Japanese-American relations (7-24-41 – 11-30-41)

321

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1189. (Part 2 of 2)

  1. The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

  2. The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

  3. Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

  4. No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

Army: 25442                                          Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
322

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent)
#1190. (Part 1 of 2) [a]

Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message #1189 [b]) showed a great disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set.

Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there would be “no last words.” If we do not cause any stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set—

Army 25444                                           Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
 
[a] Part 2 not available. 
[b] S.I.S. #25441.
323

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent) 
#1190. (Part 2 of 2)[a]

To be handled in Government Code.

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indochina. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.

Army 25480                                           Trans. 11-29-41 (1)
 
[a] S.I.S. #25444. (Part 1 of 2).
324

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent) 
#1191 Part 1 of 4.

On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him. First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in separate messages #1192 [a], 1193 [b] and 1194 [c], and then engaged in an argument. The gist of it was as follows:

  1. HULL said:

Although we have conferred with the various nations concerned and have studied your proposal of the 20th (B proposal with 6 and 7 left out) for five days, we have decided that we cannot consider it.

  1. I said:

You talk of reconciling the American proposal of June 21st with ours of September 25th, but this is vastly different from either.

HULL retorted:

As for that I want you to read and compare the paragraph I point out with the one immediately preceding it. I said that it was a plan for reconciling both the Japanese and American proposals. Since the opening of conversations, the contents of it have been kept secret and, therefore, in this country where popular opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising; particularly rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving China in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what Japan said at the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various important people are still uttering non-pacific statements. There does not seem to be much I can do in the fact of that.

Army 25481                                           Trans. 11/29/41 (2)
 
[a] See S.I.S. #25485.
[b] See S.I.S. #25489.
[c] See S.I.S. #25491.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent) 
#1191 Part 2 of 4.

To be handled in government code.

  1. Concerning Section 1 of the proposal, I pointed out that of the four principles, the fourth has changed the so-called Stimson Doctrine; but I got no clear reply. I reminded him of their insistances so far concerning the principle of non-discrimination and said that if we applied that immediately to China there would be a sudden darkening of the already cloudy economic situation and that this was improper and impossible.

HULL replied:

I fully understand that and the principle as such does not necessarily have to be put into effect right away.

  1. Concerning 1 of Section 2 of this proposal, I said:

If this plan aims to revive a Nine-Power Treaty set-up, we cannot feature it at all because we have fought a four year war in China without a cent of profit.

To this he countered with no strong rebuttal.

Army 25482                                           Trans. 11/29/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1191 Part 3 of 4
  1. I said that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same section were out of the question and, as for paragraph 4, for a country like the United States, who recognizes the Chungking Government, to say that she cannot desert the Chiang Regime is just like us saying that we certainly cannot desert the Nanking Regime.

In reply HULL said:

The evacuation under 3 would be carried out by negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected immediately. As for the Nanking Government, according to the best reports available to us, it hasn’t much influence over China as a whole any way.

I retorted:

Well, that argument is based on the statement that in the long history of China there have been many rises and falls of governments.

  1. When we came to the question of the Three Power Treaty, I said:

For the United States to hope, on one hand, that she can make us make the last possible concession regarding the Three Power Pact and on the other virtually to say to us concerning the China question “apologize to Chungking” is certainly strange. I do not suppose that that is what the President meant the other day when he spoke of “introducing.”

HULL made no special answer.

Army 25483                                            Trans. 11/2/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1191. (Part 4 of 4)

I said,

Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult plan for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is concerned, it contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so I, who would like to see an understanding established between Japan and the United States, do not know if I should even report it to Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts. We will both read it over again and consider it fully. Then we will reply.

Finally I said,

I wonder if the United States means that there is no other way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the other day said that between friends there are no last words. I wonder if you could arrange for an interview." To the former he replied that in a word this was a plan, and to the latter he said that, although he did not think that much progress was being made, he would manage the matter.

Army 25484                                           Trans. 11-29-41 (2)
325

U.S. State Department (November 27, 1941)

711.94/2507

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Washington, November 27, 1941.

The two Japanese Ambassadors called at their request. The President opened the conversation with some reference to German international psychology. Ambassador Nomura then said that they were disappointed about the failure of any agreement regarding a modus vivendi. The President proceeded to express the grateful appreciation of himself and of this Government to the peace element in Japan which has worked hard in support of the movement to establish a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. He made it clear that we were not overlooking for a moment what that element has done and is ready still to do. The President added that in the United States most people want a peaceful solution of all matters in the Pacific area. He said that he does not give up yet although the situation is serious and that fact should be recognized. He then referred to the conversations since April which have been carried on here with the Japanese Ambassador in an attempt to deal with the difficulties. The President added that some of these difficulties at times have the effect of a cold bath on the United States Government and people, such as the recent occupation of Indochina by the Japanese and recent movements and utterances of the Japanese slanting wholly in the direction of conquest by force and ignoring the whole question of a peaceful settlement and the principles underlying it. The President then made the following points:

  1. We have been very much disappointed that during the course of these very important conversations Japanese leaders have continued to express opposition to the fundamental principles of peace and order which constitute the central spirit of the conversations which we have been carrying on. This attitude on the part of Japanese leaders has naturally created an atmosphere both in this country and abroad which has added greatly to the difficulty of making mutually satisfactory progress in the conversations.

  2. We have been very patient in our dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation. We are prepared to continue to be patient if Japan’s courses of action permit continuance of such an attitude on our part. We still have hope that there may be worked out a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area of the character we have been discussing. The temper of public opinion in this country has become of such a character and the big issues at stake in the world today have become so sharply outlined that this country cannot bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gives this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurs, we can also take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation.

  3. We remain convinced that Japan’s own best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression, and that Japan’s own best interests lie along the courses which we have outlined in the current conversations. If, however, Japan should unfortunately decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate loser.

The President emphasized that the leaders in Japan had obstructed this whole movement involved in the conversations here. He said that having been in war for four years the Japanese people need to have a peace tempo; that war does not help us nor would it help Japan.

Ambassador Kurusu proceeded to say that he had been here for ten days in an endeavor to discuss and develop a peaceful arrangement; that the trouble was not with the fundamentals so much as with their application. Referring to a recent remark of the President about introducing Japan and China, Kurusu asked to know who would request the President to introduce these two governments. The President promptly replied “both sides”. He then gave an illustration of his dealing with some strike conditions when neither side desired to request the Mediation Board to bring up the matter but were anxious, without saying so, for the President to do so. I referred to the 250,000 carpetbaggers that had gone into north China following the army and said that they had seized other peoples’ rights and properties and located there as the carpetbaggers had done in the south after the Civil War and added that they had no rights over there and ought to give up the property they took from other people and get out.

The President, referring to the efforts of Japan to colonize countries that they conquer, said that Germany would completely fail because she did not have enough top people to govern the fifteen or more conquered countries in Europe and that this would cause Germany to fail in her present movements; that second class people cannot run fifteen captured countries.

The President further referred to the matter of encirclement that Japan has been alleging. He pointed out that the Philippines were being encircled by Japan so far as that is concerned.

I made it clear that unless the opposition to the peace element in control of the Government should make up its mind definitely to act and talk and move in a peaceful direction, no conversations could or would get anywhere as has been so clearly demonstrated; that everyone knows that the Japanese slogans of co-prosperity, new order in East Asia and a controlling influence in certain areas, are all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the policy of force and conquest by Japan and the domination by military agencies of the political, economic, social and moral affairs of each of the populations conquered; and that so long as they move in that direction and continue to increase their cultural relations, military and otherwise with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, et cetera, et cetera, there could not be any real progress made on a peaceful course.

CORDELL HULL

326

711.94/2560

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State

Washington, November 27, 1941.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning urgently at his request.

The Ambassador said that Secretary Hull had called him on the telephone last night to inform him of the nature of the document which he had handed the Japanese envoys. The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear in his own mind as to the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese Government with a document other than the modus vivendi document which had so recently been under discussion.

I said that Secretary Hull had requested me to say to the Ambassador in this regard that one of the reasons for the determination reached was the half-hearted support given by the British Government to the earlier proposal which had been under discussion and the raising of repeated questions by the British Government in regard thereto.

Lord Halifax said he could not understand this in as much as he had communicated to Secretary Hull the full support of the British Government.

To that I replied that the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the President yesterday could hardly be regarded as “full support,” but on the contrary, very grave questioning of the course then proposed.

Lord Halifax said that this message had been intended merely to express the objections on the part of the Chinese Government. He went on to say that he himself had been surprised by the vigor of the Chinese objections and that he had, in fact, stated to the Chinese Ambassador that in view of the fact that only ten days ago General Chiang Kai-shek was imploring the British and the United States Government to prevent the closing of the Burma Road, it would seem to him, Lord Halifax, that the course proposed by Secretary Hull gave positive assurances to the Chinese Government that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated. He said that he felt that the attitude taken by the Chinese Government was based partly on faulty information and partly on the almost hysterical reaction because of the fear that any kind of an agreement reached between Japan and the United States at this time would result in a complete breakdown of Chinese morale.

I told Lord Halifax that information received this morning tended to show that Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already very active and that Japanese forces there were being quickly increased in number. I said these reports likewise indicated that the threat against Thailand was imminent. I said, in conclusion, that it was evident from the information received here that the Japanese were preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. The gravity of the situation, I thought, could not be exaggerated.

SUMNER WELLES

327

711.94/2506

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, November 27, 1941.

The Minister of Australia called at his request. His purpose was to inquire whether the proposed modus vivendi had been abandoned permanently, to which I replied that I so considered it. He expressed great concern and desired to know more about the movements of Chiang Kai-shek and others intended to discourage the further consideration of the modus vivendi. I referred to copies of British communications on the subject, adding that Ambassador Halifax was strong for the proposal all the way and that I sympathized with his situation but I did not feel that the communications from Churchill and Eden, with qualifications such as were in them, would be very helpful in a bitter fight that would be projected by Chiang Kai-shek and carried forward by all of the malcontents in the United States, although I felt unreservedly that Churchill and Eden, like the British Ambassador here, would be for whatever we might do, even though not entirely to their liking in every way. The Minister inquired whether I thought it would be feasible to take up this matter further with the Chinese and I replied that I did not think so, so far as I am concerned. I thanked the Minister for his cooperation and that of his Government.

CORDELL HULL

328

740.0011 Pacific War/662

The Netherland Legation to the Department of State

Memorandum

Washington, November 27, 1941.

With reference to the suggested modus vivendi the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that as the negotiations can only begin at this point, the suggested military and economical concessions as a start seem to be quite far-reaching.

Justice, order and law are words which the Japanese are unable or unwilling to understand; furthermore they ascribe to others the same subterfuges they and Hitler employ themselves for ulterior motives.

That Japan will leave the Axis, seems at the present moment most unlikely.

329

740.0011 Pacific War/662

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, November 27, 1941.

The Netherlands Minister called at his request to inquire what reactions I had from the Japanese situation. I proceeded to hand him three cables from Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina area indicating that tens of thousands of Japanese troops with equipment, vessels, transports, et cetera, were proceeding to that area from the north. He examined the cables carefully and appeared much disturbed about the Japanese troop movements. The Minister stated that this presented a very serious situation.

The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally in connection with the proposed modus vivendi arrangement which I abandoned on Tuesday evening, November twenty-fifth, or practically abandoned when the Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true facts or waiting to ascertain them. I said that I had determined early Wednesday morning, November twenty-sixth, to present to the Japanese later in the day the document containing a proposed draft of an agreement which set forth all of the basic principles for which this Government stands and has stood for, for many years, especially including the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. I reminded the Minister that the central point in our plan was the continuance of the conversations with Japan looking toward the working out of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the so-called modus vivendi was really a part and parcel of these conversations and their objectives, intended to facilitate and keep them alive and that, of course, there was nothing that in any way could be construed as a departure from the basic principles which were intended to go into the general peace agreement. The Minister said he understood the situation.

CORDELL HULL

330

711.94/2577

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Washington, November 27, 1941.

The Thai Minister called upon his own initiative.

He said that some time ago Mr. Hamilton had told him that when he had any question to ask in regard to matters affecting Thailand he should not hesitate to call and ask questions which he had in mind. He said that he was taking advantage of Mr. Hamilton’s kindness this morning.

Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams told the Thai Minister that Mr. Hamilton was in conference and regretted that he himself could not talk with the Thai Minister.

The Thai Minister asked whether the following short two-sentence paragraph appearing in The New York Times was accurate:

The State Department said:

The Japanese representatives were handed for their consideration a document that is the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said so often in the past that it rests on certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.

Mr. Adams replied that he understood that the statement was substantially accurate. The Thai Minister asked whether the last sentence might be interpreted to mean that the United States insisted that the Japanese evacuate both French Indochina and China.

Mr. Adams replied that he had no information or authority which would enable him to be specific in his reply to the Thai Minister’s question. Mr. Adams said, however, that the President and the Secretary of State had on many occasions outlined the attitude of this Government toward acquisitions of territory by force. Mr. Adams said that there had been no change in this Government’s attitude in that respect.

The Thai Minister thanked Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams for the information which they had given him. He added that naturally his Government was vitally interested in the subject matter of the statement and that he wished to keep his Government informed.

331

711.94/2507

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, November 27, 1941.

Referring to the call which Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu are to make on you this afternoon at 2:30, it is suggested that you may care to include in your comments mention of the following points:

  1. We have been very much disappointed that during the course of these very important conversations Japanese leaders have continued to express opposition to the fundamental principles of peace and order which constitute the central spirit of the conversations which we have been carrying on. This attitude on the part of Japanese leaders has naturally created an atmosphere both in this country and abroad which has added greatly to the difficulty of making mutually satisfactory progress in the conversations.

  2. We have been very patient in our dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation. We are prepared to continue to be patient if Japan’s courses of action permit continuance of such an attitude on our part. We still have hope that there may be worked out a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area of the character we have been discussing. The temper of public opinion in this country has become of such a character and the big issues at stake in the world today have become so sharply outlined that this country cannot bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gives this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurs, we can also take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation.

  3. We remain convinced that Japan’s own best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression, and that Japan’s own best interests lie along the courses which we have outlined in the current conversations. If, however, Japan should unfortunately decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate loser.

332

711.94/2542

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State

Washington, November 27, 1941.

Mr. Secretary:
There is attached a memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Langdon Warner of the Fogg Museum, Boston, and Mr. Ballantine10 relating to a suggestion by Mr. Warner that consideration might be given to the sending by the President of a communication to the Emperor of Japan, having as its purpose the diverting of Japan from its present courses to courses of peace.

No further action on this matter need be taken so far as Mr. Warner is concerned.

MAXWELL M. HAMILTON

333

711.94/2512

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations

Washington, November 27, 1941.

Problem of Far Eastern relations — estimate of situation and certain probabilities

The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations.

Mr. Kurusu’s mission has had two principal objectives: (1) to obtain, if possible, from the United States, terms of agreement favorable to Japan; (2) to ascertain, if possible, what action, positive or negative, the United States might, may or will take in the event of certain moves by Japan.

The American Government has now given clear indication that it has no intention of making “concessions” to Japan which would be inconsistent with the declared principles and the general objectives of American foreign policy and that it does not intend to condone or give countenance to policies and practice, past and present and future, of aggression on Japan’s part.

Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the first objective of his mission.

The Japanese Government has given, during the course of the “exploratory conversations”, clear evidence that it is not that Government’s intention at the present time to disassociate Japan from the Tripartite Alliance; or to give up its objective of conquering China, conquering other regions in the Far East, and establishing a “new order” and a “co-prosperity sphere” in eastern Asia and the western and southern Pacific. It has persevered in distribution and disposal of its armed forces on a pattern clearly designed for offensive rather than merely defensive operations. It has shown that it clearly intends to persevere in pursuit of its general and its particular objectives by the methods of threat of force or use of force — which means continuance of contribution to instability rather than stability of situation in the Pacific and eastern Asia.

The United States has not shown what action it will take on the positive side in the event of Japan’s taking one or another of several possible steps. Mr. Kurusu may have gained certain impressions, but he cannot be sure. Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the second major objective of his mission.

The business of prophesying involves a procedure of examining facts and, as among various developments conceived to be possible, forming conclusions as to what is probable.

A prophecy is an expression by an individual or a group of individuals of an opinion as to what is going to happen.

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify their operations toward “bringing China to her knees”. They have hoped that out of the conversations with the American Government they would extract something which would facilitate their effort toward that objective. Even now, they have not entirely abandoned hope of getting from us either positive or negative action helpful to them in pursuit of that objective.

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States. The Japanese Government, while launching new offensive operations at some point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked by the United States. It therefore will not order or encourage action by its agents (foremost among which are its armed forces) which, if taken, would lead toward use by the United States of armed force by way of retaliation or resistance. So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are concerned there is less reason today than there was a week ago for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make “war” on this country. Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and Japan will not be at “war” on or before December 15 (the date by which General Gerow has affirmed that we would be “in the clear” so far as consummation of certain disposals of our forces is concerned); would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at “war” on or before the 15th of January (i.e., seven weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at “war” on or before March 1 (a date more than 90 days from now, and after the period during which it has been estimated by our strategists that it would be to our advantage for us to have “time” for further preparation and disposals). These ventures into the field of speculative prediction are posited on an assumption that our definition of “war” must be the same in reference to activities and events in the Pacific that it is in regard to activities and events in the Atlantic: the indicated wagers are offered on an assumption that, although there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic, there will not be a recognized “state of war” such as to disrupt substantially or put an end to the present program of our Army and Navy for disposal within the periods mentioned of equipment and men for “defensive” and general purposes. Stated briefly, the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate verge of “war” in the Pacific.

Japan has her disposals so made that she might now move against Russia or move against the Dutch East Indies or move against Thailand or launch some new operations in and against China. But, a move against Russia would be a major operation involving very substantial hazards for Japan; and it would be a move from which, once begun, it would be hard for Japan to withdraw. A move by Japan against the Dutch East Indies would involve for Japan a risk of armed embroilment with Great Britain and possibly the United States; it would involve a risk of developing into a major operation.

A move by Japan now against Thailand would be a move which need not require great effort or involve great risk; if made, it would have a twofold objective, on the one hand an exploration of British and American reaction, and on the other hand a possible gaining of advantageous position in connection with and for operations against the Burma Road and therefore toward bringing closer to an end the “China incident”. A move on Japan’s part via Indochina into Yunnan and toward putting the Burma Road out of commission (especially by continuous air attack) would involve little risk of embroilment with Great Britain or the United States, would not necessarily involve a major effort, and could be halted or be withdrawn from at any time should developments in the general situation render such action advisable in the opinion of Japan’s military leaders.

The reasonable probability is that Japan’s new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both.

If, when and as Japan makes either or both of those moves, Japan will ipso facto be further disclosing what are her political and military policies and will be further extending herself as regards military disposals and effort and as regards burden and draft upon her national capacity (economic, social, political and military); she will be weakening her position in the event of there coming, later, armed conflict between herself and the United States; she will be exposing herself to naval and air attack on flank and from rear, if and when, by the United States; and she will be adding to the number of her enemies and the weight of a public opinion adverse to her in the United States and the British Empire.

There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the United States by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of “concessions” by us in return for “pledges” (qualified and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific.

The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington.

STANLEY K. HORNBECK

334

711.94/254080/35

The Secretary of War to President Roosevelt

Undated

Memo which may be helpful as to certain portions of the message to the Congress.

HENRY L. STIMSON

..................

[Annex]

Gentlemen of the Congress:
I have come before you to report to you on the serious danger which is threatening this country and its interests in the Far East.

(here introduce such further opening matter as desired.)

Our interest in the safety of the Philippines, the Netherlands and Malaysia

For over forty years our government has been conducting the unprecedented experiment of training an Asiatic people in the methods of freedom and self-government as practiced by our own republic. While our immediate aim has been the development of this dependent Filipino people, thrown into our guardianship by the accident of war, into a self-governing and independent commonwealth, nevertheless we have other far-reaching interests in the success of that farsighted experiment. It is of the utmost value to the material welfare of the United States that there should exist in that portion of the world a friendly nation bound to us by the ties of association and gratitude which our long partnership in government has created. It has brought home to the nations and peoples of the Orient the name, the credit and the possibility of extensive commerce with the United States. It has helped to establish and stabilize close relations on our part with that portion of the Pacific, including particularly Malaysia and the New Netherlands, which secure for us supplies of indispensable materials for our requirements both in time of peace and in war. Thus for every reason, both spiritual and material, it is of vital importance that the purpose which we undertook four decades ago should be carried out to its intended logical fruition and that the people of the Philippines should achieve their ultimate position in the family of nations, bound to us by such ties of origin.

Our relations to China

The American policy which was thus put into effect in regard to the Philippines was in essence of the same far-sighted character as that which during the same period we applied to our relations with China. We were the founders of the policy of the Open Door — the policy which was subsequently legalized in the so-called Nine Power Treaty, and which endeavored to preserve for that great nation its territorial and administrative integrity and to permit it to develop without molestation its sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to obtain among the peoples of this earth.

The Axis attack upon this American policy in the Far East

During the past decade, however, these enlightened policies of the American government, exemplified by our attitude towards China and the Philippines, have been endangered by a scheme of world conquest set on foot by the so-called Axis powers — Germany, Italy, and Japan. These nations have without provocation or excuse attacked and conquered and reduced to economic and political slavery most of the free governments of Europe. In the Far East their Axis has been represented by the government of Japan which in 1940 joined with Germany and Italy in a covenant avowedly aimed at the interests in the Orient of the government of the United States. Japan has for over five years been attempting to carry out such a scheme of conquest and spoliation in the Far East. In flat defiance of its own covenants in the Nine Power Treaty it has invaded and sought to overthrow the government of China. Step by step the fleets and forces of Japan, passing through the China Sea in the immediate proximity of the Philippine Islands, have also invaded and taken possession of Indochina. Today its forces are proposing to go further southward and are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into the territory of Thailand. This step would directly menace the port and Straits of Singapore through which gateway runs the commerce of the world, including our own, between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

On the eastern side of the Philippines, Japan has also been extending its threatening activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation of the mandate under which it received the custody of those islands, it has been secretly establishing naval and air bases and fortifications directly on the line between the United States and the Philippine Islands.

By these steps Japan has placed itself in a position which encircles the western, northern, and eastern approaches to our territory and interests in the Philippines. Should it go further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace the vital interests of the United States.

Our efforts to peacefully persuade Japan to abandon such a policy of conquest in our neighborhood in the southwestern Pacific and the failure of that attempt

(Here describe the negotiations carried on by Secretary Hull and their failure.)

The danger to our vital interests which now confronts the United States on the failure of these negotiations

(In summary only.)

First: Japanese policy of conquest and exploitation which is now being carried out in China has already utterly destroyed in the portions of China occupied by Japan the peaceful and profitable commercial relations which the United States had previously enjoyed.

It has devastated and has sought to conquer the nation which for many centuries by its devotion to the arts of peace and commerce has been the most stabilizing influence on the western side of the Pacific Ocean.

The Japanese policy threatens to transform a peaceful continent into one devoting itself to the practice of war and dominated by the military leadership of Japan.

Second: This Japanese campaign of conquest and exploitation is now approaching and encircling the Philippine Islands. It threatens the commerce of those Islands and endangers their physical safety.

If it is successful, it will destroy the farsighted experiment which America has been conducting in those Islands and terminate their hope of independence and their peaceful democratic government.

It will destroy the mutually profitable commerce which exists between those Islands and the United States and upon which the high standard of living of the Filipinos now depends.

It will ruin the lifelong efforts and investments of thousands of American citizens who have transferred their homes and business activities to the Philippines on the faith that American principles of freedom and American methods of government would continue in those Islands.

It will forever terminate the prestige and influence of the United States which the American experiment in the Philippine Islands has been establishing throughout the Orient.

Third: It will threaten to cut off and destroy our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies and the Malayan Settlements.

If the Japanese are permitted to carry out their threat to attack and conquer these friendly countries, our imports from these countries will be interrupted and destroyed.

These imports, principally rubber, are vital to our welfare both in time of peace and war.

From those countries we receive our chief supplies of rubber. (Here add other items.)

In time of war, with the spirit of exploitation and destruction of commerce which exists in the world today, such an interruption of our trade with the Netherlands East Indies and the Malayan States would be catastrophic.

335

711.94/254030/36

The Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State

Undated

To the Congress of the United States:
The relations between the United States and the Japanese Empire have now reached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to acquaint the Congress with the exact facts of the situation and their extremely serious implications.

For the past six months, conversations have been carried on between the Secretary of State and the President on behalf of the United States, and the Foreign Minister and Premier of Japan, for the purpose of arriving, if possible, at some understanding agreeable to both governments. Throughout this entire period, the government of the United States has been steadfast in its support of basic principles which should govern international relations. The principles for which we have stood in these discussions may be summarized as follows: [Here follows blank space to be filled in.]

We have devoted every effort of which we were capable to reach an agreement. With the utmost of forbearance and patience, we have sought to bring Japan into accord with us on these principles. These efforts have failed. Japan has refused to change her posture, and relations between the two nations are threatened with rupture.

In our negotiations, we have kept in close contact with the governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands Indies, and China. We have found these nations in complete agreement with the position we have assumed. In every proposal submitted to Japan, the rights and vital interests of these four nations have been faithfully represented. In the firm position which we have taken with respect to the Japanese attitude and conduct, we have had the moral support of these nations. We also have assurance of their material and military support if that becomes necessary.

Simply stated, what we are confronted with in the Far East is a repetition of the tactics pursued by Hitler in Europe during the past two years. The methods which Hitler has used in Europe so successfully and which are being faithfully imitated by Japan, consist of a gradual expansion of power and control over neighboring peoples by a slow, progressive infiltration through which one nation after another is subdued and enslaved either by actual force or by threats of force.

After this fashion and pursuing this policy of conquest by force, Japan has established herself in Korea and Manchukuo; she has sought for the past four years to subjugate China; in recent weeks and during the progress of our negotiations with her, she has invaded Indochina, and now, she threatens with imminent attack, Thailand, Burma, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines.

This situation, precipitated exclusively by Japanese aggression, holds unmistakable threats to our vital interests and to our responsibility for the security of the Philippine Archipelago. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber is a menace to our safety which cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go practical Japanese control of the Pacific.

Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted, and considerations of justice, humanity and the principle of equality of opportunity be restored, we will witness in that region of the world, precisely what has already transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler seeks dominion by ruthless force.

Information has reached us, of dependable character that Japan contemplates further measures of aggression. She has assembled both land and sea forces for new conquests. She can go no further in that direction without seriously threatening the vital interests of Great Britain, the Netherlands Indies, Australia and ourselves. Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.

In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I have addressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts. In the meantime, while I await the result of this latest effort toward peaceful solution, I felt it incumbent upon me to apprise the Congress, and through you, the people of the United States of the serious situation with which we are confronted.

336

740.0011 Pacific War/651: Telegram

The Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State

Bangkok, November 27, 1941 — 1 p.m.
[Received 2:03 p.m.]

536.

  1. In contrast with reports from Indochina of preparation (see Saigon [telegram 157, November 26]) portending a Japanese attack on this country there appears to be here a studied Japanese attempt to allay anxiety. The Foreign Minister informed me yesterday that the Japanese have not seriously pressed the Government for any concession for 2 months. Moreover, on November 24, Minister Futami, in conversation, spontaneously stated to him that the Thai Government might rest assured that Japan would not invade this country but if it did it would proceed directly to its objective. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that his Government remained convinced that a Japanese invasion was only a matter of time and a committee is drafting plans for the removal of the capital when needful. In reply to my question he said that the Government would like to have the diplomatic missions accompany it if it were shifted. It is reliably reported that orders were issued several days ago for the packing of archives by Government departments.

  2. The mild attitude taken by the Japanese Embassy here may reflect the intentions of the civilian section of the Japanese Government as distinguished from the military or it may be a device to take the Thais and the powers sympathetic to them unprepared.

  3. I should be grateful for early information regarding the outcome of the discussions between the Department and the Japanese diplomatic representatives with special reference to possible effect on the situation here.

PECK

337

611.51G31/17

The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State

Vichy, November 26, 1941 — 10 a.m.
[Received November 27 — 7:36 p.m.]

1470.

The following letter dated November 25 signed by Admiral Darlan has been received:

By a note dated November 18, Your Excellency informed me that the Government of the United States, taking as a basis the text of the Franco-American agreement of May 6, 1936, which provides most-favored-nation treatment for American products in Indochina, protests against the concession of a preferential régime for Japanese products imported into that colony and enumerated in list A annexed to the Franco-Japanese economic agreement of May 6, 1941.

Your Excellency adds that instructions have been received from the American Government “to make formal reservation of all American rights in this matter.”

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the above mentioned note of November 18, calls for the following observations on the part of the French Government:

  1. In negotiating with Japan, the French Government did not lose sight of or contest the provisions of the Franco-American Agreement of May 6, 1936, which assures American products in Indochina the enjoyment, without limitation, of most-favored-nation treatment. If, following the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese accord of May 6, 1941, the tariff reductions and exceptions, accorded to Japan, have not been applied in practice to products of the United States, it is because no actual importation of American merchandise has been made into Indochina.

Otherwise, such merchandise would have enjoyed the same treatment accorded to similar Japanese products.

Nevertheless, and in order that there may be no doubt as to the interpretation given by the French Government to the provisions of the Franco-American Agreement of 1936 concerning the application of most-favored-nation treatment, I am disposed to proceed with an exchange of letters with Your Excellency extending to American products the benefit of the reduced duties exemptions and fixed tariffs accorded by Articles 2 and 4 of the Franco-Japanese Agreement to the Japanese products enumerated in List A annexed to that agreement.

On the other hand, the French Government would be willing to agree to a regime specially favoring the entry into Indochina of the American products listed below which are now particularly necessary for Indochinese economy:

Preserved food, raw cotton, oil (mineral), leaf tobacco, metallic or metal products, pitch, asphalt, chemical products, pharmaceutical products, paper, machines and machinery, automobiles, tires, wheat flour, canned foods, prepared tobacco, hides and skins, miscellaneous.

  1. The French Government recalls that prior to the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese Agreement of May 1941, and with a view to facilitating the resumption of exchanges between Indochina and the United States, which has been interrupted since the Armistice, it instructed its Ambassador at Washington on February 12, 1941, to present the following proposals to the Department of State:

a) To facilitate exchanges between the United States and Indochina the French Government would be disposed, in agreement with the Government of the Colony, to examine the terms to be accorded, with respct to the tariff, to American products.

b) These terms, which might be based on the contractual régime at present in force between Indochina and the other French possessions (Journal Officiel of January 4th, 1941) as well as on the régime of exchanges then envisaged between Indochina and Japan, might admit of tangible advantages in favor of American products.

c) As a quota system is now applied in Indochina with regard to the majority of French and foreign importations the French Government would be disposed to grant special quotas in favor of the greater part of American products;

  1. The American Government has not yet replied to these proposals. It has simply indicated that it would be a buyer of Indochinese rubber and ore.

The French Government recalls that if these negotiations could not be concluded with regard to the furnishing of ore to the United States in 1941, it is because of circumstances beyond its control. On the other hand and with regard to rubber no actual delivery has yet been possible to the American market notably because of delays with regard to the conclusion of contracts.

Nevertheless the French Government will address to Your Excellency new proposals in this regard in the immediate future.

  1. The French Government considers the note sent by Your Excellency on November 18, as the proof of the renewed interest of the American Government in the Indochinese market. The French Government has all the more reason to be pleased as the well understood interests of Indochina constrain it:

a) To continue its exchanges with the other French possessions and
b) To buy and sell on other markets besides the Japanese.

The Federal Government is in a position to help Indochinese economy on the first point, by facilitating the obtaining of free passage for ships on the Saigon–Dakar–Casablanca run (note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy dated November 10, 1941) and, on the second point, in favoring the exchanges between this French colony and the American market or the Philippines market. In this respect, the proximity of this American possession to Indochina, and the possibility for French ships of going there easily (in fact French ships en route to Shanghai stop at Manila) should favor exchanges consonant with the enlightened self interests of these two possessions.

I may add that although Indochina has not since the armistice effected any important direct exportations to the Philippines, this French colony actually sells great quantities of rice, coal and miscellaneous products to Shanghai, to the great advantage of foreign colonies there and particularly of American interests. The Manila market would consequently appear to be the appropriate one to furnish Saigon and Haiphong especially with the products enumerated in the above list, and eventually with other merchandise to be determined by common agreement between the two Governments.

If the Federal Government agrees in principle to this suggestion the French Government will examine with Admiral Decoux the Indochinese products which might be exported to the Philippines (notably rice and coal).

I may add that the ships which link Indochina and the Philippines should of course have free passage for themselves and for their cargoes. Furthermore the French Government would be disposed to authorize the Consulate of the United States to verify the use in Indochina of the merchandise imported from Manila.

I would be grateful if Your Excellency would inform me as soon as possible of the American Government’s reply to foregoing proposals.

JEAN DARLAN

A copy of the above letter is being forwarded by air mail.

Repeated to Algiers and Casablanca by air mail.

LEAHY

338

Japanese Foreign Office (November 27, 1941)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 November 1941
(Purple) 
#841

Please make the following corrections throughout the entire English text of the B Proposal:

Delete the “the” preceding the word “peace” in “the peace in the Pacific”;

Change “elucidating” to affirming";

Change “agreed upon” to "reached; and

Delete “mutual” from “mutual understanding”.

25791
JD-1: 7079                                (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
27 November 1941
(Purple)
#842

In the middle of your message #1280*, there is the part which mentions that the United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Now this is a very important matter, and a point which we would like to know more about.

Will you please give us the reason for your mentioning this point, and any other item which might be of help to us in this matter.

25781
JD-1: 7080                                (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)
 
*Not available.
339

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 November 1941
(J 19)
Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete)
Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

Handle as Chief of Office routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

Example. A message meaning:

Japan and USSR military have clashed.

…will read:

HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell).

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word “OWARI” (end) will not be used).

Code Word                                Meaning
 
ARIMURA                  Code communications prohibited.
ASAI                     Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA                  Will communicate by radio broadcast. You
                         are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA                  Reception of overseas broadcast impossible
                         due to interference.
AZUMA                    Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI                  Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA                 Preparations for evacuation have been com- 
                         pleted.
HANAZONO (?)             Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suit-
                         able foreign envoy (or consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA               Relations between Japan and . . . . . (blank)
                         . . . . . have been severed.
HATTORI                  Relations between Japan and . . . . .(blank)
                         . . . . . are not in accordance with expec-
                         tation.
HIZIKATA                 Japan's and . . . . .(blank's) . . . . 
                         military have clashed.
HOSINO                   Japan and . . . . .(blank) . . . . . are enter-
                         ing a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI                  Communicate to us probable date of breaking
                         off of relations between Japan and the coun-
                         try to which you are accredited.
INAGAKI                  Have you - -?- - the . . . (blank) . . . mat-
                         ter?
ISHIKAWA                 I have - -?- - the . . . (blank) . . . matter.
KASHIWAGI                We are commencing military action ? against
                         (blank) . . .
KOBAYAKAWA               Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas 
                         to Japan, to persons of . . . (blank) . . . 
                         nationality.
KODAMA                   Japan.
KOMIYAMA                 China.
KOYANAGI                 England.
KUBOTA                   USSR
KURIBARA                 France (?)
KUSUNOKI                 Germany.
MATUTANI                 Italy.
MINAMI                   USA
MIWATA                   Canada.
MIYAZAKI                 Mexico.
MOROKOSI                 Brazil.
MOTIZUKI                 Panama.
NAGAMINE                 Argentina.
NAKAZATO                 Thailand.
NAN GO                   French Indochina.
NEGI (?)                 Netherlands East-Indies.
OGAWA                    Burma (?).
OKAMOTO                  Malaya
OKUMURA                  Australia.
ONIZUKA                  Union of South Africa (?).
ONODERA                  Enemy country.
OTANI (?)                (Possibly: friendly, or allied country?)
ONISI                    Year
SIMANAKA                 Day (?)
SAKAEIBARA               Tsuki) Month
SIGENOI                  (KO) Paragraph
SANZYO                   (Toki) Time
ITIRO                    1
NISAKU                   2
SANTARD                  3
YOITI                    4
GIORO                    5
MASAROKU                 6
SIMETARO                 7
YASOKITI                 8
HISAMATU                 9
ATUMI                    0

–

25609
JD-1: 6985                                   (Y) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (7)
340

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
27 November 1941 (2327-2334 EST)
(Telephone Code) — (See JD-1: 6841) (S.I.S. #25344)
Trans-Pacific
Telephone

(Conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief, Yamamoto.)

            Literal translation                  Decode of Voice Code
 
 (After connection was completed:)
 KURUSU: "Hello, hello. This is Ku-
 rusu".
 YAMAMOTO: This is Yamamoto".
 KURUSU: "Yes, Hello, hello."
 (Unable to get Yamamoto for about six or
 eight seconds, he said aside, to himself, or
 to someone near him:)
 KURUSU: "Oh, I see, they're making a
 record of this, huh?"
 (It is believed he meant that the six second
 interruption was made so that a record could
 be started in Tokyo. Interceptor's machine
 had been started several minutes earlier.)
 KURUSU: "Hello. Sorry to trouble you 
 so often."
 YAMAMOTO: "How did the matrimonial                "How did the nego-
 question get along today?"                       tiations go today?"
 KURUSU: "Oh, haven't you got our tele-
 gram* yet? It was sent—let me see—at
 about six—no, seven o'clock. Seven o'clock.
 About three hours ago.
 "There wasn't much that was different            "There wasn't much
 from what Miss Umeko said yesterday."            that was different from
                                                 Hull's talks of yester- 
                                                 day."
 YAMAMOTO: "Oh, there wasn't much diff-
 erence?"
 KURUSU: "NO, there wasn't. As before,
 that southward matter—that south,
 SOUTH—southward matter, is having con-
 siderable effect. You know, southward
 matter."
 YAMAMOTO: (Obviously trying to indicate
 the serious effect that Japanese concentra-
 tions, etc. in French Indo-China were having
 on the conversations in Washington. He
 tries to do this without getting away from the
 "Miss Umeko childbirth, marriage" charac-
 ter of the voice code.)
 YAMAMOTO: "Oh, the south matter? It's
 effective?"
 KURUSU: "Yes, end at one time, the matri-       "Yes, and at one
 question seemed as if it would be               time it looked as
 settled."                                       though we could reach
                                                 an agreement".
 KURUSU: "But—well, of course, there are
 other matters involved too, but—that was
 it—that was the monkey wrench. Details
 are included in the telegram* which should
 arrive very shortly. It is not very long and
 you'll be able to read it quickly."
 YAMAMOTO: "Oh, you've dispatched it?"
 KURUSU: "Oh, yes, quite a while ago. At
 about 7 o'clock."
 (Pause.)
 KURUSU: "How do things look there?              "Does it seem as if a 
 Does it seem as if a child might be born?"      crisis is at hand?"
 YAMAMOTO: (In a very definite tone):            "Yes, a crisis does
 "Yes, the birth of the child seems imminent."   appear imminent."
 KURUSU: (In a somewhat surprised tone,
 repeating Yamamoto's statement):
 "It does seem as if the birth is going to take  "A crisis does ap-
 take place?"                                    pear imminent?"
 (Pause.)
 KURUSU: "In which direction. . ."
 (Stopped himself very abruptly at this slip
 which went outside the character of the voice
 code. After a slight pause he quickly re-
 covered, then to cover up the slip, con-
 tinued:)
 KURUSU: "IS it to be a boy or a girl?"
 YAMAMOTO: (Hesitated, then laughing at
 his hesitation took up Kurusu's cue to re-
 establish the voice code character of the
 talk. The "boy, girl, healthy" byplay has
 no other significance):
 YAMAMOTO: "It seems as if it will be a
 strong healthy boy."
 KURUSU: "Oh, it's to be a strong healthy 
 boy?"
 (Rather long pause.) 
 YAMAMOTO: "Yes. 
 "Did you make any statement (to the news-       "Did you make any
 regarding your talk with Miss                   statement regarding
 Kimiko today?"                                  your talks with the 
                                                President today?"
 KURUSU: "No, nothing. Nothing except 
 the mere fact that we met."
 YAMAMOTO: "Regarding the matter con-
 tained in the telegram** of the other day, 
 although no definite decision has been made 
 yet, please be advised that effecting it will 
 be difficult."
 KURUSU: "Oh, it is difficult, huh?"
 YAMAMOTO: "Yes, it is."
 KURUSU: "Well, I guess there's nothing 
 more that can be done then."
 YAMAMOTO: "Well, yes." 
 (Pause) 
 YAMAMOTO: "Then, today . . ."
 KURUSU: "Today?"
 YAMAMOTO: "The matrimonial question,            "Regarding negotia-
 that is, the matter pertaining to arranging a   tions, don't break them
 marriage — don't break them off."                 off."
 KURUSU: "Not break them? You mean talks." 
       (Helplessly:)
 KURUSU: "Oh, my."
       (Pause, and then with a resigned laugh:) 
 KURUSU: "Well, I'll do what I can."
       (Continuing after a pause:)
 KURUSU: "please reed carefully whet Miss        "Please read care
 had to say as contained in today's              fully what the Presi-
 telegram*."                                     dent had to say as con- 
                                                 tained in today's tele- 
                                                 gram*."
 YAMAMOTO: "From what time to what
 time were your talks today?"
 KURUSU: "Oh, today's was from 2:30."
 (Much repeating of the numeral 2)
 KURUSU: "Oh, you mean the duration?
 Oh, that was for about an hour."
 YAMAMOTO: "Regarding the matrimonial            "Regarding the ne- 
 question."                                      gotiations."
 "I shall send you another message. How-
 ever, please bear in mind that the matter of 
 the other day is a very difficult one."
 KURUSU: "But without anything, — they              "But without any-
 want to keep carrying on the matrimonial        thing, — they want to 
 question. They do. In the meantime              keep on negotiating. we're 
 faced with the excitement of having a           In the meantime we 
 child born. On top of that Tokugawa is          have a crisis on hand 
 really champing at the bit, isn't he? Toku-     and the army is champ-
 gawa is, isn't he?"                             ing at the bit. You 
                                                 know the army."
  (Laughter and pause.)
 KURUSU: "That's why I doubt if anything 
 can be done."
 YAMAMOTO: "I don't think it's as bad as 
 that."
 YAMAMOTO: "Well, —we can't sell a moun-            "Well, — we can't
 tain."                                           yield."
 KURUSU: "Oh, sure, I know that. That
 isn't even a debatable question any more."
 YAMAMOTO: "Well, then, although we 
 can't yield, we'll give you some kind of a re-
 ply to that telegram."
 KURUSU: "In any event, Miss Kimiko is             "In any event, the
 leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in        President is leaving
 the country until Wednesday."                    town tomorrow, and will 
                                                  remain in the coun-
                                                  try until Wednesday." 
 YAMAMOTO: "Will you please continue to 
 do your best."
 KURUSU: "Oh, yes. I'll do my best. 
 And Nomura's doing everything too."
 YAMAMOTO: "Oh, all right. In today's 
 talks, there wasn't anything of special in-
 terest then?"
 KURUSU: "No, nothing of particular in-
 terest, except that it is quite clear now that
 that southward — ah — the south, the south 
 matter is having considerable effect."
 YAMAMOTO: "I see. Well, then, good bye."
 KURUSU: "Good bye." 

25443
JD-1: 6890                                  (M) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 ( )
 
*JD-1: 6915 (S.I.S. #25495). Outline of interview on 27 November with Roosevelt-Hull-Kurusu-Nomura .
**Probably #1189 (S.I.S. #25441-42). JD-1: 6896). Washington reports the two proposals presented by the U.S. on 26 November.