Vorontsov Villa, USSR
|
Present |
|
| United States |
United Kingdom |
Soviet Union |
| Secretary Stettinius |
Foreign Secretary Eden |
Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Matthews |
Sir Alexander Cadogan |
Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Hiss |
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr |
Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Page |
Mr. Jebb |
Mr. Gromyko |
|
Major Theakstone |
Mr. Pavlov |
|
|
Mr. Golunsky |
Page Minutes
Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret
Subjects:
- WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
- YUGOSLAVIAN FRONTIERS
- CONTROL COMMISSION IN BULGARIA AND HUNGARY
- REPARATIONS
- IRAN
World Security Organization
Mr. Eden, who presided, stated that the Foreign Secretaries had been requested to consider two points vis-Ă -vis the World Security Organization; first, the question of membership which included that concerning the admission of two or three of the Soviet Republics, and, second, the question of the time and place of the meeting.
Mr. Stettinius interjected that there was also the question of exactly which nations should be invited to the initial conference.
Mr. Eden inquired whether anyone desired to initiate the discussion on this general question.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he wished to start at the bottom. He said that he would be delighted to invite the great Allies to confer in the United States. He hoped that the President had not shocked the Foreign Secretaries yesterday by mentioning the month of March as the time for the opening of the conference, and he continued that he felt sure that the time could be arranged to fit in with the convenience of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden. However, he was anxious to open the conference at the earliest possible date. Personally, he hoped that it could be held no later than the latter part of April. With respect to the question concerning who would be invited, he recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks there had been considerable talk of inviting the Associated Nations as well as the United Nations. He stated that he had come to the conclusion that it would probably be most satisfactory to limit the invitations to those who had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on the common enemy. With respect to Mr. Molotovâs references to multiple membership for the Soviet Union, it was his feeling, from the standpoint of geographical area and population, that this question should be given sympathetic consideration at the opening conference. He continued that he had thus far been unable in his own mind to decide just how inclusion of these entities could be arranged. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals there was a provision to the effect that each sovereign state had one vote. He had not thus far been able to see clearly how the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. He concluded that he wished again to refer the matter to the President who had said that the subject was most interesting and deserved sympathetic consideration.
Mr. Molotov stated that he had expressed his views on the inclusion of two or three Soviet Republics in the World Organization at the last plenary meeting. He requested Mr. Eden to state his ideas on the other subjects on the World Security agenda.
Mr. Eden stated that he would be glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the conference in the United States. He only wished to enter one caveat. He remarked that Mr. Winant, Mr. Gusev, and himself were getting a little jealous in never having any large conferences in London. If Mr. Molotov and he were to go to the United States for this conference, he hoped that there would be an early meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.
Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov supported Mr. Edenâs views with respect to a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.
Mr. Eden continued that since some time would be needed to get the Chinese and possibly the French in line, and since the lawyers would need possibly two weeks before the conference opened, he would prefer to postpone the opening of the conference until the second half of April. He pointed out that he would be committed to debates in Parliament before he would be able to go to the United States. After some discussion it was agreed by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden that the conference should open on April 25.
Mr. Molotov had previously accepted the invitation to hold the conference in the United States.
Mr. Eden stated that he wished to make a few observations on the inclusion of Soviet Republics in the Organization. He said that he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet position in this respect and would be ready to say so at whatever was considered to be an appropriate moment.
Mr. Molotov interjected âThe sooner the better.â Mr. Molotov then pointed out, in relation to the remarks made by Mr. Stettinius, that the President had indicated yesterday that according to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals each Government had one vote. However, Canada and Australia had individual votes and the fact that they were component parts of the British Empire did not prevent them from being individual members of the assembly. He said that amendments had been made to the Soviet constitution which gave the Soviet Republics the right to have contact with foreign states. The Soviet Union was a union of states. The constitution had now been revised to increase the rights of the Republics. The development of relations between the Republics and foreign states, which had already begun, was in this direction and was developing according to democratic principles. He continued that he believed that it would be superfluous to mention the political, economic and military importance of the Ukraine, White Russia and the Lithuanian Republic. He urged that it would be most desirable if agreement could be reached on this question today.
Mr. Molotov then referred to Mr. Stettiniusâ statement that only those nations which had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on Germany should be invited to the conference. This immediately gave rise to some questions. Which Polish Government, for example, should be invited.
Mr. Eden immediately interjected that this was a good reason for settling the Polish problem now.
Mr. Molotov continued that certain countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would also be invited. He stated that he would like to check the exact list of states which would attend the conference.
Mr. Stettinius gave Mr. Molotov such a list and pointed out that although Ecuador had recently declared war on Germany it was not included on the list since it had not yet signed the United Nations Declaration.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that if agreement could not be reached on the membership of the organization it should be reported accordingly.
Mr. Eden stated that only the question of the membership of the two Soviet Republics remained open.
Mr. Cadogan pointed out that if a conference were called to complete the work of Dumbarton Oaks and to reach final agreement on a charter, he did not see how any of the original members of the organization could be excluded from the conference.
Mr. Stettinius stated that the United Nations should meet to complete the charter. New members could be elected at this meeting. He said that he was trying to find a way to arrange for consideration of the Soviet request before the first meeting of the assembly.
Mr. Eden suggested as a possible procedure that the United Nations might meet and might draw up an order of the day which would include the question of extending foundation membership to two Soviet Republics. He said that he was quite ready to agree to this proposal.
Mr. Molotov suggested an amendment to Mr. Edenâs proposal to the effect that the three Foreign Secretaries had agreed that it would be advisable to grant admission to the assembly to two or three Soviet Republics.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he was favorably impressed with what Mr. Eden had said. He had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the President this morning and it was, therefore, impossible for him to make any firm commitment. However, he would be glad to discuss the question with the President promptly and hoped and expected that the United States would be able to give a favorable reply before the end of the day. He stated that he would not bring up the question of Poland since he hoped that agreement would be reached on this matter at the present conference.
Mr. Stettinius stated that there were a number of other details with respect to Dumbarton Oaks, such as the status of France, how China would be consulted, who would issue the invitations, etc.
Mr. Eden suggested that a sub-committee be set up to study these details and report back to the Foreign Secretaries. Messrs. Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to study these matters.
Yugoslavian Frontiers
Mr. Eden stated that although he did not wish to raise the question of Yugoslavian frontiers with Austria and Italy, he would like to point out that with the occupation of Austria by the Red Army there might well be administrative questions relative to the frontiers which should be handled. For this reason, the British Delegation was submitting a note to the Soviet Delegation on the question.
Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary
Mr. Eden stated that he also wished to discuss the question of a Control Commission in Bulgaria in the light of the decisions reached vis-Ă -vis the Hungarian Control Commission. It was agreed to confine the present meeting to those matters which had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries by the Chiefs of State for consideration.
Reparations
Mr. Molotov inquired as to when the American and British Delegations would be prepared to discuss the question of reparations.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he would be ready tomorrow.
Mr. Eden added that he hoped that the British side would also be ready.
Iran
Mr. Eden recalled the signing of the Declaration on Iran. He stated that the Allies had signed treaties with Iran in which certain privileges had been granted to them for the duration of the war. In all other respects, however, he felt that the Iranian Government should be the master in its own house and free to make its own decisions. The British Government felt that it was most important to observe this principle â otherwise the Allies might find themselves in competition in Iranian affairs. No one desired that. For this reason, he urged that the Allies refrain from interfering in internal Iranian matters. With respect to oil, Mr. Eden stated that the British Government did not dispute the Soviet need for Iranian oil and that it was no part of British policy to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining oil from Northern Iran. Indeed, the Soviet Union was a natural market for this oil. The British Government did not wish to put any obstacles in the way of the Soviet Unionâs obtaining oil concessions if and when the Iranians were prepared to negotiate. He continued that he felt that it should be made known publicly that the Allies would not press the matter concerning oil concessions any further until their troops had been withdrawn from Iran. The British Government was ready to consider at the Crimean Conference the advisability of making some statement which would indicate that the Allies were prepared to start to withdraw their troops earlier than was provided for in the Declaration on Iran. This withdrawal might commence as soon as the supply routes were closed. He believed that if agreement could be reached on this point it would have a good effect on world opinion and would show that the Allies were prepared to carry out the Tehran Declaration.
Mr. Molotov maintained that there were two different questions involved, i.e. those concerning the oil concessions and the withdrawal of Allied troops. With respect to the withdrawal of the troops, this question had never been placed before the Soviet Government until today. He maintained that this was a question of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty signed by Iran. If there were any need to amend this agreement the question should be studied. This would take some time.
With respect to the oil concessions, Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to make a few comments. The Soviet Government had asked Ambassador Ahi what the Iranian attitude would be to a request for concessions. Ahiâs reply had been most favorable. Kavtaradze had then proceeded to Iran to negotiate. In his first conversation with Foreign Minister Saed, the Foreign Minister had taken a favorable position. This was only natural since the granting of concessions was not only to the interests of the Soviet Union, but also to Iran. It was also in compliance with the Declaration of Tehran, since the granting of concessions would assist Iranian economy. This was the first stage of the controversy.
During the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then stated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations. Thereupon, the Medjlis had adopted a decision to the effect that there should be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many Iranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great a hurry and that it was unwise.
Why could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had changed their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no reason why they should not change it back to the first stage. The Soviet Government had endeavored to persuade them to do so. Kavtaradze had returned and the strong-armed methods he had used have subsided. He said that no negotiations were being carried on at the present time and that he did not believe it advisable to pay any special attention to this question now. He suggested that the matter be left alone â that it take its own course. The situation was not acute at the present time.
Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the United States had no wartime treaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had carried on negotiations for oil concessions but these had been dropped following the Medjlis decision. The firms were consequently in the same position as the Soviets. With respect to the withdrawal of troops from Iran he wished to point out that the American troops there were serving the interests of the Soviet Union in moving Lend-Lease supplies from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was content to leave the question of oil negotiations until the end of the war. He wished fully to support Mr. Edenâs proposals regarding the withdrawal of the Allied troops.
Mr. Eden remarked that the British Government had no opposition to the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet Government.
Mr. Stettinius stated that the United States Government took the same position.
Mr. Eden pointed out that the British had also carried on negotiations with the Iranians, even before the Soviet negotiations had started. As a result of the present attitude of the Iranian Government all of these negotiations were now held in abeyance. He said that if some statement were released, as suggested by him, it might reassure the Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil negotiations. With respect to the renewal [withdrawal] of Allied troops, there was no need to amend the Iranian treaty which stated that Allied troops would be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to withdraw these troops as soon as the supply route was no longer necessary.
Mr. Molotov stated that he believed it might be advisable to limit the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He offered to summon Kavtaradze to the conference to make a report on the Iranian situation.
Mr. Eden stated that he would like to think over what Mr. Molotov had said and added that he might have new suggestions to make at a forthcoming meeting.