Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

183

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 10, 1945, 4 p.m.

Plenary 2/10 4.55

Ed. reported on meeting For Mins

We reached agt re Pol – there were two outstanding q’s Perhaps I may come to that in a moment. Read draft as it now stands (included some changes app. agreed to by Church & St. in their private meeting before plenary session) included Mol. amend of noon. and new amend: “and will exchange Ambs. by whose reports the respective govts will be kept informed about the situation in Poland”

Church: We have made no reference to frontiers but of course people will ask at once about frontiers, what we have agreed. We are all agreed about the E. frontier, we are all agreed in prin. about W. frontier. The only q is where it is to be exactly drawn & how much we should say about it. We all agreed that the Poles are to have E. Pr. & be free to go to the line of the Oder if they so desire. We are very doubtful indeed about going further or mentioning at this stage – we have had a tel. from our War Cab. strongly deprecating frontier going as far as W. Neisse because they think the problem is larger than we could manage

Pres. We should rather hear from the Pol. Govt of Nat. Unity we had better leave out all references to boundaries

Church: on West?

Maisky on East we should say something Church. agreed.

Church people will immediately say what is the position about the frontier. We think E. frontier is settled. We think on W. frontier wishes of Pol Govt Nat Un be first consulted & matter finally settled at peace settlements

Pres: I cannot agree on Pol boundaries at this time. It must be done by the Sen later

Mol It would be very good if something could be said about full agt of 3 heads about E. frontier. Would clarify that important q. It would be good to say gen. opin of all sides represented. Prob. would provoke criticism for a time but in end would be good. Proposes leave it to 3 Mins. to find nec. formula. Not nec. to say anything about W frontier

Church: Something

Mol Yes, much less def.

Church: Say recog. by 3 powers Pol should receive substantial accession of terr both to the N. & to the W… Thereafter final line be determined

St: That would be very good That would correspond to wish of public opin. all around

Pres: 3 For Secs

Church: Along lines we have suggested

Maisk St.: As a last ¶

Ed Decl, on Lib Areas (continuing his report)

Read & Church amended the Mol. amend. to include “responsibilities” etc.

Mol: Wants his amend. to stand

Pres read it as agreed this morning

Church how can you carry out measure.

St. accepted Church. Formula

Agreed To be put in language

Document approved

Ed sug. amend. re Fr.

“In issuing this decl. the 3 powers express the hope that the French Prov. Govt will be associated with them in the action & procedures contemplated”

Pres: I have rather changed my opin. I was opposed to Fr. sitting in on the Com. of 3, Control Machinery The more I think of it the more I think the PM’s contention that a country which has an area to control can not do so without sitting in on the Con. Com. I think it would be easier if Fr. is on that Con Com to get DeG to agree to this Decl. & other things. Like St. think about it

Pres agreed to add also Ed. addition

St agreed

Ed. Yug.

Agreed For Mins. prepare first draft final communique

Pres Should communique contain Yug statement Will leave to Ed in Conf. with For Mins whether we join in on that or not.

Church These are very respectable issues

Pres I’m not trying to protect my purity

Mol What is agreed re Yug.

Ed We’ve agreed to send a message & we’ve agreed to draft a communique

Read d

Message for 3 Govts to Tito & Sub

agreed to recommend Tito-Sub be immed. formed & put into effect plus Brit amends.

Pres: All right

Mol: Tel was to be very short & without last 2 ¶s

Ed Yes then later then the amends second part.

Church. Hope commun. can mention both parts

Mol. We just had com. when agreed only 1st part be in tel.; 2nd part to be put off until United govt formed

Church But world will give more attention to immed. enforcement of agt if other part were mentioned, too. Would have effect of getting better reception for what we say.

St. It would be inconvenient if tel. & communique different & we agreed a second tel. will be sent

Church We have complex pub. opin. Want favorable reception of agt Believes it would help (include in commun)

Ed Might say: It was further agreed that when the agt is put into force, 3 govts would recommend to new govt to make a decl, of the 3 points

St. Without 3rd point, which is very objectionable

Ed. & Church: all right leave it out.

Church Besides it’s understood in Tito-Sub agt.

St. In any case change Tel – 3 parts 1st Put agt in force immed 2nd members Vojnoj be later included 3rd all acts be confirmed later Church Very good & very helpful

St & all 3 also be in communique

Ed World Org. Report of subcom re consultation Fr & China & Invitation was accepted by For Mins & need not be discussed in plenary session.

→Pres OK’d invitation

Reparations
Church We were practically instructed by our gov’t not to men tion figures. Let Com. do that

Pres goes along my idea not to mention money, not make reps an am’t of money Let Com. do Talk about the equiv.

St. That’s only a monetary expression of what the goods cost. It is not money

Pres so many people at home will think of it in terms of $ & cents

Church I don’t understand what is to be published

Pres Nothing

Church not even subject

St. There is objection to mention dollars because someone will think will take reparations in money But we have already 3 treaties on reps, where reps in kind are expressed in dollars. Why in this case should there be a misunderstanding?

Church. I was going to suggest Mos. Com. be auth. to issue an interim report & not have to issue whole report before authorization is given to taking reps. For ex. factories would be taken at once by Sov Govt

St. I think we can be quite frank How compare goods we should take from Ger. with our losses If we accept them we should say we accept as reparation. E could take factories & lands but better have a dec. I propose simple prin.: 1. Ger must pay reps. for losses caused to Allies. 2. To ask Rep. Com to find out am’t of reps. which would be nec. to take & to report to govts Am. side agreed with us to take as basis $20 million [sic] dollars. Does it mean Am side withdraws its agt

Pres: No I am completely in agt. Only one word. Reparations mean to so many people money. Add parenthesis (in kind)

St. We won’t publish

Pres U S entirely prepared discuss sum & principles. Only q I raise is use of word reps

St. We can use another word. Compensation of losses Church “Compensation in kind for losses”

St: 3 govts agree Ger. must pay in kind losses caused by her to Allies in course of war. To give to Mos Com the task to find out the figures of the reps. to be paid taking as basis To give Com to for discussion the Am-Sov formula

Church We cannot commit ourselves to fig. of $20 billion or any other figures until Com has studied

St. No commitment

Ed What is value of the figure

St. Com. could change figures & modify them in any way.

Church You could propose that when the Com. meets Read excerpt from “communication from our govt” £500,000,000 a yr.= Ger’s pre-war exports This could not be paid by Ger. True some of it capital but that make it harder for Ger. to supply rest. Attach importance to some statement re paying for Ger imports. Unless priority at least equal to reps. we shall pay by exports (?) for reps.

St: Suppose experts say figure is wrong Then can fix new one. Our fig. not sacrosanct. We propose to discuss. It is nec. that things move forward.

Pres. suggest whole thing be left to Com at Mos.

Mol: Only yesterday ERS announced results of 3 For Mins consids. Text of Read ERS report

Ed. We think putting fig. in report might commit us to the figures. If desired would be willing say:

Mos Rep Com will be instructed: 1st To take into exam the report presented by Mr M. to the Crimean Conf

Mol. The 3 Mins considered this q. Eden’s proposal ignores fact this q has been discussed at Crimean Conf

Ed. we didn’t want say how many yrs

St. 1. The heads of 3 govts agree Ger must pay cocompensation in Kind for losses caused to Allied Govts

 2. & agree Ger must pay in Kind

  1. To the Mos. Rep Com has been given task to consider the am’t of reps, to be paid

  2. In the Com. we will bring in our fig & you will bring yours Church: I agree

Intermission
St. Montreux Agt

I think this treaty is now out of date. In this treaty Jap. Emperor plays a very important role as one of the parties He plays perhaps more impor. role than S.U. The whole treaty is framed in such a way as to be linked up with Leag of Ns But Leag doesn’t exist any more, just as Jap Emperor is not in our ranks. According to this Treaty T. has rt to close Straits not only in case of war but also if T considers sit. dangerous. This also is difficult from modern point of view

The treaty was made when our rels with Gt Brit were not very tight but now G Bt wouldn’t want strangle R… I think this treaty should be very seriously modified. Now nearly indecent to say we observe the treaty of Montreux. I think there could be no objection to consideration of a revision of the treaty. In what sense I won’t go on to prejudge future decs. But I should like ints. of R to be taken account of. It is impossible to put up with a sit. where a small country will keep her hand at the throat of R. Ints of R must be taken into acct without infringing legit. ints of T. How to do it must be considered. I now propose the organ to study it. Is agreed 3 Mins will meet every few months Perhaps would be possible at 1st meeting to discuss so mins could report to their govts. That would be the preparatory stage for settlement of q. of the Straits

Pres. We have over 3,000 miles of natural boundary bet. US & Can No fort or armed ship on that boundary, Has existed for over 100 yrs. If we could get other govts do that would be wonderful thing

Church. Marshall mentioned this to Mr Ed & me when we were last in Mos. We viewed with sympathy the Sov. proposal that the treaty be revised We suggested that Sov Govt give us a note of what their ideas were on the Convention but this has not yet been done. We think proposal of Mar. is a wise one. We certainly feel present position of R with its great Black Sea being dependent upon this narrow exit is not satisfactory If the matter is brought up at the next For Secs meeting we hope the Rs will make their proposal Meanwhile I think it would be nec if T became minded to declare war on Ger for any reason, it would bee, to tell T the matter would be brought under consid. Shouldn’t like her to come in to war with out knowing of it. Indeed I think we have some promise to T that before anything is decided affecting her she would be informed Mr Ed reminds me that after we came back from Mos he mentioned the matter to the T. Amb. in general terms, so we have Kept our engagements It is worth considering whether at the time changes are made to meet the wishes & needs of R in the Straits whether some undertaking might be made to T that her indep. would in no way be affected That would make it easy for her.

St. We can hide nothing from T & we should give her some assurances

Church Then we are agreed

St. So For Mins will meet at the end of the Conf in US

Church I think it affects Brit position in the Med. more than U.S. so conference might be in Lon. I tried hard some time ago to get thru the Dardanelles. The R. Govt of that day sent 2 army corps to help from the other end. However we did not succeed

St. They were in a hurry to take away the troops. If had waited another wk. Gers & Ts all ready to capitulate Mr. Pres you would not object to conf. in Eur.

Pres No

St. No secretary of the Conf. Who is taking notes of the decs.

Ed. Will put before you a commun & a note of decisions taken Church In addition to commun.

Pres re Amended statement on Pol line For const. reasons I have made a few changes Only 2 changes. Orig text was “The 3 Powers are agreed” etc Const. q of whether I have a rt to say the 3 powers can change a boundary . . the new lang: “The 3 heads of gov’t consider” omit “3 powers” & change “agree” to “feel”

Mol Add Return her ancient terrs in E. Pr. & westerly

Pres Depends how long back you go

Mol Quite a long time ago It is of great importance to Poles from a national point of view.

Church I feel it would be better not to draw the frontiers in the W. at the present time & not to mention localities

Mol There is no mention of the frontiers & with regard to the line of the Oder there was no objection

Church Never in pub.

Mol But at the Conf

Ed On contrary, we have always said as far toward Oder as Poles want to go.

Church: If you talk of restoring the ancient terrs. I shall be asked what they are & there will be no satis. answer We’re not ag. it

St Withdrew his suggestions & “your suggestion Mr Pres (to Pres) is accepted”

That will be the last point of paper on Pol

Pres we have only commun

Church: D.O. (i. e. terr. trusteeships) [Then his advisers talked him out of it Prob. told him of revised copy of ERS report. He said “I haven’t seen it” but then matter was app. settled OK]

Pres suggested draft commun. be given to heads of govt tonight & then have 11.00 a.m. meeting tomorrow

Church Then said something about multiple membership in communique

184

Amended Draft of the Declaration on Liberated Europe

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Declaration on Liberated Europe

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have considted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately (establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration) take measures for carrying out mutual consultation.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

185 
860H.01/2-1145: Telegram

The British Foreign Secretary to the Foreign Office

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Most immediate

Following for Foreign Office from Foreign Secretary. Please repeat to Belgrade.

At plenary session of Crimea Conference on February 10th the Heads of the three Governments discussed the Yugoslav question and agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

  • (i) that Avnoj will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

  • (ii) that legislative acts passed by Avnoj will be subject to sub sequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

Please arrange for a communication to be made at once on above lines to Dr. Subasic and to Marshal Tito.

Similar instructions are being sent by Soviet and United States Governments to their representatives with Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito and action should be concerted between the representatives of the three allied Governments.

186

The President’s Special Assistant to the President

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Mr. President The Russians have given in so much at this conference that I don’t think we should let them down. Let the British disagree if they want to – and continue their disagreement at Moscow. Simply say it is all referred to the Reparations Commission with the minutes to show the British disagree about any mention of the 10 billion.

HARRY

187

The Secretary of State to the President

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Subject: RECOMMENDATION THAT THE THREE POWERS ENCOURAGE KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST UNITY IN THE WAR EFFORT AGAINST JAPAN

As this is likely to be the final plenary session, I suggest that some time during today’s meeting you find occasion to urge the Marshal and the Prime Minister to see that full encouragement is given by their Governments to Kuomintang-Communist unity in the war effort against Japan.

The importance of encouraging united Chinese efforts at this time must be apparent to all three Governments.

188

Tripartite dinner meeting, 9:00 p.m.

Vorontsov Villa, USSR

Churchill acted as host.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen Major Birse
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Alupka, February 10, 1945, 9 p.m.
Top secret
Subjects: REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY
COMMUNIQUÉ
BRITISH AND AMERICAN POLITICS
JEWISH PROBLEMS

At the beginning of dinner, the conversation was general.

The Prime Minister then proposed a toast to the King of England, the President of the United States, and to Mr. Kalinin, President of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, and he asked the President as the only Head of State present to reply to this toast.

The President replied that the Prime Minister’s toast brought back many memories – that he recalled the first year as President of the United States in the summer of 1933. His wife had gone down in the country to open a school, and on the wall there had been a map on which there had been a great blank space. He said the teacher had told his wife that it was forbidden to speak about this place, and this place had been the Soviet Union. He said he had then decided to write a letter to Mr. Kalinin asking him to send someone to the United States to open negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Marshal Stalin , in his conversation with Prime Minister Churchill, emphasized the unsatisfactory nature of the reparations question at the conference. He said he feared to have to go back to the Soviet Union and tell the Soviet people they were not going to get any reparations because the British were opposed to it.

The Prime Minister said that, on the contrary, he very much hoped that Russia would receive reparations in large quantities, but he remembered the last war when they had placed the figure at more than the capacity of Germany to pay.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought it would be a good idea to put some mention of the intention to make Germany pay for the damage it had caused the Allied Nations, and also some reference to the Reparations Commission, in the communiqué.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed to the inclusion of these statements in the communiqué.

The Prime Minister then proposed a toast to the health of Marshal Stalin. He said he hoped that the Marshal had a warmer feeling for the British than he had had, and that be felt that the great victories which his armies had achieved had made him more mellow and friendly than he had been during the hard times of the war. He said he hoped that the Marshal realized that he bad good and strong friends in those British and American representatives assembled here. We all hoped, he continued, that the future of Russia would be bright, and he said he knew Great Britain, and he was sure the President, would do all they could to bring this about. He said he felt that the common danger of war had removed impediments to understanding and the fires of war had wiped out old animosities. He said he envisaged a Russia which had already been glorious in war as a happy and smiling nation in times of peace.

Mr. Stettinius then proposed a toast to his predecessor, Mr. Cordell Hull, who he said had been an inspiration to us all in his labors for the creation of a peaceful and orderly world. He concluded by saying that Mr. Hull was a great American and great statesman.

The President then said that he recalled that there had been an organization in the United States called the Ku Klux Klan that had hated the Catholics and the Jews, and once when he had been on a visit in a small town in the South be had been the guest of the president of the local Chamber of Commerce. He had sat next to an Italian on one side and a Jew on the other and had asked the president of the Chamber of Commerce whether they were members of the Ku Klux Klan, to which the president had replied that they were, but that they were considered all right since everyone in the community knew them. The President remarked that it was a good illustration of how difficult it was to have any prejudices – racial, religious or otherwise – if you really knew people.

Marshal Stalin said he felt that this was very true.

After considerable discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to English politics, in which the latter said he did not believe the Labor Party would ever be successful in forming a government in England, the President said that in his opinion any leader of a people must take care of their primary needs. He said he remembered when he first became President the United States was close to revolution because the people lacked food, clothing and shelter, but he had said, “If you elect me President, I will give you these things,” and since then there was little problem in regard to social disorder in the United States.

The President then said he desired to propose a toast to the Prime Minister. He said that he personally had been twenty-eight years old when he entered political life, but even at that time Mr. Churchill had had long experience in the service of his country. Mr. Churchill had been in and out of the government for many, many years, and it was difficult to say whether he had been of more service to his country within the government or without. The President said that he personally felt that Mr. Churchill had been perhaps of even greater service when he was not in the government since he had forced the people to think.

The Prime Minister said that he would face difficult elections in the near future in England since he did not know what the Left would do.

Marshal Stalin said that he felt that Left and Right now were parliamentary terms. For example, under classical political concepts, Daladier, who was a radical socialist, had been more to the left than Mr. Churchill, yet Daladier had dissolved the trade unions in France, whereas Mr. Churchill had never molested them in England. He inquired who, then, could be considered more to the left?

The President said that in 1940 there had been eighteen political parties in France and that within one week he had had to deal with three different prime ministers in Prance. He said that when he had seen de Gaulle last summer, he had asked him how this had happened in French political life, and de Gaulle replied that it was based on a series of combinations and compromises, but he intended to change all that.

The Prime Minister remarked that Marshal Stalin had a much easier political task since he only had one party to deal with.

Marshal Stalin replied that experience had shown one party was of great convenience to a leader of a state.

The Prime Minister said if he could get full agreement of all the British people it would greatly facilitate his task, but he must say that during the Greek crisis he had lost two votes in Parliament and the opposition had consisted of only eleven votes against him. He said he had accosted those Members of Parliament who had deserted him and had asked them to have the courage of their convictions. He added that they had been very unhappy because they had had this stand against the government. He concluded that he didn’t know what would be the result of the election in England but he knew he and Mr. Eden would continue to support the interests of Russia and the United States no matter who was in power.

The Prime Minister then remarked that although he had had great difficulty with Mr. Gallacher, the Communist member in the House of Commons, he nevertheless had written him a letter of sympathy when he lost his two foster children in the war. He added that he felt that British opposition to Communism was not based on any attachment to private property but to the old question of the individual versus the state. He said that in war the individual of necessity is subordinate to the state and that in England any man or woman between the ages of eighteen and sixty was subject to the government.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he did not believe the Labor Party could ever form a government in England. He asked the President whether there was any labor party in a political sense in the United States.

The President replied that labor was extremely powerful in the United States but there was no one specific party.

Marshal Stalin then said he thought more time was needed to consider and finish the business of the conference.

The President answered that he had three Kings waiting for him in the Near East, including Ibn Saud.

Marshal Stalin said the Jewish problem was a very difficult one – that they had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in Virovidzhan but that they had only stayed there two or three years and then scattered to the cities. He said the Jews were natural traders but much had been accomplished by putting small groups in some agricultural areas.

The President said he was a Zionist and asked if Marshal Stalin was one.

Marshal Stalin said he was one in principle but he recognized the difficulty.

During the course of the conversation, Marshal Stalin remarked that the Soviet Government would never have signed a treaty with the Germans in 1939 had it not been for Munich and the Polish-German treaty of 1934.

Marshal Stalin came over and spoke to the President and said he did not think they could complete the work of the conference by three o’clock tomorrow.

The President replied that if necessary he would wait over until Monday, to which Marshal Stalin expressed gratification.

It was tentatively agreed that there would be a plenary session tomorrow at twelve noon, after which the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin would lunch with the President.

189

The Pittsburgh Press (February 10, 1945)

Simms43

Simms: In the balance

By William Philip Simms

WASHINGTON – United Nations circles here – especially some of the smaller members – are awaiting the outcome of the Big Three meeting with an anxiety only faintly tinged with hope.

As seen from here, Marshal Stalin and President Roosevelt hold most of the cards. Between them, they will largely decide the political issues upon which the fate of Europe and the future peace of the world so largely depend.

Prime Minister Churchill, a realist, will shape Britain’s course according to the way the Stalin-Roosevelt hands are played.

As Russia today is by far the most dominant power in the Eastern Hemisphere, Stalin can make or mar the prospects for international collaboration, in line with Dumbarton Oaks. Already a Moscow-made design for a post-war Europe is pretty far advanced. In its making, however, neither Britain nor America thus far has been consulted.

U.S. has plan too

In the Western world, the United States is the strongest power. Without it – just as without Russia – the proposed new League of Nations, built around the present grand alliance, hardly can hope to be effective. Yet it, too, has a plan for post-war collaboration. A plan which conforms to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

Today everything depends on whether the Russian and the American these can be made to dovetail. Russia, by unilateral action, has already taken most of Europe under her wing. If she stands pat, if she refuses to permit the liberated peoples of Europe to have a say in their own political and territorial future, it may well wreck the new league.

But, it is pointed out, President Roosevelt went to the Big Three parley loaded down with ammunition. Gov. Dewey and Sen. Vandenberg made it plain that the Republican Party, no less than the Democrats, is behind the proposed peace plan.

He has everything it takes to convince Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill – if they want to be convinced – that the United States is thoroughly prepared to go as far as Russia and Britain to enforce a just and durable peace.

The big unanswered questions – but which everyone hopes the Black Sea conference will answer – today are:

  • Will President Roosevelt make full and effective use of his ammunition?

  • Will Marshal Stalin meet him halfway? (Prime Minister Churchill unquestionably will do his utmost to effect a close relationship but if the attempt fails, Britain may draw closer to the Soviet Union.)

Situation reversed

It has now become a habit on both sides of the Atlantic to blame any lack of world collaboration progress on American uncertainty. Britain and Russia, these circles say, don’t know whether they can “depend on” the United States. Maybe the Senate won’t ratify.

Well, the situation is now reversed. The President, the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Republican candidate for the presidency, the national elections last November – all demand an immediate, definite, iron-bound united nations or league to safeguard against aggression.

Now, people ask, are Russia and Britain prepared to play ball with America? Do they, like the United States, want a just peace, democratically arrived at and maintained, if necessary, by force, in line with the formula laid down at Dumbarton Oaks?

The Black Sea rendezvous of the Big Three should tell the tale. If it doesn’t, the outlook will be most unpromising.

190

Roosevelt to skip Paris invitation

PARIS, France – President Roosevelt will not visit Paris after the Big Three Conference because of the fact that Gen. Charles de Gaulle was not invited to the Allied meeting.

Last fall, French officials in Washington were instructed to find out whether the President would regard an invitation to come to Paris favorably. They reported that he would, and the White House later let it be known that an informal invitation had been received.

It was believed at the time of Prime Minister Churchill’s visit here Nov. 10-11 that the President would come early in the new year. Later, it was believed that he would make the visit immediately after the three-power conference.

In view of the fact that Gen. de Gaulle was not invited, however, Americans feel that the reception of the President’s visit in official quarters would be less cordial than if it were postponed for a few months.

191

U.S. State Department (February 10, 1945)

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

My Dear Marshal Stalin: I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I might encounter in the United States in connection with the number of votes which the Big Powers will enjoy in the Assembly of the World Organization. We have agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United Nations Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure whole hearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your views in reply to this letter.

Most sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

192

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Dear Winston: As I said the other day, I am somewhat concerned over the political difficulties I am apt to encounter in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three great powers will have only a single vote in the Assembly. I understand from our conversation that you would have no objection if I found it necessary to work out some way of giving the United States additional votes in order to insure parity. I am writing you this letter since I know you understand so well our political situation in the United States and I hope in reply to this letter you can give me your agreement to this suggestion if I find it necessary for our public opinion to make some proposal along those lines at the forthcoming United Nations Conference.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have written to Marshal Stalin on the same subject.

Most sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

193

Log of the Trip

Saturday, February 10, 1945

0800: White House mail was dispatched to Washington via a Joint Chiefs of Staff courier who left Livadia this morning.

1300: Lunch at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Miss Harriman, Admiral Leahy, Justice Byrnes and Admiral Brown.

1500: Justice Byrnes left Livadia to return to Washington. He traveled by air in company with the Joint Chiefs of Staff party.

1600: The President presented specially engraved Fourth-Term Inaugural Medallions to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov, and a book entitled “Target Germany” to Marshal Stalin. This book had been prepared by General Arnold and contained photographs showing damage wrought in Germany as the result of bombings by our strategical air forces.

1630: Marshal Stalin and Mr. Harriman conferred with the President. The conference was held in the President’s study. Mr. Bohlen was also present.

1650: The Seventh Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present:

For the U.S. For Great Britain For the USSR
The President. The Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius. Mr. Eden. Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy. Mr. Cadogan. Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins. Mr. Clark Kerr. Mr. Maisky.
Mr. Harriman. Mr. Jebb. Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Matthews. Mr. Bridges. Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Bohlen. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss. Major Birse.
Mr. Foote.

The meeting adjourned at 2000.

2030: The President, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Bohlen left Livadia for the British Headquarters (Vorontsov Villa) where they dined with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Major Birse, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Pavlov as the guests of the Prime Minister.

194

U.S. State Department (February 11, 1945)

Eighth plenary meeting, noon

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Hopkins Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman Sir Edward Bridges Mr. Maisky
Mr. Matthews Mr. Jebb Mr. Gusev
Mr. Hiss Mr. Wilson Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Dixon Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Foote Major Birse

There is a list of those present and of subjects of discussion, indicated as (1) communiqué on close of conference, (2) reparations, and (3) Japan, but these are followed by the notation: “No report was written up on this Conference.”

Bohlen Note

Leningrad, February 11, 1945, noon
Secret

At the last Plenary Session, the communiqué was discussed and most of the conversation dealt with the details of language, the results of which are apparent in the final communiqué agreed upon. The Soviet suggested that in the part on voting procedure no reference be made to the fact that the proposal accepted was put forward by the President. Marshal Stalin stated that there would be no objection to the President, or any other American Official, making it public that the United States’ proposal had been adopted, but he felt such a reference did not properly belong in a communiqué. The Soviet suggestion was adopted.

195

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 11, 1945, noon

2/11 12.15 p.m.
Plenary

Communique
PM likes draft but too many “joints.” Also make separate ¶ re reparations

Mol. We have an amendment that does that

The 1st part: prefer more detail, naming personalities who took part

Church: At end

St: Better at beginning. Was at Teheran

Pres & PM: OK

St. no other remarks on opening

Church put in generals as well?

St. Yes

Church I agree with that

St name whomever you like

I Defeat of Ger.

Mol amends

Church: Is point of substance in introducing word “Hitlerite” It narrows it. We would prefer “Nazi” Germany

Mol. Withdraws amend. (re Hitlerite Ger)

Church. leave out “joint”, goes without saying various Church amendments

II OK with St.

Ed: Ought make it clear how zone is to be given

Shouldn’t indicate we have accepted the Fr. demand.

“Limits of the Fr. zone will be agreed by the 4 Govts thru their repres. on the EAC”

Wire to Winant

Mol: After II a new chap. on reparations.

We consider the q. on the costs by Ger of Allied loss to Allied Govt in this war it is fair to exact from Ger reparations in Kind in the greatest poss. amt. to the greatest possible extent possible A Commission is created on Reps which will have as its task determining the amt. of reps.

The Com. will sit in Mos.

Pres Only q is whether it is worthwhile to have sep. Chapter or work it in. I can’t find a good place.

III
Mol After 1st 2 ¶s add:

It has been also resolved to recommend to the Conf. to invite Uk. & Wh. R as orig. member

Pres very embarrassing to me

Church If brought out pub. now without any explanation of US position will cause trouble.

3 members of the War Cab. are objecting to the prin. of more than 1 vote. This only shows controversies it will raise We are all pledged to it in the draft conclusions

I should have to ask for adjournment to consult dominions. It might take several days But we put it all down in the conclusions

St.: Withdrew it But in

Mol ¶s 4 & 5

These ¶s should read as follows:

Concerning voting proc. in the Sec. Coun. of the projected org. Confused with our early draft Say they have no copy of last draft omit “put forward by the Pres.”

Mol If the text which we rec’d last night is united draft of Brit & Ams we didn’t know it. It is agreed

ERS asked Pres if it would affect him politically back home if “put forward by the Pres” is retained & Pres said it would not. Pres preferred to leave the phrase in

P M wants to eliminate 1st sentence of Chap. V on Pol.

Chap IV agreed to

Ed: insert after inherent: “we were impressed by the dangers of any divergence of policy between the major allies toward Poland”

St leave it out altogether

Church: Would prefer Ed’s amended form

St: This is only a statement about proceedings of various representatives. Some may have been impressed, others not.

Pres read our proposed new sentence

Agreed

Church wants to say dec. re Pol. will be very heavily attacked in Eng. It will be said we have yielded completely on the frontiers & the whole matter to R.

St: Is it in earnest I doubt it

Church I assure you it is. Lon Poles will raise a dreadful outcry

St: But the other Poles will predominate

Church I hope you’re right. We’re not going back on it It’s not a q. of nos. of Poles but of the cause for which Brit drew the sword Will say you have completely swept away the only const. govt of Pol. However I will defend it to the best of my ability

VI Yug
Church translate Avnoj

St That’s right. Not everyone will understand

VII Agreed

VIII Prisoners of war
St suggests mention of prisoners of war should be deleted. This is a q. among ourselves. We can take dec. but not nec to pub

Mol Says he & Ed agreed will come up in meeting For Mins

Church But can be published?

Agreed be published separately when text completed this afternoon

IX Unity O K with St.

Summary was dropped O K

IX Church what does “want” mean “It means privation & not desire”

Mol Will this communique be signed by the heads of govts

Pres Just as at Teheran

Should be signed first by St. because has been such a wonderful host

St I object

Church. If take alphabet I’ll be first

St – Am. Bloc

" If you take age I also come first

St If St. 1st signature will say he leads. Insists he be in last place

Who will take charge of final text

Church: Bridges

St. perhaps to the For Mins for final checking

Pres. Early

St Mol & Vishinsky. He is not interested in lunch

Pres: For Mins then to read it over in place of P.M., Mar. & me.

St. Who will make list of decs. Assign this task to someone else

Pres On summary of conclusions re reps. (i e Sov. protocol) entirely satis to us with few changes

Church Not for publication

196

List of Amendments to the Draft Communiqué

Yalta, February 11, 1945

Prime Minister’s Amendments to Draft Communiqué

Defeat of Germany
Line 8: For “co-ordination”
Read: “concert”

Line 9: After “launched”
Insert: “continuously.”

Three lines lower down, instead of “our joint military plans,” read “our combined military plans.”

The word “joint” appears twice in the next three lines, and the Prime Minister would omit it in these two places.

Occupation and Control of Germany
In the second line for the word “jointly” substitute the word “together.”

Line 7 – the word “co-ordinated” should be struck out and “united” substituted.

Line 10 – the last sentence of the paragraph should read as follows:

It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers if she should so desire to take over a fourth zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission.

In the first line of the next paragraph for “it is our joint purpose” read “It is our inflexible purpose.”

In the third line of this paragraph for “threaten” read “disturb.”

Six lines from the bottom of the paragraph, instead of “to take jointly such other measures” read “to take in harmony such other measures.”

The last sentence of the paragraph on this page should read as follows:

It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for the Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations.

197

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Yalta, February 11, 1945

Dear Winston: You have expressed some concern with regard to our different viewpoints concerning the policy to be pursued about Italy. I am happy to tell you that Mr. Matthews on behalf of the Department of State went over the ground on this matter with Alec Cadogan yesterday afternoon. As a result of their conversation, Matthews reports that although there are naturally some differences in emphasis in our respective viewpoints, there seems to be no basic reason for any quarrel between us. I find that we are both in accord with the important fact that whatever the Italian attitude and action have been in the past few years, we are faced with a real problem of the future. Italy is and will remain an important factor in Europe whatever we may think of the prospect. It is surely in our joint interest for us to do whatever we properly can to foster her gradual recuperation by developing a return to normal democratic processes, the development of a sense of her own responsibilities and the other steps so necessary in preparing the long hard road of Italy’s return to the community of peace-loving democratic states. To this end I believe we are both agreed that we must give her both spiritual and material food. I am impressed with the dangers for us both in Italy’s present condition of semi-servitude and of the fact that those who fish in troubled waters will be the only ones to gain from her present conditions approaching despair. I know that our soldiers share this view and feel that there is definite inherent danger in the situation to our joint military operations.

I believe that some constructive steps should be taken to move away from the present anomalous situation of onerous and obsolete surrender terms which are no longer pertinent to the situation today. I hope the Foreign Office and the State Department will be able to work out some mutually satisfactory procedure to remedy this situation. As you know, we accepted the Combined Chiefs of Staff’s directive to General Alexander along the lines suggested by Mr. MacMillan [Macmillan]. Although we felt that the directive was greatly watered down and much of its substance lost, we went along with you in the hope that we may reach some agreement on further steps in the near future.

At any rate, I want you to know that we are determined to pull together with you in Italy as we are in other areas, and that we believe that by full and continuous consultation and goodwill on both sides there is no danger of any serious split between us on this important question.

Most sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

198

Tripartite luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Roosevelt acted as host.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Fleet Admiral Leahy Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Secretary Stettinius Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Hopkins Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Harriman Major Birse
Mr. Bohlen

Bohlen Note

Leningrad, February 11, 1945, 1 p.m.

At the luncheon, which was attended by the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin; the three Foreign Secretaries, Ambassador Harriman, Clark Kerr, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, and three interpreters, the conversation was general and personal. At one point, however, Marshal Stalin made an obvious reference to Iran, and stated in his opinion, any nation which kept its oil in the ground and would not let it be exploited, was, in fact, “working against peace.”

199

Völkischer Beobachter (February 11, 1945)

Dr. Koppen: Stärker als das Schicksal…

Von Dr. Wilhelm Koppen

In diesen Tagen zeigte sich die Londoner Daily Mail höchst ungehalten, dass das verratene und verkaufte Volk im besetzten Italien noch wagt, die Ohren seiner Peiniger mit Klagerufen zu beleidigen. Die Italiener, so meint dieses Blatt, hätten gefälligst alle Prüfungen, die der Feind über sie verhängt, stillschweigend zu ertragen, denn keinesfalls könne ein Land, das es wagte, die Waffen gegen England zu erheben, darauf rechnen, milde behandelt zu werden. Dasselbe hat mit anderen Worten kürzlich auch Churchill vor dem Unterhaus zum Ausdruck gebracht und diese Denkweise entspricht vollkommen der ganzen Selbstgerechtigkeit des „auserwählten Volkes“ auf der Insel, das seit jeher seine Gegner im Kriege als Feinde der göttlichen Gerechtigkeit zu beklagen pflegte.

Dieselbe Heuchelei steht heute bei der Konferenz Pate, die an der sowjetischen Schwarzmeerküste stattfindet. Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill zeigen sich dort der Mitwelt auf dem hohen Kothurn von Weltrichtern, denen es zunächst obliege, Deutschland vor die Schranken zu ziehen und damit das Urteil zu sprechen. Die Moskauer Iswestija schreibt hierzu sehr aufschlussreich: „In der Endphase des Krieges wird die Todesstrafe, die von der gesamten freiheitsliebenden Menschheit über Deutschland verhängt wurde, durchgeführt werden.“ Diese Formulierung hat Reuters so gut gefallen, dass sie auch als Stichwort für die englische Presse ausgegeben und dort in breiter Front aufgenommen worden ist mit dem Bemerken, die alliierten Befehlshaber hätten nunmehr die Aufgabe, dieses Todesurteil an Deutschland zu vollstrecken.

Gingen die Absichten der Alliierten in Erfüllung, so wäre allerdings der Ausdruck Todesstrafe keineswegs übertrieben. Es ist durchaus glaubwürdig, was amerikanische Beobachter über Roosevelts Haltung auf der Konferenz mitteilen: der Präsident werde keinerlei Widerspruch gegen die bolschewistischen Gebietsforderungen erheben, insbesondere nicht gegen den Raub ganz Ostdeutschlands bis zur Oder. Er werde auch dem Programm zustimmen, das nach dem Besuch de Gaulles in Moskau bekanntgegeben wurde und die Auslieferung von Rhein und Ruhr an Frankreich und die Sowjets vorsah, und er sei schließlich für eine Besetzung Deutschlands bis zum Jahre 2000. Nebenbei werden dann die baltischen Länder abgeschrieben und die Ausdehnung des Sowjeteinflusses auf ganz Ost- und Südosteuropa an erkannt.

Dass die Briten Stalins Diktat ebenfalls widerspruchslos schlucken weiden, liegt auf der Linie der Politik Churchills, die England zum willenlosen Mitläufer seiner Verbündeten herabgedrückt hat, so dass amerikanische Senatoren das Vereinigte Königreich schon ganz offen als eine Art Kolonialbesitz bezeichnen.

Über das Sowjetprogramm braucht man danach keine Worte weiter zu verlieren. Sicher ist aber, dass man in Moskau das Wort Todesstrafe nicht etwa nur als politisches Symbolwort gewählt hat, sondern dabei an Massenmorde denkt, die selbst die hochgespannten britischen und amerikanischen Erwartungen bei weitem übertreffen würden, wenn es den Bolschewisten vergönnt wäre, in ganz Deutschland so zu hausen, wie sie es heute in unseren östlichen Provinzen tun. Der Mordwahn der östlichen Steppe stimmt im Übrigen genau zu den Plänen der Morgenthaus und Genossen, die mittels der Zerstörung der deutschen Industrie viele Millionen deutsche Arbeiter mit ihren Familien zum Hungertod verurteilen möchten und mit deren Absichten Roosevelt völlig übereinstimmt.

Zur allgemeinen Überraschung wurde dieser Tage eine Zwischenverlautbarung über die Konferenz ausgegeben, die offenbar dem Bedürfnis entsprang, irrigen Ausdeutungen in England und Amerika zu begegnen. Es wurde darin betont, dass man sich auf einem gemeinsamen Kriegsplan geeinigt habe. Was über die Behandlung der politischen Fragen gesagt wurde, klang allerdings wesentlich verschwommener, und es fehlt auch nicht an einer Fülle von Kombinationen von weiteren Konferenzen, die sich an die Zusammenkunft am Schwarzen Meer anschließen würden. Diese werden – so wird gemutmaßt – in einer allgemein gehaltenen Schwarzmeer-Charta nach dem Muster des verlogenen Atlantikvorbildes schließen, die von Bedrohungen gegen Deutschland begleitet sein werden, im Übrigen aber werde man sowohl über die territorialen Fragen wie auch über das Sicherheitssystem weiter verhandeln müssen. Das bestätigt die Auffassung, dass sich die drei Spießgesellen wohl über die Vernichtung Deutschlands, wie schon immer einig sind, nicht aber über die Herstellung eines Weltfriedens, der irgendwie Aussicht auf Dauer verspräche und den besonders die Sowjets gar nicht wünschen, da für sie der jetzige Krieg ja nur den Auftakt zur weltrevolutionären Ausweitung gibt.

Es war bisher das Kennzeichen aller zahlreichen Sondertagungen, die seit zwei Jahren auf amerikanischem Boden abgehalten wurden, dass man über allgemeine Empfehlungen niemals hinausgekommen ist und vor der letzten Hürde scheuen musste, nämlich vor der Abgrenzung der gegenseitigen Interessen der drei Machte, deren ewige Einigkeit doch bei den komplizierten Nachkriegsplänen als selbstverständlich vorausgesetzt wurde. Das zeigte sich besonders deutlich bei der Konferenz von Dumbarton Oaks, die sich mit der Frage der sogenannten Organisation des Weltfriedens befasste Man entwarf dort den Plan eines neuen Völkerbundes, dessen Rat von den Großmächten beherrscht werden sollte. Diesem Rat wurde die Aufgabe gestellt friedenswidrig handelnde Mitglieder in Acht und Bann zu tun. Der entscheidende Punkt aber ist die Frage was eigentlich geschehen sollte, wenn eine dieser Mächte selbst als Aggressor auftrete.

Und hier stellen sich die Sowjets sofort auf den Standpunkt, dass sie selbst Richter darüber bleiben müssten, ob sie bei irgendwelchen, dass auch für sie die zwingendsten Gründe bestehen, solche Wünsche zu hegen.

Bei der Beurteilung der Kriegslage muss sich jeder diese Tatsache vor Augen halten. Der Feind möchte es so darstellen, als ob wir einen Verzweiflungskampf führten, dessen Ausgang von vornherein feststände. Wir aber wissen, dass unser Widerstand, für den alle materiellen und moralischen Kräfte einer großen Nation angespannt sind, allein Leben und Zukunft unseres Volkes sichert und das entscheidende Gewicht auf der Waagschale des Schicksals sein wird.

Wir führen diesen schweren Kampf mit klarem Sinn und starkem Arm weiter und sind uns bewusst, dass der Erfolg nicht ausbleiben kann. Man mag am Schwarzen Meer mit angemaßter Richterpose Todesurteile fällen, wir werden solche Drohungen zu bestehen wissen und damit auch die Welt von dem Alpdruck des Dauerkrieges befreien, der für Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill der Weisheit letzter Schluss ist.

200

U.S. State Department (February 11, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 4:20 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Hiss Sir Edward Bridges

Bohlen Note

February 11, 1945, 4:20 p.m.

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers to Approve the ‘Summary of Proceedings of the Conference’

At this meeting, the discussion was almost entirely related to language and drafting problems. Mr. Eden, supported by Mr. Stettinius, proposed that Saudi Arabia be included among those countries which, if they declared war on the common enemy before March 1, would be invited to attend the United Nations Conference at San Francisco. Mr. Molotov said that he could not accept that proposal without reference to Marshal Stalin, and suggested that, since time was so short, that it would be reserved for possible future consideration. Mr. Molotov’s suggestion was accepted.

Hiss Notes

February 11, 1945, 4:20 p.m.

2/11 4.20 pm
ERS Chmn

Final meeting of For Mins

ERS: 1st subject is approval of communique

Sir Edward Bridges to report on read communique

Re D.O.
Mol. Marshal Stalin said should say what is said in conclusions that was agreed on voting & not that President’s proposal had been adopted

No objection if Mr. S. or anyone else should say this was the proposal of the Pres.

In no other place is it said on whose initiative it has been done

ERS This was discussed this morning in presence of Mar & Pres & I discussed it at length with Pres. Would be very diff. for me to agree

Mol Was no agt on this special point

We said we had another q on this par.

Simultaneously with the pub. of com. you or someone say this was the proposal put forward by the Pres. We don’t want to hush-hush this fact.

ERS: agreed to eliminate the reference to Pres.

Re consultation

Ed on procedure – US is to approach Ch. & Fr. Desirable that consultation be done as soon as possible – 48 hours if possible as will be great interest in the subject

2/11
ERS Chmn

For. Mins.

(After intermission)

Summary of Conclusions
p. 1 Mol. what would be the title: “Decisions”?

Agreed: Protocol of the proceedings of the Crimea Conference

Mol. First phrase

The Crimean Conf. of the 3 heads of the Govts of USSR, US & Gt Brit which took place in the Crimea from Feb 4 to Feb 11 took came to the following conclusions:

Ed. Would like to add Saudi Arabia before Turkey

Mol. Why

Ed They did want to declare war & we discouraged them

Mol. This q. was not discussed. There would then come others (i e new suggestions)

Ed. Good to have Moslem or two Ibn Saud is having cup of coffee with Pres.

ERS I have no objection. They have assisted in the prosecution of the war to some extent

Mol I don’t know if Saudi Arabia will be much help. Think it over & consider at end of protocol

p. 2

San Francisco inserted

Mol. I want to be there

p. 3 ERS “or in the preliminary consultations”

Agreed

p 5 Insert protocol in place of reparations section

Agreed

p 9 ERS agreed re Yug.

p 10 ERS suggests insert “among the For. Secs”

Suggests eliminate last sentence

Mol: “Mr. Mol. agreed to this proposal”

Eden: should not say views will be conveyed “aint any views” instead say: could not be approved

Persia
Mol: Suggests instead:

“Mr Ed, Mr S & Mr Mol exchanged views on the sit. in Iran”

Otherwise eliminate altogether

Ed add “It was decided agreed that the matter would be pursued further through the dip. channel.”

Montreux
Mol. after “Convention”: which ceased to correspond to the contemporary sit.”

It’s a hint in regard to change

ERS we should consider sit. before suggest give a hint

Ed. Alternative: the changes proposals which it was understood the Sov. Govt would put forward with reference in relation to the Montreux Con.

Agreed to Ed. alternative with last sentence omitted

Ed. We will inform the Turks

Mol About the fact that this q. will be raised

Ed insert informed “at the appropriate moment”

Mol. Insists on his amend

Ed. willing to stop there & leave out assurance point.

Transmit to Pres. copy of what ERS signs Protocol & of 2 tels to

Ed. submitted the draft cable to de G. re zone of occup & Control Com

ERS agreed

Mol. hadn’t had time to read

Mol. Gave his prelim. consent. Mar. St. has not seen them. Will give his answer tonight

Saudi Arabia – Mol. To let Ed. Know

201

Working Draft of the Protocol of Proceedings Revised by the Foreign Ministers

February 11, 1945, 4:20 p.m.

Crimea Conference

Summary of Conclusions Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference

The following conclusions were arrived at –

I. World organization

It was decided:

  1. that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

  2. the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

    (a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 February, 1945; and

    (b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term “Associated Nation” was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey). When the Conference on World Organisation is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e. the Ukraine and White Russia.

  3. that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation.

  4. that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

Invitation

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of ——— to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above-named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

c. Voting

  1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

  2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

  3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

Territorial trusteeship

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference, or in the preliminary consultations and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. Declaration on liberated Europe

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

III. Dismemberment of Germany

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security.

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. Zone of occupation for the French and Control Commission for Germany

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Commission for Germany.

V. Reparation

The following protocol has been approved:

It was agreed that a Reparations Commission should be set up in Moscow. This Commission will comprise one representative from the USA, USSR, and U.K., each representative being assisted by such expert advisers as may be necessary. The Commission should begin its work as soon as possible.

It was agreed that the following should be the basic principles of exaction of reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

  1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

  2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labour by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

    Removal in a single payment in the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

    These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

    Annual deliveries of commodities during 10 years after the end of the war.

  3. Germany is to pay compensation in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied Nations during the war and the Moscow Reparations Commission shall have the task of considering the amount of reparations to be paid.

VI. Major war criminals

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

VII. Poland

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the USA will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. It is They recognised that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

VIII. Yugoslavia

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

  • (i) that the National Liberation Committee will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

  • (ii) that legislative acts passed by the National Liberation Committee will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly;

and that this statement should be published in the communique of the Conference.

IX. Italo-Yugoslav frontier
Italo-Austria frontier

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations

There was an exchange of views among the Foreign Ministers Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed of the views of the Three Powers. that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov promised to consider the matter and to give his views on the following day. agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. South Eastern Europe

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:
(a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.
(c) Oil equipment in Roumania.

XII. Persia

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius drew attention to the importance of observing the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration of 1 December, 1943, particularly insofar as concerned requests for oil concessions in Persia.

XIII. Meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. The Montreux Convention and the Straits

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider what changes should be made in the arrangements for the Straits laid down in proposals which Sov Govt will make in regard the Montreux Convention and report thereon to the three Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed that this matter is under consideration and should be given an assurance that their independence and integrity is in no way affected. at the proper moment.

202

U.S. Delegation Draft of Announcement Regarding the United Nations Conference

February 11, 1945, 4:20 p.m.

Joint Communiqué on International Organization

The proposals for a general international organization resulting from the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks have been considered, and agreed proposals have been worked out on the major points left open at those conversations. Our views are being transmitted to the Government of China and to the Provisional Government of the French Republic for their consideration. As soon as these consultations have been completed, the proposals agreed upon will be made public and invitations will be issued to a United Nations Conference to be held in the United States about April 15. This conference will prepare the charter of the general international organization.