| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden |
While Truman was having luncheon with Churchill, Byrnes was a luncheon guest at Eden’s quarters in Babelsberg. No record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found.
840.70/7-1845: Telegram
London, July 18, 1945 — 1 p.m.
secret
us urgent
7236
With regard to suggested procedure for reconvening EIT conference given in Department’s 5808, July 14 Ronald has now suggested that matter could be more advantageously taken up in Berlin. FonOff has telegraphed its delegation at Berlin Conference to consult with US delegation and if agreed discuss with Russians problem of reconvening EIT conference as part of larger discussion of Russian copperation in European economic organizations. Ronald stated Weston is in Berlin and would be able to give both delegations technical background information if necessary.
WINANT
CCS 195th Meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Somervell | Field Marshal Wilson | |
| Lieutenant General Hull | General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant-General Macready | |
| Major General Norstad | Major-General Laycock | |
| Captain Oster | Major-General Hollis | |
| Captain McDill | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Captain Moore | |
| Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon |
Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the CCS 194th Meeting and approved the detailed report of the meeting subject to the substitution in the first paragraph on page 3 of the words “dispatch of a corps commander and staff to the Pacific” for “above” and subject to any-later minor amendments.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to CCS 842/2 and directed the Secretaries to forward it separately to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office in the Enclosure to CCS 462/25, as amended in CCS 462/26.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of CCS 890/2.
In regard to paragraph 2, GENERAL MARSHALL asked the British Chiefs of Staff if they would express their reaction to dividing Indo-China into two parts, leaving the northern part in the China Theater.
ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that the line dividing Indo-China would be dependent to some extent on contemplated operations through Thailand.
ADMIRAL KING stated that the division of Indo-China along the latitude of 15 degrees north was an arbitrary division and might be changed to suit contemplated operational requirements.
The British Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that they should like to study the question of the dividing line before making any proposals in regard to the matter.
The proposals contained in paragraph 3 were accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff without discussion.
In the discussion of paragraph 4, SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were in doubt as to the commitment which they would be undertaking if they agreed to the transfer on a particular date. They did not know when the operations in Borneo were scheduled to be completed nor what sort of liability they would be accepting in the form of maintenance and support for those operations.
In reply, GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the United States Chiefs of Staff reply to the questionnaire which the British Chiefs of Staff had submitted (CCS 852 and 852/1), and described the extent to which the United States Chiefs of Staff were proposing to support operations in the new British command. He said that most of the U.S. troops had been withdrawing from the area of the proposed new British command and that no further operations were scheduled in Borneo. He added that in any event there would be no question of “leaving the Borneo operations in the lurch.”
GENERAL MARSHALL then went on to point out that it would be a great advantage to the United States Chiefs of Staff if the transfer of the area to Admiral Mountbatten could take place at an early date. General MacArthur is fully occupied with operations to the northward and it would be a considerable benefit to him if he could be relieved of these responsibilities as soon as possible.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Admiral Mountbatten also was fully occupied in his present and contemplated operations in the Southeast Asia Command, and since General MacArthur was familiar with and is dealing with the Australians at the present, it might be best to continue that procedure until Admiral Mountbatten was in a better position to undertake these new responsibilities.
The British Chiefs of Staff agreed that it was desirable to effect a transfer of command in the Southwest Pacific Area at an early date, but considered that it would be necessary for them to study the matter before a definite time could be agreed upon.
GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that as Admiral Mountbatten was about to visit General MacArthur in Manila, that he and General MacArthur might discuss the timing of the transfer of command.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed in principle that that part of the present Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary proposed in paragraph 2 of CCS 852/1, should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible.
b. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would investigate and report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the earliest possible date on which the transfer of the above area could be effected.
c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would consider where the dividing line might lie in the event that approximately half of French Indo-China should be included in the new British command.
At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he wished to explain the point of view of the United States Chiefs of Staff.
He pointed out that the general concept of operations in the Pacific had been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that the control of operational strategy lay with the United States Chiefs of Staff. He recognized that in the past the British Chiefs of Staff had not had all the information that they wanted and assured them that this would be remedied in the future. He felt, however, that the operational strategy in the Pacific must remain the responsibility of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He explained the extensive difficulties in the conduct of the strategy of the Pacific arising from the great distances involved and the enormous land, sea, and air forces employed. He said that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that they could not, in addition to these problems, shoulder the burden of debating the “pros” and “cons” of operational strategy with the British Chiefs of Staff.
The United States Chiefs of Staff would be glad to give the British Chiefs of Staff timely information of U.S. plans and intentions and to hear their comments. But they felt bound to retain freedom to decide ultimately what should be done. If then the British Chiefs of Staff felt that they could not commit British troops to the operations decided upon, then they would of course be at liberty to withdraw British forces from those operations; but he desired to make it clear that if this were done, it would be necessary for the United States Chiefs of Staff to be given ample warning of British intentions so that plans of United States Chiefs of Staff could be adjusted accordingly.
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had felt that they had been rather left out of the picture but confirmed that the British Chiefs of Staff entirely supported the strategy which the United States Chiefs of Staff had so far developed. For the future, they hoped that they would be consulted on the further development of strategy but had no wish to suggest that they should interfere in any way with the operational strategy.
ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM asked if the British Chiefs of Staff would be consulted in regard to the strategy that would be adopted in the event of the Russians coming into the war.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the strategy to be adopted in these circumstances would be considered on a tripartite basis.
ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would consult with the British Chiefs of Staff, of course, but must reserve the final decision to themselves.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the event of any disagreement, the British Chiefs of Staff would certainly be given the opportunity of convincing the United States Chiefs of Staff that they were wrong.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that with respect to the strategic control of the war against Japan:
a. The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff.
b. The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions.
c. The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy, on the understanding that in the event of disagreement, the final decision on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff.
d. In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c. above, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit them to make timely rearrangements.
e. In the event the USSR enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned.
[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 889/2
British Participation in the War Against Japan
The following extracts of a message from General MacArthur to the War Department under date of 9 July 1945 concerning British participation in the war against Japan are furnished for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff:
The scope of the British proposal for participation in CORONET presents problems not heretofore encountered when the Canadian and French contingents were considered.
These problems must be viewed in their proper perspective as they relate to the specific operation in contemplation unless complexity, particularly as applies to logistics, and lack of homogeneity of forces destroy combat effectiveness or require a delay in target date.
This operation, as at present visualized, is confined to narrow limits. There will be no opportunity to assign separate sectors of responsibility along national lines.
The assault is to be made into heavily defended areas and calls for the closest coordination of air, naval, and ground forces, and within the ground forces themselves. Acceptance of the British in the assault with the differences in organization, composition, equipment, training procedures, and doctrines will complicate command, operations, and logistic support. Redeployment geared to the support of homogeneous forces and now well advanced, would have to undergo a large-scale readjustment, particularly taking into consideration a parallel line of British logistic channels, including separate bases, storage, issuance and maintenance facilities, and personnel therefor.
British forces participating in operations against Singapore in November could not be prepared for the assault phase in Coronet. It is considered doubtful that these forces could participate even in the follow-up. Certainly, to utilize considerable numbers of troops without adequate opportunity on the part of higher commanders of this area to exercise command functions prior to their use would be a most dangerous expedient.
Moreover, it would be entirely unsatisfactory to have the availability of troops scheduled for Coronet dependent in any way upon their release from another campaign. Availability of these troops as well as all others committed must be certain for a fixed date.
The following general plan is suggested as being one which will obviate the full impact of the objectionable features indicated above.
This plan takes into consideration previous communications relating to the use of Australian forces as well as Canadian forces.
a. Limit British Empire participation to one corps of three divisions; one British, one Canadian, and one Australian.
b. Re-equip British division and corps troops and Australian division with American equipment, logistic support to be provided by the United States on the same scale as provided for our troops.
c. The Australian division to be either the 7th or 9th Division, now concentrated in the Borneo-Morotai area.
d. British division and corps troops to be concentrated by 1st December in the Borneo-Morotai area or, as an alternate, in the United States, if these units can be equipped there.
e. Amphibiously train one British division and one Canadian division prior to arrival in concentration area. The Australian division is already amphibiously trained.
f. Lift this corps on assault shipping to be provided by the British to arrive in the objective area about Y plus 10. It will there be used as the AFPac assault reserve afloat. Canadian division to be lifted directly from the United States, Australian division from the Borneo-Morotai area, and British division and corps troops from either area depending on where it is concentrated.
g. Fight this corps as an integral corps within a United States Army. Utilize divisions separately within American corps if the exigencies of the situation so demand.
I doubt the advisability of employing troops of native origin in this complex operation where homogeneity of language within the corps is required.
Likewise, there is a question of the advisability of utilizing troops of tropical origin in a temperate zone without an extended period of acclimatization. Hence, the acceptance of Indian troops is not concurred in. The British division should be Anglo-Saxon.
The foregoing comments are equally applicable to Allied air components, aggravated by the difficulties of integrating relatively small air forces in tactical operations under the restrictions imposed by a comparatively limited air deployment potential. There are ample American air forces in or projected for this area to support all troops in CORONET operation.
[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 842/2
French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan
The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff forward the enclosed memorandum to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in lieu of the memorandum in the Enclosure to CCS 842/1.
[Enclosure]
Top secret
Draft
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to the question of French/Netherlands participation in the war against Japan and wish to inform you of their views which are as follows:
a. While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of the commander in chief concerned.
b. In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake to give the French/Netherlands representatives timely information of their intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East.
[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 679/6
Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships
The United States Chiefs of Staff have indicated in papers of the CCS 679 series an urgent need for 39,000 troop spaces in captured enemy shipping to supplement the trooplift available for carrying out redeployment plans.
Since the publication of CCS 679/1, U.S. requirements for trooplift in the Pacific have materially increased. Deficits now are serious.
Drastic action has been taken to augment United States resources by conversion of cargo ships, increasing air-lift, and curtailing withdrawals of U.S. troops from Europe. In spite of every possible adjustment in United States resources, the trooplift situation in the Pacific will remain serious during the last half of this year.
The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (CSAB) has had the matter of distribution of captured German shipping under discussion for several weeks. Certain agreements as to manning and operation have been reached, but the United States view that the seven vessels under consideration should be allocated for the carriage of U.S. troops during the current emergency period has been opposed on the British side of the CSAB pending decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that in order to meet emergency requirements for the movement of U.S. troops necessary for forthcoming operations, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree to the allocation for United States purposes, so long as an emergency exists, of the following seven vessels:
Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, Potsdam, Pretoria and Milwaukee.
[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 890/2
Control and Command in the War Against Japan
The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 890/1) on Control and Command in the War against Japan. They have the following comments to make.
They fully understand that it will ultimately be necessary to obtain the agreement of the Generalissimo to the inclusion of Indo-China in Southeast Asia Command. They are anxious, however, that the United States Chiefs of Staff should support them in recommending to the President and the Prime Minister that they should press the Generalissimo to agree to this transfer. They suggest, therefore, that a recommendation to this effect should be included in the final report of the Terminal Conference.
The British Chiefs of Staff note that the United States Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary to retain control of the Admiralty Islands. They, therefore, withdraw their proposal for the inclusion of these islands in the Australian command. They also agree not to press for the eastward extension of the present boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area until United States activities are cleared from the area. They note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would offer no objection to British operations against Ocean and Nauru Islands.
The British Chiefs of Staff realize the advantages of an early transfer of the Southwest Pacific Area but are up against two difficulties. The first is the fact that Admiral Mountbatten is now fully engaged on planning further operations. The assumption of further responsibilities at this particular stage must inevitably embarrass him. Secondly, we have no idea what degree of assistance the United States Chiefs of Staff are at present providing to the Borneo operations nor when those operations are due to be completed. On present information, therefore, we cannot assess the commitment we should be undertaking if we agree to the transfer on any particular date. We should like, therefore, to discuss this further with the United States Chiefs of Staff.
On the question of the higher strategic control of the war against Japan, the British Chiefs of Staff wish to reiterate and amplify their view that they should now be given a larger share of control of strategy on the lines suggested in CCS 890. They desire to bring to the notice of the United States Chiefs of Staff the following particular considerations:
a. The United States and Great Britain are the two major powers allied against Japan, and thus jointly responsible for the prosecution of the war. It is most desirable that they should consult freely on all matters of major strategic importance relating to the conduct of the war.
b. The British Chiefs of Staff have an inescapable responsibility to advise His Majesty’s Government on the use to which British forces are put in all theatres of war.
c. Although the United States are of course providing the major share, the war against Japan, like that against Germany, is being fought with pooled United States and British resources, particularly shipping. It is right, therefore, that the British should have full understanding and knowledge of the proposed methods of applying these resources.
The British Chiefs of Staff wish to make it clear that the full extent of what they are asking is that they should be consulted on major strategic policy. They have no intention of suggesting interference with the operational control now accorded to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in whom they have the utmost confidence.
The British Chiefs of Staff ask, therefore, that the United States Chiefs of Staff should reconsider their attitude on this question.
[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 895/1
Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations
We have examined the proposals by the United States Chiefs of Staff for the employment of two French colonial infantry divisions in Far Eastern operations, as set out in CCS 895.
In the light of the discussion at CCS 194th Meeting held on 17 July 1945, we suggest it would be preferable for the two French divisions to be employed in due course in French Indo-China.
The question of under whose command this force would operate would, we suggest, be decided in the light of the situation at the time.
[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 462/26
Staff Conversations with Portugal
We have considered the memorandum (CCS 462/25) by the United States Chiefs of Staff and are in general agreement with the draft letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office attached as the Enclosure thereto.
We propose, however, two minor amendments as follows:
a. In subparagraph b. of the proposed letter, it is stated that “the larger force is acceptable and can be trained in the theater.” The situation in this respect is that the Australian authorities have informed us that they cannot accept any Portuguese force. An inquiry has now been addressed to the Commander in Chief, Ceylon, asking him whether he can accept the Portuguese and, if so, the size of force he can accommodate, pointing out that we prefer the larger force.
No reply has yet been received. We cannot, therefore, be certain which of the two forces we can accept or where the training area will be.
We, therefore, propose that subparagraph b. of the draft letter should read as follows:
As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington [Babelsberg], 18 July 1945
Top secret
Foreign Office:
The Combined Chiefs of Staff on 2 September 1944 appointed an Anglo-American Military Mission to enter into conversations with Portuguese military authorities to discuss Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have arrived at the following conclusions on the report of this mission:
a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement with the Portuguese military authorities as to the direct use of Portuguese forces, they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon.
b. As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area.
c. The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, mechanics and radio specialists.
d. There is no objection from the military viewpoint to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis for transfer is an action to be taken on a governmental level.
e. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in accepting Portuguese participation do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use Portuguese troops in any other area.
f. Military operations against Portuguese Timor must for the present await the completion of operations against higher priority Japanese-held objectives. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will notify the Portuguese military authorities of impending operations against Portuguese Timor in time for them to prepare their troops for participation therein. Details as to the assembly, shipment, training and equipping of the Portuguese force will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the appropriate time.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the disclosure of any of the above information to the Portuguese if the Department of State or Foreign Office deem it necessary in diplomatic conversations. …
For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Brigadier
A. J. MCFARLAND
Brigadier General, USA. Combined Secretariat
840.6362/7-1845: Telegram
[Washington,] July 18 [1945]
Secret
52
For Clayton and Despres from Thorp. Proposed coal directive, as revised in Aide-Mémoire to the British dated July 10, copy of which you have with you, has not been submitted to Russians, nor has any comment been received from British, and therefore program is not yet in effect. Blaisdell and Winant suggested from London that directive, and proposal to use ECO as allocating body for surplus coal available in Germany for Western Europe should be referred to Russians in connection with Potsdam Meeting agenda. This suggestion came after you left, and it was felt that presentation to Russians here would not reach Moscow in time for any action. We also considered asking Moscow Embassy to present both directive and ECO proposal to Russians but decided that since Harriman and members of his staff would be coming to Berlin, the matter could more appropriately be raised there. Therefore no communication on coal has been given to Russians. Please advise if you wish action taken.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-1845: Telegram
Babelsberg, July 18, 1945
Secret
Victory 56
For Thorp from Clayton and Despres.
Please advise us whether Soviet [Union] has been informed of U.S. proposal for directive on German coal production and exports.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845: Telegram
Babelsberg, July 18, 1945
Top secret
Victory 68
For Ambassador Winant, London, repeated to State Department, Washington from Secretary of State, Berlin.
U.S. and U.K. military authorities in Germany agree that French Berlin area of occupation will be formed from existing U.K. and U.S. areas.
As soon as U.K. representative EAC have [has] received similar instructions, you are authorized accept Soviet July 12th [11th] proposal for final sentence report accompanying agreement on French Zone in Germany and conclude agreement.
BYRNES
740.00119 EW/7-1845: Telegram
Babelsberg, July 18, 1945
Secret
Victory 77
To Acting SecState Washington for Reinstein and Oliver from Collado.
The Soviets have touched on subject of Italian reparations (ref Lubin’s telegram to Kindleberger). My tentative view is no reparation claim against Germany and no current or productive capital goods payments by Italy.
We should allow restitution from Germany limited to works of art, et cetera, and should require restitution by Italy of such articles. Perhaps we should allow some token deliveries to Greece and Ethiopia. Presumably Latin American and other nations will satisfy claims for ship sinkings, et cetera, by holding on to Italian external assets.
What are your views on U.S. position on this point, and your comments on entire Italian reparations and restitution problem?
Send immediately background information on Italy’s relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction needs, her overseas assets, her shipping position, et cetera. Also background material on our attitude and actions with respect to Finnish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian reparations, none of which was included in my papers.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845: Telegram
Babelsberg, July 18, 1945
Secret
Victory 82
To Acting Secretary of State for Loy Henderson from George Allen.
Sent to Department. Repeated to Paris and Tangier for Villard and Ailing.
Russians have proposed addition of Tangier and the Levant states to the agenda for the conference.
There is, as yet, no indication of Russian attitude regarding either question.
Washington, 18 July 1945
Top secret
Subject: THE TEST
This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to recite what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico.
At 0530, 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full scale test was made of the implosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion. And what an explosion! … The bomb was not dropped from an airplane but was exploded on a platform on top of a 100-foot high steel tower.
The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were tremendous blast effects. For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten thousand feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the sub-stratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud.
A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverized dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seen from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated. 1500 feet away there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly guyed. It disappeared completely.
One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in typical 15 or 20 story skyscraper or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower which was 70 feet high, the height of a six-story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steel construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed. I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards.3 None of us had expected it to be damaged.
The cloud traveled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then mushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While here and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radioactive material in small quantities was located as much as 120 miles away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government’s interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was none too comfortable about the situation.
For distances as much as 200 miles away, observers were stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, radioactivity and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I now know that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible.
Our long-range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect weather favorable for our tests beginning on the morning of the 17th and continuing for four days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long-range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 80% chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunder storms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test set-up. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held firm and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sunrise.
Because of bad weather, our two B-29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirtland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunder storms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety.
Just before 1100 the news stories from all over the state started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base of a news release as shown on the inclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Censorship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved release supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light.
Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below:
The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of developing the weapon from the raw materials made in Tennessee and Washington and a dozen of his key assistants – Dr. Kistiakowsky, who developed the highly special explosives; Dr. Bainbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.
For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explode because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counselling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first because it provided a better observation point and second, because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points.
Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone’s mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by “Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief.” We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present – Christian, Jew and Atheist – were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people – statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers, and many others in every walk of life.
In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted “Now!” and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling roar of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast.
The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed “This is it!” No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists’ dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil.
Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian, threw his arms around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age – The Age of Atomic Energy – and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.
As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.
The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized.
My impressions of the night’s high points follow:
After about an hour’s sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground.
At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000-yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Conant said he had never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Conant reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tight rope, only to me this tight rope had lasted for almost three years and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it.
A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a memorandum written shortly after the explosion by Dr. E. O. Lawrence which may be of interest.
While General Farrell was waiting about midnight for a commercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque – 120 miles away from the site – he overheard several airport employees discussing their reaction to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city.
My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away, made the following report:
There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. As the first flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately 15 seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance.
Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of smoke of a whitish-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity.
We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some 70 feet above the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor.
I have not written a separate report for General Marshall as I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr. Harrison and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representatives.
We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.
May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratulatory cable to us and for the support and confidence which I have received from you ever since I have had this work under my charge.
I know that Colonel Kyle will guard these papers with his customary extraordinary care.
L R GROVES
[Enclosure 3]
Alamogordo, N.M., July 16 – William O. Eareckson, commanding officer of the Alamogordo Army Air Base, made the following statement today:
Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on the Alamogordo Air Base reservation this morning.
A remotely located ammunition magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosive and pyrotechnics exploded.
There was no loss of life or injury to anyone, and the property damage outside of the explosives magazine itself was negligible.
Weather conditions affecting the content of gas shells exploded by the blast may make it desirable for the Army to evacuate temporarily a few civilians from their homes.
[Enclosure 4]
[Near Alamogordo Air Base?], July 16, 1945.
Top secret
Our group assembled at a point 27 miles from the bomb site about two in the morning. We were on a plain extending all the way to the bomb and although I did not notice carefully the mountains seemed to be some miles away. We could see in the distance lights defining the position of the bomb and at about four a.m. our radio picked up conversations between the B-29s and the ground organization.
We soon learned that zero hour was 5:30 a.m. which was just break of dawn. Naturally our tenseness grew as zero hour approached. We were warned of the probable brilliance of the explosion – so bright it would blind one looking directly at it for sometime and there was even danger of sunburn!
I decided the best place to view the flame would be through the window of the car I was sitting in, which would take out ultraviolet, but at the last minute decided to get out of the car (evidence indeed I was excited!) and just as I put my foot on the ground I was enveloped with a warm brilliant yellow white light – from darkness to brilliant sunshine in an instant and as I remember I momentarily was stunned by the surprise. It took me a second thought to tell myself, “this is indeed it!!” and then through my dark sun glasses there was a gigantic ball of fire rising rapidly from the earth – at first as brilliant as the sun, growing less brilliant as it grew boiling and swirling into the heavens. Ten or fifteen thousand feet above the ground it was orange in color and I judge a mile in diameter. At higher levels it became purple and this purple afterglow persisted for what seemed a long time (possibly it was only for a minute or two) at an elevation of 20-25,000 feet. This purple glow was due to the enormous radioactivity of the gases. (The light is in large part due to nitrogen of the air and in the laboratory we occasionally produce it in miniature with the cyclotron.)
In the earlier stages of rise of the flame the clouds above were illuminated and as the flame rose it was a grand spectacle also to see the great clouds immediately above melt away before our eyes.
The final phases was the column of hot gases smoke and dust funneling from the earth into the heavens to 40,000 feet. The column was to me surprisingly narrow until high elevations were reached when it foamed out considerably. The great funnel was visible a long time. We could still make it out as we drove away a half hour later.
But to retrace, a little over two minutes after the beginning of the flash the shock wave hit us. It was a sharp loud crack and then for about a minute thereafter there were resounding echoes from the surrounding mountains. The pressure of the shock wave was not great enough to be disturbing but the noise was very loud and sharp, indeed. The noise of the shock wave was a sharp crack like that of a giant firecracker set off a few yards away – or perhaps like the report of 37 mm artillery at a distance of about one hundred yards.
A number of observers near me were looking right at the explosion through welders goggles (or the same dark glass) and they told me the light through these glasses was so bright as to blind them for an instant.
As I was not actively concerned with the problems of Y, I had on occasions asked my colleagues there what the event would be like and their predicted picture of the event was borne out completely. I am amazed that the whole business went off so exactly as their calculations had predicted.
The grand, indeed almost cataclysmic proportion of the explosion produced a kind of solemnity in everyones behavior immediately afterwards. There was restrained applause, but more a hushed murmuring bordering on reverence in manner as the event was commented upon Dr. Charles Thomas (Monsanto) spoke to me of this being the greatest single event in the history of mankind, etc. etc.
As far as all of us are concerned although we knew the fundamentals were sound and that the explosion could be produced, we share a feeling that we have this day crossed a great milestone in human progress.
ERNEST O. LAWRENCE
Stalin’s quarters, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| President Truman | Generalissimo Stalin | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Commissar Molotov | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845
Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 3:04 p.m.
3 p.
S: [blank]
M [blank]
Pres—lakes—Black
S—I must tell you they the news—hands Pres note from Sato & message from the Emperor
B—I remember that H— H—
S—worthwhile answer to answer—
Pres no respect.
S—not a war—will want lull—might answer as follows no specific—don’t know character—of K Mission—can’t—answer=a refusal
Pres satisfactory
M—factual
B—what [one word illegible] ins inspired it—fear of what you will do—
M—I think they guess
S—Can see our forces tanks etc
M—not only to USSR
S—to US. Eng & [one word illegible]
Pres—we had indicati[on] from Sweden
800.515/7-545
[Babelsberg, July 18, 1945]
On July 5 the Secretary transmitted a memorandum to the President, a copy of which is attached, outlining policy agreed in Washington for U.S. participation in German interim financing. The short annex included in the German political and economic policy directive put forward yesterday by the President follows this line exactly.
It is essential that responsibility be clearly fixed upon one U.S. Agency for all U.S. financing with respect to all imports into Germany for which the Government of the United States assumes responsibility. The memorandum of July 5 recommends that the responsibility be placed upon the War Department.
No reply has been received from the President. Since problems relating to responsibility for financing certain types of imports into the U.S. Zone have already arisen, and the necessity for handling the United States’ share of any combined financing should soon arise if the President’s proposals are adopted, it is important that an early decision be sought.
E[MILIO] G C[OLLADO]
Berlin, 18.7.45
Top secret
and personal
Mr. Secretary Stimson: I enclose a photostat record of the Hyde Park Agreement on T.A., for which you asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
This photograph was taken by a special photographic section of the Air Ministry, and flown out here in the charge of a trusted officer.
W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]
[Enclosure]
Top secret
Aide-Mémoire of Conversation Between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 18, 1944
The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding Tube Alloys, with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a “bomb” is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender.
Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing Tube Alloys for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]
W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Churchill | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Dunn | Sir William Strang | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Davies | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Sobolev |
| Mr. Harriman | ||
| Mr. Pauley | ||
| Mr. Bohlen | ||
| Mr. Cohen | ||
| Mr. Thompson |
Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret
CHURCHILL raised the question of the press in relation to the Conference. At Tehran it had been difficult for the press to obtain access to the Conference; at Yalta it had been impossible; here there were many representatives of the press outside the well-guarded fortress in which the Conference was taking place and they were raising a great outcry in the world press regarding the inadequacy of their access to information.
STALIN inquired who had let them in.
CHURCHILL replied they were outside the compound. He recognized that secrecy and quiet were necessary for the work of the Conference. If his colleagues agreed he was willing to have a talk with the press not to explain the work of the meeting but rather why the press must be excluded or it might be delegated to the President or to someone else to do this.
THE PRESIDENT pointed out that each delegation had a press representative here and suggested that it be left to them to handle and that this meeting be kept secret as the others have always been. He was not worried about the correspondents who were mostly American.
This was agreed to.
CHURCHILL said he had only offered himself as the lamb and that in any event he would only go if the Generalissimo would agree to rescue him.
THE PRESIDENT said that the Foreign Ministers had agreed that the agenda of the present meeting should be the following:
The question of procedure for peace negotiations and territorial settlements.
The question of the authority of the Control Council for Germany in political questions.
The Polish question, particularly the problems having to do with the liquidation of the former London Polish Government and with the implementation of the Yalta agreement on Poland.
THE PRESIDENT said it was agreed that the Secretary of State would present the report of the Foreign Ministers meeting and he would now ask him to do so.
MR. BYRNES then read section 1 of his report dealing with the procedure for peace settlements (Attachment 1).
STALIN said that the Soviet delegation withdrew its reservation to paragraph 1 of the United States draft and that the rest of the draft was acceptable.
CHURCHILL said he wondered about the words “with a view to their submission to the United Nations.”
MR. BYRNES said that the Declaration of [by] United Nations of January 1, 1942 called for this.
CHURCHILL said he assumed this meant the ultimate submission of the treaties to the United Nations.
STALIN said this made no difference as the three powers would represent the interests of all.
CHURCHILL said it was all right if this was clear.
THE PRESIDENT said that the report on the procedure for peace settlements was agreed to unanimously.
MR. BYRNES read section 2 of his report (Attachment 1).
CHURCHILL said the word “Germany” was used repeatedly. What was Germany for this purpose? Was it pre-war Germany. If this were meant he agreed.
THE PRESIDENT asked what was the understanding of the Soviet delegation.
STALIN replied that Germany is what she has become after the war. No other Germany existed now. Austria for example was not now a part of Germany.
THE PRESIDENT proposed that for this purpose they consider Germany as it existed in 1937.
STALIN proposed to add “minus what Germany had lost in 1945.”
THE PRESIDENT observed that Germany had lost all in 1945.
STALIN replied that he was speaking geographically and said that it was impossible to get away from the results of the war.
THE PRESIDENT agreed but said it was necessary to have a line from which to start.
STALIN referred to the Sudetenland which Germany had taken from Czechoslovakia. Did his colleagues propose that this be considered part of Germany?
THE PRESIDENT replied that he had suggested the Germany of 1937.
STALIN agreed that from a formal point of view Germany might be considered in this way. He suggested that the Western frontier of Poland be fixed now and that the question would then become clear.
THE PRESIDENT said that this could best be done when it had been decided what to do with Germany.
STALIN said that Germany was a country with no government and with no definite frontier. It had no frontier guards. It did have four occupied zones.
THE PRESIDENT said he still suggested that 1937 Germany be taken as a point from which to operate in considering this matter.
STALIN replied that of course they would have to base themselves on some starting point and from this point of view the Germany of 1937 was satisfactory.
CHURCHILL said he agreed and The President noted that Germany of 1937 was agreed to.
MR. Byrnes pointed out that economic questions connected with Germany had been referred to the subcommittee and that it was not possible to finish with this question until the subcommittee had reported. It was, however, possible to discuss the political section of the report. Certain changes in drafting had been referred to a subcommittee but that would not prevent discussion of political questions now.
STALIN said the Soviet delegation accepted, in the main, all the points in the political section of this proposed agreement. The Soviet delegation, however, had one amendment to propose in point 5, namely, the deletion of the last sentence.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Foreign Ministers had already agreed to this.
STALIN noted that the Soviet delegation agreed to the document but said that the drafting could be looked over.
MR. EDEN proposed that the Foreign Ministers look over the redraft the next morning and submit it to the next meeting of the heads of state.
This was agreed to.
CHURCHILL drew attention to section 2, paragraph (1), (b), which covered the destruction of arms, implements of war and so forth. There were many things which could not be destroyed such as wind tunnels and other technical facilities. Would it not be well to have some use of them?
THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the words of the report were “shall be seized or destroyed.”
STALIN said that they were not barbarians and they would not destroy research institutions.
CHURCHILL said he meant they could share them and use them together.
STALIN said he agreed that this could be done.
MR. BYRNES read section 3 of his report dealing with the Polish question (Attachment 1).
STALIN also presented a statement on the Polish question which was read by the interpreter (Attachment 2).
CHURCHILL said that the burden of this matter lies on the British Government. When Hitler drove the Poles out of Poland, Great Britain received them. There was no property worthwhile belonging to the London Polish Government which the British have now disowned. There were about twenty million pounds in gold which has been frozen. He supposed it was the ultimate asset of the Central Polish Bank and that they must follow whatever is the normal course of such transfers. This gold was not, however, in the control of the London Polish Government. He added that the Polish Embassy in London had been vacated by Raczkiewicz and is available to the representative of the Polish Provisional Government. The Ambassador of the Polish Provisional Government may have it when he wants it and the sooner he arrives to take it the better.
CHURCHILL said he may be asked how the Polish Government had been financed. The answer was that it had been financed by the British Government which had expended about £120,000,000 to finance the Polish Army and to look after Poles who had fled the German scourge and who had taken refuge on British shores – the only asylum available to them in Europe. When the London Polish Government had been disavowed and they had recognized the new provisional government, the British had arranged that three months salary be paid to the employees of the London Government and that they be dismissed. He thought it would have been improper if they had not given these people an opportunity to look around to see what they would do. The expense of this fell on the British Government.
CHURCHILL asked the indulgence of the President in pointing out that the British position was unique. They had to deal with the transfer or liquidation of the Polish forces who had fought with them. Some Poles had got out of France, others had escaped from Switzerland to Italy. They got 40 or 50 thousand out of France before the French capitulation and had constructed a Polish Army of about five divisions which was based in England. There were a great many Poles in a Polish corps of three divisions in Italy which was also in a very excited frame of mind. This Polish Army of about 200,000, front and rear, fought with great bravery and discipline here in Germany and also in Italy. They suffered heavy losses and held the line with distinction. Relations with these men involved the honor of His Majesty’s Government. Pledges had been given to Parliament, but in any event they would feel obliged to treat them in a manner which the world as a whole would approve.
STALIN interrupted to say “of course.”
CHURCHILL said that these men had taken an oath to President Raczkiewicz. He said it was necessary for him to state British policy toward these men. It was to persuade as many as possible to return to Poland. He had been very angry when he learned that General Anders, who is a good soldier, but who, Marshal Stalin knows, is anti-Russian in his views, told his troops that if they returned to Poland they would probably be sent to Siberia. Disciplinary action would be taken against this officer. This was the British policy but they needed a little time. This policy also applied to civilian employees. Of course, the better things were in Poland, the quicker they would go.
CHURCHILL wished to take this occasion to rejoice in the improvement which had developed in the Polish situation and to express the wish for the success of the new Polish Provisional Government. He referred to the fact that Mr. Mikolajczyk had contributed to its establishment. He had wished for more in the setting up of this Government but the progress made was a splendid example of the collaboration of the great powers. He had said in Parliament as a pledge, because feeling after the Crimea Conference was high on the Polish question, that if soldiers who had fought for Britain did not wish to return to Poland they would receive them in the British Empire. They could not cast adrift men who had been brothers in arms. He hoped as few as possible would remain and they would be encouraged to return to Poland. If the Polish Provisional Government could give them the assurance that they would be well received in full freedom and under appropriate economic conditions, this would be of great help. He would like them to feel assured in returning to their home which had been freed by the victory of the Red Army. The Foreign Ministers might discuss this matter.
MR. CHURCHILL said he had read the Soviet paper on this question which had been submitted earlier in the meeting and his remarks were in answer to it. They showed that subject to what he had said he agreed with it and suggested that it be sent to the Foreign Ministers to see if anything should be added. He said the British were also submitting a paper on Poland.
STALIN said he appreciated the difficulties of the British Government. They had sheltered the former rulers of Poland and in spite of this these foreign rulers had caused much trouble to them. The Soviet draft was not intended to make the British position more complicated. Its purpose was to put an end to the position which still existed. The Government of Arciszewski continued to exist; it had means to conduct activities; it had agents and press representatives. This made an unfavorable impression on public opinion in all allied nations. If Mr. Churchill pointed out some items in the Soviet draft that complicated the British position he was prepared to withdraw them. He repeated that it was only intended to end the present situation.
CHURCHILL said the British delegation agreed with Stalin but he pointed out that when you cut off money and end a Government you cannot prevent – in England – individuals from going on talking. This included members of Parliament. After the departure of Mr. Mikolajczyk, he had never seen the members of this Government nor had the Foreign Secretary. But what could be done if Arciszewski wandered through the streets of London and talked with journalists? He repeated that the British Government had nothing to do with these men and was giving them no facilities. They had to be careful, however, about the Army, if they were to prevent mutiny and possibly bloodshed in which case their own people would be killed. In this connection he said that many of them were in Scotland and that they only wanted to get rid of them. The British had the same objectives as the Soviets. They asked for help and a little time and also that Poland be made an attractive place for Poles to return to.
CHURCHILL said that they were willing for the draft of the Soviet Government to be examined by the three Foreign Secretaries in the light of this discussion and of the paper which he would submit. He agreed that this matter [should] be settled as soon as possible.
THE PRESIDENT observed that there was no fundamental difference. Churchill asked for time to get the Polish soldiers into a condition in which they would wish to return to Poland. Stalin had agreed to withdraw any points in the Soviet draft which would complicate the position of the British Government.
THE PRESIDENT stated that he was also interested in the Polish question. He recalled that the Yalta agreement had been reached on the holding of free and secret Polish elections as soon as possible. He hoped that this procedure would be carried out by the Polish Government.
STALIN proposed that the question be referred to the Foreign Secretaries.
CHURCHILL agreed but suggested that the whole Polish question be referred to the Foreign Ministers and that they bring out a new draft.
STALIN said he wished to state that the Polish Government had never refused to hold elections.
CHURCHILL inquired if it was agreed that they would continue tomorrow the discussion of the big question covered in section 2 of the report, namely, the German question.
THE PRESIDENT replied in the affirmative and STALIN said it was only a question of wording.
THE PRESIDENT agreed.
On the proposal of THE PRESIDENT, it was agreed that the agenda of the next meeting would be prepared by the Foreign Ministers.
CHURCHILL said he was impressed by the question of political principles to be applied to Germany and that it was well to discuss it at the next meeting. It was, however, a very big question. Were there to be uniform or different practices in the different zones?
STALIN said he understood that they were all in favor of the uniform policy.
THE PRESIDENT stated that was correct.
CHURCHILL said he only wished to emphasize this.
The meeting adjourned.
Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m.
CHURCHILL: When we were at Teheran, there were no journalists. At Yalta, there were few. Here they are all about. They carry powerful weapons. They are making a great outcry.
MOLOTOV: Where are they?
CHURCHILL: They are not in the compound. We can only do our work in absolute secrecy. If my colleagues are willing, I am willing to have a talk with them and explain as a newspaper man the need for secrecy. I am willing to speak to them or to have the President or the Marshal speak to them.
MOLOTOV: What do they wish? Are their demands known to everyone?
TRUMAN: We each have a press representative here. Let them handle it. We will make no communication until the end of the Conference. I am not disturbed by them. Most of them are Americans. Your election is over and so is mine.
Let us proceed. The Foreign Secretaries have recommended the following items for discussion:
MOLOTOV: I agree.
TRUMAN: Draft proposal for Council of Foreign Ministers (American proposal) approved in principle. May I ask the Secretary of State to read the report of the Foreign Secretaries?
MOLOTOV: Yes.
CHURCHILL: Yes.
Secretary of State Byrnes reads report of the foreign secretaries.
Three questions presented:
TRUMAN: Is it your pleasure to proceed with the first point?
MOLOTOV: The Soviet Delegation withdrew its reservation in regard to paragraph 1, as to the rest, it agrees to accept.
CHURCHILL: What is the meaning of reference to submission to the United Nations?
BYRNES: This is required by United Nations undertaking not to make a separate peace.
CHURCHILL: It means with a view to their ultimate submission.
MOLOTOV: It makes no difference. The three powers represent the whole.
CHURCHILL: British Delegation agrees.
BYRNES: (proceeds with reading of report.)
TRUMAN: What is your pleasure regarding the second item? This is the principles for the control of Germany.
CHURCHILL: What do we mean by Germany? If we mean pre-war Germany, I agree to such.
STALIN: Germany is what has become of her after war. No other Germany exists. Austria is not a part of Germany.
TRUMAN: Why not say the Germany of 1937?
STALIN: Minus what she has lost. Let us for the time being regard Germany as a geographical section.
TRUMAN: But what geographical section?
STALIN: We cannot get away from the results of the war.
TRUMAN: But we must have a starting point.
STALIN: Do you wish to restore German administration to Sudan line [the Sudetenland]?
TRUMAN: I said Germany of 1937.
STALIN: It may be so understood from a formal point of view. If German administration appears in Koenigsberg, we would expel it.
TRUMAN: We said territorial changes are to be made at the peace conference.
STALIN: Let us fix the western frontier of Poland. I have difficulty of [in?] saying what is the frontier of Germany now. No frontier guards, no troops. The country is broken up into four occupation zones.
TRUMAN: I am still suggesting we shall proceed from Germany of 1937.
STALIN: We shall proceed from there as a starting point.
CHURCHILL: I agree.
TRUMAN: That is the Germany of the Versailles Treaty. So it is agreed that the Germany of 1937 should be the starting point.
STALIN: Have we finished the political principles?
BYRNES: The economic principles have been referred to a subcommittee. As to political section, it is reported complete and is ready for discussion.
STALIN: The Russian Delegation accepts in the main all the points in the political section. There is one amendment to item 5. If possible, it would be well to delete the last four lines. We agree to the rest but wish a commission to go over the style of the document.
EDEN: I hope the foreign secretaries can go over the drafting committee’s draft tomorrow.
STALIN: That would be better.
TRUMAN: That is agreed.
CHURCHILL: I refer to Section 2(i)(b). There are experimental military stations (wind tunnels, etc.) in Germany which should not be immediately destroyed.
BYRNES: The language is seized or destroyed.
CHURCHILL: We shall use them share and share alike.
MOLOTOV: The Soviet delegation has a draft to submit.
BYRNES: (proceeds with reading of the report on Polish question.)
MOLOTOV’S paper is read. It suggests severance of all relations with the former Polish government, the transfer of all assets to the government of national unity, and the placing of Polish armed forces and fleet under the new Polish government.
CHURCHILL: The burden of this matter rests on Britain. We received the Poles when they were driven out by the Germans. There is no property of any kind or extent belonging to the old Polish government. There are 20 million pounds gold in London and Canada which is frozen and is the ultimate property of the Polish national state. There is a Polish Embassy vacated by the old ambassador which is available to the ambassador of the new government as soon as they send one and the sooner the better.
The Polish Government has been financed during the last five years by the British Government. We have advanced 120 million pounds sterling for them and their troops.
When the Polish Government in London was disavowed, it was arranged that three months’ salary should be paid all employees and they should be dismissed. It would have been improper to do otherwise. The expense has been borne by Great Britain.
Our position is unique in another way. We must deal with the transfer of forces which have fought with us against the Germans. Some of them came from France after France fell. Some came to Italy from Switzerland. We built up five divisions of 50,000 escaped Poles. The Poles built up an army of 180 to 200 thousand men. These men have fought with great bravery and discipline. They have had heavy losses. I must make it perfectly clear that this involves the honor of His Majesty’s Government. We have given pledges to Parliament and we must treat them in a manner which the world as a whole will regard as just and fair.
STALIN: Of course.
CHURCHILL: These men have taken an oath to their President and we have ceased to recognize him. What is the policy we are pursuing? Our policy is to persuade as many as possible to go back to Poland. I was angry when General Anders said to his troops that if they went back to Poland they will be sent to Siberia. This officer will not be permitted to make such prejudicial statements to the troops. Our policy is to persuade as many to go back to Poland as soon as possible. This applies also to civilian officials, and employees. The better things are in Poland, the quicker they will go. I rejoice in the improvement which has taken place in Poland and I wish every success to the new Polish government. It is not perfect but it is a great advance. I have said if there were Polish soldiers who have fought with us who do not go back we will receive them as British citizens. But we hope the great bulk will return. It would assist if the new Polish Government could give undertakings that those who do return will be safe in their livelihood. They should with proper assurances want to go back to the land of their fathers which has been liberated by Russian arms.
STALIN: Have you read the draft of the Russian delegation?
CHURCHILL: I have read the draft. I agree in principle, subject to what I have said. I should be pleased to have the draft remitted to the foreign secretaries to be considered along with the British suggestion.
STALIN: I appreciate the difficult position of the British who have sheltered their former rulers. I know that despite this fact the former rulers have caused great difficulty for the British government. I assure Mr. Churchill my draft is not intended to make the position of the British government more difficult. It is intended only to put an end to the former Polish government. They have their agents and press which make an unfavorable impression on public opinion. The purpose of our draft is to put an end to this position. I am fully prepared to withdraw anything that will complicate the British situation. Our only purpose is to put an end to an indefinite situation.
CHURCHILL: If you cut off all financial aid, you can’t in England prevent their talking. We have no relations with them. But we have to be careful about the Army. They might mutiny. Our purposes are the same. We ask for trust and confidence in the making of [in making?] Poland a place which will attract them.
TRUMAN: It seems there is no fundamental difference. The Prime Minister is asking time for soldiers to get back. I think there should be an agreement. I am interested in the Polish Government, particularly in free elections assured by the Yalta agreement.
STALIN: Let us refer this matter to the foreign secretaries, including the matter of elections. The Polish Provisional Government has never refused to hold elections.
TRUMAN: That is all the foreign secretaries have submitted today. Is there anything further? Shall I suggest that the foreign secretaries prepare another agenda for tomorrow?
CHURCHILL: I am concerned with the weight and scope of the political principles. Are we going to have uniform control or different practices in the four zones?
STALIN: This is dealt with in the political section. My understanding is that we all favor a unified policy.
Meeting adjourned.
[Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945
In accordance with your instructions, your staff has reviewed the “Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period” and respectfully submits the following comments and suggestions:
Appendix A:
(I) Insert the following at the beginning of the first sentence: “Subject to the policies and provisions of any Agreements entered into between the Governments of the USSR, UK, and USA, …”
(II) (b) The terms “starvation, disease and civil unrest” are noted. Under this, the area commander may in his own discretion maintain any plants that he may desire. This is broad power.
(d) The only financing that should be permitted should be incident to exports which are required for approved imports. Otherwise, our policy that exports should be a first charge against imports, would be undermined.
(III) Sentence should be amended by insertion of clause as indicated by underscoring: “During the period of occupation, the German Reich as its boundaries existed on December 31, 1937, shall be treated as a single economic unit.”
July 18, 1945
[Translation]
The Statement of the Heads of the Three Governments on the Polish Question
In view of the setting up on the basis of the decisions of the Crimea Conference of the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity and in view of the establishment by the United States of America and by Great Britain of diplomatic relations with Poland, which previously already existed between Poland and the Soviet Union, we agreed that the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America as well as the Governments of other United Nations shall sever all relations with the government of Arciszewski. We deem it imperative to render to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity the necessary assistance in the immediate transmission to it of all stock, assets and all other property belonging to Poland, which still is at the disposal of the government of Arciszewski and of its organs, in whatever form this property may be and no matter where or at whose disposal this property may prove to be at the present moment. The transfer of this property to any institution of any kind or to private persons is forbidden.
We also found it necessary that the Polish armed forces, including the navy and the merchant marine, now subordinated to the government of Arciszewski, should be subordinated to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity, which [will?] determine the further measures to be taken in respect of these armed forces, men of war and merchant ships.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845
Foreign Office, 18th July, 1945
The Eastern Frontier of Germany as It Affects the Principles Governing the Treatment of Germany and the Authority of the Control Council
At the plenary session on the 18th July, it was unanimously agreed that as a preliminary working assumption Germany should be regarded as comprising all territories contained within her 1937 frontiers. It is suggested that at this afternoon’s meeting Marshal Stalin should be asked how, in the light of this understanding, the Soviet Government regard the Polish claim to a frontier on the Oder and the Neisse (including Stettin) in its effect upon the joint occupation and control of Germany. Do these territories come under the authority of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Germany? Are the Polish authorities in this area acting as the agents of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and responsible to him? Are the resources of the area available for supplying the rest of Germany?
If these questions do not provoke a direct answer, we might go on to say that we understand that Marshal Zhukov at recent meetings in Berlin, has maintained that the territory to the east of the Oder and the Neisse was outside his zone and that he could not therefore draw upon it for food and fuel supplies for his zone.
We should then develop our grievance on the following lines:
Under the agreements concluded in the European Advisory Commission on the occupation and control of Germany, the controlling Powers agreed that the zones of occupation should be created out of Germany within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, including East Prussia, and that the members of the Control Council should jointly exercise authority in matters affecting Germany as a whole (i.e. 1937 Germany). His Majesty’s Government do not regard these agreements as having been modified by the Crimea decisions on Poland. His Majesty’s Government consider that the Soviet Government are not entitled to release from their authority any of the territory of 1937 Germany without prior consultation and agreement with the other controlling Powers.
If these German territories are withdrawn from the authority of the Control Council and of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, the whole basis of our combined plans for the treatment of Germany is altered. The balance between the zones is upset. The Soviet zone, reduced in area but obliged to support a larger population owing to the influx of Germans expelled from the territories further east, becomes in Marshal Zhukov’s view a deficit area. The British and American Commanders-in-Chief, instead of being able to draw upon the normal surpluses of Eastern Germany, are expected to help to supply Berlin. This radical readjustment threatens to cause very serious consequences for us in our zones. Moreover, the total stock of reparation supplies available for the common pool is gravely reduced.
His Majesty’s Government, while fully supporting Poland’s right to accessions of territory, regard the present claim to the Oder-Neisse line, including Stettin, as excessive. On the short-term view, it is doubtful whether the Poles will be able to maintain full production in the whole of this area during the critical next winter, while continued expulsion of Germans from the area will cause grave problems for the controlling Powers in Germany. On the long-term view Poland’s capacity to populate and absorb the whole of these territories is uncertain, while the permanent amputation of one-fifth of the area of Germany would be a cause of weakness to Poland and of instability in Europe as a whole.
Marshal Stalin should then be asked to have the Soviet view reconsidered in the light of our attitude and to let us know the result.
852.00/7-1845: Telegram
London, July 18, 1945 — 5 p.m.
Secret
7241
Ambassador Mallet, proceeding Madrid Monday, expressed himself this morning as in much doubt how to handle Franco. Franco’s latest moves considered by FonOff unsatisfactory, unencouraging and it seems to be feared Franco by holding on will play Spain into Soviet hands. Garran of FonOff expects interesting developments Spanish scene in view of Soviet interest in Tangier coupled with renewed radio campaign against Franco which now features, Garran said, instructions for sabotage.
Sent Dept as 7241; repeated Madrid 189.
WINANT
881.00/7-1845: Telegram
London, July 18, 1945 — 5 p.m.
Secret
7242
The British do not intend to raise Tangier question at big three meeting except in so far as determining whether Russia will participate is concerned, according to Harvey and Garran of FonOff. Embassy was told today that while Russian request presumably will be granted British hope to use their concurrence as bargaining point with Russia. It was stated British are dissatisfied with tardy and sometimes unsatisfactory Soviet action on British requests. Garran said Spanish Under Secretary Castillo has told Bowker if Russians brought in Spain will revert to status quo ante 1923. FonOff evidently believes Soviet Govt out to embarrass Franco to fullest and has noted anti-Franco Soviet broadcasts recently stepped up considerably.
Sent Dept as 7242; repeated Paris 461; Madrid 190; Tangier 44; Moscow 255.
WINANT
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1745
[Washington,] July 18, 1945
Top secret
SC-145b
Proposed Communication to the Secretary at the Berlin Meeting on the Objective of the United States Government in the Occupation of Germany
There is attached a redraft of the proposed communication to the Secretary on the objective of the United States Government in the occupation of Germany.
This redraft has been prepared by Mr. MacLeish in the light of comments in the meetings of the Staff Committee on July 16 and July 17.
[Annex]
Subject: OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY
The Allied purpose with respect to the future of Germany was stated in the communiqué issued at the close of the Crimea Conference as being “to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world.”
This objective was to be achieved by the unconditional surrender of Germany and its occupation by the Allied armies which would apply certain measures of control, political, economic, and social. The achievement of the objective by the destruction of the German people was never considered as a possibility. Even the partition of Germany was rejected. Reliance was put upon the occupation as the means of attaining the end in view.
Programs of occupation have been developed by the Allied governments, but their relation to the overall purpose “to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world” has not been defined. It is essential to the successful administration of any program or programs of occupation ultimately approved that their relation to the end purpose should be clearly understood by those responsible for their direction.
It is sometimes assumed that the occupation of Germany will remove the German threat to the peace of the world solely by destroying the German war potential. It is undoubtedly true that certain measures contemplated will deprive Germany not only of existing arms but of the materials and machines necessary to the waging of modern war. It is highly improbable, however, that the occupation will deprive Germany permanently of the material means of waging war, since it is highly doubtful that the occupation itself will be permanent.
An illustrative parallel can be drawn between the treatment of Germany and the treatment of individual criminals in modern penal institutions. It is well-known to penologists that, although numerous criminals are condemned to prison for life, and even for terms beyond life expectancy, few such criminals ever die in prison. The violence of the public demand for severe punishment declines rapidly as time passes, and life-term convicts are commonly released, at first under parole and then completely, after fifteen to eighteen years. There are already signs that the violence of the demand for German punishment is subsiding, and it is highly improbable that Allied occupation of Germany – at least American occupation – can be continued beyond the period of a few years.
Furthermore, the principal war potential of Germany is not German industry or German raw materials. The principal war potential of Germany is the German people whose industrial and scientific aptitude and whose docility in accepting military and social discipline have been demonstrated over a considerable period of time. Since the destruction of the German people is not thinkable, and since it is unlikely, not to say inconceivable, that the German people will be kept under permanent control and surveillance from without, it would follow that the Allies cannot put their sole or even their principal reliance, for the achievement of their over-all purpose, on the destruction of the material means of making war.
Over and above their reliance upon the destruction of the material means of waging war, the Allies will be obliged to attempt to bring about a change in the attitude toward war of the German people. If we are not prepared to destroy the German people, and if we are not prepared to police the German people permanently, we must attempt to change the German people in such a way that the German nation, when finally freed of occupation and surveillance, will be a nation which will not be a threat to the peace of the world.
A relevant consideration is the fact that weapons developed, or in the course of development, during the present war indicate not only that future wars will be increasingly destructive but that they will be waged with weapons which a scientifically and industrially minded people can produce under conditions which will make surveillance difficult.
If this analysis is substantially correct, then the purpose of the German occupation is to remove the German threat to peace by changing the German attitude toward peace. We are occupying Germany, in other words, with a view to changing the social and political character of the nation to such an extent that Germany can be trusted at some future time with independent existence as a nation in a world in which weapons will be more destructive and more difficult to control than they have ever been before.
It should be noted that this objective conforms to the objectives of the United Nations Organization and to the situation which the establishment of that Organization will create. A peaceful and peace-loving Germany could be introduced at some appropriate time into the United Nations where the measures of the Organization for security and for peace could be brought to play affirmatively rather than negatively.
The explicit recognition that the occupation of Germany is intended to produce a change in the German people would enable us to plan the various measures of occupation more intelligently and to administer them more effectively. At the present time, there is a tendency to make a distinction between political, economic, and military measures for Germany, on the one hand, and measures for what is called the “reeducation” of the German people on the other. Actually, if the present analysis is correct, all aspects of the occupation, whether military, or economic, or political, or social, have one end objective, which is largely psychological: to create a Germany which can be trusted to exist without continuing occupation and surveillance – a Germany which can be re-admitted to the society of peaceful nations. The success of all measures taken in the occupation should therefore be judged not by their immediate consequences alone but by their ultimate effect upon the social and political structure of Germany.
There will, of course, be conflicts from time to time between the short-term objectives and the long-range purpose of the occupation. For example, the use of German output for the relief of liberated areas may create economic distress in Germany which will make the labor of the conversion of Germany to our views and our outlook more difficult. However, the explicit recognition of the true long-range objective of the occupation, whether or not in conflict with certain short-term purposes, is essential to the success of the undertaking.
Something more is required, however, than the explicit declaration of this purpose. The purpose must also be warmly approved and not shamefacedly admitted. It is our intention to employ every means at our disposition, economic and political means as well as the more direct means of education and information, to produce the change in German thinking and German beliefs and German psychology which we desire.
Furthermore, we must be clear in our own minds, not only as to the Germany we wish to change but as to the Germany we wish to put in its place. The soul of man abhors a vacuum quite as much as nature abhors one. You cannot replace something with nothing in the mind of an individual or the mind of a nation. We must assume, although we have no explicit knowledge, that the Russians are clear as to their intentions on this point. Presumably they propose to substitute for Nazi Germany a Germany at least sympathetic to Communism. We presumably believe that a Germany converted to respect for the worth and dignity of human beings and a belief in the basic principles of justice and in the right of men to govern themselves would be a Germany which we could trust. If this, however, is our purpose, we must recognize it and pursue it consciously. We must play again the role we played at the beginning of our history. We must be ready and willing to propagate ideas of liberty and justice and human dignity.
The important point, however, is to ascertain at the earliest possible moment what the other occupying powers have in mind with reference to the kind of Germany to be set up and the means by which it is to be established. It has been pointed out in a paper delivered to the Secretary on the subject of German reeducation that it is highly desirable that the occupying powers should reach an understanding as to the common denominators of a policy for reeducation in order that Germany may not be turned, under the occupation, into an ideological cockpit. If the analysis of the present paper is correct, the same considerations would lead to the same conclusion as to the entire program of occupation. It is therefore recommended that conversations be undertaken in the early future to determine, if possible, a common Allied position as to the question of the kind of Germany we wish to see established and the means by which we propose to bring it about.
Moscow, 18 July 1945
Secret
priority
To US Headquarters Berlin District Visitors Bureau for Ambassador from Sproul, Abramovitz and Bergson signed Deane M 25043. (Confmess 5)
Approximately 40 percent of both movable and fixed capital assets before the war were located in Russian Zone. This includes Berlin.
Movable capital assets east of Oder-Neisse line were worth about 6 Billion Reichsmarks in 1938. This was about 12 percent of total Germany. This does not include value of land, mineral reserves, fixed plant, housing, commercial establishments or commercial and manufacturing inventories. Values are net after depreciation. Present value probably not less than in 1938.
Based on value added, industrial and mining output. Area east of Oder Neisse was about 28 Billion Reichsmarks in 1938. This was about 7 percent of total Germany.
It should be noted that because of dislocations involved, loss of territory may affect Germany’s capacity to pay in somewhat greater degree than percentage figures above would suggest.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3145
[Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945
My Dear Mr. Secretary: The attached memorandum on the relationship between reparations and ceded German territory embodies what we believe to be certain improvements over a similar memorandum submitted to you in my letter of July 16th.
The purpose of this proposal is quite simple. It aims to distribute reparation burdens as well as benefits among those receiving ceded German territory. The first three points provide that any exportable surpluses of commodities from any ceded territory shall be subject to the following priorities:
First, Shipment into Germany to such extent as these commodities are needed to sustain minimum subsistence.
Second, To pay for imports into Germany where needed to sustain minimum subsistence.
Third, For payment into the general reparation fund to be allocated among claimant nations.
The fourth and last point provides that the value of capital equipment and natural resources located in any ceded territory shall be accounted for as reparations delivered to the receiving nation.
Since I understand that the subject of the eastern boundaries of Germany will be considered at today’s meeting of the beads of the Governments, I urge that you give this subject your immediate personal consideration.
Respectfully,
EDWIN W. PAULEY
[Attachment]
Re: Relationship between Reparations and ceded German territory
As a part of any treaty recognizing the ceding of any portion of Germany as its boundaries existed at the end of 1937, it shall be provided that:
One. Any property or current production available for removal from any ceded territory shall be first utilized within Germany to whatever extent occupation authorities require to avoid the necessity of imports into Germany.
Two. Thereafter, the value or proceeds of any property or current production from any ceded territory available for delivery outside of Germany shall be first used to pay for approved imports into Germany.
Three. If sufficient funds are available to pay for all such approved imports, the proceeds or value of any assets delivered from any ceded territory shall be treated as a reparations delivery to such nation or nations and in such amounts as may be designated by the Allied Commission on Reparations, or a permanent Reparations Agency to be created.
Four. The value of capital equipment and natural resources within the boundaries of any territory ceded from Germany to any other nation shall be accounted for as reparations. To the extent that the production of such equipment or resources is pledged for reparations or to pay for approved imports into Germany, the reparation value of such equipment and resources shall be correspondingly decreased.
(Practically, the foregoing obligations may well have to be funded both in the form of agreements to deliver certain fixed quantities of coal, zinc, coke, iron, steel, cement, calcinated soda, etc., for a definite period of years, and by reducing the amount of reparations which will be delivered to the nation receiving ceded territory or delivered to another nation for whose security territory may be ceded.)
[Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945
It is important that we get a definite picture of what Generalissimo Stalin had in his mind yesterday when he raised the question of securing reparations from Italy.
As you know, Italy is going to be dependent on the United States for its sheer existence during the coming winter. The economic situation there verges on a state of almost complete economic disorganization. I understand that our Army representatives on the scene have estimated that the United States would have to ship approximately 750 million dollars worth of food and other materials into Italy in order to tide the country over until next spring. Investigations made by FEA place the figure at over a billion dollars, while the State Department estimates it to be no less than 500 million.
Under these circumstances, it is quite evident that we can look for very little in the form of reparations from Italy. Indeed, in the final analysis, any reparations coining from there would in fact be a contribution from the taxpayers of the United States. We certainly cannot permit materials and equipment to be taken out as reparations when at the same time we are pouring in hundreds of millions of dollars to keep the Italian people alive.
In order to clarify this issue fully, I am taking the liberty of suggesting that you ask the Generalissimo just what he has in mind when he talks about “reparations from Italy”. You might wish to ask him to be specific as to what he expects to take out and how large a sum he has in mind.
Respectfully
EDWIN W PAULEY