Nothing softer than being radio standby
Job means pay without work
By Si Steinhauser
…
U.S. State Department (February 8, 1945)
Log of the Trip
Thursday, February 8, 1945
1200: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Harriman, Justice Byrnes, and Mr. Bohlen. The conference was held in the President’s study.
The British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff met in the grand ballroom at Livadia. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister attended this meeting.
1330: The President and Mrs. Boettiger had lunch in his study from a tray.
1500: The President signed an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War to take over and operate the plants and facilities of the Detroit Edison Company of Detroit, Michigan.
1545: Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov conferred with the President in the President’s study.
1615: The Fifth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present were:
| For the U.S. | For Great Britain | For the USSR |
|---|---|---|
| The President. | The Prime Minister. | Marshal Stalin. |
| Mr. Stettinius. | Mr. Eden. | Mr. Molotov. |
| Admiral Leahy. | Mr. Cadogan. | Mr. Vyshinski. |
| Mr. Hopkins. | Mr. Clark Kerr. | Mr. Maisky. |
| Justice Byrnes. | Mr. Jebb. | Mr. Gousev. |
| Mr. Harriman. | Mr. Bridges. | Mr. Gromyko. |
| Mr. Matthews. | Mr. Wilson. | Mr. Pavlov. |
| Mr. Bohlen. | Mr. Dixon. | |
| Mr. Hiss. | Major Birse. |
The meeting adjourned at 1940.
2030: The President and certain members of his party left Livadia by motor for Koreiz Villa to dine as guests of Marshal Stalin. The complete guest list was:
| Marshal Stalin. | The President. | The Prime Minister. |
| Mr. Molotov. | Mr. Stettinius. | Mr. Eden. |
| Mr. Vyshinski. | Admiral Leahy. | Field Marshal Brooke. |
| Mr. Beria. | Justice Byrnes. | Air Marshal Portal. |
| Admiral Kuznetsov. | Mr. Harriman. | Admiral Cunningham. |
| General Antonov. | Mr. Flynn. | Mr. Cadogan. |
| Air Marshal Khudyakov. | Mrs. Boettiger. | Field Marshal Alexander. |
| Mr. Gousev. | Miss Harriman. | Mr. Clark Kerr. |
| Mr. Gromyko. | Mr. Bohlen. | General Ismay. |
| Mr. Maisky. | Mrs. Oliver. | |
| Mr. Pavlov. | Major Birse. |
U.S. Navy Department (February 8, 1945)
CINCPOA Communiqué No. 252
Army Liberators of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, bombed installations on Iwo Jima in the Volcanos on February 6 and 7 (East Longitude Date).
Army bombers of the same force attacked Okimura Town on Haha Jima in the Bonins on February 7. Three large fires were observed.
Woleai in the Western Carolines was bombed from high altitude by StrAirPoa Army bombers on February 7 and shore installations on Yap in the same group were bombed by torpedo aircraft of the Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing on the same date. Marine aircraft bombed and strafed targets on Ponape in the Carolines on the following day.
Marine planes attacked installations on Babelthuap in the Palaus on February 7.
Fourth MarAirWing fighters strafed targets on Rota in the Marianas on February 7.
Planes of Fleet Air Wing Two continued neutralizing attacks on enemy-held bases in the Marshalls on February 8.
U.S. State Department (February 9, 1945)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:00 a.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Major General Kuter | Field Marshal Wilson | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Admiral Somerville | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | ||
| Major General Hull | ||
| Major General Deane | ||
| Captain McDill | ||
| Commander Clark | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Jacob | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Corn wall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge | ||
| Colonel Capel-Dunn |
CCS Minutes
Leningrad, February 9, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret
Approval of the Minutes of the 187th Meeting of CCS
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 187th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776/2)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered those paragraphs of the draft final report which had been added since they had approved CCS 776/1.
Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in Appendix “A” of CCS 776/2. He pointed out that in paragraph 4c of the directive it was stated that, “The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction.” In order to avoid any possible delay in the movement of these forces he suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should send an instruction to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean repeated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in the following sense:
Reference paragraph 4c of the directive issued to you… The move of two Canadian and three British divisions should proceed under plans to be agreed between yourself and SCAEF, without awaiting any further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
General Marshall said that this proposal was acceptable.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the text of the report to the President and Prime Minister on the ARGONAUT Conference (CCS 776/2).
b. Approved the dispatch of the … [instruction] proposed by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke…
Liaison with the Soviet High Command with Regard to Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany (CCS 778, CCS 186th Mtg., Item 7, Two Tripartite Military Meetings)
Sir Charles Portal referred to the discussions which had been taking place between himself and General Kuter and Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov. At the meeting a draft agreement had been drawn up and agreed and submitted to the three High Commands. It was acceptable to the British and, he understood, to the United States Chiefs of Staff. However, on the previous evening identical letters had been received by General Kuter and himself from Marshal Khudyakov setting out a considerably revised draft agreement.
General Kuter said he had redrafted the Russian proposals in such a way as to make them acceptable to the U.S. and British; he proposed putting this new draft to the Russians. If this were not acceptable to the Russians, it would probably be wisest to inform them that we planned to continue with the previous arrangements.
Sir Charles Portal explained the main difference between the Russian proposals and the draft which had been agreed at the meeting of the Heads of Air Staffs. In the original draft the Allied air forces could bomb a target to the east of the line, provided 24 hours’ notice was given to the Soviet High Command and no objection was raised. In the Russian proposal, however, it was necessary to obtain agreement for any Allied bombing east of the line 24 hours before the attack was to take place. It had been his understanding in conversations with Marshal Khudyakov, that the Russian Staff was more interested in preventing incidents between Allied and Soviet aircraft than they were in protecting their ground forces.
General Kuter pointed out that there was one further important change in the Russian proposals. The Soviet Staff had now proposed that a rigid line should exist which would be moved from time to time by the Soviet Staff whereas in the original agreement the bomb-line was to move forward automatically at a given distance from the Russian front line. An example of the difficulties which would arise under Marshal Khudyakov’s proposals had recently occurred. Marshal Tito had asked that the town of Brod be bombed on a certain day and a request for permission to do so had been made by General Deane in Moscow. General Deane had written letters to the Staff on this subject four consecutive days without receiving any reply and in fact no answer had yet been received. In his view the present Russian proposal was an entirely unworkable procedure.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the best method of handling further action with regard to the Russian proposals.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and General Kuter should each reply separately to Marshal of the Soviet Air Force Khudyakov, making it clear that the revised agreement proposed by the Soviet High Command differed substantially from that which it was thought had been agreed between the Heads of the three Air Forces on 6 February; that these differences made acceptance of the revised agreement impracticable; and that the British/United States High Command therefore intended to continue with the arrangements in force prior to the Crimean Conference.
Concluding Remarks
Admiral Leahy said he would like to express on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the cooperation and assistance received from the British Chiefs of Staff during the present conference. He felt that progress had been made on the general plans of the war as a whole, and that much had been accomplished.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he would like to reciprocate on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff the feelings expressed by Admiral Leahy. He was convinced that great progress had been made during the present conference.
Völkischer Beobachter (February 9, 1945)
Die Kämpfe in Manila
Tokio, 8. Februar – Den im Norden Manilas eingedrungenen feindlichen Truppen ist es gelungen, ihre Bodengewinne zu erweitern, aber die wichtigsten Punkte sind nach wie vor fest in japanischer Hand. Durch heftige Gegenangriffe werden dem Feind Verluste an Mannschaften und Material zugefügt. Von den feindlichen Landetruppen, die vom Süden her gegen Manila Vordringen, ist es nur einem kleinen Teil gelungen, den Südteil von Manila zu erreichen.
Im Gebiet von Clark Field behaupten sich die Japaner nach wie vor. Artillerie und Infanterie stehen in heftigen Angriffen. Die Zahl der Toten des Feindes sowie der Verwundeten wird auf etwa 7.000 geschätzt, während die Japaner nur geringe Ausfälle und Schäden hatten.
In Anbetracht der Kriegslage Verlegte die philippinische Regierung ihren Sitz nach Nordluzon.
Die ‚Friedensorganisation‘ der Weltverbrecher
Berlin, 8. Februar – Nachdem um die Reise Churchills und Roosevelts zu Stalin von feindlicher Seite ein dichter Schleier des Geheimnisses gelegt worden war, ist nunmehr eine Erklärung bekanntgegeben worden, wie man sie normalerweise erst am Schluss solcher Besprechungen erwartet.
Aber die drei Kriegsverbrecher haben ihre Heimlichkeit vor ihren Völkern nicht länger verbergen können. In England und in den USA wartete man ungeduldig auf Nachrichten. Um diese Ungeduld zufriedenzustellen, wurde offenbar die erste amtliche Verlautbarung bekanntgegeben. Weiter haben die deutschen Enthüllungen über die geplante Neuauflage des Wilson-Schwindels dazu beigetragen, den drei Kriegsbrandstiftern eine vorläufige Erklärung über ihre geheimnisvollen Auseinandersetzungen abzuzwingen.
Wie nicht anders zu erwarten, besagt die Erklärung nichts. Sie beschränkt sich lediglich auf die Wiedergabe ihrer angeblichen Tagesordnung, um dann mit ein paar leeren Phrasen über „Besetzung und Kontrolle Deutschlands und Schaffung einer internationalen Organisation zur Aufrechterhaltung eines internationalen Friedens“ zu schließen.
Dies alles sind wieder einmal nur Worte, die den geplanten neuen Weltbetrug tarnen sollen. Hinter ihnen soll die wahre Absicht des Verbrechertrios, das sich am Schwarzen Meer zusammengefunden hat, verschleiert werden. Die Rauhe Wirklichkeit erfährt die Weltöffentlichkeit durch die Veröffentlichung der bolschewistischen Grausamkeiten im deutschen Osten. Diese sowjetischen Methoden des Massenmords und der Vergewaltigung wehrloser Frauen reißt den drei Erzheuchlern die Maske vom Gesicht. Alle ihre Redensarten können heute die Weltöffentlichkeit nicht mehr darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass der Sieg der plutokratisch-bolschewistischen Weltverschwörer das Chaos, die Vernichtung der Völker und den Triumph des Untermenschentums bedeuten würde.
So wie heute schon Stalin an die plutokratischen Trabanten Churchill und Roosevelt seine Befehle ausgibt, so würde et morgen bestimmen, was mit den Völkern geschieht, die sich durch die verlogenen Lockungen und die Täuschungsmanöver des Dreiertreffens blenden ließen und ihre Waffen aus der Hand legten.
Das deutsche Volk läßt sich nicht mehr täuschen. Der Wilson-Schwindel von 1918 steht ihm als brennende Warnung vor Augen, und das bolschewistische Mordbanditentum, die Schändung deutscher Frauen und Mädchen, die Abschlachtung von Kindern, Frauen und Greisen, die Folterung und Deportierung von Männern, die als Arbeitssklaven in die Sowjetunion verschleppt werden, zeigen uns das wahre Gesicht der feindlichen Kriegsverbrecher. Diese viehischen Massenmorde an deutschen Männern, Frauen und Kindern, wie wir sie schon von Nemmersdorf kennen auf deutschem Boden, können unsere Entschlossenheit, unseren Kampf bis zum letzten Atemzug durchzustehen, nur noch fanatischer machen.
Was wir gewusst und wovor wir Europa gewarnt haben, das wird nun durch die Sowjetgreuel erneut bestätigt. Es gibt für uns Deutsche nur das eine; Kämpfen bis zur Vertreibung dieser Mordbestien sowie ihrer anglo-amerikanischen Komplicen und bis zur Vernichtung der jüdisch-bolschewistischen Mordhetzer, die hinter ihnen stehen.
Wir müssen und werden alle Kraft zusammenballen, um wieder einen schützenden Wall um das Reich zu legen. Das ganze deutsche Volk, Front und Heimat, werden unter Einsatz aller Kraft und Übernahme aller Opfer dieses Ziel erkämpfen. Mit verbissener Wut schlagen sich die deutschen Soldaten mit den bolschewistischen Horden, und mit der gleichen verbissenen Wut steht hinter ihnen die Heimat, die ihnen die Mittel in die Hand gibt, um den neuen Mongolensturm zu brechen.
Deutschland muss freigekämpft werden, damit wir in Freiheit und Frieden leben und arbeiten können, damit das Leben deutscher Frauen lind Mädchen sicher und die Zukunft unserer Jugend gewährleistet ist.
Churchills Stab abgestürzt
Stockholm, 8. Februar – Wie Reuters meldet, stürzte ein Flugzeug, das einen Teil des Stabes Churchills zur Dreierkonferenz beförderte, unterwegs ab. 13 Insassen wurden getötet.
Führer HQ (February 9, 1945)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Die Besatzung von Budapest hält immer noch die Stadtteile vor der Burg gegen die noch stärker werdenden feindlichen Angriffe. Südlich des Velenczesees warfen Einheiten der Waffen-SS die Sowjets aus einer Einbruchsstelle und vernichteten 16 Panzer.
In der Slowakei und nördlich der Westbesktden setzten die Bolschewisten ihre Angriffe ohne nennenswerte Erfolge fort.
Durch zähen Widerstand verhinderten unsere Truppen nördlich Ratibor und im Raum von Brieg die vom Feinde erstrebte Ausweitung seiner beiden Brückenköpfe und schossen hierbei 38 sowjetische Panzer ab.
Aus dem Raum von Steinau traten die Bolschewisten zu starken Angriffen an. Im bisherigen Verlaufe der schweren Kämpfe, die sich bis an den Ostrand von Liegnitz ausdehnten, wurden 80 feindliche Panzer vernichtet.
An der Oderfront zwischen Fürstenberg und Oderbruch gelang es, mehrere feindliche Brückenköpfe im Gegenangriff einzuengen oder zu beseitigen.
Die harten Abwehrkämpfe im Raum von Pyritz, Arnswalde und bei Deutsch-Krone dauern an.
Die Besatzungen von Schneidemühl, Posen und Elbing behaupteten sich gegen heftige Angriffe der Bolschewisten. Der schwere Kreuzer „Lützow“ und die Torpedoboote „T 33,“ „T 28“ und „T 8“ unterstützten am 8. Februar durch ihr wirkungsvolles Feuer die tapfer kämpfende Besatzung von Elbing. Ferner nahm dieser Verband sowjetische Stellungen und Aufmarschstraßen am Frischen Haff unter schweren Beschuss.
In Ostpreußen wurden bei Landsberg und Kreuzburg erneute feindliche Durchbruchsversuche in erbitterten Kämpfen verhindert und 57 feindliche Panzer abgeschossen.
Truppenansammlungen und der Nachschubverkehr der Sowjets waren in Schlesien und in der Neumark das Angriffsziel starker deutscher Fliegerverbände. Nach den bis jetzt vorliegenden Meldungen wurden 40 feindliche Panzer und 71 Geschütze außer Gefecht gesetzt sowie 600 motorisierte und bespannte Fahrzeuge zerstört.
Im Westen sind kanadische Verbände gestern Vormittag nach sechsstündiger Feuervorbereitung gegen unsere Stellungen südöstlich Nimwegen zum Angriff angetreten. Nach heftigen Kämpfen konnten sie in einzelne Ortschäften ein dringen, blieben dann aber in unserem starken Abwehrfeuer liegen.
Im Abschnitt Vossenack und Schleiden verlor dar Feind zwölf Panzer, ohne weiteren Geländegewinn zu erzielen.
In der Schnee-Eifel setzte die 3. amerikanische Armee ihre starken Angriffe fort. Während der Feind nördlich Prüm einige Fortschritte machen konnte, wurde er westlich und südwestlich der Stadt im Gegenstoß wieder geworfen oder zu Boden gezwungen.
An der Oure und Sauer wird noch um einige kleine feindliche Brückenköpfe gekämpft.
Im oberen Elsass gelang es unseren Truppen sich in heftigen Gefechten der starken Angriffe zahlreicher französischer und amerikanischer Divisionen zu erwehren und ohne größeren Verlust an Kämpfern und Material einen engen Brückenkopf westlich von Neuenburg einzunehmen.
An der italienischen Front warfen unsere Truppen die Amerikaner aus kleineren Einbruchsstellen an der Ligurischen Küste südlich Massa. Am Serchio-Abschnitt blieben erneute feindliche Angriffe in unserem Feuer liegen.
Westlich Mostar in der Herzegowina sind Abwehrkämpfe mit starken feindlichen Kräften im Gange. In Nordslawonien machten Angriffe unserer Truppen zur Säuberung des Gebietes südlich der Drau gute Fortschritte.
Anglo-amerikanische Tiefflieger und Bomberverbände trafen mit ihren Angriffen in Westdeutschland und am Oberrhein wieder hauptsächlich die Zivilbevölkerung. Nordamerikanische Terrorflieger warfen Bomben auf Städte in Südostdeutschland. In der vergangenen Nacht war der norddeutsche Raum, die Reichshauptstadt und das Ruhrgebiet Ziele britischer Bomber. Luftverteidigungskräfte brachten 39 anglo-amerikanische Flugzeuge, in der Mehrzahl viermotorige Bomber, zum Absturz.
Das Vergeltungsfeuer auf London wurde fortgesetzt.
U.S. State Department (February 9, 1945)
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon
Livadia Palace, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Stettinius | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir Alexander Cadogan | |
| Mr. Matthews | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Hiss | Mr. Jebb | Mr. Maisky |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Dixon | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Page | Major Theakstone | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Pavlov |
Page Minutes
Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
Top secret
Subject:
- POINTS STILL BEFORE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
(A) DUMBARTON OAKS MATTERS
(B) REPORT BY SUB-COMMITTEE ON FORM OF INVITATIONS AND OTHER DETAILS OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
(C) REPARATIONS
(D) POLAND
(E) IRAN
(F) QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE YUGOSLAV FRONTIERS - THE POLISH QUESTION
- REPARATIONS
- DUMBARTON OAKS
- IRAN
- YUGOSLAVIA
Points still before the Foreign Secretaries
Mr. Stettinius, who presided, stated that he thought it might be helpful to have a general review of the unfinished items. He stated these were as follows:
(a) The Report of the February 8 Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters
This report was modified in principle by general agreement at yester day’s plenary session.
(b) Report by the Sub-Committee on the Form of Invitations and Other Details of Arrangements for the United Nations Conference
(c) Reparations
The American Delegation desired to submit a paper on this matter today.
(d) Poland
The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Secretaries.
(e) Iran
(f) Questions Relating to the Yugoslav Frontiers
After a brief discussion it was decided to touch upon the Polish question first.
The Polish Question
Mr. Stettinius stated that he would like briefly to comment upon one important point which had not been previously raised. There had been quite a struggle in the United States on American participation in the World Organization. From the standpoint of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of great importance at this time to the United States. He hoped with all his heart that the Polish question could be settled before the Crimean Conference broke up.
Mr. Stettinius then read the following statement:
After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov’s statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.
I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative “Provisional Polish Government” and we speak of the formation of a “Government of National Unity.” All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.
The following formula might therefore be considered:
That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed “The Provisional Government of National Unity;” Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This “Government of National Unity” would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.
When a “Provisional Government of National Unity” is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.
Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to obtain a copy of the text of the statement in the Russian language, as he did not feel prepared to reply to the oral statement.
Mr. Eden said that he had some preliminary remarks on Mr. Stettinius’ proposal. He must tell his colleagues frankly of his difficulties in this matter. Many people thought that the Poles had been harshly treated by the British readiness to acquiesce in a frontier on the Curzon Line. He himself had been troubled for some time because, quite apart from the merits of the case, it might become a cause of difficulty between the Soviet Government and the British.
As regards the Lublin Provisional Government, it was possible that he might be quite wrong but he thought it was a fact that hardly anyone in Great Britain believed that the Lublin Government was representative of Poland. He should have thought that that view was widely held in the rest of Europe and in the United States of America. It was for that reason that the document which he had put forward the previous day had avoided all mention of adding to the Lublin Government and had stressed that a new start was necessary.
If agreement were reached here, this would involve a transfer of recognition from the London Government to the new Government. The British Government should have to abandon recognition of the London Government and such abandonment would be much easier for it if it were not made in favor of the existing Lublin Government but in favor of a new Government.
The British Government had considerable Polish forces fighting with it – about 150,000 at present – and these forces would increase as more Poles were liberated or escaped from Switzerland. It naturally desired very much to carry them along in any settlement. The task would be easier if a fresh start were made.
He had one other comment which concerned a personality. It had been said that there was considerable opposition to Mr. Mikolajczyk in the Lublin Government. He was not convinced of that. But in any case the presence of Mikolajczyk in a Polish Government would do more than anything else to add to the authority of that Government, and to convince the British people of its representative character.
Mr. Molotov stated that while the American document was being translated he wished to make some comments. Although he could not, of course, go farther than what Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, he recalled that the President had stated that the Polish situation was temporary and could not last for a long time. In the Russian opinion the most important question was the holding as soon as practical of general elections in Poland. These elections would give a basis for a permanent Government and do away with all the difficulties that were facing the Allies at the present time. Marshal Stalin had referred to the provisional period as lasting perhaps one month, whereas the Prime Minister had mentioned two. In any event, it would be a short interval. However, at the present time it was not only a question of Poland but also the rear of the Red Army. Even for a short period, it was essential to the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to take this military situation into consideration. If there were any obstacles in the rear of the Red Army an impossible situation would arise. That was why Mr. Molotov had suggested yesterday that the reorganization of the Polish Government should be on the basis of the present Lublin Government with democratic elements from within and without the country added to it.
With respect to Mikolajczyk, Mr. Molotov stated that it might be a mistake to say that he was unacceptable. The Poles themselves must decide this. Conversations must be held with the Poles in and out of Poland. Perhaps the Mikolajczyk question was not as acute as it appeared. However, it could not be cleared up in the Crimea without consulting the Poles. Furthermore, reorganization of the Polish Government could not be undertaken without speaking to the Poles. The Moscow Commission made up of the British and American Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov would have serious tasks to perform. They should discuss the entire question with the Poles and make clear to them the basis reached in the Crimea on the Polish question.
Mr. Eden said he entirely agreed with Mr. Molotov in respect to his remarks on the importance of the Polish elections. However, he felt sure that British opinion would agree that if the elections were controlled by the Lublin Government they would not be free elections or represent the will of the Polish people.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he supported Mr. Eden’s views in full in this respect.
After a brief interruption, Mr. Molotov, on reading a translation of the American proposal, stated that he would be unable to give a final answer to the new American considerations until he had consulted Marshal Stalin. He hoped to be able to do this by four o’clock. However, at the present time, he would like to make a few preliminary comments.
Firstly, it would be inadvisable to place too much emphasis on the formula of the question of the Polish Government before consulting the Poles themselves. He still believed that the new Polish Government should be created on the basis of the Lublin Government. If the three Foreign Ministers agreed to this in principle, it would not be difficult to find a formula.
Secondly, it might be better to leave out reference to the Allied Ambassadors in Warsaw since this reference would undoubtedly be offensive to the Poles as it would indicate that they, the Poles, were under the control of foreign diplomatic representatives. The Ambassadors would, of course, see and report as they desired. In the last analysis the question of a formula was not important – the question of an agreement on the fundamental issues was more so.
Mr. Eden stated that the three Allied Governments considered that a new situation would be created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This would call for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which could be more broadly representative than was possible before the liberation of Poland. This Government should be comprised of members of the Lublin Government and other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad.
Mr. Eden felt that this Government should be called the Provisional Government of National Unity.
Mr. Molotov continued to stress the advisability of forming the new Government on the basis of the Lublin Government. Otherwise, an unstable situation would be established in the rear of the Red Army. This Government would include other representatives from Poland and from without the country.
Mr. Stettinius maintained that it would be preferable to start with an entirely new Government and stated that unless the Foreign Ministers could get away from the words “existing Polish Government,” no agreement could be reached on this question. He suggested that Mr. Molotov give consideration to a formula which would state that the Polish Government should be based upon the old and also on the democratic leaders which will be brought in.
Mr. Molotov maintained that it was very difficult to deal with the Poles and that a serious situation would arise if a period should be created in which there were no Government in Poland. The authority of the present Lublin Government would be undermined. He maintained that if the American or British proposals were adopted everything would be standing in the air and a period of instability would be created in Poland.
Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the present Polish Government would continue until the new Government was formed.
Mr. Molotov maintained that the Poles would know that negotiations were proceeding on a change in government and that the present government would not endure. This would create a situation which might well cause difficulties for the Red Army.
Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Eden’s formula avoided this situation.
Mr. Molotov, however, adhered to his former position of insisting that the new Polish Government be formed on the basis of the Lublin Government. He maintained that the matter would have to be discussed with the Poles themselves before any decision could be reached.
Mr. Stettinius inquired as to Mr. Molotov’s reactions with respect to the name of the new Polish Government.
Mr. Molotov replied that this could be taken up at a later date.
Mr. Stettinius stated that under present circumstances it would probably be best to report to the plenary session that the Foreign Ministers had discussed at length the Polish Government question on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the American Delegation and that although they had not yet reached an agreement on the matter, they had decided to continue discussions at a later date.
Mr. Harriman asked Mr. Molotov to consider a redraft of the American formula which would contain the words “based on the old and also on other democratic elements from outside and inside Poland.”
Mr. Molotov’s reaction to this suggestion was negative. He appeared to prefer the wording “based on the old government and with the calling in of representatives…“
Reparations
Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Molotov had presented to him through Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Maisky a document on the principles of exacting reparations payments from Germany. He wished now to present some counter proposals which were fundamentally based on the Soviet principles. He then read the following statement:
Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.
Setting aside for the moment the use of German labor by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:
(a) Removal in a single payment in [after] the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.
These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.
(b) Annual deliveries of commodities during ten years after the end of the war.
The total of German reparations in the form of removal from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war shall be the first subject of study by the Moscow Commission. In this study the Commission will take into consideration the effect of whatever common steps ought to be taken for the elimination or reduction of output of various important German industries, from the standpoint of the total decentralization of Germany. The Commission should take into consideration in its initial studies the Soviet Governments suggested total of twenty billion dollars for all forms of reparation.
Mr. Maisky pointed out that Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the American proposals were acceptable. However, paragraph 3 should be more fully clarified. In order to do so he suggested that the Moscow Commission accept the total of $20,000,000,000 “as a basis” for its studies. The final figures arrived at by the Commission might be a little more or less than $20,000,000,000; however, the Soviet Delegation urged that this figure be accepted as the basis.
Mr. Eden stated that the Prime Minister was strongly against stating a figure in the basic principles, even as a basis.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation was thinking only of the Soviet Union. Mr. Maisky’s Commission had done good work – it had only one defect, that of minimalism.
Mr. Stettinius urged that the question of setting a figure be left to the Commission. He continued that he of course could not commit the United States but that he felt that Mr. Maisky’s figure was reasonable.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether it would be agreeable to mention only the reparations, in the amount of ten billion dollars, which would go to the Soviet Union.
As a counterproposal Mr. Stettinius suggested that it merely be stated that 50% of the total sum of reparations collected which would be not specified would go to the Soviet Union.
Mr. Molotov stated that he did not object to this suggestion; however, the exact percentage might be a little more or less than 50% of the amount collected. He again stressed the importance of including a figure in the statement.
Mr. Eden said that his Government well understood the suffering and need of the Soviet Government and would not be niggardly in the apportionment of reparations. However, he would like the Commission to do its work and ascertain the total amount of German reparations.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation was not endeavoring to supersede the work of the Commission but only to give it guidance.
Mr. Stettinius inquired as to what price levels the Soviet Government had in mind.
Mr. Molotov replied that reparations should be based on 1938 prices since destruction had been in pre-war values.
Mr. Stettinius inquired whether the Soviet Government also had in mind additions of 15% to 20%.
Mr. Molotov said that this was likely.
Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the effect of the dismemberment of Germany on payment of reparations.
Mr. Maisky replied that it would not have any effect on the removal from the national wealth of Germany of German equipment located inside and outside of the country at the termination of the war. It might affect annual payments in the post war years. However, the Soviet Government had taken this into consideration in drawing up its report.
After some discussion the Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.
Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.
Dumbarton Oaks
Mr. Stettinius presented copies of the draft invitation to the Dumbarton Oaks [United Nations] Conference and stated that it was his understanding that the United States would consult with China and France before the invitations were issued on the Dumbarton Oaks matters which had been discussed in the Crimea.
Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this.
It was pointed out that some differences existed in the invitation submitted at the meeting and a former draft. It was suggested that the invitation be referred back to the sub-committee which would report as soon as possible to the Foreign Ministers. He explained that he had placed the draft before the meeting in order to get the Foreign Ministers’ consideration of the general principles at this stage so that time could be saved. Without decisions of the Foreign Ministers the sub-committee could not complete its work.
It was also agreed that the paragraph relative to trusteeships should be omitted from the invitation and that the five governments which would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the conference on the subject of territorial trusteeships and independent areas. This would be done on a diplomatic level.
Mr. Stettinius explained that he did not contemplate any detailed discussions on particular islands or territories but wished to establish the right of the organization to deal with the problem of trusteeships and to set up some machinery.
Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden indicated agreement.
Iran
Mr. Stettinius inquired whether Mr. Eden wished to bring up the subject of Iran.
Mr. Eden stated that he had submitted a paper on this question.
Mr. Stettinius remarked that the American Delegation was in entire agreement with the British position, as stated by Mr. Eden yesterday.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had not had time to give study to Mr. Eden’s paper. The subject was consequently no longer discussed.
Yugoslavia
Mr. Molotov referred to the unstable situation in Yugoslavia and to the Subasic-Tito agreement. He stated that he could not understand the British desire to supplement this agreement when steps had not been taken to put the original agreement into force. He proposed that the original agreement be executed and that following this subsequent questions be discussed.
Mr. Eden maintained that the amendments to the agreement which had been suggested by the British Government were reasonable in nature and provided for a more democratic Yugoslavia. He could see no harm in the application.
Mr. Molotov continued to maintain that no useful purpose would be served by the submission of supplementary agreements until the original agreement had been effected.
Mr. Stettinius suggested that representatives of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation. The British and Russian Ministers agreed to this proposal. Mr. Molotov stated that it would be desirable to state that it had been agreed at the Crimean Conference that the Subasic-Tito agreement should be fully executed.
Hiss Notes
Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
4th meeting
12.00 For Mins
ERS chmn
2/9
Poland
ERS: We have a hard fight in U.S. on particip. in Un. Ns Org. Polish sit. is of great importance to us from psych, point of view at this time. So hopes with all heart we can settle this Pol. matter before we break up in a manner which will be acceptable to the world.
- Dropped Pres. Commission idea
- (a) Mol. spoke of reorg. of Pol. Govt
(b) Brit, formula suggests formation of a fully representative provisional govt
(c) We: govt of national unity
All of us agree Pol. Govt should include 3 elements – Lublin, democrats in Pol. & abroad
Proposal Present Pol. Gov’t be reorganized to include Pol. democrats in Pol & abroad & be called Provisional Govt of Pol. Dem. Unity Pol. Commission in Mos. to consult in first instance Lublin Govt & Polish leaders in Pol & outside
Be pledged hold free elections, universal suffrage & secret ballot as soon as practicable
When Pol. Govt of Nat Unity is formed 3 Govts recognize Ambs. of 3 powers in Warsaw be charged report on holding of free elections
Reparations
ERS presented proposal
Point 1 acceptable
Point 3 add should consider 20,000,000,000 as a basis – final figures to be arrived by Commission
ERS: We think that figure should be taken into consideration. We can accept it as a basis for discussion.
Eden not prepared to mention any figure
Mol Maisky wants figure for Sov. share mentioned.
ERS Can’t commit U.S. to any figure but as said before personally thinks it is a reasonable figure
Mol. Could it be mentioned as a basis for discussion also
ERS: suggests 50% as basis for discussion
Mol: No objection but should not insist on 50% may be more or less, but figure would have significance. Distribution of total sum may be different.
ERS Can’t go further at this time
Maisky means 1938 prices
Eden: What of effect of dismemberment
Maisky Might affect annual payments – initially lower perhaps – but not total
ERS 10% or 15% variation that applied to Hung.
M: possibly
Agreed can mention 50% applies to 20,000,000,000
Report
ERS presented draft invitation
Understands we are agreed U S permitted to consult China & Fr before
Agreed
ERS Agreed – to sub-committee but reserved re terr. trus.
ERS: We do not contemplate any detailed discussions re particular islands or territorials but do wish to establish right of org. to deal with this & to set up machinery
Mol. Agreed
Ed. Why mention it?
ERS Agreed to eliminate it in invitation.
Understood we will take it up at Conf. & meanwhile among us at dip. level
Report
Mol. Brit. did not object at D. O
Ed. Agrees & should be in report to plenary session
Iran
Ed. mentioned his paper ERS said we agree
Poland
ERS Can we say U S-S U agree. Brit don’t
Yug.
Committee to prepare statement
Poland
New draft by Brit.
Mol. Can only give prelim. answer. Try to give final answer by 4:00. Mustn’t say put too much in this formula, mustn’t put in what we can’t say without consulting Poles. 1st amend.: say based on Lublin Govt 2. Leave out reference to Ambs in War. – offensive to Poles – indicate they are under control Q. of formula not important – q of agreement is
Ed: The 3 Govts consider that a new sit. has been created by the complete lib. of Pol by the Red Army. This calls for the est. of a fully repres. Provisional Govt which can now be more broadly repres. than was recently poss. This govt should comprise members of Lub Govt etc Should be called Prov. of Nat Unity
Mol. Can’t leave out statement Govt is based on present one
proposes: The present Pol. Govt be reorg. into a fully repres. Govt based on the present govt & incl. etc
ERS Must be entirely new
Might say based on Lub & on etc
Mol. Will be very diff to deal with Poles Can’t do that when no auth. or stability in Pol.
ERS Present gov’t would go on during the negs. until new govt is formed.
Mol But Poles will know negs are going on & will know present govt won’t last long – make it weak & make negs last long That impossible sit. for Red Army
Mol.: Ed. proposal incompatible with his own Must discuss this proposal with Poles
ERS What about name of new govt?
Mol. We can consider this.
Report we have discussed matter & will continue it later. & were unable to agree on this feature.
Harriman Asked reconsider based on Lub & other
Mol Negative
The Secretary of State to the Head of the Reconstruction Department of the British Foreign Office
Yalta, February 9, 1945
We must be sure – no respon. – rests on us relative to Iceland, Turkey, ete Egypt on joining World Organ
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Yalta, February 9, 1945
Points Still Before the Foreign Ministers
Report of February 8 Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters:
The report was modified in principle by general agreement at yesterday’s plenary session. Sir Edward Bridges and Sir Alexander Cadogan were preparing a re-draft which they may wish to submit to the Foreign Ministers this morning so that final text of the report can be agreed to and presented very briefly to the plenary session this afternoon.
Report by Sub-Committee on Form of Invitations and other Details of Arrangements for United Nations Conference:
Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to this Committee yesterday and are planning to meet this morning. Jebb was Chairman when we were appointed, and, as a courtesy, he might be asked to report – this report may have to be oral as we have not completed our drafting.
Reparations:
Two papers on this subject presented by Mr. Molotov at the meeting over which he presided are still under consideration.
Poland:
The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Ministers. The status of this is that Molotov presented a paper at the plenary session the day before yesterday, and yesterday the President presented a counter proposal.
Iran:
You might ask Molotov if, after thinking over the points made yesterday on Iran, he has any comments to make.
The points were:
(a) Respect for the Iranian decision not to grant oil concessions until after the war.
(b) Suggest for announcement now that the three powers would be prepared to begin to withdraw their troops from Iran pari passu, (i.e., by equal steps.)
Points mentioned by Mr. Eden Yesterday:
You may wish to ask whether Mr. Eden would like to say anything further with respect to the additional points he mentioned yesterday. These points were:
(a) Questions relating to the Bulgarian Control Commission;
(b) Questions relating to the Yugoslav frontier.
U.S. Proposal Regarding the Polish Government
Yalta, February 9, 1945
Top secret
Suggestions in Regard to the Polish Governmental Question
After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov’s statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.
I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative “Provisional Polish Government” and we speak of the formation of a “Government of National Unity.” All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.
The following formula might therefore be considered:
That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed “The Provisional Government of National Unity;” Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This “Government of National Unity” would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.
When a “Polish Government of National Unity” is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.
The Director of the Office of European Affairs to the Secretary of State
Yalta, February 9, 1945
I attach a suggested paper to hand to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden on reparations. It is based on the Russian proposal of basic principles. The first two sections follow the Russian proposal literally with the additional words in the first paragraph suggested by Mr. Eden.
I think you should likewise ask Mr. Molotov on what price, i.e., what year it is intended that the total reparations shall be fixed.
U.S. Proposal for the Invitation to the United Nations Conference
Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
Invitation
The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ———to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at ——— in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The above-named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:
C. Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.
The above-named governments have agreed that it would, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected Charter of provisions relating to territorial trusteeships and dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and place before the Conference proposals relating to these subjects.
Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.
U.S. Delegation Draft Invitation to the United Nations Conference
Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
Invitation
The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ——— to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25 or soon thereafter, at ——— in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The above-named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, a copy of which was transmitted to you for your information on October 9, 1944 which were made public last October and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI: Insert→
The above named governments have agreed that it would, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected Charter of provisions relating to
Internationalterritorial trusteeships & dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and place before the Conference proposals relating to thisese subjects.
Further information as to the exact site of the Conference and as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.
Draft Report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference
Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
Report to the Foreign Ministers
We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:
(a) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.
(b) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations Conference.
With regard to (a) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.
With regard to (b) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.
British Proposal on Iran
Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
Draft Conclusion on Persia
The remarkable progress made in the war against Germany has enabled the American, British and Russian representatives to consider the application of Article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Persia regarding the withdrawal of Allied forces from Persian territory. It has been agreed that a commencement of the withdrawal of forces need not await the termination of hostilities, but should begin pari passu in stages as military considerations, including the use of the Persian supply route, may allow. The stages of this gradual withdrawal, beginning with the evacuation of Tehran, will be discussed and agreed on by the respective military authorities of the three countries in Moscow. The Persian Government will be kept fully informed.
Misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with applications for rights to develop oil resources in Persia were also discussed in the course of the conversations. It was agreed that in the light of the known views of the Persian Government within whose free decision the matter rests, none of the Governments involved would favour pressing any suggestions for further oil concessions upon the Persian Government pending the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia.
(Possible addition to be held in reserve until it is seen how the discussion proceeds). After the withdrawal the whole question of the future exploitation of Persian oil resources not already covered by existing concessions should be the subject of discussions to be held within the framework of the Tehran Declaration of December 1 1943 and to which the Persian Government would be a party.
860H .01/2-1145
Memorandum from the British Delegation to the Soviet Delegation Regarding the Yugoslav Government
Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
When Dr. Subasic returns to Belgrade with his Government about February 7, he intends to raise two outstanding points with Marshal Tito. His Majesty’s Government consider it important that Marshal Tito should be in a position to give satisfactory assurances on both these points, and therefore hope that Marshal Stalin will agree to advise Marshal Tito in this sense.
The first of these points is that AVNOJ should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament.
The second point is that legislative acts passed by AVNOJ should be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly. This could be arranged either (1) under Article 116 of the Constitution, which lays down that all measures taken in accordance therewith should be subject to ratification, or (2) by introducing a passage in the new Government’s declaration agreed between Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic. The latter would be the more satisfactory course. It would also be helpful if the new Government’s declaration could include a statement to the effect that the Government was only temporary, pending free expression of the will of the people.
Yalta, 6 February, 1945
British Proposal Regarding the Yugoslav Government
Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
Draft for Discussion with the Soviet and American Delegations
Message from the Soviet Government, His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic.
The Heads of the three Governments have met and discussed the Yugoslav question and have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic:
(a) That the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement;
(b) That the new Government as soon as formed should make a declaration that
-
(i) AVNOJ will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary Parliament:
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(ii) Legislative acts passed by AVNOJ will be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly:
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(iii) The Government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people.