share of Berlin’s requirements; in order to explore the possibility of drawing upon Silesian coal instead, and I said that, subject to his acceptance of the invitation, we had arranged an appointment for him with Maj. General Echols. Mr. Minc replied that he would consult the other members of his Government and let me know. (He subsequently accepted, and a meeting with General Echols took place the following morning.) I then outlined the scope of functions of EECE, ECO and the projected Inland Transport Organization and expressed the hope that the Polish Government would acquaint itself with these organizations with a view to active participation in their work. Mr. Minc asked a number of questions regarding the functions, activities to date and membership of these organizations and said that he would look into the matter further.
Mr. Minc then stated that he was most eager to acquaint the United States Government as fully as possible with the present economic position and needs of Poland, in order to enable us to consider against a background of knowledge their requests for imports and for credits. He asked how this might best be accomplished. I said that we proposed to attach a well-qualified economic man to Ambassador Lane’s staff, and that we hoped that the Polish Government would extend to such man the fullest opportunities for familiarizing himself with the situation. I suggested that it would also be useful for the Polish Government to send a small number of well-qualified people to Washington for financial and supply matters. Mr. Minc expressed the personal view that it would be most desirable if the United States Government could send a special survey mission to Poland which would spend a couple of months there and then return to Washington and report. I suggested that before extending any formal invitation along these lines, it would be well to discuss this matter informally with Ambassador Lane.
After my conversation with Minc had been completed, Dr. Rajchman furnished the following bits of information:
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It is a criminal offense for a Russian commander to allow any freight cars to move eastward empty. Large amounts of supplies are seen passing through Poland, including numbers of German livestock.
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Dr. Rajchman believes that the Russians have adopted a three-year program of removals from their zone of occupation. They have set a physiological minimum standard of living for the German population and plan to leave only enough resources to support this minimum.
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For a time the Russians carried out removals from the territory newly transferred to the Polish administration, but under an agreement with the Polish Government these removals were discontinued on a specified date.
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The Red Army is having considerable difficulty in effecting the redeployment of their forces from Germany. They are believed to have had 12 million men on the whole Eastern Front. There are a number of roving bands of Red Army troops (AWOL). They are shot when caught, but drastic punishment has not solved the problem.
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Except for Warsaw, which has been far more thoroughly demolished than Berlin, material damage in Poland has not been serious. Loss of life is estimated at 5,500,000, over half Jews.
The Pittsburgh Press (July 29, 1945)
Military chiefs meet with Big Three
New Prime Minister joins other leaders
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer
…