Japanese-American relations (7-24-41 – 11-30-41)

NormanStewart · September 21, 2020, 5:08am

The Pittsburgh Press (September 18, 1941)

JAPANESE CAUTION SHOWS RELUCTANCE TO ENTER WAR SOON
…
Slowness of Tokyo’s movement betrays seriousness of economic and financial difficulties; fewer than 40,000 troops reported in Indochina
…
By Leland Stowe

Rangoon, Sept. 18 –
Far from being ready or able to push her initial tactical advantages, Japan is moving with surprising caution in Indochina and by so doing she betrays both the seriousness of her economic and financial difficulties and her reluctance to risk an early clash with Britain and the United States in the Far East.

These are inescapable conclusions after two weeks of observation while traveling back and forth across Cambodia and Cochinchina where the bulk of the Japanese forces are now stationed.

The rigid Japanese-dictated censorship to which the French authorities are obliged to consent now prohibits any mention of Tokyo’s Indochinese garrisons in dispatches filed from Saigon and a roundup picture is only possible after leaving Indochina.

The most important fact to be cited, however, belies recent reports of huge Nipponese troop movements into the rich French colony which is a third larger than pre-war France.

Six weeks after Japan first began landing troops in southern Indochina, she still has, according to reliable observers, fewer than 40,000 men, or considerably less than her Vichy-accepted quota, stationed throughout the colony.

The Japanese are busy building barracks at the airport outside Saigon, at Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia, and elsewhere in the south.

Obviously they are digging in for a long stay and some reports insist that, if fewer than two divisions are on hand now, eight more are scheduled to be sent in during the fall.

Plane used daily

Nevertheless, the Japanese are merely in the first stages of entrenchment in Indochina and are making haste with what may be significant slowness.

At present, the Japanese are believed to have about 150 airplanes scattered in eight Indochina airports, or certainly a maximum of 200. Perhaps 50 of these are at Saigon where planes keep roaring over the suburbs daily, apparently to impress the French inhabitants and natives.

But many Indochinese airfields are either too small for heavy bombers or, like Siem Reap Airport close to Angkor, neat the Thai border, they will be entirely unusable until late in November due to the rainy season’s inundations. Consequently, the Japanese will be unable to put any large air force into an operating offensive status in Indochina for another three months at least.

Good equipment used

This fails to explain, however, why the Japanese have not mustered large aviation units at the few dry Indochinese airports if Tokyo really plans to utilize southern Indochina as an armed menace equally against Thailand, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. As with Nippon’s army of occupational forces, it appears that Tokyo had adopted a prudent of thorough procedure.

What is most impressive about the Japanese military throughout Cambodia and Cochinchina is the quality of their equipment. They keep artillery and tanks out of sight as yet but are brought in literally thousands of army trucks, most of them new American makes.

Thanks to the excellent French-built main highways, troops have been transported swiftly to strategic southern centers, about 10,000 now being in the neighborhood of Phnom Penh and another 2,000 in Siem Reap.

Nevertheless, no Japanese soldiers were within 10 miles of the border control posts where I crossed from Thailand near Angkor. It is reported that thus far the Japanese have also left the border stations in the hands of the French although that condition is not expected to last indefinitely.

In numerous key cities in southern Indochina, the Japanese military occupied many public buildings and is requisitioning hundreds of the private homes of the French who yield them with the greatest reluctance, especially as rental rates are frequently not fixed in advance.

Much French resentment has been aroused in Phnom Penh because virtually every public school has been taken as a barracks for Japanese troops while the children of French and native taxpayers are now compelled to resume classes in thatched native huts. The schools, like the French colonial buildings, are modern structures but their entrances are now guarded by Japanese sentries.

The conduct of the Japanese troops in the first month of their southern occupation proved restrained but has been more aggressive here and there in the last two weeks.

The Japanese soldiers are now becoming more restive and more incline and strut their stuff. Just before I left Saigon, the police reported four separate cases in which Japanese soldiers had got into rows which ended with two Frenchman and two natives being kidnapped by them.

NormanStewart · September 21, 2020, 5:28am

War-to-finish –
‘FORGE AHEAD,’ JAPAN IS URGED
…
Manchurian anniversary arouses extremists
…
Tokyo, Sept. 18 (UP) –
A War Office spokesman asserted today, the 10th anniversary of Japan’s march into Manchuria, that:

…now is the time that we Japanese should forge ahead, smashing whatever obstacles may lie in our path.

The spokesman was Major Kametarō Tominaga, of the War Office press bureau. Writing in the Foreign Office-subsidized Japan Times and Advertiser, he said Japan was determined to fight the Chinese war to a finish and get supplies from the Dutch East Indies, despite foreign opposition.

He charged that an “aggression line” was steadily narrowing a “pressure circle” against Japan.

Major Tominaga wrote that the “Manchurian incident” (the march into Chinese Manchuria) and the “current China affair” (the Sino-Japanese War) were really:

…a racial war in which the object is to emancipate the Oriental races from the clutches of the white races.

…and that Japan, “leader of the Oriental races,” was determined to carry its program to the finish.

The “aggression line,” Major Tominaga wrote, is formed by the United States, Great Britain, China and the Dutch East Indies.

NormanStewart · September 21, 2020, 5:32am

HAWAIIANS OPPOSE APPEASING TOKYO

Honolulu, Hawaii, Sept. 18 (UP) –
The Honolulu Advertiser, in an editorial entitled “You Can’t Do Business with Tokyo,” yesterday recommended “a sharp threat of glittering steel” as the best means of settling America’s problems in the Pacific.

The editorial said:

Our State Department appears to be courting one of the world’s three chief aggressors. There is no such thing as appeasing Tokyo, and Washington should have learned that basic lesson long ago.

Japanese Foreign Office (September 18, 1941)

From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
September 18, 1941
Purple
#613

On the afternoon of the 17th, the Phoenix came in port and is now being refueled at the pier.

It is reported two more ships of the same type will soon arrive.

ARMY 22497                                            Trans. 9/20/41 (6)

From: San Francisco (Muto)
To: Tokyo
September 18, 1941
J-19
#218

According to a spy report, the English warship Warspite arrived here from Bremerton on the ----- and is at present moored near the (naval arsenal at Mare Island?). It has been determined that it requires two more months for repairs at Liverpool (my message #187 [a]).

Relayed to -----, Los Angeles and Seattle.

ARMY 22689                                            Trans. 9/25/41 (2)
 
[a] Not available.

NormanStewart · September 21, 2020, 4:34pm

The Pittsburgh Press (September 19, 1941)

Leland Stowe says –
JAPS GROWL, GRUNT TO AWE INDOCHINESE
…
Troops ‘beat eardrums’ as Nazis did in Norway to scare public
…
By Leland Stowe

Rangoon, Sept. 19 –
Japanese troops of occupation in southern Indochina are waging a vigorous psychological offensive to impress the mild-mannered Cambodian and Annamite natives with their hard-boiled qualities as warriors there by apparently hoping to put the Indochinese into a mood of docile acceptance of complete domination by their new masters from Nippon.

In some respects, the Japanese methods of psychological conquest resemble the tactics used by the Germans in Norway. Just as the Nazis kept skeleton infantry companies pounding the pavements in the center of Oslo during the first uncertain days of the invasion, the Japanese are continually marching small detachments of troops through the streets of Saigon and other main Indochinese cities as a pointed reminder of who is boss around here now.

Subtle as uppercut

But the Japanese officers have another favorite stunt which is as subtle as an uppercut to the jaw and leaves an impression quite as lasting.

Every afternoon, including Sunday, the eardrums of the citizens of Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia, are given highly effective treatment by members of the Japanese garrison. The Japanese use the parks in the center of the city for training purposes.

For several hours daily, the air is rent by the most ferocious vocal paroxysms which sound as if a Zulu war dance must be in progress or the town is being invaded by American Indians. A mad chorus of guttural snarls and roars can be heard for blocks. Actually it is only Japanese soldiers indulging in excessively realistic bayonet practice in the most public and most noteworthy manner possible.

Lunge at heart

Sometimes, several platoons operate in different sections of the same park simultaneously. The soldiers all wear fencing masks and heavy matted chest protectors and carry dummy rifles with wooden bayonets. They line up facing each other and, at their officer’s command, the men start lunging at each other.

They leap forward, each jabbing fiercely at his opponent’s body especially at the chest and heart. With every thrust, they utter blood-curdling war whoops, each soldier trying to yell more savagely than any of the others and all succeeding mighty well.

When I attended these memorable rehearsals, Cambodian natives, usually several hundred in number, stood silently watching, most of them with expressions of wonderment on their faces. I was told the Cambodians had greeted the first Japanese performance of this kind with goggles and amused laughter as if it was a good show.

Act like Norwegians

After that, it was said that Japanese officers announced that they would tolerate no levity from their audiences during bayonet drills. But like the Norwegians, who were first awestruck by the conduct of the Nazi invaders of Oslo, then began to comprehend, the Cambodians nowadays simply took and listen with growing misgivings.

One day in Saigon, a Japanese officer halted his company on front of the café terrace of the Continental Hotel where scores of Frenchmen always assemble at that hour. Then he shouted his “forward march” with super emphasis, twice indulged in a snappy bandmaster gesture and twice cast an eloquent glance in the direction of Frenchmen and their wives on the terrace. Those two haughty glances said more than words. This is the restrained but salty flavor of the undercurrent of the Japanese occupation.

Some of the Japanese soldiers, wherever they are stationed, always seem to reveal an exaggerated love for blowing bugles. Either the Japanese contingents in Indochina arrived short of trumpeters or they all are badly in need of practice. Anyhow, they blow and blow. Maybe it’s only incidental that every blast is a reminder both to all Frenchmen and to all natives within the radius of half a mile or more that a new kind of warriors have:

…assumed charge of the defense of Indochina.

Thanks to the Japanese Army’s psychological offensive, it is extremely doubtful that the Indochinese will soon forget that fact.

Japanese Foreign Office (September 20, 1941)

From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
September 20, 1941
Purple
#618

The boats anchored here, the 26th, are:
Phoenix,
Bukko [a]

[Section of blanks apparently representing about 15 code groups, LWJ] a chartered boat (12,000 to 13,000 tons, number of crew unknown) carrying (?) approximately 200 sailors.

The Pitasu [a] (Peters?), which entered the harbor on the 18th, is reported to have carried 500 soldiers.

ARMY 22772                                            Trans. 9-27-41 (6)
 
[a] Kana spelling.

From: Seattle (Sato)
To: Tokyo
September 20, 1941
J-19
#123

The following warships are now at Bremerton:

The Warspite (repair work continuing. The upper part of the bridge and the left side of the bow spotted here and there with red paint).

Maryland class, one ship (the bridge, turrets and other main armaments have been painted red. Also, they seem to be constructing mountings on the foreward main deck for ten anti-aircraft guns).

Saratoga class aircraft carrier, 1 ship (tied up alongside the pier).

One ship which appears to be a cruiser (it has two smoke stacks but we were unable to distinguish anything else).

One other ship just arrived for repair.

The New Mexico class ship mentioned in message #101 [a] has departed.

ARMY 22776 Trans. 9-27-41 (2)

[a] Not available.

NormanStewart · September 23, 2020, 5:43pm

The Pittsburgh Press (September 21, 1941)

U.S. PROTESTS ARREST OF WOMAN BY JAPS

Beijing, China, Sept. 20 (UP) –
United States diplomatic authorities protested today to the Japanese against the detention of Mrs. Johanna Kramer, an American citizen, who was held and questioned for nine hours by the Japanese gendarmerie.

Japanese Foreign Office (September 22, 1941)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
September 22, 1941
J-19
#839 (Part 1 of 4)

Currently the feeling here is, as ever, to aid the various countries on the side of the United States in carrying out the ultimate destruction of Germany. Though the Soviet, far more than was expected, has been able to put up a remarkable fight, there are many who sense an early defeat. England and the United States render such assistance as is possible in order to make impossible a separate peace or surrender. They are hopeful of being able to maintain her fighting strength in the spring provided she can weather the winter. Opinion has developed to this point. The United States is putting up an estimated $-0,000,000 worth of assistance. As a result of this, they plan to encourage the Britons’ will to fight.

With regard to submarines, their utter annihilation is recognized to be virtually impossible. But then the American Navy could move directly into the Atlantic in order to protect Atlantic shipping. Furthermore, after the anticipated 6,000,000 “dead-weight” tons of increased construction have been completed by the United States alone during the twelve months of next year, a crisis will arise in the Atlantic. No one is unduly alarmed about submarines.

Army 23011                                            Trans. 10/3/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
September 22, 1941
J-19
#839 (Part 2 of 4)

With regard to the question of the policy toward ______, the people, as a general rule, are extremely happy-go-lucky. Should a war develop between Japan and the United States, “why worry, it’s inevitable,” is their attitude. There is still a great deal of talk on the comparative merits of the navies of both countries, the gist of which can be summed up as follows: A war between Japan and the United States will be one within the scope of the navy alone; Japan’s economic strength cannot stand a long war; the United States excels greatly in its ability to replace warships lost in battle; saying these things, they boast of their ability to win out in a short while. There are only a few who are at all conscious of the danger of a war with Japan. In the field of international diplomacy, they still maintain their age-old policy toward ______. There are many who argue that to reach a compromise with Japan at the expense of China is fundamentally wrong. For example, according to the Hyde Park correspondent writing in the New York Times, Sunday edition, at the present time attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States are deadlocked. Because Japan’s demands for the continued occupation of territory held by them in China is not in agreement with HULL’s categorical denial of the possibility of such continued occupation, Premier KONOE has requested a direct conference with the President.

Army 23012                                           Trans. 10/3/41 (2)

[SECRET]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
September 22, 1941
J-19
#839 (Part 3 of 4)

Nevertheless, notwithstanding all that, since the German people’s will to fight is stronger than ever before, there are a greater number of people who feel that such a non-aggressive policy as outlined above cannot bring about a successful conclusion.

Many feel that as a result of the discontent of people in occupied lands, Italy will withdraw herself from the line of battle. In addition, many feel that the unrest of people in occupied areas will continue to increase. There are others, too, who pin unfounded hopes that the power of endurance of the German people will crumble within a short space of time.

If the war is to be a short one, one or two years will be required. If it is a long one, it will be protracted from five to ten years. the people generally here are maintaining an extremely happy-go-lucky frame of mind. There are practically none at all who think that as a result of this war the United States will be destroyed. With regard to their will to enter into the war, they feel that naval participation is sufficient. And, aside from the preparations being undertaken by military authorities, there are practically none who anticipate the dispatch of expeditionary forces on a large scale.

However, most recently there has been a sharp decline in the isolationist opinion expressed in the houses of Congress. One group is already going over to the majority group who back up the Government’s foreign policy.

Army 23013                                           Trans. 10/3/41 (7)

[SECRET]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
September 22, 1941
J-19
#839 (Part 4 of 4)

Nevertheless, the President is a person who unceasingly confers with HULL. Today the greater portion of the American Navy being is kept in the Pacific. Japan, in the event of the Russian do, fall, might move either to the south or to the north. In such a case there is some fear that a frontal clash might occur at the same time in the Atlantic and the Pacific as well. The President is giving the utmost consideration to this matter.

As for Japan’s peace terms, rumors are being circulated that in addition to Japan demanding the treaty ports and the four southern provinces in China, she might go so far as to demand other points of military importance.

Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render economic assistance to Japan.

The above are the critical observations concerning the trend of opinion in the United States made by KURATUKUHOON, [a] and I think he hit the nail on the head.

[a] Kana spelling. 
 
Army 23014                                           Trans. 10/3/41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Washington
September 22, 1941
J-19 
Circular #38. 
Message to Tokyo #173.

Re my message #166.[a]

A destroyer left port on the 16th bound for New Caledonia. Naval Captain G. T. GARGENLIEU, High Commissioner for Pacific territories under the jurisdiction of the DeGaulle Regime, and Commander G. GABANTER, Commander of Defense, took passage on this destroyer to take up their new posts.

ARMY 23095                                           Trans. 10-6-41 (2)
 
[a] Not available.

From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
September 22, 1941
J-19
#173

Ships passing through the Canal between the 17th and 21st are as follows:

  1. Pacific bound:
     1 American Tanker
     4 American Freighters
  
  2. Atlantic bound:
     2 American Tankers
     4 American Freighters
     1 English Freighter
 
ARMY #22954                                           Trans. 10/2/41 (J)

From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
September 22, 1941
Purple
#623

Re my message #618. [a]

The Phoenix left port the morning of the 22nd.

ARMY 22771                                            Trans. 9/27/41 (6)
 
[a] See S.I.S. #22772.

Japanese Foreign Office (September 23, 1941)

[SECRET]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
23 September, 1941
(Purple-CA)
#842 (3 Parts-complete)

On the morning of the 23rd, I called on Hull and handed to him the English texts of your messages #562* and #564**, and our terms of peace between Japan and China as contained in your message #590***.

I took this opportunity to point out the following points: That with these notes, together with the various other statements made by us, we have said all that we can say; that we have nothing further to say to Ambassador Grew, either; that we shall leave all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact, other than the points which have already been brought up and explained, to be decided upon at the meeting of the leaders of the two countries; that the proposals which we now make are not intended to show down the original proposals made by the U.S., but rather are intended to enlarge their scope.

I continued by describing the situation and conditions in Japan in accordance with the contents of your message #589****. I added that our government was sincerely interested in having the “Leaders’ Conference” materialize at the earliest possible opportunity…

In reply to this, Hull said that he was spending much time in promoting the materialization of the “Leaders’ Conference”. He then said that he had previously expressed his hope that we would guide public opinion to a more favorable one, and inquired if we had been successful in this.

I replied that as I had pointed out on several previous occasions, the government has faced this problem with sincerity, and that it is gradually being improved.

Hull then asked for my own personal opinions on the matter, so I replied that it is the government’s opinion that the Tripartite Pact and the improvement of U.S.-Japanese relations can be made parallel each other. I also said that I was firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen peace the of the Pacific.

Hull then advised me that he has received Grew’s report of the Minister Toyoda-Grew meeting of the 22nd, and that he is giving it his careful study at the present time. He said that he is anxious to reply to it at the earliest possible moment. I then tried to have him commit himself to be in favor of the materialization of the “Leaders’ Conference”, even if in principle only, but I was unable to make say anything definite.

Hull then went on to say that in view of world conditions, it is not too early even now, for the U.S. and Japan to consider the reconstruction of a peaceful world. He, himself, thinks that Japan and the U.S. are ideally situated right now to lend leadership to the world. At the same time, however, he is not sure whether the caliber of statesmanship of the two countries is capable of coping with such an undertaking.

I, therefore, said that even from this standpoint, it was essential that the “Leaders’ Conference” takes place.

With this, our meeting was brought to an end.

*JD-1: 5160 (S.I.S. #22248)-Detailed reply of Foreign Minister to Grew's request for interpretation of various phrases and paragraphs in Japan's notes and statements of intentions in the current U.S. negotiations. 
**JD-1: 5162 (S.I.S. #22250)-"Equitable basis" is not to be judged solely by Japan. (Refers to open door & commerce in China.) 
***JD-1: 5360 (S.I.S. #2250-51)-Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.
****JD-1: 5359 (S.I.S. #22547-49)-Grew-Toyoda talk in which Japs again emphasize that all U.S. questions have now been answered and they therefore expect a U.S. reply on the leaders' conference question. The situation during past month has steadily become more critical and will become more so, due to pro-Axis elements in Japan, if a decision is not reached prior to the 1st anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the 28th of this month. Tell the Secretary this and wire his reactions. 
 
22749
JD-1:                                           Navy Trans. 9-26-41 (1)

From: Buenos Aires
To: Panama
23 September 1941
J 19
Circular #146
Buenos Aires to Tokyo #416.
Strictly secret; COR

When Minister Yamagata* was in Panama he was asked by the Italian Minister there to deliver some maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone for him, which he did. Since then, we had Usui go to Chile to take charge of those maps and upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian Ambassador. At the same time, we requested that we be given copies of them.

Recently, these copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this delivery, Assistant Attache Kameda and Usua were present to ascertain that they were exact copies of the originals). And we entrusted them to our Navy’s courier Tatuma who is returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru.

The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon the arrival of these papers in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect through (our Embassy in Rome?)

Minister Yamagata has already advised Chief of Bureau Terasaki regarding this matter. The Navy has also sent a report.

23814
JD-1: 5970                                  (D) Navy Trans. 10-22-41 (X)
 
*Minister to Chile.

Japanese Foreign Office (September 24, 1941)

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Honolulu
September 24, 1941
J-19
#83

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in locks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

ARMY 23260 Trans. 10/9/41 (S)

NormanStewart · September 29, 2020, 8:37am

The Pittsburgh Press (September 26, 1941)

MEMBER OF JAP DIET PROPOSES POLICY CHANGE
…
Tokyo navy won’t aid Axis, Chicago University speaker says
…
Chicago, Sept. 26 (UP) –
Dr. Juiji G. Kasai, member of the lower house of the Japanese Diet, said last night that Japan should “reorient” its policy toward the Axis and expressed doubt that the Japanese Navy would be used:

…as a catspaw of a third power to fight against America.

Kasai told a University of Chicago alumni group that neither the United States nor Japan wanted war in the Pacific. A graduate of the University in 1913, he spoke as a representative of Japanese alumni at the university’s 50th anniversary celebration.

United States pressure against Japan, Kasai said, culminated in the 1939 abrogation of the commercial treaty between the two nations and forced Japan:

…to the conclusion that it was almost impossible to retain America’s friendship.

Treaty was ‘shock’

He said:

This abrogation of the commercial treaty gave me a great shock. It has accelerated the forces which were driving Japan to Hitler and which, unfortunately, resulted in the German-Japanese tripartite treaty.

Kasai said former Japanese Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka had assured his nation that the treaty with Germany would “strengthen” relations with the United States.

We know now that the treaty had provoked America and is undermining our relations and the time has come for the Japanese statesmen to reorient their policy regarding the Axis.

Called defense pact

Kasai called the pact which allied Japan with the Axis a “mere defense treaty” with “loopholes.” He said President Roosevelt’s “shoot-on-sight” speech Sept. 11 “made it clear” that American ships had been attacked by German raiders.

As Germany’s attack upon the United States has been established and proclaimed, therefore the treaty has no binding force to compel Japan to come to Germany’s assistance to fight the United States. I do not believe that the Imperial Navy will ever be used as a catspaw of a third power to fight against America.

NormanStewart · September 29, 2020, 9:03am

TOKYO LEADERS BACK AXIS TIES
…
Jap spokesman dims hope of better U.S. relations
…
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer

Tokyo, Sept. 26 –
Nobufumi Itō, president of the government Information Board, said in a radio broadcast today that Japan’s military alliance with Germany and Italy “constitutes the keynote of our diplomacy.”

He said that:

Whatever difficulties we may encounter, there will not be any change in the fact that the spirit of the three-power pact constitutes the keynote of our diplomacy and it will not be affected in the least by the activities of third powers seeking to alienate the three countries of Japan, Italy and Germany.

Previously, Koh Ishii, official spokesman, had announced that the government was considering the dispatch of a Japanese ship to Hawaii and the United States “primarily” to evacuate Japanese citizens.

In his broadcast speech, Itō said:

It is my belief that we must be strongly determined to exhaust all possible peaceful means toward establishment of a new order in accordance with the spirit of the three-power pact and if these is any third power interference we must dispel it resolutely and go forward with a steady step towards order.

In his statement, Ishii said that final decision on sending a ship to Hawaii and the United States had not yet been reached but was under discussion with American authorities.

Ishii’s statement came simultaneously with a blast of newspaper editorials and statements which put on record the demand of nationalistic elements, including the army and navy, that Japan stick to its alliance with Germany and Italy, signed a year ago tomorrow.

Admiral Sankichi Takahashi (ret.), former commander-in-chief of the combined fleet, said the Chinese war had shown which nations were friendly to Japan and which hostile.

Government spokesman Ishii, asked to comment on statements made by Seigō Nakano, pro-Axis politician, that the people would overthrow any government which reached agreement with the United States on the terms the United States might offer, said:

Those are Nakano’s views. It is very difficult for me to comment. Nakano has his followers.

Japanese Foreign Office (September 26, 1941)

[SECRET]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
September 26, 1941
Purple (CA)
#597

In solving so difficult a problem as Japanese-American relations, your Honor’s troubles and anxieties have always been deeply appreciated by me. I can easily see that, concerning the negotiations, Your Honor’s views are not infrequently at variance with mine; but as I told you in my #554 [a], this is a very serious matter and I am proceeding cautiously and deliberately. Therefore, I wish to caution you again not to add or detract a jot or tittle on your own without first getting in contact with me. In this connection, please wire me back concerning the following points:

Have you communicated to them the contents of my #590 [b]?
In your conversation with the President, did he not mention a promise on our part that we would avoid and cease any further increase in our troops stationed in French Indochina for the sake of success in the Japanese-American negotiations? When the President stated with smiling cynicism that he expected we might occupy Thailand while the Premier and he were talking, just as we did French Indochina while you and the Secretary of State were conferring (see your #752 [c]), did he not also refer to such a promise? I think he probably did. In view of the seriousness of matters as they stand, although I know the hour is all ready late, because of the necessity of keeping records, I want you please to go and question them again. Now when Germany (?) is becoming so aroused, we have no intention of rehashing things which have been gone over in the past. Please, also, (tell this to them?). Needless to say, there will be no changes in my #595 [d] of today, so will you please communicate it to them.

[a] See S.I.S. #22191 in which Tokyo tells Ambassador NOMURA that the texts of certain notes are decided upon after very careful study by all of the various ministries involved. If, however, he notes any points in such messages, he should make inquiries and suggestions by cable before delivering them to the addressees.
[b] See S.I.S. #22550-51 in which Tokyo sends Washington the text of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.
[c] See S.I.S. #21651 and #21615 in which Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo of his conference with the President with regard to the meeting between Prince KONOE and the President.
[d] See S.I.S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Army 22753.                                          Trans. 9/26/41 (S)

From: Davao (Kihara)
To: Tokyo
September 26, 1941
J-19
#135

Upon my arrival to take up my post here, I heard the following report concerning Zamboanga: [a]

Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyers and submarines enter that port from the South Seas every Saturday. After they have lain at anchor for one or two days they leave again for the South. In summing up the statements of members of the crews of these boats, it appears that these warships ply the waters from Jolo [b] to Tawao [c] and Tarakan [d] on the island of Borneo.

24468                                                 Trans. 11/7/41 (6)
 
[a] A city on the island of Mindanao.
[b] Name of the island connecting the main Philippine group to Borneo. 
[c] Town in British North Borneo.
[d] In Netherlands Borneo.

NormanStewart · September 29, 2020, 3:43pm

The Pittsburgh Press (September 27, 1941)

JAPANESE HOLD LUKEWARM PACT FESTIVITY
…
Tokyo’s Foreign Minister, Nazi envoy talk of ‘role in history’
…
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer

Tokyo, Sept. 27 –
Admiral Teijirō Toyoda, Foreign Minister, said today that Japan, Germany and Italy should renew their determination to surmount whatever difficulties are in their paths.

Toyoda spoke at a luncheon in observance of the first anniversary of Japan’s alliance with Germany and Italy. Guests included the German and Italian ambassadors, the Romanian minister and the Hungarian charge d’affaires.

Toyoda said:

Japan, Germany and Italy are steadily making great strides toward construction of a new order in Europe and East Asia. Our constructive efforts will still be confronted by many difficulties and therefore increased efforts will be required.

But I am firmly convinced that the accomplishments of these three powers – making their alliance the basis of their diplomacy – in cooperation in the brief period since their pact was signed will play a great role in world history.

Nazi envoy speaks

The alliance has the lofty mission of preventing the extension of disputes and the spread of hostilities as far as is possible. I do not doubt that in the last year our pact has accomplished a great deal in this respect. Our ideal as enunciated in the Tripartite Pact is the noble mission of mankind. Mutual cooperation, trust and patience are essential in achieving this ideal. Therefore, today each signatory should renew its attitude toward this point and renew their determination to surmount whatever difficulties lie ahead.

The German ambassador, General Eugen Ott, issued an anniversary statement in which he said, in part:

The alliance signatories are engaged in a tremendous military, economic and spiritual struggle such as the world has not seen before. Believing that the fate of coming centuries depends on the firmness and inseparability of their common front and upon the heroism of their soldiers, they enter the new alliance year proudly confident of victory but also ready for any sacrifice…

Raps Roosevelt declaration

The invasion of Syria and Iran and the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration of spiritual bankruptcy have been useless because the world is already convinced of the brittleness of Anglo-Saxon ideals… The Anglo-Saxons have gained only one ally, Bolshevist Russia, which is bent on the annihilation of all religious and national culture. The destruction of Russian Bolshevism is essential to European peace.

To observers, Japan’s part of the observance of the anniversary appeared unenthusiastic. Toyoda’s statement was regarded as lukewarm, and the government had forbidden private observances by nationalistic elements.

Few Nazi, Italian flags

Only a very few German and Italian flags were to be seen, though many Japanese flags were flown, and squadrons of army bombing planes flew over Tokyo, apparently as part of the observance.

Diplomatic quarters regarded as significant an editorial in the newspaper Asahi on the anniversary. It said that in welcoming the anniversary Japanese looked forward to its bright future prospects but at the same time were fully aware that it was Japan’s own strength, its own endeavor and its own self-reliance by which the country could deal effectively with turbulent world conditions.

Japanese Foreign Office (September 27, 1941)

[SECRET]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 September 1941
(Purple-CA)
#604

On this the 27th, at 1630, after completing the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me. Off the record, I talked to him along the lines contained in my separate message #605*. I urged him to strongly recommend to his home government to have the “leaders’ meeting” materialize immediately. Will you too, therefore, carefully read the contents of my separate wire and secretly do everything in your power to prevail upon the President to have this meeting materialize.

The above is not to be construed as being the absolutely final proposal on our part, nor is it absolutely essential that a time limit be put in force. However, in view of internal and external circumstances of our country, we cannot keep postponing matters forever. Please, therefore, put primary emphasis on the importance of holding the meeting immediately. (I mentioned this point to the U.S. Ambassador, too.)

*JD-1: 5503. 
 
22863
JD-1: 5502                              (D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT)

[SECRET]

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington
27 September 1941
(Purple CA)
#605 (In 4 parts, complete).

(Translator's Note. This is the gist of the off-the-record statement made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew - see Tokyo to Washington #604* - and is written in the first person, Toyoda speaking.)

Europe has now fallen into a chaotic condition. The flames of war have spread to the Atlantic and they are enveloping the various powers of the world. Fortunately, however, no war has, as yet broken out in the Pacific. The United States and Japan, alone, hold the key to continued peace or war in the Pacific.

Should the United States and Japan come to blows, the Pacific, too, would be immediately thrown into the chaos that is war. World civilization would then come crashing down. No greater misfortune could befall mankind.

In recent times, there have been numerous and various incidents between Japan and the United States. Relations are at an exceedingly sensitive point, and even the slightest thing must be treated with the utmost precaution.

If, at this time, Japanese-U.S. relations were to be adjusted so as to promote friendship between them, the effects would be felt not only by the United States and Japan, but would indeed contribute greatly to a world peace. The Imperial Government desires the adjustment of Japanese-U.S. relations not only for the sake of Japan and the United States, but hopes that at the same time, such a step would become the opening wedge to bringing about peace throughout the world.

Since assuming my post two months ago, I have been working on the matter of readjusting Japanese-U.S. relations even to the extent of almost forgetting to eat and sleep. It is with the same objective that Premier Konoe has expressed his willingness to act as a leader in a conference with President Roosevelt.
Japan is connected to Germany and Italy by an alliance. The fact that the Premier of Japan had volunteered to meet the President, in itself has given rise to much misunderstanding regarding her relations with Germany and Italy. Thus, there is proof that Japan is making a supreme sacrifice. Moreover, the history of Japan has no precedence of an instance where the Premier himself has gone abroad in behalf of diplomacy. This fact in itself should clearly show the sincerity of the government of Japan in its expressed desire of adjusting the relationship between Japan and the United States, and through that, of maintaining peace on the Pacific, and, indeed, for the world.
Maintenance of peace is Japan’s sole motivating power. Should there be those who believe that Japan was forced to her knees by U.S. pressure, it would indeed be a sad misconception on their part. Japan desires peace; she is not succumbing to outside pressure. Moreover, Japan is not one to yearn for peace at any price.

The Japanese people have a peculiar characteristic of repelling all outside pressures. We have pointed this fact out previously but I view of the general tone of U.S. newspapers in the past, (it is admitted that this has been considerably toned down of late), I feel that it is necessary to repeat this.

Japanese-U.S. relations are exceedingly complicated. Hence, it is quite possible that the entire matter cannot be settled in a day and a night. It is quite possible that not all of the difficult problems can be ironed out by a single meeting between the leaders of the two countries However, the political aspect of such a meeting would have exceedingly far reaching effects. Moreover, those items which have as yet remained unsettled (we do not believe that any of these exist any longer, but assuming that some do) after all of the goings and comings of cables, they could undoubtedly be settled at the conference. It should be unnecessary to point out the turn for the better in U.S.-Japanese relations that this would have.

We are under the impression that in theory, your side is not opposed to the holding of the “leaders’ conference”. Should, however, in spite of this, the meeting does not materialize for some reason, we doubt if another opportunity such as the present would appear for some time to come. Moreover, it is quite possible that here may be some fearsome reactions from such a failure.

Japan has already announced the proposals she will make at the meeting. We have moreover already submitted for your convenience a complete resume in accordance with the lines contained in the United States’ proposal of 21 June. I feel certain, therefore, that the United States is fully aware of the Japanese viewpoint by this time.
We have, of course, already decided upon the vessel which will transport the Premier and his party; the personnel of his party, including the generals and admirals, have also been decided upon. We are in a position to start at any moment now.
Since the situation is as described above, the Imperial Government awaits with expectations the United States’ reply at the earliest possible moment. Any further delays would place the government in an exceedingly difficult position from the viewpoint of the Tripartite Pact. Your Excellency is certainly fully aware that there is every possibility of commemorating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, to strengthen the ties of the three powers.

From the viewpoint of the weather there is considerable danger that it will become unfavorable in the North Pacific and in the Alaska area.

From both domestic and external circumstances, time is of paramount importance, as I have pointed out previously. It is essential that the meeting be decided upon at all possible speed and it is with this thought uppermost in my mind that I so strongly insist upon this matter at this time. I would consider it to be of greatest fortune if we were to receive a definite reply at the earliest moment.

From our standpoint if the meeting were scheduled from 10 to 15 October, it would meet with our best convenience.

In conclusion, I would like to say that in a negotiation of this type, it is of the utmost importance that each respect the other’s reliability and sincerity. Your Excellency is fully cognizant of Premier Konoe, character and his political position. I hardly feel that I can add anything in this respect at this time. However, as I said before, I doubt if another opportunity to adjust Japanese-U.S. relations will present itself because, at present, the Premier and the entire Cabinet are behind the move. At the same time, it is essential, even under present circumstances, that the leaders meet and confer directly and at the earliest possible time. I repeat this last point over and over again.

*JD-1: 5502. 
 
JD-1:                                    (D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT)
22864

[SECRET]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
27 September 1941
(Purple-CA)
#865 (In 10 parts, complete)

On this, the 27th, I had Matudaira call on Ballantine and had him relay the contents of your message and at the same time deliver the English texts contained in your messages 591* and 595**. He requested that they be delivered to Hull.

I am taking this opportunity to express my humble opinion on various points which happen to draw my attention in regard to your message #595**. I pass them on to you for whatever value they may have.

As I have pointed out on several previous occasions while reporting on matters pertaining to this issue, the United States insists that it would be inappropriate to hold the “leaders’ conference” until the two nations have come to a complete agreement on all the points involved. At present the United States is allegedly investigating our attitude with regard to said various points. Since, as you said, we have already said all that is to be said, we are now committed to await expression of intentions by the United States.

If we submit further papers to them in advance of receiving some reply from them, there is a danger that matters would become further complicated and less clear. I am of the opinion that this would tend to hamper the progress of the negotiations.

If, by some chance, some apparent inconsistencies appear in our various papers, it may lead to their becoming suspicious of our sincerity.

Fundamentally speaking, the United States wishes to proceed along the lines she express in the U.S. proposals of 21 June. Judging from developments to date we do not feel that the premises outlined in those proposals are too far afield. Moreover, from the viewpoint of practicability we feel that they are the most concrete. I, therefore, hope that you will accept the reasonings embodied therein.

The deletion of the item reading “no northward advance shall be made without justification” will no doubt be the point which will invite the most suspicion.
The respective attitudes of the two nations to the war in Europe: As I have pointed out in messages pertaining to this phase, (see particularly my message #540***), it would be exceedingly difficult from the United States’ viewpoint to retain paragraph 1 proposing joint mediation. Recent developments (particularly in view of the President’s statement subsequent to the sinking of the U.S. vessel) have further stiffened the U.S. attitude. Therefore, it is my opinion that considerable difficulty will be encountered in securing U.S. agreement to this point.

Concerning the matter of self defense as contained in paragraph two: Again, as I have previously reported, all U.S. moves pertaining to the European war are allegedly being made from the basic national policy of self defense as the starting point. Even if the United States does become actively involved in the war, she will do so in behalf of self defense and will not, supposedly, be in any sense an aggressive attack, even though she may have had ample provocation to make it so. In this way, they intend to obviate the necessity of our invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the United States is very anxious to have the term “right to self defense” as elastic as possible. (Read Secretary Hull’s speech, contained in my message #381****). For this reason, they may not be tempted to accept the wording of our proposal on this point. The fact that we outline our needs for self defense may unduly arouse their suspicion.

Regarding the matter pertaining to the settlement of the Chinese Incident: As I pointed out in my message #540***, the United States has, fundamentally speaking, insisted that we outline the peace terms we shall propose to China. She maintains that she will enter into the real negotiations only after a complete agreement as to the contents of the “annex.” Therefore, we shall undoubtedly be confronted with the difficult task of coming to an agreement on the matters of garrisoning troops and non-discriminatory treatment. I am of the opinion that in the final analysis, we shall have to agree to the terms offered by the United States in so far as they do not conflict with the terms of the Nanking Agreement. We should word our explanations and counter proposals with this in mind.

Before we are able to have the United States yield, we shall undoubtedly have to conduct several negotiations even after this. The danger of the negotiations breaking down completely as a result of the matter of our stationing troops, is constantly on the increase. The “non-discrimination” phase is not quite as tickling a problem as the former. In our proposal we state that non-discrimination will apply to the conducting of business between China and Japan only.

We add that as long as any third nation conducts her economic enterprises on a fair and even basis, she will in no way be discriminated against. I am not at all sure that the United States will be satisfied with these conditions.

Furthermore, we will probably encounter considerable difficulty in making the United States swallow, from the standpoint of policy, the new “principle of especially close relations”.

Aside from these points, paragraph one is so worded as to imply that the United States and Japan were jointly responsible to settle the China Incident. I am not at all confident that we shall be able to succeed in this because it may not give a favorable impression at the time this “understanding” is published. (As I have reported in previous messages, the United States is not in favor of keeping this “understanding” a secret).

______________ with regard to the contents of paragraph two referring to having the United States use her good offices ______________ and the point making the demands, shall necessitate the making of new demands if we are to pursue the lines laid down heretofore, as well as those contained in your instruction of 11 April.

I also believe that considerable difficulty will be encountered in having them agree to the new matter. In that part referring to peace terms, the following words appear: “Konoye statement and those agreements between Japan and China”. I feel that here, too, we shall encounter difficulty in getting their approval. Since President Roosevelt is very interested in taking the mediation actions himself it might be well to insert the word “President” in the sentence.

We have your instructions of 15 July with regard to the matter of trade between the two countries. We would appreciate your basing your proposal on the U.S. proposal of 21 June.
With regard to the matter pertaining to the political stabilization of the Pacific, it is said that that part of the U.S. proposal of 21 June referring to it was written by Secretary Hull himself. Since the United States looks upon this phase with the most importance, we would appreciate your allowing that part of their proposal to stand as is. We would particularly appreciate your deleting from the new proposals that part which states that we agree to evacuate our troops from French Indochina only at the termination of the China Incident. We feel that it would be more acceptable to the United States if we were to retain only that part which refers to the condition of a large scale peace on the Pacific. In other words, we hope to wind up all arrangements of the preliminary conference.

*JD-1: 5415 (S.I.S. #22709). Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored.
**JD-1: 5438 (S.I.S. #22748). Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U. S. to agree to a "leaders' conference."
***JD-1: 3842 (S.I.S. #19911) Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that based on the thought and discussion given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the Countries' and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.
*****Not available.

22961
JD-1: 5534                                  (D) Navy Trans. 10-1-41 (2)

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 5:30pm

U.S. Department of State (September 27, 1941)

894.24/1825

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State

Washington, September 27, 1941.

Mr. Hall called at my request. I referred to the fact that from time to time Mr. Hall had made inquiries regarding the policy of this Government toward the shipment of petroleum products from the United States to Japan and that, as he knew, the Netherlands Government had made similar inquiries. I said that yesterday Baron van Boetzelaer called again to ask for clarification on this point and that I wished to inform Mr. Hall of what I had said. I then repeated to Mr. Hall the statement which I had made to Baron van Boetzelaer, having previously refreshed my memory from the written memorandum. The statement was as follows:

[Here follows substance of statement given in memorandum by Mr. Alger Hiss, supra.]

I then referred to the suggestion which he had made that the Government of India was willing to restrict its exports of cotton to Japan and I believed to Japanese occupied China in any month to the amount which had been exported to those destinations from the United States in the preceding month. I informed him that at the present time no cotton was moving from this country to Japan and relatively small amounts to Japanese-occupied China, and that we would procure for him as promptly as possible after the end of each month a statement from the Collectors of Customs of the amounts exported.

I then referred to his letter in which he had suggested that the British authorities were prepared to stop the exports of iron ore from British Malaya if exports of iron ore from the Philippines were discontinued. I stated that we were trying to get from the Philippines a statement of the amounts of iron ore, if any, which was already under license and the amount of the unexhausted quota. Such figures as we had led us to believe that the quota was very nearly exhausted. If this were so, it would not be our intention to enlarge the quota. If there were no outstanding licenses, the policy would be to have the whole matter referred to Washington for review, with a view toward discontinuing exports. If there were any substantial number of licenses outstanding, that situation would require further study. I told him that I would discuss this matter further with him very shortly, as soon as we had received the essential information from the Philippines.

DEAN ACHESON

811.20 Defense (M)/3469

The Secretary of State to the Deputy Federal Loan Administrator

Washington, September 27, 1941.

My dear Mr. Clayton:

I am advised by officers of the Department who are working on the subject with me that the range and details of our emergency buying program for Philippine export products are being worked out and made effective. I would like to convey to you my sense of the importance of the undertaking. The action of the Philippine authorities, in conjunction with this Government, in controlling their exports will prove a very substantial contribution to the execution of our foreign policy. It should serve at once to make available to us for purposes of defense production materials we urgently need, and at the same time curtail supplies in other directions. These purposes, I am certain, will justify the expenditure that the Federal Loan Agency may be called upon to make or the financial risk to which it may expose itself thereby.

I believe it important that the Government go as far as it conscientiously can by means of our purchase program to minimize the disturbance and loss occasioned to Philippine producing interests and workers. Under certain contingencies, the Philippines might become an even more important center of political and military interests than they are at the present time. Assurances that both the Philippine authorities and the people working in the Philippines will be convinced of our consideration for their interest will be certain to be helpful. I suggest and recommend that the Federal Loan Agency consider the whole purchase program in the light of these considerations.

I understand that some hesitation exists particularly in the matter of low grade iron ore. Without going into detail, I feel that if as a consequence of our general policy in these matters the mines concerned completely or substantially lose their customary markets, this Government would be well advised during this emergency period in providing at some reasonable minimum price the financial assistance whereby the mines can avoid shutdown or too drastic reduction. If this means the accumulation of ore in the Philippines that cannot be moved to the United States now, there is always the hope that at the end of the emergency it will find a market; or at the worst, that we should have to consider this as one of the minor losses under the defense program.

Even more important than iron ore and the other base metals, from the standpoint of the Philippine economy, are such industries as coconut products, sugar, lumber and tobacco, which provide a large proportion of the Philippine income from exports and on which a large proportion of the population is dependent. I understand that plans for the alleviation of the problems of the coconut industry are being studied. The other industries mentioned are not affected by export control but are in grave danger of losing their normal markets as a result of our policy in the allocation of shipping space. The sugar industry, on which nearly ten percent of the population depends, is in a particularly difficult situation since the International Sugar Agreement provides that Philippine sugar may be sold only in the United States. It is doubtful if a loan policy would be very effective in this instance, due to storage difficulties and the unlikelihood of an adequate market at the end of the emergency, but the gravity of the situation makes it imperative that a solution of the problem be sought.

In the case of lumber, it might be found desirable to make loans against accumulated stocks, since lumber would not deteriorate and should ultimately be in good demand. It is possible that our responsibility toward the tobacco industry might be fulfilled simply by assuring that shipping space is available for the established quota for cigar shipments to the United States, which should not be difficult. It is hoped that Dr. Grady will find it possible to give some consideration to the problems of these industries, particularly sugar, before leaving the Islands.

I thank you for your consideration of this matter.

Sincerely yours,
CORDELL HULL

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 5:37pm

840.51 Frozen Credits/3519: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan

Washington, September 27, 1941 — 7 p.m.

623.

The Japanese note verbale in itself is acceptable to this Government. It is noted, however, that there has been no reply to our oral request for assurances that the treatment of American official establishments and personnel in Japan which the Japanese Government may agree upon shall in fact be extended to the official establishments and personnel of this Government in Manchuria and the occupied areas of China. However, in order to avoid further delay you are authorized to fulfil the conditions set forth in the note verbale with respect to the official establishments and personnel of this Government in the Japanese Empire and the Kwantung Leased Territory, including, of course, the establishments and personnel of all the agencies of this Government. At the same time that you furnish this information, however, it is desired that you make an oral statement, leaving a written record thereof, along lines as follows:

It is assumed that the Japanese Government will take prompt action to the end that there shall be effectively extended to the official establishments and personnel of the Government of the United States in Manchuria and the Japanese-occupied areas of China allowances and privileges equivalent to those accruing to the official American establishments and personnel in Japan and to official Japanese establishments and personnel in the United States.

The Department is instructing the Embassy at Peiping to keep a close check on whether American official establishments and personnel functioning in posts in Manchuria and the Japanese-occupied areas of China where restrictions on withdrawals and expenditures by official establishments and personnel are in force receive in the future allowances and privileges no less favorable than those accruing to American and Japanese official establishments and personnel each in the territory of the other and, within a reasonable period of time, say three or four weeks, to report to the Department on the subject by naval radio repeating its report to you.

Please repeat to Peiping your 1465, September 16, 5 p.m., and furnish Peiping by mail a precise list of the data which you plan to furnish the Japanese Government in regard to American official establishments and personnel.

Sent to Tokyo via Peiping.

HULL

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 5:43pm

793.94/16966

The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 151
Peiping, September 27, 1941.
[Received October 27]
SUMMARY

Sir:
The Japanese Expeditionary Force in north China has always been a strong advocate of the complete autonomy of north China; its functions however are primarily military. Other agencies in this area are the Army-dominated Asia Development Board, the Japanese Army Special Service Section and the Japanese Gendarmerie, each of which functions to a large degree independently of the other. Since the establishment of the Asia Development Board, the authority of the Japanese Foreign Office in China has been seriously curtailed, and the inability of the civil authorities to curb the activities of the military may account in part for the frequent futility of “third-power” diplomatic representations made in connection with acts committed by the Japanese military in China. Even though, on the termination of hostilities in China, the Japanese military may be withdrawn, it seems probable that the Asia Development Board or some similar agency representing Japanese vested interests will continue to function in north China and will prove to be a formidable obstacle to a settlement satisfactory to China, Japan and third-power interests.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
RICHARD P. BUTRICK

Counselor of Embassy

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan

Tokyo, September 27, 1941.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me to call upon him this afternoon and for some two hours we discussed in broad outline and in detail various aspects of relations between Japan and the United States. Throughout Admiral Toyoda manifested his determination and desire to cut through the maze of Japanese bureaucracy which has been and in a great number of instances is still hindering the solution of certain problems. In connection with the treatment of American nationals within the Japanese Empire and Japanese-occupied areas the Minister’s obviously sincere efforts have already proved effective, and I am led to believe from his assurances that the early future may show further progress in this direction.…

Admiral Toyoda began the conversation by remarking that, today being the anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, he had had a tiring day with a long program of attending functions and delivering speeches, but he said that he had asked me to call this afternoon, in order that he might present to me certain thoughts in an “off the record” conversation, as he did not wish to lose any time in stressing again the urgency of receiving with as little delay as possible the reply of the American Government to the proposal put forward by the Japanese Government for a meeting of the responsible leaders of the United States and Japan.

Admiral Toyoda then asked whether I had received any information indicative of the views and attitude of my Government with regard to the proposal. I replied that I had not, but that the Secretary of State had telegraphed me that he had conferred with Admiral Nomura on September 23, that Admiral Nomura had handed to the Secretary certain written material, and that the Secretary had informed Admiral Nomura that he would have the material examined as expeditiously as possible with a view to making an early reply to the proposal of the Japanese Government. Admiral Toyoda made the brief observation that he was gratified to receive that information.

The Foreign Minister’s main purpose in conversation with me today, however, was to have conveyed to the President, through the Secretary of State and myself, the anxiety of Prince Konoe and the entire Cabinet lest the proposed meeting between the heads of our two Governments might be indefinitely delayed, and orally to present various considerations regarding the position of the Japanese Government in connection with the present informal conversations, as follows.

[Begin Minister’s statement.]

The whole Atlantic area is engulfed in war and the European continent is in tumult. The Pacific area fortunately has not yet been touched by similar catastrophe. Whether or not the Pacific also is to become involved in the war is a question to which the United States and Japan hold the solution. Not only are the endeavors of Japan to adjust its relations with the United States directed against the spread of war into the Pacific, but also Japan is mindful of its desire for contributing toward the welfare of all mankind by the reestablishment of good relations between our two countries and by their cooperation for the restoration of world peace. The replacing of American-Japanese relations onto their traditional friendly basis has been the object of the Foreign Minister’s continuous thought and effort since his assumption of office some two months ago. Japan’s membership in the Tripartite Pact, however, is a consideration which renders susceptible to serious misunderstanding on the side of Japan’s allies any approach which the Japanese Government might make to the United States, particularly so important an event as a meeting between the responsible heads of the Japanese and American Governments. However, in spite of this risk and in spite of the lack of precedent in Japanese history for a Prime Minister to go abroad to confer with the head of a foreign Government, Prince Konoe is nevertheless determined to meet with President Roosevelt. In thus seeking to adjust its relations with the United States, for the welfare of humanity as a whole as well as for the sake of the two countries directly concerned, Japan’s sincerity is evident.

Since there is by no means any thought in Japan that the sacrifice of everything by Japan is required for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, it would be a most unfortunate conjecture for anyone to assume that Japan, despite its national characteristic of reacting strongly to outside influence, had surrendered to American pressure in making this approach to the United States, an approach which actually is prompted by Japan’s desire to contribute, toward the welfare of the whole world. The Minister was bringing up this point because of past suggestions to this effect appearing in American newspapers. At present, happily, this was not the case. Indeed, the Minister recalled that the Secretary of State had made mention in conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington of the improvement in the tone of the Japanese press, an improvement which was in fact one of considerable degree.

Many problems must be solved in facing the question of the reestablishment of good relations between Japan and the United States. Nobody in Japan has any idea that a single meeting between the Prime Minister and the President will resolve these problems. Such readjustment will require time. But the political effects of the very meeting of the heads of Governments would be important. An epochal improvement in Japanese-American relations would evolve from the meeting which, although Admiral Toyoda is of the opinion that divergencies of attitude and policy have been eliminated, nevertheless would remove any differences still outstanding.

No objection in principle has been raised by the Government of the United States to the proposed meeting. The favorable atmosphere and auspicious opportunity obtaining at present, however, would be subverted and would not soon recur if response by the American Government should be long delayed or various obstructions should intervene.

So far as the current preliminary conversations are concerned, the position of the Japanese Government has been completely set forth. A document embodying a résumé of that position, prepared for the convenience of the American Government and drawn up along the lines of the American draft statement of June 21, was presented to the American Ambassador on September 25. Admiral Toyoda was confident that the American Government would give earnest and careful study to the Japanese position.

All details of preparation for the proposed meeting have been completed by the Japanese Government: the personnel of the Prime Minister’s suite, including full admirals and generals, have been confidentially appointed and the ship to carry the party has been put into momentary readiness to sail. (Admiral Toyoda here remarked that Mr. Hull had mentioned to the Japanese Ambassador his fear that the Japanese Government might not be allowed by the Japanese Navy and Army to venture upon any course of peace. The Foreign Minister stated that in order to dissipate doubt as to the collaboration of the Japanese Navy and Army with the Prime Minister’s undertaking, high-ranking naval and military officers would accompany Prince Konoe.) A reply from the United States Government is being momentarily awaited. The first anniversary of the concluding of the Tripartite Pact chances to be celebrated today. A highly delicate situation is being created within Japan by opposition groups who, hoping that this very day might be a turning point in the history of Japan, are moving against the policy of the Cabinet in its endeavors to bring about an improvement in relations with the United States.

Weather conditions along the Alaskan coast and in the northern Pacific will worsen with the advent of the season of storms and fog.

That from every point of view time is of the essence has been repeatedly stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is his belief that there is every reason to expedite the decision to hold the proposed meeting. He was glad to hear that Mr. Hull had told Admiral Nomura on September 23 that he would with good will and expediency study the papers given him by the Japanese Ambassador. The Foreign Minister would be very grateful to have from the American Government at its earliest convenience an explicit reply in which the place and date of the meeting would be indicated. It would be greatly appreciated by the Japanese Government if the American Government would be pleased to assign some date between October 10 and 15 for the meeting as the Japanese mission is ready to leave at any time.

Admiral Toyoda wanted to emphasize the essential necessity for mutual confidence and faith. He was aware that the American Ambassador well knew of the Prime Minister’s feelings, his character and past career, his faith and sincerity. Prince Konoe and the entire Cabinet are of the opinion that if advantage is not taken of the present favorable opportunity another equally propitious occasion could not be expected in the early future. Consummation of the proposed meeting, it was felt, was of the greatest importance.

His statement concluded, the Minister remarked that he hoped nothing he had said would be construed as setting a time limit upon the reply awaited from the American Government or as indicating that there would not be given, if requested, further explanation of the position of the Japanese Government. Having regard, however, for the grave situations at present obtaining throughout the world as well as within Japan, the Minister declared an early consummation of the proposed meeting between the heads of the two Governments to be a matter of prime importance. Admiral Toyoda reiterated his hope that his statement would not be misinterpreted.

[End Minister’s statement.]

I informed the Foreign Minister that, although I had already communicated to the Department of State the principal points which he again brought out today, I nevertheless would report to my Government the substance of his statement as completely and precisely as possible.

It may be significant that my appointment with Admiral Toyoda followed almost immediately after the luncheon which he tendered today for the Axis diplomats and at which he made a relatively innocuous speech celebrating the anniversary of the Three Power Pact which was concluded last year. Perhaps by this meeting with me he wished to emphasize to us the fact that Japan’s membership in the Tripartite Pact would not be allowed to obstruct a readjustment of Japanese-American relations, or he may have desired to counteract any adverse effects which his speech might have caused in the United States.

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 5:44pm

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Undated

When the Jap Prime Minister requested a meeting with you he indicated a fairly basic program in generalities, but left open such questions as getting troops out of China, Tripartite pact, non-discrimination in trade on Pacific.

We indicated desire for meeting, but suggested first an agreement in principle on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success of the Conference.

Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic questions, and now continue to urge the meeting at Juneau.

My suggestion is to recite their more liberal attitude when they first sought the meeting with you, with their much narrowed position now, and earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original liberal attitude so we can start discussions again on agreement in principle before the meeting, and reemphasizing your desire for a meeting—

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 5:46pm

U.S. Department of State (September 28, 1941)

711.94/234423/25

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

Hyde Park, NY, September 28, 1941.

I wholly agree with your pencilled note — to recite the more liberal original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting, point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement in principle, and reemphasize my hope for a meeting.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 5:53pm

U.S. Department of State (September 29, 1941)

711.94/2319: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, September 29, 1941 — noon.
[Received 2:25 p.m.]
1529.

For the Secretary and Under Secretary only.

A review of our exchange of confidential telegrams since last spring pertaining to the preliminary conversations in Washington and Tokyo reveals the steadily increasing and latterly intensified efforts of Japanese Government to bring about without further delay the proposed meeting between the representative heads of the two Governments. Although my role in connection with these conversations is chiefly that of a transmitting agent, it is naturally my wish to help in any constructive way, first in endeavoring to convey to the President and yourself an accurate appraisal of conditions and factors in Japan which bear directly or indirectly on the subject under reference, and second toward bringing the Japanese Government to the adoption of such policies and measures as the American Government considers essential for a mutual agreement or understanding between the two countries.

For an extensive period, ever since the fall of the Yonai Cabinet, American diplomacy in Japan was through force of circumstances temporarily in eclipse. With the advent of the Konoe-Toyoda regime, however, American diplomacy has been given a new and very active lease of life, and it is my earnest hope that this propitious period will not be allowed to pass without our laying down a new foundation of sufficient stability to justify a reasonable degree of confidence that whatever structure we may gradually but progressively erect upon it can and will endure.

In the past I have pointed out that the pendulum in Japan has always swung between extremist and moderate policies; that under the circumstances then existing no Japanese leader or group of leaders could reverse the expansionist program and hope to survive; that only insuperable obstacles would prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance. I have pointed out that the risks of not taking positive measures to maintain the future security of the United States were likely to be much greater than the risks of taking positive measures; that Japan has been deterred from taking greater liberties with American interests only out of respect for our potential power, and that only a show of force and a demonstration of our willingness to use that force if necessary would call a halt to Japan’s program of forcible expansion. I have stated that, if by such action we could bring about the eventual discrediting of Japan’s leadership, a regeneration of thought might ultimately take shape in this country, permitting the resumption of formal relations with us and leading to a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem.

I respectfully submit that this is precisely the policy which has most wisely been followed in the United States and that this policy, in connection with other world developments, has conduced to the discrediting of Japan’s leadership, notably that of Mr. Matsuoka. Among those world developments was first of all the positive reaction of the United States to Japan’s conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance and its recognition of the Wang Jingwei regime, followed by the German attack on Russia which upset the basis on which Japan had joined the Axis for the purpose of affording security against Russia and so avoiding the danger of being caught between Russia and the United States. Japan is now trying to get out of an extremely dangerous position caused by miscalculation. I have pointed out to the Department that the impact of events abroad inevitably brings about changes in Japan’s foreign policies and that the trend of events might in due course bring the liberal elements to the top. That time has come. If a program of world reconstruction along the lines of the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration can be followed, there is a good chance under these new conditions that Japan will fall into line. The policy followed by the United States of many years of forbearance and patient argumentation and efforts at persuasion in conjunction with our manifest determination to take positive measures as called for, added to the impact upon Japan of world developments, has rendered the political soil in Japan hospitable to the sowing of new seeds which, if carefully planted and nourished, may lead to that anticipated regeneration of thought in this country and to a complete readjustment of Japan’s relations with the United States.

The thought has been advanced from certain quarters, and is no doubt prominently in the mind of the American Government, that an agreement between the United States and Japan at this juncture would serve merely to afford Japan a breathing spell in which, having succeeded with the help of the United States in untangling herself from the China conflict, she would recoup and strengthen her forces for a resumption of her program of expansion by force at the next favorable moment. No one can with certainty gainsay that thought. It is also held by this school of thought that by a progressive intensification of economic measures against Japan on the part of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, Japan would be forced by the deterioration of her domestic economy and by the threat of economic, financial and social collapse to relinquish her expansionist program. If the foregoing thesis is accepted as reasonably sound, we have been confronted with the dilemma of choosing between two methods of approach to reach our objective, on the one hand the method of progressive economic strangulation and on the other hand the method not of so-called appeasement but of constructive conciliation, with the inception of the preliminary conversations in Washington and the acceptance in principle by the President of the proposed meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister, and it would appear that the American Government had definitely chosen the latter procedure. Indeed we have never departed from our willingness, as expressed in our note of December 30, 1938, to negotiate with Japan on any issues, even although Japan had already then embarked on a program of expansion by force. The wisdom of our choice from the point of view of farseeing statesmanship would appear to be beyond cavil. If the conciliatory and constructive method of approach should fail either now or later, the other method of applying progressive economic sanctions would always be available. Whatever trend our relations with Japan may now take, whether for better or for worse, it appears obvious that the United States will have to remain in a state of preparedness for a long time to come. Meanwhile we may take whatever degree of encouragement that may be justified in the thought that the eventual victory of Great Britain in the World War would automatically solve many problems.

Admitting that risks must inevitably be involved in whatever course we pursue in dealing with Japan, it is my carefully studied belief that an agreement along the lines of the preliminary conversations, if brought to a head by the proposed meeting between the representative heads of the two Governments, would hold out substantial hope at the very least of preventing the situation in the Far East from going from bad to worse if not of ensuring definitely constructive results. On former occasions I have expressed the opinion that the principal point at issue in American-Japanese relations is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program of expansion but when. The question arises whether we are not now presented with the opportunity to halt that program without war or the immediate risk of war, and whether, if the present opportunity fails us, we shall not be confronted with the greatly increased risk of war. I firmly believe that the answers to those questions are in the affirmative.

It is held in certain quarters that under existing circumstances it is altogether improbable that Japan would deliberately take action in response to any action which the United States is likely to take in the Pacific, which action, if taken by Japan, would mean war between that country and the United States. I cannot agree that war might not supervene as a result of actions, whether deliberate or irrational, by elements in either country which might so inflame public opinion in the other country as to render war unavoidable. Let us not forget either the Maine or the Panay.

In this entire problem it is essential to understand Japanese psychology which is fundamentally different from the psychology of any Western nation. We cannot measure Japanese reactions to any given set of circumstances and predict Japanese actions by any Western measuring rod. For a country so lately emerged from feudalism, this fact is hardly surprising. It is in endeavoring accurately to interpret that psychology that I conceive my principal duty to lie, and I have aimed to do so in many reports sent to the Department during the past several months and years. With this thought constantly in mind, I venture respectfully to advance the following considerations even at the risk of repetition.

If we expect and wait for the Japanese Government to agree in the preliminary conversations to clear-cut commitments of a nature satisfactory to our Government in point both of principle and of concrete detail, the conversations will almost certainly drag on indefinitely and unproductively to a point where the Cabinet and those supporting elements who desire rapprochement to the United States will reach the conclusion that the American Government is merely playing for time and that the outlook for an agreement is hopeless. In such a contingency, having in mind Japan’s abnormal sensitiveness and the abnormal effects of loss of face, the reaction here might and probably would be serious, resulting in the discrediting of the Konoe Government and a revulsion of feeling against the United States which might and probably would lead to unbridled acts, the eventual cost of which would not be reckoned, of a nature likely to enflame the American people and through measures of reprisal and counter-reprisal lead to a situation where war would be difficult to avoid. The downfall of the Cabinet and its replacement by a military dictatorship with neither the temperament nor the disposition to avoid a head-on collision with the United States would be the logical outcome. It is open to question whether such a situation would not prove to be even more serious than that which would be created if the proposed meeting between the representative heads of the two Governments were to take place as planned and should fail to produce a wholly satisfactory agreement. In other words it is open to question whether a lack of complete success in negotiations undertaken in good faith would not prove to be less serious than would be the case if there were demonstrated unwillingness by the United States to enter upon such negotiations at all.

It has been repeatedly emphasized to me, and I believe that we must accept these declarations at their face value, that the Japanese Government cannot give us in advance of the proposed meeting and formal negotiations definitions of future commitments and assurances more specific than those already given. One reason for this position, as I have been told in the strictest confidence, is that Mr. Matsuoka, after his retirement from the Foreign Office, gave the German Ambassador in fullest detail an account of the Washington conversations up to the moment of his retirement. Many of Mr. Matsuoka’s supporters are still in the Foreign Office, and the fear has been expressed that these individuals would not scruple to disclose to the extremists as well as to the Germans any information which would render the position of the present Cabinet untenable. While the Japanese Government has provisionally accepted certain basic principles, the formulae and definitions of future Japanese policy and objectives hitherto advanced in the preliminary conversations and the statements supplementing those definitions are open to the widest interpretation and are so abstract or equivocal as to create confusion rather than to clarify the commitments which the Government is prepared to undertake. At the same time we are told that the Prime Minister is in a position to offer the President in direct negotiations assurances of a far-reaching character which would not fail to be satisfactory to us. Whether or not that is so, I have no way of knowing. I would point out however that with regard to the specific case of Japan’s relations with the Axis the Japanese Government, while consistently refusing to give an undertaking overtly to renounce membership in the alliance, has in actual fact shown itself ready to reduce to a dead letter Japan’s adherence to the alliance by indicating readiness to enter into formal negotiations with the United States. It is therefore not unlikely that the Prime Minister might be in a position to give directly to the President an engagement more explicit and satisfactory than already vouchsafed during the preliminary conversations.

In consideration of the foregoing observations, which I have every reason to believe sound, I feel that we shall fail to reach our objectives if we insist and continue to insist in the preliminary conversations on the furnishing by Japan of the sort of specific, clear-cut commitments which we would expect to see embodied in any formal and final treaty or convention. Unless we are prepared to place a reasonable degree of confidence in the professed good faith and sincerity of intention of Prince Konoe and his supporters to mould the future policy of Japan on the basic principles which they are prepared to accept and to adopt measures gradually but loyally implementing those principles, it being understood that we shall implement our own commitments pari passu with the steps taken by Japan, I do not believe that we can succeed in creating a new orientation in Japan which would lead to a general improvement in our relations and the hope of avoiding ultimate war in the Pacific. The only way of wholly discrediting the Japanese army and military machine is by wholesale military defeat of which there is at present no prospect. The alternative, and I believe the only wise alternative, is to endeavor to bring about a regeneration of thought and outlook in Japan, along the lines of our present efforts through constructive conciliation. Is it not the better part of wisdom and of statesmanship to bring these efforts to a head before they lose the force of their initial impetus and find themselves unable to overcome the opposition which we believe will inevitably and steadily mount in Japan.

The foregoing discussion is submitted in all deference to the far broader field of view of the President and yourself and in full awareness that my approach to this problem is restricted to the viewpoint of the Embassy in Tokyo.

GREW

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 6:41pm

711.94/234424/25

Memorandum of a Conversation

Washington, September 29, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary’s apartment. He handed the Secretary a document (copy of which is attached hereto) containing the gist of what the Foreign Minister said in his conversations with the American Ambassador at Tokyo on September 27.

The Ambassador said with an apparent touch of embarrassment that he was very well aware of the attitude of this Government and had made this Government’s position very clear to his own Government, and that notwithstanding this his Government had instructed him to press for an answer on the Japanese Government’s proposal. The Ambassador added that he had been asked by his Government to seek a further meeting with the President, but that the Ambassador realized the situation here and that was why he was laying the matter before the Secretary.

The Secretary replied that, as the Ambassador knew, the President’s brother-in-law had died last week, that the President went to Hyde Park over the weekend, and that consequently the Secretary had not been able to see the President for the last three or four days. The Secretary said, however, that he expected to see the President today. The Secretary went on to say that he expected to be able to give the Ambassador within two or three days a memorandum having a bearing upon the Japanese Government’s proposal. The Secretary pointed out that just as the Japanese Government had its difficulties we had our difficulties, that the whole effort of our conversations had been to narrow the gap between our respective views, and that we had felt that time was necessary in order to enable the Japanese Government to educate its public opinion to accept a broad-gauge program such as we advocated.

The Ambassador commented that he himself was in favor of a broad-gauge program, but that he knew very well the psychology within the Japanese Army. He said that even the highest-ranking generals had a simplicity of mind which made it difficult for them to see why, as they saw the situation, when the United States should be asserting leadership on the American continent with the Monroe Doctrine the United States should want to interfere with Japan’s assuming leadership on the Asiatic continent. The Secretary asked why the Japanese Government could not educate the generals. The Ambassador replied that this would take twenty years.

The Secretary then asked whether the Japanese public as a whole desired a speedy settlement of the conflict with China. The Ambassador replied that for the last two or three years the Japanese public desired such a settlement but felt that under existing circumstances they had no alternative to continuing fighting. The Secretary observed that there have been a number of our marine guards who did not want to leave China and he supposed that in the case of the Japanese occupation forces there were many who would not like to be recalled. The Ambassador laughed and replied that this was quite true, and he observed that when an Army general in China was clothed with the authority of a viceroy, naturally he did not welcome the prospect of being shorn of that authority.

The Ambassador, in reply to a further question by the Secretary, stated that he believed that the Japanese Government was in a stronger position internally than it had been, but that, nevertheless, in his own personal opinion, he judged that if nothing came of the proposal for a meeting between the chiefs of our two Governments it might be difficult for Prince Konoe to retain his position and that Prince Konoe then would be likely to be succeeded by a less moderate leader. He suggested that this was one reason why the Japanese Government desired to move as speedily as possible. The Secretary repeated that we would expect to communicate with the Japanese Ambassador in two or three days.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 6:43pm

711.94/234424/25

Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State

September 29, 1941

Gist of What the Foreign Minister Said in His Conversation With the American Ambassador at the Foreign Office, Tokyo, September 27, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The war in Europe, involving many major Powers, has spread to the Atlantic. Fortunately, it has not yet touched the Pacific Ocean, where the key to peace or war lies in the hands of Japan and the United States. Should these two countries go to war, it would mean the destruction of world civilization and a dire calamity to mankind.

In recent times various events have occurred in rapid succession, tending to destroy the friendly relations between the two countries.

An adjustment of Japanese-American relations at this time and the enhancement of the friendship of the two countries will redound not only to the benefit of Japan and America but also to the cause of world peace. The Japanese Government seeks such adjustment not solely for the sake of the two countries but also for the purpose of paving the way for a general peaceful settlement throughout the world.

For the past two months since my appointment as Foreign Minister I have striven night and day toward obtaining an amicable settlement between Japan and America. It is also with the same purpose in view that Prince Konoe himself has decided to come to the front and proposed a meeting with President Roosevelt.

Japan is bound in alliance with Germany and Italy. The very idea that the Head of my Government should meet the President of the United States is liable to give rise to misunderstandings regarding Japan’s ties with those two countries. Such a step would entail really a great sacrifice on the part of the Japanese Government. Moreover, from Japan’s domestic standpoint, it will be an event unprecedented in history for the Prime Minister to go out of the country on a diplomatic mission. This fact alone should be a sufficient testimony to the sincerity of the Japanese Government in its desire for an adjustment of Japanese-American relations and for the preservation of peace in the Pacific.

If there are those who would interpret Japan’s attitude as an indication not of her solicitude for peace but of her submission to American pressure, they are grossly mistaken. Eager as we are for peace, we will not bow under the pressure of another country, nor do we want peace at any price. It is a characteristic trait of our people to repel, rather than to submit to, external pressure. I repeat this point in view of certain comments that have appeared in American newspapers, although I am told they are showing nowadays signs of moderation.

Japanese-American relations are so complex and complicated that they are not capable of being adjusted at one stroke. The proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments may not succeed in effecting a general solution of all difficulties. However, this meeting is bound to have a vast political significance. Moreover, it is certain that at least those problems yet to be settled (assuming that there will remain such problems) that had been the subject of our negotiations by cable will be readily solved at the conference. It will mark an epochal turn for good in Japanese-American relations. The American Government has already agreed in principle to the proposed meeting between Prince Konoe and President Roosevelt. Should it fail to take place there will never be another opportunity combined with such an auspicious setting for such a conference. Besides, the repercussions of the failure might be most unfortunate.

The policy and aims of my Government have been fully communicated to the American Government. A resumé of these, put in the form of the American Draft Understanding of June 21, 1941, has also been submitted to Your Excellency. I trust that the views of my Government are being given careful consideration by the American Government.

On our side, the ship to carry the Prime Minister is ready. The members of his suite including a full General and a full Admiral have been privately appointed. The party is prepared to depart at any moment.

In the circumstances such as I have described, the Japanese Government is now anxiously looking forward to receiving a reply from the American Government at the earliest date possible. As I have spoken to Your Excellency at our last meeting, any further delay — especially after today’s anniversary of the Tripartite Pact — would put my Government in a very delicate position.

Furthermore, the climatic conditions in the Northern Pacific and the vicinity of the Alaskan coast are likely to become unfavorable for the proposed meeting.

Time, as I have often said, is a vital factor from both internal and international viewpoints. The decision must be made as soon as possible. So I desire to ask for the most speedy and sincere consideration of the American Government.

I may add that, as regards the date for the meeting, October 10-15 will suit the Japanese Government.

Finally, by way of a conclusion, I should like to say that negotiations of this sort require sincerity and mutual confidence. I need not dwell on the character, the convictions and faith of Prince Konoe as well as his political position, all of which are well known to Your Excellency. Without Prince Konoe and the present Cabinet under him, an opportunity for Japanese-American rapprochement is likely to be lost for some time to come. I wish to emphasize again the urgent necessity of having the proposed meeting at the earliest possible date.

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 6:47pm

U.S. Department of State (September 30, 1941)

711.94/2333: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, September 30, 1941 — 4 p.m.
[Received September 30 — 1:33 p.m.]
1543.

For the Secretary and Under Secretary only.

In several of my telegrams I have reported that there has been indicated to me in various ways the fact that the Japanese Government cannot afford to take the risk — because of probable premature disclosure or leakage of information of presenting the full sweep of the commitments which it would be prepared to undertake in the course of the proposed formal negotiations. I have in mind among other references the third paragraph of my 1493, September 21, 3 p.m., and the implications of paragraph numbered 3 and of the first sentence of paragraph numbered 5 of the Foreign Minister’s oral statement of September 27, as reported in my 1524, September 27, 10 p.m. That such fears are not without justification is shown by the fact that, according to an American correspondent in Tokyo, the German Embassy is actively circulating a report to the effect that a technical commission of Japanese Army and Navy officers and officials of the Foreign Office is being organized and will be sent shortly to Washington to take part in negotiations with the American Government.

GREW

711.94/2320: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, September 30, 1941 — 5 p.m.
[Received September 30 — 10:51 a.m.]
1544.

For the Secretary and Under Secretary only.

I understand from my British colleague that the British Government, although admittedly without knowledge of the precise character and scope of the settlement which is envisaged in the present exploratory conversations between the American and Japanese Governments, would not view with favor any settlement by negotiation with Japan on the ground that there would be given Japan a breathing spell to recuperate and to muster its forces for further acts of aggression at the first favorable opportunity.

As indicated in the last paragraph of my 1529, September 29, noon, I plainly realize that there may be considerations lying entirely outside my competence which might dictate need for returning a negative reply to the proposal of the Japanese Government. Anticipating the probability that the British Government, if ever consulted by our Government, would advance the argument above set forth, I wish to present briefly the following considerations.

Germany, because of its power and resources, is the primary threat to the democracies. If Germany were to defeat Britain, the fact of Japan’s having been given a breathing spell would presumably be a matter of secondary interest and concern to the British people. If on the other hand Germany were defeated, the problem of them preventing a nation, which has been unable to defeat China after more than four years of supreme effort, from engaging in further acts of aggression would be incomparably less difficult and less costly than disposing of that nation during the course of the present war.

There are many reasons for believing that the adverse trend in American-Japanese relations, now temporarily arrested by the current conversations, could not continue indefinitely without terminating in conflict between Japan and the democracies. The full weight of the latter’s cause in the event of such conflict would fall upon the United States, requiring the diversion and expenditure on a large scale of personnel and material now vitally needed by Britain.

If satisfactory adjustment of Pacific problems could be made, the cause of the democracies would be benefited by:

a) Injury to the morale of the peoples of Germany and Italy and of other nations associated with or sympathetic toward those countries;

b) The transference to the Atlantic of the American fleet gradually and in step with the liquidation of Japan’s expansionist program;

c) Availability of Japanese merchant ships and dockyards to moderate increasingly acute shortage of British shipping.

GREW

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 6:48pm

711.94/2314: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan

Washington, September 30, 1941 — 11 p.m.

629.

For the Ambassador and the Counselor only.

The Japanese Embassy on September 27 delivered to the Department a document substantially the same as that reported in your 1512, September 25, 8 p.m.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request on September 29 and delivered a document containing the purport of the remarks which the Foreign Minister made to you on September 27 (substantially the same as reported in your 1524, September 27, 10 p.m.).

I told the Ambassador that I expected to give him within the next two or three days a memorandum dealing with the proposals of the Japanese Government.

HULL

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 6:50pm

U.S. Department of State (October 1, 1941)

711.94/2337: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, October 1, 1941 — 9 p.m.
[Received 9:36 p.m.]
1561.

For the Secretary and Under Secretary only.

My Polish colleague learns from his intimate contacts in the Black Dragon Society that the proposal of the Prime Minister to meet the President on American soil is now generally known in political circles in Tokyo and that the proposal is generally applauded, even in military circles, on the ground that the economic situation in Japan renders a settlement with the United States absolutely essential. It is said that delegations from important political groups have called on Prince Konoe to assure him that the country as a whole will support him in his endeavors to reach an agreement. These circles are under the impression that the Japanese Government has already agreed to meet the position of the United States but they further aver that, if the conference takes place, the Prime Minister will be obliged to accept the American conditions because it would be unthinkable for him to return to Japan having failed in his mission.

The circles mentioned above attach importance to the facts that Prince Konoe purposely absented himself from Tokyo on the anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, that the celebration was reduced to a minimum and that German elements in Japan are now under close surveillance by the police.

The information in paragraph 1 above tends to support the repeated assurances conveyed to me by the Foreign Minister that all difficulties can and will be ironed out at the proposed conference between the responsible heads of the two Governments.

GREW

NormanStewart · October 10, 2020, 6:51pm

711.94/2356

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, October 1, 1941.

The Ambassador of China called at my request. I first referred to the armed conflicts in both the East and the West and inquired what he thought of the situation in the West. Later I showed him a map giving the position of the armies on the Russo-German front. The Ambassador did not undertake to shed any light on the Western situation, but turned to the East. He said that the morale of the Chinese was high, and that the outlook was good. I pointed out the probability of a German move into the Middle East and then I inquired of him what he thought the Japanese would do with respect thereto, apart from their conflict with China. He discounted the idea of any particular movement by Japan except in fighting China.

I said to the Ambassador that I had no particular purpose in asking him to come to see me except to say that there was really nothing new in the exploratory conversations, which have been taking place from time to time between officials of this Government and the Japanese Government, the main talks having taken place between the Japanese Ambassador and myself. I added that the situation was virtually the same as before and that this Government, of course, has had no other purpose, as has been repeatedly stated to the Ambassador and to his Government, than to discuss fully with China any pertinent questions which might arise in the possible event that we should reach the stage of negotiations. I made it clear that the chances of this latter possibility at all times have been one out of 25 or 50 or even 100. I further stated that we expected to continue to aid China until a satisfactory settlement is made. The Ambassador seemed pleased to have been called in for a report by me relative to our exploratory talks with Japan.

The Ambassador had nothing particularly new to tell me except to answer a few questions with respect to the battle of Changsha and the improved relationship between the Chinese Communists and the other Chinese forces. He indicated that Outer Mongolia and Tibet were about one-half Chinese while Inner Mongolia was chiefly, if not wholly, Chinese. He said he did not know much about conditions in Manchuria and that he was not at all sure that Japan contemplated an attack on Siberia at any early date.

CORDELL HULL