Japanese-American relations (7-24-41 – 11-30-41)

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 11, 1941)

894.20211/504

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 11, 1941.

Mr. Secretary: You will no doubt have noted that considerable publicity was given by the press to the resolution submitted by Senator Gillette of Iowa and Senator Johnson of Colorado in the Senate on October 2 for creating a special Senate Committee of five members to make a complete investigation of subversive activities in this country by alien groups and by groups of American citizens of dual nationality, and that Senator Gillette’s remarks on the floor of the Senate prefatory to submission of the resolution related to increased Japanese espionage and “Fifth Column” activities in this country. For your ready reference there are attached a few clippings dealing with the Senate resolution in question as well as a copy of the resolution itself and the issue of the Congressional Record containing Senator Gillette’s remarks introducing the resolution.

It will be noted that Senator Gillette stated in his remarks that he and Senator Johnson were offering the resolution after consultation with and with the approval of the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Army and Navy Intelligence Units.

This Division feels that a beneficial purpose would be served, both with respect to our relations with Japan and with respect to the preservation of our defense secrets, if you would informally bring the matter of the continued espionage activity of Japanese agents in this country to the attention of the Japanese Ambassador and request that he consider the advisability of initiating action to curb such activity.

It is suggested that in the course of such a conversation with the Ambassador you may care to refer to the case of Lieutenant Commander Tatibana, of the Japanese Navy, against whom prosecution on the charge of conspiracy to violate our espionage laws was dropped and who was allowed to leave this country as a result of the personal intercession of the Ambassador and in view of the Ambassador’s special interest in preserving and promoting friendly relations between Japan and the United States. You may also care to remind the Ambassador of the cases of two other officers of the Japanese Navy, Lieutenant Commander Okada and Engineer Lieutenant Yamada, associated with Lieutenant Commander Tatibana’s espionage activity in this country, which cases also were settled quietly and expeditiously out of consideration of the Ambassador’s solicitude for Japanese-American relations. Reminding him of these cases you may then wish to mention that, in reply to a recent inquiry of the Department of Justice as to the policy of the Department of State with respect to continued espionage activity in this country, this Department stated that where the evidence of the Department of Justice appears conclusive this Department will not interfere with the arrest and prosecution of individuals involved. At the same time, it might be well to draw the attention of the Ambassador to the agitation in the Senate and among the investigative agencies of this Government for positive measures to suppress reported Japanese espionage and so-called “Fifth Column” activity, and to the publicity which this agitation is receiving in the press, and impress upon the Ambassador in the interest of American-Japanese relations, the improvement of which you know the Ambassador has close to his heart, that the need of curbing espionage or other irregular activities of Japanese agents in this country is urgent.

MAXWELL M. HAMILTON

793.94/16933a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan

Washington, October 11, 1941 — 5 p.m.

650.

Reference previous telegrams in regard to damage to the Tutuila and Embassy staff residence at Chungking during air raid of July 30.

1. The Department desires that you address a note to the Foreign Office in which, after making appropriate reference to the assurances conveyed to the Department by the Japanese Ambassador on July 31 in regard to indemnification to be made for damages sustained by the USS Tutuila and the American Embassy at Chungking as a result of Japanese aerial bombing, you inform the Foreign Office that the Navy Department has advised the Department that the damages sustained by the USS Tutuila are in the total sum of twenty-seven thousand forty-five dollars and seventy-eight cents ($27,045.78), United States currency.

2. For your information the above-mentioned sum contains items of damage classified as follows, in the amounts specified:

   a) United States Government: Twenty-five thousand seven hundred fifty-four dollars and thirty-eight cents ($25,754.38).

   b) USS Tutuila wardroom mess: Five dollars ($5.00).

   c) Commissioned personnel of the USS Tutuila: Five hundred dollars ($500.00).

   d) Crew members of the USS Tutuila: Two hundred eighty-six dollars and forty cents ($286.40).

   e) Dry-docking charges: Five hundred dollars ($500.00).

The above itemized classification should not be transmitted to the Foreign Office unless such a statement is requested, in which case you may supply it in the form of an unofficial letter.

3. You may add that the Department has not yet received from the Embassy at Chungking a statement in regard to Embassy property damaged or destroyed as a result of Japanese aerial bombing, but that as soon as such a statement is available the Foreign Office will be informed.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Beiping and Chungking.

HULL

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 13, 1941)

711.94/24066/11

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State

Washington, October 13, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, the Minister-Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, called to see me this afternoon at his request.

After the usual preliminaries Mr. Wakasugi told me that he had spent exactly two weeks in Japan when he was summoned home last month. He said that he wished to be completely frank in giving me an account of his impressions during the time he was in his own country and he told me in detail of the persons he had seen and the situation as he found it.

The Minister said that as soon as he arrived he was summoned immediately by Prince Takamatsu, the brother of the Emperor and who is now the closest adviser of the Emperor. Immediately thereafter he was summoned to interviews with two others in the Imperial family and he mentioned specifically Prince Higashikuni. He was then summoned to the Prime Minister with whom he had several conferences and then to Marquis Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and likewise one of the closest advisers of the Imperial family. He said that he also, of course, had several conferences with the Foreign Minister and with high ranking officers of the Army and of the Navy.

The Minister said that on the part of all of the personages mentioned above he had found the unanimous desire for the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States and the earnest and sincere hope that the present conversations between the two Governments might reach a satisfactory result. He said, however, that there existed, particularly among the younger elements in the Army and to a lesser degree in the Navy and in other spheres of activity in Japan, a small but very powerful group that had placed its fortunes on the side of the Axis powers and was determined to move heaven and earth to prevent the reaching of any understanding between Japan and the United States and to bring Japan squarely into full activity on the side of Germany. He said quite frankly that German representatives and German agents in Japan were exceedingly powerful and most effective in their propaganda and were undoubtedly increasing their activities because of developments in Europe. He said that while the present Japanese Government had the bulk of public opinion behind it and was backed in its present policies by the controlling elements in the Japanese Army and in the Japanese Navy, it could not indefinitely continue the conversations with the United States. It would have to show some results. He said he need not remind me of the physical danger to which the members of the Japanese Government were exposed in view of the kind of incident which had unfortunately taken place in Japan so frequently in the past and particularly in recent years. He said that if the present Japanese Government fell as a result of a coup d’état, because of assassination or because it could see no hope of reaching any satisfactory adjustment with the United States, there was no telling what the result might [be]. He said that in all probability it would be replaced by a cabinet composed of military representatives responsive solely to German pressure and that in such event any hope of adjusting relations between Japan and the United States must vanish at least for the time being. He said that he wished to express very sincerely the situation as he saw it and to emphasize the fact that while a Japanese did not speak lightly of the Imperial family, the references he had made to me at the outset of our conversation should make it clear that the Imperial family, as well as the present Cabinet, was earnestly desirous of maintaining peace with the United States and of adjusting rapidly the problems which had arisen between Japan and this country.

He said that as I knew Prince Konoe had suggested a meeting between himself and the President. He said that notwithstanding every effort on the part of the Japanese Government to expedite the reaching of a friendly understanding and notwithstanding the fact that the Japanese Government had believed when it came into power in July that the fundamental principles necessary for an understanding had been found, an interminable time had elapsed without the reaching of any agreement and that it seemed impossible for the Japanese Government to find out what in reality were the desires of the United States and what in reality was the agreement which the United States desired to achieve. He said that acting under personal instructions from the Prime Minister, but nevertheless at this stage acting unofficially and without requesting any commitment from me, he would greatly appreciate it if I could tell him what the reasons for the delay might be or what the points of clarification were which this Government still desired to obtain from his Government.

I said to the Minister that it seemed to me impossible to believe that the Japanese Government did not in fact have a very clear and specific understanding of the position of this Government. I said that the views of this Government had been fully set forth not only in the innumerable conversations which the Secretary of State had had with the Japanese Ambassador, but more specifically in the presentation of our views in the documents given to the Japanese Ambassador on June 21. I said that after that date this Government had believed that very satisfactory progress was being made and that the two Governments were finding common bases for understanding when, through the statement given this Government on September 6, it appeared to our regret that the Japanese Government seemed to restrict, to limit and to modify very materially the broad principles upon which we had thought a basis for an understanding had already been reached. Subsequent to September 6, I said, it was my understanding that the Secretary of State had had several clarifying conversations with the Japanese Ambassador and that the views of this Government with regard thereto had again been very clearly set forth in an oral statement given the Japanese Ambassador on October 2.

I said therefore that since I was sure Mr. Wakasugi had fully familiarized himself since his return to Washington with all of these conversations and the more recent statements to which I had referred, there was nothing more that I could add which would clarify the issues in any useful manner beyond the clarifications already advanced.

I said that one of the chief difficulties from the standpoint of this Government in appreciating the position of the Japanese Government throughout the course of these conversations had been the fact that while the whole foundation upon which the striving for the reaching of an agreement had been predicated, namely, the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, the Japanese Government, as I had emphasized to Mr. Wakasugi just before he left for Japan, had undertaken military action in Indochina and had undertaken military activities in the north which would seem to belie entirely the main purpose for which the reaching of an agreement was sought. Only recently, I said, I had regretted to receive reports which would seem to indicate that the Japanese Government was contemplating further military activities in Indochina. From this standpoint I said it seemed unfortunately that the overt actions of the Japanese Government did not correspond to the purposes which the Japanese Government assured us they were seeking in their conversations with the United States.

The Minister then said that the Axis agents in Japan had sedulously, and to a certain extent successfully, spread the belief that this Government was deliberately delaying negotiations in order to delay them with no desire on its part to reach an understanding with Japan. I replied that it happened that only this morning I had seen a newspaper article alleging that the Government of Japan was adopting exactly this same policy in order to gain time for its own interests. I said that I could assure the Minister that this Government was sincerely desirous of exploring every possible field in order to reach a satisfactory understanding and that I felt that the two Governments, since they had pursued the conversations this far, must recognize the sincerity of the other party to the conversations in desiring to find a real understanding.

The final and very insistent question of the Minister was whether this Government had any other major demands to make as a part of the present conversations and which had not yet been submitted to the Japanese Government. I said that with regard to this question I could only reiterate what I had said at the outset of our talk, namely, that I believed that the views of this Government had been fully set forth in the documents of June 21 and in the oral statements subsequently transmitted to the Japanese Government and that it was not the policy of the Government of the United States, in an important negotiation of this type, to attempt to deceive or to mislead the other party to the negotiation.

Mr. Wakasugi said that of course he recognized that the action taken by his Government in Indochina seemed at variance with the policies which both Governments desired to pursue. He said, however, that Japanese opinion in governmental circles felt that the action taken in Indochina had been for purposes of defense and was entirely analogous to the action taken by the United States in Iceland. He said that the occupation of Indochina had been undertaken through agreement with a government which was occupied by Germany and that the occupation by the United States of Iceland had likewise been undertaken through an agreement with Denmark, a country also occupied by Germany.

I replied that the Minister was in error. I said that the Government of the United States had had no conversations with the Government of Denmark concerning Iceland, which was a country divorced from Denmark, and that the agreement for occupation of Iceland had been reached through a free agreement on the part of the Government of Iceland and on the part of the Government of the United States. Furthermore, I said, as I had already in an earlier conversation pointed out to Mr. Wakasugi, no one could possibly maintain that the Japanese Government feared any threat of aggression on the part of any other power through Indochina, whereas the Government of the United States, confronting a situation in Europe in which the Government of Germany was steadily and increasingly threatening the vital interests of the United States, was obliged to enter into the agreement which it had reached with the Government of Iceland as a means of self-defense against Germany and as a means of averting the imminent peril to the United States which would result from the occupation by Germany of Iceland or of any other region in the Atlantic which was vitally necessary for the defense of this country.

The Minister then went on to say that he felt that in some of the fundamental principles which this Government thought had been restricted by the Japanese Government in the statement of September 6 there had been unnecessary misunderstanding through the use of unfortunate phraseology. He said that the Japanese Government was entirely willing to commit itself to undertake no aggressive moves either to the south or to the north. He said that although the Japanese Government in its statement of September 6 with regard to a possible move against Russia had used the phrase that it would not undertake aggressive action in the north “save for justifiable reasons”, this latter phrase was entirely unnecessary and could readily be withdrawn. He said it had been intended solely to indicate that if the Stalin government collapsed and some other foreign power undertook to operate in eastern Siberia or if a complete case of anarchy broke out in eastern Siberia as had been the case in 1919 and 1920, the Japanese Government in that event would find it necessary to defend its own interests in the interest of “Manchukuo” against such aggression from that source. He repeated, however, that this phrase could be eliminated and that the Japanese Government was prepared to make a full commitment to undertake no aggressive activities to the north, south or anywhere else in the Pacific region.

I said that this was a very interesting and gratifying statement on his part and that I believed it tended to clarify a question which to us was of the utmost importance. He further went on to say that it was evident that this Government had been disturbed by the phraseology employed with regard to equal treatment and nondiscrimination in commercial relations in the Pacific and that the Japanese statement of September 6 had apparently given the impression that China was omitted from this commitment and that it applied only to the southwestern Pacific region. He said further that on this point the Japanese Government would be entirely willing to undertake to reach an agreement along the broad and general lines which we had in mind.

He then asked, with regard to the obligations of Japan under the Axis pact, whether this Government could not agree to leave the “discretion” of Japan as to the interpretation of its obligations under such pact to the determination of the Japanese Government. He said he realized fully that any new Cabinet that came in might determine Japan’s obligations in a manner different from that in which the present Japanese Cabinet would determine its obligations, but that as a matter of practical fact the present Japanese Cabinet was the only Cabinet which could be set up which would desire to maintain peace with the United States should the United States go to war. I said that on this point I felt that the position of this Government had already been made fully clear by the Secretary of State and that I would have to refer this question to the Secretary of State to determine whether any further clarification was necessary.

The Minister then brought up the question of evacuation of Japanese troops from China. He said that the Japanese Government was willing to evacuate all of its troops from China. (Thinking I had misunderstood him I asked him to repeat this statement which he did, in the same terms, twice.) He said, however, that it was impossible for the Japanese Government after four years of military operations in China to undertake to withdraw its entire troops from China within twenty-four hours. I said that of course nobody expected miracles in this modern age. I said with regard to this question that here again the views of this Government had been made known very clearly to the Japanese Government and that the Secretary of State had frequently referred to our own experience and to our own policies in the Western Hemisphere as an indication of what we believed the policy which would bring about peace and stability in the Pacific region should be. The Minister then asked whether, in the event that the President of the United States agreed to mediate between Japan and China, this Government would insist on passing upon the peace terms proposed by Japan before they were submitted to China. I said that once more in this case our views had been made known very clearly and that I was not in a position to give him any more specific opinion on this point without consulting the Secretary of State. I said that in general, as I had frequently explained, the point of view of this Government was that should this Government undertake the task of mediating, it could not undertake to transmit to the Chinese Government peace terms which in its judgment were inequitable and not conducive to the maintenance of a stable peace in the Pacific region.

The Minister then asked whether, if it were possible to reach a basis for an understanding with regard to all of the other major principles which this Government regarded as fundamental, the two Governments could not go ahead and leave the China question in abeyance. I said it seemed to me that this question was very much like asking whether the play of Hamlet could be given on the stage without the character of Hamlet. The Minister laughed loudly and said he fully understood my point.

The Minister said that he would make every effort to expedite a clarification of the point of view of his Government. He said he believed that the underlying principles as set forth by this Government on June 21 could be accepted by the Japanese Government. He said there was nothing he himself desired more earnestly than the reaching of a satisfactory agreement between the two countries. I said that I fully corresponded to his expressed desire in that regard. He said he believed that within 24 or 48 hours his Government must reach a final decision on the basic questions involved. He emphasized the fact that he was speaking unofficially. Before he left he said that he wished me to know that all of the controlling Generals in the Japanese Army and all of the controlling Admirals in the Japanese Navy were supporting fully the position of the Japanese Government in desiring to conclude a comprehensive and satisfactory agreement with the United States. He said this Government should be in no doubt that if an agreement could be reached before it was too late the control of the Army and of the Navy under present conditions was such as to make it sure that the Government would be able to carry out and implement the terms of such agreement.

SUMNER WELLES

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 14, 1941)

711.94/2361: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 14, 1941 — 8 p.m.
[Received October 14 — 12:52 p.m.]

1623.

For the Secretary and Under Secretary only.

I am constantly bearing in mind the fact that the conversations with the Japanese Government are taking place in Washington. However, I am now in the position of having forwarded to you at the request of the Foreign Minister, a statement that calls for some reply. Making that request Admiral Toyoda explained that he was now approaching you through me in search of certain information which Ambassador Nomura had been unable to elicit from the Department.

As I calculate that the Department’s 649, October 11, 3 p.m. was despatched after the receipt of my telegram under reference, I am in doubt whether you desired me to make reply to the Foreign Minister along the lines of the Department’s telegram or whether I may expect to receive from you in due course a further telegram addressing itself specifically to the Foreign Minister’s statement. Please instruct.

GREW

[NormanStewart]

711.94/2364: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 14, 1941 — 10 p.m.
[Received October 14 — 5:20 p.m.]

1625.

For the Secretary and the Under Secretary only.

1. Bishop Walsh left with us today a paper containing observations which were made to him, with the request that they be communicated to me, by a group of the Prime Minister’s personal advisers, including Messrs. Ito (President of the Cabinet Information Board), Ushiba and Saionji (private secretaries). A paraphrase of the document follows.

The memorandum of October 2 of the Secretary of State caused grave disappointment to the Japanese side, including all its central figures. The Japanese now think that sincerity is entirely lacking on the American side with regard to either holding a meeting or otherwise reaching an understanding, and they feel therefore that any further suggestion from the Japanese Government would serve no useful purpose. Unless there is given by the American Government some counteracting indication, for example, by the suggestion of some formula for removing the divergencies between the American draft statement of June 21 and the Japanese draft statement of September 27 (the latter should be regarded as having superseded all previous Japanese drafts), or by the giving in the near future by the President of some clear assurance either publicly or privately of his preparedness to confer with the Prime Minister which assurance would cause the Japanese Government to feel warranted in continuing the current conversations and hastening their conclusion as much as possible, the continuation of the conversations will be impossible and furthermore the way may be opened to very unfortunate and serious deterioration of the situation in the Pacific. However, if a gesture of an encouraging character with regard to the proposed meeting were forthcoming such gesture would remove effectively the present suspicion now existing in official Japanese quarters of having been deceived and would reconcile all factions each with its diverse responsibilities, solidify their confidence in the Prime Minister and thus enable the latter to moderate measures not in line with the principles which he supports but dictated by recent practical necessities and stop the seesaw performance in the regions to the south.

2. The foregoing statement of the situation might, of course, be interpreted as merely a continuation of the diplomatic pressure that has been brought to bear on me for some time from Japanese sources with a view to hastening arrangements for the proposed meeting between the responsible heads of the two Governments. From my knowledge of the situation here, however, I believe that the statement sets forth an accurate presentation of existing facts.

3. Bishop Walsh is leaving by air tomorrow morning for Hong Kong and will expect to proceed to the United States by the next Clipper.

4. In this connection, I have informed Bishop Walsh of the substance of Saigon’s 114 [113?] October 13, 11 a.m., especially the final substantive paragraph thereof as an indication of what I conceive to be one important obstacle to the successful conclusion of the current conversations. This general thought, as I have already informed you, has also been conveyed by me to Admiral Toyoda.

GREW

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 15, 1941)

711.94/2364: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan

Washington, October 15, 1941 — 6 p.m.

665.

For the Ambassador and the Counselor only.

Reference your 1604, October 10, 7 p.m., Department’s 649, October 11, 3 p.m., Department’s 661, October 14, 10 p.m., your 1623, October 14, 8 p.m., and 1625, October 14, 10 p.m.

You will have observed from the Department’s telegrams under reference that both the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Wakasugi have raised questions similar to that which the Minister for Foreign Affairs raised with you on October 10. The Secretary, Under Secretary and other officers of the Department have endeavored at some length to answer those questions. We feel that the Japanese Ambassador and the Japanese Embassy should now understand clearly the views of this Government and we believe that they have no doubt fully reported those views to the Japanese Foreign Minister.

As you are, of course, aware, we have sought at great length to describe clearly in our informal and exploratory conversations with the Japanese the basic principles and policies which we believe should underlie the courses to be followed in pursuit of a broad-gauge program of peace in the Pacific area. In an endeavor to determine whether there exists a common basis for negotiations between our two Governments, we have devoted our efforts toward exploring with the Japanese our respective views in regard to relations between the United States and Japan and in regard to world problems and situations and toward discussing our respective concepts of certain fundamental principles. Believing that it would best serve the objectives in view, we have been glad to receive from the Japanese Government expressions of its own desires and intentions in regard to a program of peace in the Pacific, but we have consistently tried to avoid being placed in a position of possible criticism for having attempted to tell the Japanese Government what it must do or what it must not do. At the same time we have not wished to give the appearance of attempting to exert pressure on the Japanese Government by presenting in detail the specifications of commitments which we have desired that Japan give. It has been our aim rather to elicit from the Japanese Government a spontaneous expression of its intention, formulated in proposals for a program of a settlement which would manifestly be consistent with and supplementary to Japan’s affirmations and declarations of policy.

We feel that the Japanese proposals of September 6 and subsequent communications revealed differences between the concept of the Japanese Government and the concept of this Government in regard to the fundamental principles which underlie our discussions. In our October 2 statement we endeavored to point out clearly that we believed those principles to be of universal applicability while the Japanese Government seemed to envisage certain qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those principles. We referred to qualifying phrases appended to assurances of Japan’s peaceful intent toward other nations, the limitation to the southwest Pacific area of the formula in regard to economic policies, the introduction of vague suggestions of desiderata with respect to economic rights in China based on propinquity, the insistence upon stationing troops within the territory of another sovereign power, the lack of a clear-cut manifestation of intent to withdraw expeditionary forces sent abroad from Japan, and in general the impression we have received that Japan is considering a program in the Pacific area circumscribed by qualifications and exceptions in the practical application of liberal and progressive principles while this Government has in view a comprehensive program of uniform application of such principles to the entire Pacific area.

In our October 2 statement mention was made of the President’s continued close and active interest in the proposed meeting with the Prime Minister and of the President’s earnest hope that fundamental questions would be so developed as to make possible that meeting. The Secretary of State (Department’s 632, October 2, 8 p.m.) has informed the Japanese Ambassador that we desire to proceed as rapidly as possible. The Under Secretary has assured Mr. Wakasugi (Department’s 661, October 14, 10 p.m.) of the sincerity of this Government in these conversations.

The Department authorizes you in your discretion to seek an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and refer to the statement which the Minister for Foreign Affairs made to you on October 10 (your 1604, October 10, 7 p.m.) and review the statements which have been made to the Ambassador and to members of the Japanese Embassy here by the Secretary, the Under Secretary and officers of the Department as reported to you. You may use in your statement any reference to our October 2 statement that you feel desirable and such material from this telegram as you feel would be helpful.

In response to a request made by Mr. Wakasugi on October 15, Mr. Welles has arranged to receive him and talk with him on October 16.

HULL

[NormanStewart]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan

Tokyo, October 15, 1941.

I was invited to lunch alone with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs today and we had a long talk together for two hours and a half which he requested should be regarded as off the record. We discussed, along lines largely parallel to the Under Secretary’s conversation on October 13 with Mr. Wakasugi (Department’s telegram 661, October 14, 10 p.m.) and previous conversations in Tokyo and Washington, the present status of the exploratory conversations now progressing in Washington.

During my meeting with the Vice Minister today the only point of importance which emerged was the observation of Mr. Amau that the German Government is insistently pressing for the issuance of a statement by the Japanese Government in confirmation of the interpretation given to the Tripartite Pact by Mr. Matsuoka, to the effect that Japan will declare war on the United States in the event of war occurring between Germany and the United States. As a reply, although it has not yet been decided when or whether such reply will be rendered to the German Government, the Japanese Government is considering a formula of a noncommittal nature to the effect that maintenance of peace in the Pacific is envisaged in the Tripartite Pact and that the attention of the American Government has been sought for its earnest consideration of Japan’s obligations under the Pact.

JOSEPH C. GREW

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 16, 1941)

894.00/1106: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 16, 1941 — 9 p.m.
[Received October 16 — 9:40 a.m.]

1643.

It was officially announced at 8:15 this evening that the resignation of the entire Cabinet had been submitted to the Emperor at 5 o’clock this afternoon. The Emperor has requested the Cabinet to remain in office for the time being.

GREW

[NormanStewart]

711.94/2388

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 16, 1941.

Mr. Secretary: The several problems which we are considering now in the field of relations with the situation in the Far East and especially our relations with Japan bring us right down to a question, as regards advisable action on our part, which must be answered largely on the basis of opinion. The question whether (a) an attitude and procedure of firmness or (b) an attitude and procedure of maximum avoidance of danger and risk will be the more efficacious is a question in final analysis of opinion. For each person, his opinion derives partly from knowledge (including experience) and partly from temperament. My opinion is that in relations in general with Japan and especially in relations in particular with Japan at this moment, a firm or even bold course on our part is and will be better strategy than would be a course giving any indication or implication of weakness or anxiety: I believe that the twofold objective of exercising a restraining influence upon Japan and avoiding war with Japan will be better served by indications of intention to exercise our reasonable rights than by indications of a disinclination and fear to run risks.

With regard to the matter of the ships, I feel strongly that we should for the moment (a) permit some of the ships to continue on their course and, for various reasons that have been stated orally, (b) slow down the westward passage of some of them while watching developments.

STANLEY K. HORNBECK

[NormanStewart]

894.00/1135

Memorandum by Mr. William R. Langdon, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Washington, October 16, 1941.

The first news of the fall of the Konoe Cabinet links this event with the rejection by the controlling forces in Japan of Prince Konoe’s conditions for adjustment of Japanese-American relations.

It is believed that the Cabinet crisis is related to the China question, that is, that the crisis has arisen from the unwillingness of the war party of Japan to agree to any sacrifices in China or other occupied territory. It is not believed that the crisis augurs any new dangerous move, specifically, an attack on Siberia, inasmuch as it is not believed that Japan has either the man power or the war equipment to fight a large scale modern campaign in addition to the China campaign. If any new campaign is undertaken to key up the Japanese people, it is believed that such campaign will be directed toward some region where no serious resistance is anticipated, specifically Thailand.

[NormanStewart]

894.00/1122

The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division, to the Chief of Staff

Washington, October 16, 1941.

Fall of the Japanese Cabinet.

1. A United Press dispatch states that the three-month-old Konoe Cabinet resigned on October 16 under nationalistic pressure for termination of Japanese-American peace negotiations.

2. This resignation was the logical result of Foreign Minister Toyoda’s failure to secure a relaxation of the economic pressure on Japan by the U.S. Government.

3. It is impossible to predict the next move on the part of Japan until the composition of the next cabinet is known. It is highly probable, however, that the trend will be toward the Axis, with the Army, rather than the Navy, exercising the controlling influence. This Army element will not be slow to take advantage of any weakening of the Siberian Army brought about by Russian reverses in Europe.

SHERMAN MILES
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

[NormanStewart]

740.0011 P. W./10–1641

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

Undated

- Proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan -

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Highness. I feel I should again address Your Royal Highness because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency in the process of formation. As Your Imperial Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two governments for many months for the purpose of keeping armed conflict from any extension in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has been the real purpose of Your Imperial Majesty also.

I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I had hoped these accords could have been agreed upon with us by your Government. The first related to the future integrity of China and the second related to the assurance that neither Japan nor the United States would wage war to obtain control of any further territory in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering armed attacks against Russia or against France or Great Britain or the Dutch or independent territory in the South, the obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near East theatres of war to the whole of the Pacific area. Such an extension would necessarily involve American interests.

The United States opposes any conquest. It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas and trade on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to keep war out of the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from the direction of Europe.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new wars north or south of her, the United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very much concerned and would try to prevent any extension of such condition of war.

[NormanStewart]

740.0011 P. W./10–1641

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 16, 1941.

Mr. Secretary: Mr. Hamilton does not recommend taking the proposed action. Mr. Ballantine feels that it is premature to come to any decision on the matter. I feel strongly that this proposed message in the form in which it stands should not at this time be sent.

A redraft is submitted here attached. The important paragraphs are, of course, the last two. We all feel that great care should be exercised to avoid making any too broad commitment or any too emphatic threat. I myself feel that we should avoid anything that implies countenancing of the Japanese operations in China.

STANLEY K. HORNBECK

......................

[Annex]

Proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty. I feel I should again address Your Imperial Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency in the process of formation. As Your Imperial Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two governments for many months for the purpose of keeping armed conflict from any extension in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been the real purpose of Your Imperial Majesty.

I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering armed attacks against Russia or against France or Great Britain or the Dutch or independent territory in the South, the obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near East theatres of war to the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American interests.

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from abroad.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very seriously concerned.

---

U.S. Navy Department (October 16, 1941)

From: Navy Department 
To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor 

Date: Oct. 16 41

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoe Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U.S. In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intentions nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 17, 1941)

711.94/2393

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Washington, October 16 and 17, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, Japanese Minister, called by appointment on October 16 and 17 on the Under Secretary. By prearrangement, Mr. Welles brought him to my office for a conversation which lasted on each occasion for some two hours. The conversation consisted mainly of a rehash of conversations I have had from time to time with Ambassador Nomura. There were elaborations here and there with respect to certain phases of the two documents which had been exchanged between the Ambassador and myself representing our respective Governments. Our document of June 21 and an elaboration of it on October 2 had both been given to the Japanese Ambassador in an informal way with the definite understanding that no stage of negotiations had been reached and that these were really exploratory oral conversations reduced to writing. The Minister referred to the more recent communications from his Government, especially the ones received in September, and to the communication sent to this Government at the time the Prime Minister sent his personal message to the President requesting a meeting between the two to discuss American-Japanese relations.

The Minister sought to keep in harmony with his talks with Under Secretary Welles some days ago, but it was apparent that he was hedging more or less on these phases, especially on the three principal points of difference relating to bringing troops out of China, to applying a non-discrimination commercial policy to the entire Pacific area and to further clarification of the Japanese attitude towards the Tripartite Pact as it might relate to the relations between Japan and the United States.

I emphasized that the proposed peaceful settlement should apply to the entire Pacific area and not to just a part of it, just as United States commercial policy based on the principle of equality and nondiscrimination applies to the entire world, and just as similar utterances apply to the entire world alike, including Japan. I then referred to the different points in Japanese statements to us at the time of and since the communication which accompanied the Prime Minister’s communication to the President requesting a meeting wherein the Japanese were narrowing both the letter and the spirit of their attitude, as clearly expressed to me from March until July by Ambassador Nomura. This narrowing attitude related to the range of the Pacific area to be included in a settlement, to the scope and breadth of the formula prescribing commercial policy based on the rule of non-discrimination, to their interpretation of the application of the Tripartite Pact as it relates to the United States, and to the breadth and spirit and implications of Ambassador Nomura’s many conversations with respect to bringing troops out of China, and to the limitation of Japanese commitments against conquest to the north and south only instead of a broad basic commitment on principles and programs for a satisfactory peaceful settlement pertaining to the entire Pacific area.

The effect of the Minister’s numerous attempts at interpretation of the foregoing and of their application did not indicate progress — certainly not progress as compared with the attitude existing with respect to these questions, as set forth by Ambassador Nomura prior to the disruption of our conversations resulting from the occupation by Japan of Indochina.

The Minister spent much time attempting an unsatisfactory interpretation of the Tripartite Pact as it might affect us, by urging that it was a peace instrument and very slightly implying that, therefore, it was not aimed at us. I reminded him that for months it was proclaimed as intended principally to keep this country out of war with Germany and that it was a joint movement on the part of Japan and Germany to this end. It was, therefore, no easy matter for us to convince this country that it was a harmless document; that Japan herself must say and do the things necessary to disabuse the public mind in this country of the very unfriendly implication of the Tripartite Pact. There the matter rested despite the Minister’s labored effort to give it a different interpretation.

The Minister strove for some time to show the necessity for Japanese troops being retained in China. I brought up the many facts and circumstances showing the great benefit it would be to Japan to get her troops out and mark off some temporary losses in one way or another and begin the work of restoring friendship and trade between the two countries under the broad principles of friendly international relations which underlie the peaceful settlement proposals of the United States. I reminded the Minister that the Japanese invasion has resulted in the establishment of many monopolies in China and many special privileges and benefits in various ways, which probably accounts for the main desire of Japan to keep troops in China, that Japan can never regain the friendship of China while she keeps troops there, that a settlement of the Chinese situation necessarily dovetails into the formula which this Government has suggested for a peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area, and that the Chinese phase must be included in any such wide settlement. We went over many of the phases that had been discussed between Ambassador Nomura and myself with respect to bringing troops out of China and the Chinese situation generally.

On the question of a broad basic liberal commercial policy such as this Government stands for and has proposed to Japan along with all other nations, the Minister and I discussed numerous phases, pro and con, without anything especially new being brought out, except that I emphasized the earnest desire of this Government for such a provision to be included in any Pacific area settlement by pointing to our recent trade agreement with the Argentine, which gives Japan and all other countries equal access with ourselves to the markets there, and also to the numerous discussions this Government is having with the British and the British Dominions with respect to the removal of empire preferences and other discriminations, including the narrow policy of bilateral trade, and suggested strongly that Japan was more interested in this course than almost any nation, and yet she was opposing the application of the policy of non-discrimination in the Pacific. The Minister finally said that he was not disagreeing and that he would communicate at once with his Government to see if it would not accept this broad proposal. I said that was good and asked him to let me know when he hears from his Government. The upshot of our exploratory conversations left us with the view that the new Japanese Government would have to speak next and before we had further serious conversations with their representatives here. We also derived the definite impression that there were no present signs of the Japanese Government coming back anywhere near the position it occupied in our exploratory conversations when they were temporarily abandoned at the time Japan went into Indochina. We are not very expectant in this line so far as future conversations are concerned, but we shall give them a full opportunity to say what they may have in mind to say.

CORDELL HULL

[NormanStewart]

711.94/2387

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, October 17, 1941.

The British Ambassador called and handed me the attached copy of a memorandum of conversation between the Ambassador of Japan and himself yesterday.

The Ambassador said that he understood the difficulties of this country and Japan in finding ways and means of keeping up the appearance of not-too-strained relations between our two countries while the present government of Japan endeavors to improve public sentiment and opinion in support of the basic principles for which this Government stands and which envisage a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The Ambassador said he would communicate with his Government in order to see if it had any suggestions along this line, which would aid the Government of Japan to move in our direction on the fundamental issues involved.

CORDELL HULL

...............

[Annex]

Memorandum by the British Ambassador

1. The Japanese Ambassador asked rather mysteriously this morning for an interview with me, and came to see me this afternoon.

He began by recalling a conversation that we had had when he had first arrived in Washington as to the desirability of maintaining peace in the Pacific. Since then, as I knew, he had for some time been talking with Mr. Hull, and from these talks three principal points of difficulty had emerged.

2. The first point concerned the Tripartite Pact. The Ambassador did not develop this in detail beyond saying that the United States Government wished for some more precise definition of the Japanese attitude than they had hitherto felt able to give, but he thought that the United States Government understood the Japanese position pretty well.

The second point concerned non-discrimination and equality of treatment in economic matters. These he thought could be adjusted.

The third point, which was the only one on which he anticipated serious difficulty, concerned the admission of a right for Japan, secured by agreement with China, to station troops for an agreed period, in North China and Inner Mongolia to control the Communist armies there.

3. So far no solution had emerged in his conversations with Mr. Hull on this third point.

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was due to internal differences between on the one hand the Prime Minister and those who wished to reach agreement with the United States by not insisting on the third point mentioned above, and on the other hand those who thought that not to insist on this point would involve too great a loss of face.

But the Ambassador did not anticipate any sudden change of policy. The Emperor was in favour of peace, and even if a general were made Prime Minister, it was unlikely that the Emperor’s wishes would be disregarded.

The outburst of a Japanese Navy spokesman as reported in the United States press today was of no importance, and might be disregarded.

Everybody in the Japanese Cabinet wanted understanding with the United States, and the only difference was as to the price that should be paid for it.

4. Reverting to the Tripartite Pact, the Ambassador said that though we might disagree, the Japanese Government of the time had regarded adherence to it as the only policy that was possible for Japan to pursue, having regard to the evidence of what he called Anglo-Saxon co-operation against Japan.

Freezing and embargo measures were not likely to affect very seriously the ordinary Japanese consuming public, who were accustomed to low standards, but would create difficulty for Japanese business, which was pressing that some way out must be found.

5. I said that nobody wanted to strangle Japan, either here or in the British Commonwealth, provided Japanese policy was no longer such as to constitute a threat. Moreover, if he would allow me to say so, Japanese economic difficulties were of her own making, and certainly she would not get out of the difficulties largely created by one war by plunging into another.

Both the United States and Great Britain wanted to see peace preserved in the Pacific, and there was no reason why peace should not be maintained if the Japanese Government abandoned its expansionist policy, and were willing to recognise principles which both the United States and Great Britain wished to see maintained.

But do not let the Japanese Government make the mistake of backing the wrong horse. I could well understand that many people in Japan might be misled by the succession of apparent German victories, but let them remember that none of these victories had yet brought Germany within sight of the only victory that would win the war.

It might indeed well be argued that they had largely aggravated Germany’s difficulties, and that the strain that they would impose would end by becoming intolerable.

The Ambassador said that many in Japan agreed with this view, and that he himself was of opinion that one victory or two victories were not the same thing as a war.

Returning to his main point, he asked me whether I thought that it would be possible to find any modus vivendi in the Pacific that might be of value in giving time for the atmosphere to calm, and make easier the solution of the third point to which he had referred at the outset of our conversation, which he thought it would be extremely difficult for any new Government to solve quickly.

He knew how close the relations of the British Government and the United States Government were, and hoped that I would take an opportunity of speaking with Mr. Hull about it. This I said I would certainly do.

6. At one point in our talk the Ambassador remarked that some Americans spoke of finishing off the Japanese Navy in a few days. But the Japanese Navy was well trained, and, as I knew, never surrendered, and he thought it could be relied upon to give a good account of itself.

I disclaimed any desire to appraise the relative merits of Navies, and told him that British policy had been repeatedly defined. I could define it for him again by repeating that we were anxious to find the way to friendly relations with Japan, but we could not hope to resume those friendly relations so long as Japanese policy retained the direction it had recently followed.

I asked him whether Mr. Shigemitsu might be expected shortly to return to London. As to this, he was without information, but he knew that Mr. Shigemitsu was in frequent conference at the Japanese Foreign Office.

I also asked him whether he had any opinion as to what might be General Chiang Kai-shek’s view of his third point as to temporary occupation by Japanese troops of an area in North China by agreement with the Chinese Government.

He said he had not, but he had an impression that though the Chinese army were not now very keen on fighting, Chinese diplomacy was extremely shrewd, and vastly better than that of Japan.

7. The whole conversation was very friendly, and left on my mind the clear impression that the Japanese Government, or certainly that part of it for which Admiral Nomura can be held to speak, felt their position to be one of extreme difficulty.

Washington, 16 October 1941.

[NormanStewart]

894.00/1141

Memorandum by Mr. William R. Langdon, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs

[Washington,] October 17, 1941.

Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo is not quite 57 years old, and has been War Minister since July 1940 (second Konoe Cabinet). Most of his military career has been spent in military educational, staff, and administrative work and he spent a term (1919) in Germany as resident officer. He was gendarmerie commander of the Kwantung Army from 1935 to 1937 and chief of staff of the Kwantung Army in 1937–1938. From 1938 to his appointment as War Minister, he was director of the military aviation department of the Army.

In Manchuria, General Tojo had the reputation of being a taciturn, clear-thinking, quick-deciding executive, with ideas leaning toward the conservative, sound side. He has the confidence of his fellow generals as a middle-of-the-road man. In Tokyo last spring he was understood by the Embassy to be thoroughly in sympathy with Prince Konoe’s policy of placing relations with the United States on a normal footing, and I understand was in the confidence of the Prince in the matter of the initial measures taken to sound out the United States’ attitude toward normalization of relations with the United States. It is believed that his designation as Premier signifies a continuation of Prince Konoe’s policies including continuation of conversations with the United States.

[NormanStewart]

894.00/1134

The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division, to the Chief of Staff

Washington, October 17, 1941.

Japan’s New Premier.

1. The United Press reports that Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo, War Minister in the late Konoye Cabinet, has been designated Premier and ordered to form a new Cabinet.

2. General Tojo was born in 1884, the son of a Samurai. He has held several high offices in the Army, notably that of Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Vice Minister of War and Inspector General of Aviation.

3. He has been called the father of modern Japanese Army strategy and is known to be anti-foreign, with a particular dislike for the Russians, and an open admiration for German methods. He created a sensation in 1938 when, as Vice Minister of War, he predicted that Japan would have to fight Russia as well as China. He also warned that America would have to be watched. When the Axis Alliance was signed in September 1940 he said that the road Japan would follow had been “definitely decided” and there was no turning back. General Tojo is regarded by his associates as a man of unshakable determination. He cites reverence and filial piety as the two most important attributes of a Japanese soldier. He has little patience for arguments or other people’s views.

4. Any cabinet selected by General Tojo may be expected to have Axis leanings, but will be otherwise anti-foreign and highly nationalistic.

SHERMAN MILES
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

711.94/2377a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan

Washington, October 17, 1941 — 10 p.m.

674.

For the Ambassador and the Counselor only.

Mr. Wakasugi talked on October 16 with the Secretary and the Under Secretary but no new points were developed. Mr. Wakasugi is to call again on the Secretary and the Under Secretary on October 17.

HULL

[NormanStewart]

711.94/2376

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, October 17, 1941.

There is attached a redraft of your proposed message to the Emperor of Japan.

In view of (1) the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister here in a two-hour conversation last evening with Mr. Welles and myself, indicating that the Japanese Government desires to continue its exploratory conversations with us, coupled with the fact that the Japanese Minister is, at his request, coming to call again this afternoon for a further extended discussion, (2) the message received by Ambassador Grew from Prince Konoe (through Prince Konoe’s private secretary) (reported in Mr. Grew’s telegram 1646, October 17, 11 a.m.) that the new Japanese cabinet would be one sincerely desirous of improving relations with the United States and of continuing the exploratory conversations, and (3) the word we have that General Tojo, a Konoe adherent and a “moderate”, has been designated by the Emperor to form a new cabinet, we incline to the view that it would be premature to send the proposed message to the Emperor pending further clarification of the situation in Japan and of the probable attitude of the new government.

........................

[Annex]

Redraft by the Department of State of “proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan”

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty on matters of state. I feel I should again address Your Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency which appears to be in the process of formation. As Your Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been the great purpose of Your Majesty.

I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering armed attacks against the Soviet Union or against British or Dutch or independent territory in the south, the obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near Eastern theaters of war to the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American interests.

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas maintained and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from abroad.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very seriously concerned and would have to seek, by taking any and all steps which it might deem necessary, to prevent any extension of such condition of war.

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan

Tokyo, October 17, 1941.

Mr. Ushiba telephoned me early this morning while I was still dressing and asked whether he might call on me at my house. He arrived as I was having breakfast. He is normally well composed, but this morning he was nervous and excited. He said that he had been up all night helping Prince Konoe to make arrangements for the transfer of office to the incoming Prime Minister.

Mr. Ushiba then handed me, unopened, a personal letter from the Prime Minister to the American Ambassador and asked that I deliver it to Mr. Grew. (Copy of Prince Konoe’s letter and copy of the Ambassador’s reply thereto are attached to this memorandum.) He suggested that I read it, as he had been instructed to tell me in the strictest confidence certain thoughts which his chief had in mind. The substance of Mr. Ushiba’s statement was as follows:

The Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 which had been handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had been a great disappointment to the Konoe Cabinet and the impression had been created inside the Cabinet that the road had been blocked to any hopes that the present conversations could be successfully concluded. Prince Konoe about a week ago had decided to resign in view of the internal situation in Japan. At that time it appeared inevitable that the succeeding Cabinet would be one of an extremist nature but Prince Konoye through intensive effort and “by a miracle” had in recent days been successful in ensuring that the government to succeed him would be composed of persons who did not subscribe to the principle that the conversations with the United States should be broken off.

No Japanese civilian statesman will undertake the task in which Prince Konoe has failed and consequently the succeeding Cabinet must be headed by an Army officer and will be composed primarily of military men. The new Cabinet may even appear to be extremist to persons unacquainted with the set-up of the various groups within the Japanese Army and other factions having influence in the Government. However, Prince Konoe entertains the hope that the Ambassador will stress to the Government of the United States that too great importance should not be given to the outward appearance of the new Cabinet. Prince Konoe also desires the Ambassador to understand that he would not have tendered his resignation at this moment without having convinced himself that the succeeding Prime Minister would be equally desirous of adjusting Japanese-American relations.

The Ambassador would readily appreciate, Mr. Ushiba added, that it would be impossible at the present time to form a civilian Cabinet with a liberal tinge: there is in Japan no civilian of adequate eminence to take over the office of Prime Minister, and even if such a civilian government should be formed, sufficient opposition to bring about its downfall would rapidly arise. Consequently the succeeding Cabinet must be composed primarily of military men by reason of the fact that a Cabinet of this complexion would represent the only element in Japan which at the present time would be capable of bringing about the downfall of the government. Mr. Ushiba emphasized that only as the result of the intensive and miraculous labors of Prince Konoe will the next government not be a military dictatorship bound to the most militaristic and drastic policy.

Mr. Ushiba concluded that Prince Konoe, although out of the government, will from the background continue to use his influence and to devote his best efforts to the achievement of the aims sought for in the conversations between the United States and Japan and he is hopeful that these conversations will be resumed very shortly.

I said that it was a great pity that Prince Konoe had felt it necessary to resign as the conversations in Washington were still in progress, the recent call of Mr. Wakasugi on the Under Secretary of State having had, in my opinion, good results toward further clarifying the position of the Japanese Government. Mr. Ushiba said that he hoped some day to be able to tell me of the events which had led to the Cabinet’s resignation, but that all that he could say for the present was that Prince Konoe had taken the decision in the confident belief that he could thus bring the conversations to a successful conclusion.

I said that it was a great pity that the Japanese Army did not have a great leader, such as Prince Yamagata, who could insure unity within the Army. Mr. Ushiba agreed. He said that General Sugiyama, Chief of the General Staff, was being touted as such a leader, but that actually General Sugiyama was too pliant an instrument for his subordinates. In his opinion, General Umezu, chief of the Kwantung Army, was the most influential man in the Army and would come forward when needed.

As Mr. Ushiba was about to leave, I asked that he convey to Prince Konoye my assurance that I would immediately see the Ambassador.

EUGENE H. DOORMAN

........................

[Annex 1]

The Retiring Japanese Prime Minister to the American Ambassador in Japan

Ogikubo, Tokyo, October 16, 1941.

My Dear Ambassador: It is with great regret and disappointment that my colleagues and I have had to resign owing to the internal political situation, which I may be able to explain to you sometime in the future.

I feel certain, however, that the cabinet which is to succeed mine will exert its utmost in continuing to a successful conclusion the conversations which we have been carrying on up till today. It is my earnest hope, therefore, that you and your Government will not be too disappointed or discouraged either by the change of cabinet or by the mere appearance or impression of the new cabinet. I assure you that I will do all in my power in assisting the new cabinet to attain the high purpose which mine has endeavored to accomplish so hard without success.

May I take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude for your most friendly cooperation which I have been fortunate enough to enjoy and also to convey to you my sincere wish that you will give the same privilege to whomever succeeds me.

With kindest [etc.]
P. KONOE

........................

[Annex 2]

The American Ambassador in Japan to the Retiring Japanese Prime Minister

Tokyo, October 17, 1941.

My Dear Prime Minister: Your friendly letter of October 16 is very deeply appreciated and I hasten to thank you heartily for your generous expressions and for the encouragement which you have given me in your confidence that the coming cabinet will make every effort to continue to a successful conclusion the conversations carried on between our two Governments. It gives me keen gratification to know that you yourself will assist the new cabinet in attaining the high purpose for which you and your colleagues have striven, and I need hardly assure you that your successor may count fully on my own earnest cooperation in a continuance of the mutual efforts of our respective Governments to achieve a successful outcome.

Please permit me to express the hope that you yourself, if you are about to lay down for a time the cares of your high office, will now find some degree of welcome relaxation and respite after your long, arduous and most distinguished official service to your country.

With expressions [etc.]
JOSEPH C. GREW

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (October 17, 1941)

U.S. fears ‘squeeze play’ in Japs’ move, ship attack

By H. O. Thompson, United Press staff writer

Washington, Oct. 17 –
Administration circles speculated today on a possible link between the Japanese cabinet upheaval and the torpedoing of the U.S. destroyer Kearny in the North Atlantic, while the House echoed with a plea for a sterner attitude toward Tokyo.

First reaction to selection of General Hideki Tōjō to form the new Japanese cabinet was “relief,” but diplomats cautioned against jumping to optimistic conclusions before the makeup of the entire cabinet is known.

Torpedoing of the USS Kearny, meanwhile, was seen by House Democratic Leader John W. McCormack (Mass.) and other administration quarters as a possible move to “put the squeeze” on the United States.

Urge warning to Japs

Mr. McCormack said:

The Japanese cabinet falls one day, preparatory to creation of a more belligerent government and an American ship is attacked in the Atlantic the next, perhaps for the purpose of inducing us to move more of our fleet into the Atlantic.

Rep. Charles E. Faddis (D-PA), during debate on the House resolution to permit arming of American merchant ships, urged that the United States:

…serve notice on Japan that if they move in any direction, we will destroy their navy.

Secretary of State Cordell Hull would not comment at his press conference on the Japanese situation.

Tōjō was regarded here as among the more conservative of the aggressive nationalist group in Japan, and observers believed that a less favorable choice, in the eyes of the United States, could have been made.

There was only guarded unofficial comment on Tojo’s selection, all sources contending that speculation on future Japanese policy must await selection of the other cabinet officers – especially the Foreign Minister.

Hope London envoy’s named

Officials have made no secret of their concern over the fall of Prince Konoe’s cabinet yesterday and are aware that the makeup of its successor may change the future course of Japanese-American relations.

Diplomats believe that if Tōjō selects a man such as Mamoru Shigemitsu for the Foreign Office post, there would be ground for hoping that relations might not worsen.

Shigemitsu, former ambassador to London, is now in Tokyo, and is considered a “moderate” favoring cooperation with the democratic nations.

Roosevelt, Hull confer

President Roosevelt conferred for several hours yesterday with Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other high diplomatic, Army and Navy officials on the Japanese crisis and continued reverses for Russia. He will keep in touch with Mr. Hull by telephone for latest developments while at his Hyde Park home this weekend.

Informed sources here reconstructed recent Japanese-American relations, beginning in August when Prince Konoe, fighting for preservation of a moderate regime, appealed to President Roosevelt for adjustment of Far Eastern issues.

It laid down these general principles on which Japan was prepared to negotiate:

1. A guarantee of non-interference with American interests in China.

2. Japan would agree to consider its Axis treaty a dead letter.

3. Japan would consent to American help arranging peace in the Chinese-Japanese war.

4. Japan proposed revival of trade with the United States with Japan abiding by American policy of the “open door” and equal opportunity in China.

Chosen Jap Premier

Ordered by the Emperor to form a new Japanese cabinet, General Hideki Tōjō was today given the support of the army.

British see Tōjō opposed to Jap entry in Nazis’ war

New Tokyo leader reportedly advises caution since Germans change tune, admit conflict will be long
By Robert P. Martin, United Press staff writer

Shanghai, Oct. 17 –
United States and British diplomatic sources said today that General Hideki Tōjō, selected to form a Japanese cabinet, has predicted that the European war would last 30 years and cautioned against Japanese involvement, especially after Germany’s failure to inflict a quick defeat on Russia.

It was asserted that he had advised caution especially because the current German admissions that the war will be a long one contradicted previous Nazi assurances of quick and complete world triumph.

For that reason, informants said, it was indicated that General Tōjō was one of the army men with whom Germany’s word held little weight.

These sources took the view that the selection of General Tōjō meant a full dress military government in which the army would accept responsibility for decisions but that it did not necessarily mean a pro-Axis cabinet.

They admitted a belief, however, that as premier, General Tōjō would be subjected to strong pro-Axis pressure.

It was held here that the army, after preferring to influence policies from behind the scenes, had now decided to take full and open responsibility.

General Tōjō was regarded as having fully supported official policies as war minister under Prince Fumimaro Konoe and as having sought to quiet more radical army men during Japanese negotiations with the United States for better relations.

General Tōjō was said to have supported Prince Konoe’s attempts to improve relations with the United States because he believed the army had overextended itself on the Asian continent.

Therefore, informants said, it appeared likely that a premier he would oppose any swift move against Russia in Siberia or in a southward expansionist program. They would not speculate on possible long-range Japanese policies, however.

Diplomatic informants just arrived from Tokyo said that the background for the fall of Prince Konoe’s cabinet was formed last week when the Premier sought to reshuffle his ministry in an attempt both to appease the United States and to form a totalitarian regime which could meet any eventuality.

[NormanStewart]

Seek safe ports, Navy tells ships

Vessels in Asiatic waters warned by radio to put into friendly harbors; growing tension in Far East brings move

San Francisco, Oct. 17 (UP) –
Headquarters of the 12th Naval District said today orders have been issued by radio to all American merchant ships in Asiatic waters to put into “friendly ports” immediately.

Shipping circles took the orders to confirm that the international situation in the Pacific was rapidly approaching a climax.

It was reported one U.S. flag merchantman, the Maritime Commission freighter Perida, had already turned back to Shanghai.

American vessels in the Pacific are operated also by American President Lines, Matson Navigation Co. and the major oil companies.

The American President Lines operates 13 vessels from San Francisco and Los Angeles to the Philippines, Burma, Dutch East Indies, Shanghai, Hong Kong and other Far Eastern ports.

Henry F. Grady, president of American President Lines, called an immediate emergency conference of all his operating heads.

American President Line officials said Philippine, British and Dutch East Indian ports would probably be considered “friendly” within the meaning of the Navy’s order.

The orders were expected to affect a major portion of the American merchant fleet now engaged in carrying oil and war supplies to the Russian port of Vladivostok, and in taking war supplies to Malaysia for transfer to the Chinese Army.

American ships plying to the southern Pacific return with strategic materials such as chrome, tungsten, and manganese from China, tin from Burma and rubber from the Dutch East Indies. The bulk of American shipping that would be affected is in the South Pacific, plying the “lifeline route” from Malaysia, the Indies and the Philippines.

But in recent weeks, the northern route to Siberia has been receiving emphasis as a defense supply line. American ships have been carrying war materials to Russia over this route in increasing quantities and in so doing pass within sight of the Japanese coast.

On Oct. 11, the Japanese Foreign Office announced three ships would sail “soon” for the United States to evacuate Japanese nationals.

The British and American embassies and the Canadian legation privately advised their nationals in Japan to take advantage of the sailings and go home.

The Tatsuta Maru was scheduled to have sailed Oct. 15 for San Francisco via Honolulu. Others were scheduled to sail Oct. 20 and Oct. 22.

Simms says –
Anger mounts in Washington at Jap threat

War almost certain if Tokyo invades Siberia, naval men claim
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

Washington, Oct. 17 –
It would be difficult for the United States to avoid war in the Pacific, it was privately stated in naval circles here today, if Japan invades Siberia and blockades Vladivostok.

Yet, officials agreed, that is what Japan seems on the point of doing. Prodded by Hitler and pushed by her own military hotheads, now apparently once more in the ascendant, she is believed to be about to undertake her greatest and most dangerous gamble for the domination of the Far East.

The reaction here to Japanese threats, therefore, is significant. It is not one of anxiety but rather one of grimness. Not since the Pacific war-scare of 1920 have I witnessed anything quite like it. Capitol Hill is getting angry.

It is widely felt here, however, that the vast majority of people in Japan – including many ranking officers of the army and navy – do not want war with the United States. What is feared is that a combination of circumstances may force war on the United States regardless.

For one thing, prevailing opinion in Japan isa that the United States will not fight if the Japanese will only confine their aggressions to the Asiatic mainland – to Manchuria, China proper, Indochina, Thailand or Siberia. War, the Japanese believe, would almost certainly result if Japan attacked the Philippines, the East Indies, Singapore or Australasia, but not if she expanded northward and westward.

It is said that a second popular notion in Japan is that most Americans are pacifists. But Rep. Charles A. Eaton (R-NJ) received an ovation yesterday when he warmly supported the administration’s war policy in the House. At one point in his speech, he said the Japanese were harboring an illusion if they thought Americans were pacifists. He said:

Americans are dangerous when angered and they are getting angry.

There is disappointment but no surprise here that the Japanese-American appeasement efforts of the past few months have apparently ended in failure.

It can be said, however, that the effort was real on both sides. The formation of Prince Konoe’s third cabinet at the insistence of Emperor Hirohito himself is regarded as proof of that. In this cabinet, Yōsuke Matsuoka, sponsor of the pact with Germany and Italy, was replaced as Foreign Minister by Admiral Toyoda, who got along famously with the British and Americans. Sent to Washington as ambassador was Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura, graduate of Annapolis and boyhood friend of Admiral Toyoda. Between these two, there was perfect understanding and, it is reported, a sincere desire to head off a Japanese-American conflict.

But the army clique in Japan stood in the way. Its members have long held that now if ever is the tie to realize Nippon’s “manifest destiny” – meaning the complete domination of all eastern Asia, from Kamchatka to Singapore. And while they did not enjoy the wholehearted favor of the emperor, the world situation continued to play into their hands rather than into the hands of those seeking understanding with the United States.

War fever rages

In the first place, Japan has been at war with China for going on five years. There is a war psychosis. The press of the country, even some of the most liberal newspapers, have caught the fever. So when Germany turned on Russia, Japan’s traditional enemy, the jingoes saw their chance. As the Nazis rolled toward Moscow, the Japanese war party increased its pressure on Prince Konoe, demanding an end to the Tokyo-Washington conversations. If Moscow fell – and it was sure to fall – that would be the time for Japan to occupy Vladivostok and eastern Siberia, United States or no United States Navy. So the jingoes insisted. And Konoe had to resign.

That Konoe’s fall gives rise to an extremely dangerous situation is frankly admitted. If he is succeeded by a hothead, the fat may be in the fire. For it can be said with almost complete certainty that the United States is in no mood to be pushed around.

Airlines is new Japanese threat

A new blast of belligerency against the democracies by Japanese newspapers accompanied establishment of a Japanese airline in the South Pacific. The map shows how this plane route is a threat to the Netherlands Indies and Australia.

Japs bluffing to upset U.S., ex-envoy says

Resigned Minister to Thailand looks for move against Russia

Washington, Oct. 17 (UP) –
Hugh Grant, recently resigned Minister to Thailand, said today that he thought Japan was playing “the old bluffing game” to keep the United States agitated and its attention away from Europe.

He said in an interview upon his return here from the Far East:

That’s the old Axis game.

Emphasizing that his views were “personal” and not “official,” Mr. Grant predicted that Japan’s next move would be against Soviet Russia, if Hitler defeats the Russians, rather than into the South Pacific.

He said:

However, the Japanese are not overlooking any opportunities to do some more grabbing in the Southeast.

Jap ‘fifth column’

They are working on the Thais from within through a Japanese “fifth column” movement and it is not at all unlikely that they may get control of that country without a fight in the same way that Hitler took Austria and Czechoslovakia.

He said he was confident Japan wants to avoid a war with the United States and that:

…they will not take the plunge unless they are convinced first that there is no chance of a comeback on our part.

But he believed that only “the heaviest sort of pressure – economic and otherwise” – would keep Japan from carrying out her “co-prosperity” program:

…which means ultimate domination of East Asia.

‘They understand only force’

He continued:

The Japanese don’t understand our language of conciliation and don’t give a continental for the protests we make from time to time.

The language of force is the only thing they understand and it may take a real fight eventually.

The consensus of American missionaries and businessmen in the Far East, he said, was:

…that the time has come for real action if American interests in the Orient are to be maintained.

Ambulance carries aged Japan to parley

Tokyo, Oct. 17 (UP) –
Indicating the gravity with which Japan regards the current cabinet crisis, Count Keigo Kiyoura, 91, a former Premier in retirement since 1936, journeyed to a conference of former premiers in an ambulance today. Throughout the meeting with six other former premiers, Count Kiyoura was attended by a physician and a nurse and inhaled oxygen.

Disregarding the advices of his physicians, Count Kiyoura left his villa at Atami Hot Springs in the ambulance to ride into Tokyo.

Count Kiyoura was Premier in 1924. He also served as Minister of Justice and President of the Privy Council.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Department of State (October 18, 1941)

740.0011 P.W./571: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi to the Secretary of State

Hanoi, October 17, 1941 — 4 p.m.
[Received October 18 — 2:59 a.m.]

159.

Reference to my telegram No. 157, October 14, 11 a.m. According to reasonably reliable sources, the Japanese have landed approximately 2,000 troops at Haiphong within the last 24 hours. I am also informed that the Japanese have recently requested that the Government General allow them to organize and manage the railway transportation of Japanese troops throughout Indochina, a request which has been refused up to now. The news of the resignation of the Konoe Government has increased appreciably the apprehension here of further Japanese moves in this area.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department, Chungking, Beiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

REED