Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

Text Considered by the Subcommittee on Admission to the United Nations

[Undated]

The three Governments consider that the time has come to terminate the present anomalous position of Italy. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. She gives promise of becoming a firm supporter of a policy of peace and resistance to aggression.

The three Governments have therefore resolved that very early steps should be taken to conclude a peace treaty with Italy and have included the preparation of this among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. The conclusion of such a peace treaty will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations Organization.

As regards the admission of other States, Article IV of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

  1. membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;

  2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The three Governments so far as they are concerned will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded on the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

868.00/7-2245

Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill

Potsdam, 22nd July, 1945
P (TERMINAL) 25
Secret

Greece

In view of the reference to Greece in the Soviet Memorandum, I circulate the following two papers to the Conference. The first is the report of Field Marshal Alexander. The second is the report on the visit of the British Trades Union Delegation to Greece, which was headed by Sir Walter Citrine and composed of leading Trades Unionists. This I believe gives a true picture of the rights and wrongs of the Greek position.

I am puzzled at the reference on paragraph 4, Sub-section 2 of the Soviet Memorandum to “the representatives of Greek democracy.” According to the information I have, the EAM-ELAS elements in Greece in no way represent Greek democracy or the vast majority of Greeks. Their conduct in Athens during their attempt to seize and dominate the city have made a gulf between them and the Greek people which will last for many years. The report of the Trades Union Delegation should be read in this connection.

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a.m.

CCS 199th Meeting

Present
United States United Kingdom
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson
General Somervell General Ismay
Lieutenant General Hull Lieutenant-General Macready
Vice Admiral Cooke Major-General Laycock
Major General Norstad Major-General Holmes
Rear Admiral Flanigan Major-General Hollis
Captain McDill
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Captain Moore

CCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 21, 1945
Top secret

Approval of the Minutes of the 198th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 21 July 1945

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 198th Meeting and approved the detailed report, subject to any later minor amendments.

Employment of Captured Enemy Ocean-Going Passenger Shipping and British Troopship Employment in U.S. Trans-Atlantic Programs in the First Half of 1946 (CCS 679/6, 679/7, 679/8, and 679/9)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered CCS 679/9 and regretted that the amendments proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff were not acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff. It appeared to be the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that if the seven captured German ships were moved to the Pacific they would be unable to make more than one trip before the 31st of December, 1945. If then, as a result of the review of the combined requirements and combined resources for the first half of 1946, it was decided that these seven captured ships should no longer be allocated to the United States, their initial assignment to the Pacific in 1945 would prove uneconomical. He said he appreciated the point of view of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out, however, that the very fact that these ships had been moved to the Pacific would be a strong argument for retaining them there. This argument would be weighed with all the other arguments when it came to the combined review which the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed in paragraph 6 of CCS 679/8. To exclude these ships from the review at this stage seemed to the British Chiefs of Staff to be wrong.

ADMIRAL KING proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept CCS 679/8, provided that the combined study on the lines suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff be undertaken as a firm commitment to be completed by mid-September.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in CCS 679/6 for United States employment up to 31 December 1945.

b. Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would allocate to the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for the movement of Canadians.

c. Directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, to submit by 15 September 1945 a report, on the lines of CCS 679/1, of the combined requirements and combined resources (including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946, the study to cover the recommendation in paragraph 7 of CCS 679/7 and the employment during the first half of 1946 of the seven ships listed in CCS 679/6.

Provision of Personnel Ships for the Requirements of Allied Governments (CCS 897)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in Enclosure “A” to CCS 897, subject to amendments agreed in discussion, and directed that it be dispatched to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

Command in French Indo-China (CCS 890/3)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendation in paragraph 3 of CCS 890/3, and directed that the statement contained in that paragraph, as amended in discussion, be included in their final report to the President and Prime Minister.

Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 900)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 900, as amended in discussion.

Control of Allied Naval Units Other Than U.S. at Present Under Command of Seventh U.S. Fleet

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that upon the dissolution of the U.S. Seventh Fleet pursuant to the reallocation of areas and change in command in the Southwest Pacific, as proposed in CCS 890/1, it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet to release to British control those Allied naval units other than U.S. at present incorporated in the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 679/9

Employment of Captured Enemy Ocean-Going Passenger Shipping and British Troopship Employment in U.S. Trans-Atlantic Programs in the First Half of 1946

The United States Chiefs of Staff agree with the provisions of CCS 679/8 except for the date of 31 December 1945 given in paragraph 5 as terminating the use by the United States of the six of the seven captured German ships destined for the Pacific.

After moving these ships great distances to the Pacific we shall be fortunate to obtain one trip from them before the 31 December date. By then our deployment will not have ended and the main operation will yet have to be undertaken. It would be uneconomical to remove this shipping from the Pacific after just one run. When ships may be withdrawn from the Pacific, less adaptable shipping such as the converted Victory ships should be first transferred back to the Atlantic. The lift of these ships of course will be included in the proposed review of personnel shipping to be completed by mid-September.

Accordingly, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that paragraphs 5 and 6 of CCS 679/8 be modified as indicated in the Enclosure.

[Enclosure]
Top secret
  1. In view of the serious position of United States movement to the Pacific, the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to agree that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in CCS 679/6 for to the United States employment up to 31st December 1945 for employment as follows: the Europa until 31 December 1945; and the Caribia, Patria, Vulcania, Potsdam, Pretoria and Milwaukee until 30 June 1946. In return, they ask that the United States Chiefs of Staff allocate to them a lift of 16,000 during the rest of 1945 for movement of the Canadians, many of whom have been absent from their homes for a very long time. The Canadian Government are pressing us very strongly in this matter.

  2. The British Chiefs of Staff further suggest that a combined study on the lines of CCS 679/1 of the combined requirements and combined resources (including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946 should be completed by mid-September if possible. The study would cover the recommendation in CCS 679/7 and also the employment during the first half of 1946 of the seven ships to which reference is made in CCS 679/6 subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 above.

740.00119 Control (Austria)/7-2345: Telegram

The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State

Verona, July 23, 1945 — 2 p.m.
Secret
126

July 21 Koniev sent letter to United States, British, and French commanders stating he had been instructed facilitate occupation of various sectors Vienna by our forces. Gruenther, Winterton and Cherrière invited to Vienna meeting 1 p.m., July 24, to settle problems discussed at July 16 conference re taking over and they have accepted. US reconnaissance party moving to Vienna July 22 and July 24.

Soviet began evacuating Styria July 22 but were not quite ready to move into Upper Austria north of Danube. Soviet Genl who went to Linz for preliminary arrangements was reported as most cooperative.

ERHARDT

Morse-Weston conversation, 2:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Morse Mr. Weston
Mr. Bissell Mr. Nicholson

The principal subject covered was the discussion of Swedish requisitioning of shipping which was expected to take place at a forthcoming meeting of the United Maritime Authority.

Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 4 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Clayton Sir David Waley Mr. Maisky
Mr. Pauley Mr. Harrison Mr. Golunsky
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Coulson Mr. Potrubach
Major Theakstone

Department of State Minutes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

THE SECRETARY said that he had expressed the views of the United States on the subject of reparations from Germany to Mr. Molotov this morning and had subsequently informed Mr. Eden of this talk. He said it would not, therefore, be necessary for him to repeat all that he had said but he merely wished to state that in our view it was difficult to reconcile certain positions of the Soviet Government with the principle of an overall plan of reparation. He said that since Mr. Maisky was here he would like to have confirmation or clarification of the Soviet definition of “war booty.” As it had been reported to him by the American representative on the Separations Committee it covered all supplies and equipment, including plants and other materials.

MR. MOLOTOV then handed in what he said was the true definition from the Soviet point of view of “war booty.” (Annex 1)

THE SECRETARY then said he would like to ask Mr. Molotov a question not in any attitude of hostility but with the simple desire of ascertaining the facts in the situation, and that was, whether it was true that the Soviet authorities had taken large quantities of equipment and materials out of their zone. He said that they had even heard that household equipment, such as plumbing, silver, furniture, etc. had also been removed.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that “Yes, this was the case,” that a certain quantity of property had been removed. He said that if this was what was worrying the Secretary that they agree to deduct from their reparation plans a suitable figure to cover removals already made. He said in this connection it should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union had suffered direct losses of many billions of dollars. He offered to knock off 300 million for miscellaneous removals.

THE SECRETARY said that every country had suffered in this war, that the United States had spent 400 billion dollars so far in the war and its national debt had risen to 250 billion dollars, but we were not talking about that and he felt it was idle to discuss it on that basis.

MR. MOLOTOV said that they would be prepared to reduce their claims from 10 billion to 9 billion in order to cover removals already made and thus dispose of the question.

THE SECRETARY said that according to our estimates approximately 50% of the present wealth of Germany lay in the Soviet zone.

MR. MOLOTOV said that that was not their figure.

THE SECRETARY then said that our figures did not agree and it would be difficult to establish agreed figures on this subject.

There was some discussion between Mr. Maisky and Ambassador Pauley as to the figures of German resources in the Soviet zone.

MR. MOLOTOV then remarked that having agreed to give Poland compensation in the west he could not believe that at Yalta any of us had had in our minds to strip the territory of everything in reparations before turning it over to the Poles. He felt that such a step would be impossible. He added, however, that it was possible to consider the equipment and materials in the area as Poland’s share of reparations.

MR. EDEN then remarked that since this territory was to go to Poland only at the time of the peace treaty, until that time it should be considered part of Germany for the purposes of economics.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had meant that the treatment of the part to go to Poland must of necessity be considered differently; he did not mean that it should be entirely excluded from consideration.

MR. EDEN said that a part of the question was that during the period of occupation we had a problem of feeding and retaining approximately the same number of Germans, but under the Soviet suggestions on conditions which would cut off the source or a large part of the source from which this same population formerly drew its sustenance.

THE SECRETARY then remarked that even if the Soviet plan was put at 9 billion, thus making the total 18 billion, it was still a mystery to him where any such amount of reparations was to come from.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that this had been the figure accepted as the basis for discussion at Yalta.

THE SECRETARY replied that since then our armies have invaded Germany and have destroyed literally billions of dollars worth of property and that this would inevitably alter the situation. He added that we were faced with a terrible problem with regard to feeding the German population in our zone, that we had 800,000 more people in our zone [sector] in Berlin than had lived there before and approximately 4 million more in our zone as a whole. He said that counting fifty cents per day per person it would cost the United States in the first year some billion and a half dollars to maintain this excess population. They would, of course, work but they would work for the production of reparations for others and that was what we could not agree to. He said under the suggestion he had made this morning, that if each country should take reparations from its own zone, it would be possible to exchange goods between the zones. In this manner the Soviet Union would get its share from its own zone and the United States and Great Britain from theirs and would be able to take care of the needs of France, Belgium, Holland, etc. He repeated that according to our figures, approximately 50% of German resources were in the Soviet zone, 30% in the British and 20% in the American and French zones combined.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired what about the Ruhr; that the Soviet Union desired in the form of reparations certain industrial equipment and machines from the Ruhr. He said they would be prepared to reduce their reparation figure even to 8½ or 8 billion, but they must insist on a fixed amount, say two billion, from the Ruhr. He said they could agree to no plan which did not contain such a provision.

MR. EDEN remarked that they were thinking of the immediate problem which faced them this winter, which was either to have wholesale starvation in their zone or to pay for the necessary imports, since it was apparent from the discussion that the Soviets were unwilling to turn over food and coal from the zone which they wished to give to Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV said this was a question that could be discussed.

THE SECRETARY remarked that he was worried that quarrels would develop between the Soviet, British and American Governments over these matters since there would obviously be a disposition on the part of the Soviet authorities to question the need for imports which would reduce the amount available for reparations from the western zones.

MR. MOLOTOV in conclusion repeated his willingness to reduce their figure but repeated Soviet insistence on a fixed quantity of reparations from the Ruhr. He reiterated his belief that agreement could be reached. He inquired as to what was to be the future status of the Ruhr, whether it was to be internationalized or not.

Both MR. EDEN and THE SECRETARY said that this was another subject of great political importance, but that they were thinking now of the immediate situation confronting the United States and Great Britain in their tasks of occupying Germany.

Land-Leathers conversation, 4:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Vice Admiral Land Lord Leathers
Mr. Morse

The following subjects were discussed: the use of British vessels in the Pacific for CORONET; United States agreement not to request the conversion of 18 British cargo vessels to troopships, subject to the allocation of the Milwaukee to the United States; the allocation of captured German passenger vessels to the United States; the question whether the Milwaukee should be converted in the United States or the United Kingdom and whether this vessel should be manned by American or British crews; the inability of the United Kingdom to supply France with coal during the coming winter and the allocation of American shipping for this purpose; United States support of British coal requirements for bunkering, either on a lend-lease or a pay basis; possible British payment of charter hire for Italian vessels; possible Italian membership in the United Maritime Authority; shipping aspects of a possible revision of the Italian armistice terms and of a peace treaty for Italy; disposition of captured German vessels, the use of the Soviet share in the war against Japan, and the possibility that the Soviet Union might wish to man these vessels; possible Soviet membership in the United Maritime Authority; the relationship of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to the United Maritime Authority; British consent to United States participation in the work of the Capcraft commission in the light of needs of the United States Navy for sea-going tugs for use in CORONET; the mechanism in London to be used for the division of captured German vessels as between the United States and the United Kingdom; and a draft British paper on shipping programs intended for submission to the August meeting of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

The War Shipping Administrator and the Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration to the Acting War Shipping Administrator

Babelsberg, 23 July 1945
Secret
priority

Victory 233

To Conway from Land and Bissell reference your War 34607 of 19 July.

  1. Have discussed with British use of their ships in the Pacific. They are assuming substantial commitments there in connection with developments in military plans and will also assist with redeployment sailings. Following arrangements agreed.

  2. In connection with separation of Australia, New Guinea, and NEI from MacArthur’s Theater and placing of these areas under British military command MWT have agreed to assume responsibility for retentions in British area as well as maintenance from U.S. and U.K. Estimate this will involve about 30 MWT retentions and corresponding relief to MacArthur.

  3. 3 to 5 British divisions expected to take part in Pacific operations under MacArthur’s command replacing equivalent number of U.S. divisions. MWT have agreed to provide all shipping required for organizational equipment and maintenance these forces. If U.S. Army undertakes supply responsibility, MWT will put number of vessels required for support of British divisions into WSA Pacific pool. British Army estimates total shipping required to support 5 divisions including retentions and long voyages would be 80 to 100 vessels employed for 3 months smaller number permanently employed thereafter.

  4. In addition to commitments paras 2 and 3 MWT is providing 100 military retentions in SEAC.

  5. MWT has agreed to provide minimum of 25 sailings for ammo cargoes from ETO to Pacific. Up to 20 can be provided in August thereby covering most or all of August requirements. Total of 25 may be increased sufficiently to cover most of September requirement as well.

  6. We have agreed that provision British shipping for military purposes in Pacific as described above is more important than blowup of 18 Sam ships to carry troops and we expect to drop request for conversions.

  7. If you have any comments or recommendations please cable soonest to Bissell London. Otherwise will assume you authorize Monroe to arrange for use of MWT vessels on above basis for August loadings in U.K.

The War Shipping Administrator and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator to the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration and the Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board

Babelsberg, 23 July 1945
Confidential
priority

Victory 221

To Monroe and Carnwath, War Shipping Administration, London, England. Repeat to Conway, WSA, Washington, D.C. from Vice Admiral Land and Morse. Reference your Wsa 3844 July 21.

Have discussed matter with State Department here and Weston. UMA papers should not be sent to officials of former Polish Government and they should not be invited to attend meetings or communicated with further on UMA matters.

Seventh plenary meeting, 5 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Davies Mr. Attlee Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Bohlen Major Birse Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Allen Field Marshal Alexander
Mr. Cohen

Department of State Minutes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret

MR. MOLOTOV presented the following report as Rapporteur of the Morning Meeting of the Foreign Ministers:

The following questions were discussed by the Foreign Ministers:

1. Reparations from Germany, Austria and Italy
It was decided to instruct the Economic Commission [Subcommittee] to give preliminary examination to the two drafts which had been submitted and to have the matter considered by the Foreign Ministers.

2. Economic principles in regard to Germany
There was a discussion of paragraphs 13 and 18, as well as a new paragraph 19, submitted by the Soviet Delegation. At the meeting Molotov said that he withdrew his amendment regarding paragraph 13 and he suggested that paragraph 18 be deleted on the understanding that the matter would be given study by the Allied authorities in Germany and that in case no agreement was reached in the Control Council the matter be decided by the Governments concerned. Agreement was not reached on this matter and it was referred to the Big Three. Molotov had submitted to the British and Americans a new paragraph 19. Secretary Byrnes said it was not acceptable. Molotov then submitted a new paragraph dealing with the question of priority between reparations and exports in payment for German imports. No agreement was reached and this matter was referred to the Heads of Government.

3. Council of Foreign Ministers
The text submitted by the Drafting Commission [Committee] was approved without amendment.

4. Trusteeship
The draft of the Soviet Delegation on this question was discussed. Mr. Eden said that in the first place they should settle the question as to whether colonies should be detached from Italy and if so which. He had argued that this should be settled when the peace treaty is drawn up. The question of to whom the trusteeship of any Italian colonies should be given should be settled by the United Nations Organization. Secretary Byrnes proposed that the matter be put off until the conclusion of the peace treaty. Molotov had proposed to refer the Soviet memorandum to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September. Eden had stated that there was no need to refer the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers, since the question of the Italian colonies would arise automatically when the peace treaty with Italy was drawn up. Molotov asked that notice be taken that all of the questions in the Soviet memorandum would be raised at the September meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

5. Directive to Military Commanders in Germany
On the proposal of the American Delegation it was agreed to convey to the Commanders-in-Chief of Allied troops in occupation of Germany all decisions of this Conference relating to them after they had been agreed upon with the Provisional Government of France. It was decided to set up a sub-committee to deal with the matter, consisting of Messrs. Murphy, Riddleberger, Strang, Harrison, Gusev and Sobolev.

6. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems
A commission was appointed to give preliminary consideration to the memorandum of the United States Delegation, consisting of Messrs. Clayton and Pauley, Brand and Coulson, and Arutunian and Garachin [Gerashchenko].

7. Tangier
The Soviet draft was discussed and it was agreed to accept the first paragraph of the Soviet paper on this subject stating that the area including the city of Tangier and the zone adjacent to it should remain under international control. It was also agreed that the whole question of Tangier should be discussed at the next conference in Paris of the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France.

8. Approval of Telegram to China and France
The text submitted by the commission to consider this matter was approved with no amendment. It was decided that the telegram should be sent forty-eight hours before the publication of the communiqué on the results of the Conference.

9. Agenda for the Meeting of the Heads of Governments
The following agenda was agreed upon for the afternoon meeting of the Heads of Governments:

  1. Turkey.
  2. Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg area.
  3. Syria and the Lebanon.
  4. Iran.

Turkey and the Black Sea Straits

STALIN said that it appeared that what had been approved by the Foreign Ministers was automatically approved by the Big Three.

THE PRESIDENT said that this was satisfactory to him.

STALIN inquired if the decisions of the Foreign Ministers was [were] regarded as accepted.

THE PRESIDENT replied in the affirmative.

Returning to the subject of Turkey, THE PRESIDENT remarked that he did not think that the Prime Minister had finished his remarks when they had adjourned at the last meeting.

CHURCHILL replied that he had finished his remarks at the last meeting when he had stated that he could not consent to the establishment of a Russian base in the Straits and that he did not think that Turkey would agree to that proposal.

STALIN remarked that yesterday Churchill had said that the Russians had frightened the Turks and that one of the chief points was that the Russians had concentrated too many troops in Bulgaria. He considered it necessary to give information on this point. Churchill’s information was out of date. He did not know what information Churchill had been given by the Turks, but Russia had less troops in Bulgaria than the British had in Greece.

CHURCHILL inquired how many Stalin thought the British had in Greece.

STALIN replied: “Five divisions.”

CHURCHILL said there were only two.

STALIN inquired with respect to armored units, and asked how strong the British divisions were.

CHURCHILL said they had about 40,000 troops altogether.

STALIN replied that they had about 30,000.

CHURCHILL said he hoped that the meeting would hear Field Marshal Alexander as he preferred that he give the figures.

STALIN replied that he was not seeking for accuracy but that he believed Churchill 100%. He said that should it prove necessary General Antonov could make a detailed report, but one thing was clear—the Turks had nothing of which to be afraid. The Turks had about twenty-three divisions and there was nothing to be afraid of. That was the Russian information.

As to the rectification of the frontiers, which might have frightened the Turks, he said that perhaps it was the possible restoration of the pre-war frontiers that had existed under the Czar that had frightened the Turks. He said that he had in mind the area of Kars, formerly in Armenia, as well as Ardahan, formerly in Georgia. He pointed out that this question of the restoration of frontiers would not have been brought up if the Turks had not brought up the question of an alliance. An alliance meant that they would defend the frontiers of Turkey, just as Turkey would defend the frontiers of the Soviet Union, but in the Soviet opinion the frontiers in the area mentioned was [were] incorrect and they had told the Turks that if there was to be an alliance the frontiers had to be rectified. If this were not done the question of an alliance would be dropped. What was there to be afraid of?

The third question was that of the Straits. He drew their attention to the fact that the position of such a great state as the Soviet Union was the following. The Montreux Convention had been decided against Russia. Russia considered it inimical. Turkey had the right under this treaty to block the Straits to any shipping not only if Turkey were at war but also if it seemed to Turkey that there was a threat of war. The Convention also left it to Turkey to decide when this threat appeared. Thus, an impossible situation was created in which Turkey was free to block the Straits when she thought they were threatened. The situation at the moment was that the Russians had the same rights in the Straits as the Japanese Emperor. This was ridiculous, but it was a fact. The result was that a small state supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet. He said that they could imagine what commotion there would be in England if a similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez Canal, or what a commotion there would be in the United States if such a regime existed with regard to the Panama Canal. Hence, the point at issue was to give Soviet shipping the possibility to pass to and from the Black Sea freely. As Turkey was too weak to guarantee the possibility of free passage in case complications arose, the Soviet Union would like to see them defended by force.

CHURCHILL, who appeared to misunderstand, said: “Not law?”

STALIN replied that force was necessary just as in the case of the Panama Canal, which was defended by the American navy and for shipping through the Suez Canal, which was guaranteed by the British navy. He said that if they thought that naval bases in the Straits were unacceptable to the Turks, then let them give the Soviet Union some other base where the Russian fleet could repair and refuel and where in cooperation with its allies the Russian fleet could protect the Straits. For the situation to continue as it was would be ridiculous.

THE PRESIDENT said that the attitude of the American Government was that the Montreux Convention should be revised, thought, however, that the Straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world and that they should be guaranteed by all of us. He had come to the conclusion after a long study of history that all the wars of the last two hundred years had originated in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier of Russia. In the last two instances the peace of the whole world had been overturned; by Austria in the case of the previous war, and by Germany in the case of this war. He thought it should be the business of this Conference and of the coming peace conference to see that this did not happen again. He thought that to a great extent this could be accomplished by arranging for the passage of goods and vessels through the Straits on the basis of free intercourse just as was the case in American waters. He said that he was presenting a paper and that he wanted to see Russia and England and all other countries have free access to all the seas of the world. The President then read his paper on the free and unrestricted navigation of inland waterways.

THE PRESIDENT then continued that he did not want to engage in another war twenty-five years from now over the Straits or the Danube. He said that our ambition was to have a Europe that was sound economically and which could support itself. He wanted a Europe that would make Russia, England, France and all other countries in it happy and with which the United States can trade and be happy as well as prosperous. He thought that his proposal was a step in that direction.

He said that the question of territorial concessions was a Turkish and Russian dispute which they would have to settle themselves and which the Marshal had said he was willing to do, but he pointed out that the question of the Black Sea Straits concerned the United States and the whole world.

CHURCHILL said that he strongly supported Stalin’s wish for a revision of the Montreux Convention with the object of securing for Soviet Russia free and unrestricted navigation of the Straits by merchant and war ships alike in peace or war. He entirely agreed with the President when he said that this should be guaranteed by all of us. A guarantee by the Great Powers and the powers interested would certainly be effective. He earnestly hoped that the Marshal would consider this alternative in contrast to that of a base in close proximity to Constantinople. With regard to the other waterways, they were in full accord with the general line that the President had taken in his statement. He thought that the Kiel Canal should certainly be free and open and guaranteed by all the Great Powers. He also attached great importance to the free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine. He felt that there was a great measure of agreement between the Three Powers represented at the Conference.

THE PRESIDENT said there was no doubt regarding their agreement on the question of the revision of the Montreux Convention.

CHURCHILL added “and on the purpose of that revision.”

STALIN said that he would have to read attentively the proposal made by the President, which was now being translated, before he could discuss it.

Transfer to the Soviet Union of Koenigsberg

STALIN said that this question had been discussed at the Tehran Conference. The Russians had complained that all ports of the Baltic freeze. They froze for a shorter or longer period but they froze. The Russians had stated that it was necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Stalin’s arguments in favor of this were that the Russians had suffered and had lost so much blood that they were anxious to have some piece of German territory so as to give some small satisfaction to the tens of millions of their inhabitants who had suffered in this war. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister had raised any objections and this question had been agreed upon by the three of them. He said they were anxious to see this agreement approved at this Conference.

THE PRESIDENT said he was ready to agree in principle although it would be necessary to study ethnographic and other questions, but in principle he agreed.

CHURCHILL said that Stalin was right in saying that the matter had been raised at Tehran and he added that it had also been discussed between Stalin and himself in October 1944 in Moscow in connection with the question of the Curzon line. He had made a speech in Parliament on September [December] 15, 1944 in which he had mentioned the Soviet wish to secure the ice-free port of Koenigsberg and that the Soviet frontier should run south of that point. He had made it clear that His Majesty’s Government was in sympathy with this wish. The only question which arose was that of the legal occasion to transfer. At the present time the position was that the Soviet draft as put in would require each of them to admit that East Prussia did not exist and also to admit that the Koenigsberg area was not under the authority of the Allied Control Council in Germany. It would also commit them to the recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. He pointed out that all these matters really belonged to the final peace settlement. So far as His Majesty’s Government was concerned they should support the Soviet wish to have this port of Germany incorporated into the Soviet Union. He made this statement as one of principle. They had not examined the Soviet line on a map. This could be examined at the peace conference but he would like to assure the Marshal of their continued support of the Russian position in this part of the world.

STALIN replied that they were suggesting nothing more than this at the present time. Of course, the matter would be settled at the peace conference. He said they were satisfied that the British and American Governments approved.

CHURCHILL said that there would have to be certain redrafting of the Russian statement and in the communiqué which would be issued at the end of the Conference he recommended that more general terms be used. The agreement of the Three Powers would be recorded in the minutes of this meeting.

Syria and Lebanon*

MOLOTOV said that the Soviet delegation wished to present a short paper on this subject (annex 2).

CHURCHILL said that the burden of defending Syria and Lebanon had fallen upon the shoulders of the British. They did not wish to receive any advantage there not enjoyed by other powers. At the time they entered Syria and Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the troops of Vichy they had made an arrangement with the French in which they both recognized Syria and Lebanon. In consideration of the very long historical connection of France with these countries the British had said that they would not object to France having a favored position there if this were satisfactorily arranged with the new independent Governments of those countries. The British had told General de Gaulle that the moment he made a satisfactory treaty with Syria and Lebanon which was satisfactory to those countries, the British would withdraw their troops. If they withdrew their troops now it would lead to the massacre of the French civilians and the small number of troops there. They would not like to see this happen and he pointed out that it would lead to great excitement throughout the Arab world. He also said that it would affect their task of keeping the peace in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. There would be a great outbreak of turbulence and warfare which might affect Egypt too. There could not have been a worse moment than this for creating such a disturbance in the Arab world because it would endanger their lines of communication through the Suez Canal which was being used in the war against Japan by both the United States and Great Britain. The line of communications for the war against Japan was important to the United States as well as to Great Britain. General de Gaulle had acted very unwise[ly] in this region. Against their advice and entreaties about 500 men had been sent to Syria and this had caused a serious outbreak which had still not died away. How silly this was for what could 500 men do? They had, however, been a spark and this uprising had followed immediately. The Government and people of Iraq had wanted to go to the help of the Syrians. All of the Arabic world was convulsed with excitement in regard to this matter. Later, however, General de Gaulle had agreed to hand over the so-called “Troupes Spéciales” to the Syrian Government. He trusted that they should be able to reach an agreement with the French. He could not say agreement but a settlement with de Gaulle which would guarantee the independence of Syria and Lebanon and which would reserve for the French some recognition of their cultural and commercial interests which they had built up over such a long period of time. He wished to repeat before this council that Great Britain had no wish to remain there one day longer than necessary. The British would be delighted to withdraw from what was a thankless task assumed in the interest of the Allies. Having regard to the fact the matter rested between them and the French, and of course Syria and Lebanon, and the British did not welcome a proposal to have the Conference in which the United States and the Soviet Union would enter with Great Britain and France and come to a decision. The whole burden had been borne by them, except for diplomatic approval of the United States which they had enjoyed. The British would not welcome the whole matter being reviewed by a body of this kind. Of course, if the United States wanted to take their place that would be a different matter.

THE PRESIDENT replied “no thanks”. He added that when this controversy arose there had been an exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and himself. The Prime Minister had said that the British had sufficient troops to keep peace in this area and to stop the outbreak of war in that region. He had asked the British to do so immediately for the United States was also much interested in this line of communications to the Far East through the Suez Canal. The President said, however, that we thought that no country should have special privilege. The French did not deserve a special position after the way they had stirred up all this trouble. All should have equal rights.

STALIN inquired if he might infer of this that his colleagues did not recognize any privileged position of the French in this area.

CHURCHILL replied that the British position was that they wanted to see France have a special position and that he had promised this to the French at a time when the British were weak. This promise was made of course only so far as the British were concerned. They had no power to bind others nor had they undertaken to make serious exertions to procure special rights for the French. If they could get them the British would not object and would smile benignly on their achievements.

STALIN inquired from whom the French could obtain these special rights.

CHURCHILL replied that they could obtain them from Syria and Lebanon.

STALIN queried, “them alone?”

CHURCHILL replied in the affirmative. He added that the French had many schools there, and archeological institutes, etc.; many French live there and the French even had a song which went “Nous partous tour La Syrie” [Partant pour la Syrie?]. They dated their claims back to the Crusades. But he pointed out that the British were not embarking on a serious quarrel with the great powers on this matter.

The President said that the United States stood for equal rights for all.

CHURCHILL asked the President if he would endeavor to prevent the Syrians from giving special rights to the French.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had no qualms in this respect as he was sure that the Syrians would not want to grant special rights.

STALIN observed that they were reluctant. He said that the Russian delegation thanked Mr. Churchill for the information that he had given and that they withdrew their proposal.

CHURCHILL and THE PRESIDENT said they wished to thank STALIN for this action.

Iran

CHURCHILL said they had submitted a paper to the Council and he would be very glad to hear the views of the other great powers.

STALIN said that the British proposals were based on the presumption that the term for the presence of Allied troops in Iran had expired. The Soviets proceeded on the assumption that the term had not expired and that it would do so only after the termination of the war against Japan. He pointed out that this was stipulated by the treaty. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation concurred with paragraph 1 of the British paper that their troops be withdrawn from Tehran and he suggested that they let it go at that.

THE PRESIDENT said that we had been ready for a long time to withdraw but pointed out that we had many supplies in Iran and that we wished to guard them for use in the war against Japan.

STALIN said that the Russian delegation had no objection to the presence of American and British troops in Iran but he agreed that troops from Tehran might be withdrawn.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought that there were no American troops in Tehran.

STALIN said that even if there were the Russians had no objection. He proposed that they confine themselves to the immediate withdrawal from Tehran.

CHURCHILL said that the British were anxious to proceed to the other points raised in the British paper. Of course only two and one-half months had elapsed since the termination of the war against Germany. The British would like for the removal of troops to continue on both sides because they had promised that they would go when the German war was over. They would, therefore, like to withdraw when the other two stages were completed.

STALIN said that they would like to have time to think this over. The treaty said that the troops should be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of the war with Germany and her associates. That included Japan. They had until six months after the completion of the war with Japan. This gave them plenty of time.

CHURCHILL suggested that they accept the proposal to withdraw from Tehran and that they let the Foreign Ministers take another look at the matter when they met.

THE PRESIDENT said that we were proceeding with our withdrawal because we needed our troops in the Far East. He said that we expected to be out within sixty days.

STALIN said that the United States was fully entitled to look after their supplies. He added, “So as to rid the United States of any worries we promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran.”

THE PRESIDENT said he thanked Stalin for this statement.

(Field Marshal Alexander entered the room at this point and Stalin walked around the table to shake hands with him after which he greeted the President.)

Occupation of Vienna

CHURCHILL said that with respect to the zones [sectors?] allotted to British and American troops it appeared that so far as the British were concerned that in the principal zone of Vienna there were 500,000 people. As the feeding grounds of Vienna lay to the east of Vienna, they would not be able to undertake the feeding of those 500,000 persons. What they suggested, therefore, was a provisional arrangement under which the Russians would go on feeding until a more permanent arrangement could be worked out. He called upon Field Marshal Alexander to speak.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that there were about 500,000 people in Vienna to be fed. He did not have the food to send from Italy. There was a small reserve in Villach in the Klagenfurt area. This could be provided but he thought he was correct in stating that it would be enough for only about three weeks or one month. If they took on the obligation to feed these people the food would have to come from the United States.

CHURCHILL pointed out that this would be in addition to the population in the United States zone of Vienna.

THE PRESIDENT said that there were about 375,000 in our zone. He said that our transport was almost totally engaged in transporting supplies in the Japanese war and in supplying Italy, France, Russia, and other countries in Europe.

STALIN asked what about the French zone.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not know.

STALIN said he would have to talk with Marshal Konev. He was acquainted with the matter. He would like to know what period they had in mind. Was it until the next harvest?

CHURCHILL said the difficulty was that the people in Vienna had always drawn their food from the East.

STALIN said that they had made an arrangement with the Austrian Government that they would undertake to provide a small quantity of food for money until the next harvest. This would continue until August or September. He would have to talk, however, with Marshal Konev.

CHURCHILL pointed out that Field Marshal Alexander was entering Styria with his troops but was reluctant to enter Vienna because of the difficulty in regard to food.

STALIN asked if the food situation in Vienna was so bad now.

CHURCHILL replied that they had not been there.

STALIN said that it wouldn’t seem to be so bad so far as the population was concerned.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that if the Generalissimo could help them with food they were ready to go forward and take up their work.

STALIN said that he would let them know that evening or the next day.

CHURCHILL thanked the Marshal for this.

STALIN said it would be well if the British and American Governments would agree to extend the authority of the Renner Government to their zones. This would not imply diplomatic recognition but they should be placed in the same position as Finland. The authority of the Renner Government should be extended to the British and American zones in order to help them in the collection of food.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought that as soon as we had moved in and had looked into the matter we would be able to agree to this.

CHURCHILL referred to his remark of the previous day [earlier today] when he had said that they had two divisions in Greece and he proposed to ask Field Marshal Alexander to speak on this subject.

STALIN interrupted and said he disagreed and as he had said at the previous meeting a Churchill statement could not be impugned.

CHURCHILL said he wished to raise a question of procedure. He had drawn the attention of his colleagues to the fact that Mr. Attlee and he had interests to attend to in London on Thursday. They, therefore, had to leave by lunch time on Wednesday, taking the Foreign Secretary with them, and that they would be back for the evening sitting on the 27th. He added, “or some of us will be back”. Could they not meet on Monday [Wednesday] morning before his departure. This was agreed to.

CHURCHILL suggested that the Foreign Ministers continue to meet and that in Mr. Eden’s absence Sir Alexander Cadogan would represent him. This was agreed to.

The meeting adjourned.

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m.

MOLOTOV reads the report of the Foreign Secretaries.

  1. The economic subcommittee was instructed to consider Soviet proposals on reparations.

  2. Economic principles for Germany were discussed. Russia withdrew her proposed amendment to paragraph 13 thereof. Russia asked the deletion of paragraph 18 for further study by the Allied Control Commission. No agreement was reached, and the question was referred to the Big Three.

  3. Proposal for council of Foreign Ministers was approved with verbal amendments.

  4. Trusteeships were discussed. It was agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies should be taken up by the council of Foreign Ministers.

  5. It was agreed that all decisions of the conference affecting the work of the Allied commanders in Germany should be communicated to them, and that a committee should be empowered to draft such communication.

  6. The matter of collaboration of the three powers in European economic problems was discussed.

  7. Tangier. It was agreed that Tangier should be returned to its international status, and that the question should be discussed in a conference of the four powers, including France, in the near future. The invitation to China and France to participate in the council of Foreign Ministers was approved, and it was agreed that this should be sent 48 hours before the release of the final communiqué.

The agenda proposed for the Big Three discussion today included Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, and Iran.

TRUMAN: First subject is Turkey.

CHURCHILL: I thought we would renew the discussion of the problem of feeding Germany.

(It was agreed that matters referred to the Foreign Secretaries and agreed to by them could be regarded as accepted by the Big Three, unless some objection was raised.)

CHURCHILL: Before I finished talking yesterday, I made it clear that we could not support Russia’s claim against Turkey for a military base in the Black Sea.

STALIN: Yesterday, Mr. Churchill asserted Russia had frightened Turkey, particularly by concentrating troops in Bulgaria. Mr. Churchill’s information is out of date. Russia has very few troops in Bulgaria, but the British have more in Greece.

CHURCHILL: We have only 40 thousand troops in Greece.

STALIN: Russia has less. The Turks have nothing to be afraid of. The Turks have 23 divisions on the frontier. As to rectification of the frontier, I refer to the two provinces [Kars and Ardahan]. This question of the rectification of the frontiers would not have come up if the question of an alliance had not come up. If the alliance is dropped, the rectification of the frontiers will lapse.

So far as the Straits are concerned, the position of Russia is deplorable. The Montreux Convention is inimical to Russia. Turkey has a right to block our ships. More than that, Russia has less rights than Japan. Small states controlled by Britain have real control of the Straits. Turkey is not capable of keeping control of the Straits. The Straits must be defended by force, the same as the [Panama Canal is defended by the] American navy, the same as the British navy defends the Suez.

TRUMAN: The Montreux Convention should be revised. Most of the wars in the last twenty years have arisen in this area. It should be the business of the peace conference to see that that does not happen again. There must be freedom of intercourse in all that section. I want to see Russia, Britain and the United States have access to all the seas in the world. I will distribute a paper on this subject.

(The President reads the paper. He emphasizes that there should be free and unrestricted traffic on inland waterways, and such waterways should be controlled by the representation of all states concerned. As initial step, there should be international agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The function of these agencies should be the development of navigation on the rivers in question. The membership of these agencies should include the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Riparian States. The same procedure should apply in the case of the Kiel Canal, and the Montreux Convention should be similarly revised.)

TRUMAN: I do not want to fight another war in twenty years because of a quarrel on the Danube. We want a prosperous, self-supporting Europe. A bankrupt Europe is of no advantage to any country, or to the peace of the world. The territorial dispute between Russia and Turkey should be settled by themselves, but the waterways are of interest to the whole world.

CHURCHILL: I strongly support Marshal Stalin’s wish for the revision of the Montreux Convention, with the objective of security for Russia, and free and unrestricted navigation of the Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean by merchant ships and by warships, whether in time of peace or war. I agree with the President that that freedom should be guaranteed by all of us. I earnestly hope that the Marshal will consider that alternative to the establishment of a Russian base in close proximity to Constantinople.

As to the other waterways, we are in full accord with the general lines of the President’s statement. The Kiel Canal should be free and open, and guaranteed by the great powers. We also attach great importance to free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine.

TRUMAN: There is no disagreement on the revision of the Montreux Convention.

CHURCHILL: Nor on the purpose for which it is to be revised.

STALIN: I must read attentively the President’s paper. Perhaps in the meantime we might consider the next question.

TRUMAN: The Koenigsberg area.

STALIN: This was brought up at Yalta. We stated it was necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Too much blood has been spilled by the Soviet Union not to have some piece of German territory. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister raised any objection at Yalta, so the question was agreed upon. We are anxious to have that agreement confirmed at this conference.

TRUMAN: No objection in principle, but technical and ethnic details must be considered.

CHURCHILL: I spoke in the Commons in 1944, and referred to the Soviets’ wish to have Koenigsberg, which would mean that Poland’s frontier would run to the south of that. I made it clear that the British government sympathized with the Russian desires.

TRUMAN: The next question is Syria and the Lebanon.

MOLOTOV: The Soviet delegation submits a short draft on this question.

CHURCHILL: The burden of maintaining order falls on our shoulders. We are seeking no advantage for ourselves which will not go to all other countries. Both France and Britain have recognized the independence of this area, when a troop settlement was made. In consideration of France’s long, historic connection with Syria and the Lebanon, we agreed not to object to France having a favored position, if that could be satisfactorily arranged with the governments of Syria and the Lebanon. We have told General de Gaulle that as soon as he makes a satisfactory treaty with Syria and the Lebanon, we will withdraw our troops. The withdrawal of our troops now would lead to the massacre of French civilians and French troops there. We should not like to have that happen. It would lead to great excitement throughout the Arab world, and make the maintenance of peace more difficult in Palestine and Iraq. It might affect Egypt, too. We could not have a worse moment for this disturbance. It would endanger lines of communication through the Suez Canal through which both British and American supplies are proceeding for the war against Japan.

General de Gaulle has acted very unwisely in this region, against our advice and entreaty. The outbreak was caused by 500 troops being sent on the ship. They could do nothing but strike a spark. Lately, de Gaulle has agreed to hand over the “Troupes Spéciales” to the Syrian government, and I trust we shall be able to reach, if not an agreement then some sort of settlement with him which would guarantee the independence of Syria and the Lebanon, and secure some recognition for the French – their cultural and commercial interests, which they have built up over so many years.

Let me repeat, Britain will not remain there one day longer than necessary. We will be delighted to withdraw from a thankless task, assumed in the interest of our Allies, as well as ourselves. In view of the states interested, we do not welcome the proposal to have a conference in which the United States and the Soviet Union would enter with Great Britain and France. The whole burden has been borne by us.

EDEN: (interrupting) Except for the diplomatic approval of the United States.

CHURCHILL: (continuing) If the United States desires to take our place, it might open a new question.

TRUMAN: No thank you, Mr. Churchill. The British reported to us on the disorders in Syria, and advised us that they had troops to protect the situation affecting the lines of communications. The United States told the Prime Minister to go ahead.

We might, however, be in disagreement on one point. We do not think any country entitled to special privilege. We are for equality for all.

STALIN: I may assume that my colleagues do not recognize privileged rights in Syria and the Lebanon?

TRUMAN: Yes.

CHURCHILL: We promised France a favored position when we were very weak. We cannot bind others. If France cannot get them, we would not object.

STALIN: From whom can France obtain these privileges?

CHURCHILL: From the Syrian and Lebanese republics.

STALIN: From them alone?

CHURCHILL: Yes.

TRUMAN: We shall stand for equal rights.

CHURCHILL: Would you prevent the Syrians from giving privileges?

TRUMAN: That will not be necessary.

STALIN: The Soviet delegation thanks Mr. Churchill for his information, and withdraws their paper on this subject.

TRUMAN: Iran is the next subject on our agenda.

STALIN: The British proposals are based on the assumption that the term for Allied troops in Iran has expired. We proceed on the contrary assumption. The term expires only after the war with Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviets accept the first paragraph of the British proposal, that troops should be immediately withdrawn from Tehran.

TRUMAN: We would be willing to withdraw at any time, but we have vast quantities of supplies to protect.

STALIN: The Russian delegation has no objection to American and British troops in Tehran, but our troops will be withdrawn.

TRUMAN: We have no troops in Tehran.

STALIN: We would not object, but let us withdraw from Tehran.

CHURCHILL: We would like the movement to continue. We promised to go out. We would like the other two phases to proceed.

STALIN: I think we still have time to think. The treaty says six months after all hostilities with Germany and her associates. That implies Japan.

CHURCHILL: Shall we agree to withdraw from Tehran now, and look at the problem again in September, when the council of Foreign Ministers meets?

TRUMAN: We will be out in sixty days. We need the troops and supplies in Japan.

STALIN: Of course, the United States has the right to do so. We promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran.

(Field Marshal Alexander arrives, and is greeted by Marshal Stalin and President Truman).

CHURCHILL: We are unable to undertake the feeding of the population in our zone in Vienna. We suggest Russia continue to feed this zone until more permanent arrangements can be worked out.

ALEXANDER: There are 500 thousand Viennese to be fed. I have not the food to send from Italy. The reserves available will not last three weeks. So if we undertake to feed, the food must come from the United States.

TRUMAN: There are 375 thousand in our zone.

STALIN: Let me have a talk with Marshal [Konev]. The situation does not appear to us to be so bad, and I will let you know tonight or tomorrow.

CHURCHILL: I thank the Marshal.

STALIN: It will be a good thing if the American and British governments would allow the Renner government to extend its authority to their zones. This need not imply recognition. This will facilitate the distribution of food.

TRUMAN: We will be glad to consider this.

CHURCHILL: We also.

CHURCHILL: Field Marshal Alexander will give the figures of our troops in Greece.

STALIN: The Prime Minister has given the figures, and his figures cannot be impugned.

CHURCHILL: My memory may have been bad.

ALEXANDER: 40 thousand.

STALIN: The Prime Minister’s figures cannot be impugned.

CHURCHILL: We must leave Wednesday at lunch-time, and will [be] back in the evening of the 27th; so we would suggest a morning session Wednesday, and we will be back for the Friday session.

I also suggest the Foreign Secretaries continue to meet with Sir Alexander Cadogan, acting as Eden’s Deputy.

TRUMAN: That is satisfactory.

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

Berlin Conference, July 23, 1945

Subject: FREE AND UNRESTRICTED NAVIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS

The United States Government proposes that there be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states and that the regulation of such navigation be provided by international authorities representative of all nations directly interested in navigation on the waterways concerned.

As an initial step there should be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies should be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on these agencies should include the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, France, and the sovereign riparian states recognized by these Governments.

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

Berlin, July 23, 1945
[Translation]

Syria and Lebanon

Owing to the international importance of the question of the situation in Syria and Lebanon the Conference expresses itself in favour of this question being considered by representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, the USSR and France and deems necessary that consent of the Government of France should be first obtained to this proposal.

Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.

Churchill’s quarters, 23 Ringstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Army General Antonov
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Alexander Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham Marshal of Aviation Fodalev [Falaleyev?]
General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetzov
Mr. Bohlen Sir Edward Bridges
Field Marshal Montgomery
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Field Marshal Brooke
Commander Thompson
Major Birse
Lord Moran

Churchill:
“… There were many speeches, and Stalin, without even ensuring that all the waiters and orderlies had left the room, proposed that our next meeting should be in Tokyo. .… I had another very friendly talk with Stalin, who … seemed to have no inkling of the momentous information about the new bomb the President had given me. He spoke with enthusiasm about the Russian intervention against Japan, and seemed to expect a good many months of war, which Russia would wage on an ever-increasing scale, governed only by the Trans-Siberian Railway.

“… After a pause Stalin said, ‘If you find it impossible to give us a fortified position in the Marmora, could we not have a base at Dedeagatch [Alexandroupolis]?’ I contented myself with saying, ‘I will always support Russia in her claim to the freedom of the seas all the year round.’”


811.001 Truman, H.S./7-2445

The Assistant to the Secretary of State to the President

Babelsberg, July 24, 1945

Memorandum for the President

The following, as near as I can remember it, is the Prime Minister’s toast to you yesterday evening, your reply, and Marshal Stalin’s additions:

The Prime Minister said they had already drunk to the President as Head of State, but he wished now to propose a toast to the President as a man. He said that he had not had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Truman until this Conference, but he was sure that everyone present had been as impressed as he had with the firm, decisive and business-like direction of their deliberations. He said that they had all been struck also with the President’s sincerity, frankness and powers of decision. The President, Mr. Churchill continued, reflected in his character and abilities the best qualities of the great republic which he headed. He said he knew he was speaking for Marshal Stalin when he said they were glad to welcome the President into association and friendship and he wished to raise his glass to a man who was sincere in purpose, clear in speech, and true in deed.

The President, in reply to this toast, expressed his deep appreciation for the kind words of the Prime Minister and said that he was naturally a timid man and that when the Prime Minister had suggested and Marshal Stalin had supported the proposal that he be made presiding officer over this Conference he had been literally overwhelmed. He said he would continue to do his utmost for the success of the Conference and for the future peace and well-being of the world, and he wished to say what a great pleasure and privilege it was for him, a country boy from Missouri, to be associated with two such great figures as the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin.

Marshal Stalin then arose to say that in his opinion modesty such as the President’s was a great source of strength and a real indication of character; he added that this was particularly true when it was coupled, as in the case of President Truman, with real strength and character and honesty of purpose. He concluded that he wished to associate himself fully with the remarks of the Prime Minister and was delighted to welcome President Truman into their midst.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

Mosely-Gusev conversation, evening

Present
United States Soviet Union
Mr. Mosely Mr. Gusev
740.00119 EAC/7-2345: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Babelsberg, July 23, 1945
Secret
Victory 241

To AmEmbassy London for Winant. Info [Acting] SecState Washington.
(Message has been sent to MA, London.)

Gousev informed Mosely tonight instructions sent Saksin last night or this morning to sign EAC agreement on additional requirements.

BYRNES

The Pittsburgh Press (July 23, 1945)

Truman speeds Big Three sessions

Conference may end this week
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Jap peace feeler reports continue

Editorial: Telling the Japs

Background of news –
Territory Japan will lose

By Bertram Benedict