NO MORE GASOLINE FOR AUTOS IN JAPAN
Tokyo, Sept. 1 (UP) –
Effective today, nationwide distribution of gasoline for use in buses, taxicabs and private autos is suspended and the only such vehicles that will be able to operate will be those which use a substitute fuel.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 2, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Batavia (Isizawa)
To: Tokyo
September 2, 1941
Purple
#902
Re the first part of Circular #261 [a] from Ambassador HONDA.
Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indochina, it is a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude of aid to China. This is evidenced by the unconvincing control exercised by the authorities here over the anti-Japanese editorials of the Chinese press, the solicitation of funds for the construction of military airplanes for Chungking among Chinese resident here, and their demand for suspension of publication of the Japanese-operated East India Daily News Chinese character edition, as well as the Malayan language magazine Sinarusuratan. However, on the other hand, in order that we may give a sufficiently clear picture of the situation, there is a small group of Chinese resident here whose anti-Japanese tendencies have slightly improved as a result of the activities of the government here. However, no sooner than they got the impression that these Chinese were coming slightly closer to us in feeling, it could be seen that they began to exercise their old tendencies on a still greater scale. Japanese who had good contacts with Chinese here were unmercifully exiled, and these Chinese friends were hauled unceremoniously to the police stations for questioning or possibly taken before the person in charge of Chinese affairs here. It has been anonymously reported that a statement has been made that they are in danger of their lives. Thus they have begun to hinder our schemes with regard to the Chinese with more and more determination.
Therefore, when an excellent opportunity presented itself, I deliberately took the occasion to exchange arguments on the Sino-Japanese incident with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, RO [b], who is chiefly in charge, within the government circles, of the handling of the Chinese question. At that time, the fundamental points of his argument relating to the Chinese question here, I am giving below for your information.
I have lived in China many, many years. In addition, since my return to the Netherlands East Indies ten years ago, I have gradually come into repute in my handling of the Chinese question. I think I am pretty well aware of matters having to do with the Chinese, but the fact that Japan has set up the Nanking regime and is very anxious to overthrow the regime of CHIANG KAI-SHEK is I think, extremely foolhardy and has slight chance of success. I personally cannot condone Japan’s effort to beguile the Chinese masses from CHIANG KAI-SHEK through the establishment of the Nanking Government made up of second-rate or worse individuals. There is no more logical course for Japan to follow in the settlement of the China incident than to reach a compromise with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. This is my firm belief.
Though it is said that there are practically no Chinese living here in the Netherlands East Indies who support the Nanking Government, this is actually no exaggeration. All Chinese here give their support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Furthermore, the Dutch Government recognizes the CHIANG regime, and because she does not recognize the Nanking regime, it can be clearly seen that the Netherlands Government entertains the same convictions.
WANG CHING-WEI, who heads the Nanking Government is sold on the Asia doctrine. He advocates Sino-Japanese peace. His fundamental policy is the expulsion of the white man from East Asia. It is but natural that the Netherlands East Indies Government should oppose this theory. Therefore the consequent reaction here is the decision to follow a course of seeing to it that the Chinese on these islands are not swept off their feet.
At the present time, martial law has been put into effect on these islands, and everything is on a wartime footing. The people are united, and in order that the Netherlands home government might be restored, they are ready to fight. The 1,500,000 Chinese resident here on these islands are an important and integral part of the society of the Netherlands Indies. Their well-being greatly affects the peace, order, and economic livelihood of all living on these islands. Therefore, the Netherlands Indies authorities have definitely decided to follow a policy of unequivocally crushing out political schemes from abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here.
Having said all this, I endeavored to refute him with all the strength that I could command. RO, however, would not be convinced and adamantly stuck to his statements. Not only is the situation like this, but recently the fact that the police strength on these islands has been greatly augmented has made it extremely difficult for us to carry on our schemes toward the Chinese resident here. As a consequence, the situation practically means that we can do nothing directly. Therefore, I would like to have our organs here for the manipulation of public opinion as well as those who work in the development of our schemes remain passive for a little while. For the time being, we are concentrating our efforts in the collection of intelligences having to do with the activities of Chinese here as we as other things.
Therefore, in the meantime, until we have securely brought French Indochina and Thai within our sphere of influence, I think that it would be most propitious for us to strengthen our schemes with regard to the Chinese here. For this purpose I would like to have sent to these islands influential persons in whom the Nanking Government has much confidence, who can command large numbers of followers among the Chinese here, who will have for their main objective the preaching of the doctrine that the Chinese and the Japanese are one, as well as set up organizations to influence Chinese opinion. These men would have absolutely no relations with either this office or with Japanese persons but would meet in large and small group and talk with influential Chinese as well as substantial individuals of that group here.
Please transmit this message to Ambassador HONDA in China an to other competent diplomatic officials to whom this information, in your good judgment, might be usable.
Army 21816 Trans. 9/4/41 (7)
[a] Not available.
[b] ROFINCK.
The Pittsburgh Press (September 2, 1941)
JAPAN PRESSES SHIP PROTESTS
…
New representations made to U.S. and Russia
…
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer
Tokyo, Sept. 2 –
Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoe’s government today made new representations against American war shipments to Russia and promised to consider demands for stronger measures against interference with Japanese expansion in Greater Asia, including the creation of a “safety zone” around Japan’s territorial waters.
The proposal for stronger action in the spirit of Japanese ties with the Axis was advanced by the East Asia League, which called upon the government to exercise the rights of self-defense in Japanese territorial waters.
This was described by the Dōmei News Agency as a plan for a “safety zone” (presumably similar to the American Hemisphere safety zone patrolled by the United States fleet), but it was pointed out that no definite limits for such a zone were suggested.
The American safety zone was agreed upon by a Pan-American Conference and designated the limit of Atlantic waters from which belligerents would be excluded if possible. There have been frequent belligerent actions within the zone, although these have decreased with intensification of the American patrol system. Whether the Japanese proposal called for similar patrols was not indicated but any such safety zone drawn by Japan in the Pacific would presumably cover the approaches to Vladivostok.
It was recalled that when the German-Russian war began, there were proposals in Japanese military and naval sources for extension of Japanese territorial waters. These proposals for precautionary measures would have extended territorial waters to the sea lanes leading to Vladivostok, as Japan has emphasized that control of the Sea of Japan is an essential defense measure.
The new Japanese representations to the United States and Russia, particularly against oil shipments now en route to Vladivostok, were made after receipt of “unsatisfactory” preliminary replies to earlier protests by Tokyo, a spokesman said.
The demands for “stronger measures” to defeat anti-Japanese “maneuvers” by America, to defeat all forms of aid to the Chungking government and to carry on the Japanese program of expansion southward in line with Japan’s “loyalty to the spirit of leadership” of the Axis were made by the East Asia League of 59 nationalist groups.
Konoe replied that he would consider the demands in carrying out government policy and presumably in connection with the representations to Washington and Moscow.
Japan, said the spokesman Ichii Kishi of the Government Information Board, does not consider the American and Russian replies to the first representations as “final replies,” hence Japan’s further pressing of the matter.
Concerned over route
Kishi said:
The Washington intermediary expression of opinion was slightly different from Russia’s.
…but he did not elaborate.
Japan, he added, is concerned over the route the supplies will follow and the use to which they might be put.
Shipments to Siberia from the United States undoubtedly would be destined for Vladivostok and the route to this Siberian port lies through the Japanese archipelago. The Tokyo radio said Thursday that three American ships carrying aviation gasoline are already en route to Vladivostok.
Regarding current Japanese-American relations, the spokesman said that:
At this stage, the less said the better.
He pointed out the President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull have remarked similarly concerning speculation of the trend of relations between the two countries.
Kishi said no reply had been received as yet from President Roosevelt to a message sent him by Premier Prince Konoe, but that it was expected.
The contents of Konoe’s message, receipt of which was announced by President Roosevelt Thursday, have not been made public, but it was said to have outlined Japan’s attitude toward the Pacific situation while analyzing the causes of tension.
Kishi said that a speech made last night by Colonel Hayao Mabuchi, War Office spokesman, and other strong anti-American, anti-British statements:
…have nothing to do with Washington negotiations.
Colonel Mabuchi was quoted as saying at an air defense meeting last night that the Japanese Empire now faces a crisis on which it must “rise or fall.” He said that a nation of 100 million persons – obviously Japan – must be:
…ready to rise up in arms in the event it is necessary to break through the ABCD [American, British, Chinese and Dutch] encirclement.
There was no official comment here on President Roosevelt’s Labor Day address but unofficial quarters considered it significant that the President did not mention Japan or discuss the Far Eastern question.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 3, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
3 September 1941
(Purple-CA)
#524
Since the existence of the Premier’s message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner.
In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher’s story in the Herald-Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well imagine.
The government is not afraid of the above mentioned confusion; nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this case.
Because of the circumstances being what they are, we would like to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible (If the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our approval).
Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of this plan.
21792
JD-1: 4923 (D) Navy Trans. 9-5-41 (S-TT)
The Pittsburgh Press (September 4, 1941)
FIRST U.S. OIL SHIP REACHES VLADIVOSTOK
…
Tanker full of plane fuel gets safe passage around Japan
…
Washington, Sept. 4 (UP) –
The State Department was advised today that the first American tanker carrying gasoline to Russia has arrived safely in the Soviet Pacific port of Vladivostok.
This first tanker to reach its Russian destination was the L. P. St. Clair of the Union Oil Co. It sailed on Aug. 15 from Los Angeles and carried 95,000 barrels of aviation gasoline.
To make the trip, it had to pass through the narrow straits between the northern Japanese islands. Japan has indicated reluctance to acquiesce in passage of ships carrying supplies to an enemy of its Axis partner, but there was no indication that any effort had been made to interfere with the ship.
The tanker was the first of a group of American ships assigned to carry gasoline to Russia. It made the 5,000-mile trip in 16 days.
Although Japan had opposed the shipment of war materials to Russia through Japanese waters, officials here had doubted that Japan would do anything to hinder the passage of the American ships which travelled under the American flag. This government had indicated that it expected free passage through Pacific waters for its ships, and the Soviet Union had told Japan that any interference with Soviet-American trade would be regarded as an unfriendly act.
Officials here have agreed that an incident involving any of the tankers would precipitate a serious situation between the United States and Japan.
Some officials here expressed belief that Japan would be careful to avoid any incident concerning the tankers at this time when negotiations are in progress regarding Japanese desires for a general settlement of Japanese-American problems. Any interference with the tankers, it was said, would be a quick way to break off these talks which officials here have described as being in an exploratory stage.
Shortly after the State Department’s announcement of the safe arrival of the first tanker, Dr.
Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador, visited Secretary of State Cordell Hull for what was described as “an exchange of information.” No announcement was made concerning the topics discussed, but it was assumed that Dr. Hu was keeping in close touch with all phases of the Far Eastern situation.
JAPANESE WARNED TO WATCH U.S.
Tokyo, Sept. 4 (UP) –
Japan must watch every move by the United States and must not be lulled into any false optimism because President Roosevelt didn’t mention Japan in his Labor Day speech, the newspaper Miyako said today.
It said Japanese and American policies were fundamentally incompatible and there was no hope for a solution unless the United States changed its attitude.
The newspaper Yomiuri said Japan was trying both to keep peace with the United States and settle the “China incident completely,” but that it would tolerate no third power interference in working out the “settlement.”
Premier Fumimaro Konoe, breaking a silence on national affairs for the first time in five weeks, told a round table conference of representatives of the government and the war industries yesterday that Japan faced the gravest crisis in its history and that the only way to surmount it was to totally mobilize the nation’s economic power.
Foreign Minister Teijirō Toyoda visited the Emperor today and Dōmei, the official news agency, said he reported on “matters under his jurisdiction.”
U.S. AID INCREASES TO EAST INDIES
New York, Sept. 4 (UP) –
The official Dutch East Indies news agency Aneta reported from Batavia today that shipments of United States war materials to the Dutch East Indies had increased five-fold during the past six months and said that shipments would probably be doubled during the next half-year.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 4, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
September 4, 1941
Purple (CA)
#528 (Part 1 of 2.)
Re your #556 [a].
Army 21790 Trans. 9/4/41 (S)
[a] Not available.
[b] See S.I.S. #21786, #21787 and 21788.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
September 4, 1941
Purple (CA)
#528 (Part 2 of 2.)
And so at 4:30 p.m. on the 4th I asked Ambassador GREW to come to see me and, upon his arrival, I communicated to him what is in the separate telegram. Bearing this in mind, will you also communicate the same to the Secretary of State.
(1) We expect each of the matters upon which Japan has made her pledge, especially Japan’s stand with regard to the Three-Power Alliance, will win the approval of the United States Government
(2) As to the withdrawal of the orders for freezing of assets by both countries, you should avoid giving the impression that this freezing measure taken by the United States had proven to be damaging to Japan.
a) Explain the fact that if the ---- of this measure is technical and complicated and, furthermore, a halfway step, it will not be understood by the people at large.
b) Explain the fact that this step which the United States has taken has given the impression to the Japanese people that it was meant to be a punishment for Japan’s occupation of French Indochina.
c) Consider its spectacular aspect as secondary and emphatically propose that in view of the importance of the pledges made at this time by Japan, the United States must reciprocate Japan’s decision even by overcoming a possible strong opposition within the American Government. By the word “immediately” with reference to the time when these orders are to be withdrawn, the time when an agreement regarding the matter included in the aforementioned (1) has been reached by the leading conferees, is meant.
(3) By ceasing to take military measures we mean, for example, to cease dispatching more submarines and airplanes to the Philippines and cease acquiring military bases in the southwestern Pacific area, in China and in Far Eastern Russia.
Army 21791 Trans. 9/4/41 (S)
The Pittsburgh Press (September 6, 1941)
JAP NEWS ORGAN BOLDLY PREDICTS HITLER’S DEFEAT
…
Finish of horrible carnage should be within grasp of the Allies’ by end of war;'s third year, publication says in unusual statement
…
Tokyo, Sept. 6 (UP) –
A sensational article predicting the defeat of Germany was published today by Japan Newsweek, which often reflects the views of high government quarters.
Several hours after the publication appeared on the newsstands, police had made no attempt to suppress it.
The publication said that the situation ushering in the third year of the European war was such that:
Although it does not indicate that the Nazis and their ill-founded plans have been defeated, it does not mean that by the end of the third year, the finish of the horrible carnage should be within the grasp of the Allies.
‘Hitler is fallible’
However well Adolf Hitler may have thought he planned a march to world domination, Newsweek said:
It is now quite apparent that even he is fallible.
It said the second year of the war proved that Hitler erred in believing the German Air Force could blast Britain into submission.
It said:
The enb of the second year finds an expanded Royal Air Force attacking at will vital spots in Germany and occupied France.
The subsequent failure to drive British shipping from the Atlantic must have been more bitter yet… Perhaps no less disheartening to the Chancellor [Hitler] is the slow progress being made in an attempt to subjugate the mighty Red Army of the Soviet Union…
While the Chancellor may well view with alarm the military situation he now faces, it is perhaps less immediately disturbing to him than the growing evidences of complete rejection by the conquered countries of the Nazi scheme for a new world order.
Urged U.S. agreement
The previous issue of Newsweek, on Aug. 30, had urged that American and Japanese statesmen get together in a spirit of “compromise and conciliation” and try to “bridge the bottomless chasm” between the two countries.
Newsweek had urged that Japan make the first overture and that she abandon the idea that the United States has no legitimate concern in Far Eastern affairs, because such an attitude:
…is incompatible with Japan’s avowed claim that she recognizes the legitimate rights of all nations in her co-prosperity sphere.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 6, 1941)
From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Singapore and Batavia
September 6, 1941
Purple
Cir. #1947 (Strictly Secret)
After you have made an immediate investigation on the following matters, please make a report, sending it to us in an appropriate manner.
Please inform me as to the various types of fishing entered into by Japanese from the point of view of their use in fishing of gasoline-powered vessels (“gasoline-powered vessels” is a military term for vessels known as “sea arks” which have a considerable cruising ability).
In regard to these fishing concerns who operates these so-called “sea arks”:
a) List the number of vessels for each concern separately.
b) Give the tonnage of each vessel.
c) The speed of each vessel.
d) Whether or not they have wireless equipment.
e) Give the present position of each ship.
f) Should we require the use of these fishing vessels, please advise us as to the method by which we could transmit instructions for each vessel. (This is particularly important.)
g) The time of day we should wire these orders. (This is particularly important.)
h) Please ascertain the length of time-required subsequent to receipt of orders to move from their present position to the southern part of French Indochina.
ARMY 22009 Trans. 9/10/41 (6)
U.S. Department of State (September 8, 1941)
861.24/613: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, September 8, 1941 — 1 a.m.
[Received 2:10 a.m.]
1419.At the instance of the Foreign Minister, the Chief of the American Bureau called this morning and said that he wished me to take note of the fact that the Soviet Government had planted many mines, presumably in its territorial waters, and that some of these mines had become loose and were now floating in the open Sea of Japan. He was under the impression that at least one Japanese fishing vessel had been damaged by the explosion of one of these mines. No reference was made to American vessels proceeding to Vladivostok but the implication was obvious.
GREW
711.94/2280Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the British Chargé
Washington, September 8, 1941.Minister Campbell called at his request. He inquired about the Japanese situation. I told him that all of the recent publicity about an agreement this week or at any particular time in the future was propaganda. I said that, speaking in great confidence, the Government officials in Japan were putting out reports to such an effect, presumably on the theory that it may enlist support of public opinion and check the efforts of the extreme elements in Japan to carry public opinion in the opposite direction. The Minister thought the greatest difficulty about the Chinese-Japanese matter would be Manchuria, so far as a settlement might be concerned. I indicated to him that the Japanese Government might be disposed to settle with China in other ways provided that the Japanese acted in good faith and could so satisfy the Chinese. I made it clear to the Minister that negotiations were still in an exploratory stage and that a number of basic matters would have to be discussed and settled before we would be in a position to take up the matter in earnest with the Chinese, the British and other interested countries; that I doubted if that situation ever would develop and that, in my opinion, delaying the possible expansion movements of Japan, which I have had in mind since last spring, was still a matter of primary consideration.
CORDELL HULL
711.94/2268: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, September 8, 1941 — 8 p.m.
[Received September 8 — 3:30 p.m.]
1427.For the Secretary and the Under Secretary only.
I have given careful thought to the proposed plan for the army transport Pierce to call at Yokohama on or about September 22 to embark American citizens, and I strongly recommend that consideration of the project be deferred until decision is taken by our Government with regard to the Japanese proposal for a conference between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister. If a negative reply is returned to the latter proposal, which I most earnestly hope will not be the case, I shall expect to submit immediately certain recommendations with regard to the evacuation of American citizens. But so long as decision is pending on this most important proposal, it would seem highly desirable to defer the sending to Japan of a public vessel on an emergency call, which would be attended by the utmost publicity and by undesirable speculation and excitement, all of which would inevitably be taken by the Japanese Government as indication of intention on the part of our Government to reject the proposal. If the meeting is arranged, I do not think that an evacuation ship should come at this time.
The outlook with regard to steamship accommodations to Shanghai for American citizens, which is discussed in our immediately following telegram, has improved considerably.
GREW
894.20211/9–841The Acting Attorney General to the Chairman of the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities
Washington, September 8, 1941.My Dear Mr. Congressman:
In your letter of August 27, 1941, addressed to the Attorney General, you stated that if the Attorney General had no objection, you would suggest to your Committee the advisability of conducting public hearings to receive evidence regarding Japanese activities in the United States.
The Attorney General has discussed the situation with the President and the Secretary of State, both of whom feel quite strongly that hearings such as you contemplate would be inadvisable. The Attorney General is of the same opinion, and accordingly is unable to approve the course which you have in mind.
Sincerely yours,
MATTHEW F. McGUIRE
The Pittsburgh Press (September 8, 1941)
JAPAN FEARLESS, EDITOR STATES
Tokyo, Sept. 8 (UP) –
Japanese newspapers, continuing their attacks on the United States, charged today that President Roosevelt is trying to lead his country into war and one writer said that under usual conditions, Japan:
…should have already lost patience with America.
The newspaper Nichi Nichi referring to the destroyer Greer incident said the President’s administration was:
…using all available means to lead the American nation into the war.
…and that:
…a second and a third Greer incident would greatly increase the danger of Germany and the United States entering into warfare.
The editor of the Diplomatic Review, a publication close to the Foreign Office, wrote in today’s conservative newspaper Chugai Shogyō that Japan:
…under ordinary circumstances, should have already lost patience with America.
The editor, Pyokujō Hanzawa, said that:
Japan, with her present fighting power, has really nothing to fear of America. In a military light, this may now be rather a capital opportunity for this country to liquidate its relations with that country.
But it must be noted that Japanese-American relations are not the only phase of the present situation. How Japan will move has a serious bearing on the rise and fall of mankind as a whole.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 8, 1941)
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
September 8, 1941
(Purple)
#590
On the 7th, the Houston and two destroyers entered port.
ARMY 22061 Trans. 9/11/41 (6)
U.S. Department of State (September 9, 1941)
711.94/2262: TelegramThe Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan
Washington, September 9, 1941 — 11 a.m.
573.For the Ambassador and the Counselor only.
The Japanese Ambassador delivered to me on September 6 the proposals communicated in your 1384, September 4, 9 p.m. and we are studying these proposals.
The assurances of the Japanese Prime Minister that the Japanese Government fully subscribes to the four points which I enumerated as a basis for a reconstruction of Japanese-American relations are very gratifying as are also the manifestations of his earnest desire to achieve success in his present efforts.
With reference to the observations contained in numbered paragraph 4 of your 1413, our doubts do not relate to the question whether the Konoe Cabinet can carry out the terms of an agreement based upon the proposals which it has made to us but to the question whether the Konoe Cabinet can agree to and carry out the terms of an agreement consistent with the principles and procedures which we have suggested: terms which would be fair and just to China, duly considerate of the rights and interests of all powers concerned in the Far East, and substantially contributory toward creation and maintenance of peace with stability, order, and justice. The present hostilities between China and Japan constitute a fundamental factor in the problem of a general Pacific settlement, and consequently, the reaching of an equitable adjustment by China and Japan of their difficulties is essential to any general settlement of Pacific problems which could be expected to ensure future peace and stability in that area. The original Japanese proposal called for the exercise of good offices by the President, and we told the Japanese that we could not approach the Chinese Government with a suggestion that it enter into negotiations with Japan unless we were informed of the basic terms which Japan proposed to offer and unless we were satisfied that these terms were in harmony with the principles to which this Government was committed. We reached an impasse in our discussion of these terms because of the insistence of the Japanese upon stationing troops for an indefinite period in Inner Mongolia and North China and because we were unable to obtain explicit commitments in regard to the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to Japan’s proposed program of economic cooperation with China. We have contended throughout for an agreement the objective and the provisions of which shall relate to comprehensive peace in the Pacific and Eastern Asia.
The latest Japanese proposals apparently seek to bridge the impasse not by meeting us on these points but by undertaking that Japan shall deal with China directly on the assumption that, as our good offices are not to be invoked, we would not be concerned with the nature of the peace terms which Japan proposes to offer to China or with developments in the conflict between those two countries. Such an assumption overlooks or disregards our intention, which we have repeatedly made clear to the Japanese Ambassador, before we undertake to enter into any definitive negotiations with Japan relating to a settlement covering the Pacific area, to consult with the Governments of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, et cetera. This is because we regard the peace of the Pacific not as a matter to be disposed of by Japan and the United States but as a matter in which the other interested powers have a rightful concern and inevitable responsibilities. Nor would this Government enter into any agreement restricting the measure of assistance that this Government is now according or in future may wish to accord countries which are resisting aggression. It may be assumed that the Chinese Government no less than the Japanese Government is desirous of reaching a peaceful settlement of its difficulties with Japan and that consequently if the Japanese Government is prepared to offer the Chinese Government fair and just terms the two countries would be able to resolve their difficulties. In such a case, there would appear to be no need for a provision such as that contained in item A of the proposed commitments on the part of the United States.
In view of the foregoing considerations, it is obvious that a solution of the difficulties above-mentioned must await some further initiative on the part of the Japanese Government. You may in your discretion discuss the foregoing points with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. It occurs to us also that it might be helpful if you could obtain answers to certain preliminary questions which suggest themselves. Those answers might serve to throw further light upon the intent of the Japanese Government. Among these questions are:
In Item “A”, Japanese provisional commitments, Japan indicates its readiness to concur in the points already tentatively agreed upon in preliminary informal conversation with Washington. Does this mean points on which the formulae appearing in our draft of June 21 are identical to those in the draft which the Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State on September 4 or in some previous draft?
Is it to be understood that the peace terms to be offered to China by Japan will conform to the several points in the annex to Section III of the Japanese draft of September 4 above referred to?
If the answer to question 1 above is in the affirmative, it would appear that the provisions of a number of the stipulations in the Japanese proposals contained in your 1384 are more restrictive than are the commitments called for in the formulae previously tentatively agreed upon. For example, in Item “F” Japan commits itself to observe the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce in the region of the southwest Pacific. Does this mean that Japan does not bind itself similarly in respect to its economic activities elsewhere, especially China? In relation to this general question it is believed that further clarification is desirable of what is meant by the provisions of Item “E” in regard to the economic activities of the United States in China. That is to say, what is meant by an “equitable basis” and whether it is implied or rightly to be inferred that Japan is to be the judge of what constitutes an equitable basis?
In taking up these questions with the Minister for Foreign Affairs you should indicate that other questions may arise in our minds in the course of our further study.
With regard to the formula contained in Item C having to do with the attitude of the United States and of Japan to the war in Europe, although we feel that the formula does not satisfactorily meet the situation — it seems to leave Japan free to interpret any commitment “independently” — we should like to give the matter further study before offering any suggestions.
While the Department perceives no objections to your carrying on conversations paralleling those here with a view to obtaining further elucidation of the intent of the Japanese Government, it is felt that, as the subject is a matter in which the President has a close and active interest, any definitive discussions concerned with the reaching of an agreement on principle should continue to be conducted here.
HULL
711.04/2262: TelegramThe Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan
Washington, September 9, 1941 — 8 p.m.
579.For the Ambassador and Counselor only.
We have not yet taken up with the Japanese Ambassador the points outlined in the Department’s telegram under reference except of course as we have repeatedly covered the subject matter of the third and fourth paragraphs in the course of conversations prior to the receipt by us of the Japanese Government’s recent proposals. The Ambassador has made an appointment to see me on the morning of September 10 at which time I shall expect, if opportune, to discuss the subject with him along the lines indicated in the telegram above referred to.
HULL
The Pittsburgh Press (September 9, 1941)
JAP COUNCIL RECEIVES REPORT ON U.S. TALKS
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer
Tokyo, Sept. 9 –
Foreign Minister Teijirō Toyoda reported tonight to the Cabinet and Privy Council on “recent diplomatic developments” after 12 conferences in the last week with United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew.
An official statement in London said Britain and the United States had reached important conclusions on means of preventing a spread of the war to the Pacific and further Far Eastern encroachments by Japan, which the British and Americans regard as endangering their interests.
Developments were building up to an important statement by Premier Fumimaro Konoe, expected tomorrow after the Emperor receives a member of the Privy Council.
The Foreign Office announced meanwhile that Britain and Japan had reached agreement on plans for evacuating their nationals.
A British ship is scheduled to arrive here Sept. 24 to evacuate non-essential Britons and four Japanese vessels will evacuate 1,600 Japanese nationals from the British Isles, Malaya, India, the Near East and Africa, the Foreign Office said.
The Pittsburgh Press (September 10, 1941)
HULL DOUBTS THAT U.S.-JAP ACCORD NEARS
…
Replies to report of agreement expected in Tokyo
…
Washington, Sept. 10 (UP) –
Secretary of State Cordell Hull said today that he had no advices which might indicate that an announcement might come soon regarding the status of Japanese-American diplomatic conversations.
He made the statement in response to questions regarding newspaper reports that an important announcement could be expected soon concerning Japanese-American relations. It was indicated by Mr. Hull that there was nothing new in the field of Japanese-American relations which could be discussed at this time.
TOKYO HOPEFUL OF SETTLEMENT
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer
Tokyo, Sept. 10 –
Hope surged suddenly in Japanese official and business quarters today that an important Japanese-American agreement was near. The nation awaited a statement by Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoe on foreign policy.
The Emperor’s Prive Council met for two hours to hear confidential reports on the general war situation, especially on the Russo-German campaign by Gen. Hideki Tōjō, War Minister, and Gen. Heitarō Okamoto of the Army General Staff.
It was reported that this meeting and the reports given at it were closely related to the negotiations which, it is now known, are being conducted between Japan and the United States on Pacific problems.
There have been indications that Japanese leaders are inclining toward the view that Germany is going to lose the war, and diplomatic quarters at Shanghai reported today that, in any agreement between the United States and Japan, gradual Japanese withdrawal from its alliance with Germany would be contemplated.
The Pittsburgh Press (September 11, 1941)
JAPAN STRIVES TO AVOID WAR
…
Emperor takes command of army headquarters
…
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer
Tokyo, Sept. 11 –
Emperor Hirohito today took direct command of Japanese Army headquarters and moved to assure closer Army collaboration with Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoe’s government, which appeared to be trying to keep Japan out of war even if that meant drifting away from her Axis ties.
Major developments in Japan’s efforts to cope with what Konoe has described as the most serious crisis in her history were:
The War Office established a new defense general headquarters under command of Gen. Otozō Yamada. Yamada is personally responsible to the throne and becomes virtual generalissimo of the Army, superseding previous general staff control.
Konoe appointed Fumio Gō to succeed Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu as chairman of the Central Cooperative Council of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association – which replaced Japan’s former political parties.
The Emperor gave great prestige to the cabinet and implicitly gave his approval to find a solution of Japan’s problem “short of war” by entertaining it at luncheon:
…in appreciation of the outstanding services they [the ministers] have rendered to the state.
The new defense headquarters will be under the direct command of the Emperor, the Dōmei News Agency said. Yamada, as commandant, will be responsible for the defense of Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin.
Yamada was formerly inspector general of military education and a member of the Supreme War Council. It was believed that Yamada’s new appointment would assure the closest possible army collaboration with government policies.
Observers attached importance to creation of the new defense general headquarters because it places the army under the personal command of the Emperor, whose will is law among the Japanese warrior class and whose sanction is required for any new departure in Japanese policy, political, military or economic.
Closely linked with Yamada’s appointment was Konoe’s action in putting Gō into office in place of Suetsugu in a key political post and linked with both moves was the action of the Emperor in entertaining the cabinet at luncheon at the Imperial Palace.
It was believed that in his signal gesture towards the cabinet, the Emperor had placed his approval on policies understood to have been agreed upon in recent deliberations. The luncheon gathering was also regarded as giving notice to the Army that the Emperor backed the cabinet and expected Army collaboration with its policies.
The newspaper Chūgai, which is close to the cabinet, said there was still opportunity to avoid armed collision with the United States. It said that Japan’s object in joining the military alliance of Germany and Italy was to prevent extension of war, but it pointed out that United States pressure on Japan had increased since she tied up with the Axis.
Chūgai said that Japan was simply anxious to avoid outside interference with her program for East Asia and it said that Japan’s main objective was to establish stability in East Asia.
GASOLINE AT PREMIUM IN JAPAN
Tokyo, Sept. 11 (UP) –
All gasoline-propelled vehicles except those needed for specific emergency ise were banned from the streets of Japan today because of a fuel shortage which emphasized the effect of United States and British economic pressure.
The transport situation here was serious. Only one-third the normal number of taxicabs were operating – propelled by gasoline substitutes – and buses, streetcars, subways and elevated railroads were already congested because of strict fuel rationing (buses use substitute fuels).
Japanese Foreign Office (September 11, 1941)
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
11 September 1941
(Purple)
#595
The Houston, which we reported having entered on the 7th, has been alongside the pier loading fuel and stores until today when it left for unknown destination accompanied by two submarines and two destroyers.
22254
JD-1: 5153 (M) Navy Trans. 9-15-41 (5-AR)
The Pittsburgh Press (September 12, 1941)
SHANGHAI SEES SIGNS OF U.S.-JAP ACCORD
Shanghai, Sept. 12 (UP) –
President Roosevelt’s speech was interpreted in diplomatic quarters today as further evidence that an important announcement may be made soon on Japanese-American friendship.
The President’s comment that the United States meant to move its ships in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic was taken as a plain, if indirect, notification to Japan that the United States meant to send supplies to Russia through Vladivostok.
But, at the same time, it was suggested that the entire tone of the speech was one which puts emphasis on the Atlantic, and on German threats to American safety, and thus avoided any reference which might embarrass the Japanese government at a delicate moment when it is fighting radical army units in its attempts to pursue a conservative foreign policy.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 13, 1941)
From: Manila
To: Tokyo
13 September 1941
(Purple)
#601
BUKKU (*Black Hawk*?)
2 destroyers.
BERU
1 submarine
22422
JD-1: 6263 (H) Navy Trans. 9-17-41 (6 AR)
The Pittsburgh Press (September 14, 1941)
JAPAN HOPING FOR PEACE BUT IS SET FOR WAR
…
Tokyo ready for supreme effort if parleys with U.S. fail
…
By H. O. Thompson, United Press staff writer
Washington, Sept. 13 –
Japan is hoping for improved relations with the United States but is prepared for a do-or-die effort toward supremacy in the Orient if negotiations with America fail, informed Far Eastern observers said today.
They believe the current readjustment of Japan’s internal affairs may be intended to ease the tension in the Pacific. But at the same time, it was pointed out that, by placing the army under centralized control, Japan is mobilized more effectively, regardless of the direction in which she turns.
This double-edged development in Japan, it was said, has been preceded by assurances to the United States that Japan desires peace in the Pacific.
Plan may fail
Precautions for eventualities which may take an opposite course, these observers believe, are based on a knowledge, shared by American diplomats, that Japan may be unable to extricate herself from the desperate situation into which her policies of the last decade have led her.
Japan’s premier, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, has indicated a hope that some settlement of Japanese-American problems can be reached. American statesmen here and in Tokyo have been working toward that end and diplomatic conversations of an exploratory nature have been going on in both capitals.
Thus far, it was said, the Japanese offers, while keeping the way open for continued talks, have not coaxed the United States from its clear-cut policy of open-door-and-equal-opportunity in the Far East. And it appears certain that this country will not recede from that policy.
Success not sure
The conclusions therefore appears tenable, they said, that unless the Japanese make further concessions the task will not have a successful outcome.
Diplomatic sources in London reported that the United States has set a one-month deadline which expires next Tuesday for exploratory talks with Japan. It was not known whether the Tuesday headline has been extended in view of recent Tokyo developments.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull said at his press conference today there had been no new developments in relations between the United States and Japan. In response to questions concerning reports that a basis for an agreement between the two countries had been reached, he said that talks between the two nations thus far were only exploratory and based on a theory of ascertaining whether actual negotiations between the two governments would be desirable or feasible.
Prince Konoe has been working ever since he assumed the premiership to bring the army into line with government policies in Tokyo. During the past year, he has brought it under more control than it has ever known.
Independence retained
This week, the Emperor shifted matters to make the army still more closely identified with the government in Tokyo. But it is significant that the three big overseas commands – in Manchukuo facing the Russian border, in China in close proximity to American interests and in Indochina facing toward the south – retained their traditional rights of independent action.
Japan entered the treaty with Germany and Italy because of strong pressure from the extremists and also because Yōsuke Matsuoka, then Foreign Minister and supposedly an expert on American affairs, convinced some of the doubtful that it would insure peace in the Pacific by having an intimidating effect upon the United States.
Matsuoka’s theories backfired and his dismissal from office showed as much as anything else that the responsible leaders in Japan desired friendlier relations with America.
SIGNS OF JAP MODERATION MULTIPLY DURING WEEK
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer
Tokyo, Sept. 13 –
Signs of moderation in Japanese policies multiplied today after a week in which Emperor Hirohito exerted his personal influence to curb army extremists and support Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoe’s cabinet.
Developments included:
Leading Japanese newspapers virtually ignored a great mass meeting at which a pro-Axis orator expressed pessimism over the chances for Japanese-American rapprochement and called on the country to stick to its obligations to the Axis.
Apparently inspired reports hinted that Japan was making an effort to settle the “China incident” by encouraging negotiations between Chungking and the Japanese-sponsored regime at Nanking which would result in a unified, sovereign China friendly to Japan and amenable to Japanese economic exploitation.
French news agency reports, published abroad and asserting that the United States and Japan were about to conclude a non-aggression pact leading to reestablishment of economic relations were described merely as “definitely premature.”
Except for these signs, Japan marked time and there was no official comment on reports of German pressure to bring Japan into the war, if only to keep the United States busy. An expected statement by Konoe on Japanese policies was still withheld and there was no further indication of the status of reported Japanese-American rapprochement negotiations.
Reports that Nanking and Chungking were nearing an agreement to merge their regimes under a scheme which would call for gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, restoration of full Chinese sovereignty and extension of preferential economic concessions in China to Japan were denied in authoritative quarters and at Chungking.
The pro-Axis demonstration was staged in Hibiya Park by Seigō Nakano described as a second-rank politician.
HITLER SEEKS U.S.-JAP WAR BY CREATING AN INCIDENT
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor
Washington, Sept. 13 –
Hitler’s next step, it is thought here, may be to invite an “incident” – have one of his warships fired upon, or sunk, by an American warship – then demand of Japan that she honor her pledge and enter the war against the United States simultaneously with her Axis partners.
Article 3 of the German-Italian-Japanese alliance of September 27, 1940, called on the Axis members:
…to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if one of the contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Japanese-Chinese conflict.
Since President Roosevelt has ordered the United States Navy to sink German or Italian warcraft on sight within certain areas as far east as Iceland, Hitler can stage-manage his “attack” pretty much when and how he likes it.
And this is not without importance. For if the Axis vessel fires first, or even in case of doubt, Nippon would have a perfectly legitimate loophole for getting out – if she were looking for one. Former Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka, who negotiated the three-power pact, claimed for Japan the right to decide for herself which side was the aggressor.
That Germany will not put all available pressure on Japan is certain. Not only is American aid reaching Britain in ever-increasing volume, but aid to Russia is expected to take on sizeable proportions in the very near future.
Three aid routes
Soon – probably next week – the American and British missions headed respectively by W. Averell Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook will reach Moscow. The purpose of their visit will be to see to it that Russia gets whatever it takes to keep her in the war.
This war material will reach Russia mostly from the United States. It will go chiefly by three routes. One route lies across the Atlantic via Central or South Africa and the Middle East. Another is across the North Pacific via Vladivostok and Siberia. The third is across the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean via Singapore, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.
Gas shortage felt
Germany and Italy, of course, must undertake to prevent the flow of supplies across the Atlantic-African routes. And that will be no easy job – especially since the President’s order to sink Axis U-boats and surface raiders on sight. They will not have much time for operations in the Pacific and yet that ocean – now that Russia is in the war – has become almost as vital as the Atlantic.
The European Axis partners, therefore, must, of necessity, bring Japan in on their side if they can possibly manage it.
Italy has been short of gas and oil since the war began. Germany is said to be running so short that farmers are being denied gas for their tractors, supremely important though crops are to the Germans and Italians. The Axis, therefore, must hack its way through to the Russian and Middle Eastern oil fields this winter or face disaster next spring or summer for lack of the vital fluid.
Munitions reaching Russia via Vladivostok and the Indian Ocean might spell the difference between the success or failure of the Axis drive for oil. It would be worth quite a number of German or Italian warcraft, therefore if their sinking by the American Navy brought Japan into the fray.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 15, 1941)
From: Manila
To: Tokyo
15 September 1941
(Purple)
#604
Re my #601*.
According to secret information received it is the St. Louis, with three other vessels (names unknown) said to be starting for Singapore. It was observed that waves of about 24 or 25 knots are painted on the bows. At present explosives are being lowered (red flags being hoisted).
JD-1: 5271 (F) Navy Trans. 9-18-41 (6-AR)
*JD-1: 5263 (SIS #22422).
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
15 September 1941
(Purple)
#819 (In 3 parts, complete).
Re your 561 to 563*.
Points that have occurred to us here:
Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as “two in one.”
The expression “Communistic and other subversive activity” would arouse their caution, and the words “common defense in China” would give rise to questions, while “agreement” would still leave a doubt as to just what it does mean in concrete terms.
The United States has intimated that it wants to be advised of the peace terms between Japan and China and has further indicated that she would refuse to act as intermediary in the peace negotiations unless the terms were fair and just. Under such circumstances, I feel certain that the United States will not agree to promoting the peace conference if we now avoid outlining our terms.
In view of the national characteristics of the United States and of the President’s position, it will be next to impossible to leave the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact up to the “leaders” at the conference, for them to settle from a political viewpoint. In other words, if opinions of both sides do not coincide at the preliminary conferences, there will be no “leaders’ conference.”
The United States has absolutely no objections to making these talks a Japanese-U.S. affair. Moreover, she has never even suggested the addition of a third power to it. The only thing they want to do to is arrange matters with Britain, China, Netherlands, etc. in advance, so that they will not get the impression that the United States is trading them off. However, I shall, of course convey the gist of your instructions to Hull.
I have been doing everything in my power, however insignificant my efforts may seem, to carry out your various instructions and suggestions concerning the proposed negotiations. I fear, however, that if I were to go ahead and make some disposition of the various points you are discussing in Tokyo, I may find myself going off at a tangent. I should like, therefore, to leave these points alone for the time being and watch developments.
22427
JD-1: (FD) Navy Trans. 9-18-41 (1)
*#561-JD-1 5159. (S.I.S. #22247)
#562-JD-I 5160. (S.I.S. #22248)
#563-JD-I 5161. (S.I.S. #22249)
The Pittsburgh Press (September 16, 1941)
Background of news –
JAPAN AND U.S. – NOW AND A YEAR AGO
By editorial research reports
If the realists in charge of Japan’s foreign policy should now announce a policy of cooperation with the United States, it would be because the situation has changed radically from the situation of a year ago, when Japan was on the eve of signing with Germany and Italy a pact obviously aimed at the United States.
The Tripartite Pact was signed in Berlin on Sept. 27, 1940. It pledged the signatories to aid one another “with all political, economic and military means” if any one of them were attacked by a power not at that time engaged in the existing wars in Europe or Asia. Japanese Premier Konoe stated a week later that:
…if the United States refused to understand the real intention of Japan, Germany, and Italy in concluding an alliance… and persists in challenging those powers in the belief that the accord is a hostile action… there would be no other course to Japan than to go to war.
Both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt were quick to pick up the gage thus thrown down. On Oct. 8, Churchill told the House of Commons:
Neither of the branches of the English-speaking race is accustomed to react to threats of violence by submission.
At Dayton, Ohio, on Oct. 12, Roosevelt announced:
No combination of dictator countries, dictator countries of Europe and Asia, will… stop the help that we are giving to almost the last free people now fighting to hold them at bay.
When, a year ago, Japan was getting ready to sign the Tripartite Pact, the British felt themselves so weak in the Far East that they had closed the Burma Road to China for a trial period of three months. They had largely yielded to Japanese demands as to British garrisons in China. France had surrendered; Germany held Norway, Belgium, Holland and Denmark; the British were still reeling from Dunkirk and air-raids over their island; shipping to the British Isles was taking a terrific beating; the Soviet Union was still supposed to be an ally of Hitler.
As for the United States, the mandatory embargo on arms shipment had been repealed, but the Lend-Lease Act was still in the future, and British resources for buying American supplies were beginning to run low. In the hot presidential election campaign, the Republican candidate was charging that the President intended to involve the United States in war, until the President had to pledge that no American Army would be sent to foreign shores. True, the United States had abrogated its general trade treaty with Japan, but the only vital export being denied to Japan was aviation gasoline.
A year afterward, the United States has been getting increasingly tough with Japan. Just before the Tripartite Pact was actually signed, an American loan was made to China and exports of scrap were denied to all countries except Britain. The freezing of Japanese credits in the United States has practically ended trade between the two countries, the Panama Canal is no longer freely available for Japanese shipping, an American military mission has gone to China.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 16, 1941)
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
September 16, 1941
Purple
#605
Re my #604 [a].
They left the harbor early on the 16th loaded with food supplies. On the stern three sea planes (single wing) were observed. Designation is as stated in my previous message. It is also reported that they (arrived here?) by way of Australia but whether this is true or not I don’t know.
ARMY 22693 Trans. 9/25/41 (6)
[a] S.I.S. #22430. I have secret information that the St. Louis and three other ships are leaving for Singapore and that they apparently have ammunition on board.
The Pittsburgh Press (September 17, 1941)
2 BRITISH, U.S. VESSELS HELD BY JAPS AT SHANGHAI
Shanghai, Sept. 17 (UP) –
Japanese customs officials are holding the American steamship Zoella Lykes and an unidentified British steamship of about 4,000 tons, it was learned today.
It was understood that the Zoella Lykes was held on the grounds that its manifest was incorrect, the Japanese alleging that, although its entire cargo was supposed to be destined for Shanghai, some was for shipment to Manila.
The Japanese said the British ship tried to sail for Hong Kong with salvage gear, contrary to customs regulations forbidding shipment of machinery from Shanghai.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 17, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
17 September, 1941
(Purple-CA)
#823 (Parts 1 and 2 of 3) [a]
Although we are aware of your instructions contained in your message #397 of 24 July,* since the negotiations broke down at about that time, we could do nothing about your instructions of 15 July. The breakdown continued, and the talks were resumed only after the recent message was sent.
It is my opinion that the U.S. will be more likely to come to terms at the preliminary negotiations if the general lines contained in the proposal were followed.
Hull (insists?) that the negotiations be held here.
*JD-1: 3986 (S.I.S. #20091)-(You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined on a definite policy because of the fact that I have not as yet been in office very long. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U.S. Should the U.S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the U.S. of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.
[a] For Part 3; see S.I.S. #22477.
22506
JD-1: 5301 Navy trans. 9-19-41 (7)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
17 September, 1941
(Purple-CA)
#823 (Part 3 of 3). [a]
In view of the above facts, I believe that it is doubtful whether the preliminary negotiations can be arranged in accordance with only our proposal of 4 September. In any event, our first task is to find terms which are acceptable to both sides concerned, regarding the three points-particularly regarding the matter of garrisoning troops.
According to information from that usual source, the atmosphere of the Cabinet meeting held here last Friday showed considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U.S. conference. There is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made.
Nishiyama (Financial Attaché) says that a very good friend of his told him that Hull said to him (the friend) that the President “went too far” during the talks with this Ambassador.
[a] Parts 1 & 2 not available.
22477
JD-1: 5301 Navy Trans. 9-19-41 (7)