Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 6, 1945)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Vorontsov Villa, USSR

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall		Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King		Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Vice Admiral Cooke		Field Marshal Wilson
Rear Admiral McCormick		Field Marshal Alexander
Major General Bull		General Ismay
Major General Anderson		Admiral Somerville
Major General Hull		Major General Laycock
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
	Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland		Major General Jacob
Captain Graves		Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
		Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

Alupka, February 6, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret

Approval of Minutes of the 185th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 185th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and Northwest Europe

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Planning Date for the End of the War Against Germany (CCS 772)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to accept for planning purposes the following dates for the end of the war with Germany:
a. Earliest date, 1 July 1945.
b. Date beyond which war is unlikely to continue, 31 December 1945.

Provision of LVTs for the Mediterranean

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Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany (CCS 320/35)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff proposing the acceptance of an agreement regarding the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave and the use of the railway from Bremen to the southwest zone, on the understanding that this agreement did not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area.

General Marshall referred to the fact that the letter at Enclosure “B” visualized the necessity for making a more detailed form of agreement, covering a variety of circumstances. He felt strongly that no such detailed agreement was necessary. The broad policy had been decided and the good will was there. Details could be left very largely to local commanders and any problems of overlapping authority which did arise could be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the time came.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then agreed to the following amendments to the Appendix to Enclosure “B” of CCS 320/35:

a. In paragraph 1, delete the words “but will be generally administered as a sub-district of a larger British controlled area.”

b. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, delete the words “larger district” and substitute “British zone.”

c. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, delete the word “responsible” and substitute the word “responsive.”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Endorsed the views expressed by General Marshall above and approved the Appendix to Enclosure “B” of CCS 320/35 as amended in discussion (Subsequently circulated as CCS 320/37).

b. Agreed to take no further action on the detailed recommendations included in the letter at Enclosure “B” to CCS 320/35.

Basic Undertakings (CCS 775)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff recommending a substitution for the existing paragraph 6h in CCS 680/2.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to agree to this subparagraph h., as it had been amended informally in discussion at a previous CCS meeting when this had been discussed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to the following revised subparagraph h.:

h. Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan.

Liaison With the Soviet High Command Over Anglo-American Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany (CCS 778)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff suggesting a line that might be taken with the Soviet General Staff at a meeting which was to be held later the same day to discuss the matter of the bombline.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the desirability of putting forward this fresh memorandum in the place of the one recently submitted in FAN 477.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the United States Chiefs of Staff should put forward to the Russians the views expressed in CCS 778, as amended in discussion.

Next Meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet again, provisionally at 1000 on Thursday, 8 February 1945, to finish off any outstanding items on the ARGONAUT Agenda.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Yalta, 5 February 1945
Top secret
CCS 320/35

Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany

1. With regard to the draft agreement concerning the Bremen-Bremerhaven area proposed by General Macready in the attached letter to Mr. McCloy (Enclosure “B”), the United States Chiefs of Staff prefer that the final agreement exist on one sheet of paper and recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve Enclosure “A.”

2. As regards the numerous points proposed in General Macready’s letter it appears to the United States Chiefs of Staff that such matters which cannot be agreed to by the local commanders of the Zones of Occupation should be referred at that time to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision. There will be undoubtedly some problems of overlapping authority and conflicting interests which will have to be resolved under the policy of coordination and cooperation.

3. It has been our understanding that the draft agreement as proposed by Lord Halifax and Mr. McCloy and as modified by the British Chiefs of Staff does not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. Such command, with the full authority that is inherent in command, must rest with the American commander of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area, as subordinate of the American commander of the Southwestern Zone. It is intended, however, that in the normal administration of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area the American commander thereof will, in accordance with the draft agreement, conform to the general policy pursued in the administration of the British Zone as qualified in the phrasing of the draft agreement.

4. If the British Chiefs of Staff prefer to retain the wording of the agreement attached to General Macready’s letter it is acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff provided the British Chiefs of Staff indicate their concurrence to the above interpretation of the draft agreement.

5. The United States Chiefs of Staff urge that this matter be completed before the end of the present conference.

Enclosure “A”

1. The Bremen and - Bremerhaven enclave Area as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the larger district British Zone, subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave Bremen-Bremerhaven Area in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

   2. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree to permit necessary access by the British to offices, and necessary use of available installations, situated in the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area, which provide services essential to British administration of the British Zone of Occupation.

2. 3. The U.S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area to the Southwestern Zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American Zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for United States (or British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. 4. The map referred to is attached is the same as that attached to CCS 320/29.

[NormanStewart]

Agreement Regarding the Bremen-Bremerhaven Enclave Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Yalta, 6 February 1945
Top secret
CCS 320/37

The Bremen Enclave

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the British zone subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The U.S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for (United States/British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. The map referred to is that attached to CCS 320/29.

[NormanStewart]

Second tripartite military meeting, noon

Yusupov Palace, USSR

		Present
United States		United Kingdom		Soviet Union
Fleet Admiral Leahy		Field Marshal Brooke		General of the Army Antonov
General of the Army Marshall		Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal		Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Kuter				Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Vice Admiral Cooke		Field Marshal Wilson
Major General Deane		General Ismay		Lieutenant General Gryzlov
Major General Bull		Admiral Somerville
Major General Anderson		Rear Admiral Archer		Vice Admiral Kucherov
Major General Hull				Commander Kostrinsky
	Secretariat		Interpreters
	Brigadier General McFarland		Captain Lunghi
	Brigadier Cornwall-Jones		Lieutenant Chase
	Captain Graves		Mr. Potrubach
	Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, noon
Top secret

Chairmanship

General Antonov requested Admiral Leahy to serve as Chairman of the 2nd Tripartite Meeting.

Admiral Leahy thanked General Antonov but suggested that in the interest of continuity, Field Marshal Brooke continue to preside.

Bombline and Liaison Arrangements

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the first item to be discussed should be General Antonov’s proposal for a bombline running from Stettin through Berlin, Vienna and Zagreb. He asked the United States Chiefs of Staff to express their views on this proposal since they were most intimately concerned with it.

General Kuter said he would like to read a statement on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, setting out their views on this matter. This statement read as follows:

1. Our wishes are:
   (a) To continue to do the greatest possible damage to the German military and economic system.
   (b) To avoid interference with or danger to the Soviet forces advancing from the East.
   (c) To do what is possible to assist the advance of the Soviet Army.

2. To achieve the first wish, that is, maximum damage to the Germans, it is essential to avoid as far as possible any restriction of strategic bomber action. It is not our wish to draw a line on the map which would exclude our bombers from attacking any targets which are important to the warmaking power of the enemy, whether against the Soviet or the British and American forces.

3. To achieve the second wish, that is, avoidance of interference with Soviet land operations, we must rely upon the Soviet High Command to inform the British and United States Missions in Moscow of the positions of the Red Army from day to day. We also invite the Soviet High Command to inform the British and United States Missions if there are any particular objectives, for example, railway centers or centers of road communication close in front of their armies which they wish us not to attack. We should require at least 24, and preferably 48 hours’ notice for action upon such requests.

4. A regular daily meeting between the British and United States Missions in Moscow and a responsible officer of the Soviet General Staff seems to us to be essential.

5. To achieve the third wish, that is, assistance to the Russian advance, we should be glad to receive through the British and American Missions in Moscow any suggestions from the Soviet High Command. This suggestion would have to be considered in the light of other commitments and such factors as the distance and the weather.

6. To summarize, we suggest:
   (a) That there should be no rigid division of eastern Germany into spheres of action of the Soviet and British and American strategic bombers respectively;

   (b) That day-to-day liaison should be established between a responsible officer of the Russian High Command and representatives of the British and American Missions in Moscow, in order to exchange information upon which we can regulate the action of the Anglo-U.S. strategic bombers in accordance with the development of Soviet operations on land.

7. When the Soviet Air Force is ready to undertake strategic bombing deep into Germany from the East, the coordination of policy should be discussed by Soviet, American and British Staff representatives in London or in Moscow. Some further machinery for the closer coordination of operations would appear to be necessary at that time.

General Kuter said that he would like to add that in addition to his objection to the principle of a fixed line on the map, there was the further objection that there were valuable strategic targets to the east of the proposed line. From among some 20 such strategic targets which would be denied to Allied air power he would mention a few. These included the oil targets at Politz, the main production center of high octane gasoline and main source of fuel supply for the German Air Force; Ruhrland, second only in importance to Politz, and one of the four major synthetic oil plants in Germany. In addition, there were several other oil targets. Further the proposed line would appear to prohibit attacks on some industrial and communication targets in the neighborhood of Berlin and Dresden. The line would also prohibit attack on three tank and self-propelled gun factories; and, lastly, and of great importance, it would prevent attacks on three jet-propelled fighter engine factories where components of the Juno jet engines were made and the engines themselves were assembled. He would point out that the oil targets referred to required repeated attacks in view of the German’s ability to repair them rapidly.

There was one further point he would like to make. Apart from the strategic implication of the line, it was unacceptable in view of topographical considerations. A bombline must be clearly visible to a pilot in the air, both from high and low altitudes.

General Marshall said he would like to add an additional illustration of the point made by General Kuter. He had that morning received a message from the Commanding General of the United States heavy bombers operating from the United Kingdom, reporting an attack on Berlin carried out three or four days previously by a thousand heavy bombers supported by some 600 fighters. These fighters were practically over the Russian lines and, in fact, destroyed a number of German aircraft taking off from an airfield east of Berlin. The Commanding General pointed out that, with good liaison parties and proper radio communication, not only could valuable information be given to the Russians before such an attack but also that the most recent information with regard to enemy and Russian movements could be communicated to him.

With the speed of modern fighters, the aircraft taking part in this raid were involved in operations only five minutes flying time from the Russian ground forces. Yet it must be remembered that these aircraft were bombing a definite point which the Russian staff had requested should be attacked. Unless better methods of handling liaison were evolved, it would mean that the most powerful weapon of the war would be denied its proper use in assisting the Russians. He asked that an immediate and really practical solution should be found to this problem.

Sir Charles Portal then explained the point of view of the British Chiefs of Staff. Owing to the fact that United States bombers operated by day while the Royal Air Force bombers operated mainly by night, this problem affected the United States forces more than it did the British. Nevertheless, the problem for both air forces was almost identical. Already complete integration of control of the United States and British bomber effort from the West and from the South had been achieved.

Speaking for the British Air Staff, he fully supported the proposals which had been put forth by General Kuter which would entirely cover British requirements.

General Antonov explained that in putting forward at the previous meeting his proposal with regard to the bombline, he had in mind the wishes expressed by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff which had been put forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer. These wishes expressed a desire that the bombline should be as near as possible to the Soviet front. The line that he now suggested was only some 60 to 75 kilometers in front of the Soviet lines. There was no possibility of moving the bombline further to the eastward as this would hinder the action, not only of the Soviet ground forces but also the Soviet air forces. He appreciated that there were a number of important targets to the east of the proposed line which should be bombed. In connection with the bombing of such individual targets, each one could be considered separately. He would ask also that consideration should be given to the fact that the Soviets had a large number of aircraft themselves. He had mentioned on the previous day the 8,000 aircraft now being employed on the central fronts If all the targets to the east of the line were made available to the Allied air forces, then there would be nothing left for the Soviet forces to attack. The line now proposed was only a very general line drawn in the light of considerations put forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer and would have to be worked out in detail and, in particular, altered to enable Allied flyers easily to identify it. With regard to changes in the line necessitated by changes in the position of Soviet forces, full information with regard to this would be provided daily through the missions in Moscow. Through the same channel, the efforts of the Soviet air forces could also be coordinated.

Sir Charles Portal said that as he understood it, General Autonov’s view was that if the line which he had proposed was to be moved further to the east, there would be nothing left for the Soviet Air Force to attack. He felt there had been some misunderstanding on this point since the United States and British air staffs were entirely agreeable that any strategic target should be attacked by all three air forces. This was one of the reasons why he was opposed to drawing of any line which would divide Germany into two parts from the point of view of strategic bombing.

General Kuter said he would like to comment on two points. He was glad to learn that the Soviet wishes were similar to his own, as indicated by General Antonov’s reference to constant liaison to enable coordination to be achieved. Secondly, he would like to refer to the results achieved during the advance across the western desert. In this operation, as the result of excellent air-ground liaison, it was possible to place the bombline not at some specific distance ahead of the front line but at a point which it was expected that our own ground forces might be able to reach in eight hours.

General Marshall asked confirmation that General Antonov’s view was that the bombline he proposed should be altered so that it could be better defined topographically and that at the same time arrangements could be made for Allied forces to bomb critical points on the Soviet side of this line.

General Antonov said the line which he had indicated was a rough guide only. He felt that the Heads of the Air Staffs could work out the details of this line so as to insure its recognition from the air. This redefinition of the line could, he believed, be undertaken at the present conference. He also supported the statement made by Sir Charles Portal that there could be no line established which would entirely divide the targets of the three strategic air forces. It was for this reason that he considered that the action of the Soviet strategic air force should be coordinated with the Allied air effort through the missions in Moscow. If it was desirable for the Allied air forces to bomb targets to the east of the line, such action could be discussed in Moscow and the necessary decision taken.

Sir Alan Brooke said he regarded the bombline as a line of demarcation between the action of air forces and land forces and not as a line of demarcation between the action of strategic air forces. In Allied operations on the Western Front there was no line of demarcation between the action of the United States and British strategical air forces but there were bomblines on the various fronts closely connected with the action of the land forces and designed to insure close cooperation between land and air forces. He asked if it were to be assumed from General Antonov’s statement that the proposed bombline now being discussed was to be considered as the bombline which would ensure coordination of action between land and air forces but not designed to restrict the action of the strategic air forces, which action would be regulated through the missions in Moscow on a day-to-day basis.

Sir Charles Portal said he would like to put the question in a different way. Was it the intention of the Soviet Staff that the improved liaison which it had been suggested should take place through the missions in Moscow, would be in lieu of the line proposed and should be such as to safeguard the Soviet ground forces from the action of strategic bombers?

General Antonov said that the line he had proposed was designed to secure Soviet land forces from the possibility of accidental bombardment by the Allied air forces. Such a line could not be permanent and would be changed frequently to conform to changes in the land front. The actions of the strategic air forces, both Soviet and Allied, would not be bound by this line, however. It was drawn so close to the Soviet front that he presumed that the Allied strategic air forces would not find many targets to the east of this line though such targets might exist and in this case action against any of them could be decided upon individually. As to the Soviet strategic air force it would appear that in most cases their attacks would take place to the west of the line.

Admiral Leahy suggested that, since there appeared to be a large measure of agreement, time would be saved if the three air staffs met together and worked out the details of the proposed bombline.

Sir Charles Portal said he would like to suggest an amendment to Admiral Leahy’s proposal. He felt that instead of the air staffs trying to work out the details of the line they should work out the requirements for safeguarding the interests and security of the Soviet forces, having regard to the need for the destruction of as many important German installations as was possible. There seemed to be little difference between the various views expressed and what differences there were could, he felt sure, be settled quite easily.

Admiral Leahy said that he accepted Sir Charles Portal’s amendment to his suggestion.

General Antonov said that he agreed with Admiral Leahy’s view that the matter should be referred to the air staffs to work out a detailed line in accordance with the principles which had been discussed.

It was agreed that Marshal Khudyakov, General Kuter and Sir Charles Portal should meet together immediately to consider this matter.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there was one further related question which remained unsettled. This was the question of liaison on a lower level. General Antonov had undertaken, at the previous meeting, to seek the views of Marshal Stalin on this point.

General Antonov said he had reported on this matter to Marshal Stalin. Marshal Stalin had pointed out that there had so far been no close contact between Soviet and Allied land forces and therefore wished that liaison should take place through the Staff of the Red Army and the Military Missions in Moscow.

Coordination of Offensive Operations

Sir Alan Brooke said that the forthcoming offensives had been fully discussed at the previous meeting and coordination had been broadly settled. There remained, however, the question of the offensives during March and April. General Antonov had mentioned also a summer offensive. Could he give any further information as to the probable date of the commencement of this summer offensive and whether it would be in great strength? Further did he foresee any long periods between the end of the present offensive and the commencement of the summer offensive?

General Antonov said that Soviet offensive action had started and would continue. The Soviet forces would press forward until hampered by weather. With regard to the summer offensive, it would be difficult to give exact data with regard to the interval between the end of the winter and beginning of the summer attack. The most difficult season from the point of view of weather was the second part of March and the month of April. This was the period when roads became impassable.

General Marshall asked, with regard to General Antonov’s comment on the bad weather period between the winter and summer offensives, whether it was anticipated that it would be possible to carry out any important action until the summer offensive could be started.

General Antonov said that, if during this period operations in the West were carried out actively, the Soviets would take every possible action on the Eastern Front wherever this could be done.

General Marshall emphasized that the interval between the winter and summer offensives would probably be the period at which the Allies would be trying to cross the Rhine. He was therefore most anxious that the enemy should not be able to concentrate forces against the Allies on the Western Front at that particular time.

General Antonov said that he could assure General Marshall that the Soviets would do everything possible to prevent the transference of German forces from east to west during this period.

Exchange of Information with Regard to River-Crossing Technique and Equipment

Admiral Leahy said that at the first meeting between the Heads of State, the British Prime Minister had raised the question of exchanging information with regard to technique and equipment employed by the Soviet forces in river crossings. At the present time in view of the Allied proximity to the River Rhine this was a most immediate problem for the Allied forces. There were now two officers present from General Eisenhower’s headquarters and it appeared highly desirable that they should meet with the appropriate Soviet experts on the subject of the technique and equipment employed by the Red Army in major river crossings which they had undertaken. Thus the Allies on the Western Front could obtain the benefit of the experience of the Red Army in this matter. He would therefore very much appreciate if General Antonov would indicate whether this could be done and if so would make such arrangements as were practicable for the officers from General Eisenhower’s headquarters to meet with the appropriate Soviet officers.

General Antonov said that the Soviet Army was always ready to share its battle experience with its allies. However, at the moment there were no specialists in this technique available and he would like therefore time to look into this matter. He would furnish the required information later.

Admiral Leahy thanked General Antonov for this very satisfactory reply.

Bases for U.S. Strategic Bomber Forces in the Vienna-Budapest Area

General Marshall said that as the Soviet advance proceeded it would be found logistically possible to move U.S. strategic bomber forces now in Italy, with their protecting fighters, to bases in the Vienna-Budapest area. It was very desirable for such aircraft to operate from that vicinity. It was therefore the hope of the United States Chiefs of Staff that this could be arranged by having a staging area or zone of passage in that area so that it could be arranged for some 670 individual heavy bomber sorties to be undertaken each month. This would require the support of about 1,800 fighter missions in the same period. To effect this it would be necessary to carry out certain construction work for which some 2,000 United States personnel could be provided from Italy and 200 from elsewhere. The greatest difficulty would be the transfer of the necessary supplies and equipment. 22,000 tons would be required initially and a further 8,300 tons a month thereafter. The President of the United States was likely to present this project to Marshal Stalin with a request for his approval. It would involve the use of two airfields in the Budapest area and also agreements that the Soviet authorities should undertake the movement of the necessary stores to the Budapest area by road, rail or barge.

General Antonov said that the matter would probably be decided between Marshal Stalin and the President. He personally felt that it could conveniently be undertaken and suggested that the Heads of the Air Forces should consider the problem.

General Marshall said he would be very happy for this to be arranged.

Provision of Soviet Airfields for Damaged British Night Bombers

Sir Charles Portal said he had one request to make. It would be extremely helpful if the Soviet General Staff could allocate air bases with night landing equipment at various points distributed along their front at which British night bombers, damaged in night combat over Germany, could land instead of having to fight their way back over the heavy defenses of Germany. If these aircraft were so badly damaged that they could not get back, and no such airfields were available, the crews had no alternative but to bail out and lose their aircraft. If the Soviet authorities could agree to this request he suggested that details could be arranged through the missions in Moscow.

Marshal Khudyakov said that he regarded this as a technical question. Up to the present the Soviet forces had never denied assistance to Allied fliers, who had always been met and taken care of. He suggested the details of Sir Charles Portal’s proposal should be worked out after the conference.

Enemy Intelligence

General Antonov said that at the previous Conference he had referred to the fact that the Germans would endeavor to stop the Russian offensive on the line of the Oder. Quite possibly they would not only adopt a passive defense on this line but would try to gather together counterattack forces for a breakthrough. He would be glad to know if the Allied commander in the West had any intelligence with regard to the collection of such forces, their movements or the likely point for such an attack. He was particularly interested in the transference of the Sixth SS Panzer Army.

General Bull said that when he left General Eisenhower’s headquarters a short time ago evidence existed that the Sixth Panzer Army was leaving the Western Front and possibly an additional two divisions from north of the Vosges. General Eisenhower had taken immediate action to put the maximum possible air effort on these German movements. He was not up to date with regard to the direction of these moves but he was certain that such information as was available at the Supreme Commander’s headquarters could be sent to the Soviet General Staff. He would be glad to take this matter up with General Eisenhower immediately on his return.

General Marshall said that he had received a message on the previous day which gave definite information of the moves of certain divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army from the Western Front. This message had also given the new total of enemy divisions on the Western Front as 69. This morning’s operational report raised this total to 70 since a newly formed parachute division had appeared on the Western Front on the right of Field Marshal Montgomery’s forces, in a position somewhere east of Venlo. He would get an exact statement on this matter and give it to General Antonov.

Sir Alan Brooke said that his information was very similar to that given by General Marshall. It was known that the Fifth Panzer Army had also been pulled out of the line but there were no indications yet of its moving to the eastward. The British experts believed that this move was unlikely to take place. If General Antonov wished, a telegram could be sent asking for the latest information.

General Antonov said he was very grateful for the information given him and was particularly interested in the transfer of the Sixth Panzer Army to the eastward.

Sir Alan Brooke said, with regard to the Italian Front, that as far as was known only one division was being withdrawn although there were indications of considerable movement.

General Marshall said it might be helpful, if the Soviet Staff was not already aware of them, to give details of the attack in the Ardennes. This attack had been made by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. Prior to the attack the Sixth Panzer Army had been out of the line for several months and had been located northeast of the Ruhr with five divisions. The Fifth Panzer Army had been in the front line or close to it. The Sixth Panzer Army had crossed to the west of the Rhine a month or six weeks before the offensive had taken place but had not been located until the attack was launched. The Sixth Panzer Army had been the first to be withdrawn from the attack and the Fifth Panzer Army was finally also withdrawn though it was not known if it had left the front.

Marshal Khudyakov asked if the losses in the Fifth Panzer Army were known.

General Marshall said it was difficult to differentiate between losses incurred by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. At the meeting on the previous day he had given information with regard to the destruction inflicted on one or the other of these armies in the course of two days operations. It was believed that very heavy casualties had been inflicted on the motor vehicles and tanks of almost all the divisions of both the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies.

General Bull said the Fifth Panzer Army had attacked in the center and, of the two, made the most progress. The Sixth Panzer Army had attacked in the north in the direction of Malmedy-Liege. Both the Fifth and the Sixth Armies had suffered considerable losses in armor and two divisions of the Fifth Army in particular were known to have suffered heavily.

[NormanStewart]

Pacific Operations

Admiral King said that the general principles for the conduct of the war against Germany and Japan were: firstly, the defeat of both Germany and Japan at the earliest possible date; secondly, that Germany was the principal enemy; thirdly, that continuous and unremitting pressure would be maintained against the Japanese forces. Efforts would be made to attain positions from which the final attack on Japan could be staged when the necessary forces became available from Europe. There had been no fixed schedule but endeavor had been made to go as fast and as far as the available means permitted. At the present time our operations were hampered chiefly by lack of shipping and the shortage of service and auxiliary troops. It was worthy of note that all operations in the Pacific had, of necessity, been amphibious operations and some were carried out over great distances.

In general, the forward line now held included Attu, the Marianas, and Luzon. In addition, we had control of the sea and air not only up to this line, but beyond it to China, Formosa, the Ryukyus, and even to the coast of Japan itself. The present fighting was taking place on the island of Luzon, about 1,500 sea miles from Japan itself. The Japanese appeared to prefer to keep the fighting at that distance from their homeland. What was important was that it was still possible to inflict casualties on the Japanese navy, air forces, and shipping. The British Pacific Fleet was now available, and had been reported to him as being available for operations about the 15th of March.

Regarding future operations, it was proposed to continue the liberation of the Philippines and to establish air bases in Luzon from which to interdict enemy air and shipping in the north part of the China Sea, including the China coast and the area of Formosa. On the 19th of February the United States forces would seize the Bonin Islands, which would be used chiefly as a base for fighters accompanying the heavy bombers on raids on Japan. About the first of April it was proposed to go into Okinawa in the Ryukyus for the purpose of establishing air bases and an advance naval base, and to intensify the sea and air blockade of Japan.

Though no decision had been taken, planning was proceeding on an operation to go into the Chusan Archipelago to broaden the base for intensifying the air and sea blockade of Japan. This would also assist interdiction of communications in the Shanghai-Hankow area, including the great water highway of the Yangtze.

In the North Pacific, air operations were being conducted from the Aleutians and occasional ship bombardments of the Kuriles, chiefly against the islands of Paramushiru and Shushima in the extreme north of the chain. The weather for air operations in this area was particularly bad, and consequently there had been a number of forced landings by United States aircraft in Kamchatka. He would like to express his deep appreciation for the care and assistance which had been rendered to these airmen by the Soviet authorities.

For a period of about a year examination and study had been continuing of the possibility of securing a safe sea passage through the Kuriles by seizing an island, preferably in the central part of the chain, whose topography was such as to permit the establishment of airfields. Lack of means made it unlikely that such operations would take place during 1945 unless they became so vitally important that ways and means would have to be found to do them, even though the overall means available for the war against Japan were limited.

Admiral Kuznetsov asked if the capture of an island in the Kuriles was planned for 1945.

Admiral King said that means were not available to undertake it as well as the other operations which had been planned; however, as always, it was a question of the relative importance of the various operations under consideration.

General Marshall said he would like to add that from the point of view of the Army, plans were kept up to date in great detail, particularly with regard to shipping, in order to effect the most rapid possible movement of forces from Europe to the Pacific. These plans were so arranged that the movement would start one week after the termination of the war in Europe. The total transfer would, however, take a long time. Air would move first, accompanied by the service units needed to support the air forces and to prepare bases for the other troops. The necessity for these plans was one of the reasons why an estimated date for the end of the war against Germany had been required.

General Antonov said that, as he had mentioned on the previous day, it would be more convenient to discuss questions concerning the Far East after this matter had been considered by the Heads of State.

VLR Bomber Operations Against Japan

General Kuter said that the B-29s, the heavy long-range United States bombers, were organized into the Twentieth Air Force commanded by General Arnold. The operations of the Twentieth Air Force had been following a plan somewhat similar to that used by the strategic air forces in Europe. The Japanese aircraft industry had been selected as the first priority target. At the present time this air force had approximately 350 operational B-29s. About a third of that number had been operating from China bases since May 1944 and the remainder had begun operating from the Marianas in July 1944. It was expected to build up a force of approximately 1,800 operational B-29s. The latest operation carried out was on the previous Sunday, when 120 B-29s had attacked Kobe. Broadly speaking, the relatively small force of B-29s which had so far been employed had exceeded the anticipated results for the number of attacks that had been carried out.

Operations in Burma and China

Sir Alan Brooke said that during 1944 the Japanese had delivered a serious attack in north Burma. This attack was stopped and the Japanese were driven back by the British forces in north Burma, assisted by Chinese forces under United States direction which had been trained by United States officers in India. Land communications to China had now been opened through north Burma. The road was not good but motor vehicles and guns could now be delivered by that road to China. Operations in Burma were continuing southward with the object of ultimately clearing the Japanese out of Burma, which would then provide a suitable base for further operations against the Japanese in those parts. In addition, as Admiral King had mentioned, British naval forces had been dispatched to take part in operations in the Pacific. Carrier attacks had also been carried out against the oil targets in Palembang on the island of Sumatra.

Sir Charles Portal said that it was of interest to add that the British advanced forces operating in the Mandalay area and to the west of it, were almost entirely dependent on air supply provided by United States and British transport aircraft.

General Marshall said that the United States maintained a considerable air force in China, consisting, at the present time, of some 600 planes with more to come. The sole source of supply for these forces was over the 17,000-foot mountains between northeast Burma and Kunming. These operations presented an extremely difficult proposition from every point of view. As Sir Alan Brooke had said, the Japanese had in the previous spring attacked towards the line of communication to China. This was the line of communication not only for the British forces in Burma but also for the Chinese forces in Burma, and the United States air transport force flying supplies into China. In spite of all the difficulties, 44,000 tons of supplies had been flown over the Himalayas last month. A transport plane left airfields in Burma every two minutes of the day and night. It was necessary to provide not only gasoline for the air forces operating out of China but to provide also for the ground forces in China who had little food or equipment. United States transport aircraft had moved Chinese forces to India from where, after training, they had again been transferred by air to the seat of operations where they had joined up with their equipment. More recently the Chinese forces had been flown back over the mountains, thus providing the only really dependable well-equipped fighting force in China. They were, however, without armored fighting vehicles or medium artillery. Now that the road was open, armored fighting vehicles, trucks and artillery could be sent to them. There had been almost a complete lack of motor transport in China and what there had been was now worn out. It was under these circumstances that the United States Chiefs of Staff had asked assistance from the Soviets in order to get 500 trucks to the Chinese. He very much appreciated the efforts the Soviets had made and fully understood their difficulties. Fortunately, these vehicles could now be sent to China direct by road.

A United States general (General Wedemeyer) was now acting as chief of staff to the Generalissimo in an effort to coordinate the various activities of the Chinese forces. This was of particular importance in relation to United States action in the Pacific. Operations in China were of increasing importance now that naval forces were so close to the coast of China. General Wedemeyer was endeavoring to restore a very serious situation and, with armored cars and trucks now available, his task should prove easier. As he (General Marshall) had previously mentioned, in the face of unparalleled difficulties 44,000 tons had been flown over the Himalayas last month. He mentioned this because to him it meant the accomplishment of the greatest feat in all history. In the face of such achievements cooperation by the staffs now seated around the table should be relatively easy.

General Antonov asked if the operations in Burma were regarded as decisive operations or secondary operations.

Sir Alan Brooke said that they were decisive operations aimed at the clearing of Burma of all Japanese forces.

General Antonov asked if it was considered that there were enough troops for decisive action on the two fronts – the Far East and Europe. Would not concentration on the main front hasten the end of the war in Europe and thus hasten the end of the war against Japan by making additional forces available?

Sir Alan Brooke explained that mainly local forces were being used in Burma, the majority of them being from the Indian Army. Indian divisions had been taken from India and had been engaging Germans since the beginning of the war. However, it had been essential to protect India’s eastern frontier and at the same time to open up a land route to China. Far greater forces were required in this theater to carry out all the desired operations. As General Marshall had mentioned, plans were ready to transfer forces as fast as possible upon the completion of the war with Germany in order to finish the war against Japan. Up to the present time Germany was regarded as the main enemy and Japan as the secondary enemy, to be taken on with full forces immediately Germany was defeated.

General Marshall explained that the policy of the United States Government played a great part in the decisions with regard to operations in Burma. The United States Government placed great importance on the maintenance of the present regime in China. From the military point of view it would be a very serious matter if all China passed into Japanese control. Only relatively small American forces had been used except for transport aircraft.

It was imperative, however, that operations should not stand still in the Pacific. This would enable the Japanese to build up a solid line in the occupied areas. In the first year of the war only small land and air forces had been available to assist the strong naval force in the Pacific. These forces had, however, pushed forward by bypassing Japanese positions. At present some 200,000 to 300,000 Japanese troops had been cut off in these bypassed positions and a comparable number could now be considered as cut off in Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and even Burma.

Admiral Kuznetsov asked for information with regard to the area of the United States submarine operations in the Pacific.

Admiral King said that the United States submarine force had always operated where the most Japanese shipping was to be found. The main submarine force used Hawaii as its main base and worked generally north of the latitude of 20°N. A further submarine force was based on Australia and was now supplemented by a considerable number of British submarines. This force worked in the area of the East Indies. Allied submarines in the Pacific had taken a heavy toll of Japanese shipping, which was now reduced from a maximum of some seven million tons to two million tons. These Japanese losses had been inflicted by submarines, by air forces and by naval surface vessels. United States submarine losses had remained relatively constant at about two per month. The number of United States submarines operating was still increasing. It was clear that the closer operations come to Japan the tougher would be the opposition not only for submarines but also for air and naval forces and for ground troops.

Admiral Kuznetsov asked if it was intended that United States submarines should operate in the Sea of Japan.

Admiral King said that so far they had not operated in the Sea of Japan though they operated in the Yellow Sea.

Admiral Kuznetsov suggested that the Japanese were likely to shift their sea lines of communication to the Sea of Japan.

Admiral King explained that such a line of communications already existed as did a Japanese sea line of communications to Manchuria and to the North China coast.

Future Business

After a brief discussion it was agreed that all the necessary subjects had already been covered and that no further meetings were called for until such time as the Heads of State might submit additional problems to the military staffs.

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, General Antonov said that he felt that for the present no written report to the Heads of State was necessary, but rather that each staff should report individually to its own Head of State. Should a written report be required, this could easily be prepared later.

In conclusion, Sir Alan Brooke said he would like to thank General Antonov for his hospitality in receiving the United States and British Chiefs of Staff in Yalta and for his cooperative attitude during the meetings.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Matthews	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Foote	Mr. Harrison	Mr. Novikov
Mr. Page	Major Theakstone	Mr. Golunsky

Page Minutes

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subjects:

1. PRESS RELEASE
2. PROCEDURE FOR STUDYING DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY
3. REFERENCE OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY TO THE EAC

Press Release

Mr. Stettinius stated that it had been deemed advisable to issue a preliminary communiqué on the Crimean Conference. He had requested Mr. Stephen Early, the Assistant to the President on press matters, to make a few remarks on this subject. A copy of this release is attached hereto.

During the course of the discussion Mr. Molotov suggested that the word “common” be inserted before the word “enemy” and Mr. Stettinius suggested that the words “for meeting” and “immediately” be eliminated. Mr. Molotov agreed to these delinations [deletions]. He stated that he would have to refer the release to Marshal Stalin and that he hoped to give an answer at the 4:00 o’clock meeting.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the release would be held in strict secrecy until its simultaneous issuance in London, Moscow and Washington on Thursday.

The Dismemberment of Germany

Mr. Stettinius stated that this topic had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. In his opinion much research and study would be necessary before agreement could be reached, but he hoped that they could come to agreement on the general principles involved. At the present session he would like to suggest that the word “dismemberment” be added after the word “demilitarization” in Article 12 of the surrender instrument for Germany. He also wished that consideration be given to the assignment of this topic to the EAC in London for study.

Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Stettinius’ suggestion regarding the addition of the word “dismemberment” was entirely acceptable.

Mr. Eden stated that he had worked out another formula which included the addition of the words “and measures for the dissolution of the German unitary state” which he wished included in the second paragraph of Article 12.

Mr. Molotov then suggested that the paragraph commence with the words “In order to secure peace and security of Europe, they will take measures for the dismemberment of Germany.” He felt that this reading would reflect the agreement reached at yesterday’s plenary session.

Mr. Eden maintained that this wording would commit the three powers to too great an extent before the question had been thoroughly studied. He stated that he would prefer merely to add the words “and the dismemberment.” He felt that his proposed draft would not only cover the dismemberment of Germany but also its decentralization.

Mr. Molotov continued to press for the Soviet draft.

Mr. Eden maintained that the British Delegation could go no further than the addition of the words “and the dismemberment.”

Mr. Stettinius suggested as a possible alternative a phrase reading to the effect that “including dismemberment to the degree necessary to safeguard the peace and security…” He added, however, that his preference was his original suggestion of inserting the words “and the dismemberment.”

Mr. Molotov was inclined to prefer the second draft submitted by Mr. Stettinius.

Mr. Eden strongly objected.

Mr. Molotov then suggested rephrasing the paragraph by including the words “for the future peace and security” and eliminating the words “as deemed requisite.”

Mr. Eden maintained that he would be unable to accept this draft, since it was too broad. However, he would readily accept Mr. Stettinius’ original proposal. The British Government could go no further.

After some discussion as to the merits of Mr. Stettinius’ first and second proposals, during which Mr. Molotov mentioned that the second proposal was preferable since [it] was more definite and more closely reflected what Mr. Churchill had said at yesterday’s plenary session, it was decided to sum up the discussion by stating that all three Foreign Secretaries desired the word “dismemberment” included in Article 12 and that Mr. Eden would consult with Mr. Churchill as to whether this course was preferred by him to Mr. Stettinius’ second proposal.

Reference of the Question Concerning the Dismemberment of Germany to the EAC

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether it might not be agreed that the question concerning the dismemberment of Germany might not be referred to the EAC for study.

Mr. Molotov suggested that this question be taken up at a later time. He said that since it was a specific matter it might be better to establish a special commission to study the question.

[NormanStewart]

Matthews Notes

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, noon

1. Communiqué–S. thinks wise to issue one

Mol . Preliminary One suggestion: add “common” enemy. Likes communiqué. No objection to mention Black Sea area. Must be approved by Stalin

2. S. announces 3 questions before the 3 F.M. On first point.

Adding “dismemberment” to Art 12 & refer to EAC.

Mol. Accepts addition of word.

Eden. Another formula “and measures for the dissolution of the German unitary state” Would cover abolition of centralization of Germ. govt.

Mol: Will exercise sup. power… take measures for dismemberment of G. For peace & security of Europe necessary to dismember G.

Agreed to add: “And the dismemberment” after demilitarization.

No agreement on Russian change.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Delegation Draft of Preliminary Yalta Press Release

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, noon

Press Communiqué

YALTA, February 6, 1945

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, their foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the enemy and for building, with their allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. While their discussions have not progressed as yet beyond the preliminary stages, they have been marked by most encouraging expressions of unity of purpose, frankness and friendship.

Meetings are continuing day and night.

The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, for meeting the immediate political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain the peace.

A complete communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 1 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman

[NormanStewart]

Third plenary meeting, 4:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse

Bohlen Minutes

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

Subjects:

1. WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
2. THE POLISH QUESTION

World Security Organization

The President inquired whether the committee of Foreign Ministers had anything to report to the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius said it had been decided to insert the word “dismemberment” of Germany into Article 12 of the unconditional surrender terms, but that Mr. Molotov had had some additional phrases which he wished to see put in.

Mr. Molotov replied that he was withdrawing his proposed additional words.

Mr. Stettinius then said that they could report full agreement to insert the word “dismemberment” into Article 12 of the surrender terms but that they would like to have some more time before reporting on reparations and the relationship of the French zone to the control commission.

The Prime Minister said that he had not had an opportunity to obtain the consent of the War Cabinet to the proposed insertion but that he was glad to accept on the behalf of the British Government the decision on this point. He went on to say that in regard to the French zone he felt that the importance of France in the future had been enhanced by the limitation which the President yesterday had placed on the length of time United States forces might stay in Europe. He said that Great Britain would not be strong enough alone to guard the Western approaches to the Channel.

The President said that he had spoken on the basis of present conditions and he felt public opinion in the United States would be prepared to support an international organization along the lines of Dumbarton Oaks and that this might change their attitude in regard to the question of troops. The President then added that he felt the Conference should now proceed to the consideration of the United States proposal in regard to Dumbarton Oaks. He felt strongly that all the nations of the world shared a common desire to see the elimination of war for at least fifty years. He said he was not so optimistic as to believe in eternal peace, but he did believe fifty years of peace were feasible and possible. He said that since neither he, Marshal Stalin, nor the Prime Minister had been present at Dumbarton Oaks he would ask the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) who had been chairman of that conference to explain the United States position on the question of voting in the Security Council.

Mr. Stettinius then read the following statement of the American position on voting in the Council:

Review of Status of this Question
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members: provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

Analysis of the American Proposal
(a) We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.

The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

Reasons for the American Position
From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure,

First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world.

Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization, large and small.

We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 of last year provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

It is our earnest hope that our two great Allies will find it possible to accept the President’s proposal.

The President suggested that the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) might usefully analyze the effect of the United States proposal on the decisions in the Council.

Mr. Stettinius reported as follows:

II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

• I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

  1. Admission of new members;
  2. Suspension of a member;
  3. Expulsion of a member;
  4. Election of the Secretary General.

• II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

• III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

  1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

  2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

  3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

  4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

• IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.\

• V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

• VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

• I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

• II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

• III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

• IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

• V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

Marshal Stalin inquired what was new in Mr. Stettinius, statement that had not been included in the President’s message of December 5, 1944.

The President replied that there had been no change of any significance.

Mr. Stettinius said that there had been a minor drafting change (this minor change was explained to Mr. Molotov by Mr. Bohlen on the document).

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the question of voting in the Security Council and, therefore, he wished to study the United States proposal and in particular the effect of the drafting change and would be ready to discuss the question tomorrow.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Government had given the most careful consideration to the United States proposals. He had not agreed with the original proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks since he was anxious that the realities of the situation of the Three Great Powers should be considered, but in studying the President’s latest proposal his anxieties on that score had been removed. He could thus say that on behalf of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Empire and, he believed, the Self-Governing Dominions the President’s new proposals were entirely satisfactory. He said that in the last resort world peace depended on the friendship and cooperation of the three Governments, but that the British Government would consider that they were committing an injustice if reservation were not made for free statement of then grievances by small countries. The matter looks as though the Three Great Powers were trying to rule the world, whereas, our desires are to save the world and save it from a repetition of the horrors of this war. He said he felt that the Three Major Powers should make a proud submission. He said that he had looked into the whole matter as it would affect British interests and would give an illustration of why the British Government does not think the President’s proposal would bring any harm to British interests. He said, for example, if China should raise the question of the return of Hongkong under the President’s proposal, both China and Great Britain would be precluded from voting in regard to the methods of settlement of this controversy, as listed in the five points of the analysis read by Mr. Stettinius. In the last analysis Great Britain would be protected against any decision adverse to her interests by the exercise of the veto power under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius’ analysis.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether or not Egypt, for example, would be on the assembly.

Mr. Eden replied “yes, but not on the Council unless elected.”

Marshal Stalin then said suppose Egypt raised the question of the return of the Suez Canal.

The Prime Minister replied that he hoped that Marshal Stalin would let him finish his illustration in regard to Hong Kong.

The Prime Minister said that under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius’ analysis Great Britain would in fact have the right by their veto to stop all action against Great Britain by the Council of the World Organization. He, therefore, felt that it would not be necessary for Great Britain to agree to any decision contrary to her own interests and, for example, Great Britain would not be required to return Hongkong unless they felt that this should be done. China should, however, have the right to speak and the same considerations would apply to Egypt if that country had a complaint in regard to the Suez Canal. He concluded that he felt that insofar as the United States was concerned the same considerations would also apply. For example, in the event that Argentina raised a complaint against the United States.

The President then said that he recalled that in the Tehran Declaration the Three Powers had stated:

We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world…

The President added that he thought this Declaration was pertinent to the discussion in progress.

The Prime Minister said that since he saw no reason to fear the United States proposals he was glad to associate the British Government with them. He added that because of our great power, which is still protected by the veto if we do not agree, we should allow others to be heard.

Marshal Stalin said that he would like to have this document to study, since only hearing it orally it was impossible to catch all of the implications. He said that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals already give the right of discussion in the assembly, but he did not believe that any nation would be satisfied with expressing its opinion. They would want some decision. He said that if Mr. Churchill thought that China after raising the question of Hongkong would be satisfied with merely expressing her opinion, he was mistaken since China would want a decision. The same was true of Egypt in the possible question of the Suez Canal. He added that it was not a question of one power or three powers desiring to be masters of the world since he felt that the Dumbarton Oaks organization put a brake on that. He said that he would like to ask for further clarification on what powers Mr. Churchill had in mind when he spoke of a desire to rule the world. He said that he was sure Great Britain had no such desire, nor did the United States and that that left only the USSR.

The Prime Minister replied that he had spoken of the three Great Powers who could collectively place themselves so high over the others that the whole world would say these three desired to rule.

Marshal Stalin then said ironically that it looks as though two Great Powers have already accepted a document which would avoid any such accusation but that the third has not yet signified its assent. He then went on to say that in his opinion there was a more serious question than the voting procedure or the question of the domination of the world. They all knew that as long as the three of them lived none of them would involve their countries in aggressive actions, but after all, ten years from now none of them might be present. A new generation would come into being not knowing the horrors of the present war. He felt that there was, therefore, an obligation to create for the future generation such an organization as would secure peace for at least fifty years. He said the main thing was to prevent quarrels in the future between the three Great Powers and that the task, therefore, was to secure their unity for the future. The covenant of the new World Organization should have this as its primary task. He said the greatest danger was conflict between the three Great Powers represented here, but that if unity could be preserved there was little danger of the renewal of German aggression. He said, therefore, a covenant must be worked out which would prevent conflicts between the three Great Powers. Marshal Stalin apologized for not having had an opportunity for studying in detail the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. He said he had been busy on other matters. He said that as he understood it, there were two categories of disputes involved in Mr. Stettinius’ explanation: (1) conflicts which would require the application of sanctions, economic, political or military, and (2) conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means. He said in regard to the first the permanent members had a right to vote even if they were parties to such disputes. Under the second category, however, in conflicts susceptible to settlement by peaceful means, the parties in dispute would not be allowed to vote. He added that we Russians were being accused of spending too much time on the technique of voting, which he admitted. But they attached great importance to this question since all decisions were made by votes and they were interested in the decisions, not in the discussions. He said, for example, if China or Egypt raised complaints against England they would not be without friends or protectors in the assembly.

Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Stettinius pointed out that under the United States proposal the power of the World Organization could not be directed against any of the permanent members.

Marshal Stalin said that he was afraid that any conflict might break the unity of our united front.

The Prime Minister replied that he saw the force of that argument, but he did not believe that the world organization would eliminate disputes between powers and that would remain the function of diplomacy.

Marshal Stalin said that his colleagues in Moscow could not forget the events of December 1939 during the Finnish war when at the instigation of England and France the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union from the League and mobilized world opinion against the Soviet Union, even going so far as to speak of a crusade.

The Prime Minister answered that at that time the British and French Governments were very angry at the Soviet Union and in any event any such action was impossible under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Marshal Stalin said he was not thinking of expulsion but of the question of the mobilization of opinion against one country.

The Prime Minister answered that he thought this might happen to any nation, but he doubted very much if either the President or Marshal Stalin would lead a savage attack against Great Britain and he felt this applied also to the other two countries.

The President then said that he felt that the unity of the Great Powers was one of our first aims and that the United States policy promoted rather than impaired this aim. He said that should there unfortunately be any differences between the Great Powers, and there might well be, this fact would become fully known to the world no matter what voting procedure was adopted. In any event, there was no method of preventing discussions of differences in the assembly. He said that full and friendly discussions in the Council would in no sense promote disunity, but on the contrary, would serve to demonstrate the confidence which the Great Powers had in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

The Polish Question

The President inquired whether the Polish question should be taken up now or postponed until the next meeting.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped that at least a start could be made today.

The President said that the United States was farther away from Poland than anyone else here, and that there were times when a long distance point of view was useful. He said that at Tehran he had stated that he believed the American people were in general favorably inclined to the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland, but he felt that if the Soviet Government would consider a concession in regard to Lwow and the oil deposits in the Province of Lwow that would have a very salutary effect. He said that he was merely putting forth this suggestion for consideration and would not insist on it. He said that in regard to the government he wished to see the creation of a representative government which could have the support of all the great powers and which could be composed of representatives of the principal parties of Poland. He said one possibility which had been suggested was the creation of a Presidential Council composed of Polish leaders which could then create a government composed of the chiefs of the five political parties – Workers Party, Peasant Party, Socialist Party, etc. He said that one thing must be made certain and that was that Poland should maintain the most friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union.

Marshal Stalin replied that Poland should maintain friendly relations not only with the Soviet Union but with the other Allies.

The President said he had merely put forth a suggestion but he thought if we could solve the Polish question it would be a great help to all of us. He added he didn’t know personally any members of the London government or Lublin government, but he had met Mr. Mikolajczyk who had made a deep impression on him as a sincere and an honest man.

The Prime Minister said that he had consistently declared in Parliament and elsewhere that the British Government would support the Curzon Line, even leaving Lwow to the Soviet Union. He had been criticized for this and so had Mr. Eden, but he felt that after the burdens which Russia had borne in this war the Curzon Line was not a decision of force but one of right. He said he remained in that position. Of course, he added, if the mighty Soviet Union could make some gesture to the much weaker country, such as the relinquishment of Lwow, this act of magnanimity would be acclaimed and admired. He said he was much more interested in sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the frontier line—he wanted to see the Poles have a home where they could organize their lives as they wished. That was an objective that he had often heard Marshal Stalin proclaim most firmly, and he put his trust in those declarations. He said that he therefore had not considered the question of the frontier as a question of vital importance. It must not be forgotten, however, that Great Britain had gone to war to protect Poland against German aggression at a time when that decision was most risky, and it had almost cost them their life in the world. He said Great Britain had no material interest in Poland, but the question was one of honor and that his government would therefore never be content with a solution which did not leave Poland a free and independent state. The freedom of Poland, however, did not cover any hostile designs or intrigue against the USSR, and none of us should permit this. It is the earnest desire of the British Government that Poland be mistress in her own house and captain of her soul. He said that the British Government recognized the present Polish government in London but did not have intimate contact with it. He said he had known Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer and had found them good and honest men. He inquired whether there might be some possibility of forming a government here for Poland which would utilize these men. If this could be done all the great powers could then recognize it as an interim government until such time as the Poland government [Polish people?] by free vote could select and form their own government. He concluded by saying he was interested in the President’s suggestion.

At the suggestion of Marshal Stalin, there was a ten-minute intermission.

Marshal Stalin then gave the following summary of his views on the Polish question: Mr. Churchill had said that for Great Britain the Polish question was one of honor and that he understood, but for the Russians it was a question both of honor and security. It was one of honor because Russia had many past grievances against Poland and desired to see them eliminated. It was a question of strategic security not only because Poland was a bordering country but because throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia. We have to mention that during the last thirty years Germany twice has passed through this corridor. The reason for this was that Poland was weak. Russia wants a strong, independent and democratic Poland. Since it was impossible by the force of Russian armies alone to close from the outside this corridor, it could be done only by Poland’s own forces. It was very important, therefore, to have Poland independent, strong and democratic. It is not only a question of honor for Russia, but one of life and death. It was for this reason that there had been a great change from the policies of the Czars who had wished to suppress and assimilate Poland. In regard to the questions raised here on which we have different opinions, the following might be said:

In regard to the Curzon Line, concessions in regard to Lwow and the Lwow Province, and Mr. Churchill’s reference to a magnanimous act on our part, it is necessary to remind you that not Russians but Curzon and Clemenceau fixed this line. The Russians had not been invited and the line was established against their will. Lenin had opposed giving Bialystok Province to the Poles but the Curzon Line gives it to Poland. We have already retreated from Lenin’s position in regard to this province. Should we then be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau? We could not then return to Moscow and face the people who would say Stalin and Molotov have been less sure defenders of Russian interest than Curzon and Clemenceau. It is, therefore, impossible to agree with the proposed modification of the line. I would prefer to have the war go on although it will cost us blood in order to compensate for Poland from Germany. When he was in Moscow Mr. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear that Poland’s frontier would extend to the West Neisse River and I favor the Polish frontier on the West Neisse and ask the conference to support this proposal.

As to the question of the Polish government, Mr. Churchill has said it would be good to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue, for without participation of the Poles it is impossible to create a Polish government. I am called a dictator and not a democrat, but I have enough democratic feeling to refuse to create a Polish government without the Poles being consulted – the question can only be settled with the consent of the Poles. Last autumn in Moscow there was a good chance for a fusion of the various Polish elements and in the meeting between Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Lublin Poles various points of agreement were reached as Mr. Churchill will remember. Mikolajczyk left for London but did not return since he was expelled from office precisely because he wanted agreement. Artieszewski [Arciszewski] and Raskiewiycz [Raczkiewicz] are not only against agreement but are hostile to any idea of an agreement. Artieszewski has characterized the Lublin Poles as bandits and criminals and they naturally pay him back in the same coin. It will be difficult to bring them together. The Warsaw Poles, Bierut and Osubka Morawski, do not even want to talk about any fusion with the London government. I asked them what concessions they might make in this respect and they said they could tolerate Jelikowski [Zeligowski] or Grabski but they do not even want to hear about Mikolajczyk being prime minister. I am prepared to support any attempt to reach a solution that would offer some [chance] of success. Should we ask the Warsaw Poles to come here or perhaps come to Moscow? I must say that the Warsaw government has a democratic base equal at least to that of de Gaulle.

As a military man I demand from a country liberated by the Red Army that there be no civil war in the rear. The men in the Red Army are indifferent to the type of government as long as it will maintain order and they will not be shot in the back. The Warsaw, or Lublin, government has not badly fulfilled this task. There are, however, agents of the London government who claim to be agents of the underground forces of resistance. I must say that no good and much evil comes from these forces. Up to the present time they have killed 212 of our military men. They attack our supply bases to obtain arms. Although it has been proclaimed that all radio stations must be registered and obtain permission to operate, agents of the London government are violating these regulations. We have arrested some of them and if they continue to disturb our rear we will shoot them as military law requires. When I compare what the agents of the Lublin government have done and what the agents of the London government have done I see the first are good and the second bad. We want tranquility in our rear. We will support the government which gives us peace in the rear, and as a military man I could not do otherwise. Without a secure rear there can be no more victories for the Red Army. Any military man and even the non-military man will understand this situation.

The Prime Minister said that he must put on record the fact that the British and Soviet Governments have different sources of information in Poland and therefore they obtain different views of the situation there. He said it is possible that their reports are mistaken as it is not always possible to believe everything that anyone tells you. He believed, he added, that with the best of all their information he could not feel that the Lublin government represents more than one third of the people and would be maintained in power if the people were free to express their opinion. One of the reasons why the British have so earnestly sought a solution had been the fear that the Polish underground army would come into collision with the Lublin government, which would lead to great bloodshed, arrests and deportations which could not fail to have a bad effect on the whole Polish question. The Prime Minister said he agreed that anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished, but he repeated that the British Government could not agree to recognizing the Lublin government of Poland.

The Conference then adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow.

[NormanStewart]

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

		Livadia
Note to Pres				Tonight
for ERS			Harriman
re VIII C			Page	} Gromyko who else?
			AH
redraft of provision		Voting Plenary
Letter from ERS to vish. for set of pictures
			2/6	4.15 pm – 6.20
				(Then Poland)

1. Pres, ERS, Leahy, Bohlen, Byrnes, Harriman
2. P.M., Eden, Cadogan, Interpreter (military), Sir Ed. Bridges, Clark-Kerr
3. Stalin, Molotov, Maisky, Vishinsky, Gusev, Gromyko

1. Behind:	Hopkins, Matthews, A. H.
2. “:	Jebb, Dixon, Wilson
3. “:	Pavolov

ERS reported that the words “and the dismemberment” be added to Art XII of Articles of Surrender. Mr. Mol. has a further proposal which will require more discussion. Ask to submit final report tomorrow

Molotov withdraws his suggestion

ERS made final report

Church, said instrument of dismemberment had not been approved by Cabinet but he is glad agt has been reached

Church: Position of Fr. becomes of great importance to us. Must have a strong French army

Pres: Pub. opinion in US will determine; – but in his opinion if we get D.O. much more likely to take part in world activity

ERS Read analysis

Pres: ERS explain US proposal as he was at D.O. & none of 3 heads of deleg. were.

Feel strongly people going to insist on getting something that will ensure peace, not for all time, but say for 50 years

ERS: read statement

3 ribbon copies to each of 3 heads of deleg.

Pres. suggested ERS read types of decisions requiring unan.

Agreed

I shall first present 6 situations in which unan. of great powers must be maintained at all times

Read I to VI of Part II our paper (analysis)

I shall now read the situations which also require etc… in other words unanimity except when involved in a dispute

Read I to IV [V?]

Pres that ends the reading & explanation of part of the procedure

Thing we have to remember – objective of the 5 great & of all nations is same & on a q. of procedure there ought not be any real difficulty

Stalin: Would like to know what is new in proposals read by ERS as compared with Dec. 5

Asked about minor phraseological change

Long discussion

Asked for more time to study the proposal made by ERS as compared with Pres. proposal

Could we put it off to tomorrow

Church. Agrees to study of this particular & to adjourn q. to tomorrow

I cannot conceal from the company that HMG that has examined the U.S. proposal – the general proposal – with very close attention. I did not feel myself wholly in agt. with the orig. proposal at DO I have been anxious to make sure that the realities of the positions of the 5 great powers have been fully faced

On studying the Pres. new proposal my anxieties have been removed so far as Brit Com of Ns & Brit Empire are concerned.

I & the self governing dominions have the feeling that of course whether world peace is achieved on a lasting found, can only depend in the last resort upon the collab of the 3 great powers

Not doing justice to our true heart felt intentions if didn’t provide for the free statement of grievances by the many smaller states of the world

It might look as if we were claiming to rule the world – we 3 Whereas our desire is to serve the world & to preserve it from renewal of the frightful horrors which have fallen upon the lap of its inhabs. ∴ I feel that we great powers – 3 – should make what I would call a proud submission to the commun of the world. Within the limits stated. I’ve naturally been looking at this as to how it would affect the fortunes & ints of Brit Em & Com. I’m going to take a part, instance to illustrate why I do not feel this submission wh. we make to the whole world will be damaging to Brit, interests. The case I take is a difficult one which affects Gt. Brit. I take the case of HK If we agree to the proposal of the US let us suppose Ch. asks us to return HK to them. We should have a right to state our case fully ag. any case made by the Ch. But we should not be allowed to vote on the qs set out – the 5 q’s set out at the end of this doc. (missed sentence – see Jebb)

St. Who is we

Church I’m speaking only of the Brit Govt

St. Will Eg. take part in the Assembly?

Church In Ass. but not in Coun. unless elected

St. Any member of Ass. could freely express his opin.

Church: Yes & so long as Brit G concerned these 5q’s the Brit Govt would not be allowed to vote. I say we agree to these procedural matters being decided without our vote – I’m only taking HK illus. – we means Brit Govt

I humbly beg to be allowed to keep to illus. I introduced & then others can follow

What his majesty’s Govt could not agree to is that the other matters in ¶ III the 4 matters set out there

I consider that we are suff. safeguarding ag. being overruled in a matter affecting sovereignty because of our rights under ¶ III

We have in fact the right by our veto power to stop all further action ag. us by the world organ.

∴ I can not feel that we should have to agree to any dec. contrary to our free choice in these matters as set out. We should be protected by our rt. of veto ag. all measures of the kind in ¶ III

No (missed more)

On other hand I feel it would be wrong that Ch. should not have oppor to state its case fully & Coun not have powers in last 5 ¶s US paper & we not vote on those

In the same way if Eg raises a q. ag the Brit affecting Suez canal–

Pres. read sentence from Tehran re good will

HMG see no danger from their own point of view in associating themselves with prop. in the US paper & we see great advantage in the 3 great powers not assuming the position of rulers of all the rest without even allowing them to state their case. In fact we feel it would not be right to take that position of denying them the rt. to state the case & we rely on ¶ III if we are not convinced by the arguments made ag. us.

(Absent see Doc)

St. If any nation raise any import, q. will raise not only q. but will want a dec. Already have rt to express opin in Ass. Mr. Church thinks that Ch after raising q of HK would be content to express her opin. Ch. might ask for a decision.

Will demand a dec.

∴ matter is much more serious than merely to secure for each nation rt. to express its opin

Also it is not a matter of 3 powers liking to be master of world, D.O. proposals should be a break upon such a group of powers. I don’t know any great power which would have intention to master world. Perhaps I am mistaken & see not everything.

I would like to ask my friend Mr Ch. to name which powers might intend domin world

Im sure Mr Ch & Brit doesn’t want domin. I’m sure US hasn’t opin. of this kind. USSR hasn’t There remains only 1 power. China

Church I was speaking of 3 great powers gathered here collectively lifting themselves so high that others would consider they were trying to domin world – not any 1 power but the 3 Not 1 but a trinity

(St) If 2 great powers accept provs. which excuse them from that. 1 power has not yet agreed to that

I will examine the doc. & perhaps I will understand what is the matter but at present everything is not clear to me.

Think much more serious q than rt of powers express opin or appear domin world

I fear – we are not now & will not allow that any of our gt countries – act of agg. But in 10 yrs time we will disappear – new generations will come which did not experience horrors of war & forget what we been thru

Seems we would like to secure peace at least for 50 yrs. I have such an idea. I think we have now to build up such a form which would put as many obstacles as possible to domination of world. I think that the task is to secure our unity of 3 powers in future & for this purpose must elaborate such a covenant which would in certain respects (?) The greatest danger for future is possibility of conflicts among ourselves If unity Ger danger not very great & now we have to think how to create --that our great powers & poss. Ch. & Fr. will keep united fronts in future There must be elaborated a statement which would prevent conflicts among great powers.

I must apologize I was real busy other matters & not chance study this q in detail As far as I understand what was said by Ams today all points divided in 2 categories–

In 1st cat. as I understood belong such things as sanctions econ, pol & mil & in other cat. all those conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means without sanctions

Also understood that in consid. of conflicts of both types contemplated free discussion of the Council

I understood in consid. of q’s of 1st cat.

perm, members being party to dispute has rt. to vote & not be asked to withdraw

But in conflicts of 2nd cat. party in dispute not be allowed to vote.

We Rs being accused talking too much about how to vote. But Issues are being decided by vote & we are interested in the decisions & less in discussions Can discuss for 100 yrs & nothing settled, but I’m interested in decs.

Suppose Ch. suggests HK be returned or Suez Can. to Eg. I can assure Mr Church Ch & Eg. will be not alone. They will have some friends in Ass. & possibly some protectors

Church: I would say no when it came to use of Leag. powers. Powers should not be used ag. us if we remained unconvinced

St: Is it so.

Church It is as I understand it

Eden They could talk & complain but no dec. could be taken without our consent

ERS No econ. sanction or use of force without unan. of perm, members of Sec. Coun.

Maisky No recommend, could be made

Maisky These 5 points will not be decisions but only discussions?

ERS Yes

St I’m afraid these conflicts re HK might break our unity

Church See force of that but whole force of diplomacy proceeds & is not prevented by World Org. Members will always be discussing matters among themselves

St: Another picture my colleagues in Mosc cannot forget the case which occurred in Dec 39 during Rus-Fin war when Brit & Fr. used Leag. ag us & eventually expelled us, & isolated us & later mobilised all the powers ag. us in matter of crusade

Church: we were very angry, were all alone

St: How guar, such thing not occur ag.

Church We couldn’t do it here

St. Couldn’t we make more obstacles in way of it

Church: Expulsion must be unan. & gt. power could veto.

St. First time we have

Pres: Should emphasize action like Fin. one would be impossible as would require unan. of 5

St. Not only expulsion but mobilization of opinion

Church. I see the case which cause anxiety to any of us, agitation be worked up & lot of abuse be levelled at one of us. Might be Brit I can only say dip. would be active

Everything would be done to prevent anything that would mar our unity

I’m quite sure Mar. St. wouldn’t make a harsh att on Brit Em-- verbally I mean – without talking to us first We would get to some arrangement, in any event we should be very careful not to let the unity be destroyed

St: I would prob. but what of Maisky

Pres: Let’s put it another way. Whole doc. is drawn up to promote not impair unity. Will be differences – will be known – will be talked in Assembly. To permit discussion in Coun. will in no sense impair unity but will promote it & will demonstrate confid. have in each other & in justice

St tomorrow continue, meanwhile study

Poland
In intermission Gromyko indicated he had not understood from L.P. the changes in 3rd ¶ of our proposal. I straightened him out on the score of texts but he was still not clear satisfied that the effect of the reference to VIII C was clear or desirable. He also said he would have great difficulty explaining its effect to his colleagues. He said it would be much easier for the Rs if we could drop the whole reference & asked if Pres would agree to that. I said I thought so

[NormanStewart]

Matthews Minutes

February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

The first part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the voting procedure for the world organization. This is covered in Mr. Hiss’ notes.

Poland

PRESIDENT: I should like to bring up Poland. I come from a great distance and therefore have the advantage of a more distant point of view of the problem. There are six or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said in Tehran, in general I am in favor of the Curzon line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face.

STALIN: (interrupting) Who will save face, the Poles in Poland or the émigré Poles?

PRESIDENT: The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland. I raised the question of giving them Lvov at Tehran. It has now been suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov might be given them. I am not making a definite statement but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture in this direction.

But the most important matter is that of a permanent government for Poland. Opinion in the United States is against recognition of the Lublin government on the ground that it represents a small portion of the Polish people. What people want is the creation of a government of national unity to settle their internal differences. A government which would represent all five major parties (names them) is what is wanted. It may interest Marshal Stalin that I do not know any of the London or of the Lublin government. Mikolajczyk came to Washington and I was greatly impressed by him. I felt that he was an honest man.

The main suggestion I want to make is that there be created an ad interim government which will have the support of the majority of the Polish people. There are many ways of creating such a government. One of the many suggestions is the possibility of creating a presidency council made up of a small number of men who would be the controlling force ad interim to set up a more permanent government. I make this suggestion as from the distance of three thousand miles. Sometimes distance is an advantage. We want a Poland that will be thoroughly friendly to the Soviet for years to come. This is essential.

STALIN: (interrupting) Friendly not only to the Soviet but all three allies.

PRESIDENT: This is my only suggestion. If we can work out some solution of this problem it will make peace much easier.

PRIME MINISTER: I have made repeated declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to the Curzon line, that is to say, leaving Lvov with Soviet Russia. I have been much criticized and so has Mr. Eden especially by the party which I represent. But I have always considered that after all Russia has suffered in fighting Germany and after all her efforts in liberating Poland her claim is one founded not on force but on right. In that position I abide. But of course if the mighty power, the Soviet Union, made a gesture of magnanimity to a much weaker power and made the gesture suggested by the President we would heartily acclaim such action.

However, I am more interested in the question of Poland’s sovereign independence and freedom than in particular frontier lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free to live their own life there. That is an objective which I have always heard Marshal Stalin proclaim with the utmost firmness. It is because I put my trust in his declaration about the sovereign independence and freedom of Poland that the frontier question I consider not of supreme importance. This is what is dear to the hearts of the nation of Britain. This is what we went to war against Germany for—that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone here knows the result it was to us unprepared as we were and that it nearly cost us our life as a nation. Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. Her interest is only one of honor because we drew the sword for Poland against Hitler’s brutal attack. Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state. However, I have one qualification: I do not think that the freedom of Poland could be made to cover hostile designs by any Polish government, perhaps by intrigue with Germany, against the Soviet. I cannot conceive that the world organization would ever tolerate such action or leave it only to Soviet Russia to take proper measures. Our most earnest desire which we care about as much as our lives is that Poland be mistress in her own house and in her own soul. I earnestly hope that we shall not separate without taking a practical step with this objective. At the present time there are two governments about which we differ. I have never seen any of the present London government. We recognize them but have not sought their company. But Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski are men of good-sense and we have confidence in them. We remain in informal but friendly contact with them. There will be great criticism against us all if we let them divide us when we have such great tasks and common hopes. Can we not make a government here in Poland. A provisional or interim government, as the President said, pending free elections so that all three of us can extend recognition as well as the other United Nations. Can we not pave the way for a free future on the future constitution and administration of Poland? If we could do that we should leave the table with one great step accomplished toward future peace and the prosperity of Central Europe. I am sure that effective guarantees can be laid down to secure the line of communications of the victorious Red Army in its battle to defeat Germany. His Majesty’s Government cordially support the President’s suggestion and present the question to our Russian allies.

Stalin suggests a ten-minute intermission.

STALIN: The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britian the question of Poland is a question of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. It is a question of honor for Russia for we shall have to eliminate many things from the books. But it is also a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland’s frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. The corridor cannot be mechanically shut from outside by Russia. It could be shut from inside only by Poland. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet State. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basis of our policy and we favor a strong independent Poland.

I refer now to our allies appeal with regard to the Curzon line. The President has suggested modification, giving Poland Lvov and Lvov Province. The Prime Minister thinks that we should make a gesture of magnanimity. But I must remind you that the Curzon line was invented not by Russians but by foreigners. The Curzon line of Curzon was made by Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans in 1918–1919. Russia was not invited and did not participate. This line was accepted against the will of the Russians on the basis of ethnological data. Lenin opposed it. He did not want to give Bialystok and Bialystok Provinces to Poland but the Curzon line gives them to Poland. We have retreated from Lenin’s position. Some want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. What will the Russians say at Moscow and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau. I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow. I prefer that the war continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of Germany. I asked Mikolajczyk what frontier he wanted. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear of a western frontier to the river Neisse. I must say that I will maintain this line and ask this conference to support it. There are two Neisse rivers. The east and the west. I favor the west.

Now about the government. The Prime Minister has said that he wants to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue. Without the participation of Poles we can create no Polish government. They all say that I am a dictator but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish government without Poles. It must be with participation of Poles. We had the opportunity in Moscow to create a Polish government with Poles. Both London and Lublin groups met in Moscow and certain points of agreement were reached. Mikolajczyk returned to London and was kicked out of the government. The present London government of Archuchuski [Arciezewski], which is in reality under the President Brachewicz [Raczkiewicz]. All these people were against the agreement and hostile to the idea. They called the Lublin government “bandits” and “traitors.” Naturally the Lublin government paid the same coin to the London government. It is difficult to bring them together. The principal personalities, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, won’t hear of the London government. I ask what kind of concessions can be made. They can tolerate Grabski and General Jelikowski [Zeligowski] but they won’t hear of Mikolajczyk. Under these circumstances I am prepared to support any attempt to create unity if there is some chance of success. I am prepared to call the Warsaw Poles here or better to see them in Moscow. But frankly, the Warsaw government has as great a democratic basis in Poland as de Gaulle has in France.

Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indifferent as to what kind of government there is in Poland but they do want one that will maintain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government fulfils this role not badly. There are agents of the London government connected with the so-called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. They have attacked supply bases for arms. It was announced that all wireless stations must be registered but these forces continued to break all the laws of war and complained of being arrested. If they attack the Red Army any more they will be shot. When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. The military must have peace and quiet. The military will support such a government and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the situation.

The President says that it is now quarter to eight and that the meeting should adjourn.

PRIME MINISTER: I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin government represents even one third of the Polish people. This is my honest opinion and I may be wrong. Still, I have felt that the underground might have collisions with the Lublin government. I have feared bloodshed, arrests, deportation, and I fear the effect on the whole Polish question. Anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished but I cannot feel that the Lublin government has any right to represent the Polish nation.

[NormanStewart]

Völkischer Beobachter (February 6, 1945)

Roosevelts Plan zur Weltherrschaft

wh. Berlin, 5. Februar – Wer es unternimmt, sich ein Bild von der Dreimächtekonferenz zwischen Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill zu machen, tut gut daran, nicht nur an die akuten Probleme (wie vor allem an den Plan, das deutsche Volk mit Sirenenklängen zu ködern) oder etwa an Polen, Griechenland, Italien usw. zu denken, sondern sich auch zu fragen: Was ist das vorige Mal in Teheran vor sich gegangen und was plant Roosevelt eigentlich, von dem man sagen kann, dass er sich am meisten um das Dreiertreffen bemüht hat?

Es hat lange gedauert, bis man aus authentischer amerikanischer Quelle erfuhr, was wirklich in Teheran passierte, aber die Wahrheit über Teheran enthüllte gleichzeitig den „Großen Plan“ des amerikanischen Präsidenten. Forrest Davis, ein Publizist, der in Washington nicht nur zu Hause ist, sondern auch im Weißen Haus immer eine offene Tür findet, hat in der konservativen und äußerst populären amerikanischen Wochenzeitschrift Saturday Evening Post mit ihrer Auflage von weit über drei Millionen berichtet, wie sich Roosevelt die Nachkriegswelt vorstellt. Sein Plan bedeutete die absolute Beherrschung der Welt durch die USA, Moskau und England, unter gnädiger Anhörung Tschungkings und Frankreichs, nach der Vernichtung des Reiches, Ausrottung des deutschen Volkes und völliger Niederwerfung Japans.

Dieser „Große Plan“ einer Kontrolle der Welt durch Moskau, Washington und London steht und fällt zweifellos mit der Notwendigkeit, Moskau aus seiner ideologischen Vereinsamung und dem sich daraus ergebenden revolutionären Herrschaftsanspruch herauszulösen, um es wieder in die „Familie der demokratischen Nationen“ einzureihen. Der amerikanische Präsident hofft offensichtlich, dass es möglich wäre, Stalin und die Sowjetunion in eine solche Weltorganisation westlerischer Prägung einzugliedern. Roosevelt ist bereit, alles auf diese Hoffnung zu setzen. Man kann sich vorstellen, wie er in Teheran mit nervösen Spielerhänden eine Chesterfield nach der anderen in seinem langen Zigarettenhalter entzündete, während er versuchte, Stalin von seinem „Größen Plan“ zu begeistern, um aber zu sehen, dass der Mann aus dem Kreml erst dann wirkliches Interesse zeigte, als ihm durch Roosevelt Konzessionen gemacht worden sind, die alles auslöschen, was in London seit 1939 an Plänen für Europa in mühseliger diplomatischer Arbeit geschaffen worden war.

Welche Vorteile verspricht sich Roosevelt von seinem Plan, wenn er bereit ist, soviel dafür auf das Spiel zu setzen?

• Der Präsident in Washington vertritt die These, dass keine Machtkonstellation in der Welt in der Lage wäre gegen den Stachel der drei zu lecken, solange gegen eine solche wie auch immer geartete Machtballung die Riesenkapazität der amerikanischen maschinellen Produktion und die Wucht der sowjetischen Menschenmassen gestellt werden könnten. Deshalb ist Roosevelt bereit, für eine Zusammenarbeit Moskau-Washington auch angesichts größter Schwierigkeiten einzutreten. Der bisherige Verlauf des jetzigen Weltkrieges wird von ihm dabei als Hauptargument benützt.

• Der Mann im Weißen Hause fürchtet, dass bei einem Zusammenbruch seines Planes sowohl die Sowjetunion wie auch England eine verzweifelte Jagd nach Interessengebieten und Verbündeten in Europa beginnen würden, wodurch in kurzer Zeit ein neuer Weltbrand seinen Anfang nehmen müsste. Roosevelt fürchtet sogar, eine Ausschaltung Stalins von der „Weltorganisation“ würde ermöglichen, dass der zweite Weltkrieg pausenlos in den dritten Weltkrieg übergehen könnte, denn Amerika könnte aus klaren und im Weißen Haus eindeutig vertretenen geopolitischen Gründen niemals dulden, dass Europa mit der Sowjetunion zusammen einen eurasischen Block bilde. Umgekehrt weiß Roosevelt, dass ein völlig von Großbritannien beherrschtes Europa von Moskau als ständige Bedrohung aufgefasst werden würde. Um deshalb die wilde Jagd nach Interessengebieten in Europa zu verhindern, glaubt Roosevelt, alles versuchen zu müssen, um Stalin erst einmal grundsätzlich in die „Familie der demokratischen Völker“ einzubauen, auch um den Preis von Konzessionen an den Sowjetwillen zur Einflussnahme in Europa.

• So sehr Roosevelt seinen „Großen Plan“ auch deshalb wünscht, weil er glaubt, bei einer allgemeinen „Weltkontrolle“ die USA ausschlaggebend zu sehen, so schließt doch sein weiteres Bemühen, Tschungking als „Anhängsel“ in den Plan zu verankern, einen sehr praktischen Grund ein. Wenngleich Tschungking-China eindeutige totalitäre Tendenzen aufweist, so steht Roosevelt doch hinter Tschiangkaischek, weil er dadurch hofft, 450,000.000 Chinesen als Abnehmer für seine überschüssige Produktion an Autos, Eisschränken und Radios zu gewinnen. Auch in Asien würde das Nichtzusammenarbeiten der Sowjets in dieser Weltorganisation eine gewissenlose Jagd nach Interessensphären bringen. Diesmal allerdings zwischen Washington und Moskau, wobei es keineswegs entschieden ist, ob Japan die ihm von Roosevelt zugedachte Rolle des „kleinen Mannes“ spielen würde.

Die Roosevelt-Planung für die Schaffung einer Weltordnung auf Grundlage des Gleichgewichts der Großmächte mit Washington als Zünglein an der Waage erscheint den Amerikanern einleuchtend. Trotzdem gibt es Amerikaner, deren Bedenken in die Öffentlichkeit dringen. Diese Männer erklären, dass durch Teheran und was dann folgte, Roosevelt heute bereits dastehe, wo Wilson 1919 sich im Versailler Spiegelsaal befunden habe. Wie Wilson hat Roosevelt seine Hoffnung für die Weltsicherheit auf eine zentrale fixe Idee aufgebaut. Wilsons „Großer Plan“ war der „Völkerbund.“ Wilson war beredt, um diesem Plan das Leben zu schenken, Punkt für Punkt seiner Gerechtigkeit versprechenden 14 Punkte aufzugeben oder umdeuten zu lassen. Roosevelts „Großer Plan“ ist ein Weltsystem mit einer „Drei-Mächte-Konstellation“ an Stelle eines Völkerbundes, von dem Roosevelt glaubt, dass er scheitern musste, weil weder genug Macht dahinterstand, noch die Völker in der Lage waren, die Ideale eines solchen Instruments in die Praxis umzusetzen. Roosevelt glaubt, dass seine Drei-Mächte-Konstellation diese Macht besitzt; aber auch er ist bereit, um seine fixe Idee durchzusetzen, Punkt für Punkt seiner „Atlantik-Charta“ über den Haufen zu werfen oder in Kompromissen ersticken zu lassen, deren verhängnisvollster das der „freien Hand für Moskau in Europa“ ist. Dem Ehrgeiz Roosevelts soll Europa geopfert werden, vor allem das deutsche Volk, dessen Todesurteil nach dem Willen des Judentums Stalin Vollstreckern soll.

Den Morgenthau-Plan in der Tasche

br. Bern, 5. Februar – Man erinnere sich an den Morgenthau-Plan, der darauf hinausläuft, Deutschland nach dem erhofften Siege seiner Gegner jeder Industrie zu berauben und es, soweit man es nicht unter seine Nachbarn aufteilt, zu einem „großen Kartoffelacker“ zu machen.

Der Plan wurde damals in einem ungelegenen Augenblick bekannt, denn er schien in seiner Hirnverbranntheit geeignet, die Aussichten Roosevelts auf eine abermalige Wiederwahl zu stören.

Nun ist Roosevelt wiedergewählt – nun glaubt man wieder offener sprechen zu können. Und so meldet eine nordamerikanische Agentur in Verbindung mit der Dreierkonferenz in aller Harmlosigkeit: „Roosevelt habe im Augenblick nur den Morgenthau-Plan bei sich, der als Grundvorschlag der Vereinigten Nationen vorgelegt werden soll.“ Also nicht ein unverbindlicher Privatvorschlag ist dieser Plan jetzt, sondern ein offizieller Vorschlag, mit dem der Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten zur Konferenz mit Stalin und Churchill gefahren ist. Nun weiß man wenigstens, was gemeint ist, wenn diese drei ihren angekündigten Aufruf an das deutsche Volk starten sollten, um nach Wilsons Vorbild wieder einmal zu versichern, es werde gar nicht so schlimm werden, wenn Deutschland nur erst einmal kapituliert habe.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 6, 1945)

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

Statement on the American Position on Voting in the Council

Review of Status of this Question
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

The text I have just read contains a minor drafting change in accordance with Soviet and British comments on the original text submitted by the President.

Analysis of the American Proposal
(a) It is entirely consonant with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which the sovereign member states other than the permanent members have a right to state their case without arbitrary prohibition.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization we all desire would be seriously jeopardized, if not made impossible. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from that we have contemplated.

The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

Reasons for the American Position
From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world to which I have referred.

Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for justice for all members of the organization.

It is our task to reconcile these two major elements. We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5, 1944, provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

Yalta, February 6, 1945

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

Voting Procedure

Supplementary Arguments for Use of Secretary

1. Doubt as to acceptability of Organization unless our proposal is adopted. Our main concern is being able to establish the Organization.

American public opinion and the smaller nations, especially the Latin American nations, and – we believe – the British Dominions, may not accept an Organization which they believe fails to accord them a just and reasonable position.

2. Importance of the Organization starting off with good will of all members and of world public opinion.

In the Tehran Declaration, the three powers stated:

We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world…

Without this good will on the part of all members of the Organization – even if it could be established – its future would be uncertain.

To insure this good will so necessary to the effective operation of the Organization, we must avoid the charge of great power domination.

3. Unity of the great powers is one of our major aims and is promoted rather than impaired by our proposal.

If there should unfortunately be any differences between the great powers, the fact would become fully known to the world, whatever voting procedure is adopted.

Discussion of differences cannot be prevented in the Assembly in any event.

To permit full and free discussion in the Council will in no sense promote disunity, but will, on the contrary, demonstrate the confidence the great powers have in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

Yalta, February 6, 1945

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

Proposed Formula for Voting Procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and Analysis of the Effects of That Formula

The provisions of Section C. of Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would read as follows:

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension of a member;
3. Expulsion of a member;
4. Election of the Secretary General.

II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

[NormanStewart]

The President’s Special Assistant to the President

Yalta, February 6, 1945

Mr. President: Why not let this wind up today when Stalin is thru – and say we will talk it over again tomorrow. It is 7.15

HARRY

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (February 6, 1945)

Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill meet

European policy statement likely

LONDON, England (UP) – The “Big Three” conference was underway today and observers here expected it to conclude with a broad statement of European policy, supplementing and perhaps expanding the Atlantic Charter.

High U.S. conferees favored a detailed announcement of the conclusions reached. But it was questionable whether the conference statement would reveal many of the decision by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

Observers believed they would issue a statement charting the general course of their policy, but leaving many key questions unanswered publicly.

There were strong reasons to believe they would disclose little if anything of their plans for the future of Germany beyond a broad statement of intent. Russia’s intention toward Japan was believed almost certainly not to be revealed at this time.

That the conference was underway was confirmed for the first time by Sir Walter Citrine, general secretary of the British Trades Union Congress

He made the disclosure at the opening session of the World Trade Union Conference in explaining why Mr. Churchill could not address the meeting.

Mr. Churchill had promised to speak at the conference, but instead sent a message of greetings to the delegates.

Speculation continued over the whereabouts of the “Big Three” meeting, with most sources suggesting the Black Sea area or possibly Stalingrad. One theory was that some sessions at least were being held aboard a warship, perhaps American, with Mr. Roosevelt as host.*

Gen. Charles de Gaulle expressed French resentment that he hadn’t been invited to participate in the conference and laid down French conditions for post-war Europe in a radio address yesterday.

His conditions were: French military occupation of the whole length of the Rhine River; separation of the left bank of the Rhine and the Ruhr Basin from the “German state or states,” and independence of “the Polish, Czech, Austrian and Balkan peoples.”

Japs show concern

The Japanese betrayed increasing concern that Marshal Stalin would align Russia with the United States and Britain against Japan at the conference.

They obviously feared that Marshal Stalin, flushed by victories over the German Army. will give Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill a definite promise to throw at least part of the Red Army against the Japs after Germany has surrendered.

The influential Tokyo newspaper Asahi, as quoted by the German Transocean Agency, said the question of Soviet participation would “most certainly be raised,” since the Pacific war situation was “nearing the decisive stage.”

[NormanStewart]

Editorial: Time to tell the Germans

German morale is the growing question mark as the Red armies sweep on toward Berlin, as Anglo-American planes bomb the panicky capital and Gen. Eisenhower moves through the Siegfried Line. That morale must be much less affected by propaganda and counter-propaganda than by the actual chaos and carnage which the German people see and feel. And yet propaganda does continue to play a part. At least Herr Goebbels, who has been more consistently successful than Hitler or the generals, is shouting louder than ever.

He is harping on two strings. One is German pride. He says: Remember how the Russians held out at Leningrad and Moscow (Stalingrad is passed over as too painful for reminders), how the Poles took it at Warsaw, how Londoners refused to crack under the blitz and planned to fight on elsewhere if their capital fell. Then he asks: Will Germans, the superior race, weaken when inferior Russians, Poles and Britons stood firm? That’s a good line. It may stiffen some sagging German spines.

Goebbels’ second line is the appeal to German fear of Allied retaliation. He says: If Germany surrenders, she will be destroyed. This is also potent. The Germans know the bestial record of their armies in conquered lands, they see the foreign slave labor which has been brought into Germany, they know they have earned the hatred and revenge of the world.

Because there is much truth in the situation which Goebbels is now exploiting with an evil twist, it is not easy for the Allies to counter his propaganda. They cannot deny that there is hatred of Germans among those who have survived the barbarism of German occupation. Nor do the Allies wish to sugarcoat the truth that the settlement terms will be hard, that everything necessary will be done by the victors to prevent another revival of German power of conquest.

But we think the Allies, within the realm of honesty and reason, could be more effective in counter-propaganda. They can emphasize, more than they have done, the official statements of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin that unconditional surrender means destruction of Nazism and German aggressive power, but not of the German people. The sooner there is a joint Big Three declaration of that kind the better.

Moreover, the Big Three ultimatum should stress that the danger of destruction of the German people would not be created but removed by an armistice. They should be told that Hitler’s plan to continue the war means national suicide, that German cities will be wiped out at a rate hitherto undreamed, that millions upon millions of Germans will die needlessly. In sober truth Germany today is facing destruction – not because the Allies will it; but because the German people, who started the war under Nazi orders, go on making war under Nazi orders.

[NormanStewart]

Background of news –
Since Tehran

By Bertram Benedict

It is now 14 months since the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union signed their joint declaration at Tehran, in Iran.

In those 14 months, there has been no other meeting of the Big Three, although Mr. Roosevelt conferred with Mr. Churchill at Quebec in September and Mr. Churchill with Stalin at Moscow in the following month. There have been three great international conferences in the United States on post-war problems: at Chicago, on aviation; at Bretton Woods, on financial relations; at Dumbarton Oaks, on world organization.

The main Tehran Declaration (there was another on Iran) was largely political, but probably the most vital decisions reached were military. Now, with the Red armies near Berlin, the most vital decisions of the Big Three may well be political, on what to do after victory over Germany.

Since Tehran, British and American relations with Chiang Kai-shek have deteriorated, although a little improvement seems to have been achieved of late. Fourteen months ago, the Generalissimo conferred with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill (Russia is not at war with Japan) at Cairo prior to the Tehran meeting, and the three issued a joint declaration on the territorial future of Japan.

Reds were still in Russia

When the Tehran conference met, the Red armies were still on Russian soil. British and American armies were on the continent of Europe only in Italy, and there they were still south of Rome. But in January 1944, the Red Armies reached the old border of Poland and lifted the siege of Leningrad; in March, they were in the Ukraine; in April, in the Balkans; in August, in East Prussia.

On June 6, two days after Rome fell, the Allies landed in Normandy; on August 15, they invaded southern France; on August 25, they took Paris; on September 12, they were on German soil in the west. And on July 20, a German army group tried to assassinate Hitler.

In the Pacific, the Marshalls were invaded in February 1944 and Saipan in June; by August 15, the Japanese were all out of India; late in October, U.S. troops landed on Leyte in the Philippines and the U.S. Navy inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese Navy in a naval battle; on December 16, the Americans landed on Luzon and began their march on Manila; and Tokyo has come under systematic bombing from the air.

Roosevelt policy strengthened

Since Tehran, Germany has lost every ally in Europe, and Turkey has broken diplomatic and economic relations with Berlin. At the time of Tehran, the Axis held 20 European capitals. Only five are left.

President Roosevelt goes to a new conference with Mr. Stalin and Mr. Churchill strengthened politically by his reelection, by the election defeat of some outstanding opponents of his foreign policy, by a larger majority for his party in the House, by retention of his party majority in the Senate.