America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

[NormanStewart]

British Proposal Regarding the Austrian-Yugoslav Frontier

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

British Statement on Austro-Yugoslav Frontier

If the British proposals for the allocation of zones of occupation in Austria are approved, the whole length of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier will be a British responsibility. This may involve us in difficulties with Yugoslavia because though the Yugoslav Government have not so far asked for any alteration of the Styrian portion of this frontier they have advanced claims to Klagenfurt and those parts of Carinthia which they failed to obtain under the plebiscite held in 1919. Action may be required to resist Yugoslav efforts to assert these claims and to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav partisans who in the course of operations may well advance into Carinthia and establish control over it. It would be invidious for HMG to be solely responsible for such action and after our experiences in Greece we must try to prevent British troops from becoming involved in fighting with Allied partisans. We hope, therefore that an agreement might be reached between the three powers for the maintenance of the 1937 Austro-Yugoslav frontier pending the final territorial settlement and for joint measures to ensure its maintenance and observance by Yugoslavia.

It is therefore suggested we should agree at the present conference:

• (a) that pending the final peace settlement the 1937 frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia shall be restored.

• (b) that the integrity of this frontier is the joint interest of the three powers, and that the USSR and the USA will support any action which HMG may see fit to take to preserve its integrity.

• (c) that the three powers should jointly inform the Yugoslav Government of decisions (a) and (b) above and request the Yugoslav Government to give an undertaking to preserve this frontier.

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British Proposal Regarding Venezia Giulia

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Notes for the Secretaries of State in Regard to Venezia Giulia

I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the province of Venezia Giulia in the northeast of Italy is a potential powder magazine. It is therefore likely that there will, as the war draws to a close, be clashes in this area between the Yugoslavs and the Italians, and we must prevent these outbursts to the best of our ability.

We had originally intended to set up Allied Military Government over the whole province up to the 1937 frontier but we now have doubts whether this would be a very satisfactory course for the following reasons. Tito has not yet put his views in writing but he has made it pretty clear that he will not agree to such a proposal. He certainly intends to administer himself the considerable areas which he claims for Yugoslavia and part of which are already controlled by his Partisans. Even if under extreme pressure he was forced to accept Allied (British) Military Government his Partisans would remain in arms throughout the district and it would be a miracle if sooner or later they did not obstruct our Military administration. We should then have to take forceful measures to assert our authority and fighting might begin. Alternatively, there might be clashes between the Yugoslav Partisans and the Italian Partisans, both trying to hold as much territory as they could. In that case also we should have to intervene to keep the peace by force. I would therefore ask my colleagues to agree to establish some body for the purpose of working out a provisional line of demarcation in the Venezia Giulia between the area to be controlled by Tito and the area over which we should establish Allied Military Government. We have made an attempt ourselves to draw up such a line based for the most part of ethnic considerations. But obviously we cannot jointly agree on a line now, all we can do is agree to the principle that there should be such a line and that some body of technicians should be established for the purpose of determining it. After that it would no doubt be for His Majesty’s Government to obtain Tito’s acceptance of it. But if they do this His Majesty’s Government would like to be able to say that both their Allies agree with the proposal.

Finally, I would point out that in any case, even if the area west of my suggested provisional line is allotted to Tito, it will be necessary, in the early stages at any rate, for our Supreme Commander to make use of the communications from Trieste northwards in which case he would have to take suitable measures to that end. It might later be possible for him to arrange for his communications to Austria to pass further to the west.

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British Proposal Regarding the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria

His Majesty’s Government regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the “Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary,” and His Majesty’s Government suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11, 1944.

His Majesty’s Government also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.

During the second period, i.e. after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, His Majesty’s Government wish to ensure that

• (a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commissions. They should also have the right of direct access to the Bulgarian authorities.

• (b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commission should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in de facto control of Bulgaria through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Government or taking action which has not been approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.

• (c) The extent to which the British and Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commission will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any subcommittee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

• (d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commission on the spot.

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British Proposal on Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

His Majesty’s Government recently communicated to the Soviet Government an expression of their views regarding a possible Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. In replying to this communication, the Soviet Government informed His Majesty’s Government that they were aware that negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for the conclusion of a pact of alliance and mutual assistance were proceeding and added that their attitude towards this was favourable. The Soviet Government, however, considered that the question of a Balkan federation, and in particular of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, was not at present actual and was of no practical importance.

While His Majesty’s Government are glad to learn that the Soviet Government do not consider the question of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation to be actual at present and that they regard the matter as of no practical importance, they are disturbed to learn that a pact of alliance and mutual assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is under negotiation and that the attitude of the Soviet Government towards these negotiations is favourable.

His Majesty’s Government cannot but regard the pact now under negotiation as open to the same objections which they felt in regard to a possible federation. In their view an enemy state whose status is still regulated by an armistice regime must be debarred from entering into special treaty relations with another state, more particularly with another state with which she is still technically in a state of war except with the explicit permission of all the victorious Powers with whom the armistice was concluded.

Quite apart from the important question of principle involved, His Majesty’s Government are also anxious regarding the effect of the pact now under negotiation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria upon the interests of Greece which has hitherto not received from Bulgaria the full reparation to which she is entitled under the terms of the armistice. This aspect of the matter is treated in greater detail in a separate aide-mémoire.

His Majesty’s Government accordingly consider that a communication should be made to the Bulgarian Government by all the victorious Powers with whom she recently concluded an armistice, stating that they cannot agree to her entering into special treaty relations with Yugoslavia at this stage and that full reparation must be made to Greece before there can be any question of such negotiations being resumed. His Majesty’s Government consider that Marshal Tito should simultaneously be informed of the objections seen by the victorious Powers to the conclusion of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact. His Majesty’s Government would be glad to learn the views of the Soviet Government upon this matter as soon as possible.

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British Proposal Regarding Greek Claims on Bulgaria

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Greek Claims Upon Bulgaria, More Particularly in Regard to Reparations

His Majesty’s Government are concerned regarding the position in regard to Greek claims against Bulgaria. On the occasion of the signature of the Armistice with Hungary, the Soviet Government informed the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments that they might send representatives to be accredited to the Hungarian Control Commission for the purpose of dealing with all questions affecting their particular government.

On January 23, the Greek Government, with the support of His Majesty’s Embassy in Moscow, approached the Soviet Government with a request for facilities in Bulgaria similar to those granted to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments in Hungary. No reply has, however, yet been vouchsafed to this request by the Soviet Government.

The Greek people have suffered very seriously from Bulgarian depredations and are in the view of His Majesty’s Government entitled to early satisfaction and to immediate reparation deliveries of which Greece stands in urgent need. The Greek Government have already presented to the Bulgarian Control Commission a list of commodities necessary to the Greek economy and due to them in virtue of the Bulgarian Armistice Agreement, the delivery of which to Greece in the immediate future is essential to the maintenance of Greek economy. Deliveries which are more urgently required comprise, inter alia, food stuffs, locomotives, agricultural implements and livestock. Furthermore, in view of the decision incorporated in the Hungarian armistice terms allotting to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fixed sums payable in commodities as reparations over a period of six years, it is in the view of His Majesty’s Government equitable that similar arrangements should be made to fix a lump sum due to Greece by Bulgaria to be paid similarly in commodities over a period of six years. In the view of His Majesty’s Government a corresponding sum should be allocated to Yugoslavia which has also suffered from Bulgarian occupation. In this connection his Majesty’s Government desire to make it clear that, while they are in general opposed to the fixing of lump sums for reparations to be exacted from enemy countries, they consider it only equitable, in view of the fact that lump sums have been allocated to the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments under the Rumanian, Finnish and Hungarian Armistices, that a similar lump sum should now be allocated to Greece and Yugoslavia under the Bulgarian Armistice.

His Majesty’s Government accordingly trust that the Soviet Government will accede to the proposals put to them on January 23 with the support of His Majesty’s Government concerning Greek representation on the Control Commission in Bulgaria. They further trust that the Soviet Government will agree to give explicit instructions to the head of the Control Commission in Bulgaria that immediate deliveries must be made to Greece in accordance with the terms of the armistice and that the list already presented by the Greek Government to the Soviet Government is to be taken as the basis for determining the nature and amounts of commodities to be delivered. Finally, His Majesty’s Government are of the opinion that immediate consideration should be given to the question of fixing the total Bulgarian reparation liability to Greece and Yugoslavia, if necessary in terms of money.

[NormanStewart]

British Memorandum on Oil Equipment in Romania

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Oil Equipment in Roumania

His Majesty’s Government have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat plant should remain in situ. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned, His Majesty’s Government considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly, the Ruat plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by His Majesty’s Government that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, His Majesty’s Government can only refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking unilateral action.

[NormanStewart]

Harriman Memorandum of Conversations

Leningrad, February 10, 1945, 2:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.
Top secret

		1st Conversation
Present:	Mr. Harriman	Date:	February 10, 1945
	Mr. Molotov	Time:	2:00 PM
	Mr. Pavlov	Place:	Koreis
		2nd Conversation
Present:	The President	Date:	February 10, 1945
	Mr. Harriman	Time:	[blank]
		Place:	Livadia Palace
		3rd Conversation
Present:	The President	Date:	February 10, 1945
	Mr. Harriman	Time:	4:30 PM
	Marshal Stalin	Place:	Livadia Palace

Subject: THE FAR EAST – POLITICAL

At Mr. Molotov’s request I called on him at Koreis at 2:00 p.m. He handed me in English translation the draft of Marshal Stalin’s political conditions for Russia’s entry in the war against Japan as discussed with the President on February 8.

I explained to Molotov that there were three amendments I believed the President would wish to make before accepting:

2. b) should indicate Stalin’s readiness to accept the President’s proposal that Port Arthur and Dairen should be free ports and 2. c) should cover the alternative of the railways being operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission, both of which Marshal Stalin had agreed to. In addition, I said I felt sure that the President would not wish to dispose finally of these two matters in which China was interested without the concurrence of the Generalissimo.

Mr. Molotov indicated that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the first two points but it took me some time to explain to Molotov the reasons for the last. I agreed to submit to Molotov the President’s suggested revisions.

On my return to Livadia I showed the President the proposed draft (copy attached) with the amendments covering the points mentioned (copy of amendments attached): The President approved and authorized me to resubmit them to Mr. Molotov, which I did.

After the formal Conference meeting in the afternoon between the President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin and their associates, Marshal Stalin came to me to explain the further changes he had in mind for the Agreement. He said that he was entirely willing to have Dairen a free port under international control, but that Port Arthur was different, it was to be a Russian naval base and therefore Russia required a lease.

I suggested to Marshal Stalin that he take the opportunity to discuss this matter at once with the President, which he thereupon did.

The President agreed to Marshal Stalin’s revised proposal regarding the ports as above.

Marshal Stalin then explained that he agreed it would be more appropriate for the Manchurian Railroads to be operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission. He further agreed in the need for concurrence of the Generalissimo on these matters but stated that the Generalissimo should also give his concurrence to status quo in Outer Mongolia.

The President asked Marshal Stalin whether he (Stalin) wished to take these matters up with T. V. Soong when he came to Moscow or whether Stalin wished the President to take them up with the Generalissimo.

Marshal Stalin replied that as he was an interested party he would prefer to have the President do it.

The President then asked when the subject should be discussed with the Generalissimo having in mind the question of secrecy.

Marshal Stalin said he would let the President know when he was prepared to have this done.

The President said that he would send an army officer from Washington through Moscow to Chungking with a letter of instructions to Ambassador Hurley in order to insure secrecy.

At that moment the Prime Minister interrupted the discussion. I had an opportunity later, however, to ask Marshal Stalin whether he would undertake to draft the further revisions, to which he replied in the affirmative.

W. A. HARRIMAN

3. Attachments

[Attachment 1 — TRANSLATION]

Draft of Marshal Stalin’s Political Conditions for Russia’s Entry in the War Against Japan

The leaders of the three Great Powers – the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. Status quo in the Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic) should be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:

• a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union,

• b) possession of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored.

• c) the rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding that China should continue to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

[Attachment 2]

Mr. Harriman’s Suggested Changes in Marshal Stalin’s Draft of Russia’s Political Conditions for Russia’s Entry in the War Against Japan

Item 2 b)

possession lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen en lease should be restored, or these areas should become free ports under international control.

Item 2 c)

Add the following after the word “Manchuria;” at the end of the paragraph “or these railroads should be placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet Commission.”

Item 3

Add final paragraph:

It is understood that the agreement concerning the ports and railways referred to above requires the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

NOTE: Portions crossed out are deletions and portions underlined are additions to original document.

[NormanStewart]

Seventh plenary meeting, 4:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Foote	Major Birse
Mr. Early	Mr. Roberts
	Mr. Allen

Bohlen Minutes

Leningrad, February 10, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

Subjects:

• POLAND
• FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GERMANY
• YUGOSLAVIA
• WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
• REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY
• THE DARDANELLES

The President said that he thought that Mr. Eden had a report to make on the progress achieved at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning.

Mr. Eden said that he had to report agreement on the future Government of Poland, that there had been two questions involved which he would refer to later but in the meantime he would read the new formula. He read the new formula with one correction which he admitted to have been made by Mr. Molotov. The new formula was as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the re-organisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the USA will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The Prime Minister said that the document made no mention of frontiers. He said we are all agreed on the Eastern frontier of Poland and he agreed that Poland should receive compensation in the West, up to the line of the Oder if the Poles so desired. He said that the British Government was very doubtful about going any further or mentioning any such possibility at this stage, since he did not believe that the War Cabinet would accept the line of the Western Neisse. He said he felt, however, that some mention should be made of the territorial settlement otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been decided on this question. There would be some criticism, but nevertheless, it would be better than no mention at all.

The President said that the Polish Government should be consulted before any statement was made in regard to the Western frontier.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought that there should be some statement on the Eastern frontier on which all present had agreed.

The Prime Minister concurred with this statement of Marshal Stalin and repeated the people would wish to know what we had decided on this question.

Mr. Molotov remarked that it would be a good thing if something definite could be said about the Eastern frontier, since it would clarify and quiet the whole situation insofar as the Poles were concerned. He said that it was certain that there would be criticisms, but he felt it would in general be beneficial. He suggested that the matter be referred to the three Foreign Ministers to draft some statement on this point. He added that it was perhaps not necessary to be as specific in regard to the Western frontier as in regard to the Eastern frontier.

The Prime Minister said that he had already gone on record to the effect that Poland would receive a good slice of territory in the North and in the West but that the opinion of the New Polish Government of National Unity would be sought.

The President said he had no objection in principle to such a statement but he thought the Prime Minister should draft it.

Mr. Molotov suggested that it should form a last sentence of the Polish statement.

Mr. Eden, continuing his report, said that in regard to his [the] declaration on liberated Europe the Soviet Delegation had proposed an amendment in regard to the last sentence of the fifth paragraph to the effect that the three Governments should immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultations. Mr. Eden said that he proposed a draft that the three Governments should immediately consult together upon the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

After some discussion as to what had been agreed upon at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning, Marshal Stalin said he accepted the British suggestion.

Mr. Eden then said there was a note which he wished to attach to this declaration, namely, that the French should be invited to associate themselves with the declaration and that his note would merely state that in issuing this declaration the three heads of Governments expressed the hope that the Provisional Government of France would associate themselves in the actions and procedures envisaged therein.

The President then said that he had changed his mind in regard to the question of the French participation in the Control Commission. He now agreed with the views of the Prime Minister that it would be impossible to give France an area to administer in Germany unless they were members of the Control Commission. He said he thought it would be easier to deal with the French if they were on the Commission than if they were not.

Marshal Stalin said he had no objections and that he agreed to this.

The Prime Minister suggested that there should be a joint telegram sent to De Gaulle informing him of these decisions to which there was general agreement.

Mr. Eden said the next subject was that of Yugoslavia and read the text of a telegram to be sent to Marshal Tito and Subasic suggesting that the agreement which they had reached be immediately put into effect as the basis for the formation of a unified Government of Yugoslavia.

The President said he was not sure whether he would be able to join in the statement on Yugoslavia but when it had been read to him, he agreed that it was satisfactory and that he could associate himself with it.

After some discussion Marshal Stalin suggested that the telegram to Marshal Tito and Subasic should say that the heads of the three Governments have agreed that the agreement between Tito and Subasic should be put immediately into effect and that as soon as a new Government was formed the two amendments proposed by the British should be put into effect. He said he thought it was inconsistent to put more in the communiqué than there was in the telegram.

The Prime Minister said he hoped that both of the two amendments proposed by the British could be in the communiqué.

Mr. Molotov said he thought it would be better to confine the telegram and reference in the communiqué to the entry into force of the Tito-Subasic agreement.

The Prime Minister said he thought the British people would be more reconciled to the Government and it would have a better reception if the two amendments were included.

After some discussion with the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden, Marshal Stalin said he thought that three points could be included in the telegram: (1) that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go immediately into force, (2) that the members of the Skupschina who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into the Vetch, and (3) that the actions of the anti-fascist Vetch would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assembly. He added that he thought these three points could go into the communiqué.

Mr. Eden said that the sub-committee in regard to Dumbarton Oaks had reported on the matter of informing the French and Chinese Governments and on the form of the invitations, but he did not feel that it was necessary to bother the Conference with these small matters. He went on to say that in regard to reparations the British Government still had reservations in regard to the Soviet proposals.

The Prime Minister said he had received instructions from the War Cabinet not to mention figures and that that should be left to the reparations committee to determine.

The President said that he was afraid that if reparations and especially if any figures were mentioned that the American people would believe that it involved money.

Marshal Stalin explained that the sum mentioned was only the expression of the value of the reparations in kind.

The Prime Minister added that nothing would be published, as he understood it, in regard to reparations but that he could not agree to the inclusion of a definite sum.

Marshal Stalin said he wished to discuss the circumstances of the matter. He did not understand why there should be any confusion in regard to payment in money since the Soviet Union had concluded three treaties with Finland, Rumania and Hungary in which the value of reparations in kind were definitely stated and that there had been no confusion as far as he knew on this subject. He said that if the British felt that the Russians should receive no reparations at all, it would be better to say so frankly. He said he had heard a great deal of talk at the Conference that the Russians would receive reparations in kind in the form of factories and plants but that no decision had been reached. He said he thought that two decisions might be taken by the Conference: (1) that it was agreed in principle that Germany should pay reparations and (2) that the Reparations Commission to sit in Moscow should fix the amount and should take into consideration the American-Soviet proposal that there should be twenty billion dollars of reparations, with fifty per cent to the Soviet Union.

The President said he feared the word “reparations” somewhat since he thought the people in America would think it meant reparations in cash.

Someone replied that this could be easily avoided by using the term “compensation for damages caused by Germany during the war” instead of “reparations.”

Mr. Molotov said that the Moscow commission would have the duty of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula.

The Prime Minister replied that the British Government could not commit itself to any figure.

Marshal Stalin replied that there was no commitment involved but it might be said that the Commission might take as material for discussion the American-Soviet formula.

The Prime Minister then read a telegram from the War Cabinet which said that they considered it inadmissible to state any figure until an investigation had been completed on the spot and that at any rate the figure of twenty billion dollars was too great. It was equal to Germany’s export trade in times of peace and it was beyond the capacity of Germany to pay. It was true that some of these reparations would come from Germany’s capital assets but that in turn would make it more difficult for Germany to pay her bills. The payments would more than cover German imports and if these imports were not given a priority ahead of reparations it would mean that the other countries would be paying for German reparations to those countries receiving them.

Marshal Stalin said he did not want to go into the circumstances of the telegram the Prime Minister had just read. The experts may be right, but that all they were preparing was a figure to be used as a basis for discussions – it could be reduced or increased by the Commission in Moscow.

The President then suggested that the whole matter be left to the Commission in Moscow.

Marshal Stalin said that he felt in principle that Germany should pay reparations which would be stated by the three Governments here.

Mr. Molotov said that yesterday Mr. Stettinius had analyzed the results of the meeting and had reported full agreement on the first two points of the Soviet proposal. Now the question was what countries should receive reparations and the type of reparations and differences only appeared between the United States and the Soviet Delegation on the one hand and the British on the other in regard to the naming of a sum.

Mr. Eden said that rightly or wrongly, the British Government felt that even the naming of a sum as the basis of discussions would commit them. He said he proposed that the Moscow Commission be instructed to examine the report of Mr. Maisky, made at the Crimean Conference.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Maisky both replied that to refer a question put by the Crimean Conference to a lesser body would be utterly illogical.

The Prime Minister said that no agreement had been reached as to the mention of a sum.

Mr. Eden added that the first two points referred to by Mr. Molotov were agreed upon but not the last which related to the sum.

Marshal Stalin repeated that he was willing to propose the following formula: (1) that the heads of the Governments had agreed that Germany must pay compensation for the damages caused to the Allied nations as a result of the war, and (2) that the Moscow Commission be instructed to consider the amount of reparations. This was agreed to by the Conference.

There was then a short intermission.

The President inquired whether they could discuss the British text of the paragraph on frontiers to be added to the Polish statement.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not yet received the Russian translation.

Marshal Stalin then said that he would like to say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles. He said the treaty was now outmoded. As he recalled, the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union. The treaty was linked with the League which does not exist just as the Japanese Emperor was not present at this Conference. Under the Montreux Convention the Turks have the right to close the Straits not only in time of war but if they feel that there is a threat of war. He said that the treaty was made at a time when the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not perfect, but he did not think now that Great Britain would wish to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese. The treaty needed revision. He thought that there would be no objection to a consideration of the revision of that treaty. He said in what manner the treaty should be revised he did not know and he did not wish to prejudge any decisions, but he felt that the interests of Russia should be considered. He said that it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia’s throat. He added, however, that it should be done in such a manner as not to harm the legitimate interests of Turkey. This was a question which an appropriate organization could consider and he thought that the three Foreign Ministers who were to meet periodically – every two or three months – might well consider this matter at their first meeting and report to their respective cabinets.

The President said he had one general observation to make and that was that in the United States we had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada and there was no fort and no armed forces. This situation had existed over a hundred years and it was his hope that other frontiers in the World would eventually be without forts or armed forces on any part of their national boundaries.

The Prime Minister said that Marshal Stalin had reminded them of the question of the Straits when they were in Moscow last autumn. They had said then that they were in sympathy with the revision of the treaty and had suggested to the Soviet Government that a note be sent on the subject but none has as yet been received. He said that he thought that the method proposed by Marshal Stalin was a wise one. The British certainly felt that the present position of Russia with their great interests in the Black Sea should not be dependent on the narrow exit. He said if the matter is brought up at the meeting with the Foreign Ministers he hoped the Russians would make their proposals known. In the meantime, it might be well to inform the Turks that the matter of revision of the Montreux Convention would be under consideration. This was particularly true if the Allies desired them to come into the war on their side. Mr. Eden reminded him that he had mentioned the matter several times to the Turkish Ambassador in London. He said it might be advisable to give the Turks at the same time some assurance that their independence and integrity will be guaranteed.

Marshal Stalin replied it was impossible to keep anything secret from the Turks and that such assurance should be expressed.

The President agreed to this.

Marshal Stalin said the Foreign Ministers could meet at the United Nations Conference and discuss the question of the Straits.

The Prime Minister said that he thought that this matter affected the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean more than it did that of the United States and that he felt that if the Foreign Ministers had a meeting in London that that would be the proper place to discuss this question. He went on to say that some years ago he had tried very hard to get through the Dardanelles and then the Russian Government had made available an armed force to help but it did not succeed.

Marshal Stalin said that the Prime Minister had been in too much of a hurry in withdrawing his troops since the Germans and Turks were on the verge of surrender.

The Prime Minister replied that by that time he was out of the government because of the Dardanelles campaign and had had nothing to do with that decision.

Marshal Stalin then inquired who was taking down decisions reached at this conference.

Mr. Eden replied there would be an agreed upon communiqué as well as a list of the decisions taken.

The President then said he wished to propose some small amendments in the paragraph regarding frontiers in the Polish statement. He said these amendments were necessary for American Constitutional reasons. He suggested that instead of the first words “The three powers” he would like to substitute “The three heads of government” and that in the second sentence the words “three powers” be eliminated, and in the last sentence the word “feel” instead of “agree” should be used.

These amendments were accepted by the conference, and the following text approved:

The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. It is recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

Mr. Molotov said he had one suggestion and that was to add to the second sentence “with the return to Poland of her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder.”

The President inquired how long ago these lands had been Polish.

Mr. Molotov said very long ago, but they had in fact been Polish.

The President said this might lead the British to ask for the return of the United States to Great Britain.

Marshal Stalin replied that the ocean prevented this. He added that at the present the draft said nothing specific about frontiers, which he thought was very important for the Poles.

The Prime Minister said he would prefer not to mention the frontier in the west since he shared the same difficulties the President had spoken of.

Mr. Eden said that they had always said that they would accept any line up to the Oder that the Poles desired.

The Prime Minister said that there was no stopping place between what we proposed to do and the line of the Oder, and if the question is asked about ancient territories there would be no answer. He said that he was not against the line of the Oder in principle if the Poles so desired.

Mr. Molotov said he thought it might be worthwhile considering this wording.

Marshal Stalin said he would withdraw the Soviet amendment and leave the British draft as it had been.

The draft of the last paragraph regarding Polish frontiers was accepted.

The President then remarked he would have to leave Yalta tomorrow at three o’clock in the afternoon.

The Prime Minister remarked that he doubted if it would be possible to get all the work done by then, particularly the communiqué and the final text of the documents.

There followed a discussion between the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden concerning the possibility of preparing the communiqué before the time set for the President’s departure.

Marshal Stalin remarked that there was very little time and he felt it was impossible to complete the work in view of the dinner. He suggested that the dinner might be cancelled.

After some discussion it was decided that a drafting committee for the communiqué should come to the Villa and report at ten o’clock to the Foreign Ministers and heads of government.

The meeting then adjourned.

[NormanStewart]

Matthews Minutes

Leningrad, February 10, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

The President opened the meeting (which was delayed owing to an earlier discussion between Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin) by asking Mr. Eden to render a report on the foreign secretaries’ meetings of last night and this morning.

Eden: I should like to report that with the exception of two points outstanding we have reached a decision on the Polish question. I believe that we have since worked out an agreement with regard to these two points. (He reads the Polish formula, which after some discussion as to wording was finally agreed to.)

Prime Minister: There is no reference in this formula to the frontier question. The world at large will ask about that. We are all agreed I believe about the eastern frontier. We are all agreed in principle about the western frontier. The only question is where the line is to be drawn and how much to say about it in our communiqué. We are doubtful about going further in mentioning frontiers at this stage. I have received a telegram from the War Cabinet deprecating any frontier going as far west as the Neisse. They feel that the population problem is too large to handle.

President: My position is that I would rather hear from the new government of national unity what they think about it. Therefore, I think we had better leave out all references to frontiers.

Prime Minister: On the west?

Stalin: It is important to say something.

Prime Minister: I agree. People will immediately ask what is the settlement on the question of the frontiers. We think that the eastern frontier is settled. On the west the wishes of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity must be consulted.

President: I do not believe we should say anything in the communiqué. I have no right to make an agreement on boundaries at this time. That must be done by the Senate later. Let the Prime Minister make some public statement when he returns if that is necessary.

Molotov: I think it would be very good if something could be said about full agreement of the three heads of government on the eastern frontier. We could say that the Curzon line is generally representative of the opinion of all present. It is possible that there might be criticism of this for some time but that would be better in the long run. We should either agree or leave to the three foreign ministers to find a formula. I agree that we need say nothing about the western frontier.

Prime Minister: I agree we must say something.

Molotov: Yes, but less specific if you wish.

Prime Minister: We must say that Poland is to get compensation in the west; also that there is to be left for discussion with the Polish government before the line is drawn.

Molotov: Very good.

Prime Minister: We must go out now with the rest of our communiqué on Poland. (Matter is referred to the three foreign ministers.)

Stalin: That could be done during our intermission.

Eden: I shall next report on the declaration on liberated areas. Mr. Molotov kindly withdrew his amendment of last night with regard to the third from last paragraph but has proposed the following wording at the end of the penultimate paragraph. (There followed considerable discussion as to the exact wording that was agreed upon and finally Marshal Stalin accepted the following: “… shall consult together on the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.” In this form it was approved.)

I should like to add a sentence with regard to the French which we proposed last evening to clear up the ambiguous situation in regard to France. (The following was approved: “In issuing this declaration the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of France will associate itself with them.”)

President: I should like to say that I have changed my mind with regard to the position of the French on the Control Council for Germany. The more I think of it the more I think that the Prime Minister is right and that a nation with a zone of occupation must sit in on the control machinery. I think it would be easier if France is on the commission to get de Gaulle to agree to join the liberated areas declaration and many other things.

Stalin: I have no objection. (It is agreed upon.)

Prime Minister: Of course France may say that she will have no part in the declaration and reserve all rights for the future. (laughing) We must face that.

Molotov: We must be ready to receive a rough answer.

Eden: Next is the question of Yugoslavia. We prepared a draft on this which is still under discussion. (After some discussion between the British and Russians a draft telegram to Yugoslavia is agreed upon. Copy attached.) Molotov insisted that the telegram should be short and should be sent today. The Prime Minister wanted the joint telegram to contain not only the exhortation that the Tito-Subasic agreement be put into effect immediately and the new united government formed but also the additional points which the new government would be asked to accept (Subasic recommendations). First that the Avnoj be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament, and, two, that legislative acts passed by the Avnoj would be subject to ratification by a constituent assembly. The British also wanted a third provision to the effect that the government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people but dropped this at the Russian request as offensive to Yugoslav sensibilities. On that basis the telegram was agreed upon by all three after considerable discussion by the Prime Minister and Stalin, the latter wanting originally to confine the telegram to the question of the execution of the Tito-Subasic agreement and await till the government was formed before taking up the other point.

There followed a lengthy and at times somewhat heated discussion between Marshal Stalin and Churchill on the question of reparations. This was the only time during the conference that Stalin showed some annoyance. He obviously felt suspicious of the British opposing Russian reparations as part of a program to build up a strong Germany. At one stage in the discussion, he asked point blank if the British did not want the Russians to receive reparations they should say so frankly. This of course Mr. Churchill emphatically denied. Stalin proposed that the three governments accept the principle of reparations in goods. (The President made it clear that what he feared was a system of reparations paid in money.) And second that the Moscow commission should be asked to find out the total or total possible reparations and report to the respective governments. He also asked that the three governments agree that Germany must pay in kind for losses suffered in the course of the war.

Molotov: We must give the Moscow commission on reparations the task of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula. The commission need only take that as the basis.

Prime Minister: We have had a very important communication from our government on this question. We cannot accept any specific figures in any formula.

Stalin: I propose first that the three heads of government agree that Germany must pay compensation in kind for losses caused during the war. Two, the heads of the three governments agree that Germany must pay for losses to the allied nations. Three, the Moscow reparations commission is given the task to consider the amount to be paid. We bring our figures before the commission and you bring yours, (to Churchill)

(This was followed by an intermission during which the formula to be used on Polish frontiers for inclusion in the communiqué was largely worked out.)

President: Marshal Stalin said that he wanted to talk a little on some question after our intermission and I now invite him to do so.

Stalin: I should like to say a few words on the Montreux Convention. We believe that it is now out of date. The Japanese Emperor was one of the parties to it. In fact, he plays a greater role in it than the Soviet Union. The treaty was made at a time when relations between Britain and Russia were not very good. Now that is all changed. I do not think that Great Britain would with the help of the Japanese want to strangle Russia. Now the convention should be seriously modified. I do not wish to pre-judge future decisions. The interests of Russia should be taken into account and observed. The legitimate interests of Turkey must not be infringed. The question is how to do it. We can of course ask a certain organism to discuss this question. We have agreed that the three foreign ministers should meet from time to time. Perhaps they could discuss this question at their first meeting and report to the three governments. This would be a preparatory step to settling the question.

President: I only want to say that we have three thousand miles of natural boundary with Canada. There is no fort and no armed ship on this entire distance. If other parts of the world would do the same it would be a wonderful thing.

Prime Minister: Marshal Stalin mentioned this question to me and to Eden in Moscow. We viewed it with sympathy. We agreed with the Soviets that the Montreux Convention should be revised or reconstructed. We asked the Soviet Government for a note with their ideas. This has not yet been received. The suggestion of Marshal Stalin is a wise one. I certainly feel that the present position of Russia – her Black Sea dependent on the narrow exit – is not satisfactory. I hope our Russian allies will make their proposal. Meanwhile, if Turkey wanted to declare war we should tell her beforehand that this matter is to be brought under consideration. They should know that fact before going into the war. I believe we are obligated to tell them. (After conferring with Mr. Eden) Eden tells me that he did mention that matter to the Turkish ambassador in London in general terms following our Moscow visit, so we have kept our engagement. It is worth considering whether when changes are made some assurances should be given Turkey that her independence will not be affected.

Stalin: Certainly we should give such assurance. When the foreign ministers meet in April in the United States at the end of the conference could they not discuss the question of the straits?

Prime Minister: Well, I think this question affects Britain with her Mediterranean interests more than the United States. Therefore, I believe that the meeting should be in London.

I tried some time ago to get through the Dardanelles (smiling) and the former Russian government had two army corps ready to help me at the other end. However, we did not succeed in joining hands. I consequently have some feeling on this question.

Stalin: You were in too much of a hurry to take away your troops. Perhaps in another week you would have won as the Germans and Turks were getting ready to withdraw.

Prime Minister: I had nothing to do with that decision. I was already out of the government. (It was decided that the question would be discussed by the three foreign ministers in London.)

President: The only thing left now is the amended text on the frontiers of Poland. (The text is then read for consideration by the Russians who had received the Russian text.)

Stalin: I should like to suggest an amendment in the phraseology to indicate that Poland should receive the return of her ancient frontier of East Prussia and the Oder.

President: (Laughing to Prime Minister) Perhaps you would want us back?

Prime Minister: Well you might be as indigestible for us as it might be for the Poles if they took too much German territory.

Molotov: This change would give great encouragement to the Poles.

Prime Minister: I prefer to leave it as it is.

Molotov: But there is no mention of frontiers in the west. What about the Oder? No exchange was mentioned.

Prime Minister: Well, between what we propose and the question of specifying ancient territories up to the Oder there seems to be no stopping place.

Stalin: I withdraw my suggestion and agree to leave it as drawn. The President suggested changes (change “agreed” to “consider” in the first sentence and change “the three powers” to “the three heads of government” in the third sentence) are accepted. This I believe is our last point of decision.

President: There only remains the question of the communiqué I must leave tomorrow at 3 p.m. I hope we can get the communiqué done and I suggest that if we meet at eleven tomorrow we can finish it by lunch. (This suggestion is vigorously opposed by Churchill and to a lesser degree by Stalin, both of whom insist that the communiqué is most important and should not be drawn too hastily. The matter was left indefinite with the representatives of the three governments assigned the task of concluding their drafts – an American and British draft had already been prepared – for submission to the Big Three.)

The meeting then adjourned.

[NormanStewart]

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 10, 1945, 4 p.m.

Plenary 2/10 4.55

Ed. reported on meeting For Mins

We reached agt re Pol – there were two outstanding q’s Perhaps I may come to that in a moment. Read draft as it now stands (included some changes app. agreed to by Church & St. in their private meeting before plenary session) included Mol. amend of noon. and new amend: “and will exchange Ambs. by whose reports the respective govts will be kept informed about the situation in Poland”

Church: We have made no reference to frontiers but of course people will ask at once about frontiers, what we have agreed. We are all agreed about the E. frontier, we are all agreed in prin. about W. frontier. The only q is where it is to be exactly drawn & how much we should say about it. We all agreed that the Poles are to have E. Pr. & be free to go to the line of the Oder if they so desire. We are very doubtful indeed about going further or mentioning at this stage – we have had a tel. from our War Cab. strongly deprecating frontier going as far as W. Neisse because they think the problem is larger than we could manage

Pres. We should rather hear from the Pol. Govt of Nat. Unity we had better leave out all references to boundaries

Church: on West?

Maisky on East we should say something Church. agreed.

Church people will immediately say what is the position about the frontier. We think E. frontier is settled. We think on W. frontier wishes of Pol Govt Nat Un be first consulted & matter finally settled at peace settlements

Pres: I cannot agree on Pol boundaries at this time. It must be done by the Sen later

Mol It would be very good if something could be said about full agt of 3 heads about E. frontier. Would clarify that important q. It would be good to say gen. opin of all sides represented. Prob. would provoke criticism for a time but in end would be good. Proposes leave it to 3 Mins. to find nec. formula. Not nec. to say anything about W frontier

Church: Something

Mol Yes, much less def.

Church: Say recog. by 3 powers Pol should receive substantial accession of terr both to the N. & to the W… Thereafter final line be determined

St: That would be very good That would correspond to wish of public opin. all around

Pres: 3 For Secs

Church: Along lines we have suggested

Maisk St.: As a last ¶

Ed Decl, on Lib Areas (continuing his report)

Read & Church amended the Mol. amend. to include “responsibilities” etc.

Mol: Wants his amend. to stand

Pres read it as agreed this morning

Church how can you carry out measure.

St. accepted Church. Formula

Agreed To be put in language

Document approved

Ed sug. amend. re Fr.

“In issuing this decl. the 3 powers express the hope that the French Prov. Govt will be associated with them in the action & procedures contemplated”

Pres: I have rather changed my opin. I was opposed to Fr. sitting in on the Com. of 3, Control Machinery The more I think of it the more I think the PM’s contention that a country which has an area to control can not do so without sitting in on the Con. Com. I think it would be easier if Fr. is on that Con Com to get DeG to agree to this Decl. & other things. Like St. think about it

Pres agreed to add also Ed. addition

St agreed

Ed. Yug.

Agreed For Mins. prepare first draft final communique

Pres Should communique contain Yug statement Will leave to Ed in Conf. with For Mins whether we join in on that or not.

Church These are very respectable issues

Pres I’m not trying to protect my purity

Mol What is agreed re Yug.

Ed We’ve agreed to send a message & we’ve agreed to draft a communique

Read d

Message for 3 Govts to Tito & Sub

agreed to recommend Tito-Sub be immed. formed & put into effect plus Brit amends.

Pres: All right

Mol: Tel was to be very short & without last 2 ¶s

Ed Yes then later then the amends second part.

Church. Hope commun. can mention both parts

Mol. We just had com. when agreed only 1st part be in tel.; 2nd part to be put off until United govt formed

Church But world will give more attention to immed. enforcement of agt if other part were mentioned, too. Would have effect of getting better reception for what we say.

St. It would be inconvenient if tel. & communique different & we agreed a second tel. will be sent

Church We have complex pub. opin. Want favorable reception of agt Believes it would help (include in commun)

Ed Might say: It was further agreed that when the agt is put into force, 3 govts would recommend to new govt to make a decl, of the 3 points

St. Without 3rd point, which is very objectionable

Ed. & Church: all right leave it out.

Church Besides it’s understood in Tito-Sub agt.

St. In any case change Tel – 3 parts 1st Put agt in force immed 2nd members Vojnoj be later included 3rd all acts be confirmed later Church Very good & very helpful

St & all 3 also be in communique

Ed World Org. Report of subcom re consultation Fr & China & Invitation was accepted by For Mins & need not be discussed in plenary session.

→Pres OK’d invitation

Reparations
Church We were practically instructed by our gov’t not to men tion figures. Let Com. do that

Pres goes along my idea not to mention money, not make reps an am’t of money Let Com. do Talk about the equiv.

St. That’s only a monetary expression of what the goods cost. It is not money

Pres so many people at home will think of it in terms of $ & cents

Church I don’t understand what is to be published

Pres Nothing

Church not even subject

St. There is objection to mention dollars because someone will think will take reparations in money But we have already 3 treaties on reps, where reps in kind are expressed in dollars. Why in this case should there be a misunderstanding?

Church. I was going to suggest Mos. Com. be auth. to issue an interim report & not have to issue whole report before authorization is given to taking reps. For ex. factories would be taken at once by Sov Govt

St. I think we can be quite frank How compare goods we should take from Ger. with our losses If we accept them we should say we accept as reparation. E could take factories & lands but better have a dec. I propose simple prin.: 1. Ger must pay reps. for losses caused to Allies. 2. To ask Rep. Com to find out am’t of reps. which would be nec. to take & to report to govts Am. side agreed with us to take as basis $20 million [sic] dollars. Does it mean Am side withdraws its agt

Pres: No I am completely in agt. Only one word. Reparations mean to so many people money. Add parenthesis (in kind)

St. We won’t publish

Pres U S entirely prepared discuss sum & principles. Only q I raise is use of word reps

St. We can use another word. Compensation of losses Church “Compensation in kind for losses”

St: 3 govts agree Ger. must pay in kind losses caused by her to Allies in course of war. To give to Mos Com the task to find out the figures of the reps. to be paid taking as basis To give Com to for discussion the Am-Sov formula

Church We cannot commit ourselves to fig. of $20 billion or any other figures until Com has studied

St. No commitment

Ed What is value of the figure

St. Com. could change figures & modify them in any way.

Church You could propose that when the Com. meets Read excerpt from “communication from our govt” £500,000,000 a yr.= Ger’s pre-war exports This could not be paid by Ger. True some of it capital but that make it harder for Ger. to supply rest. Attach importance to some statement re paying for Ger imports. Unless priority at least equal to reps. we shall pay by exports (?) for reps.

St: Suppose experts say figure is wrong Then can fix new one. Our fig. not sacrosanct. We propose to discuss. It is nec. that things move forward.

Pres. suggest whole thing be left to Com at Mos.

Mol: Only yesterday ERS announced results of 3 For Mins consids. Text of Read ERS report

Ed. We think putting fig. in report might commit us to the figures. If desired would be willing say:

Mos Rep Com will be instructed: 1st To take into exam the report presented by Mr M. to the Crimean Conf

Mol. The 3 Mins considered this q. Eden’s proposal ignores fact this q has been discussed at Crimean Conf

Ed. we didn’t want say how many yrs

St. 1. The heads of 3 govts agree Ger must pay cocompensation in Kind for losses caused to Allied Govts

 2. & agree Ger must pay in Kind

2. To the Mos. Rep Com has been given task to consider the am’t of reps, to be paid

3. In the Com. we will bring in our fig & you will bring yours Church: I agree

Intermission
St. Montreux Agt

I think this treaty is now out of date. In this treaty Jap. Emperor plays a very important role as one of the parties He plays perhaps more impor. role than S.U. The whole treaty is framed in such a way as to be linked up with Leag of Ns But Leag doesn’t exist any more, just as Jap Emperor is not in our ranks. According to this Treaty T. has rt to close Straits not only in case of war but also if T considers sit. dangerous. This also is difficult from modern point of view

The treaty was made when our rels with Gt Brit were not very tight but now G Bt wouldn’t want strangle R… I think this treaty should be very seriously modified. Now nearly indecent to say we observe the treaty of Montreux. I think there could be no objection to consideration of a revision of the treaty. In what sense I won’t go on to prejudge future decs. But I should like ints. of R to be taken account of. It is impossible to put up with a sit. where a small country will keep her hand at the throat of R. Ints of R must be taken into acct without infringing legit. ints of T. How to do it must be considered. I now propose the organ to study it. Is agreed 3 Mins will meet every few months Perhaps would be possible at 1st meeting to discuss so mins could report to their govts. That would be the preparatory stage for settlement of q. of the Straits

Pres. We have over 3,000 miles of natural boundary bet. US & Can No fort or armed ship on that boundary, Has existed for over 100 yrs. If we could get other govts do that would be wonderful thing

Church. Marshall mentioned this to Mr Ed & me when we were last in Mos. We viewed with sympathy the Sov. proposal that the treaty be revised We suggested that Sov Govt give us a note of what their ideas were on the Convention but this has not yet been done. We think proposal of Mar. is a wise one. We certainly feel present position of R with its great Black Sea being dependent upon this narrow exit is not satisfactory If the matter is brought up at the next For Secs meeting we hope the Rs will make their proposal Meanwhile I think it would be nec if T became minded to declare war on Ger for any reason, it would bee, to tell T the matter would be brought under consid. Shouldn’t like her to come in to war with out knowing of it. Indeed I think we have some promise to T that before anything is decided affecting her she would be informed Mr Ed reminds me that after we came back from Mos he mentioned the matter to the T. Amb. in general terms, so we have Kept our engagements It is worth considering whether at the time changes are made to meet the wishes & needs of R in the Straits whether some undertaking might be made to T that her indep. would in no way be affected That would make it easy for her.

St. We can hide nothing from T & we should give her some assurances

Church Then we are agreed

St. So For Mins will meet at the end of the Conf in US

Church I think it affects Brit position in the Med. more than U.S. so conference might be in Lon. I tried hard some time ago to get thru the Dardanelles. The R. Govt of that day sent 2 army corps to help from the other end. However we did not succeed

St. They were in a hurry to take away the troops. If had waited another wk. Gers & Ts all ready to capitulate Mr. Pres you would not object to conf. in Eur.

Pres No

St. No secretary of the Conf. Who is taking notes of the decs.

Ed. Will put before you a commun & a note of decisions taken Church In addition to commun.

Pres re Amended statement on Pol line For const. reasons I have made a few changes Only 2 changes. Orig text was “The 3 Powers are agreed” etc Const. q of whether I have a rt to say the 3 powers can change a boundary . . the new lang: “The 3 heads of gov’t consider” omit “3 powers” & change “agree” to “feel”

Mol Add Return her ancient terrs in E. Pr. & westerly

Pres Depends how long back you go

Mol Quite a long time ago It is of great importance to Poles from a national point of view.

Church I feel it would be better not to draw the frontiers in the W. at the present time & not to mention localities

Mol There is no mention of the frontiers & with regard to the line of the Oder there was no objection

Church Never in pub.

Mol But at the Conf

Ed On contrary, we have always said as far toward Oder as Poles want to go.

Church: If you talk of restoring the ancient terrs. I shall be asked what they are & there will be no satis. answer We’re not ag. it

St Withdrew his suggestions & “your suggestion Mr Pres (to Pres) is accepted”

That will be the last point of paper on Pol

Pres we have only commun

Church: D.O. (i. e. terr. trusteeships) [Then his advisers talked him out of it Prob. told him of revised copy of ERS report. He said “I haven’t seen it” but then matter was app. settled OK]

Pres suggested draft commun. be given to heads of govt tonight & then have 11.00 a.m. meeting tomorrow

Church Then said something about multiple membership in communique

[NormanStewart]

Amended Draft of the Declaration on Liberated Europe

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Declaration on Liberated Europe

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have considted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately (establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration) take measures for carrying out mutual consultation.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

[NormanStewart]

860H.01/2-1145: Telegram

The British Foreign Secretary to the Foreign Office

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Most immediate

Following for Foreign Office from Foreign Secretary. Please repeat to Belgrade.

At plenary session of Crimea Conference on February 10th the Heads of the three Governments discussed the Yugoslav question and agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

• (i) that Avnoj will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

• (ii) that legislative acts passed by Avnoj will be subject to sub sequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

Please arrange for a communication to be made at once on above lines to Dr. Subasic and to Marshal Tito.

Similar instructions are being sent by Soviet and United States Governments to their representatives with Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito and action should be concerted between the representatives of the three allied Governments.

[NormanStewart]

The President’s Special Assistant to the President

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Mr. President The Russians have given in so much at this conference that I don’t think we should let them down. Let the British disagree if they want to – and continue their disagreement at Moscow. Simply say it is all referred to the Reparations Commission with the minutes to show the British disagree about any mention of the 10 billion.

HARRY

[NormanStewart]

The Secretary of State to the President

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Subject: RECOMMENDATION THAT THE THREE POWERS ENCOURAGE KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST UNITY IN THE WAR EFFORT AGAINST JAPAN

As this is likely to be the final plenary session, I suggest that some time during today’s meeting you find occasion to urge the Marshal and the Prime Minister to see that full encouragement is given by their Governments to Kuomintang-Communist unity in the war effort against Japan.

The importance of encouraging united Chinese efforts at this time must be apparent to all three Governments.

[NormanStewart]

Tripartite dinner meeting, 9:00 p.m.

Vorontsov Villa, USSR

Churchill acted as host.

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse
		Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Alupka, February 10, 1945, 9 p.m.
Top secret

Subjects:	REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY
	COMMUNIQUÉ
	BRITISH AND AMERICAN POLITICS
	JEWISH PROBLEMS

At the beginning of dinner, the conversation was general.

The Prime Minister then proposed a toast to the King of England, the President of the United States, and to Mr. Kalinin, President of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, and he asked the President as the only Head of State present to reply to this toast.

The President replied that the Prime Minister’s toast brought back many memories – that he recalled the first year as President of the United States in the summer of 1933. His wife had gone down in the country to open a school, and on the wall there had been a map on which there had been a great blank space. He said the teacher had told his wife that it was forbidden to speak about this place, and this place had been the Soviet Union. He said he had then decided to write a letter to Mr. Kalinin asking him to send someone to the United States to open negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Marshal Stalin , in his conversation with Prime Minister Churchill, emphasized the unsatisfactory nature of the reparations question at the conference. He said he feared to have to go back to the Soviet Union and tell the Soviet people they were not going to get any reparations because the British were opposed to it.

The Prime Minister said that, on the contrary, he very much hoped that Russia would receive reparations in large quantities, but he remembered the last war when they had placed the figure at more than the capacity of Germany to pay.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought it would be a good idea to put some mention of the intention to make Germany pay for the damage it had caused the Allied Nations, and also some reference to the Reparations Commission, in the communiqué.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed to the inclusion of these statements in the communiqué.

The Prime Minister then proposed a toast to the health of Marshal Stalin. He said he hoped that the Marshal had a warmer feeling for the British than he had had, and that be felt that the great victories which his armies had achieved had made him more mellow and friendly than he had been during the hard times of the war. He said he hoped that the Marshal realized that he bad good and strong friends in those British and American representatives assembled here. We all hoped, he continued, that the future of Russia would be bright, and he said he knew Great Britain, and he was sure the President, would do all they could to bring this about. He said he felt that the common danger of war had removed impediments to understanding and the fires of war had wiped out old animosities. He said he envisaged a Russia which had already been glorious in war as a happy and smiling nation in times of peace.

Mr. Stettinius then proposed a toast to his predecessor, Mr. Cordell Hull, who he said had been an inspiration to us all in his labors for the creation of a peaceful and orderly world. He concluded by saying that Mr. Hull was a great American and great statesman.

The President then said that he recalled that there had been an organization in the United States called the Ku Klux Klan that had hated the Catholics and the Jews, and once when he had been on a visit in a small town in the South be had been the guest of the president of the local Chamber of Commerce. He had sat next to an Italian on one side and a Jew on the other and had asked the president of the Chamber of Commerce whether they were members of the Ku Klux Klan, to which the president had replied that they were, but that they were considered all right since everyone in the community knew them. The President remarked that it was a good illustration of how difficult it was to have any prejudices – racial, religious or otherwise – if you really knew people.

Marshal Stalin said he felt that this was very true.

After considerable discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to English politics, in which the latter said he did not believe the Labor Party would ever be successful in forming a government in England, the President said that in his opinion any leader of a people must take care of their primary needs. He said he remembered when he first became President the United States was close to revolution because the people lacked food, clothing and shelter, but he had said, “If you elect me President, I will give you these things,” and since then there was little problem in regard to social disorder in the United States.

The President then said he desired to propose a toast to the Prime Minister. He said that he personally had been twenty-eight years old when he entered political life, but even at that time Mr. Churchill had had long experience in the service of his country. Mr. Churchill had been in and out of the government for many, many years, and it was difficult to say whether he had been of more service to his country within the government or without. The President said that he personally felt that Mr. Churchill had been perhaps of even greater service when he was not in the government since he had forced the people to think.

The Prime Minister said that he would face difficult elections in the near future in England since he did not know what the Left would do.

Marshal Stalin said that he felt that Left and Right now were parliamentary terms. For example, under classical political concepts, Daladier, who was a radical socialist, had been more to the left than Mr. Churchill, yet Daladier had dissolved the trade unions in France, whereas Mr. Churchill had never molested them in England. He inquired who, then, could be considered more to the left?

The President said that in 1940 there had been eighteen political parties in France and that within one week he had had to deal with three different prime ministers in Prance. He said that when he had seen de Gaulle last summer, he had asked him how this had happened in French political life, and de Gaulle replied that it was based on a series of combinations and compromises, but he intended to change all that.

The Prime Minister remarked that Marshal Stalin had a much easier political task since he only had one party to deal with.

Marshal Stalin replied that experience had shown one party was of great convenience to a leader of a state.

The Prime Minister said if he could get full agreement of all the British people it would greatly facilitate his task, but he must say that during the Greek crisis he had lost two votes in Parliament and the opposition had consisted of only eleven votes against him. He said he had accosted those Members of Parliament who had deserted him and had asked them to have the courage of their convictions. He added that they had been very unhappy because they had had this stand against the government. He concluded that he didn’t know what would be the result of the election in England but he knew he and Mr. Eden would continue to support the interests of Russia and the United States no matter who was in power.

The Prime Minister then remarked that although he had had great difficulty with Mr. Gallacher, the Communist member in the House of Commons, he nevertheless had written him a letter of sympathy when he lost his two foster children in the war. He added that he felt that British opposition to Communism was not based on any attachment to private property but to the old question of the individual versus the state. He said that in war the individual of necessity is subordinate to the state and that in England any man or woman between the ages of eighteen and sixty was subject to the government.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he did not believe the Labor Party could ever form a government in England. He asked the President whether there was any labor party in a political sense in the United States.

The President replied that labor was extremely powerful in the United States but there was no one specific party.

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Marshal Stalin then said he thought more time was needed to consider and finish the business of the conference.

The President answered that he had three Kings waiting for him in the Near East, including Ibn Saud.

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Marshal Stalin said the Jewish problem was a very difficult one – that they had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in Virovidzhan but that they had only stayed there two or three years and then scattered to the cities. He said the Jews were natural traders but much had been accomplished by putting small groups in some agricultural areas.

The President said he was a Zionist and asked if Marshal Stalin was one.

Marshal Stalin said he was one in principle but he recognized the difficulty.

During the course of the conversation, Marshal Stalin remarked that the Soviet Government would never have signed a treaty with the Germans in 1939 had it not been for Munich and the Polish-German treaty of 1934.

Marshal Stalin came over and spoke to the President and said he did not think they could complete the work of the conference by three o’clock tomorrow.

The President replied that if necessary he would wait over until Monday, to which Marshal Stalin expressed gratification.

It was tentatively agreed that there would be a plenary session tomorrow at twelve noon, after which the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin would lunch with the President.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (February 10, 1945)

CANADIAN DRIVE REACHES RHINE
Allies breach West Wall on northern front

Nazis release water from Roer dams

…

[NormanStewart]

Quake and B-29s rock Tokyo

Superfortresses achieve ‘excellent results’ in record blow at city

…

[NormanStewart]

Cornered Japs battling fiercely inside Manila

Enemy falls back for death stand inside old walled city as 2 Yank divisions attack

MANILA, Philippines (UP) – Jap resistance in southern Manila flared with renewed violence today as the cornered enemy fell back slowly toward the waterfront for a death stand inside the old walled city.

Fighting through a choking pall of smoke that covered virtually all South Manila, elements of two U.S. divisions hit the Jap front and rear in the Pandacan and Paco districts below the Pasig River.

Japs lash back

The converging attack was squeezing several thousand Japs slowly westward toward the burned-out port area, where they were expected to make their last stand behind the massive walls of the old Spanish city – the Intramuros.

After yielding the Pasig River crossing opposite the Malacanang Palace to the U.S. 6th Infantry Division almost without a struggle, the Japs lashed back suddenly at their pursuers with artillery, mortars and rifle fire.

Battle below city

At last reports, the 37th Infantry Division and vanguards of the U.S. 11th Airborne Division advancing from the south were rooting the Japs from their street barricades and ruined houses in a hand-to-hand battle that outdid in sheer ferocity anything Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s troops have experienced since they entered Manila a week ago.

Tokyo, after announcing that all but a skeleton force had been evacuated from Manila, began boasting that the Americans had fallen into a trap in the capital. That version appeared purely a propaganda invention, however, as front dispatches said Gen. MacArthur was moving overwhelming force into the city and that its complete liberation could not be delayed long.

More than 20 miles south of Manila, equally heavy fighting broke out around Tagaytay, where a pocketed Jap force launched two counterattacks against units of the 11th Airborne Division. Both thrusts were beaten off with serious losses to the enemy.

Northwest of Manila, vanguards of the 38th Infantry Division pushed 10 miles down the west coast of Bataan from the recaptured Olongapo Naval Base to reach Moron.

Seventy to 75 miles north of Manila, the hard-fought Pampanga River crossings at Rizal and Bongabon were finally secured by the U.S. 6th Infantry Division continued its advance up the Villa Verde trail leading to Imugan and the Cagayan Valley, after smashing Jap defenses five miles north of San Nicolas.

Planes aid Yanks

U.S. medium bombers and fighters worked over the enemy in close support of the advancing ground forces on all sectors, and joined in with light naval units in a coastal sweep that wrecked a great number of small Jap craft.

At the same time, Gen. MacArthur’s heavy bombers dropped 56 tons of bombs on Jap troop concentrations in the northern part of Cebu Island. Other fighters and heavies ranged more than 500 miles north of Manila to bomb and strafe the Heito barracks on Formosa and Jap rail and road traffic on the island.

In those and other forays over southern waters, the American airmen sank five to six enemy vessels, and destroyed at least six Jap planes.

[NormanStewart]

New England’s storm toll 24

…

[NormanStewart]

Sinatra decision expected Monday

…

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U.S. captives rescued by Reds

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[NormanStewart]

I DARE SAY —
Tonight And Every Night

By Florence Fisher Parry

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[NormanStewart]

6,027 soldiers have lost one or more limbs in war

One ‘triplicate’ case reported so far – 331 have suffered double losses

…

[NormanStewart]

Japs transfer U.S. prisoners to Manchuria

Wainwright among 177 Yanks moved

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[NormanStewart]

Medal of Honor pinned on sergeant’s widow

Posthumously given at Logan Armory

…

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Anne Shirley weds movie producer

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