892.51/238: TelegramThe Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, December 4, 1941 — 2 p.m. [Received December 4 — 10:12 a.m.]
549.Following is the full text of an aide-mémoire dated December 3, 1941 from the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation at Bangkok:
Aide-Mémoire
His Majesty’s Government, ever desirous of maintaining and promoting the friendship and commercial relations with the United States of America, have the honor to lay before the United States Government the pressing need of Thailand for United States dollars.
In order to facilitate or even enable the trade relations of this country with the United States of America to be carried on during these times of the dislocation of normal trade conditions, His Majesty’s Government venture to approach the United States Government with a view to grant by them to his Majesty’s Government of United States dollar credits upon conditions, for which the basis of negotiations is submitted in the memorandum attached hereto.
His Majesty’s Government will warmly appreciate the sympathetic consideration by the United States Government of this matter; and as it is a matter of urgency, His Majesty’s Government will be grateful for any steps which might be taken in order to expedite the consideration thereof.
Memorandum
The Thai Government is unable any longer to maintain its orders from the United States of America owing to the complete drying up of normal sources of supply of United States gold.
The Thai Government is completely solvent, as is clearly set out for the benefit of all foreign observers in the lately issued report of the Financial Adviser.
The Thai Government requests the United States Government to place at its disposal through the Export and Import Bank the sum of $8,000,000, half to cover such Thai Government imports from the United States of America and half to cover Thai commercial market imports from the United States of America as may be permitted by license.
The Thai Government requests the United States Government to agree in principle to the repayment of this sum at the end of war, when it reenters into the free use of all its foreign assets, the larger part of which, being in sterling, can for the present only be used in the sterling area.
In the meanwhile, the Thai Government is prepared to earmark as cover for this accommodation baht 22,000,000 (pound sterling 2,000,000) worth of its gold deposits in Bangkok in favor of the United States of America.
The Thai Government, however, reserves to itself the right of repaying, in whole or in part at any earlier moment than that envisaged in Article 4, should it find itself in funds that permit such anticipated repayment.
PECK
740.0011 Pacific War/673: TelegramThe Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, December 4, 1941 — 3 p.m. [Received 4:40 p.m.]
550.The Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning again asked me to convey to the Department the hope of the Thai Government that the American and British Governments will issue public statements to the effect that Japan by invading Thailand would incur the enmity and armed resistance of those two countries in addition to Thailand’s. He recalled American and British statements of last August which I referred to in paragraph 2 of the Legation’s 504, November 6, 5 p.m. and said the Thai Government believed a new and even stronger statement would accomplish two results — it would deter the Japanese from the invasion on which they are now determined and would strengthen the will to resist of a Thai faction that is wavering because of disbelief that our two nations will actually come to the aid of Thailand when it is called on to resist aggression. He said this faction has considerable political influence and that it is impressed by the Japanese argument that all the small nations whom Great Britain encouraged to resist were abandoned and were conquered by Germany. He insisted that the Thai Government will resist invasion even without exterior aid but that it needs and earnestly hopes for the assistance it would derive from the suggested American and British statements.
PECK
711.94/2515: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, December 4, 1941 — 9 p.m. [Received December 4 — 8:20 p.m.]
1892.Dōmei report issued this afternoon too late for afternoon papers gives opinions of well-informed Japanese observers as follows. After stating that Secretary Hull’s announcement of certain details of Japanese-American negotiations [is] apparently designed for internal effect in United States [it] nonetheless raises doubts as to United States honesty in current negotiations, especially as issued at most delicate juncture of Japanese-American situation, with no sign conclusion despite passage of 17 days since resumption negotiations on arrival [of] Kurusu. Hull’s statement, together with recent strengthening military anti-Japanese encirclement camp, creates a situation which demands utmost caution as statement is considered as one of various preparatory measures being undertaken [by] United States Government with a view to any contingency in connection with outcome negotiations and an attempt to eliminate any pro-Japanese sentiment among American people who are not yet necessarily ready to keep step with their government in strong policy against Japan. Hull’s reference various principles to which United States subscribe indicates United States still scheming to oppose Japan on old obsolete principles incompatible with Far Eastern situation even in the past.
Dōmei cites same observers as of the opinion “it is utterly impossible for Japan to accept that which is stipulated in the American document of November 26 and that the logical conclusion is that such a document cannot serve as a basis for further Japanese-American negotiations”.
In conclusion report states that observers in Tokyo note that despite the fact that two conferences have taken place since the presentation of the American document there has been no evidence of any progress and that the unilateral disclosures by Secretary Hull of the negotiations have made the situation still more grave.
GREW
751G.94/402: TelegramThe Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State
Vichy, December 3, 1941 — 11 p.m. [Received December 4 — 10:07 p.m.]
1493.We talked with Ostrorog today who was delighted with the report that the President has asked the Japanese negotiators in Washington why Japan wishes to increase its occupational forces in Indochina. He then referred to a Dōmei press report from Tokyo dated December 2 which stated that:
The official spokesman of the French Government has said that France would permit Japan to use her bases and facilities in Indochina in the event of war in the Far East.
This, he said, was utterly and completely false and had been fabricated in Tokyo; France had made no such statement and he had drafted the denial which Havas had sent abroad last evening. (Neither the Dōmei report nor the denial was published in the French press.)
He then went on to say that the Japanese had for over 2 months been pressing the French to permit them to increase substantially their forces in Indochina the number provided for in the Franco-Japanese agreement of May 9, 1941. Some time ago, he said, after constant pressure from the Japanese, particularly in Indochina, the French Embassy at Tokyo had finally been instructed to inform the Japanese Government that France would resist with such force as she had at her disposal any attempt to increase Japanese garrisons in Indochina beyond the terms of the agreement. He said that he had personally urged this policy of resistance because, while the French in Indochina were actually powerless to resist the Japanese, he believed that the threat of French resistance, coupled with the stand which England and the United States had taken in the Far East, would be sufficient to keep the Japanese from increasing their forces. Upon receipt of this notification, the Japanese had agreed that they would make no such increases at the moment but gave no assurances that they would not do so in the future. He went on to say, however, that the Japanese recently had been sending large amounts of military equipment and material to Indochina.
Now that the question of the increase in Japanese forces in Indochina has become a part of the negotiations in Washington, he said, the French position is considerably strengthened. We asked him what position the French Government would take in the event of hostilities breaking out in the Far East and he replied that while theoretically the French would continue to hold to their position that the Japanese occupation of Indochina was purely for defense of that territory and that no offensive action would be tolerated, should war actually break out he did not see what France could do since the Japanese were so thoroughly installed there they were complete masters of the situation.
He is still of the opinion, however, that Japan will not declare war and that the Tojo Government will resign and a new government, possibly headed by Prince Konoe, will replace it.
LEAHY
740.0011 Pacific War/1456Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Schmidt, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy
Washington, December 4, 1941.Mr. Terasaki called on Mr. Schmidt at the Department and left with him the attached newspaper clipping, said to be taken from the Washington Post of December 4, 1941.
Mr. Terasaki said that he had been instructed by Mr. Kurusu to give this newspaper clipping to Mr. Ballantine and to inquire whether the remarks in the clipping attributed to the Secretary of State were correct.
Mr. Schmidt glanced at the newspaper clipping and said that he would be glad to give it to Mr. Ballantine when he came in. Mr. Terasaki said that he would like to have Mr. Ballantine call him or to have Mr. Ballantine send a reply to Mr. Terasaki in any way he saw fit.
Mr. Terasaki said that naturally newspaper reports of this sort were sent to Japan; that the Japanese people and possibly the Japanese Government might decide that it was no longer worthwhile to carry on with the conversations; and that the Embassy here might receive a telegram from the Japanese Government asking whether the newspaper report were correct or not.
740.0011 Pacific War/1095Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, December 4, 1941.Mr. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy called on an officer of this Division this afternoon and stated that the British Ambassador in Tokyo had raised the question whether endeavor should not be made to effect an arrangement with the Japanese Government under which, in the event of British-Japanese hostilities, British and Japanese officials and nationals in the territory of the other would be withdrawn or exchanged. Mr. Hayter did not know whether the British Ambassador in Tokyo had in mind an arrangement designed also to be effective as regards Manchuria and Japanese-occupied areas of China. Mr. Hayter stated that the British Foreign Office, before acting in the matter, desired that the British Embassy discuss it with the Department with a view to learning our views.
Although it is possible that the Japanese Government would not be willing to enter into such an arrangement, especially with regard to Manchuria and occupied areas of China, it is believed that, for the sake of the personal safety of American officials and other American nationals, it would be advisable for this Government as well as the British to attempt to make such arrangement. Such attempt might, at this time, be advisable also in that it would be definite indication to the Japanese Government of the firmness of the American position in the present crisis and would be one means of impressing upon the Japanese Government the seriousness with which we view the present situation.
It is our opinion that, if endeavor is made to effect such an arrangement, earnest effort should be made to have included within its scope both the occupied areas in China and Manchuria. It seems to us that there is a fair possibility that American officials and other nationals in Japan would, in case of hostilities between Japan and this country, receive reasonably correct treatment (although such treatment in the case of nationals placed in concentration camps would naturally, because of the lower standard of living in Japan, involve much more physical discomfort than would be the case in this country). On the other hand it is likely that our officials in Manchuria, who have no official status vis-à-vis the “Manchukuo” regime, and our nationals there as well as our officials and nationals in occupied areas of China, might receive extremely harsh treatment especially as the Japanese military authorities in control of those areas are to be classed in general among the extremists and are in general anti-American.
The proposed agreement would seem necessarily to envisage assent on the part of this Government to the withdrawal from United States territory of a number of Japanese subjects many times as great as the number of American nationals in territory controlled or occupied by Japan.
The officer of this Division on whom Mr. Hayter called informed Mr. Hayter that the matter would be brought to the attention of the high officers of the Department and that the British Embassy would be informed as soon as it was possible to reach a conclusion. It is suggested that, if it is decided that endeavor will be made to effect the suggested arrangement, the American approach to the Japanese Government be made independently of the British.
As the making of such an approach would be interpreted by the American public as a definite indication that this Government expects war between Japan and the United States, the Secretary may wish to speak to the President in regard to the advisability of this Government’s making such an approach at this time.
756D.94/193Captain Roscoe E. Schuirmann, of the Office of Naval Operations, to the Secretary of State
Washington, December 4, 1941.November 22nd the Special Naval Observer London informed the Chief of Naval Operations that Vice Admiral Furstner, Minister of Marine of the Dutch Government in London and Commander in Chief of All Dutch Naval Forces had received information that the Japanese were concentrating an expeditionary force in the Pelew Islands and that the Dutch Government were considering what it should do in case a Japanese expeditionary force should cross the Davao-Waigeo line or the equator east of that line, and that the Dutch Government were inclined to regard such a movement as a direct threat to the territories and interests of Great Britain and the United States, which should immediately be countered by force. The Dutch stated that before making up their minds they would like the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The Chief of Naval Operations replied that he discounted the information as to the assembly of an expeditionary force in the Pelews. That he was not in a position to offer advice as the question asked involved political questions, but authorized the Naval Observer London to express his views as to the importance of the Pelews for the protection of the Mandates and for an offense against the Philippines or the Netherlands East Indies.
December 3 the Special Naval Observer London reported that he has kept the British Admiralty informed of the above as the same subject has been discussed by the Dutch with the British. He suggested to the British Admiralty that it might be necessary for the Dutch to declare the area south of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator line an area dangerous to shipping, in order that Dutch forces might be free to take prompt action against suspicious vessels crossing from the North and from the East. The British Admiralty concurred that this would constitute a useful defense measure from the naval point of view. However it was essential for political reasons that the zone should be declared in as unprovocative a manner as possible and should be represented as a defense zone rather than as a dangerous zone.
The British Admiralty informed Furstner that they also doubted the accuracy of his information and suggested the Dutch take the matter up with the Foreign Office.
When the Dutch Foreign Minister visited Eden his proposal went beyond that of Furstner as it invited a joint declaration of a defense zone by the United States or Great Britain. After consulting the Admiralty, Eden replied to the Dutch Foreign Minister as follows: (A) That during the continuance of the present negotiations between Japan and the United States, it was undesirable that any declaration be made unless there was the plainest evidence that the Japanese were preparing an expedition against the Netherlands territory, and that until more definite evidence becomes available that Japanese concentrations are threatening Dutch territory no declaration should be made. (B) That Great Britain recognizes the military value the declaration of a defense zone would have, but that it considers it would be less provocative to Japan and less prejudicial to the Washington negotiations if it were confined to a unilateral declaration by the Netherlands East Indies of a zone manifestly designed as a defense measure for their own shores. (C) That in similar circumstances His Majesty’s Government had been compelled to make a unilateral declaration of a defense zone on the open seas off the coast of Johore when the Japanese concentrations on the border of Indo China began to constitute a threat to Malaya; the declaration of this zone in waters adjacent to British territory was plainly a measure of defense and at the time was accepted as such by Japan without serious criticism.
Mr. Eden therefore suggested that if a declaration should prove necessary the Netherlands Government should declare that certain military and naval defense measures have been taken in the area south and west of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator line and that accordingly all vessels intending to enter this zone must notify the Netherlands Naval authorities of their intention and call at specified ports for routing instructions. Such a declaration would be analogous to that made by His Majesty’s Government off Johore and would not be likely to increase existing tension.
On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Special Naval Observer in London to transmit to the Dutch and British Admiralties in London, the following views on the military aspect of this subject.
While the Chief of Naval Operations believes the November reports of a concentration in the Pelews were unfounded, the possibility of a Japanese attack from that region against the Philippines or Netherlands East Indies cannot be ruled out.
In regard to the Dutch project to declare areas south and west of the Davao–Waigeo–Equator line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch Forces may attack suspicious vessels entering from the North and East, if this were done it would apply to all merchant shipping regardless of nationality and to British and United States Naval vessels as well as those of Japan. It is doubtful if the Dutch could establish promptly a control system which would not cause excessive delay to shipping important to the United States particularly to the shipping carrying reinforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between the United States and the Far East is routed via Torres Straits.
The declaration of this large area as a defense zone would hardly be analogous to the British declaration of the Johore area, as the latter area is a small one. The declaration of a large area of the high seas as a defense zone would create a precedent for Japan to close the Okhotsk Sea, Sea of Japan, the western part of the South China Sea, and the Gulf of Siam. If the United States acquiesced in the Dutch declaration, it would be difficult to object to similar declarations by the Japanese.
At present aid to Russia is being shipped via the Okhotsk Sea and Sea of Japan. The Dutch, British and United States are taking reconnaissance measures to cover areas considered dangerous. Shipments to Siberia and patrol measures should continue. The Chief of Naval Operations is convinced that the closing of the area west and south of the Davao–Waigeo–Equator area by the Dutch would be prejudicial to the naval and military interests of all three powers.
If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese the Chief of Naval Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during the current situation Japanese Naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross the Davao–Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be attacked.
Ambassadors Winant and Biddle have been informed by the Special Naval Observer London of the contents of the memorandum.
R. E. SCHUIRMANN
By Direction
Japanese Foreign Office (December 4, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941
Purple
#881
Re my #867. [a]
Before you burn the codes brought you by KOSAKA, have him teach all your telegraphic staff how to use them. If you have not yet burned the keying described in my Circular #2400 [b], keep it in your custody until the last moment. Moreover, send it by some suitable plane to our ministry in Mexico in care of Junior Secretary MATSUI or Secretary NAGAKI in San Francisco or some other suitable courier. Wire this to Mexico and let me know what reply they make.
Army 25754 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)
[a] S.I.S. #25640 which gives instructions regarding the destruction of codes.
[b] See S.I.S. #25753.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#891
To be handled in Government Code.
Re your #1256 [a].
What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875 [b]. I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my afore-mentioned message.
Army 25731 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)
JD-7105
[a] Not available.
[b] S.I.S. #25725
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Net
December 4, 1941
Purple
Cir #2467
Departmental secret to be handled in Government code. Strictly secret outside the department.
On the 4th, the Government held a conference for control and liaison and decided on the policy which Manchukuo must follow in case of a sudden change in the International relations. It is as follows:
Policy
When Japan enters a war, Manchukuo for the time being shall not enter it because of Manchukuo’s relation to Japan and her policy. Manchukuo shall treat Great Britain, the United States and Netherland Indies as enemy countries, and shall take measures to that end.
The principal points
-
Manchukuo shall not recognize either the consuls and _ _ _ _ _ or _ _ _ _ _ as enjoying _ _ _ _ _ privileges and shall forbid them to carry on their duties. (The use of code telegrams and short wave radio sets shall be prohibited). Furthermore in regards to the treatment to be accorded, performance of their duties. Manchukuo shall accord treatment in the spirit of fairness following the methods employed by Japan in dealing with latest _ _ _ _ _.
-
Manchukuo follows the same methods as Japan in dealing with public and private properties of _ _ _ _ _ and the _ _ _ _ _.
-
Manchukuo shall not recognize any request addressed to any third power for the protection of consulate buildings and the interests of the residents. However, Manchukuo shall carry out her legal measures following the methods employed in Japan for dealing with _ _ _ _ _ and do so in the spirit of fairness and justice.
-
In the treatment to be accorded the citizens of Soviet Russia residing in Manchukuo in view of the existence of a neutrality treaty between Soviet Russia and-Japan, she shall keep in step with Japan and take every precaution so as not to provoke Soviet Russia.
This message sent to Peking, Nanking, and Shanghai.
(Japanese)
Army 25994 Trans. 12/9/41 NR[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, Hsinking
December 4, 1941
Purple
Circular #2468 Separate wire, Restricted Distribution.
(Secret outside the Department).
-
Until a state of war develops between Japan and the Netherlands, the Netherlands Government will be considered a quasi-enemy power. Already they have put into force prohibitions regarding the use of codes and are exercising rigid control and surveillance of our officials (consequently it is indicated that they are positively working in conjunction with enemy powers).
-
In the event the Netherlands declares war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands. In the event that a state of war exists between our country and the Netherlands before the Netherlands has actually made a declaration of war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands. Otherwise, in accordance with International Law, we will treat her as an enemy nation.
A. The advantages accruing the Netherlands Government through repudiation would be that at the same time she carried out her repudiation she would declare the Minister to be persona non grata. Though there are indications that she has gone beyond this, there will be no need to handle the situation any other way but in accordance with (1) above.
B. Should the Netherlands Government repudiate this, there will be no responsibility under International Law for the Netherlands to protect our nationals in the Netherlands East Indies. Then, too, even after a state of war has been brought about in her relations with us, she will be forced to stand in the position of not accepting a protest under International Law. Then again, she could bring about great inconvenience by demanding the evacuation of our Consular officials.
C. To date the Netherlands Government has actually maintained her position under International Law, but should she repudiate this, there would be no advantage in any other plan but A, mentioned above. Then, too, in the event that the Netherlands Government begins hostilities, this would indicate her intention to repudiate our relationships and there would be no necessity to handle her in any other way but as a qiesa enemy nation.
(Translation sketchy due to garbles.)
Army 26101 (Japanese) Trans. 12/11/41[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
December 4, 1941
Purple
#909 (Strictly Secret)
Re my #892 [a].
On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my #873 [a] our policy was changed as follows:
When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate. Because Manchukuo is closely bound up with the Japanese Empire and because England and the United States and the Netherlands have not recognized the Government of Manchukuo, as a matter of fact, Hsinking will regard those three nations as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly.
Wherever “England and the United States” and “English and Americans” occur in the text, we changed them to “England, the United States, and the Netherlands” and “English, Americans and Netherlanders.”
(Japanese)
Army 26142 Trans. 12/11/41 (5)
[a] Not available.
[Secret]
From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 4, 1941
Purple (CA)
#1410
In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.
Army 25807
JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
December 4, 1941
PA-K2
#249
On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft. - - - - - - - - - -.
Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.
ARMY 26161 (Japanese) Trans. 12/12/41 (2)Japanese Foreign Office (December 5, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 December 1941
(Purple)
#896
Re your #1245*
Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days.
25839
JD-1: 7140 (D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 7051 (S.I.S. #25722).
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941
(Purple)
#1261 (In 2 parts, complete)
On the 5th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on Secretary Hull, and, putting the matter contained in your instructions in writing, submitted it to him.
Hull:
You explain the matter as if the Chinese have concentrated troops near the border and that there is a fear that they would take aggressive action.
We:
Whether or not they would attack and where from if they do attack, depends entirely on such things as the military strengths of each and on other considerations. We who do not have a clear picture of the exact conditions on the scene, cannot make any explanations other than those contained in the instructions we receive.
However, the fact remains that there is a possibility that the Chinese would take the offensive. We have been in receipt of advices for some time past that the Chinese have been concentrating large forces in the Kwangsi area.
Hull said that he would relay the explanations to the President.
While we were there, we continued along the following line:
Fundamentally speaking, it was because we wanted to avoid just exactly what happened as a result — namely, the misinterpretations and the consequent belligerent argumentations — of the President’s most recent inquiries, that we wished to bring about a speedy settlement through our 20 November proposal.
You keep bringing up the subject of our occupation of French Indochina. Basically this is merely a phase of “power politics.” Your country herself, has stated that the “best defense is an offense.” Your military men in particular have taken this adage literally, and as proof thereof, have been making every effort to strengthen the army and the fleet of the ABCD. With this situation being flaunted before their eyes, our army and navy cannot remain unconcerned.
So saying, we repeated the gist of the contents of your message #878**.
Hull:
Since these conversations were started this spring until 24 July when Japan occupied the southern part of French Indochina the United States continued to permit the exporting of oil to Japan. During that time, I was the target of terrific criticism for allowing this, from Senators and from many other sources. Even in those times, the opposition to allowing this was of blistering intensity. Public opinion would absolutely prohibit the resumption of exporting of petroleum to Japan today.
We:
If the relationship between Japan and the United States underwent some improvement and if peaceful cooperation between our two countries is established, in accordance with that which is our Excellency’s custom to advocate, the concern you express now would automatically be dissolved.
We are convinced that the correct starting point leading to the above described ideal situation, is to settle our major differences individually, rather than attempt to reach a blanket agreement, along the lines proposed by us on 20 November.
Hull then pointed out that the general tone of our press and other publications were making it difficult for the United States and Japan to reach an agreement. We therefore said that the same can be said of a portion of the U.S. press and went on to relate to him the contents of paragraph 1 of your message #878**.
(Translator’s note: Last 5 lines of text unreadable).
25842
JD-1: 7139 (D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)
**JD-1: 7049 (S.I.S. #25720).
*JD-1: 7105.
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941
(Purple)
#1268
Re your #867*.
From Councilor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication Section:
We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.
25836
JD-1: 7136 (M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)
*(Dated 2 December) JD-1: 7017 (S.I.S. #25640): Directs Washington to destroy all copies of codes except one copy of certain ones, and also destroy one code machine.[Secret]
From: Peking
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941
(Purple)
Cir #625—(Circular Number) To be handled in government code.
Re my secret military communication #262* of November 30th.
-
Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy countries.
-
Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland consulates.
-
In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.
26108
JD-1: 7335 (H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (AR)
*Not available.[Secret]
From: Peking.
To: Shanghai.
5 December 1941
(Purple)
#626 (Circular)
Peking to Tokyo #770 (To be handled in government code)
Re your Circular #2467*
(Strictly confidential)
-
It is recognized that the treatment accorded to the property and staff of the consulates of Britain, America, and Holland in North China should be, as a matter of policy, comparable to that accorded them in occupied territory. We have gone ahead with our preparations on this basis. This is for your information.
-
Is there any objection to our adopting the policy of recognizing a suitable person of a third power (say for instance Belgium, Spain, or Brazil) as custodian of the interests of Britain, America, and Holland in North China.
Relayed to NANJO (GAISIN), Shanghai.
26107
JD-1: 7334 (H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (6-AR)
*JD-1: 7246. Re policy of Manchukuo in event Japan enters war. S.I.S. No. 25994.[Secret]
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941
(PA-K2)
#367
Re your #134.*
Reporting destroying by burning the code books in accordance with instructions.
26068
JD-1: 7313 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (7)
*Available, badly garbled, not yet identified.From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941
(PA-K2)
#252
-
During Friday morning. the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
-
The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
-
The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.
Four ships of the Honolulu class and - - - - - - - - - - were in dock.JD-1:7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
*Available. dated 29 November.
From: Tokyo
To: Singapore
5 December 1941
(PA-K2)
#377
(Abstract)
Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships.
JD-1: 7446 26263 (A) Navy Trans. 12-13-41 (AR)U.S. Department of State (December 5, 1941)
311.9454 Tatsuta Maru/9The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
Washington, December 5, 1941.The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Japanese Ambassador and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his communication No. 330 of December 3, 1941 regarding the proposed visits to United States ports of the steamship Tatsuta Maru, which has been requisitioned by the Japanese Government.
The Secretary of State has informed the Attorney General that he accepts as true the statements contained in the Ambassador’s communication and recognizes and allows the claim of immunity made by the Japanese Government. The Secretary of State has requested the Attorney General to bring the matter to the attention of the appropriate courts having jurisdiction in the ports of this country and of the Panama Canal Zone to be visited by the vessel and to take such steps as may be necessary to the end that its immunity may be recognized by the courts.
740.0011 Pacific War/680: TelegramThe Consul at Saigon to the Secretary of State
Saigon, December 4, 1941 — 4 p.m. [Received December 5 — 4:24 a.m.]
158.Japanese supply ships are still arriving at Saigon but at a reduced rate and this Consulate has no information which would lead it to modify the data furnished in its telegram No. 151 as to the number of Japanese troops in southern Indochina. However, I was informed yesterday evening by a competent observer that in his opinion the Japanese force in southern Indochina was between 130 and 135,000.
At least 300 cavalry horses were landed at Saigon last week as well as more trucks, tanks and airplane parts. It is estimated that there are now in the neighborhood of 300 planes at the Saigon airport which has been closed to Air France by the use of movable obstacles. Recently there has been much night flying by Japanese military planes.
It is generally believed here that the Japanese Army is so fanatical and impervious to reason that Thailand will be attacked soon regardless of the consequences.
The local Chief of Police informed me yesterday that he expected the attack to be signalized by the simultaneous arrest of Americans and British (and certain French), occupation of their properties, and seizure of such public [facilities?] as the Postal Telegraph and Telephone services, customs, et cetera. He stated that all Americans now in Indochina were in grave danger since the French authorities could no longer protect them.
I was warned twice yesterday by police officials that I was being shadowed by Japanese and that I should not go out after dark unarmed. I shall of course not carry arms. However, I have consented to a police guard for the temporary quarters of the Consulate.
Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department, Chungking, Beiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo. Repeated to Bangkok.
BROWNE
793.94/17043: TelegramThe Consul General at Canton to the Secretary of State
Canton, December 5, 1941 — 5 p.m. [Received December 5 — 9:42 a.m.]
94.The eastward movement through Canton of Japanese troops from the West River area appears to have ceased. On the basis of close estimates [by] observers nearly 10,000 men and over 3,000 horses, including cavalry mounts, pack and dray animals passed along reservation [rivershore?] bund opposite Shameen during the past 3 days. It is believed that there are relatively few Japanese troops remaining in the above-mentioned area and that the bulk of two puppet divisions is stationed there.
There have been no reports of [a redisposition of troops?] to the east of Canton but the movement of supplies in that direction apparently continues, the despatch of large numbers of pack animals and several scores of carts loaded with ammunition having been seen this morning. Due to weather conditions in the past few days airplanes were grounded but today they have been fairly active.
Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Beiping. By pouch to Hong Kong.
MYERS
740.0011 Pacific War/681: TelegramThe Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, December 5, 1941 — 3 p.m. [Received December 5 — 1:30 p.m.]
551.During a call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in reference to gasoline supplies, he informed me that the Japanese Ambassador had just called and informed him that the Japanese forces in Indochina definitely would not be used to invade Thai[land] and that they were concentrated for use against the Burma Road. Consequently Thailand need feel no anxiety. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that his Government, in spite of Japanese assurances, is nevertheless greatly worried because it has received additional evidence that an attack by land and air is imminent. He was unwilling to tell the nature of the evidence but said he had asked the British Minister to call in order to check up on the report. My British colleague has received no evidence of this sort recently so far as I am aware. The Foreign Minister inquired anxiously whether I had reported to the American Government the hope of the Thai Government that public statements would be issued by Great Britain and the United States promising to stand by Thailand if invaded by Japan (see Legation’s 550, December 4, 3 p.m.).
PECK