Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Yalta, February 8, 1945

Points to Take Up with the President

Location of Conference
(See attached papers)

Consultation of France before Invitations are Issued
(a) France is listed in the proposals as one of the five permanent members “in due course.”
At Dumbarton Oaks, “in due course” was understood to mean recognition – which has now occurred.

(b) We need France’s influence among the smaller powers in “selling” the Organization.
(c) To save time, the United States can consult France on behalf of Britain and Russia.

Consultation of China before Invitations are Issued
(a) China is a full-fledged Dumbarton Oaks participant and must be one of the sponsoring powers.
(b) We can consult China on behalf of Britain and Russia.

Mr. Stimson is Opposed to Territorial Trusteeships
(a) Joint Chiefs have agreed to setting up the machinery of Territorial Trusteeships – without discussion of specific territories.

(b) United States public opinion has criticized Dumbarton Oaks for leaving out Territorial Trusteeships.
(c) New organization can’t supersede League of Nations without disposing of Mandates System.
(d) Chinese, Russians, Latin Americans all want Territorial Trusteeships.

The British will agree.

We can’t be the one objecting power.


U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Yalta, February 8, 1945

Items Still Remaining Open Before Conference Can Be Called

Status of France
At Malta the British and we agreed that France should be a fifth sponsoring power and should be included along with China as one of the powers on whose behalf invitations will be issued.

Nature of Consultation with France and China
At Malta we and the British agreed that the United States should consult France and China on behalf of Britain and Russia.

Mr. Grew is all prepared to initiate this consultation promptly in Washington as soon as he gets a flash.

Form of Invitation
The invitations could most conveniently be issued by the United States on behalf of itself and the other four sponsoring powers. (We have a draft invitation.)

International Trusteeships
We should get agreement that the subjects of international trusteeships and dependent areas will be discussed at the United Nations Conference, and that provisions on these subjects will be incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.

(We should arrange for prompt interchange of papers on these subjects after the Crimean Conference in order to try to get agreed proposals drafted before the United Nations Conference.)

Communiqué of the Crimean Conference on Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
We have a drafted communiqué. (Wilder Foote is preparing an alternative draft for your consideration.)

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Yalta, 8 February 1945
Top secret
Operational priority
ARGONAUT 92

Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius. Topsec.

  1. For your urgent information only the five Latin American associated nations which have not yet declared war should be urged to do so and adhere to the United Nations declaration with the greatest promptness. It is absolutely essential that this be accomplished by the end of this month if their action is to be effective in their interests. Please limit knowledge of the existence of this message to yourself, Dunn, Rockefeller, Pasvolsky and Raynor.

  2. I rely upon you to renew the Department’s recommendations to these countries without disclosing the cause for such renewal.

Komsomolskaya Pravda (February 8, 1945)

Конференция руководителей трёх союзных Держав – Советского Союза, Соединённых Штатов Америки и Великобритании

(TACC) – Президент Соединённых Штатов Америки, Премьер Советского Союза и Премьер-Министр Великобритании, в сопровождении своих начальников штабов, а также трёх министров иностранных дел и других советников, совещаются в настоящее время в районе Черного моря.

Их цель заключается в координировании планов завершения разгрома общего врага и установления вместе со своими союзниками твёрдых основ длительного мира.

Совещания происходят беспрерывно.

Конференция началась с военных переговоров. Было рассмотрено нынешнее положение на всех европейских фронтах и состоялся обмен самой полной информацией. Существует полное согласие относительно совместных военных операций в конечной фазе войны против нацистской Германии. Военные штабы трёх правительств в настоящее время совместно разрабатывают подробные планы,

Начались также переговоры по проблемам, связанным с установлением прочного мира. Эти переговоры распространяются на выработку, совместных планов, касающихся оккупации и контроля над Германией, на политические и экономические проблемы освобождённой Европы и на предложения о скорейшем создании постоянной международной организации для сохранения мира.

По окончании Конференции будет опубликовано коммюнике.

U.S. State Department (February 8, 1945)

Tripartite dinner meeting, 9:00 p.m.

Yusupov Palace, USSR

Marshal Stalin acted as host.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Mr. Byrnes Sir Alexander Cadogan General of the Army Antonov
Mr. Harriman Field Marshal Brooke Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Flynn Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal Mr. Beriya
Mrs. Boettiger Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham Mr. Maisky
Miss Harriman General Ismay Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Mr. Bohlen Field Marshal Alexander Mr. Gusev
Mrs. Oliver Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 9 p.m.
Top secret

Subject: GENERAL CONVERSATION

The atmosphere of the dinner was most cordial, and forty-five toasts in all were drunk. Marshal Stalin was in an excellent humor and even in high spirits. Most of the toasts were routine – to the armed forces of the representative countries and the military leaders and the continuing friendship of the three great powers.

Marshal Stalin proposed a toast to the health of the Prime Minister, who he characterized as the bravest governmental figure in the world. He said that due in large measure to Mr. Churchill’s courage and staunchness, England, when she stood alone, had divided the might of Hitlerite Germany at a time when the rest of Europe was falling flat on its face before Hitler. He said that Great Britain, under Mr. Churchill’s leadership, had carried on the fight alone irrespective of existing or potential allies. The Marshal concluded that he knew of few examples in history where the courage of one man had been so important to the future history of the world. He drank a toast to Mr. Churchill, his fighting friend and a brave man.

The Prime Minister , in his reply, toasted Marshal Stalin as the mighty leader of a mighty country, which had taken the full shock of the German war machine, had broken its back and had driven the tyrants from her soil. He said he knew that in peace no less than in war Marshal Stalin would continue to lead his people from success to success.

Marshal Stalin then proposed the health of the President of the United States. He said that he and Mr. Churchill in their respective countries had had relatively simple decisions. They had been fighting for their very existence against Hitlerite Germany but there was a third man whose country had not been seriously threatened with invasion, but who had had perhaps a broader conception of national interest and even though his country was not directly imperilled had been the chief forger of the instruments which had lead to the mobilization of the world against Hitler. He mentioned in this connection Lend-Lease as one of the President’s most remarkable and vital achievements in the formation of the Anti-Hitler combination and in keeping the Allies in the field against Hitler.

The President, in reply to this toast, said he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was as that of a family, and it was in those words that he liked to characterize the relations that existed between our three countries. He said that great changes had occurred in the world during the last three years, and even greater changes were to come. He said that each of the leaders represented here were working in their own way for the interests of their people. He said that fifty years ago there were vast areas of the world where people had little opportunity and no hope, but much had been accomplished, although there were still great areas where people had little opportunity and little hope, and their objectives here were to give to every man, woman and child on this earth the possibility of security and wellbeing.

In a subsequent toast to the alliance between the three great powers, Marshal Stalin remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. He said the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peacetime should be as strong as they had been in war.

The Prime Minister then said he felt we were all standing on the crest of a hill with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us. He said that in the modern world the function of leadership was to lead the people out from the forests into the broad sunlit plains of peace and happiness. He felt this prize was nearer our grasp than anytime before in history and it would be a tragedy for which history would never forgive us if we let this prize slip from our grasp through inertia or carelessness.

Justice Byrnes proposed a toast to the common man all over the world. He said there had been many toasts to leaders and officials and while we all shared these sentiments we should never forget the common man or woman who lives on this earth.

Miss Harriman, replying for the three ladies present, then proposed a toast to those who had worked so hard in the Crimea for our comfort, and having seen the destruction wrought by the Germans here she had fully realized what had been accomplished.

The Pittsburgh Press (February 8, 1945)

Big Three plans to put Nazis in straitjacket

Allied heads meet in Black Sea area
By Lyle C. Wilson, United Press staff writer

WASHINGTON – Announcement of the Big Three conference raised great hope here today that the meeting in the Black Sea area is reaching real agreement on Europe’s peacetime future and the style of Germany’s post-surrender straitjacket.

President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Joseph V. Stalin have agreed on the strategy to insure Germany’s military defeat.

Now they have begun political and economic talks. These are the key to the future, perhaps the most important conversations in the memory of any living person.

The world will pay for any mistakes made on the Black Sea shores and benefit from all wise decisions.

Would limit policing

Mr. Roosevelt is believed to have told Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin that the United States prefers not to participate in the ultimate, long-term policing of Germany. It is understood that task is to be assigned to Great Britain and Russia with the possible assistance of France. We would participate directly in post-war occupation but for a limited time only.

Compromises by all three toward mutual all-over agreements generally are expected. Assurances that U.S. troops would not be among the semi-permanent European police detail could count heavily toward winning American acceptance of such compromises as the President may have to make.

To rally support

Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill are reported planning to speed directly home from the conference to rally public support.

Official announcement that the Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill meeting was taking place was made simultaneously yesterday in London, Moscow and Washington. Berlin had already accurately broken the news of time and place.

The announcement said the three men with their foreign ministers, chiefs of staff and advisers – probably Harry L. Hopkins for the President – were meeting in the Black Sea area. The Big Three has completed its military discussion and the staff chiefs are working out details for Germany’s early defeat.

Other problems faced

In search of “firm foundations for a lasting peace,” the conferees have begun the other phase of their conference.

The communiqué said:

These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain peace.

The language of the communiqué committed the conferees to discussion of “joint plans” for Europe’s political and economic future. Another communiqué was promised when the conference ends.

Program outlined

General Black Sea conference plans for post-war Germany are understood to be as follows:

  • Destruction of Germany’s warmaking potential centered in heavy industry, the aviation industry and the synthetics industry.

  • Prevention of German living standards from improving more rapidly than those of her ravished neighbors.

  • Assurance that Germany shall aid in reconstruction of her neighbors’ economies, notably by provision of materials and forced labor.

Would split up Reich

Mr. Roosevelt is known to have been convinced that Germany must survive in some form, but tailored geographically. He is believed to be proposing that Prussia shall be separate from all else in Germany – Prussia being damned as the seat of German belligerency. But the extent to which Germany shall be further dismembered – if at all – is subject to discussion.

Germany would be deprived of airplanes and submarines, the facilities to manufacture them, and, possibly, the privilege of teaching her people to fly.

The conception of “grounding” an entire nation is understood to be Mr. Roosevelt’s own.

Disarmament planned

Germany would be disarmed. The Black Sea conferees are expected to complete and perhaps to announce a peacetime plan for international policing and regular inspection of Germany to prevent nullification of armaments prohibitions this time as Germany so deftly nullified them after World War I.

If inspection found Germany cheating, her borders would be closed. If cheating persisted, air police with bombs would enforce the regulations.

A distinction is made between the initial period of “occupation” of Germany and the ultimate period of international police control. The United States will participate with its armed forces in Germany’s “occupation” as hostilities cease.

In joint custody

Occupation plans are expected to put Berlin in joint Anglo-American-Russian custody. Russian troops would occupy eastern Germany, British troops northwestern Germany, and U.S. troops southwestern Germany. Early plans called for Anglo-American occupation of the Rhineland. It is likely that France now will share in that.

Some officials here talk of occupation in terms of “until 2000 AD” – a matter of 50 to 55 years. Mr. Roosevelt, however, is believed to feel that the American people would not accept such direct responsibility for the peace of Europe on such long terms.

Mr. Churchill is understood to have felt – at least at one time – that the Americans would and should accept responsibility for keeping armed forces in Europe for many years.

Full participation for U.S.

Mr. Roosevelt’s idea is understood to be that the enforcing power of the regulations under which a surrendered Germany must live would be the United Nations (Dumbarton Oaks organization) with full U.S. participation and complete acceptance of that responsibility.

But the implement would be British, Russian and French international police – no Americans. If the police were unable to handle the job, they could call for help – and get it – including U.S. troops if needed.

The President’s idea of a likely period of initial “occupation” of Germany is understood to be about a year.

Wants treaty delayed

He would prefer that 12 months elapse after the end of hostilities before the United Nations undertake to write a peace treaty for the defeated Germans. Occupation would appear to be necessary pending the peace treaty.

The British have not abandoned their hope that the United States will contribute armed forces of some kind for the long-term policing of Germany after the occupation period ends. It has been suggested here and in Britain that the German police detail would be a good place to train some of our young men if we adopt post-war universal military training.

It is possible, of course, that the British may obtain agreement to at least a “token” armed force from this country. But the President is known to have doubted that the American people would accept such responsibility.

May allot areas

In what apparently will be partly a partition and partly an internationalization of portions of Germany, there has been discussion of allotting industrial Silesia on the east to Poland – a rich prize.

France wants internationalization of the Rhineland, the Saar Basin and part of the Ruhr Valley. That is industrial Germany on the west.

Germany under that setup would lose outright, or lose control, of about 75 percent of her coal. Her warmaking power would be lost with it.

Marshal Stalin may hear gently from Mr. Roosevelt that full dress Russian participation in the peace problems of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean areas is of questionable necessity.

Open elections favored

But Russia’s prime interests on the continent are recognized. The only string to that is that the United States urgently seeks assurances that liberated countries shall have a fair and open chance to choose their form of post-war government.

Polish, Greek, Italian and Yugoslav situations challenge that American objective in various degrees. The three little Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – were long since incorporated into the Soviet Union by formal action preceded by a vote.

Objectors have complained that Russian troops were occupying the three states when the votes were taken. Few here, however, have any expectation that the question involved there will be opened for further examination.

Polish compromise sought

But a Polish compromise is eagerly sought and with some confidence. The idea is that Moscow might agree to some kind of merger of the Lublin Polish government, which Russia recognizes, with the London Polish government. The latter is recognized by the United States and Britain.

Mr. Roosevelt may propose that Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of the Polish Peasant Party and former premier of the London Polish government, join the Lubin government. That is the nearest to a “solution” of the problem that American diplomacy has conceived so far as is known here.

The Polish question is hot in the United States where some millions of voters were born in Poland or are of Polish descent.

Frontiers to be changed

If the conferees face the Polish problem directly, they will have to agree on a substantial revision of that nation’s frontiers. Russia has taken back a large area of eastern Poland and intends to keep it.

There has been some apprehension here that events, with or without assistance from Moscow, will lead to the post-war communization of Europe. Mr. Churchill rather than Mr. Roosevelt is expected to take the lead in seeking any assurance from Marshal Stalin on that question. It has been repeatedly emphasized here by well-informed persons that on the continent of Europe neither the United States nor Britain has any really enforceable demands.

Moscow wants post-war credits, heavy machinery and technical aid from us. Those are bargaining points. But beyond bargaining and persuasion there does not appear to be any means by which Marshal Stalin could be prevented from adopting such continental policies as may seem desirable to him.

Allies may name military board

LONDON, England (UP) – Diplomatic quarters believed today that one of the decisions to be announced at the end of the Big Three conference may be the formation of a military board by America, Britain and Russia to deal the death blow to the German Army.

Observers here believe the Russians are ready – for the first time – to join the Americans and British in the formation of a military committee that will execute the strategy planned by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. Military experts are already working on the decisions made by the Big Three.

London diplomats believe the military board will function only until the defeat of Germany. After that, a joint administrative commission would be formed, it was reported, to rule the Reich.

Simms43

Simms: Rumors flood Washington in lieu of news

Story of Big Three adds more material
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

WASHINGTON – Washington today is a city of rumor. It reminds me of Paris during those 11 hectic days of November preceding the armistice of 1918.

The simultaneous release here, in London and in Moscow of the first official announcement of the meeting between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin in the Black Sea area. has served to increase the flood.

Envoys with European pipelines are convinced that peace forces inside Germany are already moving to dispense with Hitler and organize some kind of setup for dealing with an ultimatum expected at any time from the Big Three.

Hitler support wanes

According to these sources, Hitler is rapidly losing his support save for the Himmlers, the Goebbels and the fanatical Nazis who already feel the noose closing about their necks and who have everything to lose by surrender.

As for the rest, an increasing number of Germans – including many generals – are desperately seeking an out which would save at least something from the inevitable wreck.

Some informed diplomats are convinced that Berlin may be invested or occupied by the Red Army within the next few days. They also expect an Allied breakthrough to the Rhine and beyond within an equally short time.

Officials won’t talk

American officials are not quite so inclined to talk. They were badly burned last fall when their forecasts of an early end of the European war proved to be erroneous. Overoptimism at that time led to decreased war production and there were stories of ammunition shortages on the Western Front. Then came the Nazi counterattack and a news blackout which gave this country one of the gloomiest Christmases since Pearl Harbor. So nobody wants to be blamed for any more of that sort of national disillusionment.

Nevertheless, the impression in diplomatic circles here is that the crackup of Germany cannot be delayed much longer. While resistance may continue for some time after the fall of Berlin, few experts believe Hitler and his fanatics can hope to defy the Allies indefinitely.

Three invincible machines

So far as the Russians, the Americans and the British are concerned it is observed, they will continue to have, in being, the invincible war machine. After Berlin falls however, and with all the other principal industrial and communication centers, the Wehrmacht will be through as an integrated machine. The best Germany could hope for would be to keep up, for a while, a sort of guerrilla resistance which the Allies could and doubtless would crush probably within a comparatively short period.

Another widely credited report here is that most of the military leaders in Germany are in contact with the generals of the Free Germany Committee headed by Field Marshal von Paulus at Moscow. These officers have been telling their colleagues inside the Reich to cease the struggle and save their country from destruction.

These are just some of the rumors current here. Obviously, no war is ever until the last shot is fired. Every intelligent military leader knows that overconfidence is one of the most fatal of all mistakes. The last, dying bite of a wounded beast can be the most dangerous and most painful. Which is why one observer remarked: “The situation is too widely promising for speculation.”

Allies plot Reich’s defeat by end of next summer

Chiefs of Staff working out details for final blows in east and west

WASHINGTON (UP) – Announcement that the Big Three powers were jointly making detailed plans for the “final phase” of the European war seemed today to mark Germany for the knockout blow before next summer’s end.

The announcement was made in a progress report from the “Black Sea area” where it was disclosed that President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Joseph V. Stalin are in conference. They have completed the military phases of their own talks. Their chiefs of staff are now working out the details.

Complete agreement

The official announcement of the current Big Three conference said:

There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

Observers felt that military leaders would not be formulating “detailed plans” for the “final phase” until they felt confident that this phase would be completed with a relatively short time.

Much significance was seen in the statement that the plans are being formulated “jointly” by the military staffs of the three governments.

Closer collaboration

They believed that such joint planning meant there would be much closer collaboration henceforth between the Eastern and Western Fronts.

Use of the phrase “joint military operations in the final phase of the war” did not necessarily mean that Russian and British or U.S. troops would literally be fighting side by side, these observers believed, but it did show clearly that operations on the two fronts would be made to dovetail.

A timetable for bringing Germany to her knees probably has been or is being drafted.

Charges refuted

Some observers believe that if the Russians succeed in crossing the Oder in force now and drive a flanking movement into the plains north or south of Berlin, the Western Allies will hurl everything they can assemble into a simultaneous assault on the Western Front.

Regarding military cooperation between Russia and the Western Allies, observers here regarded the announcement of joint plans and planning as official refutation of charges that such cooperation has been lacking.

Actually, there has been closer military cooperation all along then has been realized publicly, and there was no truth to reports that American-British military leaders were not informed in advance of the imminence of the current Russian offensive.

Nazis prepare defiant reply

Official denounces Big Three leaders

LONDON, England (UP) – Nazi propagandists were believed preparing a defiant and sarcastic reply to the announcement that the Allied Big Three were plotting Germany’s final defeat and post-war control of the Reich.

German news agencies carried the Allied announcement without comment for foreign consumption, but have not yet relayed it to the German people.

German press chief Dr. Otto Dietrich gave a clue to the probable propaganda line yesterday when – several hours before the Allied announcement – he denounced President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin as the “greatest war criminals of all time.”

Dr. Dietrich said:

They have made known that they have two aims to pursue. They want to make the German people give themselves up by a maneuver of agitation, and they want to promise eternal peace to a gullible humanity.

They have not succeeded in persuading the German people in past years to capitulate… they will not succeed now, either.

Propaganda drive aimed at Reich

WASHINGTON (UP) – The Big Three conference announcement was a propaganda bomb intended to give unhappy Germans a dreadful shudder.

If their morale was sagging yesterday, it should be drooping today. That is the way the war psychologists estimate the unveiling of the Black Sea area conference.

The Allied leaders broke the precedent of their first meeting by officially announcing this one, and its purpose, while it was still in progress.

Observers believe that a primary purpose in doing this is to exploit the psychological warfare value of the conference to the utmost at this moment while Allied armies are biting deeper into the Reich.

Editorial: The Big Three – and others

The Big Three communiqué does not tell much. Having failed to keep the secret the whole world knew, they confirm that they are meeting with their military and political advisors in the Black Sea area. Perhaps their joint announcement at the close of the conference will be more enlightening.

The American people, at least, are tired of having to rely on Churchill crumbs in Commons and on Marshal Stalin’s acts to discover Allied policies and American commitments which President Roosevelt fails to report. Resentment against the President’s secrecy is building barriers of suspicion, which will cause needless trouble when the people are called upon to support the settlement.

We believe the President is sincerely trying to represent a basic American policy acceptable to Congress and the public. If so, it is all the more unfortunate that his yen for lone-hand methods and for keeping the people in the dark weakens him in these Black Sea negotiations. For his power is in direct ratio to the weight of enlightened public opinion behind it. Only as that popular will is known to our allies can the President speak with authority. Fortunately, there have been some such public expressions from Congress, from Protestant organizations and the Catholic hierarchy, from the press and other private agencies, despite the President’s lack of cooperation.

From these expressions, it is clear that the American people – regardless of party or creed or national origin – take very seriously the pledges in the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Declaration and the Hull-Moscow Pact. They are fighting not only for complete military victory, but also for peace terms and post-war conditions under a democratic international organization which can prevent another war. This is more than sentimental concern and humanitarian regard for the rights of small nations. The kick in American opinion today is the practical conviction that a system of big power dictatorship and conflicting spheres of influence means war in the future as in the past.

Next to military unity, which the communiqué says has been achieved, the biggest issue at the Black Sea session is Allied political unity versus separate settlements – imposed by Marshal Stalin or Mr. Churchill, or both, without consent of the United States, France and the others. The test of this meeting is whether or not it speeds a representative conference with the other Allies, which the Big Three have prevented so far. When de Gaulle says France will be bound by no agreement to which it is not a party, he is speaking for every ally.

“Joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain peace” are what the Big Three are discussing, according to the official communiqué. But there is not one word indicating that the Big three recognize that they alone should not and cannot really settle anything. Only a majority of the Allies, backed by a majority public opinion, can do that. Even then, the post-war forces of disorder and chaos will strain the strongest peace settlement.

U.S. State Department (February 8, 1945)

Log of the Trip

Thursday, February 8, 1945

1200: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Harriman, Justice Byrnes, and Mr. Bohlen. The conference was held in the President’s study.

The British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff met in the grand ballroom at Livadia. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister attended this meeting.

1330: The President and Mrs. Boettiger had lunch in his study from a tray.

1500: The President signed an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War to take over and operate the plants and facilities of the Detroit Edison Company of Detroit, Michigan.

1545: Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov conferred with the President in the President’s study.

1615: The Fifth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present were:

For the U.S. For Great Britain For the USSR
The President. The Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius. Mr. Eden. Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy. Mr. Cadogan. Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins. Mr. Clark Kerr. Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes. Mr. Jebb. Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman. Mr. Bridges. Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Bohlen. Mr. Dixon.
Mr. Hiss. Major Birse.

The meeting adjourned at 1940.

2030: The President and certain members of his party left Livadia by motor for Koreiz Villa to dine as guests of Marshal Stalin. The complete guest list was:

Marshal Stalin. The President. The Prime Minister.
Mr. Molotov. Mr. Stettinius. Mr. Eden.
Mr. Vyshinski. Admiral Leahy. Field Marshal Brooke.
Mr. Beria. Justice Byrnes. Air Marshal Portal.
Admiral Kuznetsov. Mr. Harriman. Admiral Cunningham.
General Antonov. Mr. Flynn. Mr. Cadogan.
Air Marshal Khudyakov. Mrs. Boettiger. Field Marshal Alexander.
Mr. Gousev. Miss Harriman. Mr. Clark Kerr.
Mr. Gromyko. Mr. Bohlen. General Ismay.
Mr. Maisky. Mrs. Oliver.
Mr. Pavlov. Major Birse.

U.S. State Department (February 9, 1945)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:00 a.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Kuter Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Somervell General Ismay
Vice Admiral Cooke Admiral Somerville
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Hull
Major General Deane
Captain McDill
Commander Clark
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob
Captain Graves Brigadier Corn wall-Jones
Commander Coleridge
Colonel Capel-Dunn

CCS Minutes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret

Approval of the Minutes of the 187th Meeting of CCS

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 187th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered those paragraphs of the draft final report which had been added since they had approved CCS 776/1.

Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in Appendix “A” of CCS 776/2. He pointed out that in paragraph 4c of the directive it was stated that, “The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction.” In order to avoid any possible delay in the movement of these forces he suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should send an instruction to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean repeated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in the following sense:

Reference paragraph 4c of the directive issued to you… The move of two Canadian and three British divisions should proceed under plans to be agreed between yourself and SCAEF, without awaiting any further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that this proposal was acceptable.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the text of the report to the President and Prime Minister on the ARGONAUT Conference (CCS 776/2).

b. Approved the dispatch of the … [instruction] proposed by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke…

Liaison with the Soviet High Command with Regard to Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany (CCS 778, CCS 186th Mtg., Item 7, Two Tripartite Military Meetings)

Sir Charles Portal referred to the discussions which had been taking place between himself and General Kuter and Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov. At the meeting a draft agreement had been drawn up and agreed and submitted to the three High Commands. It was acceptable to the British and, he understood, to the United States Chiefs of Staff. However, on the previous evening identical letters had been received by General Kuter and himself from Marshal Khudyakov setting out a considerably revised draft agreement.

General Kuter said he had redrafted the Russian proposals in such a way as to make them acceptable to the U.S. and British; he proposed putting this new draft to the Russians. If this were not acceptable to the Russians, it would probably be wisest to inform them that we planned to continue with the previous arrangements.

Sir Charles Portal explained the main difference between the Russian proposals and the draft which had been agreed at the meeting of the Heads of Air Staffs. In the original draft the Allied air forces could bomb a target to the east of the line, provided 24 hours’ notice was given to the Soviet High Command and no objection was raised. In the Russian proposal, however, it was necessary to obtain agreement for any Allied bombing east of the line 24 hours before the attack was to take place. It had been his understanding in conversations with Marshal Khudyakov, that the Russian Staff was more interested in preventing incidents between Allied and Soviet aircraft than they were in protecting their ground forces.

General Kuter pointed out that there was one further important change in the Russian proposals. The Soviet Staff had now proposed that a rigid line should exist which would be moved from time to time by the Soviet Staff whereas in the original agreement the bomb-line was to move forward automatically at a given distance from the Russian front line. An example of the difficulties which would arise under Marshal Khudyakov’s proposals had recently occurred. Marshal Tito had asked that the town of Brod be bombed on a certain day and a request for permission to do so had been made by General Deane in Moscow. General Deane had written letters to the Staff on this subject four consecutive days without receiving any reply and in fact no answer had yet been received. In his view the present Russian proposal was an entirely unworkable procedure.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the best method of handling further action with regard to the Russian proposals.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and General Kuter should each reply separately to Marshal of the Soviet Air Force Khudyakov, making it clear that the revised agreement proposed by the Soviet High Command differed substantially from that which it was thought had been agreed between the Heads of the three Air Forces on 6 February; that these differences made acceptance of the revised agreement impracticable; and that the British/United States High Command therefore intended to continue with the arrangements in force prior to the Crimean Conference.

Concluding Remarks

Admiral Leahy said he would like to express on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the cooperation and assistance received from the British Chiefs of Staff during the present conference. He felt that progress had been made on the general plans of the war as a whole, and that much had been accomplished.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he would like to reciprocate on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff the feelings expressed by Admiral Leahy. He was convinced that great progress had been made during the present conference.

Völkischer Beobachter (February 9, 1945)

Die ‚Friedensorganisation‘ der Weltverbrecher

Berlin, 8. Februar – Nachdem um die Reise Churchills und Roosevelts zu Stalin von feindlicher Seite ein dichter Schleier des Geheimnisses gelegt worden war, ist nunmehr eine Erklärung bekanntgegeben worden, wie man sie normalerweise erst am Schluss solcher Besprechungen erwartet.

Aber die drei Kriegsverbrecher haben ihre Heimlichkeit vor ihren Völkern nicht länger verbergen können. In England und in den USA wartete man ungeduldig auf Nachrichten. Um diese Ungeduld zufriedenzustellen, wurde offenbar die erste amtliche Verlautbarung bekanntgegeben. Weiter haben die deutschen Enthüllungen über die geplante Neuauflage des Wilson-Schwindels dazu beigetragen, den drei Kriegsbrandstiftern eine vorläufige Erklärung über ihre geheimnisvollen Auseinandersetzungen abzuzwingen.

Wie nicht anders zu erwarten, besagt die Erklärung nichts. Sie beschränkt sich lediglich auf die Wiedergabe ihrer angeblichen Tagesordnung, um dann mit ein paar leeren Phrasen über „Besetzung und Kontrolle Deutschlands und Schaffung einer internationalen Organisation zur Aufrechterhaltung eines internationalen Friedens“ zu schließen.

Dies alles sind wieder einmal nur Worte, die den geplanten neuen Weltbetrug tarnen sollen. Hinter ihnen soll die wahre Absicht des Verbrechertrios, das sich am Schwarzen Meer zusammengefunden hat, verschleiert werden. Die Rauhe Wirklichkeit erfährt die Weltöffentlichkeit durch die Veröffentlichung der bolschewistischen Grausamkeiten im deutschen Osten. Diese sowjetischen Methoden des Massenmords und der Vergewaltigung wehrloser Frauen reißt den drei Erzheuchlern die Maske vom Gesicht. Alle ihre Redensarten können heute die Weltöffentlichkeit nicht mehr darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass der Sieg der plutokratisch-bolschewistischen Weltverschwörer das Chaos, die Vernichtung der Völker und den Triumph des Untermenschentums bedeuten würde.

So wie heute schon Stalin an die plutokratischen Trabanten Churchill und Roosevelt seine Befehle ausgibt, so würde et morgen bestimmen, was mit den Völkern geschieht, die sich durch die verlogenen Lockungen und die Täuschungsmanöver des Dreiertreffens blenden ließen und ihre Waffen aus der Hand legten.

Das deutsche Volk läßt sich nicht mehr täuschen. Der Wilson-Schwindel von 1918 steht ihm als brennende Warnung vor Augen, und das bolschewistische Mordbanditentum, die Schändung deutscher Frauen und Mädchen, die Abschlachtung von Kindern, Frauen und Greisen, die Folterung und Deportierung von Männern, die als Arbeitssklaven in die Sowjetunion verschleppt werden, zeigen uns das wahre Gesicht der feindlichen Kriegsverbrecher. Diese viehischen Massenmorde an deutschen Männern, Frauen und Kindern, wie wir sie schon von Nemmersdorf kennen auf deutschem Boden, können unsere Entschlossenheit, unseren Kampf bis zum letzten Atemzug durchzustehen, nur noch fanatischer machen.

Was wir gewusst und wovor wir Europa gewarnt haben, das wird nun durch die Sowjetgreuel erneut bestätigt. Es gibt für uns Deutsche nur das eine; Kämpfen bis zur Vertreibung dieser Mordbestien sowie ihrer anglo-amerikanischen Komplicen und bis zur Vernichtung der jüdisch-bolschewistischen Mordhetzer, die hinter ihnen stehen.

Wir müssen und werden alle Kraft zusammenballen, um wieder einen schützenden Wall um das Reich zu legen. Das ganze deutsche Volk, Front und Heimat, werden unter Einsatz aller Kraft und Übernahme aller Opfer dieses Ziel erkämpfen. Mit verbissener Wut schlagen sich die deutschen Soldaten mit den bolschewistischen Horden, und mit der gleichen verbissenen Wut steht hinter ihnen die Heimat, die ihnen die Mittel in die Hand gibt, um den neuen Mongolensturm zu brechen.

Deutschland muss freigekämpft werden, damit wir in Freiheit und Frieden leben und arbeiten können, damit das Leben deutscher Frauen lind Mädchen sicher und die Zukunft unserer Jugend gewährleistet ist.

Churchills Stab abgestürzt

Stockholm, 8. Februar – Wie Reuters meldet, stürzte ein Flugzeug, das einen Teil des Stabes Churchills zur Dreierkonferenz beförderte, unterwegs ab. 13 Insassen wurden getötet.

U.S. State Department (February 9, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Matthews Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hiss Mr. Jebb Mr. Maisky
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Dixon Mr. Gusev
Mr. Page Major Theakstone Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Page Minutes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subject:

  1. POINTS STILL BEFORE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
    (A) DUMBARTON OAKS MATTERS
    (B) REPORT BY SUB-COMMITTEE ON FORM OF INVITATIONS AND OTHER DETAILS OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
    (C) REPARATIONS
    (D) POLAND
    (E) IRAN
    (F) QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE YUGOSLAV FRONTIERS
  2. THE POLISH QUESTION
  3. REPARATIONS
  4. DUMBARTON OAKS
  5. IRAN
  6. YUGOSLAVIA

Points still before the Foreign Secretaries

Mr. Stettinius, who presided, stated that he thought it might be helpful to have a general review of the unfinished items. He stated these were as follows:

(a) The Report of the February 8 Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters
This report was modified in principle by general agreement at yester day’s plenary session.

(b) Report by the Sub-Committee on the Form of Invitations and Other Details of Arrangements for the United Nations Conference

(c) Reparations
The American Delegation desired to submit a paper on this matter today.

(d) Poland
The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Secretaries.

(e) Iran

(f) Questions Relating to the Yugoslav Frontiers
After a brief discussion it was decided to touch upon the Polish question first.

The Polish Question

Mr. Stettinius stated that he would like briefly to comment upon one important point which had not been previously raised. There had been quite a struggle in the United States on American participation in the World Organization. From the standpoint of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of great importance at this time to the United States. He hoped with all his heart that the Polish question could be settled before the Crimean Conference broke up.

Mr. Stettinius then read the following statement:

After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov’s statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative “Provisional Polish Government” and we speak of the formation of a “Government of National Unity.” All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

The following formula might therefore be considered:

That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed “The Provisional Government of National Unity;” Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This “Government of National Unity” would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

When a “Provisional Government of National Unity” is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to obtain a copy of the text of the statement in the Russian language, as he did not feel prepared to reply to the oral statement.

Mr. Eden said that he had some preliminary remarks on Mr. Stettinius’ proposal. He must tell his colleagues frankly of his difficulties in this matter. Many people thought that the Poles had been harshly treated by the British readiness to acquiesce in a frontier on the Curzon Line. He himself had been troubled for some time because, quite apart from the merits of the case, it might become a cause of difficulty between the Soviet Government and the British.

As regards the Lublin Provisional Government, it was possible that he might be quite wrong but he thought it was a fact that hardly anyone in Great Britain believed that the Lublin Government was representative of Poland. He should have thought that that view was widely held in the rest of Europe and in the United States of America. It was for that reason that the document which he had put forward the previous day had avoided all mention of adding to the Lublin Government and had stressed that a new start was necessary.

If agreement were reached here, this would involve a transfer of recognition from the London Government to the new Government. The British Government should have to abandon recognition of the London Government and such abandonment would be much easier for it if it were not made in favor of the existing Lublin Government but in favor of a new Government.

The British Government had considerable Polish forces fighting with it – about 150,000 at present – and these forces would increase as more Poles were liberated or escaped from Switzerland. It naturally desired very much to carry them along in any settlement. The task would be easier if a fresh start were made.

He had one other comment which concerned a personality. It had been said that there was considerable opposition to Mr. Mikolajczyk in the Lublin Government. He was not convinced of that. But in any case the presence of Mikolajczyk in a Polish Government would do more than anything else to add to the authority of that Government, and to convince the British people of its representative character.

Mr. Molotov stated that while the American document was being translated he wished to make some comments. Although he could not, of course, go farther than what Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, he recalled that the President had stated that the Polish situation was temporary and could not last for a long time. In the Russian opinion the most important question was the holding as soon as practical of general elections in Poland. These elections would give a basis for a permanent Government and do away with all the difficulties that were facing the Allies at the present time. Marshal Stalin had referred to the provisional period as lasting perhaps one month, whereas the Prime Minister had mentioned two. In any event, it would be a short interval. However, at the present time it was not only a question of Poland but also the rear of the Red Army. Even for a short period, it was essential to the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to take this military situation into consideration. If there were any obstacles in the rear of the Red Army an impossible situation would arise. That was why Mr. Molotov had suggested yesterday that the reorganization of the Polish Government should be on the basis of the present Lublin Government with democratic elements from within and without the country added to it.

With respect to Mikolajczyk, Mr. Molotov stated that it might be a mistake to say that he was unacceptable. The Poles themselves must decide this. Conversations must be held with the Poles in and out of Poland. Perhaps the Mikolajczyk question was not as acute as it appeared. However, it could not be cleared up in the Crimea without consulting the Poles. Furthermore, reorganization of the Polish Government could not be undertaken without speaking to the Poles. The Moscow Commission made up of the British and American Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov would have serious tasks to perform. They should discuss the entire question with the Poles and make clear to them the basis reached in the Crimea on the Polish question.

Mr. Eden said he entirely agreed with Mr. Molotov in respect to his remarks on the importance of the Polish elections. However, he felt sure that British opinion would agree that if the elections were controlled by the Lublin Government they would not be free elections or represent the will of the Polish people.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he supported Mr. Eden’s views in full in this respect.

After a brief interruption, Mr. Molotov, on reading a translation of the American proposal, stated that he would be unable to give a final answer to the new American considerations until he had consulted Marshal Stalin. He hoped to be able to do this by four o’clock. However, at the present time, he would like to make a few preliminary comments.

Firstly, it would be inadvisable to place too much emphasis on the formula of the question of the Polish Government before consulting the Poles themselves. He still believed that the new Polish Government should be created on the basis of the Lublin Government. If the three Foreign Ministers agreed to this in principle, it would not be difficult to find a formula.

Secondly, it might be better to leave out reference to the Allied Ambassadors in Warsaw since this reference would undoubtedly be offensive to the Poles as it would indicate that they, the Poles, were under the control of foreign diplomatic representatives. The Ambassadors would, of course, see and report as they desired. In the last analysis the question of a formula was not important – the question of an agreement on the fundamental issues was more so.

Mr. Eden stated that the three Allied Governments considered that a new situation would be created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This would call for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which could be more broadly representative than was possible before the liberation of Poland. This Government should be comprised of members of the Lublin Government and other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad.

Mr. Eden felt that this Government should be called the Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov continued to stress the advisability of forming the new Government on the basis of the Lublin Government. Otherwise, an unstable situation would be established in the rear of the Red Army. This Government would include other representatives from Poland and from without the country.

Mr. Stettinius maintained that it would be preferable to start with an entirely new Government and stated that unless the Foreign Ministers could get away from the words “existing Polish Government,” no agreement could be reached on this question. He suggested that Mr. Molotov give consideration to a formula which would state that the Polish Government should be based upon the old and also on the democratic leaders which will be brought in.

Mr. Molotov maintained that it was very difficult to deal with the Poles and that a serious situation would arise if a period should be created in which there were no Government in Poland. The authority of the present Lublin Government would be undermined. He maintained that if the American or British proposals were adopted everything would be standing in the air and a period of instability would be created in Poland.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the present Polish Government would continue until the new Government was formed.

Mr. Molotov maintained that the Poles would know that negotiations were proceeding on a change in government and that the present government would not endure. This would create a situation which might well cause difficulties for the Red Army.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Eden’s formula avoided this situation.

Mr. Molotov, however, adhered to his former position of insisting that the new Polish Government be formed on the basis of the Lublin Government. He maintained that the matter would have to be discussed with the Poles themselves before any decision could be reached.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to Mr. Molotov’s reactions with respect to the name of the new Polish Government.

Mr. Molotov replied that this could be taken up at a later date.

Mr. Stettinius stated that under present circumstances it would probably be best to report to the plenary session that the Foreign Ministers had discussed at length the Polish Government question on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the American Delegation and that although they had not yet reached an agreement on the matter, they had decided to continue discussions at a later date.

Mr. Harriman asked Mr. Molotov to consider a redraft of the American formula which would contain the words “based on the old and also on other democratic elements from outside and inside Poland.”

Mr. Molotov’s reaction to this suggestion was negative. He appeared to prefer the wording “based on the old government and with the calling in of representatives…“

Reparations

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Molotov had presented to him through Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Maisky a document on the principles of exacting reparations payments from Germany. He wished now to present some counter proposals which were fundamentally based on the Soviet principles. He then read the following statement:

  1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

  2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labor by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

    (a) Removal in a single payment in [after] the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

    These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

    (b) Annual deliveries of commodities during ten years after the end of the war.

  3. The total of German reparations in the form of removal from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war shall be the first subject of study by the Moscow Commission. In this study the Commission will take into consideration the effect of whatever common steps ought to be taken for the elimination or reduction of output of various important German industries, from the standpoint of the total decentralization of Germany. The Commission should take into consideration in its initial studies the Soviet Governments suggested total of twenty billion dollars for all forms of reparation.

Mr. Maisky pointed out that Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the American proposals were acceptable. However, paragraph 3 should be more fully clarified. In order to do so he suggested that the Moscow Commission accept the total of $20,000,000,000 “as a basis” for its studies. The final figures arrived at by the Commission might be a little more or less than $20,000,000,000; however, the Soviet Delegation urged that this figure be accepted as the basis.

Mr. Eden stated that the Prime Minister was strongly against stating a figure in the basic principles, even as a basis.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation was thinking only of the Soviet Union. Mr. Maisky’s Commission had done good work – it had only one defect, that of minimalism.

Mr. Stettinius urged that the question of setting a figure be left to the Commission. He continued that he of course could not commit the United States but that he felt that Mr. Maisky’s figure was reasonable.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether it would be agreeable to mention only the reparations, in the amount of ten billion dollars, which would go to the Soviet Union.

As a counterproposal Mr. Stettinius suggested that it merely be stated that 50% of the total sum of reparations collected which would be not specified would go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Molotov stated that he did not object to this suggestion; however, the exact percentage might be a little more or less than 50% of the amount collected. He again stressed the importance of including a figure in the statement.

Mr. Eden said that his Government well understood the suffering and need of the Soviet Government and would not be niggardly in the apportionment of reparations. However, he would like the Commission to do its work and ascertain the total amount of German reparations.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation was not endeavoring to supersede the work of the Commission but only to give it guidance.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to what price levels the Soviet Government had in mind.

Mr. Molotov replied that reparations should be based on 1938 prices since destruction had been in pre-war values.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether the Soviet Government also had in mind additions of 15% to 20%.

Mr. Molotov said that this was likely.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the effect of the dismemberment of Germany on payment of reparations.

Mr. Maisky replied that it would not have any effect on the removal from the national wealth of Germany of German equipment located inside and outside of the country at the termination of the war. It might affect annual payments in the post war years. However, the Soviet Government had taken this into consideration in drawing up its report.

After some discussion the Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

Dumbarton Oaks

Mr. Stettinius presented copies of the draft invitation to the Dumbarton Oaks [United Nations] Conference and stated that it was his understanding that the United States would consult with China and France before the invitations were issued on the Dumbarton Oaks matters which had been discussed in the Crimea.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this.

It was pointed out that some differences existed in the invitation submitted at the meeting and a former draft. It was suggested that the invitation be referred back to the sub-committee which would report as soon as possible to the Foreign Ministers. He explained that he had placed the draft before the meeting in order to get the Foreign Ministers’ consideration of the general principles at this stage so that time could be saved. Without decisions of the Foreign Ministers the sub-committee could not complete its work.

It was also agreed that the paragraph relative to trusteeships should be omitted from the invitation and that the five governments which would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the conference on the subject of territorial trusteeships and independent areas. This would be done on a diplomatic level.

Mr. Stettinius explained that he did not contemplate any detailed discussions on particular islands or territories but wished to establish the right of the organization to deal with the problem of trusteeships and to set up some machinery.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden indicated agreement.

Iran

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether Mr. Eden wished to bring up the subject of Iran.

Mr. Eden stated that he had submitted a paper on this question.

Mr. Stettinius remarked that the American Delegation was in entire agreement with the British position, as stated by Mr. Eden yesterday.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had not had time to give study to Mr. Eden’s paper. The subject was consequently no longer discussed.

Yugoslavia

Mr. Molotov referred to the unstable situation in Yugoslavia and to the Subasic-Tito agreement. He stated that he could not understand the British desire to supplement this agreement when steps had not been taken to put the original agreement into force. He proposed that the original agreement be executed and that following this subsequent questions be discussed.

Mr. Eden maintained that the amendments to the agreement which had been suggested by the British Government were reasonable in nature and provided for a more democratic Yugoslavia. He could see no harm in the application.

Mr. Molotov continued to maintain that no useful purpose would be served by the submission of supplementary agreements until the original agreement had been effected.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that representatives of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation. The British and Russian Ministers agreed to this proposal. Mr. Molotov stated that it would be desirable to state that it had been agreed at the Crimean Conference that the Subasic-Tito agreement should be fully executed.

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, noon

4th meeting

12.00 For Mins
ERS chmn

2/9

Poland
ERS: We have a hard fight in U.S. on particip. in Un. Ns Org. Polish sit. is of great importance to us from psych, point of view at this time. So hopes with all heart we can settle this Pol. matter before we break up in a manner which will be acceptable to the world.

  1. Dropped Pres. Commission idea
  2. (a) Mol. spoke of reorg. of Pol. Govt
    (b) Brit, formula suggests formation of a fully representative provisional govt
    (c) We: govt of national unity

All of us agree Pol. Govt should include 3 elements – Lublin, democrats in Pol. & abroad

Proposal Present Pol. Gov’t be reorganized to include Pol. democrats in Pol & abroad & be called Provisional Govt of Pol. Dem. Unity Pol. Commission in Mos. to consult in first instance Lublin Govt & Polish leaders in Pol & outside

Be pledged hold free elections, universal suffrage & secret ballot as soon as practicable

When Pol. Govt of Nat Unity is formed 3 Govts recognize Ambs. of 3 powers in Warsaw be charged report on holding of free elections

Reparations

ERS presented proposal

Point 1 acceptable
Point 3 add should consider 20,000,000,000 as a basis – final figures to be arrived by Commission

ERS: We think that figure should be taken into consideration. We can accept it as a basis for discussion.

Eden not prepared to mention any figure

Mol Maisky wants figure for Sov. share mentioned.

ERS Can’t commit U.S. to any figure but as said before personally thinks it is a reasonable figure

Mol. Could it be mentioned as a basis for discussion also

ERS: suggests 50% as basis for discussion

Mol: No objection but should not insist on 50% may be more or less, but figure would have significance. Distribution of total sum may be different.

ERS Can’t go further at this time

Maisky means 1938 prices

Eden: What of effect of dismemberment

Maisky Might affect annual payments – initially lower perhaps – but not total

ERS 10% or 15% variation that applied to Hung.

M: possibly

Agreed can mention 50% applies to 20,000,000,000

Report
ERS presented draft invitation

Understands we are agreed U S permitted to consult China & Fr before

Agreed

ERS Agreed – to sub-committee but reserved re terr. trus.

ERS: We do not contemplate any detailed discussions re particular islands or territorials but do wish to establish right of org. to deal with this & to set up machinery

Mol. Agreed

Ed. Why mention it?

ERS Agreed to eliminate it in invitation.

Understood we will take it up at Conf. & meanwhile among us at dip. level

Report
Mol. Brit. did not object at D. O

Ed. Agrees & should be in report to plenary session

Iran
Ed. mentioned his paper ERS said we agree

Poland
ERS Can we say U S-S U agree. Brit don’t

Yug.
Committee to prepare statement

Poland
New draft by Brit.

Mol. Can only give prelim. answer. Try to give final answer by 4:00. Mustn’t say put too much in this formula, mustn’t put in what we can’t say without consulting Poles. 1st amend.: say based on Lublin Govt 2. Leave out reference to Ambs in War. – offensive to Poles – indicate they are under control Q. of formula not important – q of agreement is

Ed: The 3 Govts consider that a new sit. has been created by the complete lib. of Pol by the Red Army. This calls for the est. of a fully repres. Provisional Govt which can now be more broadly repres. than was recently poss. This govt should comprise members of Lub Govt etc Should be called Prov. of Nat Unity

Mol. Can’t leave out statement Govt is based on present one

proposes: The present Pol. Govt be reorg. into a fully repres. Govt based on the present govt & incl. etc

ERS Must be entirely new

Might say based on Lub & on etc

Mol. Will be very diff to deal with Poles Can’t do that when no auth. or stability in Pol.

ERS Present gov’t would go on during the negs. until new govt is formed.

Mol But Poles will know negs are going on & will know present govt won’t last long – make it weak & make negs last long That impossible sit. for Red Army

Mol.: Ed. proposal incompatible with his own Must discuss this proposal with Poles

ERS What about name of new govt?

Mol. We can consider this.

Report we have discussed matter & will continue it later. & were unable to agree on this feature.

Harriman Asked reconsider based on Lub & other

Mol Negative

The Secretary of State to the Head of the Reconstruction Department of the British Foreign Office

Yalta, February 9, 1945

We must be sure – no respon. – rests on us relative to Iceland, Turkey, ete Egypt on joining World Organ

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Yalta, February 9, 1945

Points Still Before the Foreign Ministers

Report of February 8 Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters:
The report was modified in principle by general agreement at yesterday’s plenary session. Sir Edward Bridges and Sir Alexander Cadogan were preparing a re-draft which they may wish to submit to the Foreign Ministers this morning so that final text of the report can be agreed to and presented very briefly to the plenary session this afternoon.

Report by Sub-Committee on Form of Invitations and other Details of Arrangements for United Nations Conference:
Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to this Committee yesterday and are planning to meet this morning. Jebb was Chairman when we were appointed, and, as a courtesy, he might be asked to report – this report may have to be oral as we have not completed our drafting.

Reparations:
Two papers on this subject presented by Mr. Molotov at the meeting over which he presided are still under consideration.

Poland:
The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Ministers. The status of this is that Molotov presented a paper at the plenary session the day before yesterday, and yesterday the President presented a counter proposal.

Iran:
You might ask Molotov if, after thinking over the points made yesterday on Iran, he has any comments to make.

The points were:
(a) Respect for the Iranian decision not to grant oil concessions until after the war.
(b) Suggest for announcement now that the three powers would be prepared to begin to withdraw their troops from Iran pari passu, (i.e., by equal steps.)

Points mentioned by Mr. Eden Yesterday:
You may wish to ask whether Mr. Eden would like to say anything further with respect to the additional points he mentioned yesterday. These points were:
(a) Questions relating to the Bulgarian Control Commission;
(b) Questions relating to the Yugoslav frontier.

U.S. Proposal Regarding the Polish Government

Yalta, February 9, 1945
Top secret

Suggestions in Regard to the Polish Governmental Question

After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov’s statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative “Provisional Polish Government” and we speak of the formation of a “Government of National Unity.” All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

The following formula might therefore be considered:

That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed “The Provisional Government of National Unity;” Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This “Government of National Unity” would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

When a “Polish Government of National Unity” is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

The Director of the Office of European Affairs to the Secretary of State

Yalta, February 9, 1945

I attach a suggested paper to hand to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden on reparations. It is based on the Russian proposal of basic principles. The first two sections follow the Russian proposal literally with the additional words in the first paragraph suggested by Mr. Eden.

I think you should likewise ask Mr. Molotov on what price, i.e., what year it is intended that the total reparations shall be fixed.