Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

U.S. State Department (February 9, 1945)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:00 a.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Kuter Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Somervell General Ismay
Vice Admiral Cooke Admiral Somerville
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Hull
Major General Deane
Captain McDill
Commander Clark
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob
Captain Graves Brigadier Corn wall-Jones
Commander Coleridge
Colonel Capel-Dunn

CCS Minutes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret

Approval of the Minutes of the 187th Meeting of CCS

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 187th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered those paragraphs of the draft final report which had been added since they had approved CCS 776/1.

Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in Appendix “A” of CCS 776/2. He pointed out that in paragraph 4c of the directive it was stated that, “The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction.” In order to avoid any possible delay in the movement of these forces he suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should send an instruction to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean repeated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in the following sense:

Reference paragraph 4c of the directive issued to you… The move of two Canadian and three British divisions should proceed under plans to be agreed between yourself and SCAEF, without awaiting any further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that this proposal was acceptable.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the text of the report to the President and Prime Minister on the ARGONAUT Conference (CCS 776/2).

b. Approved the dispatch of the … [instruction] proposed by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke…

Liaison with the Soviet High Command with Regard to Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany (CCS 778, CCS 186th Mtg., Item 7, Two Tripartite Military Meetings)

Sir Charles Portal referred to the discussions which had been taking place between himself and General Kuter and Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov. At the meeting a draft agreement had been drawn up and agreed and submitted to the three High Commands. It was acceptable to the British and, he understood, to the United States Chiefs of Staff. However, on the previous evening identical letters had been received by General Kuter and himself from Marshal Khudyakov setting out a considerably revised draft agreement.

General Kuter said he had redrafted the Russian proposals in such a way as to make them acceptable to the U.S. and British; he proposed putting this new draft to the Russians. If this were not acceptable to the Russians, it would probably be wisest to inform them that we planned to continue with the previous arrangements.

Sir Charles Portal explained the main difference between the Russian proposals and the draft which had been agreed at the meeting of the Heads of Air Staffs. In the original draft the Allied air forces could bomb a target to the east of the line, provided 24 hours’ notice was given to the Soviet High Command and no objection was raised. In the Russian proposal, however, it was necessary to obtain agreement for any Allied bombing east of the line 24 hours before the attack was to take place. It had been his understanding in conversations with Marshal Khudyakov, that the Russian Staff was more interested in preventing incidents between Allied and Soviet aircraft than they were in protecting their ground forces.

General Kuter pointed out that there was one further important change in the Russian proposals. The Soviet Staff had now proposed that a rigid line should exist which would be moved from time to time by the Soviet Staff whereas in the original agreement the bomb-line was to move forward automatically at a given distance from the Russian front line. An example of the difficulties which would arise under Marshal Khudyakov’s proposals had recently occurred. Marshal Tito had asked that the town of Brod be bombed on a certain day and a request for permission to do so had been made by General Deane in Moscow. General Deane had written letters to the Staff on this subject four consecutive days without receiving any reply and in fact no answer had yet been received. In his view the present Russian proposal was an entirely unworkable procedure.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the best method of handling further action with regard to the Russian proposals.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and General Kuter should each reply separately to Marshal of the Soviet Air Force Khudyakov, making it clear that the revised agreement proposed by the Soviet High Command differed substantially from that which it was thought had been agreed between the Heads of the three Air Forces on 6 February; that these differences made acceptance of the revised agreement impracticable; and that the British/United States High Command therefore intended to continue with the arrangements in force prior to the Crimean Conference.

Concluding Remarks

Admiral Leahy said he would like to express on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the cooperation and assistance received from the British Chiefs of Staff during the present conference. He felt that progress had been made on the general plans of the war as a whole, and that much had been accomplished.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he would like to reciprocate on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff the feelings expressed by Admiral Leahy. He was convinced that great progress had been made during the present conference.

Völkischer Beobachter (February 9, 1945)

Die ‚Friedensorganisation‘ der Weltverbrecher

Berlin, 8. Februar – Nachdem um die Reise Churchills und Roosevelts zu Stalin von feindlicher Seite ein dichter Schleier des Geheimnisses gelegt worden war, ist nunmehr eine Erklärung bekanntgegeben worden, wie man sie normalerweise erst am Schluss solcher Besprechungen erwartet.

Aber die drei Kriegsverbrecher haben ihre Heimlichkeit vor ihren Völkern nicht länger verbergen können. In England und in den USA wartete man ungeduldig auf Nachrichten. Um diese Ungeduld zufriedenzustellen, wurde offenbar die erste amtliche Verlautbarung bekanntgegeben. Weiter haben die deutschen Enthüllungen über die geplante Neuauflage des Wilson-Schwindels dazu beigetragen, den drei Kriegsbrandstiftern eine vorläufige Erklärung über ihre geheimnisvollen Auseinandersetzungen abzuzwingen.

Wie nicht anders zu erwarten, besagt die Erklärung nichts. Sie beschränkt sich lediglich auf die Wiedergabe ihrer angeblichen Tagesordnung, um dann mit ein paar leeren Phrasen über „Besetzung und Kontrolle Deutschlands und Schaffung einer internationalen Organisation zur Aufrechterhaltung eines internationalen Friedens“ zu schließen.

Dies alles sind wieder einmal nur Worte, die den geplanten neuen Weltbetrug tarnen sollen. Hinter ihnen soll die wahre Absicht des Verbrechertrios, das sich am Schwarzen Meer zusammengefunden hat, verschleiert werden. Die Rauhe Wirklichkeit erfährt die Weltöffentlichkeit durch die Veröffentlichung der bolschewistischen Grausamkeiten im deutschen Osten. Diese sowjetischen Methoden des Massenmords und der Vergewaltigung wehrloser Frauen reißt den drei Erzheuchlern die Maske vom Gesicht. Alle ihre Redensarten können heute die Weltöffentlichkeit nicht mehr darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass der Sieg der plutokratisch-bolschewistischen Weltverschwörer das Chaos, die Vernichtung der Völker und den Triumph des Untermenschentums bedeuten würde.

So wie heute schon Stalin an die plutokratischen Trabanten Churchill und Roosevelt seine Befehle ausgibt, so würde et morgen bestimmen, was mit den Völkern geschieht, die sich durch die verlogenen Lockungen und die Täuschungsmanöver des Dreiertreffens blenden ließen und ihre Waffen aus der Hand legten.

Das deutsche Volk läßt sich nicht mehr täuschen. Der Wilson-Schwindel von 1918 steht ihm als brennende Warnung vor Augen, und das bolschewistische Mordbanditentum, die Schändung deutscher Frauen und Mädchen, die Abschlachtung von Kindern, Frauen und Greisen, die Folterung und Deportierung von Männern, die als Arbeitssklaven in die Sowjetunion verschleppt werden, zeigen uns das wahre Gesicht der feindlichen Kriegsverbrecher. Diese viehischen Massenmorde an deutschen Männern, Frauen und Kindern, wie wir sie schon von Nemmersdorf kennen auf deutschem Boden, können unsere Entschlossenheit, unseren Kampf bis zum letzten Atemzug durchzustehen, nur noch fanatischer machen.

Was wir gewusst und wovor wir Europa gewarnt haben, das wird nun durch die Sowjetgreuel erneut bestätigt. Es gibt für uns Deutsche nur das eine; Kämpfen bis zur Vertreibung dieser Mordbestien sowie ihrer anglo-amerikanischen Komplicen und bis zur Vernichtung der jüdisch-bolschewistischen Mordhetzer, die hinter ihnen stehen.

Wir müssen und werden alle Kraft zusammenballen, um wieder einen schützenden Wall um das Reich zu legen. Das ganze deutsche Volk, Front und Heimat, werden unter Einsatz aller Kraft und Übernahme aller Opfer dieses Ziel erkämpfen. Mit verbissener Wut schlagen sich die deutschen Soldaten mit den bolschewistischen Horden, und mit der gleichen verbissenen Wut steht hinter ihnen die Heimat, die ihnen die Mittel in die Hand gibt, um den neuen Mongolensturm zu brechen.

Deutschland muss freigekämpft werden, damit wir in Freiheit und Frieden leben und arbeiten können, damit das Leben deutscher Frauen lind Mädchen sicher und die Zukunft unserer Jugend gewährleistet ist.

Churchills Stab abgestürzt

Stockholm, 8. Februar – Wie Reuters meldet, stürzte ein Flugzeug, das einen Teil des Stabes Churchills zur Dreierkonferenz beförderte, unterwegs ab. 13 Insassen wurden getötet.

U.S. State Department (February 9, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Matthews Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hiss Mr. Jebb Mr. Maisky
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Dixon Mr. Gusev
Mr. Page Major Theakstone Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Page Minutes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subject:

  1. POINTS STILL BEFORE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
    (A) DUMBARTON OAKS MATTERS
    (B) REPORT BY SUB-COMMITTEE ON FORM OF INVITATIONS AND OTHER DETAILS OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
    (C) REPARATIONS
    (D) POLAND
    (E) IRAN
    (F) QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE YUGOSLAV FRONTIERS
  2. THE POLISH QUESTION
  3. REPARATIONS
  4. DUMBARTON OAKS
  5. IRAN
  6. YUGOSLAVIA

Points still before the Foreign Secretaries

Mr. Stettinius, who presided, stated that he thought it might be helpful to have a general review of the unfinished items. He stated these were as follows:

(a) The Report of the February 8 Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters
This report was modified in principle by general agreement at yester day’s plenary session.

(b) Report by the Sub-Committee on the Form of Invitations and Other Details of Arrangements for the United Nations Conference

(c) Reparations
The American Delegation desired to submit a paper on this matter today.

(d) Poland
The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Secretaries.

(e) Iran

(f) Questions Relating to the Yugoslav Frontiers
After a brief discussion it was decided to touch upon the Polish question first.

The Polish Question

Mr. Stettinius stated that he would like briefly to comment upon one important point which had not been previously raised. There had been quite a struggle in the United States on American participation in the World Organization. From the standpoint of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of great importance at this time to the United States. He hoped with all his heart that the Polish question could be settled before the Crimean Conference broke up.

Mr. Stettinius then read the following statement:

After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov’s statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative “Provisional Polish Government” and we speak of the formation of a “Government of National Unity.” All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

The following formula might therefore be considered:

That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed “The Provisional Government of National Unity;” Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This “Government of National Unity” would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

When a “Provisional Government of National Unity” is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to obtain a copy of the text of the statement in the Russian language, as he did not feel prepared to reply to the oral statement.

Mr. Eden said that he had some preliminary remarks on Mr. Stettinius’ proposal. He must tell his colleagues frankly of his difficulties in this matter. Many people thought that the Poles had been harshly treated by the British readiness to acquiesce in a frontier on the Curzon Line. He himself had been troubled for some time because, quite apart from the merits of the case, it might become a cause of difficulty between the Soviet Government and the British.

As regards the Lublin Provisional Government, it was possible that he might be quite wrong but he thought it was a fact that hardly anyone in Great Britain believed that the Lublin Government was representative of Poland. He should have thought that that view was widely held in the rest of Europe and in the United States of America. It was for that reason that the document which he had put forward the previous day had avoided all mention of adding to the Lublin Government and had stressed that a new start was necessary.

If agreement were reached here, this would involve a transfer of recognition from the London Government to the new Government. The British Government should have to abandon recognition of the London Government and such abandonment would be much easier for it if it were not made in favor of the existing Lublin Government but in favor of a new Government.

The British Government had considerable Polish forces fighting with it – about 150,000 at present – and these forces would increase as more Poles were liberated or escaped from Switzerland. It naturally desired very much to carry them along in any settlement. The task would be easier if a fresh start were made.

He had one other comment which concerned a personality. It had been said that there was considerable opposition to Mr. Mikolajczyk in the Lublin Government. He was not convinced of that. But in any case the presence of Mikolajczyk in a Polish Government would do more than anything else to add to the authority of that Government, and to convince the British people of its representative character.

Mr. Molotov stated that while the American document was being translated he wished to make some comments. Although he could not, of course, go farther than what Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, he recalled that the President had stated that the Polish situation was temporary and could not last for a long time. In the Russian opinion the most important question was the holding as soon as practical of general elections in Poland. These elections would give a basis for a permanent Government and do away with all the difficulties that were facing the Allies at the present time. Marshal Stalin had referred to the provisional period as lasting perhaps one month, whereas the Prime Minister had mentioned two. In any event, it would be a short interval. However, at the present time it was not only a question of Poland but also the rear of the Red Army. Even for a short period, it was essential to the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to take this military situation into consideration. If there were any obstacles in the rear of the Red Army an impossible situation would arise. That was why Mr. Molotov had suggested yesterday that the reorganization of the Polish Government should be on the basis of the present Lublin Government with democratic elements from within and without the country added to it.

With respect to Mikolajczyk, Mr. Molotov stated that it might be a mistake to say that he was unacceptable. The Poles themselves must decide this. Conversations must be held with the Poles in and out of Poland. Perhaps the Mikolajczyk question was not as acute as it appeared. However, it could not be cleared up in the Crimea without consulting the Poles. Furthermore, reorganization of the Polish Government could not be undertaken without speaking to the Poles. The Moscow Commission made up of the British and American Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov would have serious tasks to perform. They should discuss the entire question with the Poles and make clear to them the basis reached in the Crimea on the Polish question.

Mr. Eden said he entirely agreed with Mr. Molotov in respect to his remarks on the importance of the Polish elections. However, he felt sure that British opinion would agree that if the elections were controlled by the Lublin Government they would not be free elections or represent the will of the Polish people.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he supported Mr. Eden’s views in full in this respect.

After a brief interruption, Mr. Molotov, on reading a translation of the American proposal, stated that he would be unable to give a final answer to the new American considerations until he had consulted Marshal Stalin. He hoped to be able to do this by four o’clock. However, at the present time, he would like to make a few preliminary comments.

Firstly, it would be inadvisable to place too much emphasis on the formula of the question of the Polish Government before consulting the Poles themselves. He still believed that the new Polish Government should be created on the basis of the Lublin Government. If the three Foreign Ministers agreed to this in principle, it would not be difficult to find a formula.

Secondly, it might be better to leave out reference to the Allied Ambassadors in Warsaw since this reference would undoubtedly be offensive to the Poles as it would indicate that they, the Poles, were under the control of foreign diplomatic representatives. The Ambassadors would, of course, see and report as they desired. In the last analysis the question of a formula was not important – the question of an agreement on the fundamental issues was more so.

Mr. Eden stated that the three Allied Governments considered that a new situation would be created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This would call for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which could be more broadly representative than was possible before the liberation of Poland. This Government should be comprised of members of the Lublin Government and other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad.

Mr. Eden felt that this Government should be called the Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov continued to stress the advisability of forming the new Government on the basis of the Lublin Government. Otherwise, an unstable situation would be established in the rear of the Red Army. This Government would include other representatives from Poland and from without the country.

Mr. Stettinius maintained that it would be preferable to start with an entirely new Government and stated that unless the Foreign Ministers could get away from the words “existing Polish Government,” no agreement could be reached on this question. He suggested that Mr. Molotov give consideration to a formula which would state that the Polish Government should be based upon the old and also on the democratic leaders which will be brought in.

Mr. Molotov maintained that it was very difficult to deal with the Poles and that a serious situation would arise if a period should be created in which there were no Government in Poland. The authority of the present Lublin Government would be undermined. He maintained that if the American or British proposals were adopted everything would be standing in the air and a period of instability would be created in Poland.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the present Polish Government would continue until the new Government was formed.

Mr. Molotov maintained that the Poles would know that negotiations were proceeding on a change in government and that the present government would not endure. This would create a situation which might well cause difficulties for the Red Army.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Eden’s formula avoided this situation.

Mr. Molotov, however, adhered to his former position of insisting that the new Polish Government be formed on the basis of the Lublin Government. He maintained that the matter would have to be discussed with the Poles themselves before any decision could be reached.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to Mr. Molotov’s reactions with respect to the name of the new Polish Government.

Mr. Molotov replied that this could be taken up at a later date.

Mr. Stettinius stated that under present circumstances it would probably be best to report to the plenary session that the Foreign Ministers had discussed at length the Polish Government question on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the American Delegation and that although they had not yet reached an agreement on the matter, they had decided to continue discussions at a later date.

Mr. Harriman asked Mr. Molotov to consider a redraft of the American formula which would contain the words “based on the old and also on other democratic elements from outside and inside Poland.”

Mr. Molotov’s reaction to this suggestion was negative. He appeared to prefer the wording “based on the old government and with the calling in of representatives…“

Reparations

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Molotov had presented to him through Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Maisky a document on the principles of exacting reparations payments from Germany. He wished now to present some counter proposals which were fundamentally based on the Soviet principles. He then read the following statement:

  1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

  2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labor by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

    (a) Removal in a single payment in [after] the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

    These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

    (b) Annual deliveries of commodities during ten years after the end of the war.

  3. The total of German reparations in the form of removal from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war shall be the first subject of study by the Moscow Commission. In this study the Commission will take into consideration the effect of whatever common steps ought to be taken for the elimination or reduction of output of various important German industries, from the standpoint of the total decentralization of Germany. The Commission should take into consideration in its initial studies the Soviet Governments suggested total of twenty billion dollars for all forms of reparation.

Mr. Maisky pointed out that Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the American proposals were acceptable. However, paragraph 3 should be more fully clarified. In order to do so he suggested that the Moscow Commission accept the total of $20,000,000,000 “as a basis” for its studies. The final figures arrived at by the Commission might be a little more or less than $20,000,000,000; however, the Soviet Delegation urged that this figure be accepted as the basis.

Mr. Eden stated that the Prime Minister was strongly against stating a figure in the basic principles, even as a basis.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation was thinking only of the Soviet Union. Mr. Maisky’s Commission had done good work – it had only one defect, that of minimalism.

Mr. Stettinius urged that the question of setting a figure be left to the Commission. He continued that he of course could not commit the United States but that he felt that Mr. Maisky’s figure was reasonable.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether it would be agreeable to mention only the reparations, in the amount of ten billion dollars, which would go to the Soviet Union.

As a counterproposal Mr. Stettinius suggested that it merely be stated that 50% of the total sum of reparations collected which would be not specified would go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Molotov stated that he did not object to this suggestion; however, the exact percentage might be a little more or less than 50% of the amount collected. He again stressed the importance of including a figure in the statement.

Mr. Eden said that his Government well understood the suffering and need of the Soviet Government and would not be niggardly in the apportionment of reparations. However, he would like the Commission to do its work and ascertain the total amount of German reparations.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation was not endeavoring to supersede the work of the Commission but only to give it guidance.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to what price levels the Soviet Government had in mind.

Mr. Molotov replied that reparations should be based on 1938 prices since destruction had been in pre-war values.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether the Soviet Government also had in mind additions of 15% to 20%.

Mr. Molotov said that this was likely.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the effect of the dismemberment of Germany on payment of reparations.

Mr. Maisky replied that it would not have any effect on the removal from the national wealth of Germany of German equipment located inside and outside of the country at the termination of the war. It might affect annual payments in the post war years. However, the Soviet Government had taken this into consideration in drawing up its report.

After some discussion the Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

Dumbarton Oaks

Mr. Stettinius presented copies of the draft invitation to the Dumbarton Oaks [United Nations] Conference and stated that it was his understanding that the United States would consult with China and France before the invitations were issued on the Dumbarton Oaks matters which had been discussed in the Crimea.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this.

It was pointed out that some differences existed in the invitation submitted at the meeting and a former draft. It was suggested that the invitation be referred back to the sub-committee which would report as soon as possible to the Foreign Ministers. He explained that he had placed the draft before the meeting in order to get the Foreign Ministers’ consideration of the general principles at this stage so that time could be saved. Without decisions of the Foreign Ministers the sub-committee could not complete its work.

It was also agreed that the paragraph relative to trusteeships should be omitted from the invitation and that the five governments which would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the conference on the subject of territorial trusteeships and independent areas. This would be done on a diplomatic level.

Mr. Stettinius explained that he did not contemplate any detailed discussions on particular islands or territories but wished to establish the right of the organization to deal with the problem of trusteeships and to set up some machinery.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden indicated agreement.

Iran

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether Mr. Eden wished to bring up the subject of Iran.

Mr. Eden stated that he had submitted a paper on this question.

Mr. Stettinius remarked that the American Delegation was in entire agreement with the British position, as stated by Mr. Eden yesterday.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had not had time to give study to Mr. Eden’s paper. The subject was consequently no longer discussed.

Yugoslavia

Mr. Molotov referred to the unstable situation in Yugoslavia and to the Subasic-Tito agreement. He stated that he could not understand the British desire to supplement this agreement when steps had not been taken to put the original agreement into force. He proposed that the original agreement be executed and that following this subsequent questions be discussed.

Mr. Eden maintained that the amendments to the agreement which had been suggested by the British Government were reasonable in nature and provided for a more democratic Yugoslavia. He could see no harm in the application.

Mr. Molotov continued to maintain that no useful purpose would be served by the submission of supplementary agreements until the original agreement had been effected.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that representatives of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation. The British and Russian Ministers agreed to this proposal. Mr. Molotov stated that it would be desirable to state that it had been agreed at the Crimean Conference that the Subasic-Tito agreement should be fully executed.

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon

4th meeting

12.00 For Mins
ERS chmn

2/9

Poland
ERS: We have a hard fight in U.S. on particip. in Un. Ns Org. Polish sit. is of great importance to us from psych, point of view at this time. So hopes with all heart we can settle this Pol. matter before we break up in a manner which will be acceptable to the world.

  1. Dropped Pres. Commission idea
  2. (a) Mol. spoke of reorg. of Pol. Govt
    (b) Brit, formula suggests formation of a fully representative provisional govt
    (c) We: govt of national unity

All of us agree Pol. Govt should include 3 elements – Lublin, democrats in Pol. & abroad

Proposal Present Pol. Gov’t be reorganized to include Pol. democrats in Pol & abroad & be called Provisional Govt of Pol. Dem. Unity Pol. Commission in Mos. to consult in first instance Lublin Govt & Polish leaders in Pol & outside

Be pledged hold free elections, universal suffrage & secret ballot as soon as practicable

When Pol. Govt of Nat Unity is formed 3 Govts recognize Ambs. of 3 powers in Warsaw be charged report on holding of free elections

Reparations

ERS presented proposal

Point 1 acceptable
Point 3 add should consider 20,000,000,000 as a basis – final figures to be arrived by Commission

ERS: We think that figure should be taken into consideration. We can accept it as a basis for discussion.

Eden not prepared to mention any figure

Mol Maisky wants figure for Sov. share mentioned.

ERS Can’t commit U.S. to any figure but as said before personally thinks it is a reasonable figure

Mol. Could it be mentioned as a basis for discussion also

ERS: suggests 50% as basis for discussion

Mol: No objection but should not insist on 50% may be more or less, but figure would have significance. Distribution of total sum may be different.

ERS Can’t go further at this time

Maisky means 1938 prices

Eden: What of effect of dismemberment

Maisky Might affect annual payments – initially lower perhaps – but not total

ERS 10% or 15% variation that applied to Hung.

M: possibly

Agreed can mention 50% applies to 20,000,000,000

Report
ERS presented draft invitation

Understands we are agreed U S permitted to consult China & Fr before

Agreed

ERS Agreed – to sub-committee but reserved re terr. trus.

ERS: We do not contemplate any detailed discussions re particular islands or territorials but do wish to establish right of org. to deal with this & to set up machinery

Mol. Agreed

Ed. Why mention it?

ERS Agreed to eliminate it in invitation.

Understood we will take it up at Conf. & meanwhile among us at dip. level

Report
Mol. Brit. did not object at D. O

Ed. Agrees & should be in report to plenary session

Iran
Ed. mentioned his paper ERS said we agree

Poland
ERS Can we say U S-S U agree. Brit don’t

Yug.
Committee to prepare statement

Poland
New draft by Brit.

Mol. Can only give prelim. answer. Try to give final answer by 4:00. Mustn’t say put too much in this formula, mustn’t put in what we can’t say without consulting Poles. 1st amend.: say based on Lublin Govt 2. Leave out reference to Ambs in War. – offensive to Poles – indicate they are under control Q. of formula not important – q of agreement is

Ed: The 3 Govts consider that a new sit. has been created by the complete lib. of Pol by the Red Army. This calls for the est. of a fully repres. Provisional Govt which can now be more broadly repres. than was recently poss. This govt should comprise members of Lub Govt etc Should be called Prov. of Nat Unity

Mol. Can’t leave out statement Govt is based on present one

proposes: The present Pol. Govt be reorg. into a fully repres. Govt based on the present govt & incl. etc

ERS Must be entirely new

Might say based on Lub & on etc

Mol. Will be very diff to deal with Poles Can’t do that when no auth. or stability in Pol.

ERS Present gov’t would go on during the negs. until new govt is formed.

Mol But Poles will know negs are going on & will know present govt won’t last long – make it weak & make negs last long That impossible sit. for Red Army

Mol.: Ed. proposal incompatible with his own Must discuss this proposal with Poles

ERS What about name of new govt?

Mol. We can consider this.

Report we have discussed matter & will continue it later. & were unable to agree on this feature.

Harriman Asked reconsider based on Lub & other

Mol Negative

The Secretary of State to the Head of the Reconstruction Department of the British Foreign Office

Yalta, February 9, 1945

We must be sure – no respon. – rests on us relative to Iceland, Turkey, ete Egypt on joining World Organ

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Yalta, February 9, 1945

Points Still Before the Foreign Ministers

Report of February 8 Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters:
The report was modified in principle by general agreement at yesterday’s plenary session. Sir Edward Bridges and Sir Alexander Cadogan were preparing a re-draft which they may wish to submit to the Foreign Ministers this morning so that final text of the report can be agreed to and presented very briefly to the plenary session this afternoon.

Report by Sub-Committee on Form of Invitations and other Details of Arrangements for United Nations Conference:
Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to this Committee yesterday and are planning to meet this morning. Jebb was Chairman when we were appointed, and, as a courtesy, he might be asked to report – this report may have to be oral as we have not completed our drafting.

Reparations:
Two papers on this subject presented by Mr. Molotov at the meeting over which he presided are still under consideration.

Poland:
The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Ministers. The status of this is that Molotov presented a paper at the plenary session the day before yesterday, and yesterday the President presented a counter proposal.

Iran:
You might ask Molotov if, after thinking over the points made yesterday on Iran, he has any comments to make.

The points were:
(a) Respect for the Iranian decision not to grant oil concessions until after the war.
(b) Suggest for announcement now that the three powers would be prepared to begin to withdraw their troops from Iran pari passu, (i.e., by equal steps.)

Points mentioned by Mr. Eden Yesterday:
You may wish to ask whether Mr. Eden would like to say anything further with respect to the additional points he mentioned yesterday. These points were:
(a) Questions relating to the Bulgarian Control Commission;
(b) Questions relating to the Yugoslav frontier.

U.S. Proposal Regarding the Polish Government

Yalta, February 9, 1945
Top secret

Suggestions in Regard to the Polish Governmental Question

After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov’s statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative “Provisional Polish Government” and we speak of the formation of a “Government of National Unity.” All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

The following formula might therefore be considered:

That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed “The Provisional Government of National Unity;” Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This “Government of National Unity” would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

When a “Polish Government of National Unity” is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

The Director of the Office of European Affairs to the Secretary of State

Yalta, February 9, 1945

I attach a suggested paper to hand to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden on reparations. It is based on the Russian proposal of basic principles. The first two sections follow the Russian proposal literally with the additional words in the first paragraph suggested by Mr. Eden.

I think you should likewise ask Mr. Molotov on what price, i.e., what year it is intended that the total reparations shall be fixed.

U.S. Proposal for the Invitation to the United Nations Conference

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon

Invitation

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ———to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at ——— in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above-named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

  1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

  2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

  3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

The above-named governments have agreed that it would, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected Charter of provisions relating to territorial trusteeships and dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and place before the Conference proposals relating to these subjects.

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

U.S. Delegation Draft Invitation to the United Nations Conference

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon

Invitation

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ——— to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25 or soon thereafter, at ——— in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above-named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, a copy of which was transmitted to you for your information on October 9, 1944 which were made public last October and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI: Insert

The above named governments have agreed that it would, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected Charter of provisions relating to International territorial trusteeships & dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and place before the Conference proposals relating to thisese subjects.

Further information as to the exact site of the Conference and as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

Draft Report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon

Report to the Foreign Ministers

We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

(a) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

(b) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations Conference.

With regard to (a) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (b) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.

British Proposal on Iran

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon

Draft Conclusion on Persia

The remarkable progress made in the war against Germany has enabled the American, British and Russian representatives to consider the application of Article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Persia regarding the withdrawal of Allied forces from Persian territory. It has been agreed that a commencement of the withdrawal of forces need not await the termination of hostilities, but should begin pari passu in stages as military considerations, including the use of the Persian supply route, may allow. The stages of this gradual withdrawal, beginning with the evacuation of Tehran, will be discussed and agreed on by the respective military authorities of the three countries in Moscow. The Persian Government will be kept fully informed.

Misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with applications for rights to develop oil resources in Persia were also discussed in the course of the conversations. It was agreed that in the light of the known views of the Persian Government within whose free decision the matter rests, none of the Governments involved would favour pressing any suggestions for further oil concessions upon the Persian Government pending the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia.

(Possible addition to be held in reserve until it is seen how the discussion proceeds). After the withdrawal the whole question of the future exploitation of Persian oil resources not already covered by existing concessions should be the subject of discussions to be held within the framework of the Tehran Declaration of December 1 1943 and to which the Persian Government would be a party.

860H .01/2-1145

Memorandum from the British Delegation to the Soviet Delegation Regarding the Yugoslav Government

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon

When Dr. Subasic returns to Belgrade with his Government about February 7, he intends to raise two outstanding points with Marshal Tito. His Majesty’s Government consider it important that Marshal Tito should be in a position to give satisfactory assurances on both these points, and therefore hope that Marshal Stalin will agree to advise Marshal Tito in this sense.

The first of these points is that AVNOJ should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament.

The second point is that legislative acts passed by AVNOJ should be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly. This could be arranged either (1) under Article 116 of the Constitution, which lays down that all measures taken in accordance therewith should be subject to ratification, or (2) by introducing a passage in the new Government’s declaration agreed between Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic. The latter would be the more satisfactory course. It would also be helpful if the new Government’s declaration could include a statement to the effect that the Government was only temporary, pending free expression of the will of the people.

Yalta, 6 February, 1945

British Proposal Regarding the Yugoslav Government

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon

Draft for Discussion with the Soviet and American Delegations

Message from the Soviet Government, His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic.

The Heads of the three Governments have met and discussed the Yugoslav question and have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic:

(a) That the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement;

(b) That the new Government as soon as formed should make a declaration that

  • (i) AVNOJ will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary Parliament:

  • (ii) Legislative acts passed by AVNOJ will be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly:

  • (iii) The Government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people.

Draft Report by the Foreign Ministers to the Sixth Plenary Meeting

Yalta, February 9, 1945
Top secret

Report to the Plenary Session of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

The Polish Question

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov’s proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

Reparations

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the type of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

Dumbarton Oaks

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the subjects of territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

It was also agreed that these subjects should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.

The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today’s meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

Iran

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

Yugoslavia

On the proposal of the Chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt, noon

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
General Ismay
Admiral Somerville
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob

CCS Minutes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
Top secret

Report to the President and the Prime Minister (CCS 776/2)

The Meeting had before them the draft of the final report to the President and the Prime Minister, containing the results of the Combined Chiefs of Staff ARGONAUT discussions (CCS 776/2).

The report was accepted and approved by the President and the Prime Minister without amendment.

In the course of the ensuing discussion, the following matters were touched on briefly:

a. There was a discussion of possible developments after the defeat of Germany and the possible action of Russia at that time.

The text of this report, renumbered CCS 776/3 after its approval by Roosevelt and Churchill, follows these minutes.

The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that it would be of great value if Russia could be persuaded to join with the United States, the British Empire, and China in the issue of a four-power ultimatum calling upon Japan to surrender unconditionally, or else be subjected to the overwhelming weight of all the forces of the four powers. Japan might ask in these circumstances what mitigation of the full rigour of unconditional surrender would be extended to her if she accepted the ultimatum. In this event it would be for the United States to judge the matter; but there was no doubt that some mitigation would be worthwhile if it led to the saving of a year or a year and a half of a war in which so much blood and treasure would be poured out. Great Britain would not press for any mitigation but would be content to abide by the judgment of the United States. Whatever the decision, Great Britain would see the matter through to the end.

The President thought that this was a matter which might well be mentioned to Marshal Stalin. He doubted whether the ultimatum would have much effect on the Japanese, who did not seem to realize what was going on in the world outside, and still seemed to think that they might get a satisfactory compromise. They would be unlikely to wake up to the true state of affairs until all of their islands had felt the full weight of air attack.

b. The Prime Minister expressed his thanks to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the work which they had accomplished. He said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff was a wonderful institution which smoothed out so many difficulties, issued clear directions to the commanders in the field and would without doubt be held up in years to come as a model of cooperation between Allies. He hoped very much that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could be kept in being for three or four years more. There would be many problems affecting the security of the two nations in this period, the solution of which would be greatly facilitated if the Combined Chiefs of Staff could continue to operate.

The President agreed that there would be many matters affecting the two countries, such as the use of bases, which would have to be effectively handled.

In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, General Marshall expressed his personal opinion that the continuance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be advantageous. Its existence had certainly simplified the solution of the problems which had confronted the two nations during the war.

c. There was a short discussion upon the provision of intelligence to the Russian armies, and the President and the Prime Minister were informed of certain steps which had been agreed in discussion between General Marshall and Field Marshal Brooke.

The Meeting then adjourned.

CCS Report to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Yalta, 9 February 1945
Top secret
CCS 776/3

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the ARGONAUT Conference

The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at ARGONAUT Conference is submitted herewith:

Overall Objective
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.

Overall Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.

Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Basic Undertakings in Support of Overall Strategic Concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:

a. Maintain the security and warmaking capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the warmaking capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications.

e. Continue the offensive against Germany.

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

h. Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan.

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.

Execution of the Overall Strategic Concept

Defeat of Germany

The U-Boat War
We are concerned with the possibility that German U-boats may again constitute a serious threat to our North Atlantic shipping lanes. It is too early yet to assess the extent to which such an offensive could achieve success, and we propose to review the matter again on 1 April 1945.

Meanwhile, we have agreed on the following countermeasures:
a. To build up as much as is practicable the strength of surface hunting groups and anti-U-boat air squadrons.

b. To maintain and, if possible, increase “marginal” bomber effort on assembly yards, concentrating as far as is practicable against Hamburg and Bremen.

c. To maintain “marginal” effort against operating bases, being ready to increase this when bases become crowded beyond the capacity of concrete pens.

d. To increase, by 100% if possible, the air mining effort against U-boats, including the training areas.

e. To mine waters beyond range of d. above by using surface minelayers and carrier-borne aircraft.

f. To intensify operations against enemy minesweepers.

g. To maintain and intensify operations against the enemy shipping used to supply U-boat bases.

Operations in Northwest Europe
In two telegrams, SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has presented his appreciation and his plan of operations for Northwest Europe. His plan is as follows:

a. To carry out immediately a series of operations north of the Moselle with a view to destroying the enemy and closing the Rhine north of Düsseldorf.

b. To direct our efforts to eliminating other enemy forces west of the Rhine, which still constitute an obstacle or a potential threat to our subsequent Rhine crossing operations.

c. To seize bridgeheads over the Rhine in the North and the South.

d. To deploy east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr the maximum number of divisions which can be maintained (estimated at some 35 divisions). The initial task of this force, assisted by air action, will be to deny to the enemy the industries of the Ruhr.

e. To deploy east of the Rhine, on the axis Frankfurt-Kassel, such forces, if adequate, as may be available after providing 35 divisions for the North and essential security elsewhere. The task of this force will be to draw enemy forces away from the North by capturing Frankfurt and advancing on Kassel.

We have taken note of SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194 and of the Supreme Commander’s assurance that he will seize the Rhine crossings in the North just as soon as this is a feasible operation and without waiting to close the Rhine throughout its length. Further, that he will advance across the Rhine in the North with maximum strength and complete determination, immediately the situation in the South allows him to collect the necessary forces and do this without incurring unreasonable risks.

Strategy in the Mediterranean
We have reviewed our strategy in the Mediterranean in the light of the development of the situation in Europe and of the fact that the enemy is at liberty at any time to make a voluntary withdrawal in Italy. We have agreed that our primary object in the war against Germany should be to build up the maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater.

In accordance with this concept we have agreed to withdraw certain forces from the Mediterranean Theater and to place them at the disposal of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and to redefine the tasks of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

Our proposals are contained in the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, attached as Appendix “A.”

The War Against Japan

Overall Objective in the War Against Japan
We have agreed that the overall objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:
a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

Operations in the Pacific Area
We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/11 (Appendix “B”).

Operations in Southeast Asia Command
We have agreed to the following policy in respect of employment in Southeast Asia Command of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater:

a. The primary military object of the United States in the China and India-Burma Theaters is the continuance of aid to China on a scale that will permit the fullest utilization of the area and resources of China for operations against the Japanese. United States resources are deployed in India-Burma to provide direct or indirect support for China. These forces and resources participate not only in operating the base and the line of communications for United States and Chinese forces in China, but also constitute a reserve immediately available to China without permanently increasing the requirements for transport of supplies to China.

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff contemplate no change in their agreement to SACSEA’s use of resources of the U.S. India-Burma Theater in Burma when this use does not prevent the fulfillment of their primary object of rendering support to China including protection of the line of communications. Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have reviewed the progress of the campaign in Burma and agreed upon the terms of a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. This directive is attached as Appendix “C.”

Planning Dates for the End of the War Against Germany and Japan
We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate planning dates for the end of the war against Germany and Japan. These dates are necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.

We recommend that the planning dates for the end of the war against Germany should be as follows:
a. Earliest date – 1 July 1945.
b. Date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue – 31 December 1945.

We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany.

All the above dates to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

Shipping
We have reviewed the over-all cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 under the assumption that Germany is defeated on 1 July 1945.

For the first half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be with cargo shipping, which will be tight and in which deficits will approach unmanageable proportions until V-E Day. We have issued instructions to theater commanders to exercise strict control of shipping and have agreed that deficits should be adjusted in accordance with the following principles:

In the event of a deficit in shipping resources, first priority should be given to the basic undertakings in support of the over-all strategic concepts as agreed in ARGONAUT.

So long as these first priority requirements are not adequately covered, shipping for other requirements will not be allocated without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff.

For the second half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be troop shipping, which will become particularly acute in the last quarter of the year. We have agreed that the matter should be reviewed and a report submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 April 1945. This report will take account, from the shipping point of view, of the possibility that the war against Germany may continue beyond 1 July 1945.

Oil
We have reviewed and agreed upon the levels of stocks of all petroleum products that should be maintained in all theaters. The text of our agreement is attached as Appendix “D.”

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces
The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, has submitted proposals (NAF 841) designed to assist the Greek Government in forming their own army and so releasing British forces for employment elsewhere.

We have agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should proceed to implement the Supreme Commander’s proposals, on the understanding that this will not interfere with the provision of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

Appendix “A”

Directive to SAC, Mediterranean, Repeated to SCAEF

It is our primary intention in the war against Germany to build up the maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater. We have, therefore, reviewed your directive and decided as follows:

Greece
The earliest possible discharge of British obligations in Greece must be your constant aim.

The object of British presence and operations in Greece is to secure that part of Greece which is necessary for the establishment of the authority of a free Greek Government.

This object must always be regarded in the light of the paramount need for releasing troops from Greece for use against the Germans. You should, therefore, concentrate on building up a Greek force on a national basis as soon as possible.

Italy
In pursuance of the policy given in paragraph 1, it has been decided to withdraw from your theater to the Western Front up to five divisions (of which not more than two should be armored) as follows:

a. At the earliest possible date three Allied divisions drawn from the Allied Armies in Italy.

b. Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.

c. It is intended to withdraw Canadian and British divisions. The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction. The program will be agreed between you and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before any moves take place.

Air Forces
Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

There will be no significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces.

We recognize that these withdrawals will affect the scope of your operations in the Italian Theater. We, therefore, redefine your objects as follows:

a. Your first object should be to ensure that, subject to any minor adjustments you may find necessary, the front already reached in Italy is solidly held.

b. Within the limits of the forces remaining available to you after the withdrawals in paragraph 4 above have been effected, you should do your utmost, by means of such limited offensive action as may be possible and by the skillful use of cover and deception plans, to contain the German forces now in Italy and prevent their withdrawal to other fronts.

c. You should, in any case, remain prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces.

Adriatic
Subject to the requirements of the Italian Theater, you should continue to give all possible support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, until the territory of Yugoslavia has been completely cleared. You will carry out such minor operations on the eastern shores of the Adriatic as your resources allow.

Appendix “C”

Directive to SAC, Southeast Asia

Your first object is to liberate Burma at the earliest date. (To be known as operation LOYALIST).

Subject to the accomplishment of this object, your next main task will be the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca (To be known as operation BROADSWORD).

In view of your recent success in Burma, and of the uncertainty of the date of the final defeat of Germany, you must aim at the accomplishment of your first object with the forces at present at your disposal. This does not preclude the dispatch of further reinforcements from the European Theater should circumstances make this possible.

You will prepare a program of operations for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In transmitting the foregoing directive the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct your attention to the agreed policy in respect of the use in your theater of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater (see paragraph 16 of the Report).

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Boettiger Mrs. Oliver
Miss Harriman
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman

According to Leahy: “The conversation centered around voting procedure in the proposed assembly of the world peace organization. Churchill agreed orally to an arrangement whereby the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Republics should have equal voting power in the Assembly.”

Meeting of the American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States Soviet Union
General of the Army Marshall General of the Army Antonov
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Major General Kuter Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov (aided by a 2-star admiral)

Kuter Minutes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, 3:30 p.m.
Top secret

General Antonov opened the meeting with the statement that he had discussed all of the points raised at the previous meeting with Marshal Stalin. Whereas his comments at the first meeting represented only his personal views, he was prepared for the second meeting to give definite and official replies to each of the points. General Antonov continued then to present brief statements on each of the questions that had been raised:

a. There is no change in intent and only minor change in the plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October. In October, it had been planned to begin the movement of units to the Far East in early 1945. The units which it had been proposed to move are now involved in the center of the line on the Russian front. The only change in the basic plan is therefore a delay in the movement of units eastward until they can be disengaged from the fighting now going on.

b. These Soviets will require specific supply routes after Soviet Japanese hostilities start. Sea routes are needed to provide food and all types of gasoline and other petroleum products. Air routes also will be required.

c. Agreement is given for the operation of U.S. Air Forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area. Advance reconnaissance and survey parties may be sent to that area without delay.

d. Due to the great distance from the bulk of Soviet military strength “U.S. assistance will be very useful” for the defense of Kamchatka.

e. Pre-hostility preparations, including construction, reception, and storage of U.S. stock piles in Eastern Siberia (Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk) and in Kamchatka, will be prepared by the Soviets for the U.S. air units to be based in Soviet territory. Final decision must naturally await decision as to the air base requirements. Material assistance may be needed from the United States. Knocked-down fuel storage tanks (and probably pumps, pipes, etc.) will be required. These requirements are in addition to all current requisitions. Supplies in the MILEPOST project have been computed as requirements for Soviet forces exclusively.

f. The departure of a survey party from Fairbanks to Kamchatka must be deferred “until the last moment.” In explanation for this decision considerable discussion ensued as to the fact that the presence of an American survey party in Kamchatka could not be kept a secret from the Japs.

g. After the beginning of hostilities the Soviets will take Southern Sakhalin unassisted by the United States. Although detailed plans are not yet firm, Soviet operations against Southern Sakhalin will be one of their first operations. Admiral King stated that his discussion with Admiral Kuznetsov was an adequate reply to our question concerning the La Perouse Strait. (See Appendix “A” of the notes on the meeting held 8 February 1945)

h. We had asked to be assured that combined planning in Moscow would be vigorously pursued. In his reply General Antonov replied: “We shall fulfill on our side the plan which was made.” General Marshall explained that we were not questioning Soviet good faith or ability to carry out plans. General Antonov then stated that combined planning in Moscow will proceed vigorously.

i. Our request for additional weather reporting stations in Siberia is approved. The details are to be handled by Military Mission in Moscow.

General Antonov then asked for a statement as to our airbase requirements in the Kamchatka-Nikolaevsk area. It was decided to have the Air Staffs (Marshal Khudyakov and General Kuter) continue with the discussion of air matters after the major meeting was completed.

General Marshall asked if the Soviets agreed that a high order of security was necessary in handling all Far Eastern matters because the Japs may attack if they learn of Soviet-American plans or of the movement of Soviet units. General Antonov agreed with this view.

General Marshall asked how many weeks it would be after the movement of Soviet units to the East began that the Soviets would be strong enough to meet a Jap attack. General Antonov replied that it would be “not less than three months.”

General Marshall asked when these movements Eastward would begin. General Antonov replied that the Soviets were initiating the movements of supplies at this time and stated that “units of troops, in any size, cannot be moved without attracting notice by the Japs.”

General Marshall asked if divisional equipment would precede the divisions. General Antonov stated that divisional armor and equipment would move with the divisions. However, supplies (ammunition, food, etc.) would precede the movement of divisions.

General Marshall asked how many divisions per week could be moved from the German to the Japanese front. General Antonov replied that a three-month period would be required to move the necessary forces.

General Marshall stated that Field Marshal Brooke will expedite and will extend the flow of information from London to Moscow concerning German movements and intentions.

The principal meeting was adjourned with an exchange of statements of pleasure at the free, frank, clear, and definite interchange of information achieved in these conferences between the Russian and American military staffs.

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov and Major General Kuter continued to discuss the air side of the Soviet-American business for about two hours. The principal items covered in the discussion follow:

a. General Kuter gave to Marshal Khudyakov a prepared statement of our detailed requirements in expanding the weather reporting establishment in Siberia. He explained that Admiral Olsen was equipped with the same information and that further arrangements would be made in Moscow through the Military Mission.

b. General Kuter gave to Marshal Khudyakov a detailed statement of our requirements to permit the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey to operate on strategic air objectives which have already been captured by the Russians and those which might be captured in the future. It was agreed that further details would be arranged in Moscow with the Military Mission. Marshal Khudyakov requested that Soviet experts on bomb damage assessment would be permitted to accompany our survey parties. General Kuter stated that this was entirely acceptable, and furthermore, our reports of this survey would be made available to the Soviets on each of the targets within the Soviet area if those reports were desired.

c. General Kuter stated that our broad requirement in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area was for two large air bases, each to accommodate one group of very heavy bombers (B-29 Superfortresses). He stated the requirement for 8500-foot takeoff strips with good approaches, and the heavy construction needed for landing, takeoff, and dispersed parking by 150,000-pound aircraft. General discussion followed on the heavy bomb tonnages and very heavy 100-octane gasoline requirements of B-29 groups. Marshal Khudyakov appeared somewhat shaken by the magnitude of the air base requirement to handle our very heavy bombers. He repeated the probable necessity that we provide the materials to handle aviation gasoline storage and distribution, bomb trailers, and steel planking. Marshal Khudyakov stated that it might be difficult to find sufficient personnel to do the necessary construction and asked if American aviation engineers could be provided if needed for building. General Kuter replied that American aviation engineers would be available.

d. General Kuter stated that our request for air bases asked for the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area or some more suitable area. He explained the fact that two groups of B-29s in the far North in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area could pour far fewer bombs on Japan than would be possible if much larger numbers of heavy bombers (B-17 and B-24) were based in the Vladivostok area within range of Japanese targets. General Kuter made it clear that he would not prejudice the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk decision by raising the issue of the bases in the Vladivostok area, and further that it was appreciated that supply difficulties and the requirement to base extensive tactical air forces in the Vladivostok area would probably postpone consideration of that area until after progress had been attained in the ground battle West from Vladivostok. Air Marshal Khudyakov clearly understood the desire not to prejudice other decisions and that Vladivostok probably could not be used as strategic air base area until the Russian ground war with the Japs in Manchuria had progressed, but stated that he was anxious to have heavy bombers attacking Japan and that he would initiate action toward making two bases on the scale of Poltava available to U.S. strategic air units in the Vladivostok area.

e. Marshal Khudyakov stated his requirement for C-54 type transport aircraft and acknowledged the reply that General Kuter could see no chance of providing that type transport. Discussion of C-47s followed and it was agreed that the Army Air Forces would cut down on proposed provision of C-47s to our troop carrier units in order to make additional C-47s available to the Red Air Force. (General Deane has been informed that we can provide an additional 100 C-47s to the Soviets during the first six months of 1945 and can provide 40 per month thereafter. This will more than double any scheduled flow of C-47s to the Red Air Force, and in my opinion, will tax their capacity to absorb transports.)

f. Marshal Khudyakov stated a requirement for four to five hundred single and twin-engine trainers, plus 1500 – 200 to 400 horsepower trainer engines. The engines are for installation in Russian trainers. This was a surprise request. General Kuter replied that single engine primary trainers could be provided if shipping is available and that sympathetic consideration would be given to the request when received in Washington.

g. The current tour of the Army Air Forces Band in the European Theater, and General McNarney’s suggestion that this band might be available to play in Moscow and the Balkan capitals was presented. General Kuter stated that if the Soviets wished to have the band, we would make it available and would request a visit to American bases by a Russian military choral group as a reciprocal gesture. Air Marshal Khudyakov voiced his personal hope that such arrangements could be made and requested that General Deane initiate the matter in writing in Moscow. General Deane will take this action.

h. General Kuter handed to Marshal Khudyakov a formal written statement of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff rejection of the Soviet’s proposal to prohibit strategic air attack on targets near the Russian front without Soviet-American agreement. Marshal Khudyakov inferred that he had pressed the adoption of the agreement reached in the Khudyakov-Portal-Kuter meeting but had been overridden by the General Staff. This matter also will be handled by the Military Mission in Moscow.

This meeting concluded in a friendly tone with the statement that the airmen can get along all right, but whatever the nationality, the airmen cannot guarantee agreement by General Staffs.

(Dictated to and transcribed by S/Sgt. Arthur Miller. General Kuter’s notes and Sgt. Miller’s shorthand notes have been destroyed.)

L. S. KUTER
Major General, USA

Three (3) copies originally prepared, with distribution made to the individuals indicated below:
Admiral Leahy -- No. 1
General Hill -- No. 2
General Kuter -- No. 3

Three (3) additional copies prepared, with distribution to the individuals indicated below:
General Marshall -- No. 4
Admiral King -- No. 5
General Hull -- No. 6