Japanese-American relations (Dec. 1941)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as “Introducer” of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called “Introducer” of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD-1:7143                                       Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
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[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple 
#902 (Part 6 of 14)
  1. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indochina, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indochina as a measure of easing the situation.

JD: 1-7143                                         Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)
25843
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From: Tokyo 
To: Washington
December 4, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

  1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another’s position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one’s selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
JD: 1-7143                                         Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)
25843
1 Like

[Secret]

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple 
#902 (Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world’s actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states:

Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD-1:7143                                        Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
1 Like
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

  1. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.
JD-7143                                          Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
1 Like
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 10 of 14)
  1. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr-(45 letters garbled or missing)-been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the --es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.
JD1-7143                                         Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
1 Like
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indochina is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,-Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,-excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indochina and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indochina of a system similar to the n-(50 letters missed)-sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD1-7143                                         Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 
25843
1 Like
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 12 of 14)
  1. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan’s position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.
JD-1: 7143                                       Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
1 Like
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple 
#902. (Part 13 of 14)
  1. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan’s sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

  2. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan’s position.

JD-1: 7143                                       Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
1 Like

U.S. Department of State (December 7, 1941)

711.94/2553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 7, 1941 — 1 p.m.
[Received December 7 — 6:47 a.m.]

1904.

On December 5, my British colleague spoke to the Foreign Minister about General Tojo’s speech of November 30 which, coming at a moment when Japan’s foreign relations were so delicate, had made a deplorable impression throughout the world. The Minister replied that he wished to make two points: (1) the translation of the speech in the Japan Times and Advertiser was highly colored and such words as “vengeance” did not appear in the original; (2) the statement had been prepared on Saturday, November 29 by members of the Prime Minister’s staff but, owing to the weekend, it had unfortunately not been possible to contact the Prime Minister himself before the statement was read out at one or two meetings on the following day. The statement had therefore not received the approval of the Prime Minister.

GREW

711.94/12–741

Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 7, 1941.

Mr. Secretary:
It is suggested that when next the Japanese Ambassador calls you may wish to offer comment along lines as follows:

It will be recalled that last spring when the Japanese Ambassador first offered a proposal for a Pacific settlement as a basis for informal exploratory conversations we were given to understand that the Japanese Government shared the view of this Government that such a Pacific settlement should be founded squarely on principles of peace. Proceeding on the assumption that the Japanese Government desired to adopt courses of peace, this Government entered into informal exploratory conversations on the basis of the Japanese Government’s proposal and with great patience endeavored to point out the respects in which in the opinion of this Government the Japanese Government’s proposal was inconsistent with courses of peace. The United States has not asked for anything for itself in connection with such a settlement. It has asked only that such a settlement as might be arrived at be wholly in harmony with principles which this Government considers the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. Under such circumstances it is obvious that the Government of the United States has not been in position to make concessions in the way of bargaining. It has felt, however, that the program it offers is one which would provide peace and stability under law and justice for the entire Pacific area. The Japanese Government has been representing that, whereas the United States has been maintaining an unyielding attitude in the conversations, the Japanese Government has been adopting a conciliatory attitude and has offered the utmost by way of concessions to meet the position of the United States. This Government is unable to perceive, however, that the Japanese Government has budged in any material respect from its original position. This position, as the United States sees it, amounts to an insistence upon obtaining a complete victor’s peace over China — that is to say, upon complete realization of the very objectives which brought on Japan’s conflict with China four and one-half years ago.

The Japanese Government maintains that it cannot agree to a proposal which would involve withdrawal of Japanese support from the Wang Jingwei regime. The Government of the United States finds itself unable to reconcile such a position with the express desire of the Japanese Government that the President exercise his good offices in bringing the Chinese Government at Chungking into direct negotiations with the Japanese Government. Under these circumstances the Government of the United States is at a loss to understand what purpose the Japanese Government has in view in entering into negotiations with the Chinese Government at Chungking.

The Japanese Government makes it clear that it is still intent upon compensation from China for Japan’s “sacrifices” in its conflict with China and upon realization of the so-called “New Order in East Asia” and the “Co-prosperity Sphere”. Such concepts in the opinion of this Government are utterly at variance with this Government’s concept of what should constitute the basis of a Pacific settlement if there is to be assured a stable peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area.

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Japanese Foreign Office (December 7, 1941)

[Secret]

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
December 6 [7], 1941
Purple
#919 (Departmental Secret)

Re your #821 [a] and #23 [a] addressed to Your Excellency from Singora. All telegraphic codes referred to have been destroyed on December 5th.

Army 25885                                           Trans. 12-8-41 (NR)
[a] Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent-Very Important)
#907 To be handled in government code

Re my #902. [a]

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

    Army 25850                                            Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
    
    [a] S.I.S. #25843-text of Japanese reply.
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711.94/2594⅞

Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 7, 1941 — 2:20 p.m.
  1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

  1. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan’s true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking régime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan’s constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indochina, they have attempted to frustrate Japan’s aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indochina, both American and British Governments, wilfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these Countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

  1. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

  1. The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indochina, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

  2. Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

  3. Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

  1. The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

  2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indochina upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indochina to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as “introducer” of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called “introducer” of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

  1. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific Area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indochina, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indochina as a measure of easing the situation.

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

  1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another’s position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one’s selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world’s actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

  1. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states—

Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the War in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.

  1. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

  2. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indochina is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries, — Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand, — excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indochina and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indochina of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

  1. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan’s position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any régime other than the régime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

  2. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan’s sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

  3. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan’s position.

  4. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

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711.94/2594⅞

Memorandum of a Conversation

Washington, December 7, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment to see the Secretary at 1:00 p.m., but later telephoned and asked that the appointment be postponed to 1:45 as the Ambassador was not quite ready. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu arrived at the Department at 2:05 p.m. and were received by the Secretary at 2:20.

The Japanese Ambassador stated that he had been instructed to deliver at 1:00 p.m. the document which he handed the Secretary, but that he was sorry that he had been delayed owing to the need of more time to decode the message. The Secretary asked why he had specified one o’clock. The Ambassador replied that he did not know but that that was his instruction.

The Secretary said that anyway he was receiving the message at two o’clock.

After the Secretary had read two or three pages he asked the Ambassador whether this document was presented under instructions of the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied that it was. The Secretary as soon as he had finished reading the document turned to the Japanese Ambassador and said:

I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them.

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then took their leave without making any comment.

A copy of the paper which was handed to the Secretary by the Japanese Ambassador is attached.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

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Statement by the Secretary of State

December 7, 1941

Japan has made a treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack upon the United States.

At the very moment when representatives of the Japanese Government were discussing with representatives of this Government, at the request of the former, principles and courses of peace, the armed forces of Japan were preparing and assembling at various strategic points to launch new attacks and new aggressions upon nations and peoples with which Japan was professedly at peace including the United States.

I am now releasing for the information of the American people the statement of principles governing the policies of the Government of the United States and setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area, which I handed to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941.

I am likewise releasing the text of a Japanese reply thereto which was handed to me by the Japanese Ambassador today. Before the Japanese Ambassador delivered this final statement from his Government the treacherous attack upon the United States had taken place.

This Government has stood for all the principles that underlie fair-dealing, peace, law and order, and justice between nations and has steadfastly striven to promote and maintain that state of relations between itself and all other nations.

It is now apparent to the whole world that Japan in its recent professions of a desire for peace has been infamously false and fraudulent.

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811.20 (D) Regulations/5483a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the High Commissioner in the Philippines

Washington, December 7, 1941.

548.

The following telegram was sent today to all Collectors of Customs by the Economic Defense Board:

All licenses, whether general or individual, authorizing exports to Japan and Japanese possessions, Manchukuo, China other than shipments via the Burma Road and Rangoon, French Indochina, Shanghai, and Thailand, of articles and materials which have been enumerated in all Export Control Schedules under the Export Control Act of July 2, 1940, and all such licenses authorizing exports to Japanese Nationals anywhere, are hereby revoked. This revocation applies to all shipments of the character referred to whether or not laden upon the carrier in which they are scheduled to be exported. While the revocation described herein applies to all licenses now in effect authorizing exports to Thailand, it may be pointed out that the Economic Defense Board is prepared to consider new applications for license to export to that country. Accordingly, you may accept as valid all licenses for export to Thailand which are dated on or after December 9, 1941.

Compliance with above required immediately. Licensing instruction in conformance with above will be radioed shortly.

HULL

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740.0011 Pacific War/1079

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of a Conversation With Captain Roscoe E. Schuirmann of the Office of Naval Operations

Washington, December 7, 1941.

Captain Schuirmann telephoned Mr. Atcheson at ten minutes of five this evening and stated that a report had been received from the British Admiralty that from three to five Japanese ships were attacking Kota Bharu in British Malaya (just below Siam, 6° north, 102° east) and attempting to land troops there. [(]This information was communicated by Mr. Atcheson to the Secretary’s and to Mr. Hornbeck’s office).

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[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#908 (To be handled in government code)

All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done.

Army 25853                                            Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
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[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#909

From Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO to Commercial Attaché IGUCHI and his staff as well as to Secretary YUKI.

I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health.

Army 25858                                            Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
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[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#910

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 [a] and also #907 [b], #908 [c] and #909 [d], please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

Army 25854                                            Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
 
[a] S.I.S. #25843-text of reply.
[b] S.I.S. #25850.
[c] S.I.S. #25853.
[d] S.I.S. #25858.
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[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular)
7 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#2492 Confidential within diplomatic circles.

The Departments concerned have been giving study to the question of handling enemy subjects, and enemy property in Japan, as well as the handling of neutrals, and on the 6th the results were reported to the Imperial Headquarters; the main points of which I am giving in my separate circular #2193*. Both this message the separate message are addressed to Manchukuo, Taiwan, NANSO, (for foreign propaganda), Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Hankow, Canton.

Peking will contact Kalgan, and Dairen (?). Tsingtao will contact Tsinan; Canton will contact Amoy.

25966
JD-1: 7229                                (F) Navy Trans. 12-9-41 (C-NR)
 
*JD-1: 7231 (S.I.S. #25967).
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