JAPS SAY U.S. STORES OIL IN AUSTRALIA
Tokyo, Aug. 9 (UP) –
The newspaper Miyako, in a dispatch from San Francisco, said today that the United States was storing large quantities of oil in Australia for use by American warships, as part of the British-U.S. plan to encircle Japan.
Its dispatch said six U.S. tankers had left the U.S. for Australia Aug. 4 and claimed that storage of American oil reserves in Australia could be regarded as “significant.”
The Pittsburgh Press (August 10, 1941)
ENCIRCLEMENT ‘PLOT’ BACKED BY JAP PRESS
Tokyo, Aug. 9 (UP) –
The Japanese press supported charges of Anglo-American-Russian “encirclement” designs today with allegations that the United States was establishing naval fuel depots in Australia and that the British battleship Warspite had appeared off Thailand in order to “intimidate” that country.
A San Francisco dispatch to the newspaper Miyako said that six American oil tankers left Aug. 4 for Australia where the U.S. Navy was allegedly storing an auxiliary fuel supply.
The tankers’ departure, the dispatch said, was:
…significant as part of a widely reported encircling formation against Japan.
The tankers were scheduled to meet steamers laden with war supplies and join them in a convoy, the dispatch added.
While the Japanese government consolidated its occupation of French Indochina, garrisoning points near the Thai border, and continued mobilization of the nation’s military manpower, the press published but did not comment on foreign reports that the United States and British governments were deliberating on a joint warning to Japan not to extend her expansion to Thailand.
The newspaper Chugai reported that four young lieutenants on the Thai Air Force would fly here Aug. 18 to study Japanese aviation technique for three years.
HOW ALLIED BOMBERS CHECK JAPAN
Allied bombers, with ranges of 3,000 miles and up, are a major force blocking Japanese aggression southward, for they can blanket all southeast Asia and would probably meet little opposition from the older, weakening Japanese Air Force.
The map shows areas bombers now at Singapore, Manila, and Chungking could cover, with Vladivostok as a possible base for direct bombing of Tokyo.
AUSTRALIA APPREHENSIVE; CABINET TOLD TO ‘STAND BY’
…
Action indicates deterioration of Far Eastern situation – Japan’s move watched carefully
…
Adelaide, Australia, Aug. 9 (UP) –
Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies today requested the Federal Court to stand by for an emergency meeting Monday.
The request was interpreted as an indication that the government considered the situation in the Pacific was deteriorating.
Mr. Menzies said in a speech yesterday that the war had taken an ominous turn in the last few weeks and that the future course of Australian policy would be determined in the next few weeks.
Despite Japan’s association with the Axis cause, we have made no threat against Japan and nobody can say Japan fears attack or encirclement. However, Japan moved into Indochina by arrangement with Berlin. The next few weeks may well determine the future course of Australian policy.
The Prime Minister assured the country that Australia was:
…immeasurably better equipped to defend herself today than in 1939.
…and added:
This country will and can defend itself.
Brisbane, Australia, Aug. 9 –
The United States cruisers visiting Australia sailed today for an “unknown destination.”
Canberra, Australia, Aug. 9 –
600,000 Australians are already either under arms or ready for immediate mobilization a government report issued today disclosed.
Britain’s Federated Malay States may soon have Japan as a nextdoor neighbor if Thailand grants bases to Tokyo. The next step might be a Japanese invasion of Malay, in a land drive on Singapore.
The Pittsburgh Press (August 11, 1941)
AUSTRALIAN CABINET CALLED, PACIFIC CRISIS FEARED
Melbourne, Australia, Aug. 11 (UP) –
The Australian Cabinet met in a hastily summoned emergency meeting today, apparently inspired by growing tension in South Asia where Japan is believed to be threatening the sovereignty of Thailand.
Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies said before the meeting:
There is no doubt that the Pacific situation is more full of danger than ever before.
He had canceled a tour of South and West Australia at Adelaide and hastened here.
Menzies continued:
It is also true that in two years Australia’s capacity for self-defense and its equipment for self-defense have both improved out of sight. While there is no doubt we are facing some grave days, I do not want the people of Australia to have any unfounded anxiety about our defense position.
Even the highest ranking ministers professed to be unaware of the Menzies’ reasons for suddenly summoning the emergency meeting.
Bangkok, Thailand, Aug. 11 –
The people of Thailand last night were urged to stand up “like Carthaginians” and resist any invaders by every means at their disposal – including poison gas – and lay waste their land before retreating. The warning was given on a popular radio program which sometimes reflects official views. It was symptomatic of the general tension here and fears of an attack.
JAPS SHIFT ECONOMIC LIFE TOWARD WAR-FOOTING
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer
Tokyo, Aug. 11 –
Japan girded for war on the economic front today as newspapers reported the United States “prepared with resolution” to face any emergency arising in the Pacific.
The increasing strain of diplomatic and economic tug-of-war in the Far East was indicated in developments on a front from Siberia to the Dutch East Indies, including:
Approval of four ordinances to the Japanese Mobilization Act designed to shift the nation economically and financially to a full war-footing.
A statement by Kaname Wakasugi, Japanese Minister to Washington who is now in Los Angeles, that the United States was much concerned regarding the future position of Thailand and that Americans “seem prepared with resolution” after arranging to enforce “step-by-step all countermeasures” against any action Japan may take.
A report by the newspaper Hōchi that the United States had proposed that America and Russia take concerted defensive measures if a “third power” attacked the Dutch East Indies.
Reports, which were discounted by an official government spokesman, that Japan has indicated she would refuse to permit American war supplies for Russia to reach Vladivostok on the grounds that such materials might be destined for China.
Dispatches from Japanese-occupied Saigon said that the bulk of the Japanese expeditionary force in French Indochina had been sent to Cambodia Province, bordering Thailand.
The statement of Wakasugi, made by telephone from Los Angeles to the newspaper Nichi Nichi), said that:
…the attitude of the United States concerning Thailand is very delicate.
He described the United States as desirous of maintaining friendship with Japan but:
…they seem prepared with resolution.
He added:
It is clear that the Americans will not take the initiative but their attitude will depend solely upon Japan’s.
The United States is impressed by the idea that Japan is doing in the Far East what Germany is doing.
Americans are engrossed in expansion of national defense and the influence of the anti-war factions is not as great now as previously. The government is prevailing in everything.
It is a great mistake to consider the United States on the basis of conditions prevailing a year ago.
In Washington, Secretary of State Hull told a press conference today that he was uninformed regarding a reported move to better relations with Tokyo if she were to quit the Axis. He said that any such rapprochement would have to stem from creation of a peaceful order in the Orient.
The Canadian Pacific steamship line ordered all its offices in Japan closed yesterday. The National City Bank of New York was reported to be considering curtailment of its organization here and might close its Kobe, Osaka and Tokyo offices.
The newspaper Hōchi reported today that the United States had proposed to the Soviet Union that America and Russia should take concerted defensive measures in event of a “third power” attack on the Dutch East Indies.
Japanese Foreign Office (August 12, 1941)
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
August 12, 1941
Purple
#507
Re: Your #254. [a]
(1) At the time a non-commissioned officer of the American Navy told me confidentially that the ship mentioned in my #414 [a] (8?) [a] was the Warspite and I took this to be reliable information. This British ship, however, had its name painted over. Some spies who viewed the ship when it docked report that it was something like a 7,000-ton vessel. It was further reported that this ship moored at Cavite pier on the --th. Now, considering the shallowness of the water there, I do not see how it could have been the Warspite. (When the Cincinnati approaches that dock, it gradually lets out water ballast.) Judging from its shape, I would say that it was a light cruiser of the Leander class. (According to another report it was an 8,000-ton craft. This seems rather accurate.) (2) Among the members of the crew who came on shore there were some with such names as YORK. GEORGE, etc., on their hatbands and we also have a spy report to the effect that some forty-eight soldiers wounded in the Mediterranean were being accommodated. (3) I know nothing of the movement of this ship after my #451. [b]
Lately no British ships save this has entered port here (that is side from the Taggubwno (?) mentioned in my #494. [a]
ARMY 21094 Trans. 8/16/41 (6)
[a] Not available.
[b] (SIS #20468) British cruiser which was anchored at Cavite for several days departed for - - - - - - on the 27th.
The Pittsburgh Press (August 13, 1941)
PATIENCE NEAR END, JAPANESE WARN WORLD
…
Nations who underestimate Tokyo’s strength are doomed, they say
…
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer
Tokyo, Aug. 13 –
Japan is in “the calm before the storm,” and hostile nations that underestimate Japanese strength are “inviting unfortunate results,” a naval spokesman warned today, as restrictions on exports from Indochina tightened the diplomatic crisis in the Pacific.
The spokesman, Hideo Hiraide, told Japanese newspapers:
Now is not the time to fuss over whether Japan should enter the war.
The present is merely the calm before the storm and the people must be prepared.
Limit to Jap patience
Hiraide said that the Japanese were peace-loving but that there was a limit to their patience and that after that limit was reached there would be an explosion.
The Japanese people, he said, would not be discouraged by pressure.
Previously, the United States and Britain were understood to have expressed grave concern in regard to a possible Japanese move against Thailand, due to the concentration of Japanese troops occupying Indochina on the Thai border.
Hiraide’s statement followed official expressions of concern over plans for shipment of American war supplies to Russia by way of Vladivostok and coincided with a Dōmei news agency dispatch from Hanoi saying that all exports from Indochina had been banned except for exports to Japan. The ban was not explained.
Warning not explained
Hiraide did not explain his warning to nations opposed to Japan other than to say that they should avoid underestimating Japan’s strength.
The Japanese radio asserted that the United States had offered military aid to Thailand, but that it had been “flatly refused.”
The broadcast said that the American minister at Bangkok reportedly had “urged Thailand to give up its pro-Japanese attitude” but that the Thai leaders had replied they would remain neutral.
The Pittsburgh Press (August 14, 1941)
BULLETIN
London, Aug. 14 –
The Board of Trade tonight banned all exports to Japan effective Aug. 15.
INDOCHINA BANS EXPORTS
Saigon, French Indochina, Aug. 14 –
All exports from Indochina except to Japan were halted today under a decree issued by Governor General Jean Decoux. All exports were placed under government control and subject to licensing.
Hideo Hiraide brings up a very good point. Far to often a nation will declare war on another that it believes is much weaker than its self, only to be defeated. Its a good thing Japan is smart enough to never ever underestimate an opponent.
Japanese Foreign Office (August 15, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
15 August 1941
(Purple)
#739 (Separate message)
At the time of my conversation with Ambassador Smetanin the other day, I mentioned our desires in regard to the full realization of our rights and interests in Northern Saghalien and also the removal of danger zones in the waters of the Far East. Since then, we have been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the German-Russian war; to which we have replied that there has been no change in our intentions of continuing friendly relations between Japan and Russia, that thus far we have maintained an attitude of observing the neutrality pact, and that it is still our desire to continue this in the future, but, that whether or not we can continue thus is a question that depends on the way in which the Soviet Union responds to this. For instance if (a) any of the Soviet Union’s territory in East Asia should be ceded, sold, or leased to a third power, or offered as military bases, (b) the Soviet Union should take any steps that would cause the sphere of any third power’s military movements to be extended into East Asia, or should conclude with a third power an alliance that might have the Empire as its object, we certainly could not overlook the threat that this would be to our nation.
To this the Soviet Ambassador replied, that the Soviet government is rigidly observing the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and that as far as the above mentioned two points are concerned he could give assurance that there has been nothing of the kind and that there will be none in the future.
I furthermore took this opportunity to call the attention of the Soviet to the fact that of late it is persistently rumored that the United States will be shipping munitions to the Soviet via Vladivostok, and that if this should be true, Japan would have to take a serious view of it, as it would involve the three power pact relations.
In regard to the Japanese Government’s attitude to the German-Russian war, I reiterated that there has been no change in our foreign policy, which has as its keynote the spirit and the objectives of the three power pact, even as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had communicated to the Soviet Government 2 July, and that this point is well understood by the Soviet.
21175
JD-1: 4637 (F) Navy Trans. 8-19-41 (C-N R)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
15 August 1941
(Purple)
#740
On the 15th I told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo confidentially, of my recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassador along the lines of my separate message #739. Ambassador Ott expressing a desire to understand the basic problem, said that according to the notice sent to the German Government on 2 July, he understood that the possibility of Japan’s participating in the German-Russian war was not precluded but asked if, now since the Soviet have given assurances regarding the two points which Japan considers vital, to the effect that there has been nothing of the kind and will not be in the future, the Soviets do not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war. To this I replied that, in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-mentioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet which will be undertaken together with the German Government, that this is entirely in harmony with the spirit and objectives of the Tripartite Treaty, and that I hoped that the German Government would fully understand this point. Ambassador Ott thereupon asked if it is proper to understand that this present arrangement is the first step toward future measures that are to be taken against Russia, that this is merely a temporary arrangement, in other words that it partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed. To this I replied in the affirmative.
Please relay to Rome together with the separate message.
JD-1: 4637 S.I.S. #21175. Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality Pact is being strictly observed, Japan warns against third power's acquiring Russian territory in East Asia; extension of third power's military movements to East Asia, and shipment of U.S. munitions to Vladivostok.
21219
JD-1: 4656 (F) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (C-NR)
The Pittsburgh Press (August 15, 1941)
BRITAIN BANS ALL EXPORTS TO JAPS
London, Aug. 15 (UP) –
The government’s new ban on all exports to Japan, except under license, went into effect today, in a new move which informed quarters said was designed to convince Tokyo that Japan must keep out of the war and cease “all aggression” or:
…suffer the maximum consequences of combined British-American pressure.
The drastic decision, carrying farther the “economic war” on Japan started by this country’s action in freezing Japanese assets, was made known in an announcement by the Board of Trade (Ministry of Commerce).
The ban, presumably a result of the historic conference between Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt, includes all territories occupied by the Japanese forces and those over which Japan holds mandates.
The order affects Karafuto (the Japanese half of Sakhalin Island), the ex-German Caroline and Marshall Island groups in the Pacific and any other areas over which Japan received mandates in the post-World War I settlements, Korea, the Kwantung Leased Territory (south Manchuria), Formosa and Manchuria (Manchukuo).
Japanese Foreign Office (August 16, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 1 of 4)
Re your #480[a].
(1) As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today reached a stage in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take place with Japan’s occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you, the United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with regard to participation in the European war, and the President himself is hesitant. However, the people are unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. According to those well versed in political affairs, this is what Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire.
[a] Not available.
Army 21150 Trans. 8/19/41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 2 of 4)
I hardly think the President will go to the extreme, inasmuch as he and the naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific war would be. I understand that the British believe that if they could only have a Japanese-American war started at the back door, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war. The people here believe that though Germany might eventually defeat Soviet Russia, the war has already passed the stage of being a short, decisive one and has entered the stage of being one of attrition; that inasmuch as the submarine war in the Atlantic is turning in favor of Britain and the United States, these countries will be able in time to attain their original objective; and that the situation resembles closely that which existed in 1917. I understand that confidence in ultimate victory is gaining.
Army 21151 Trans. 8/19/41 (7)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 3 of 4)
(2) Since such is the state of affairs in this country, I could not have helped but refer to the State Department the proposal for a conference which you made in your telegram, but as you already know, the Secretary of State gave a negative reply to the proposal.
I, therefore, subsequently tried to interest a member of the cabinet who was intimately associated with the Secretary of State, but he also showed little interest in the subject. Besides, it is customary the Secretary to be present at such conversations. I understand the President at one time had thought of arranging for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, but since Japan’s occupation of French Indochina, he has come to believe that Japan does not want a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations but that she is carrying on an appeasement policy toward the United States. I hear that they are beginning to think that I have been fooled by my country and that his having conferred with me was exceptional thing.
Army 21152 Trans. 8/19/41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 4 of 4)
In the meantime, Japanese newspapers have printed scorching criticism of the statement issued by the American Government. Thus the atmosphere is getting worse. Unless something is do now to eliminate this misunderstanding, I shall not be able to accomplish our object. Furthermore, viewing the problem from the politic standpoint, so long as the head of the country remains unfavorable to the proposal, we cannot expect him to do anything about it. I believe the United States is wishing that we would give, at least, some sort of a pledge regarding those three critical points taken up during the past conversations; namely, the question of self-defense, withdrawal of troops from China, and nondiscrimination in trade. Today, when the Secretary of State has already rejected our proposal, I cannot help but feel keenly the necessity of careful consideration and a great deal of smoothing out if we are to bring about what you have instructed me in your telegram. I am told that the Preside will be returning in a few days, so will you please consider the point I have given above, and if you have any further instructions, wire them at once.
Army 21153 Trans. 8/19/41 (2)
The Pittsburgh Press (August 17, 1941)
Virtual hostages –
100 AMERICANS HELD IN JAPAN
…
U.S. refused permission to remove citizens
…
By John A. Reichmann, United Press staff writer
Washington, Aug. 16 –
New strains were placed tonight on taut Japanese-American relations by the Tokyo government’s action in keeping American citizens in Japan as virtual hostages.
The State Department announced that the Japanese government has refused to permit the American liner President Coolidge to call at a Japanese port and take aboard approximately 100 United States citizens desiring to return to their homeland.
This development overshadowed for the moment the vastly accelerated plans for fuller and faster aid to Britain and Russia. These plans included virtual discard of previous additional Lend-Lease estimates in favor of a broader and bigger program.
Action due next week
Congressional leaders expect President Roosevelt to call for such a program next week after his return from the hostile sea conference with Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
In furtherance of the expanded war aid program, Lord Beaverbrook, the British Minister of Supply, talked for 15 minutes with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, accompanied him.
Shortly after this visit, the State Department issued a formal statement that it has considered diverting to Japan the liner Coolidge which was scheduled to leave Shanghai Thursday so that Americans there who desired to return home could be accommodated. The plans of these Americans to return had been disrupted by cancellation of sailings of Japanese trans-Pacific vessels.
Discussions in Tokyo
To this end, discussions were held between the American Embassy in Tokyo and their Japanese Foreign Office. The State Department said that the result of these talks was that Japan agreed to permit the President Coolidge to come into port and pick up approximately 20 American officers, but not any private citizens.
The State Department said:
Under these circumstances, it has seemed advisable and has been decided that the steamship Coolidge adhere to her regular schedule and proceed directly from Shanghai to San Francisco without calling at a Japanese port.
The Department is continuing to give its close and serious attention to the question of providing transportation for American citizens desiring to return to the United States from Japan, as well as for the Americans elsewhere.
Officials here regarded Japan’s refusal as possibly setting a precedent for refusing to permit the Americans to depart on any other ship. They considered it as making the Americans there virtual hostages.
Japan’s demands as the price of arrangements for the departure of the Americans was not made clear. Observers here believed that they would include repatriation of Japanese citizens from the United States and better treatment of Japanese vessels calling at American ports.
There are many more Japanese nationals in the United States than American nationals in Japan. Therefore, observers believe that a way of reciprocal repatriation could be worked out.
Americans stranded
Tension between the nations reached a high pitch after the United States froze Japanese assets in this country and Japan took similar countermeasures. Japan followed this with cancelling all sailings to American ports. This left Americans stranded and their plight was serious because many had sold their homes, packed their furnishings to American ports. This change in restrictions made it difficult for them to get along.
Simultaneously with the State Department’s announcement, it was revealed that the United States is sending as 16-member medical commission to China to direct health measures for the 250,000 coolies building a railroad from Lashio, British Burma, to Suifu, China. The railroad is being built parallel to the Burma Road and is designed to multiply the war aid to China in her resistance to Japanese aggression. It was understood $1,150,000 in Lend-Lease funds were being used to finance the commission.
Authoritative sources said that all estimates for Lend-Lease fund additions have been scrapped and that British and American officials are drafting a new program, perhaps doubling previous tentative arrangements. Already $7 billion in Lend-Lease aid has been extended. Tentative arrangements were for an additional request of $6 billion.
But since the return of some of the conferees at the Atlantic meeting between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, the figure being talked about is not less than $7 billion and perhaps as much as $12 billion.
Even this vast sum does not include the considerable phase of aid for Russia, which has been promised to be advanced unstintingly in a letter Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill sent to Premier Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union. Russia has large reserves of cash here and has indicated desire to buy war supplies outright.
Japanese Foreign Office (August 18, 1941)
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
J-19
#120
Report on observations:
1. Ships moving through the Panama Canal toward the Atlantic:
August 15th Four U. S. submarines (number------)
" 16th Two " freighters
" 17th One " "
One ----- "
2. Moving toward Pacific:
August 15th One U. S. freighter
One DeGaullist Government destroyer
(Triumphant) (now anchored at
Balboa)
3. August 17th One U. S. destroyer anchored at Balboa
One warship which appeared to be a
cruiser was seen to arrive.
Recently five large-size destroyers have been in port (taking on fuel, rations and other supplies).
ARMY 22813 Trans. 9-29-41 (S)
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
J-19 (Urgent)
#121
The Douglas B-18, the Martin B-17A bombers, totaling 100 planes, as well as a number of heavy Boeing 24’s, which have been stationed at Albrook Field in the past, completely disappeared about two weeks ago. I am attempting to find out where they went.
I have heard that approximately (35 or 45?) two-motored bombing planes are stationed at the newly constructed Agua Dulce Air Field in the province of Cocli.
ARMY 22855 Trans. 9/30/41 (S)
Japanese Foreign Office (August 20, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 20, 1941
Purple CA
#487 (Part 1 of 2)
Re the last part of your #705 [a].
We cannot, of course, predict what the outcome of the Russo-German war will be, but this does not preclude our anticipating the fact that in case Soviet Russia loses and as a result the Stalin Regime disintegrates, Far Eastern Russia will be thrown into political confusion. It is a self-evident fact that Japan is pressed with the necessity of taking precautionary measures for the sake of maintaining peace in the Far East as well as for the sake of Japan’s national defense and security, in view of the actuality that that part of Soviet Russia is adjacent to Japan and Manchukuo. Furthermore, since, due to the Russo-German war, there is a possibility of the influence of a third power being implanted in Far Eastern Soviet Russia, as for instance of Soviet Russia resorting to such unfriendly act as to allow the establishment of —----- and military bases in the Maritime province of Siberia or in Kamchataka, and consequently of the security of both Japan and Manchukuo being threatened, we need to prevent such a thing from happening.
The Japanese Government has decided to increase the Japanese forces in Manchukuo to the minimum number necessary to cope with such a possibility. On the other hand negotiations are being carried on in Tokyo with Soviet officials in order to arrive at a friendly solution of various matters having to do with this area. I understand that the Soviet officials have been instructed by the party leaders to be cautious in their attitude toward the forces stationed in Manchukuo. This is solely for your information.
Army 21234 Trans. 8/19/41 (S)
[a] S.I.S. #21165. NOMURA asks to be informed for his own information what the Japanese government intends to do with regard to her northern policy.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 20, 1941
Purple (CA)
#487 (Part 2 of 2)
If the United States Government asks you questions concerning the increase of Japanese troops in the North, will you explain to them suitably as your own view of the matter what I have pointed out above. Impress upon their minds that the movement of the troops has for its objective purely preventive precautions against unforeseen emergency and that by it we will be able to forestall any possibility of peace in the Far East being disturbed.
Recently when the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo inquired about this matter, I replied that so long as the Russian Government lives up to the treaty Japan also will be faithful to it. The Ambassador was very much pleased to hear this, saying that my statement had clarified the matter. This is solely for your information.
If it becomes definitely known that the United States is shipping iron, airplanes and other materials by way of Japanese coastal waters to assist Soviet Russia, this fact would unnecessarily provoke the feelings of the Japanese people, and it cannot be said that it will not have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting Japanese-American relations — a question which is at the present stage a very delicate one. We would like, therefore, to see the United States refrain from such action. Will you take a good opportunity and tactfully call the attention of the United States authorities to this fact. Today I personally called the attention of the American Ambassador to it.
Army 21235 Trans. 8/20/41 (S)
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
J-19
#123
Please refer to (?) of my message #120 [a]. The Triomphant left Balboa for Tohita on the 17th according to report.
On the 19th two United States freighters and 1 British freighter were observed to transmit the Canal toward the Pacific.
ARMY #23342 Trans. 10/11/41 (2)
See S.I.S. #22813. Panama reports movements of ships through the Panama Canal.
From: Manila
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple
#532
Re your Circular #1793 [a].
I am reporting to you below information which I have been able to get, though it may be somewhat incoherent.
There are many tall buildings in the city, to the upper stories of which admittance is forbidden. It is thought, therefore, that antiaircraft guns have been placed in them. It is fairly certain that guns have been placed on the Great Eastern Hotel (some have actually seen ten disguised machine guns on the top of it,) the (hitchcock?) Avenue Hotel (this is the former Marco Polo Hotel), and on the Insular Life and the Trading Commerce. Besides these, I presume guns have been placed on top of the Capitol, the Municipal Building, the post office, etc. (I believe that the army and the navy both have in their possession a map giving the locations of the tall buildings in the city.).
A person has seen during the evenings in the latter part of July, 36 anti-aircraft guns being transported to Camp Murphy.
ARMY 21461 Trans. 8/26/41 (6)
[a] Not available.
From: Manila
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple
#533 (Report of Primary Importance)
Last March work was begun on the reparation of the airplane base south of Darurakku [a] on the way to San Miguel. For a time, however, the work was stopped. Lately it seems that the undertaking has been resumed.
Eye witnesses say that they are using about 300 employees and are hurrying the work along. I understand that at present the gliding ground is being prepared.
ARMY 21563 Trans. 8/28/41 (6)
[a] Kana spelling.
Japanese Foreign Office (August 22, 1941)
From: Davao (Kihara)
To: Tokyo
August 22, 1941
J-19
#104 (Intelligence of Primary Importance)
Because too much time would be required to fill in the paddy fields as originally planned in the construction of a new air base, it is rumored that these plans have been changed. Construction is to begin on an air base which will be laid down between the sea and the paddy fields where now stands a cocoanut grove. In order that bombing planes can use this air field, four concrete runways are to be constructed. It is understood that some 2,500 recruits from among the local populace will be used in this construction enterprise. Four or five hundred wheelbarrows which will be used in this construction work have already been unloaded onto the pier. When I last visited this area and made an investigation of the land they planned to use, it seemed to me that they would have to use more than three feet of dirt to fill in these paddy fields. A great deal of work will be entailed, I observe, in the cutting down and removal of the cocoanut trees in the grove.
ARMY 24063 Trans. 10/28/41 (6)
From: Davao (Kihara)
To: Tokyo
August 22, 1941
J-19
#107
During the middle of July a number of American destroyers entered the harbor of Jolo. We have intelligence to the effect that they came to this port from Hawaii, but we have no evidence to substantiate it.
During the last ten days of July, 6 American destroyers entered the ports of Jolo, [a] Kabunko [b] and Kanbin. [b] (Please refer to part 3 of my #32. [c]) While in the area of these three ports, they engaged in target practice with live ammunition.
During the middle of August, one large airplane capable of carrying 26 persons landed on the water in the vicinity of Jolo and was tied up there for a number of hours.
It is understood that there are approximately 2,000 drums of airplane gasoline stores within the military establishment at Jolo.
Furthermore, reports on the movements of war vessels in and out of the port of Jolo are prone to be delayed because of the existing conditions. Do you want me to send this sort of delayed information by urgent wire? Please wire.
ARMY 23958 Trans. 10-24-41 (6)
[a] Town on the island of the same name, one of the southernmost islands of the Philippine Island group.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] Not available.
The Pittsburgh Press (August 23, 1941)
QUICK COLLAPSE SEEN FOR JAPAN IN BIG AIR WAR
…
Writer points out weak spots in aviation, production low
…
New York, Aug. 23 –
Lucien Zacharoff, in an article on Japanese air power in the September issue of Aviation magazine, says:
Japan would crumble like a house of cards if engaged in a great air war.
Mr. Zacharoff points out that Japan:
…is isolated from Axis fellow-aggressors, who have their hands full with their own adventures, her air industry is woefully weak and her air force is of low offensive strength and highly questionable as a factor in even defending her own cities.
The air force in Japan is divided between the army and the navy, These two air arms between them, according to informed sources, can muster a maximum first-line strength of less than 5,000 machines, although equally dependable commentators put the figure at no more than 3,000 workable military aircraft of all types, from trainers to frontline fighters. The pilots available to man those planes probably number 5,000.
Accident rate high
The writer says:
It sounds incredible that Japan’s seven army and navy air-training schools are graduating a total of much fewer than 1,000 pilots a year! The quality of their education may be appraised by the fact, admitted by Tokyo censors, that even in peacetime, the Japanese military and commercial fliers have the highest accident rate in the world.
Most of the leading Japanese military aircraft types are obsolete or obsolescent. The article points out that Japan more or less has had her way in the air over China principally because no flying equipment worthy of the name has been available to the Chinese. Japan is notorious for copying other countries’ blueprints of aircraft and aero engines, and this accounts for the obsolescence of her flying machines. The best and latest designs are guarded secrets and anything released for export to Japan, even by Germany, is at least three years old. Hence, Japanese aeronautical engineering lags by at least that much behind the rest of the powers.
Build 250 a month
The peculiar shortcomings of Japanese aviation stem from the inescapable necessity for air power to base itself on heavy industry of enormous capacity, what with immense replacements and reinforcements demanded by modern air service in combat. On this point, Aviation says:
Economic and military experts unanimously inform us that Japan’s current output of military aircraft of all types, including trainers, is about 250 a month, shared about equally by the army and navy.
Japan, over a period of years , has grown accustomed to depend for her industrial supplies on the very nations that are her likeliest adversaries in a possible armed clash – American and England. There was a time when Japan could also look for assistance to Germany in the event of war in the Pacific. But German aircraft could be sent to Japan only by shipment on the Trans-Siberian Railway or flown over Soviet territory; neither of these channels is now open due to the Nazi-Soviet war.
Evidence of Japanese engineering backwardness is the fact that while the leading designers in other parts of the world are introducing in their national air forces 2000 hp engines, the Japanese are still to produce their first 1000 hp motor.
Japanese Foreign Office (August 23, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
23 August 1941
(Purple)
#497
From Financial Attaché Nishiyama (#70).
American inspection of Japanese firms and banks comes closer to being a search for “subversive acts” rather than an inspection connected with the freezing order. There was a marked difference in the Japanese inspection of American banks. Influential persons in the Specie Bank are much concerned and desire an investigation to ascertain just what the real purpose of the American officials is. Furthermore the National City Bank is arranging for the Kobe and Yokohama branches to unite with the Tokyo office and is closing out the Dairen office. According to Curtis’s explanation the above move is dictated by economic policy as was the case in the Osaka amalgamation and that there is no other reason for the move. Two or three young Americans will be left in the Tokyo office and the others will be returned home.
A proposal has been received from the British-Dutch Bank to exchange commodities for commodities in order to liquidate the bank’s accounts and this matter is being pressed by the head of the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank. However officials in the foreign office do not look with favor upon pushing negotiations to the solution of this one problem when there are so many other questions pending between Japan and Britain. Also the immediate conclusion of such an agreement would exert an unfortunate influence upon the leadership of public opinion hence orders have been issued not to ratify such an agreement.
(This item is for your information only).
21644
JD-1: 4860 (H) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
23 August 1941
(Purple)
#543
Ships in port on the 23rd.
A. Manila.
Transports 6.
HON
PISU (Arrived the morning of the 23rd).
B. Cavite.
Destroyers 1. (Arrived from Manila on the 21st).
Transports GORUDOSTNA (entered port about a month ago
and is now under repairs.)
The oiler TORINIRCIC left harbor on the 22nd headed for Tarakan in order to take on oil.
Recently several destroyers and submarines have been stationed in the vicinity of Mariveles. We are investigating the number stationed at present.
Brig. General Cragette arrived here on the 20th apparently on the Dutch ship TIBADAEKY and had a conference with MacArthur on the 21st.
According to newspaper reports the CHANTO (formerly the Hilda Maersk) arrived here the 20th after having been repaired at Olongapo and her sister ship the KABARUNDO (formerly the Gertrude Maersk) is at present being repaired there. Hence the floating drydock must have been there formerly, however we will continue investigations.
On the 16th a ship which appeared to be the MADDO and two destroyers arrived in Cebu and all left that same night.
21518
JD-1: 4810 (H) Navy Trans. 8-27-41 (6-AR)
The Pittsburgh Press (August 25, 1941)
JAPAN CITES ITS ‘PATIENCE’
Tokyo, Aug. 25 (UP) –
Sources close to the Foreign Office today described Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s warning to Japan to abandon her expansionist policy as repetition of previous attempts to undermine Japanese public opinion.
They denied Mr. Churchill’s assertion that Japan threatened British and American interests, and added, regarding efforts between the United States and Tokyo to reach an amicable settlement of Far Eastern questions, that Japan had displayed patience.
JAP FOOD BLOCKADE FEARED IN SHANGHAI
Shanghai, Aug. 25 (UP) –
Foreigners feared today that Japanese construction of barbed wire barricades around the entire International Settlement and the French Concession portended a food blockade here comparable to the 1939 blockade at Tientsin.
Japanese military authorities, however, said the barricades were designed to make possible a closer check in Chinese crossing the settlement boundaries in order to smash an outbreak of terrorism.
One Japanese civilians was killed and another was wounded last week and several pro-Nanking Chinese have been killed.
The Japanese have built about 25 miles of barbed wire barricades around the settlement and have channeled highways into single lanes. Some informed sources believed that, if the Pacific situation becomes worse, the Japanese will cut off Shanghai from essential food supplies.
Japanese Foreign Office (August 26, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple CA (Very Urgent)
#504
Re my #503.
That message contains the maximum concessions that we can make to the proposal of the President of the United States; however, whether or not you can convince the Americans of this is naturally another matter. Now the international situation as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hopes on an interview between the Premier and the President.
Please try to convince ROOSEVELT and HULL to this effect and please bear in mind that I do not consider that the interview need necessarily be bound strictly by what is set forth in my caption message.
Army 21481 Trans. 8/26/41 (S)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple
#505
Notwithstanding representations made by us on successive occasions the United States is treading a course which seems to be bent on exciting public opinion within our country. Beginning the first day of September they are exercising stringent limitations on gasoline shipments essential to our civilian population. At this time they are planning to pass through waters adjacent to our shores with cargoes of petroleum products which should be coming to us. The fact that they are transporting these petroleum products to Vladivostock has dealt a severe blow to the sensibilities of our government and people. At the same time that this brings about grave effects upon Japan and American relations, a terrific blow is being dealt by those in Washington to the whole country far more than you can realize.
This being the case, we are forced to cry out our disapproval of the realization of such measures and the Ministry of Interior as well as the War Ministry are very apprehensive. Therefore, because such measures are not in keeping with the neutrality treaty between Japan and Soviet Russia nor in accord with the interpretation of international law, I would like to have you make representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general viewpoint of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations. Wire me back as soon as you have filed these representations.
In the event the United States assumes the position that it is impossible to cut off shipments of petroleum products to the Soviet, then as it seems advisable to your Excellency make suggestions that they change the transportation route. However, should they not comply with this request, either, I think it would be wise to try to persuade the American authorities that they revive shipments of petroleum products to Japan immediately.
Furthermore, additional representations have been filed with the Soviet too, as of the 26th.
Army 21482. Trans 8/26/41 (S)
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
August 26, 1941
Purple
#554
Four “S” [a] boats on the 24th and “REI” on the 25th entered the harbor.
ARMY 21611 Trans. 8/29/41 (6)
[a] Submarine.
STATEMENT ON SENDING OF A MILITARY MISSION TO CHINA
August 26, 1941
This Government is preparing to send a military mission to China. The mission will be sent for the purpose of assisting in carrying out the purposes of the Lend-Lease Act. It is being organized and it will operate under the direction of the Secretary of War. Its chief will be Brigadier General John Magruder.
The function of the mission will be to study, in collaboration with Chinese and other authorities, the military situation in China, the need of the Chinese Government for materiel and materials; to formulate recommendations regarding types and quantities of items needed; to assist in procurement in this country and in delivery in China of such materiel and materials; to instruct in the use and maintenance of articles thus provided; and to give advice and suggestions of appropriate character toward making Lend-Lease assistance to China as effective as possible in the interest of the United States, of China, and of the world effort in resistance to movements of conquest by force.
The sending of this mission is in keeping with and is on parallel lines to the sending of a similar mission to the Soviet Union. The purposes of the two missions are identical.
General Magruder has had long experience in China where he twice served as Military Attaché. He, therefore, will be working on familiar ground, among people he knows well and to whom he is well known. An adequate staff of thoroughly qualified officers will accompany General Magruder.
Japanese Foreign Office (August 28, 1941)
From: Batavia (Ishizawa)
To: Tokyo
August 28, 1941
Purple
#895
(Secret outside the department.)
Re my #77 [a].
The large transport planes turned out to be two DC 5’s of KUNIRUMU. [b] Now, according to a newspaper report, the KUNIRUMU [b] Company owned planes are:
5 of the DC 5 type
3 of the DC 3 type
3 of the DC 2 type
14 Lockheeds
2 of the Sikorsky S 43 type
2 of the Guranmen [b] G. E. 21 type
1 De Haviland Dragon
2 of the Fokker EHS 7 type
2 of the Fokker LHU 12 type
And it is understood that the Kacfueru [b] EMU has 4 of the DC 3 type.
While the Java class Cruiser was still at anchor in Puriooku [b] harbor, on the morning of the 27th, one destroyer of the Bankerutu [b] class entered port.
ARMY 21721 Trans. 9/3/41 (5)
[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.
Japanese Foreign Office (August 29, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
29 August 1941
(Purple-CA)
#756 (4 part message, complete except for Part 4)
Regarding my #732 (?)*
The following is the gist of my discussion with Hull, last evening, (28th), regarding the proposed conference, etc.
(A) As the result might be quite unfortunate should either one of the conferring heads of the two governments assume an uncompromising attitude on certain points, it is the expressed desire of Hull to hold preliminary conversations for tile purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the meeting of the two heads, and also to make the decisions of the two principals as final. (Hull used the expression “certification”). (Regarding this point please refer to my #703 (?)**)
(B) While it is necessary to bring up to date the various points of past conversations, the United States maintains that the adjustment of Japanese-American relations can be achieved without-considering the question of China, which is vital to her.
(C) Despite Japan’s insistence that she cannot alter her policy towards China, the United States government is unwilling to seek adjustments in Japanese-American relations at the expense of existing American-Chinese relations. Neither is the United States Government willing to give cause to “explosion” in China by its action. Furthermore, the task of placating China by the United States Government for accepting the basis of Chinese-Japanese negotiations will involve the tremendous effort of winning the approval of Britain and the USSR and for this reason it is deemed unfeasible.
(D) Regarding the question of withdrawal of our troops from China and the right of protection, I informed the Secretary that I had nothing to state except what has already been stated on previous occasions. However when I explained that so long as Prince Konoe remains in the saddle, I am confident that he will make every effort to settle these questions satisfactorily, Hull replied that he hoped that the Imperial Government will see fit to take definite steps towards this end.
Please check over my #540*** regarding these questions and let me know the government’s opinion regarding them. Also please obtain details regarding same from Colonel Iwakuro upon his return.
(E) I wish to make the following suggestions in the event that it has been decided to hold the “Leaders’ Conference”.
(1) While it is the desire of the Japanese Government to designate Hawaii as the meeting place, we should consent to accept Juneau, if for reasons of constitutional requirements or personal safety, Hawaii is unsatisfactory to the President.
(2) The conference date should be from September 21st (?) to ----.
(3) Five persons each from the Foreign Office, the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and Consulate, that is a total of 20 persons or less, should be present at the conference.
(Part 4 not yet available).
*#732 available, not translated. Dated 23 August. Corrects the word "insisted" in a previous message to "instituted".
**JD-1: 4642 (S.I.S. #21150 to 53). Amb. Nomura brings up to date the seriousness of Japanese-American relations; reports that since Secy. Hull has already rejected Japan's proposal (for continued negotiations) and the President is returning shortly, Tokyo should consider giving the U. S. some sort of pledge regarding the three critical points: self-defense, withdrawal of troops, and nondiscrimination in trade.
***JD-1: 3842 (S.I.S. #19911). Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that, based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.
21732
JD-1: (A) Navy Trans. 9-3-41 (7)
Japanese Foreign Office (August 30, 1941)
From: Manila
To: Tokyo
August 30, 1941
Purple
#559 (Primary Intelligence)
(1) In Manila, 3 destroyers of the Bell class; 6 submarines (submarines left port on the 27th but have returned). Furthermore, the tanker Trinity came to this port on the 27th and dropped anchor here (please refer to Part 2 of my #543 [a]).
(2) One destroyer (undergoing repairs) Gorudosu.
A large portion of the submarines, according to intelligences which have come to me, are now in the Ringaen [b] area.
500 American soldiers arrived here on the Cleveland the 29th. Furthermore, on the same day the Migsk entered this harbor. (Though details of this ship could not be ascertained, it is understood that she is loaded to capacity with military equipment.
ARMY 21666 Trans. 9/2/41 (6)
[a] S.I.S. #21518 regarding boats in harbor at Manila.
[b] Lingayen on the west coast of the Island of Luzon.
From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Manila
August 30, 1941
J-19
#277
According to intelligences obtained by naval authorities, the Houston was observed on the 20th or there about to pass through the harbor entrance but since that time they have not been able to learn where it went. Please investigate the waters in and around Manila for some trace of this warship and then make your report.
ARMY 24527 Trans. 11/8/41 (6)
The Pittsburgh Press (August 31, 1941)
Must save face –
FAR EAST PEACE HINGES ON JAPS
…
Final effort being made to prevent war
…
By Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Washington, Aug. 30 –
Hesitating before open hostilities with the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and possibly Russia, the Japanese suddenly decided to follow their Washington ambassador’s advice and try to patch up a peace with all of them.
Thursday, that same ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura, brought to President Roosevelt a letter from the Japanese Premier, Prince Fumimaro Konoe.
The letter merely intimated that the Japanese saw no reason why all obstacles to peace between the United States and Japan could not be eliminated. But the fact of its arrival was considered extremely important.
Willing to forego dream
Washington felt, or affected to feel, that the Japanese for the first time in two years had reached the point where they would be willing to forego their dream of dominion over all of Eastern Asia if only someone would lend a hand in saving their precious face. The President announced that he would answer the letter.
This was more or less in the cards. Last Sunday, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill told the world that the United States was negotiating with the Japanese more or less in the name of all the democracies.
Everything, he said, would be done to obtain a peaceful settlement but at the same time Japanese aggression had to stop. If negotiations failed, Britain (weight Holland as a matter of course, and probably Russia) would range itself:
…unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.
Final effort agreed on
From which it seems clear that at the Atlantic conference, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill agreed that one final effort should be made to eliminate the trouble in the Pacific but that if the Japanese proved stubborn, they would have to be fought.
The Japanese took the hint: Their threats of stopping American supplies to the Soviets via Vladivostok were getting them nowhere, their threat to Thailand was met by a British counterattack and American determination. Why not talk awhile and see what they could get without further fighting?
The fact that high people in Washington went out of their way to reassure the Chinese must be taken to mean that none in Washington intends to ask any sacrifices of China.
But Manchukuo?
Or French Indochina – which Vichy France announced it had “voluntarily” permitted the Japanese to occupy?
Why should not Japan keep them, and receive a lot of economic concessions and become rich and fat and prosperous?
Why not, if only the commercial interests were still uppermost in Japan? They are not.
To achieve peace with the democracies Japan publicly would have to leave the Axis, desert Adolf Hitler, get out of China, demobilize and settle down to normal life. Will the Japanese militarists do so much?
Can the entire country be brought to renounce a dream of 25 years at least, for the aim of dominion goes back at least to the Tanaka memorandum and perhaps ever to the demands on China of World War I?
Or is it not more likely that Japan is simply sparring for time? Japan can fulfill its dream only through a German victory, which means a defeat of Russia, Britain and the United States successively.
But the Russians are not yet defeated. Should not Japan keep its neck in for a while longer, instead of allowing itself to be forced into a showdown?
Since the United States is perfectly willing to let matters remain as they are for a while, Japanese-American negotiations looking toward peace are going to continue.
Japanese Foreign Office (September 1, 1941)
From: Manila (Nibro)
To: Tokyo
1 September 1941
(Purple)
#562 (?)
The Marblehead returned to port on the 31st. Two destroyers left port on the 1st.
22349
JD-1: 5198 (H) Navy Trans. 9-16-41 (AR)
From: Tokyo
To: Manila
1 September 1941
(Purple)
#279 (?)
Strictly confidential.
In regard to the points you were to note, from now on in case there is no special change, report once a week, but report each change of the following as they occur:
Arrival and departure of Houston.
Arrival and departure of more than 5 or 6 destroyers or submarines.
Arrival and departure of naval ships other than American; (report in detail the particulars and relationships involved).
22081
JD 1: 5037 (H) Navy Trans. 9-11-41 (6-AR)
The Pittsburgh Press (September 1, 1941)
JAPS DENOUNCE BRITISH ‘SCARE’
By Robert Bellaire, United Press staff writer
Tokyo, Sept. 1 –
The new British move to evacuate nationals from Japan was interpreted in Japanese circles today as an effort to “create another Far Eastern crisis scare” in order to influence current Japanese-American negotiations.
The newspaper Yomiuri said that, irrespective of explanations by the British Embassy:
The fact the notice was issued at this time, when Pacific affairs are presently developing into an extremely delicate situation, must be interpreted as designed to restrain the countries concerned.
This obviously referred to the United States and Japan in connection with Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoe’s message to President Roosevelt.
The Tokyo papers generally continued to support Konoe’s message as opening the way for a frank discussion of strained Japanese-American relations. Newspapers were unanimous, however, in asserting that, if negotiations were to be successful, the United States would have to reconsider Far Eastern policy.
Yomiuri asserted that “Britain and other third powers” are maneuvering to drag Japan and the United States into war for their own advantage. The newspaper warned Japan against “hasty action based on lack of a correct understanding” in connection with future Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations.
In Shanghai, the organ of the Japanese Army said editorially that the Roosevelt-Konoe negotiations were:
…only a gesture by which the United States expected to win concessions from Britain and Russia during the coming (Moscow) conference.
The editorial continued that:
Under no circumstances will Japan accept a worthless return from the five-year China War in which Japanese blood was sacrificed for the sake of the co-prosperity sphere. We are not in favor of such conferences, which are likely to alienate Japan from the Axis.
Japanese newspapers, pessimistic that anything would come of the negotiations with the United States, warned that the Japanese nation must be prepared for any serious developments arising from the conferences.
JAP POLICE TAKE OVER FRENCH CONCESSION
Shanghai, Sept. 1 (UP) –
The Central China Daily News, organ of Wang Jingwei (President of the Japanese-sponsored “national government” of China at Nanking) reported today that Nanking government police yesterday took over police duties at the French concession in Hankou.
The move could be considered as the opening wedge in the Nanking and Japanese campaign to “recover” concessions in China.
This is the first time that the Japanese have gained police control over any third power’s concession in China with exception of the joint municipal council in Nanking and control of the western district in Shanghai.
The newspaper said that the Nanking police took over the concession as a result of a settlement of a Franco-Japanese dispute arising from an incident at Hankou on July 11 in which six Japanese and several French Annamite police engaged in a battle in a hotel washroom. One Japanese was killed and two Annamites were wounded, the newspaper said.
The Annamite police removed from Hankou, it was reported, have gone to Shanghai.
JAP BOMBS ENDANGER U.S. DIPLOMATS
Chungking, China, Sept. 1 (UP) –
Japanese bombers which raided Chungking Saturday night endangered members of the American diplomatic staff, it was learned today.
An incendiary bomb landed 150 yards from a cottage atop a hill on the south bank of the Yangtze River in the so-called “safe zone” where American Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss and members of his staff were working.
None of the Americans was injured. They had made their headquarters in the cottage recently to escape anticipated interruptions in their work due to raids on Chungking proper.
Bombs destroyed the home of Arnold Vaught of Chicago, head of the Friends Mission, and also wrecked the mission’s school classrooms, dining rooms and dormitory. There were no casualties, however.
Approximately 200 Japanese bombers raided Sichuan Province areas again yesterday morning and 27 of them attacked the western suburbs of this city.