Japanese-American relations (7-24-41 – 11-30-41)

301

[Secret]

From: Hanoi
To: Tokyo
25 November 1941
(Purple-YO)
#118

(Strictly secret.)

We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two. It goes without saying here, of course, that if the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various enterprises shall be launched in accordance with the plans which have been laid down in advance.

Should, however, the negotiations not end in a success, since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day.

Under these circumstances, however, there shall have to be some alterations in the program we have laid out for the various enterprises. We shall, undoubtedly, have to establish organs and conduct negotiations which will not conflict with the campaign. The thing that we are most concerned about is whether or not, in the event of war, the status quo will be maintained as far as the French Indochina’s governmental setup is concerned. I feel that it is essential that we not only be advised of this, but it must be done immediately as we wish to make all pre-arrangements as far in advance as possible.

If you have any opinions as to the outcome of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations, will you please inform this office of them together with whatever other pertinent information you may deem wise to impart to us.

Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance. According to press reports, however, the United States conferred with the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and even of China, in Washington, and hence the governments of these countries are now aware of the matters being discussed in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. Moreover, by means of (courier?) service, the military here are aware of not only our stand in the negotiations but also of the general atmosphere of the said negotiations.

We feel as if we, a Foreign Office organ, alone have been left out of the picture. As you pointed out in your circular message #2353* the situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Please, therefore, make arrangements to advise us on these points by means of either cable or by special messenger services.

25345
JD-1: 6838                               (D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S-TT)
 
*Available, dated 19 November.
302

[Secret]

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
25 November 1941
(Purple)
#849 (In 2 parts, complete)

In the event of the Empire’s taking decisive action in a southward advance, it will of course be necessary in the exercise of a belligerent’s rights to make clear the relations of sovereign and subjects. On the one hand it will be absolutely necessary to bring Thai into our camp. My conversation with Pibul as reported in my #834* was undertaken with this as the underlying motive. If and when Japan at last does make her proposals of joint defense, the following three points should be made especially definite, and Thai should be led to voluntarily take an attitude of cooperation with us.

  1. In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malay, there would of course be a temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand, but after our objectives have been attained, restoration would immediately be made, and the independence of Thai would be respected even more than at present while Thai is maintaining neutrality.

  2. In case she cooperates in a positive way with Japan, full assurances will be given that Thailand’s swamp lands will be reclaimed in the areas concerned.

  3. In the event of Thai’s assets in England being frozen great fluctuation would result in the value of Thai’s money, but Japan would make available sufficient funds to create a foundation for a yen “bloc” money system, and also give every consideration to providing petroleum and other essential commodities.

To summarize: By cooperating with Japan the racial longings of Thailand will be realized, and with indivisible relations with Japan her existence as an independent nation will be strengthened… (three lines missed) …stop with as simple a… as possible to the effect that “will cooperate in every way for the realization of the objectives of East Asia co-prosperity and stability”, while the particulars as necessity may require will be put into a secret treaty…

Furthermore, in the light of Japan’s basic national policy which has for its purpose the establishment of an East Asia co-prosperity sphere, and the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples, it goes without saying that Thailand’s sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the minimum limits of necessity, and that her standing as an independent nation must be maintained to the very last; while strictest military discipline must be used to reassure the Thai populace and strict control should by all means be exercised over any attempts at profiteering.

Have sent by the hand of Consul General Asada who has returned to Japan, but to make doubly sure I am also cabling it to you.

25389
JD-1:6844                                (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (S-TT)
 
*Available, dated 21 November.
303 
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
25 November 1941
(Purple)
#790

  1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.

  2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

  3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

JD-1: 7035 25708 (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-11 (6-AR)

*Probably the USS HOLLAND (of 8000 tons).
304

U.S. State Department (November 26, 1941)

711.94/2472: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State

London, November 26, 1941 — 6 a.m.
[Received November 26 — 12:55 a.m.]

5670.

For the President from the Former Naval Person.

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.

WINANT

305

740.0011 Pacific War/646: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi to the Secretary of State

Hanoi, November 25, 1941 — 6 p.m.
[Received November 26 — 9:45 a.m.]

187.

The following information is forwarded for what it may be worth.

A reliable source informs me that a certain agency of the Government General has just received from one of its agents a report to the effect that the Japanese Navy will, without a declaration of war or ultimatum, attack the Isthmus of Kra [at Singora?] on or about December 1, and that the Japanese Army will begin its advance into Thailand at the same time. The above mentioned agent reports that the Japanese do not anticipate any Chinese reaction along the Tonkin frontier.

The above information may explain the present acceleration in troop landings at Haiphong, approximately 4,000 within the last few days, and the increased movement by rail towards the south, approximately 1,500 Japanese troops are to be sent by special trains this evening and tomorrow. There are now about 25,000 troops in Tonkin and about 90 planes at Gia Lâm.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department, Chungking, Beiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo. Repeated to Bangkok.

REED

306

893.24/1214: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi to the Secretary of State

Hanoi, November 26, 1941 — 11 a.m.
[Received November 26 — 10:59 a.m.]

189.

Early yesterday morning the Mayor of Haiphong advised all interested parties by urgent circular that the Japanese intended to remove all cargo that had been in transit to China and that the Japanese demanded that the keys to all bonded warehouses be delivered to them by yesterday noon. The circular stated further that the French authorities had protested but that the interested parties were to use their own discretion as to whether or not they would deliver their keys to the Japanese.

It is understood that the Japanese entered a number of private warehouses yesterday afternoon and removed certain cargoes. Details of these new seizures have not been obtained as yet.

This action constitutes a new violation of French sovereignty in Indochina and indicates the continuing helplessness of the French authorities. In this connection it is worthy of note that the arrival of the Yoshizawa mission has not prevented violations of French sovereignty (including the recent arrest of Annamites and Chinese at Saigon by the Japanese military) nor has it brought about the settlement of outstanding problems as yet. As previously reported the mission appears to be marking time and awaiting a clarification of the political situation in the Far East.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department, Chungking, Beiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai; Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

REED

307

740.0011 Pacific War/647: Telegram

The Consul at Saigon to the Secretary of State

Saigon, November 26, 1941 — 5 p.m.
[Received November 26 — 4:56 p.m.]

157.

On November 21 Japanese troop and supply ships began to arrive at Saigon and they now occupy all of the pier space including that of the Messageries Maritimes. It is reliably reported that 20,000 Japanese troops have landed since that date. Another 10,000 are believed to have arrived from the north during the same period and the Japanese forces in Southern Indochina are now estimated at 70,000. One qualified observer places their number at 128,000 but this is probably too high as yet. The Government still insists that there are not more than 30,000 in the south.

Large numbers of trucks have been landed and these are being used to move men and equipment out of Saigon. A large movement is taking place and it would appear that military operations against Thailand may soon begin.

During the night of November 21–22 Japanese troops erected barricades in Saigon and Chợ Lớn, entered Chinese dwellings and arrested about 60 Chinese. They also arrested some 40 Annamites at a neighboring town. The Government has protested. The Yoshizawa mission obviously has no restraining effect on the actions of the Japanese Army in Indochina.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department, Chungking, Beiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai; Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo. Repeated to Bangkok.

BROWNE

308

892.24/88: Telegram

The Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State

Bangkok, November 26, 1941 — 11 p.m.
[Received November 26 — 6:47 p.m.]

534.

  1. I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs today of the Department’s replies to the Thai requests. He said that the Minister in Washington had reported the American offer of supplies after invasion but observed that China’s situation was very different from that of this country.

  2. The Foreign Minister told me very confidentially that he had said frankly to the British Minister that the fate of certain small countries in Europe had lessened the confidence of his Government in British promises of joint action in the event of a Japanese invasion and that he had pressed for a formal statement from the British Government. I thought it advisable to observe that while I had no official information concerning the Department’s conversations with the Japanese Ambassadors I have decided enough had been published to show that the American Government was seeking to curb Japanese expansion and that success in this effort would obviously be to the advantage of Thailand.

I recalled also the American Government had been crediting in [credited with?] respecting the Government’s policy of neutrality.

  1. There is evidence of a growing sentiment in the Government in favor of linking Thailand with the democracies against Japan. Two radio political commentators publicly known to speak for the Premier recently announced that if Thailand were invaded it would have friends and would welcome their aid. Berrigake, United Press representative, informed me that the Director of Publicity even authorized him to assert that if Great Britain and the United States publicly asserted an intention to support this country against invasion Thailand would join the so-called ABCD group at once. I am informed this material has not been used.

PECK

309

711.94/2479a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan

Washington, November 26, 1941 — 8 p.m.

783

I called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in the afternoon of November 26 and gave them two documents — an oral statement and draft outline of a proposed basis for a broad agreement covering the entire Pacific area.

A summary of these documents follows in a subsequent telegram.

HULL

792.94/164

The Netherland Legation to the Department of State

Memorandum

Washington, November 26, 1941.

Japan’s pressure on Thai[land] is said to be increasing. The Thai Government is feeling more and more uneasy, which seems to be caused by the uncertainty about the question how soon the United States and Great Britain will give Thai[land] what it needs for its military and economic defense. The British Minister is assisting the Thai Government in obtaining aviation gasoline. As regards other war supplies Thai[land] depends on the United States.—The impression is that the United States is not very anxious to give this help.—

Japan is said to have proposed to take charge of the military defense of Thai[land], but this offer which was made orally has been turned down by the Prime Minister who referred to the non-aggression treaties with Great Britain.

The main questions pending at the present time are the following:

  1. Permanent control by Japan over the demilitarized Eastern Provinces;

  2. All Thai airports to be used during 6 months, enabling a mixed border commission to take pictures from the air of the above-said Provinces.

310

711.94/2504

Memorandum of a Conversation

Washington, November 26, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called by appointment at the Department. The Secretary handed each of the Japanese copies of an outline of a proposed basis of an agreement between the United States and Japan and an explanatory oral statement.

After the Japanese had read the documents, Mr. Kurusu asked whether this was our reply to their proposal for a modus vivendi. The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as there was so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the United States and in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United States we have a political situation to deal with just as does the Japanese Government, and he referred to the fire-eating statements which have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which he said had been causing a natural reaction among the public in this country. He said that our proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation, which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this might give rise to misunderstanding. He also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador of the ambition that had been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the proposed agreement. He noted that in our statement of principles there was a reiteration of the Stimson doctrine. He objected to the proposal for multilateral non-aggression pacts and referred to Japan’s bitter experience of international organizations, citing the case of the award against Japan by the Hague tribunal in the Perpetual Leases matter. He went on to say that the Washington Conference Treaties had given a wrong idea to China, that China had taken advantage of them to flaunt Japan’s rights. He said he did not see how his Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4) of the proposed agreement and that if the United States should expect that Japan was to take off its hat to Chiang Kai-shek and propose to recognize him Japan could not agree. He said that if this was the idea of the American Government he did not see how any agreement was possible.

The Secretary asked whether this matter could not be worked out.

Mr. Kurusu said that when they reported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands. He noted that this was a tentative proposal without commitment, and suggested that it might be better if they did not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents further informally here.

The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents carefully before discussing them further. He repeated that we were trying to do our best to keep the public from becoming uneasy as a result of their being harangued. He explained that in the light of all that has been said in the press, our proposal was as far as we would go at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there was so much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about some clarification; that we have reached a stage when the public has lost its perspective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a document which would present a complete picture of our position by making provision for each essential point involved.

The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public feeling was so acute on that question that he might almost be lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan should fill Indochina with troops our people would not know what lies ahead in the way of a menace to the countries to the south and west. He reminded the Japanese that they did not know what tremendous injury they were doing to us by keeping immobilized so many forces in countries neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are primarily out for our permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in Indochina affects our direct interests.

Mr. Kurusu reverted to the difficulty of Japan’s renouncing its support of Wang Jingwei. The Secretary pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek had made an outstanding contribution in bringing out national spirit in China and expressed the view that the Nanking regime had not asserted itself in a way that would impress the world. Mr. Kurusu agreed with what the Secretary had said about Chiang, but observed that the question of the standing of the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion. His arguments on this as well as on various other points were specious, and unconvincing.

The Ambassador took the occasion to observe that sometimes statesmen of firm conviction fail to get sympathizers among the public; that only wise men could see far ahead and sometimes suffered martyrdom; but that life’s span was short and one could only do his duty. The Ambassador then asked whether there was no other possibility and whether they could not see the President.

The Secretary replied that he had no doubt that the President would be glad to see them at any time.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi.

The Secretary replied that we had explored that. Mr. Kurusu asked whether it was because the other powers would not agree; but the Secretary replied simply that he had done his best in the way of exploration.

The Ambassador when rising to go raised the question of publicity. The Secretary replied that he had it in mind to give the press something of the situation tomorrow, and asked what the Ambassador thought. The Ambassador said that they did not wish to question the Secretary’s right to give out what he desired in regard to the American proposal. The Ambassador said he would like to have Mr. Wakasugi call on Mr. Ballantine on Thursday to discuss further details.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

311

711.94/2504

Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador

Washington, November 26, 1941.

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

312

711.94/2504

Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador

Washington, November 26, 1941.
Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment.

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan

Section I: Draft mutual declaration of policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

  1. The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

  2. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

  3. The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

  4. The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

  1. The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

  2. The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

  3. The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

  4. The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

  5. The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

Section II: Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

  1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

  2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

  3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

  4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support — militarily, politically, economically — any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

  5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

  1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

  2. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

  3. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

  4. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

  5. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

313

711.94/254029/35

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, November 26, 1941.

With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese Government, namely:

  1. A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad basic peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations now going on and to be carried on, if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject.

  2. The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a modus vivendi intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations.

In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, without in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and the benefit of this step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal.

CORDELL HULL

314

Japanese Foreign Office (November 26, 1941)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#830

To both Ambassadors.

It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connection between the question of withdrawing our army from French Indochina and that of the freezing of assets. As I have already indicated in my #798, [a] my proposal made on the 17th, even if submitted by you, would be inadequate to meet the situation. Our final proposal envisages an agreement on the basis of the “B” proposal in toto (it excludes from the “B” proposal paragraphs 6 and 7; namely, the question of non-discrimination in trade and the question of the Three-Power Agreement, and includes, as indicated in my #816, [b] the proposal which the United States Government made on the 12th, that is, the question of mediation by the United States for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China as contained in our Proposal “B”), and so the acceptance of this proposal is the most that we can expect. In view of the fact that time is getting short with but few days left this month, I would like to have you at once contact the United States authorities again and do your utmost in getting them to accept our proposal.

I need not suggest the following, for you, no doubt, have already thought of it. I would like to have you make full use of influential Americans about whom you have wired me in the past and put pressure on the United States authorities indirectly as well.

 Army 25790                                            Trans. 12-5-41 (6)
 
[a] S.I.S. #25040 which states that no further concessions can be made and if the U.S. does not consent to Proposal B the negotiations will have to be broken off.
[b] S.I.S. #25175. If the U.S. accepts Proposal B, Japan will have no objection to letting Pres. ROOSEVELT act as mediator between Japan and China.
315

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple (Priority)
#833 (To be handled in Government Code)

Re my #798 [a]

When you reach a settlement in accordance with our new proposal, it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection with clauses 2 and 3 of that proposal. Of these goods, the acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the Empire. Therefore, in accordance with the course of negotiations, prior to the signing of an understanding, and at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following lines:

4,000,000 tons per year from the United States. (This figure is the average amount of imports during the years 1938, '39, and '40 from the United States. The breakdown according to type, aviation gasoline included, corresponds to the actual figures covering imports before the freezing legislation went into effect.) That is to say, roughly 333,000 tons per month.

In addition, on the basis of past negotiations and roughly in the agreed amounts, we hope to import from the Netherlands Indies 1,000,000 tons per year.

After the establishment of a verbal agreement, I would like to have a definite promise of the above incorporated into an exchange of documents between Your Excellency and the Secretary of State.

Furthermore, these figures are to be taken as the basis for negotiation (however, they can not be called our absolute minimum figures). On the other hand, as far as we are concerned, along with a restoration of trade in the future, we hope for an increase of these figures over the past. Therefore, after you have read all this, please negotiate along these lines to the best of your abilities.

Army #25346                                          Trans. 11/26/41 (S)
 
*S.I.S. #25040 which states that no further concessions can be made and if the United States does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.
316

[Secret]

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 26, 1941. 
Purple 
#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

Japanese [*]                         English
 
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai             Nyuu Yooku
(Three-Power Treaty question)     (New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai           Shikago
(The question of nondiscrimina-   (Chicago)
tory treatment)                   Sanfuranshisuko
Shina Mondai                      (San Francisco)
(The China question)              Itoo Kun
Soori                             (Mr. Itoo)
(Premier)                         Date Kun 
Gaimudaijin                       (Mr. Date)
(Foreign Minister)                Tokugawa Kun
Rikugun                           (Mr. Tokugawa)
(The Army)                        Maeda Kun
Kaigun                            (Mr. Maeda)
(The Navy)                        Endan
Nichi-bei kooshoo                 (Marriage proposal)
(Japan-American negotiations)     Kimiko San
Daitooryoo                        (Miss Kimiko)
(President)                       Fumeko San
Haru                              (Miss Fumeko)
(Hull)                            Shoobai
Kokunaijoosei                     (Trade)
(Internal situation)              Yama Wo Uru
Jooho Suru                        (To sell the mountain)
(To yield)                        Yama Wo Urenu
Jooho Sezu                        (Not to sell the mountain)
(Not to yield)                    Kodomo Gaumareru
Keisei Kyunten Suru               (The child is born)
(Situation taking critical turn)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

  Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617
  Section Chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793
  The Minister's residence: Ginza 3614
  The Vice-Minister's residence: Ginza 1022

Army #25344
JD-6841                                              Trans. 11-26-41 (S)
317

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
26 November 1941 (1745 EST)
(Telephone code)*
Trans-Pacific Telephone

To Kumaicho Yamamoto** from Kurusu:

Wakasugi speaking, said:

This is Wakasugi speaking at Kurusu’s request. Kurusu and Nomura have at this very moment gone to meet Hull with whom they had an appointment at 4:45.

Yamamoto:

Would they then meet the President?

Wakasugi:

They would (arrange?) (to) meet the President after seeing Hull, but they had not yet taken steps to see the President. Hull has been conversing with the Chinese for three days past and had seen the Chinese today also. The future of the present talks would be decided during the course of today’s conversations.

Yamamoto:

Call me by telephone again upon completion of today’s meeting.

Wakasugi:

Have you anything you want me to tell Kurusu?

Yamamoto:

(Reply unintelligible to intercepter and according to him unintelligible to Wakasugi as well.)

After above few unintelligible sentences Wakasugi concluded with a promise to phone later.

(Note: A call has been placed for 2100 EST this evening).

25348 
JD-1: 6842                           (M) Navy Trans. 26 Nov. '41 (12-TT)
 
*See JD-1: 6841 (S.I.S. #25344). 
**Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST)
(Telephone Code)**
Trans-Pacific Telephone

To Kumaicho Yamamoto* from Kurusu:

Kurusu:

I have made all efforts, but they will not yield.*** I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already…

…he interrupted himself:

…you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems.

Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued:

If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable.

Yamamoto:

The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also.

After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued:

The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult.

Kurusu:

I believe it is of no avail.

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu:

I rather imagine you had expected this outcome.

Yamamoto:

Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished.

Kurusu:

I am unable to make any movement (i.e. progress?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation.

25349
JD-1: 6843                              (M)-Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (12-TT)
 
*Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.
**See JD-1: 6841, (S.I.S. #25344), of this date.
***Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The intercepter read this as "Sore... kesa" (that... this morning) and translated this as "It is now...", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.
318

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our “B” proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indochina, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indochina and Thai.)

Army 25435
JD: 6891                                             Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
319

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1180. (Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

Army 25436
JD: 6896                                             Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
320

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941. 
Purple (Extremely urgent)
#1189. (Part 1 of 2)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said,

For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th.

So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called “four principles.”

B.

  1. The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

  2. Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indochina and equality of economic treatment fir French Indochina.

  3. The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indochina.

  4. Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

  5. The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

Army 25441 Trans. 11-28-41 (1)