Japanese-American relations (Dec. 1941)

793.94/17043: Telegram

The Consul General at Canton to the Secretary of State

Canton, December 5, 1941 — 5 p.m.
[Received December 5 — 9:42 a.m.]

94.

The eastward movement through Canton of Japanese troops from the West River area appears to have ceased. On the basis of close estimates [by] observers nearly 10,000 men and over 3,000 horses, including cavalry mounts, pack and dray animals passed along reservation [rivershore?] bund opposite Shameen during the past 3 days. It is believed that there are relatively few Japanese troops remaining in the above-mentioned area and that the bulk of two puppet divisions is stationed there.

There have been no reports of [a redisposition of troops?] to the east of Canton but the movement of supplies in that direction apparently continues, the despatch of large numbers of pack animals and several scores of carts loaded with ammunition having been seen this morning. Due to weather conditions in the past few days airplanes were grounded but today they have been fairly active.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Beiping. By pouch to Hong Kong.

MYERS

740.0011 Pacific War/681: Telegram

The Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State

Bangkok, December 5, 1941 — 3 p.m.
[Received December 5 — 1:30 p.m.]

551.

During a call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in reference to gasoline supplies, he informed me that the Japanese Ambassador had just called and informed him that the Japanese forces in Indochina definitely would not be used to invade Thai[land] and that they were concentrated for use against the Burma Road. Consequently Thailand need feel no anxiety. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that his Government, in spite of Japanese assurances, is nevertheless greatly worried because it has received additional evidence that an attack by land and air is imminent. He was unwilling to tell the nature of the evidence but said he had asked the British Minister to call in order to check up on the report. My British colleague has received no evidence of this sort recently so far as I am aware. The Foreign Minister inquired anxiously whether I had reported to the American Government the hope of the Thai Government that public statements would be issued by Great Britain and the United States promising to stand by Thailand if invaded by Japan (see Legation’s 550, December 4, 3 p.m.).

PECK

711.94/2547: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 5, 1941 — 5 p.m.
[Received 7:50 p.m.]

1895.

For the Secretary and Under Secretary only.

You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal is being represented here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of “fanciful principles which ignore the realities of the situation”, and that no intimation whatever has been given out that the proposal, if implemented, would provide Japan by peaceful and orderly processes with that security — political as well as economic — which she affects to seek by exercise of force. The response of most Japanese to whom we have said the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well-balanced, constructive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating order out of the disorders of the past, has been to express strong disappointment that the private individual is not in a position to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a matter of such supreme importance, while some have said that if the American proposal is actually such as we have described it to be, an attitude of intransigence on the part of the Japanese would be viewed with regret by the masses.

It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect publication of our proposal would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the proposal, notably complete evacuation of China, would be strong and indeed might be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility of an agreement. However, there would seem to be even greater risks of the elimination of that possibility if the points at issue continue in Japan to be befoggged by ignorance and misrepresentation. I feel sure that you will have considered the wisdom of publishing the proposal as soon as possible after consultation with the Japanese Government but even without the latter’s assent if that should not be forthcoming, publication to be accompanied by a statement substantially along the lines of the thought expressed in paragraph 2 of my 1874, December 1, 8 p.m.

A prominent Japanese in close touch with Government circles wrote to me in handwriting yesterday inter alia:

The situation is most deplorable. I may understand how you feel and you know how I feel. Allow me to write to you frankly what I have now in my mind. After speaking with friends and studying their frame of mind I come to conclude that they feel without having the knowledge of the true nature of your document of the 26th November as if we received an ultimatum from Washington. Under such unfortunate psychology of your people the only way left us, I think, that your government will broadmindedly take our proposal as a base of discussion for the modus vivendi with a view of arriving at final settlement on the line of your proposal. From sheer desire for happy ending I have to write you.

I believe this letter to be a fair criterion of public opinion here.

GREW

740.0011 Pacific War/1002

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, December 5, 1941.

The British Ambassador called at my apartment by his request.

He said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign Office, setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of course relates to the matter of defense against Japan.

I expressed my appreciation.

CORDELL HULL

711.94/25946/8

Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State

December 5, 1941

Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indochina. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows:

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indochina bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indochina. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed in the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.

711.94/25946/8

Memorandum of a Conversation

Washington, December 5, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. The Ambassador handed to the Secretary a paper which he said was the Japanese Government’s reply to the President’s inquiry in regard to Japanese troops in French Indochina. The paper reads as follows:

[Here follows text of the statement printed infra.]

The Secretary read the paper and asked whether the Japanese considered that the Chinese were liable to attack them in Indochina. He said, so Japan has assumed the defensive against China. He said that he had heard that the Chinese are contending that their massing troops in Yunnan was in answer to Japan’s massing troops in Indochina. Mr. Kurusu said that that is all that they have received from their Government in regard to this matter. The Ambassador said that as the Chinese were eager to defend the Burma Road he felt that the possibility of a Chinese attack in Indochina as a means of preventing Japan’s attacking the Burma Road from Indochina could not be excluded.

The Secretary said that he had understood that Japan had been putting forces into northern Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he had never heard before that Japan’s troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. The Secretary added that it was the first time that he knew that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese are alarmed over increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD powers in the southwest Pacific area, and that an airplane of one of those countries had recently flown over Formosa. He said that our military men are very alert and enterprising and are known to believe in the principle that offense is the best defense. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador’s observations applied to defensive measures we are taking against Hitler. The Ambassador replied that he did not say that, but that it was because of Japan’s apprehensions in regard to the situation that they had made their November 20 proposal.

The Secretary asked whether, if the Chinese are about to attack Japan in Indochina, this would not constitute an additional reason for Japan to withdraw her armed forces from Indochina. The Secretary said that he would be glad to get anything further which it might occur to the Japanese Government to say to us on this matter.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government was very anxious to reach an agreement with this Government and Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Government felt that we ought to be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations between China and Japan were initiated. The Secretary pointed out that when the Japanese bring that matter up it brings up the matter of the aid Japan is giving to Hitler. He said that he did not see how Japan could demand that we cease giving aid to China while Japan was going on aiding Hitler. Mr. Kurusu asked in what way was Japan aiding Hitler. The Secretary replied that, as he had already made clear to the Japanese Ambassador, Japan was aiding Hitler by keeping large forces of this country and other countries immobilized in the Pacific area. (At this point the Ambassador uttered sotto voce an expression in Japanese which in the present context means “this isn’t getting us anywhere”.) The Secretary reminded the Ambassador of what the Secretary had said to the Ambassador on this point on November 22 as well as on our unwillingness to supply oil to Japan for the Japanese Navy which would enable Japan to operate against us in the southern Pacific and also on our attitude toward continuing aid to China. The Ambassador said that he recalled that the Secretary had said that he would almost incur the danger of being lynched if he permitted oil to go to Japan for her navy. The Ambassador said that he believed that if the Secretary would explain that giving of oil to Japan had been prompted by the desirability of reaching a peaceful agreement such explanation would be accepted. The Secretary replied that senators and others are not even now desisting from criticizing the Secretary for the course that he had hitherto taken.

The Secretary then recapitulated the three points on which he had orally commented to the Japanese Ambassador on November 22, with reference to the Japanese proposal of November 20, namely one, our difficulty with reference to the Japanese request that we discontinue aid to China, two, our feeling that the presence of large bodies of Japanese troops anywhere in Indochina caused among neighboring countries apprehensions for their security, and, three, public attitude in this country toward supplying Japan with oil for military and naval needs. He asked the Ambassador whether he had not set forth clearly his position on these points to the Ambassador on November 22. The Ambassador agreed.

The Ambassador said that this Government blames Japan for its move into Indochina but that if Indochina was controlled by other powers it would be a menace to Japan. The Secretary replied that as the Ambassador was aware we could solve matters without delay if only the Japanese Government would renounce courses of force and aggression. The Secretary added that we were not looking for trouble but that at the same time we were not running away from menaces.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that if we could only come to an agreement on temporary measures we could then proceed with our exploration of fundamental solutions. He said that such a fundamental agreement would necessarily take time and that what was needed now was a temporary expedient. The Secretary replied that the Japanese were keeping the situation confused by a malignant campaign conducted through the officially controlled and inspired press which created an atmosphere not conducive to peace. The Secretary said that we knew the Japanese Government could control the press and that therefore we did not understand what the motives are of the higher officials of the Japanese Government in promoting such a campaign. Mr. Kurusu said that on the American side we were not free from injurious newspaper propaganda. He said that for example there was the case of a newspaper report of the Secretary’s interview with the press which created an unfortunate impression in Japan. The Secretary replied that he had been seeing for months and months that Japanese officials and the Japanese press had been proclaiming slogans of a bellicose character and that while all this was going on he had kept silent. He pointed out that now he was being jumped on by the Japanese if he said a single word in regard to his Government’s principles. Mr. Kurusu then referred to a press report casting aspersions on Kurusu to the effect that he had been sent here to check on the Ambassador, et cetera, et cetera. The Secretary replied that he had heard only good reports in regard to Mr. Kurusu and the Ambassador. At this point the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu took their leave after making the usual apologies for taking so much of the Secretary’s time when he was busy.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

U.S. Department of State (December 6, 1941)

711.94/25946/8a

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

 Washington, December 6, 1941.

Pursuant to your request, there is sent you herewith a draft of a message from you to the Emperor of Japan.

I understand that, prior to sending the message to the Emperor, you have in mind sending a message to Chiang Kai-shek in which you would, without quoting the text of the message to the Emperor, outline to him the substance of the “stand-still” arrangement which you contemplate proposing to Japan.

From point of view of ensuring the confidential nature of your message to Chiang Kai-shek, it is suggested that you might care to call in the Chinese Ambassador and Dr. Soong, to impress upon both of them the urgency and secrecy of the matter, and to ask the Ambassador to communicate to Chiang Kai-shek, by his most secret code, your message.

................

[Annex]

Draft message from President Roosevelt to the Emperor of Japan

Washington, December 6, 1941.

I feel I should address Your Majesty because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation in relations between our two countries. Conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. It has been my sincere hope that this would be achieved and I am sure that it has equally been the sincere hope of Your Majesty.

Developments are now occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and humanity of the beneficial influence of the long and unbroken peace which has been maintained between our two countries for almost a century. Those developments are suggestive of tragic possibilities.

In these circumstances, where continuance of present trends imperil the now tenuous threads which still hold our two countries in amicable relationship, I feel that no possibility should be overlooked which might serve to relieve the immediate situation and thus enable our two Governments to work out in a calmer atmosphere a more permanent solution. I am sure Your Majesty will share my feelings in this regard.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by wise decisions and enlightened acts, arrested harmful trends and directed national policies along new and farsighted courses — thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other nations.

With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose now the conclusion of a temporary arrangement which would envisage cessation of hostilities for a period of ninety days between Japan and China and an undertaking by each of the Governments most concerned in the Pacific area to refrain from any movement or use of armed force against any of the other parties during the period of the temporary arrangement. If the Japanese Government is favorably disposed toward conclusion of such an arrangement I would be glad promptly to approach the other Governments concerned with a view to obtaining their assent and commitment.

In order to give those Governments an incentive to enter into this arrangement, I further propose that, toward relieving existing apprehensions, Japan reduce her armed forces in French Indochina to the number which Japan had there on July 26, 1941, and that Japan agree not to send new contingents of armed forces or materiel to that area during the ninety-day period of the temporary arrangement.

If the commitments above envisaged can be obtained, I would undertake as a further part of the general arrangement to suggest to the Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those Governments enter into direct negotiations looking to a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which exist between them. Such negotiations might take place in the Philippine Islands should the Japanese and the Chinese Governments so desire.

In as much as the Chinese Government has been cut off from its principal industrial areas, I believe it equitable that during the temporary period of the proposed arrangement the United States should continue sending material aid to China. I may add that the amount of material which China is able under present conditions to obtain is small in comparison with the amount of material that Japan would save through discontinuance of operations for a period of three months.

It is my thought that while this temporary arrangement would be in effect our two Governments could continue their conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The kind of solution I have had and continue to have in mind is one in which Japan, on the basis of application of the principle of equality, would be provided through constructive and peaceful methods opportunity for the freer access to raw materials and markets and general exchange of goods, for the interchange of ideas, and for the development of the talents of her people, and would thus be enabled to achieve those national aspirations which Japan’s leaders have often proclaimed.

In making this proposal, I express to Your Majesty the fervent hope that our two Governments may find ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional condition of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

740.0011 Pacific War/856

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 6, 1941.

Proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

More than a year ago Your Majesty’s Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indochina for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces [avowedly for the same reason — protection against Chinese attack on Indochina from the north.] to enter Southern French Indochina for the common defense of French Indochina. I think I am correct in saying that no [Chinese] attack has been made upon Indochina, nor that any has been contemplated [by the Chinese Government.]

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that [very large numbers of] Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indochina in such large numbers [to places so far removed from the defense area of Northern Indochina] as to [constitute] create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in [Southern] Indochina is [neither] not defensive in its character [nor directed against China at all].

Because these continuing concentrations in [Southern] Indochina have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indochina if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indochina would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.0011 Pacific War/856

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, December 6, 1941.

There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page three of the message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I spoke to you on the telephone.

If you approve the draft as it now stands, we shall see that it gets off to Grew at once.

CORDELL HULL

740.0011 Pacific War/856

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

The White House, Washington, December 6, 1941.

Dear Cordell:
Shoot this to Grew — I think it can go in gray code — saves time — I don’t mind if it gets picked up.

F.D.R.

740.0011 Pacific War/856

President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan

Washington, December 6, 1941.

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

More than a year ago Your Majesty’s Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indochina for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indochina for the common defense of French Indochina. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indochina, nor that any has been contemplated.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indochina in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indochina is not defensive in its character.

Because these continuing concentrations in Indochina have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indochina if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indochina would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.0011 P.W./684: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State

London, December 6, 1941 — 4 p.m.
[Received December 6 — 10:40 a.m.]

5918.

Personal to the Secretary and the President.

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a.m. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.

WINANT

751G.94/402: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France

Washington, December 6, 1941 — 3 p.m.

897.

Please inform Foreign Office that your Government officially requests information as follows: What number of armed forces are the Japanese authorized by agreements with French authorities to have in Indochina? What number does the Vichy Government understand Japan to have in Indochina now?

HULL

892.51/238: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Thailand

Washington, December 6, 1941 — 6 p.m.

168.

You may assure Thai authorities that extension of a credit to Thailand for current needs is fully agreed to in principle, and that Department expects no delay in working out details with the appropriate lending agency of this Government.

HULL

751G.94/407½

The Secretary of War to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 6, 1941.

Dear Mr. Secretary:
I enclose the figures of our G–2 estimate of Japanese air and ground forces in Indochina, Hainan, and Formosa, as requested by the President yesterday.

Faithfully yours,
HENRY L. STIMSON

[Enclosure]

The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff

Washington, December 6, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Estimate of Japanese Air and Ground Forces in Indochina, Hainan and Formosa.

  1. Indochina.
Japanese troops in the theater 125,000
In the North 25,000
In the South 82,000
On ships in harbors 18,000
Total 125,000
(Other troops in transit toward Indochina, south of Shanghai) Unknown
Planes (bulk in the south) 450
  1. Hainan.
Japanese troops 50,000
Planes ~200
  1. Taiwan (Formosa).
Japanese troops 40,000
Planes ~400
  1. Basis of the foregoing: Reports by MID, ONI, State Department and British Intelligence.

SHERMAN MILES
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

740.0011 P. W./659: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan

Washington, December 6, 1941 — 7 p.m.

816.

The Foreign Office note has been brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

In connection with this question, you may be interested to know that the Navy Department has been informed by the Governor of Guam that about noon on November 24 an unidentified two-motored airplane circled the southern extremity of Guam for about ten minutes flying at an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet.

HULL

711.94/254b: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan

Washington, December 6, 1941 — 8 p.m.

817.

An important telegram is now being encoded to you containing for communication by you at earliest possible moment text of message from the President to the Emperor.

HULL

711.94/2550: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 6, 1941 — 7 p.m.
[Received 8:19 p.m.]

1901.

I learn from what is believed to be a reliable Japanese source that General Tojo’s speech of November 30 had been seen neither by the Prime Minister nor by any other member of the Cabinet prior to its delivery. The speech was read by proxy as is commonly done in Japan. Observers point out that tone and substance of the speech differs entirely from the other utterances by Tojo and it is believed that the address was written by some person in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

GREW

711.94/2554c: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China

Washington, December 6, 1941 — 9 p.m.

286.

Please communicate, in person if feasible, at the earliest possible moment to Chiang Kai-shek for his confidential information a copy of a message which the President is sending to the Emperor of Japan, reading as follows:

[Here follows text printed on December 5]

In communicating copy of this message to Chiang Kai-shek, please state orally as from the President that the quoted message has already been sent by the President to the Emperor; that this message, as the situation now stands, would seem to represent very nearly the last diplomatic move that this Government can make toward causing Japan to desist from its present course; that if the slender chance of acceptance by Japan should materialize, a very effective measure would have been taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it is very much hoped that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in Chinese Government circles adverse comment.

HULL

Japanese Foreign Office (December 6, 1941)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
*897

Re your #1268. [a]

To Counselor IGUCHI from KAMEYAMA.

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867 [b] was that of the two sets of “B” code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other.

Army 25835                                            Trans. 12/6/41 (S) 
 
[a] Not available.
[b] S.I.S. #25640 regarding the destruction of codes and one code machine in the Washington office.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
PA-K2 
#899 (Strictly Secret.)
  1. The recent occupation of Netherlands Guiana by American troops, or call it what you will — occupation it is, is the first example in the present war of the United States’ invading South America. In the light of the Havana agreement, French territory may next be expected to be taken over. As for the Good Neighbor Policy, so far it has been used merely for getting military bases and aeronautical rights together with certain economic and financial interest. But now that the situation is tenser, the hitherto good neighbor, the United States, will no longer hesitate to use arms. This at length has come to the surface, and we must be on the strictest alert.

  2. Based on an agreement with France, we penetrated Southern French-Indo China for joint defense. Scarcely were our tracks dry, when along comes good old nonchalant America and grabs Netherlands Guiana. If she needs any of the American countries for her own interest, hiding under the camouflage of joint defense, she will take them, as she has just proven. This is a menace to the Latin American nations; so will you please at every opportunity, impress upon the Government and people of the country to which you are accredited that the United States bodes them naught save ill. Moreover, please investigate the following points and wire me back.

  1. Has there been any other agreement or understanding established between the Netherlands Government and the Latin American Nations and the United States besides the one concerning Netherlands Guiana? If so, what is it like with reference say to bases, troop movements, annexation, etc.?

  2. The attitude of the country to which you are accredited toward this act of aggression, and the trend of public opinion.

Please send to all Ambassadors and Ministers in Central and South America (including San Paula).

Sent to Washington. Washington will send to Ottawa.

25868                                                 Trans. 12/7/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#901

Re my #844 [a].

  1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 [b] (in English).

  2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

  3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

Army 25838
JD: 7149 Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

[a] See S.I.S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.
[b] Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#904

Re my #902.

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoiré be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Army 25844
JD: 7144                                              Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
December 6, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#1003

Re 2 of your #1418 [a].

  1. From the standpoint given in 4 of my #985 [b], we would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it; and so get the German Government to understand this position of ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question.

In doing this, explain to them at considerable length that insofar as American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither of high quality nor of large quantity, and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia. Please endeavor to come to an understanding on this line.

  1. However, should Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP insist upon our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have no other recourse, make a statement to the effect that we would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia via the Japanese waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this out thoroughly.

  2. In case the German Government refuses to agree with 1 or 2 and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear in mind.

  3. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later

Army 25925 Trans. 12/8/41 (NR)

[a] Not available.
[b] Parts 1 and 3, S.I.S. Nos. 25552, 3; Part 2 not available. Tokyo informs Berlin that there is extreme danger of war suddenly breaking out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that if Russia joins hands with England and the United States against her, Japan will turn upon her with all her might.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Canton
December 6, 1941
Purple
#225 (Strictly secret)

Re your #516 [a].

You are to note the following points:

  1. In your communication to the British and American Consuls, the statement:

We will take over the concessions and other interests.

…is not necessarily accurate so you had better change it to:

We will place the settlements and other interests under the control of the Imperial Army.

  1. The evacuation of the Consular staffs and resident Nationals of hostile nations will have to parallel and coincide with measures concerning the departure of our Consular staffs and our resident Nationals, so when you receive orders from Headquarters you may proceed to handle this matter.

  2. Public property of hostile nations, Consulates, and buildings will be seized or commandeered and after being sealed they will be in our custody.

  3. Private property, even though it might serve us in some military way, cannot be seized. It might merely be taken over and kept under surveillance.

(Japanese)

Army 25997                                            Trans. 12/9/41 (5)
 
[a] Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Bangkok
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
(CA)
#852

The (----) [a] day (X Day) decided by the ---- [b] liaison conference on the 6th (?) [c] is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be given is the 7th (?) (Sunday). As soon as you have received this message, please reply to that effect.

Army 25881                                            Trans. 12/8/41 NR)
 
Translator's assumptions:
[a] "Proclamation" or "declaration." 
[b] "Ambassadorial" or "China." 
[c] This word is garbled and could be either the word "6th" or the word "November."

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1272

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

  1. On the 4th those engaged in Plan “A” dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the “introducing” at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advise of these individuals.

  2. Those carrying on Plan “B” included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States’ proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us _ _ _ _ _ (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) _ _ _ _ _

Army 25846
JD: 7176 Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#128

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123 [a] the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

ARMY 26158 JD 7381 (Japanese)                        Trans. 12/12/41 (5)
 
[a] Not available.

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#253

Re the last part of your #123. [a]

  1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, [b] there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

  2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

ARMY 25877 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#254

1… On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2… It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874 JD-7179                                 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

From: Seattle
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#184 (Urgent intelligence.)

1… The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.

2… The Saratoga sailed the same day.

ARMY 25876                                         Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
1 Like

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 1 of 14) Separate telegram
 
MEMORANDUM
  1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views, concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

  1. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owning to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan’s true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143
25843                                            Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
2 Likes
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan’s constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indochina, they have attempted to frustrate Japan’s aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indochina, both American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1:7143                                         Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)
25843
2 Likes
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple
#902 (Part 3 of 14).

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental -(75 letters garbled)-The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1:7143                                         Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)
25843
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