Japanese-American relations (7-24-41 – 11-30-41)

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 6:54pm

U.S. Department of State (October 2, 1941)

711.94/2340a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan

Washington, October 2, 1941 — 8 p.m.

632.

For the Ambassador and the Counselor only.

I gave the Japanese Ambassador on October 2 a statement dealing with the Japanese proposals of September 6, and with subsequent communications from the Japanese Government. In that statement there is reviewed briefly the exchanges of documents and messages on August 17, August 28 and September 3, and there is reaffirmed the desire of this Government that there be worked out a peaceful settlement of Pacific problems on the basis of practical application to the entire Pacific area of the fundamental principles which we believe constitute the only sound practicable basis for stable relations between nations. There is expressed the gratification of the President and the Government of the United States at receiving on August 28 the message of Prince Konoye and the statement of the Japanese Government, setting forth a desire and intent on the part of Japan to follow courses of peace in harmony with basic principles to which this country and people are committed and also the statement of Prince Konoe to you on September 6 that he fully subscribed to the four principles which have on several occasions been enumerated to the Japanese Government. The observation is made that this Government has not sought to undertake discussion of details but has requested certain clarification in the belief that efforts toward a meeting of minds would thereby be expedited. It is pointed out that such developments and assurances precedent to the Japanese proposals of September 6 seemed to justify a conclusion that adherence to and practical application of a broad progressive program for the entire Pacific area might be expected from Japan; but that we were disappointed that the proposals of September 6 and subsequent communications from the Japanese Government, in our opinion, served to narrow and restrict application of basic principles and various broad assurances given by the Japanese Government.

It is noted that there may arise in some minds questions regarding Japan’s purpose in circumscribing its assurances of peaceful intent with qualifications which would seem to be unnecessary. Reference is made to Japan’s restriction to the southwest Pacific of economic non-discrimination (Section V of the draft understanding) and to the introduction of unspecified reservations and vague desiderata based on Japan’s propinquity to China. The undesirability of either the United States or Japan pursuing one course in some areas and an opposite course in other areas is set forth. It is pointed out that the procedure of insisting, while in military occupation of parts of China, upon the right to station troops in China would not seem to be in harmony with progressive enlightened courses and principles under discussion and therefore would not, we believe, be likely to contribute to stability or peace. Appreciation is expressed of Japan’s further step toward solving the difficult question of its attitude toward the European war and request is made for further study. The suggestion is offered that Japan might go far toward disarming possible critics and making clear its intention and desire to follow courses leading to peace and stability by a clear-cut manifestation of its intent toward withdrawal of troops from Indochina and China.

There is pointed out our impression that the Japanese proposals of September 6 and subsequent communications appear to disclose divergence in our Governments’ concepts — we envisage a broad-gauge program of uniform application of liberal and progressive principles throughout the whole Pacific area; but from what we have thus far received from the Japanese Government, Japan seems to envisage certain qualifications and exceptions to any such program.

The question is asked whether, providing the impression of divergence in concepts of the two Governments is correct, the Japanese Government feels that a meeting of the heads of state would serve to advance the high purposes sought by both countries. This Government’s belief is expressed that renewed consideration of fundamental principles already referred to may helpfully advance our common efforts to reach a meeting of minds on essential questions and thereby provide a firm foundation for a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister. Reference is made to the continued and active interest of the President in this subject; and, in conclusion, it is stated that the President earnestly hopes that discussions of basic questions may be developed so that such a meeting can be held and that the Japanese Government shares the conviction of this Government that, if both Governments resolve to give practical and comprehensive application to the principles mentioned, there can be worked out a rehabilitation of relations between the two countries and contribution can be made to stable peace in the entire Pacific area with order, equity and justice.

After reading the statement the Japanese Ambassador said that in view of the very earnest desire of the Japanese Government to hold the meeting, he feared his Government would be disappointed. The Ambassador assured me of the lack of ulterior purpose and the complete sincerity of his Government in this matter, but added that internal difficulties in Japan might in his opinion render his Government unable to modify its position further at this time. I replied that I was entirely convinced of the sincerity of the Premier and others in the Japanese Government and mentioned that this Government also faced difficulties, and that it was not easy to satisfy objections of critics, in the light of past developments. I added that this situation made it highly desirable that any agreement should be of such a character that both Governments’ purpose to pursue consistently peaceful courses should be self-evident from the agreement itself.

I emphasized that we had no desire to cause any delay, but that the objective of establishing peace in the Pacific area could not be achieved by any patchwork arrangement. I added that we were already in position to gauge public reaction to the proposal of an agreement as a result of there having already been allowed to transpire the fact that exploratory conversations were proceeding, and that it was now important to insure success of any meeting by endeavoring to reach a meeting of minds on essentials.

In emphasizing my belief that no country stood to gain more than Japan by universal application of the principle of non-discrimination in economic affairs, I mentioned my desire to give the Ambassador a report of the Lima Conference and the resolutions on economic matters adopted there in the belief that the Japanese Government might consider adopting similar policies in the Far East.

The Ambassador mentioned measures taken by other countries, such as Empire preferences adopted at Ottawa as having given rise to ideas of a regional economic bloc. I replied that I had been fighting such measures as were taken at Ottawa and that in the fight for liberal economic policies I would like to have Japan ranged with this country.

HULL

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 6:59pm

740.0011 European War 1939/16081

The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs

Washington, October 2, 1941.

Dear Mr. Atherton:

In compliance with your request, I am enclosing a paraphrased copy of two secret radiograms: One sent September 30 to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, and the other dispatched the same date to Major General Chaney, Special Army Observer, in London.

Sincerely yours,
L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General

[Enclosure 1]

Paraphrase Copy Secret Radiogram, War Department to Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Far East, September 30, 1941

Air defense of Philippines-Australia-Dutch East Indies-Singapore Area, would be strengthened if airfields with necessary detachments and supplies, are established and made available to the United States at Singapore, Port Darwin, Rabaul, and Port Moresby and advanced air depot facilities at Rockhampton.

In order to provide these facilities as early as possible, you are requested to contact, at once, appropriate British authorities in the Far East and secure permission for the establishment of advanced air depot at Rockhampton; the use of airfields at Singapore, Port Darwin, Rabaul and Port Moresby for our heavy bombardment and reconnaissance aviation; and the emergency use of other airfields in British possessions. Also contact local Dutch authorities to secure permission for use of their airfields in an emergency.

United States force will be limited to service detachments. Request British and Dutch provide local defenses. The War Department will at once request London authorities to authorize their local officials to enter into necessary agreement.

When permission is obtained, it is desired that you provide immediately two missions of 500-pound bombs and ammunition at Singapore and Port Darwin, and a similar amount at Rabaul or Port Moresby, or divided between the two, for one heavy bombardment group of 35 airplanes. Supplies will be shipped from Philippine stocks. Bombs and ammunition for two missions at these airfields for an additional heavy bombardment group and replacements for bombs shipped from the Philippines will leave the United States about December 1.

If practicable, please arrange for supply of 100 octane gas and appropriate quantities of oil as follows:

Singapore and Port Darwin 300,000 gallons

Rabaul and Port Moresby 200,000 gallons

Rockhampton 200,000 gallons

Advise if local arrangements not possible. Shipment will then be made from the United States. Advise by radio, if necessary shipping can be secured locally and if use of any U.S. Army transports is required.

Air depot detachment for Rockhampton will be organized in the United States and sent first transportation available. Funds will be allotted by War Department on request.

One airfield between Singapore and Manila is essential for operation of B-17 type bomber. Request you urge British to develop one airfield in North Borneo at earliest possible date.

Additional bombers for Philippines are leaving San Francisco October 3. 19th Bombardment group sails same port October 4. Airplanes move by air about October 20. An additional heavy bombardment group (35 B-17) will be dispatched about January 1, and a dive bombardment group (52 A-24) and two pursuit squadrons (50 P-40) during November and December. Transfer of 35 B-24 bombers as reserve will be made January 1942.

It is planned to increase Philippine air units as rapidly as airplanes and units become available. This will provide 136 operating heavy bombers and 34 additional in reserve; 57 operating dive bombers and 29 additional in reserve; 130 operating pursuit planes with an additional 65 in reserve.

Under consideration is one additional pursuit group, Second Aviation Objective strength. Augmentation to commence about April 1942 and to be completed October 1942.

[Enclosure 2]

Paraphrase of Secret Cablegram Sent to Special Army Observer, London — September 30, 1941

It is considered that the Air Defense of the Philippines-Australia-Dutch Indies-Singapore Area would be materially strengthened if operating fields with necessary supplies and equipment including bombs, ammunition, gasoline and oil, and service detachments at Singapore, Port Darwin, Rabaul and Port Moresby, and advanced air depot facilities at Rockhampton were available to the United States. To provide such facilities at earliest possible moment, you are requested to contact appropriate British authorities in Far East at once and secure permission for use of these facilities and for emergency use of other airfields in British Possessions for operations by our heavy bombardment and reconnaissance aviation. Also contact local Dutch authorities and secure permission for emergency use of their airfields. United States Forces will be limited to necessary service detachments as determined by you. British and Dutch should be requested to provide necessary local defenses. One field between Singapore and Manila suitable for operations of B-17 type bombers is essential to our probable operations. Request you urge the British to develop at least one airfield in North Borneo to necessary extent at earliest possible date.

Desire that you request British authorities in London to authorize their local authorities in Far East to enter into necessary agreements with MacArthur and to cooperate with him in the execution of the above directive.

Expedite report of result of your action.

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 7:02pm

711.94/9–3041

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations

Washington, October 2, 1941.

Reference Tokyo’s telegram number 1542 of September 30 and previous telegrams regarding recent Japanese demands, under threat of force, for air bases and military barracks in southern Indochina, which demands the French have complied with under threat of force.

Coming at precisely this moment this incident is of special significance. The most noticeable recent increase in tension in Japanese-American relations arose directly from Japan’s move last July under threat of force into southern Indochina. An emphasized point in the American position in the conversations which have ensued subsequent to that occupation has been our suggestion that, as one of the first steps which Japan should take in order to better her relations with the United States, her forces in Indochina should be withdrawn.

While Japanese “moderates”, official and unofficial, are still carrying on conversations with the United States envisaging the possibility of some significant settlement between Japan and the United States, while these representatives declare that the Japanese Government is in accord with the principles to which the United States is committed, and after repeated specific assurances have been voiced that this time the Japanese Government speaks with the full concurrence of the leaders of the Japanese Army, a new Japanese move of aggression is now ordered by the Japanese Government and is now taking place in the very area where, as the Japanese well know, recent actions by Japan have been a particular cause of concern to the United States and a specific topic in the conversations. Our Tokyo Embassy reports that the French Counselor of the Embassy at Tokyo states that the Japanese Foreign Office has affirmed to that official that the Japanese Government does not approve of the attitude of the Japanese military authorities in Indochina but is not in a position to intervene. But, we have indisputable evidence that the Japanese Government has ordered and is directing, in major outline, the move which the Japanese military authorities are now in process of making.

This incident affords new indicative evidence that (1) the “moderate” element in the Japanese Government is not in a position (has not the effective authority) reliably to guarantee that Japan’s military forces will desist from their program of conquest and (2) while that element professes that all elements in the Japanese Government are prepared to make a commitment to refrain from further actions of aggression, the Japanese Government as a whole is both sanctioning and ordering a new step in the national program of conquest.

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 7:05pm

711.94/24061/11

Memorandum of a Conversation

Washington, October 2, 1941.

The Ambassador called at the Secretary’s apartment at the request of the Secretary. The Secretary handed the Ambassador a strictly confidential statement containing the views of this Government with respect to the Japanese Government’s proposals.

After the Ambassador had read the statement the Secretary invited the Japanese Ambassador to comment. The Ambassador said that he feared that his Government would be disappointed because of its very earnest desire to hold the meeting. He said he wished to assure the Secretary that he was convinced that the Japanese Government was entirely sincere in this matter and had no ulterior purpose. He added, however, that in view of the difficulties of the internal situation in Japan he did not think his Government could go further at this time. The Secretary replied that he was fully convinced of the sincerity of the Prime Minister and others in the Japanese Government. He said that so far as this Government was concerned we had our difficulties, too; that we had to meet the objections of critics; and that in view of past developments it was not possible in one day to remove their misgivings. For this reason, as the Secretary had often remarked, we felt it necessary to have an agreement that would speak for itself: one that would on the face of it make manifest the purposes of both Governments consistently to pursue courses of peace. The Ambassador referred to a press report that he had seen yesterday of a speech by a member of the American Cabinet in which there was a reference to bringing about the defeat of Japan. His comment implied that such statements would have a bad effect in Japan as it would be assumed that what a member of the Cabinet said represented the views of the administration. He said that certain persons in Japan might have made unfortunate statements, but he did not think that such persons were members of the Cabinet and that anything a member of the Japanese Cabinet might say would be taken as representing the views of the Japanese Government.

The Secretary referred to the fact that all the time the Ambassador and he were holding conversations in regard to our proposed understanding Mr. Matsuoka was making public statements of a character inconsistent with the spirit of those conversations. He noted that the Ambassador had continued their conversations despite those statements.

The Secretary went on to say that we had felt that we could not proceed through indirect courses to attain the objects which our two Governments are seeking, that we must proceed directly, and that no patchwork arrangement would meet the situation of establishing peace in the Pacific area. It was for that reason the Secretary felt that we should endeavor to reach a meeting of minds on essential points before holding the proposed meeting. We had no desire whatever, he emphasized, to cause any delay. The Secretary further pointed out that we had tried the effects of both secrecy and of publicity and that we already were able to gauge public reaction to the proposed understanding between the two Governments as a result of our letting it be known that informal and exploratory conversations were proceeding. Thus the important thing for us now was to endeavor to reach a meeting of minds on essentials in order to insure the success of any meeting that we might hold.

As the Ambassador did not appear to understand the foregoing point made to him, Mr. Ballantine repeated in Japanese what the Secretary had said.

The Ambassador said that he felt that the only point on which he anticipated difficulty in the two Governments reaching an agreement was in regard to the question of retention of Japanese troops in China. He thought that, with regard to the question of non-discrimination, the Japanese Government would meet us. The Secretary emphasized that in his opinion no country would stand to gain more than Japan from the general universal application of this principle. The Secretary added that he would like to give the Ambassador a report of the Lima Conference containing the resolutions adopted in regard to economic matters and he suggested that the Japanese Government might be interested in adopting similar policies in the Far East. The Ambassador said that Japanese present-day thought with respect to regional economic blocs was the result of circumstances, that is to say, of measures taken by other countries such as the Empire preferences introduced at Ottawa. The Secretary replied that he had been fighting such measures as those taken at Ottawa and he would like to have Japan join with the United States in fighting for liberal economic policies.

In conclusion, the Ambassador commented that he thought that the Konoe Cabinet was in a comparatively strong position and that he did not anticipate that there was a likelihood of reactionary groups coining into power. He repeated his conviction that the Konoe Cabinet was extremely desirous of reaching an agreement with the United States.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 7:06pm

711.94/24061/11

Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador

Washington, October 2, 1941.

Reference is made to the proposals of the Japanese Government communicated on September 6, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, and to statements relating thereto subsequently communicated to this Government by the Japanese Government.

Thoughtful study has been given to the communications to which reference is made, and in connection with that study careful review has been made of other communications previously received from the Japanese Government on the same subject. On the basis of this study observations are offered as follows:

The Government of the United States welcomed, as affording a possible opportunity for furthering the broad-gauge objectives and principles of a program of peace, the Japanese Government’s suggestions made through its Ambassador here in the early part of August that there be held a meeting of the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan and that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two countries to ascertain whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

Accordingly, in the reply made by the President on August 17, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador the view was expressed that such informal conversations would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful means; that such a program would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities, and there were described the advantages which would flow to all countries, including Japan, from the adoption of such a program. In conclusion, it was stated that if the Japanese Government were in position to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, this Government would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

In the light of the broad purposes and fundamental principles which this Government holds, it was gratifying to the President and the Government of the United States to receive the message of the Prime Minister and the statement of the Government of Japan on August 28, 1941, containing statements expressing Japan’s desire and intent to pursue courses of peace in harmony with the fundamental principles to which the people and Government of the United States are committed. In its statement the Japanese Government gave, with some qualifications, broad assurances of its peaceful intent, including a comprehensive assurance that the Japanese Government has no intention of using without provocation military force against any neighboring nation. The Japanese Government declared [Page 658]that it supported the program and principles which had been briefly outlined by the President not only as applicable to the Pacific area but also as a program for the entire world.

The Government of the United States, while desiring to proceed as rapidly as possible with consideration of arrangements for a meeting between the heads of state, felt it desirable, in order to assure that that meeting would accomplish the objectives in view, to clarify the interpretation of certain principles and the practical application thereof to concrete problems in the Pacific area. It has not been the purpose of this Government to enter into a discussion of details; this Government has felt, however, that the clarification sought would afford a means of expediting our effort to arrive at a meeting of minds.

On September 3, 1941, the President in giving reply to the Japanese Ambassador expressed the earnest desire of the Government of the United States to collaborate in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government made reference. The President reiterated the four principles regarded by this Government as the foundation upon which relations between nations should properly rest. Those principles are:

Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.

Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

The President pointed out that in order to bring about any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions it was highly important to reach a community of view and a clear agreement upon certain points with respect to which fundamental differences of opinion between our two Governments had developed in the informal conversations; and the President requested an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to those fundamental questions.

On September 6, the Prime Minister of Japan in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo stated that he subscribed fully to the four principles above mentioned.

The foregoing developments and assurances, together with other statements made by the Japanese Government, seemed to justify this Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area. It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the United States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area.

As has already been said, the various broad assurances given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government are highly gratifying. In putting forward its attitude of peaceful intent toward other nations, the Japanese Government qualified its assurances with certain phrases the need for which is not easily understood. It is difficult to conceive of there developing under present circumstances in any of the territories neighboring French Indochina, in Thailand or in the Soviet Union any aggressive threat or provocation to Japan. The inalienable right of self-defense is of course well recognized by all nations and there could arise in some minds a question as to just what the Japanese Government has in view in circumscribing its assurances of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases.

In the informal conversations there was tentatively arrived at a formula in regard to economic policy (Section V of the draft understanding), which provided that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In the Japanese Government’s proposals of September 6 and in subsequent communications from the Japanese Government the commitments contained in that formula were restricted to the countries of the Southwest Pacific area (not the Pacific area as a whole). In reference to China, the Japanese Government states that it will respect the principle of non-discrimination, but the explanation given in regard to this point would seem to be open to the implication that the Japanese Government has in mind some limitation upon the application of this principle occasioned by reasons of Japan’s geographical propinquity to China.

Obviously, it would not be likely to serve the purposes affirmed by the Japanese Government or by this Government if either the United States or Japan were to pursue one course or policy in certain areas while at the same time pursuing an opposite course or policy in other areas.

This Government has noted the views of the Japanese Government in support of its desire to station troops for an indeterminate period in certain areas of China. Entirely apart from the question of the reasons for such a proposal, the inclusion of such a provision in the proposed terms of a peaceful settlement between Japan and China at a time when Japan is in military occupation of large areas in China is open to certain objections. For example, when a country in military occupation of territory of another country proposes to the second country the continued stationing of troops of the first country in certain areas as a condition for a peaceful settlement and thus for the withdrawal of the occupationary forces from other areas, such procedure would seem to be out of keeping with the progressive and enlightened courses and principles which were discussed in the informal conversations and thus would not, in the opinion of this Government, make for peace or offer prospects of stability.

It is believed that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan’s intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indochina would be most helpful in making known — in particular to those who might be inclined to be critical — Japan’s peaceful intentions and Japan’s desire to follow courses calculated to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area.

With reference to the attitude of each country toward the European war, this Government has noted with appreciation the further step taken by the Japanese Government to meet the difficulties inherent in this aspect of the relations between the two countries. It is believed that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could give further study to the question of possible additional clarification of its position.

In the exchanges of views which have taken place between the two Governments in an effort to reach an agreement in principle upon fundamental questions in order to prepare the ground for the proposed meeting of the responsible chiefs of government, this Government has endeavored to make clear that what it envisages is a comprehensive program calling for the application uniformly to the entire Pacific area of liberal and progressive principles. From what the Japanese Government has so far indicated in regard to its purposes this Government derives the impression that the Japanese Government has in mind a program which would be circumscribed by the imposition of qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those principles.

If this impression is correct, can the Japanese Government feel that a meeting between the responsible heads of government under such circumstances would be likely to contribute to the advancement of the high purposes which we have mutually had in mind?

As already stated, this Government welcomed the assurances contained in the statement of the Japanese Government which accompanied the Japanese Prime Minister’s message to the President of the United States that the Japanese Government subscribed to the principles which have long been advocated by this Government as the only sound basis for stable international relations. This Government believes that renewed consideration of these fundamental principles may be helpful in our effort to seek a meeting of minds in regard to the essential questions on which we seek agreement and thus lay a firm foundation for a meeting between the responsible heads of the two Governments. The subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought have engaged, and continue to engage, the close and active interest of the President of the United States, and it is the President’s earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions may be so developed that such a meeting can be held. It is also the President’s hope that the Japanese Government shares the conviction of this Government that, if the Governments of Japan and of the United States are resolved to give those principles practical and comprehensive application, the two Governments can work out a fundamental rehabilitation of the relations between the United States and Japan and contribute to the bringing about of a lasting peace with justice, equity and order in the whole Pacific area.

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 7:09pm

894.24/1813

The British Minister to the Assistant Secretary of State

Washington, October 2, 1941.

Dear Mr. Acheson:

After our conversation last Saturday morning I reported to London that exports of cotton from the United States to Japan during August last had been zero and that they were almost certain to be zero during September. London has passed on this information to the Government of India and suggested to that Government that it should now implement the general undertaking which it suggested about cotton exports to Japan. Under this undertaking shipments from India during October to Japan should be nil, except insofar as shipments are made under unexpired, pre-zero confirmed credits for other pre-zero contracts where payment is made in cash.

Very sincerely yours,
NOEL F. HALL

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 3:41pm

U.S. Department of State (October 3, 1941)

711.94/2359

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, October 3, 1941.

The British Ambassador called at his request. He said that his Government had information to the effect that China, while voicing a contrary view, really desired to see our talks with Japan prove successful. I replied that I had not heard anything to this effect.

CORDELL HULL

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 3:43pm

U.S. Department of State (October 6, 1941)

711.94/2373: Telegram

The Military Attaché in Portugal to the War Department

Lisbon, October 6, 1941.

Within 6 months according to Japanese Military Attaché in Madrid the United States and Japan would be at war.

SHIPP

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (October 7, 1941)

Jap demands rejected

Singapore, Oct. 6 (AP) –
French authorities have rejected sweeping new Japanese demands on Indochina, reports from the French colony said today. The Japanese were said to have asked for complete control over postal censorship within Indochina, control of all establishments in the Cam Ranh Bay area south of Saigon and the right to establish an arsenal and other military works in Saigon.

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 3:46pm

U.S. Department of State (October 7, 1941)

711.94/2348: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, October 7, 1941 — 3 p.m.
[Received October 7 — 10:05 a.m.]
1579.

For the Secretary and the Under Secretary only.

A Japanese official who is an intimate friend of the Prime Minister and who closely reflects his views informed the Counselor this morning as follows:

The memorandum handed to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State on October 2, far from accepting the Japanese proposal for a meeting of the heads of government, contains no helpful suggestion and has made the position of the Prime Minister one of extreme difficulty. The Army had been anxious for sometime to bring about a conclusion by negotiation of the China conflict but it would not assume responsibility for initiating any such settlement. Prince Konoe had, however, assumed that responsibility with the approval and support of the Emperor. If his approach to the United States should end in failure he would have “to admit responsibility” and then there would be no other person with sufficient courage to assume the risks which Prince Konoe had taken or with personal prestige and political influence sufficient to receive the support of the Army in any undertakings vital to the nation as the terminating of the China conflict. Further, Prince Konoe’s failure to make any progress in the conversations has furnished his opponents with substantial ammunition.

Although many months have elapsed since the beginning of the conversations, the United States which has admittedly given Japan full presentation of its views with regard to the principles which should regulate relations between nations has as yet given Japan no specifications with regard to the exact character of the undertakings which it expects from Japan. An increasing number of persons in Japanese Government circles are coming around to the view that Japan has fallen into a trap. Their line of reasoning is as follows — The United States never had any intention of reaching an agreement with Japan; it has now elicited from the Japanese Government an exposition of Japanese policies and objectives; such policies and objectives are not in line with those of the United States: there is therefore justification for refusal by the United States to adjust relations with Japan and for continuing to maintain against Japan a position of quasi hostility.

Even the final memorandum of October 2, which is understood to be a carefully considered statement of American views on the basis of all the information which the Japanese Government is prepared to give with regard to its policies and objectives prior to the opening of formal negotiations, contains no suggestions or indications which would be helpful to the Japanese Government toward meeting the desires of the American Government. It is argumentative and preceptive in tone and uncompromising in substance. It reflected again the apparently great care that has been taken by the American Government not to give the Japanese any specifications or to lay any of its cards on the table (end substance of statement).

GREW

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 3:49pm

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan

Tokyo, October 7, 1941.

In reply to a request by telephone yesterday from Mr. Ushiba, I suggested that he breakfast with me this morning at my house. Mr. Ushiba arrived promptly at the appointed time. Owing to the presence of the servant during the meal, that part of our conversation which needs to be recorded was brief and was substantially as follows:

Mr. Ushiba said that the Prime Minister’s position had been made difficult by the failure of the preliminary conversations with the United States to make any progress. Prince Konoe was at a loss to know what further he could do, the opposition had now something concrete to use in their attacks on the Cabinet, and the future looked dark. He said that, unless we fully appreciated the circumstances in which his chief had assumed responsibility for initiating these conversations, we would not be able to understand the full implications of the situation. The Army was anxious to bring the conflict with China to an end but it would never take the responsibility for initiating a liquidation of the conflict. When Prince Konoe had taken that responsibility, the Army gave him full and unqualified support, and if his high hopes are not fulfilled he will have to “assume responsibility”, and there would be no one who would have the courage to take the risks which the Prince has taken or with sufficient prestige and political position to gain the support of the Army in any undertaking so vital to the nation as settlement of the China conflict by process of negotiation.

Mr. Ushiba went on to say that pessimism in Japanese official quarters had been strengthened by failure on the part of the American Government to lay any of its cards on the table. It was true that the American Government had given a full presentation of its principles, but it had not precisely specified what it wanted the Japanese Government to undertake. Although several months had elapsed since the conversations began, the apparently great care being taken by the American Government not to give the Japanese any specifications was extremely discouraging. Since the receipt of the last American memorandum (October 2) an increasing number of persons in Japanese Government circles were of the opinion that Japan had fallen into a trap, the argument running somewhat as follows — the United States never had any intention of coming to any agreement with Japan; it has now got from Japan an exposition of Japanese policies and objectives; those policies and objectives are not in line with American policies and objectives; and there is therefore justification for refusing to make an agreement with Japan and for continuing to maintain an attitude of quasi-hostility against Japan.

I told Mr. Ushiba that there was no basis for any such conjecture. I recalled that the memorandum of October 2 referred to the reaction of the American public to reports that conversations with Japan were taking place and that the statement was made that, although the American Government was no less eager than the Japanese Government to have brought about settlement of Pacific problems, public opinion in the United States was such as to render necessary a meeting of minds on certain fundamental points prior to the opening of formal negotiations.

Mr. Ushiba asked whether we had received the actual text of the memorandum. The summary (which I had allowed him to read on October 4) shown to him by me was business like and objective in tone, but the actual memorandum was, he said, “extremely disagreeable”. It was argumentative and preceptive, it was quite uncompromising, and it contained no suggestion or indication calculated to be helpful to, the Japanese Government toward meeting the desires of the American Government. Citing the reference to attitudes toward the European war, he put the rhetorical question, Why was there not provided some indication of the kind of undertaking the Japanese Government was expected to give?

In conclusion, Mr. Ushiba expressed the thought that the only thing left for the Japanese Government was to ask the American Government to give specifications with regard to the character of the undertakings which Japan was desired to give, and that if a clear-cut reply was not forthcoming to bring the conversations to an end.

EUGENE H. DOOMAN

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 3:52pm

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan

Tokyo, October 7, 1941.

When I called upon the Foreign Minister at his request this morning he first informed me that the text of the memorandum handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2 by the Secretary of State had been received and was being carefully studied. In reply to the Minister’s question whether I could make any comments on the memorandum I said that until I had had an opportunity to study the full text, the Embassy having received a resume only, I would prefer to make no observations.

Admiral Toyoda then told me that he was informed of my private meeting with the Prime Minister on September 6 and was aware that I had communicated to President Roosevelt through the Secretary of State, as a “personal and private message”, the substance of Prince Konoe’s statements to me at that meeting. The Foreign Minister said he wanted me clearly to understand that he harbored no objection to my contact with Prince Konoe; rather he was desirous that by such meetings between the Prime Minister and myself a helpful exchange of views might be effected. Admiral Toyoda stated that the private records of the Prime Minister with regard to the September 6 meeting revealed that, although Prince Konoe had “in principle” accepted the four points which the Secretary of State had continuously stressed, the Prime Minister had indicated that some adjustment would be required in the matter of applying the four points to actual conditions. However, a statement that the Prime Minister “fully subscribed” to the four points was contained in the memorandum given to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2. Admiral Nomura had therefore, in view of this disparity in the records, been instructed to inform the Secretary of State that the phrase “in principle” should replace the words “fully subscribed” in attributing to the Prime Minister the statement, which had been made privately.

The Foreign Minister declared that the statements made to me by the Prime Minister on September 6 were of a purely private and informal nature and were intended merely to acquaint me with the personal views of an individual who held an important position in the moulding of the decisions and policies of the Government of Japan. The thought of authorizing me to communicate the substance of his observations as a personal message to the President had only occurred to Prince Konoe during the course of our meeting. Accordingly there had been no expectation, said Admiral Toyoda, that there would be incorporated into a public document, which had to be circulated among various Japanese Government officials who had no knowledge of my meeting with Prince Konoe, any statement made to me by the Prime Minister under these circumstances. Thus, since an attribution of views to the Prime Minister had appeared in an official document of the United States Government, it had been deemed necessary, in view of the absence of previous comparison between the Foreign Minister and myself of notes relating to what might have been stated by Prince Konoe at the time of his meeting with me on September 6, to clarify the Japanese record of the Prime Minister’s statement. (There is no doubt whatsoever that the observations of the Prime Minister, which were made in Japanese and translated by Dooman to me, were correctly and accurately set forth in my telegram No. 1413, September 6, 10 p.m., reporting my meeting with Prince Konoe. The Prime Minister doubtless is referring to his remark made subsequently that “he is convinced that divergences of view can be satisfactorily met” and that he “realizes that certain points may require elucidation and precision”.)

Admiral Toyoda stated at this point that he hoped to be able to comment following the completion of his examination of the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2, and in the meantime he felt that it would be helpful if discussion of items arising from what he termed “technical procedure” could be avoided. He had in mind such differences of understanding as that relating to Prince Konoe’s statement of September 6, and to certain material delivered to the Department by the Japanese Ambassador which either had no official standing or was incomplete as in the case of the Ambassador’s draft statement of September 4. Admiral Toyoda believed that any efforts to clear up details of this character arising out of questions of technical procedure would only tend to complicate the discussions, but once some real progress had been made he would be prepared to take up such questions. The Foreign Minister said that in so far as the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 was concerned, he would like to make one brief comment, namely, that it was his impression that the Government of the United States wished the Japanese Government to revert at once and unqualifiedly to the status quo which prevailed four years ago. Since that time Japan had been involved in warfare on a large-scale demanding hardships and sacrifices of the people of Japan who had been led to support such trials as a patriotic duty. The Japanese Government was willing and prepared to return to the situation prevailing four years ago but it was essential that the Government of the United States should understand that to undo virtually at a moment’s notice the work of the past four years is an undertaking of tremendous scope and one entailing basic adjustments.

Admiral Toyoda then inquired whether unofficially and privately I felt able to offer an opinion on the position of the United States Government as outlined in the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2. In reply I told him that it was the desire of the United States Government to establish conditions in the Far East on a sure and enduring foundation and that no lasting arrangements could be made except on such a basis. I told him that my personal reaction to the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 was that the American Government was endeavoring to assure itself that Japan would genuinely and fully observe those principles without which no sure basis for a lasting peace in the Pacific area could be achieved.

JOSEPH C. GREW

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 3:55pm

U.S. Department of State (October 8, 1941)

793.94/16937

Dr. E. Stanley Jones to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Kinston, North Carolina, October 8, 1941.

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

I do not want to unnecessarily impose upon your time and perhaps your patience, by a continuation of the matter which I raised with you and Mr. Dean Acheson regarding a possible basis of settlement with Japan and China. However, several other things which seemed to me to be relevant, have come to me and I pass them onto you for what they are worth.

If the two things which I mentioned could be put together, I think they would form a basis of possible peace. The two things to which I refer are:

That Japan clear out all troops from China, including north China, and that China then make a treaty with Japan that in case she is attacked in the north by a third party, Japan would come to her help. This would give Japan what she says she needs, namely: A joint defense of north China against communism; and it would give to China what she wants, namely: Territorial and political integrity. I wrote you that the Japanese Ambassador said that he personally would agree to such a solution in the north, but that he was not sure what Tokyo would do.

That New Guinea should be turned over to Japan for her surplus population. I am persuaded that unless some provision is made for Japan’s surplus population any agreement which is now made would have to be made over again within ten years. With an arable territory as big as California, she has twelve times the population of that State. This is a real problem and must be provided for; otherwise, we will have an unstable situation in the Far East.

I suggested that I thought two or three things would come out of such an arrangement: First, that you would save Japan’s face; second, that you would provide for Japan’s surplus population of [in?] New Guinea; with a population of six hundred thousand, it could probably sustain twenty millions; and third: You could relieve pressure upon China and get a generous peace for her in view of the fact that you had been generous to Japan elsewhere; and fourth: It is probable you might detach Japan from the Axis by such a stroke.

If these two things could be bound up together, namely: The treaty in regard to north China, and the giving over to Japan of New Guinea, you might have then a key to a stable peace.

The objection which you raised, and it is a real one, namely: That the Netherlands and Australia might say that we were giving away territory belonging to somebody else, and on our part we are doing nothing. My reply was that the Netherlands and Australia should be willing to sacrifice something in order for a stable peace in that section. My further suggestion is this: Why could not the United States offer a money compensation to the Netherlands and Australia in giving over New Guinea to Japan? Suppose we offered fifty millions of dollars to each. This would be a wise expenditure of money, for two days of war would consume that much, and more.

I know that the prestiges of government must be considered; but it seems to me that the greatest prestige that any government can gain is the ability to settle a matter by generous attitudes which will meet the psychological factors involved. No nation ever lost prestige by generosity. I feel that a wise radicalism at this time will be true conservatism.

I need not tell you that I did not raise the question of New Guinea in my talk with the Japanese Ambassador.

With my best wishes for you in your very responsible position,

Yours very sincerely,
E. STANLEY JONES

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 3:57pm

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan

Tokyo, October 8, 1941.

Mr. Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, called on me this afternoon, at his request, and asked if I had read the full text of the Department’s memorandum of October 2 which he had lent us for perusal. I replied in the affirmative. Mr. Terasaki then asked if I would tell him in an entirely personal way and off the record my impressions of the memorandum. I said that I thought the memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance and that it indicated a clear desire on the part of our Government to make progress in the conversations.

Mr. Terasaki then asked what particular points impressed me in connection with the desires of the United States for action by Japan in order to reach a mutual agreement. I replied that without having the actual document before me I could not undertake to cover all the points presented, but that personally and off the record I might say that three of the points which had particularly caught my eye were (1) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; (2) application to the entire area of the Pacific of certain of the Japanese assurances which appeared to be limited to the southwestern Pacific and (3) the special privileges claimed by Japan as a result of her geographical propinquity to China. In connection with the third point mentioned above I took the occasion to say that many prominent Japanese were comparing our Monroe Doctrine and our relationship to the countries of Latin America with Japan’s position in the Far East and her relationship with the neighboring countries, and I wished to say that in my opinion there was no more comparison between these two situations than between black and white. Mr. Terasaki said that he was obliged to disagree with me and we did not pursue that subject.

Mr. Terasaki then pointed out that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Indochina must necessarily take time as it could not physically be done all at once and he wanted to know my opinion as to whether our Government intended to insist on the actual departure of all Japanese troops from China and Indochina before the proposed meeting of the President and the Prime Minister could be held and in this connection he asked my interpretation of the Department’s phrase “manifest intention”. I replied that I was not in a position to interpret the phrase under reference except to say that in my personal opinion the Department desired concrete evidence that these troops would be withdrawn. In the conversations it had developed that it was the desire of the Japanese Government to leave troops for a stated period in North China, Mongolia and possibly other areas and I pointed out to Mr. Terasaki the unfortunate experiences which we had met in times past through the failure of various Japanese Governments to carry out assurances given us in apparent good faith. It therefore seemed to me obvious and reasonable that my Government should seek concrete evidence of the Japanese Government’s “manifest intention”, and this would be my personal, off the record interpretation of the phrase.

I then pointed out to Mr. Terasaki that I had no authority from my Government to interpret the memorandum of October 2 and as I had said to the Foreign Minister in a previous conversation, in connection with his suggestion that the conversations be transferred from Washington to Tokyo, it was Mr. Hull’s wish, in view of the active interest of the President in these conversations, that they continue to be held in Washington although parallel conversations might be held concurrently in Tokyo. Mr. Terasaki at first seemed a little surprised by this statement but I reiterated that I had already clearly conveyed this fact to Admiral Toyoda. I therefore suggested that if the Japanese Government was still uncertain of the meaning of any statements contained in the memorandum of October 2 it might be well for Admiral Nomura to seek an interview with Mr. Hull and to put these questions to him.

In the course of the conversation reference was made by Mr. Terasaki to our Government’s suggestion that the Japanese Government might helpfully consider the advantage of making a public declaration with regard to its expressed intention to withdraw its troops from China and Indochina so that it was evident that this point had been clearly understood but this particular point was not pursued in our conversation.

At the end of our talk it was once more made clear both by Mr. Terasaki and myself that our conversation had been entirely personal and off the record.

JOSEPH C. GREW

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 4:02pm

U.S. Department of State (October 9, 1941)

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan

Tokyo, October 9, 1941.

I called this morning on Mr. Terasaki at his request.

Mr. Terasaki said that he was very anxious to obtain “off the record” my impressions of the memorandum handed by the Secretary of State to Admiral Nomura on October 2. I said that the Ambassador told me that Mr. Terasaki had already called on the Ambassador and had received the latter’s private and informal observations on the memorandum, and that I did not see that I was in a position to add anything. Mr. Terasaki then briefly summarized his conversation of last night with the Ambassador, laying special emphasis on the Ambassador’s observations that, in our view, the memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance. He went on to say that he was especially interested in that portion of the memorandum which makes mention of the need for Japan’s manifesting evidence of intention to withdraw its forces from Indochina and China. He pointed out that the paragraph under reference might be open to the interpretation that the American Government expected that Japan should withdraw its forces from the areas mentioned before the proposed meeting of the heads of Government could be held. After remarking that possibly the passage which he had in mind was open to such interpretation, I said that there was obviously another one. The Japanese military forces in Indochina were acting as though they were in permanent occupation of French Indochina and had converted that area into a Japanese colony. It stood to reason that the American Government would hesitate to make the slightest move toward agreeing to the opening of formal negotiations so long as the actions of the Japanese forces in Indochina constitute a complete negation of the spirit and letter of the undertakings which the Japanese Government expresses willingness to assume.

Mr. Terasaki said that he was not aware of the situation in French Indochina to which I referred. I told him that it was extremely important that he should bring himself completely up to date on recent developments, and I suggested that he confer with the Director of the South Seas Bureau. I referred to the actions of the Japanese military forces, such as the arrests of French and Chinese nationals, seizure of private property, seizure of airfields and military barracks, threats to seize the Customs, etc. I expressed the belief that he would agree, in view of the extremely difficult position created in Indochina by the Japanese forces, that there was sound reason for assuming that the American Government would not want to have the conversations progress at this time.

In reply to Mr. Terasaki’s question whether the Japanese formula with regard to the application of the principle of equality of treatment in the southwestern Pacific constituted a serious obstacle, I said that it was my opinion, based on what he had said to me on various occasions, that the Japanese formula under reference was not designed to be taken as an expression of intention on the part of the Japanese Government to confine the application of the principle of equality of opportunity to the southwestern Pacific — that it was intended as an affirmation of a positive intention with regard to an area in part of which the Japanese Government now exercise de facto control, namely, French Indochina, but that it was not intended by implication to exclude the application of the principle from other areas under which the Japanese exercised control. Mr. Terasaki said that that was precisely the case, and that it was evident that the intentions of the Japanese Government had not been clearly expressed. He thought also that the Japanese explanation with regard to equality of opportunity in China, particularly the reference to conditions created by geographical propinquity, were open to implications the giving of which the Japanese Government had especially desired to avoid.

Mr. Terasaki reverted to the reference in the October 2 memorandum to the question of withdrawal of troops from China. He said that it was impossible for Japan to manifest evidence, by withdrawing its troops from China, of intention to effect such withdrawal, until agreement had been reached between Japan and China. How then was it possible for Japan to meet this requirement of the American Government? I said that I could not pretend to interpret the passage under reference, but there could be several ways in which the Japanese Government could demonstrate the sincerity of its desire to evacuate China. It might be possible, for example, to provide a time schedule of withdrawal of troops; or, again, the Japanese Government might indicate willingness to consider the establishment of a military police force by the Chinese Government, possibly with the assistance of foreign military experts, as a satisfactory substitute for the Japanese troops which Japan proposed to station in Inner Mongolia and North China for the specific purpose of maintaining law and order.

Mr. Terasaki was summoned at this point by the Foreign Minister, and in bringing our conversation to an end he expressed his appreciation for my courtesy in calling on him this morning and giving him the benefit of my views.

EUGENE H. DOOMAN

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 4:03pm

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan

Tokyo, October 9, 1941.

I called upon the Director of the American Bureau late this afternoon and told him that the Embassy was informed that the Japanese military were preparing to land on or about the 15th of October some 50,000 additional troops in Tonking, French Indochina. At the direction of the Ambassador I requested that Mr. Terasaki convey to the Foreign Minister the personal and private opinion of Mr. Grew that the Japanese Government should expect the current conversations to suffer seriously adverse effects if it is prepared to grant permission for such forces to be landed. Recalling to Mr. Terasaki that the conversations between our two Governments had been suspended because of the despatch of Japanese troops to Indochina in July, and bringing to mind again the circumstances of the renewal of these conversations, I stated on my own responsibility that, were the proposed landing of forces carried out, I should expect a termination of the conversations. Mr. Terasaki, obviously much disturbed, said that he knew nothing about the matter and would immediately convey to Admiral Toyoda the information which I had communicated to him.

EUGENE H. DOOMAN

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 4:05pm

711.94/24064/11

Memorandum of a Conversation

Washington, October 9, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary’s apartment. He said first of all he wished to express his appreciation of the action of this Government in regard to the matter of the visit to the United States of three requisitioned Japanese ships.

The Ambassador then went on to say that he had communicated to his Government our statement of October 2. He said that while he thoroughly understood the position of this Government he had been instructed three times during the last few days to obtain from the Secretary an expression of the Secretary’s views in regard to the points on which there remains a divergence of view between our two Governments. He was, therefore, making this inquiry at the express and repeated instruction of his Government. The Ambassador said that he understood there were three points of divergence, namely: the question of the relation of the two countries to the European war; the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas of China; and the question of application of the principle of non-discrimination to the entire Pacific area.

The Secretary pointed out that during our conversations up to the time that the conversations were interrupted by Japan’s action in Indochina, we had been talking about an understanding in regard to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area; that he felt that only on the basis of a broad-gauge program of universal application could we expect to establish peace and stability in the Pacific area; that the Japanese Prime Minister, in his statement to the President, had indicated that he subscribed to the principles upon which our conversations have been based; and that then came the Japanese proposals which appeared to us to narrow down the application of these principles. For example, the Secretary noted that we had talked about the application to the entire Pacific area of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, whereas the Japanese proposal seemed to call for narrowing it down to the southwest Pacific area, and that it was not clear what the Japanese meant when they suggested some limitation of the principle of non-discrimination on account of Japan’s relations of propinquity to China. The Secretary then went on to say that he would be glad to have Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine see the Japanese Ambassador in an endeavor to see whether any points in our respective documents could be further clarified and shades of meaning brought out. The Secretary added that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine would then report to the Secretary thereon.

Mr. Ballantine said to the Japanese Ambassador that we would be glad to be at his disposal at his convenience. (A little later on the Japanese Ambassador asked Mr. Ballantine whether we could come right away and Mr. Ballantine suggested that it might be better to wait until this afternoon. That seemed agreeable to the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Obata said to Mr. Ballantine, “Then we will get in touch with each other later.”)

The Ambassador said that the Japanese Prime Minister had told Ambassador Grew that the Prime Minister personally subscribed in principle to the four principles to which the Secretary had referred. The Ambassador said, with regard to the question of stationing troops in certain areas of China, that this presented to the Japanese Government a very difficult question; that chaotic conditions might be expected to prevail in China following the withdrawal of Japanese troops and a serious question would be presented by the lack of adequate protection for Japanese commercial enterprise in China. The Ambassador added that at the present time there were conflicting groups within China with the Kuomintang on one side and the Communists on another and that the only thing that was holding the Chinese together was a common desire to resist Japan.

The Secretary asked the Ambassador whether he thought the Chinese Government would agree to such a proposal as that of stationing Japanese troops in China. The Ambassador made no definite reply and the Secretary went on to ask whether the Ambassador did not think it possible that there were sufficient number of trained Chinese troops who could be counted upon to maintain order in China. The Secretary pointed out that according to the experience of this country we had found maintenance of troops in Latin American countries only aroused ill will and perpetuated a situation of instability. For this reason he felt that, even though some losses and sacrifices might have to be faced at the outset, in the long run the gains would justify them. The Secretary referred to the situation in the South after the Civil War when northern troops were stationed in southern states and to the bitter resentment aroused in the South by the presence of these troops. The Ambassador indicated his personal belief in the soundness of what the Secretary said.

The Ambassador then said that what he wished now to say to the Secretary was not as coming from the Japanese Ambassador but as expressing in confidence his own personal views. He said that he had talked with a great many people in this country and all of them, including Republican leaders, agreed as to the complete integrity of the Secretary. The Secretary said that he hoped that the Ambassador would feel free to say anything that he might wish to say and that the Secretary, for his part, had always felt that he could talk in complete confidence and with frankness to the Ambassador. The Ambassador then said that Japan was now at the crossroads and the Japanese Government was in a very difficult position. He remarked that it was quite true that 99% of the Japanese people did not want trouble with the United States but that they were a disciplined people and would fight if commanded to do so. The Ambassador said that there were agitators in Japan who were trying to cause trouble in our relations and they were probably being assisted with funds from other countries. The Ambassador then pointed out that war between the United States and Japan, whatever might be the final outcome, would be a very serious undertaking, as undoubtedly the President, from his long experience in the Navy Department, fully realized. The Ambassador, therefore, felt that both from the point of view of Japan and of the United States everything possible should be done by both sides to avert the possibility of a conflict between the two countries. The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for having expressed his views freely.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 4:08pm

11.94/24065/11

Memorandum of a Conversation

Washington, October 9, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt called on the Japanese Ambassador conformably with an arrangement made earlier in the day at the suggestion of the Secretary in response to questions which had been raised by the Japanese Ambassador.

The Japanese opened the conversation by stating that they desired to inquire, as they had been instructed by the Japanese Government to do, wherein and on what points the Japanese proposals made on September 25 (a redraft of our document given the Japanese on June 21) were objectionable, unsatisfactory or unacceptable to this Government. They desired to go over the proposals point by point.

Following this introduction and again later in the conversation, we stated that in coming to the Japanese Embassy today we had expected that they would wish to go over our October 2 document in order that we might be able to clarify and elaborate any points in that document which were not entirely clear to them. We added that in the document of October 2 it was pointed out that we believed that renewed consideration of the fundamental principles long advocated by this Government might prove helpful in our effort to find a meeting of minds on essential questions. We remarked that we were still of that belief and that we felt the October 2 document along with previous documents and statements by officers of the American Government should give the Japanese Government a clear outline of our thoughts. There were given, we said, in the document of October 2, some examples of instances wherein we felt the Japanese proposals and explanations of September 6 and subsequent dates served to narrow and to restrict the broad-gauge principles we had been discussing and the general assurances we had received from the Japanese Government.

The Japanese stated that the Prime Minister had accepted “in principle” the four fundamental principles which had been enumerated on several occasions by the Secretary. (The Japanese Ambassador brought out this point several times during the conversation.) They maintained that we were therefore in agreement on principles, and that the Japanese Government accepted those principles “in principle”; but that it was desirable to determine wherein the American Government found objection to the Japanese proposals in order that the Japanese Government could consider the question of meeting, if possible, the desires of the American Government.

This same approach to the problem was repeated by the Japanese numerous times throughout the conversation lasting almost two hours. On each occasion we endeavored in reply to point out the general desirability of laying a firm foundation for any agreement or meeting between heads of state by trying to reach a mutual understanding of what each Government has in mind as relating not only to fundamental principles and general assurances but also as to our concepts of the program and policies to be followed in the practical application of those principles and assurances. We tried in our discussion in so far as possible to point to the October 2 document as embodying the thoughts of our Government, and wherever possible we employed the language of that document. We suggested that it might be desirable from the viewpoint of the Japanese Government for that Government itself to go over its recent proposals in the light of the fundamental principles referred to and the general assurances already given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government. We brought out the desire of our Government to seek a broad general settlement of Pacific problems. On several occasions as opportunity arose in the conversation we referred to previous discussions which we had had, documents which we had exchanged with the Japanese and points which we had made in the informal exploratory conversations. We stated that we believed the Japanese Government, by reviewing those documents, statements and conversations would be able clearly to understand and to visualize the position of this Government. We pointed out that the Secretary had informed the Japanese Ambassador that the position of this Government in regard to the fundamental principles in its relations with other nations was clearly portrayed in the record of those relations, and that we had not from the first held anything back, but had placed our position squarely on those principles.

The Japanese Ambassador stated that when he had talked with the President some weeks ago he (the Ambassador) had expressed his understanding that there were outstanding three points of difference between the American and Japanese Governments as developed in the informal conversations. Those points were, the Ambassador said, enumerated by him to the President and the Secretary as: (1) The question of the Tripartite Pact and the inalienable right of self-defense; (2) the question of the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial affairs; and (3) the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory. The Ambassador said that he had expressed his own personal opinion to the President to the effect that only one of those questions would probably present especial difficulty. He went on to say that he believed that Prince Konoye would be able to present some formula in a meeting with the President which would solve the difficult question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China. He suggested indirectly that the Prime Minister would find it most difficult to evolve such a formula prior to such a meeting. The Ambassador went on to say that the Secretary of State had pointed out at the time of the meeting with the President that in addition to the three questions which Ambassador Nomura had enumerated there were certain problems of phraseology and the question of bringing the document (our draft of June 21) up to date.

We pointed out to the Japanese that following the interruption of the conversations in July there had developed certain conditions and situations in the world with respect to areas north of Japan as well as French Indochina and other areas and that therefore certain new questions had in fact arisen. We expressed the belief, however, that when the Secretary had mentioned the desirability of bringing the document up to date and of making certain changes in phraseology, the Secretary merely had in mind, in addition to these new situations which had arisen, such changes as we had suggested on September 10 when we gave them a redraft of Section V of the proposed understanding. This redraft, we believed, served to broaden the purport of the document and was to the advantage of Japan. We pointed out that in our belief there had been no substantial change in the attitude of this Government toward questions which had been tentatively agreed upon in the draft of June 21.

The Ambassador then stated that he understood from what we had said that in addition to the three questions which remained outstanding there had arisen the question of Siberia and the Japanese attitude toward Russia and Japanese activities in Indochina.

We pointed out that there was also the more general and fundamental question of peace in the entire Pacific area. We referred again to the initial reaction of the Secretary upon receiving the Japanese proposals of September 6 and added that the more we studied those proposals and subsequent explanations which we had received, the stronger our feeling became that those proposals and subsequent explanations narrowed and restricted the broad-gauge principles and general assurances which we had had in mind.

The Ambassador digressed for a moment and spoke of the attitude of Japan toward the Tripartite Pact. He said that the Japanese Government fundamentally desires peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Government has indicated its willingness to give a commitment that it will independently interpret the obligations of the Tripartite Pact, and the Ambassador suggested that as the Japanese Government has this fundamental desire for peace in the Pacific the implication in that commitment is clear.

The Japanese, as they did several times during the conversation, pointed out the difficult position in which the Japanese Government will be placed, if it were to meet the position of the American Government on the outstanding questions and then the United States were to raise new questions. They pointed out on several occasions that the principles which we had outlined were “inherently good”, as were the Ten Commandments and other moral precepts, the soundness of which could not be controverted; but that, as a matter of practicality, there were occasions when it was necessary to discuss the question of adjustments in the practical application of those principles to concrete problems.

The Ambassador referred to the Versailles conference, which he said he had attended, and to the proposal of fourteen points by President Wilson, which proposal, he said, led to discussions lasting a half a year. The Ambassador expressed the opinion that there were no insurmountable difficulties in the present situation if both sides were of a mind to overcome differences. He added that he himself had noted some contradictions of “the four principles” in the Japanese proposals of September 6 and inquired whether if a reexamination of those proposals were made, there would possibly arise new points requiring further discussion. He emphasized the necessity of informing Tokyo exactly of the position of this Government.

Mentioning that the Japanese public had suffered the sacrifices of four years of war, the Ambassador said that his Government would necessarily have to present to the Japanese people some reward for that sacrifice or some attractive alternative gain. We replied that, as we had often told the Japanese, our experience led us to believe that Japan stood to gain more by following a progressive and constructive program of peace in the entire Pacific than by any other course. We mentioned that our desire was to build for future stability. We said that we had sought to avoid being placed in a position of possible criticism for having tried to tell the Japanese Government what it must do or must not do.

We agreed that the procedure suggested by the Japanese of taking each question point by point was possibly one way of handling the situation. We pointed out, however, that just as the Japanese had emphasized difficult questions of domestic politics we also were faced with similarly difficult questions in this country. We mentioned that the Japanese had themselves suggested the desirability of avoiding becoming lost in a maze of details; and spoke of the fact that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed Ambassador Grew that he was studying the October 2 document and would later make observations on that document. We pointed out that, on the other hand, another way of approaching this problem, which might serve to avoid becoming lost in a maze of details and minutiae and to get back to fundamental principles, might be to take the October 2 document and to study it in the light of other statements which this Government had made and conversations which the Secretary has had with the Ambassador. We pointed out again the desire of this Government to accomplish a broad-gauge general settlement of Pacific problems based upon the fundamental question of peace in the Pacific.

The Ambassador mentioned that he had received from his Government certain instructions in regard to the June 21 draft which we had given him but that he had been unable to deliver a document based on those instructions owing to the interruption in the conversations. The Ambassador again expressed a desire to obtain concrete information of the views of this Government in regard to outstanding questions and differences. We once more went over the position of this Government as expressed in the October 2 document and referred to previous exchanges and conversations in which the views of the American Government had, we believed, been extensively set forth.

In concluding the conversation the Japanese Ambassador suggested in Japanese to members of his staff that a report should be sent to Tokyo stating that the American Government had no concrete counter-proposal to make and that it would seem that the Japanese Government could either redraft its proposals or could prepare a new document on the basis of additional consideration of the fundamental principles which we had discussed.

The Japanese seemed disappointed that we had avoided taking up point by point their proposals of September 6 or the redraft of the proposed agreement which was given Ambassador Grew on September 25. The Japanese, however, expressed their appreciation of our discussion and indicated that they now understood more clearly what the American Government had in mind in its document of October 2 and its suggestion that “renewed consideration” of fundamental principles might be helpful. We expressed our readiness to meet the Ambassador and his associates at any time and to be helpful in any way that we could.

Throughout the foregoing conversation we brought out our views in regard to basic principles and policies, including those relating to the application of the principle of equality of opportunity throughout the Pacific area and to the stationing of troops of one country in the territory of another country.

MAX W. SCHMIDT

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 4:10pm

U.S. Department of State (October 10, 1941)

711.94/2449

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 10, 1941.

Mr. Secretary: At the Convention of the National Foreign Trade Council I gained among many impressions two which stand vividly in perspective:

From the platform and on the floor I heard everywhere statements indicative of hearty approval of the Government’s foreign policy in general and its commercial policy, with special reference to the trade agreements program, in particular.

There was no indication of dissatisfaction with or criticism of the principles which we have applied and the procedures which we have adopted in the handling of relations with countries of the Far East. I realize that there is a tendency on the part of individuals to refrain from expressing dissatisfaction or criticism directly to officials known to be participating in deliberations which lead to decisions which have been and are in effect, on such occasions. But, I have had over a number of years many contacts with some of the persons who were present, and among these contacts there have been and are some individuals who have never hesitated to voice to me expressions of dissatisfaction or of criticism of which they were conscious. At the Convention under reference these persons not only voiced no criticism but in some cases went out of their way to assure me that on their part and among their contacts there is practically universal approval of the course which we have followed; and they especially emphasized that this was the case particularly as regards recent application of material (economic) pressures against Japan, as regards aid to China, and as regards refusal to compromise. The one note of criticism which I heard offered, by several people, was in the nature of a misgiving rather than of a condemnation: several people asked me questions about the “exploratory conversations” with the Japanese; I invariably replied that this was a subject which I preferred not to discuss beyond giving assurance that the conversations have been “exploratory”; and then these persons expressed some apprehension lest our Government might be tempted into the making of some concessions and followed this with expression of the hope that no concessions would be made. I made it a point to seek out persons whom I have known to be substantially concerned with and involved in trade with Japan. I expected to find some of them bemoaning, at least mildly, the adverse effects of our action upon their interests. I found nothing of the sort. I found instead a certain amount of mourning over the general facts of the situation, affirmation of Japan’s culpability, affirmation that the Japanese have gotten into a tight position up a tree for which they have no one to blame but themselves, and an expression of opinion that it is the Japanese rather than we who should worry about what Japan may do next. Several of these observers asked whether some “face-saving formula” could not be devised which would make it possible for Japanese to “climb down”. When I inquired whether they had any suggestion of a formula to offer, each of them said “no”. When I asked whether they thought Japan likely to follow any course of desperate violence, they, one after another, said in effect “not against the United States”.

STANLEY K. HORNBECK

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 4:12pm

740.0011 European War 1939/16178

The Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State
Serial No. 034913 (SC) A7–1
Washington, October 10, 1941.
Sir:
Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station, has informed the Navy Department of the following:

According to United Press, Air Chief Marshal Brooke Popham, upon his return to Singapore stated that he had conferred with me during his visit to Manila. For the Department’s information my talks with Brooke Popham here were limited to brief discussions of PBY planes. In my opinion the fanfare of publicity which accompanied the above visit and which the British always seek to give to our talks with them in this area is unwise. This opinion is based on the following beliefs: first insofar as our own and joint preparations for eventualities with Japan are concerned time is on our side and therefore for the present it is injudicious to provide Nipponese jingoists with ammunition for the aggravation of public opinion. Second the occasion of preliminary conversations which are but the first steps toward the achievement of a strong and efficient Anglo-Dutch-U. S. partnership against Japanese aggression is not the proper time for publicity. This is particularly true inasmuch as initial talks often prove entirely ineffectual.

I have informed Admiral Little, RN, head of the British Admiralty Delegation, of Admiral Hart’s views and that if he concurred:

…that it would be appreciated if appropriate action might be taken to handle publicity concerning our joint conferences in the Far East in accordance with this belief.

In view of the possible effect of publicity concerning joint defense conferences on your negotiations with Japan, perhaps as a separate matter, without mentioning Admiral Hart, you may wish to invite attention of the British Embassy to the desirability of keeping such publicity to a minimum.

Respectfully,
FRANK KNOX

NormanStewart · October 17, 2020, 4:14pm

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan

Tokyo, October 10, 1941.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this afternoon.

The Minister began by saying that although he had given careful study to the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 he had encountered some difficulty in seizing the point of the memorandum. He had, however, come to the conclusion that the three questions concerning which the American and Japanese Governments held divergent views were as follows: (1) the maintenance of Japanese armed forces in China, (2) the respective attitude of the United States and Japan in regard to the war in Europe, and (3) equal opportunity in China. The Minister added that on October 3 he had instructed the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to ask the Secretary whether the United States Government would set forth in precise terms the obligations which the United States Government wished the Japanese Government to undertake with reference to the three questions mentioned above. Having heard nothing from the Japanese Ambassador, he had again on October 6 instructed Admiral Nomura to approach the Secretary in the above sense. On October 9 the Japanese Ambassador had telegraphed the Foreign Minister that he had seen the Secretary on that date but that the Ambassador was unable to provide the information which had been requested by the Foreign Minister. Admiral Toyoda added that a week of very valuable time had been wasted in an endeavor to elicit through the Japanese Ambassador information which, had it been received, would have measurably accelerated the present conversations. The Foreign Minister had today sent further instructions to Admiral Nomura to continue his efforts to obtain the desired information, but at the same time, in order to prevent further delay, he was requesting that I ask my Government to provide the desired information in reply to the following statement:

The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government of the United States with reference to certain questions proposals which are apparently not satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Will the American Government now set forth to the Japanese Government for its consideration the undertakings to be assumed by the Japanese Government which would be satisfactory to the American Government?

At this point in the conversation I took occasion to reply to the criticism in the Japanese press concerning the absence of progress in the present conversations, by stressing to Admiral Toyoda that the American Government in the determination and execution of its policy continuously considers and gives due worth to the development and state of American public opinion. Admiral Toyoda remarked that public opinion even in Japan could not be disregarded but that it would be a comparatively easy matter to control public opinion in this country provided, as a result of the suggested meeting between Prince Konoe and the President, some agreement were arrived at. The Minister gave me his assurances that the Japanese Government would find it possible to make commitments of a far-reaching character at such a meeting but that under present conditions the full extent of the undertakings which the Japanese Government was willing to assume could not be set forth prior to the meeting. He reiterated his concern lest the Government be unable to control extremist groups in Japan if matters remain in their present undetermined conditions.

The Minister having at the beginning of the conversation expressed his appreciation of the message which I had sent him yesterday concerning the reported plan to send additional Japanese forces into French Indochina, I reverted to this point and strongly emphasized to him that the despatch of Japanese reinforcements to Indochina at this juncture while the conversations were in progress between our two Governments would create a very delicate situation and in my opinion could not but seriously and adversely affect these conversations. I told the Foreign Minister that the arrival of additional Japanese forces in Indochina at this time, in the light of recent activities of the Japanese authorities in Indochina to which I had already drawn his attention, such as threats to take over the telegraph, post, and customs, and the demands for additional air bases, would inevitably give rise to the most serious suspicions in regard to Japan’s aims in respect of French Indochina. The Minister replied that he was giving most careful study to my private and informal message on the subject and had already conferred with the Minister of War and hoped to be able to give me a reply in a few days. He added that he had also discussed with the War Minister the activities of the Japanese authorities in Indochina to which I had drawn his attention and had asked the Minister to take immediate steps to remedy the situation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then told me that since he had the impression that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was apparently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to the question of sending to Washington a diplomat of wide experience to assist the Ambassador in carrying on the present conversations. Admiral Toyoda said he had in mind a high-ranking diplomatic official with the personal rank of Ambassador, but he had not yet approached the official in question and was therefore uncertain as to whether he would agree to undertake to accept the mission. It would be of great assistance to the Minister to ascertain whether the Government of the United States, in the event that it was decided to send the official in question to Washington, would be prepared to make available a reservation for him on the airplane from Manila to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the official in question would not be accredited to the Government of the United States but would be temporarily and unofficially attached to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. I told the Foreign Minister that I would transmit his inquiry to my Government.

In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed to me, in view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity of expediting the progress of the conversations.

JOSEPH C. GREW


Singapore and Port Darwin	300,000 gallons
Rabaul and Port Moresby	200,000 gallons
Rockhampton	200,000 gallons