Japanese-American relations (7-24-41 – 11-30-41)

281

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
23 November 1941
(Purple)
#1160 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re my #1159*

From Kurusu.

Secretary Hull and I conferred for about a half an hour on the 21st to arrange our talks for the 22nd. At that time Hull said that he thought my idea of attaching so much importance to the agreement that it would outshine the Tripartite Pact, as expressed by me during our talks on the 18th, was wholeheartedly in favor of peace on the Pacific through joint action of the United States and Japan, and through this accomplishment, to contribute to the peace of the world.

He went on to say that he still remembers with pleasure that at the Economic Conference in London, he fought for free commerce shoulder to shoulder with Viscount Isii and (Eigo Fukai?). Hull said that he has looked upon Japan’s leadership in the Far East as only a natural phenomenon. It is true that Japan’s actions and statements regarding the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere have been slightly on the unpolished and abrupt side but he is able to be sympathetic with the spirit of it.

As long as Japan strives for this goal without resorting to the force of arms, the United States has nothing against the program and has no intention of interfering with its realization.

I would like to see the U.S.-Japanese relationship which existed shortly subsequent to the Russo-Japanese war reestablished. At that time Japan and the United States exercised their influence over the Far East and the Western Hemisphere respectively, but at the same time maintained very friendly relations and close cooperation in all matters with each other.

I hope that we can revive the spirit of those times and reach an agreement to maintain peace on the Pacific. At the same time, I wish that Japan would make it clear that the Tripartite Pact is not an obstacle to attaining that goal.

Under the present critical conditions, the United States acceptance or rejection of our Proposal “B” may have a vital bearing on whether or not the negotiations will break down. However, because of the circumstances outlined in my message referred to in the heading, we may receive some proposal from Hull with regard to an agreement covering the Pacific area on Monday.

In the meantime, if you have any suggestions which may lead to a settlement, please advise us immediately.

25397
JD-1: 6857                                  (D) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (2)
 
*JD-1: 6839 (S.I.S. #25347).
282

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
23 November 1941
(Purple)
#1161 (In 2 parts, complete)

Regarding my #1160*

General outline of conversation on the night of 22nd is as follows:

Trade between Japan and the United States could gradually be resumed if Japan were willing to take a peaceful attitude, representatives of foreign powers that are friendly with the United States met in conference yesterday. They were all advised of this and are to meet again on Monday, after they have reported to their own government and received their answers.

Hull continued that there was a limit to his powers, and although he understood the reason for Tokyo’s demand of urgency regarding the matter, he does not seem to see the reason why Tokyo can not wait a few days.

The Chinese Ambassador KOTEKI came to the conference yesterday, getting up from. bed (due to illness) and arriving at the end of the conference.

According to Hull he does not intend to act as a mediator in the Japan-China incident right now, or to give up aid to China, (however the aid to China today is not to a very great extent). It seems as though he wishes to handle (discuss) the China incident later.

According to reliable information it seems that to station troops for duration of necessity can be considered as stationing of troops indefinitely, but if it was stated that troops were to be stationed for a certain period of four or five years, at the end of which period conditions were to govern restationing of troops, there might not be so much opposition. But with just an indefinite stationing of troops for an indefinite period, it would be against the U.S. policy which is against annexation and interfering with self-government. (The fact that during the preparatory conference last July, the Japanese troops went into French Indochina, causing the conference of that time to be broken off) – the above was mentioned again today and thus hinting that it was hoped a similar occurrence would not develop this time.

He continued that to merely move troops which were in southern French Indochina to the north would not relieve the tension in the south Pacific or relieve the anxiousness of the countries of the south Pacific, etc. so that it was explained that to an experienced military observer this was great information and should add much to the peace of that part. Hull explained that the contents of the conference would be strictly restricted to himself alone, (then later said he would mention it to a few), so that gave the appearance of his not understanding much about military aspects.

I presented the prelude of our B Proposal and tried to get his answer of yes or no on each item, and Hull seemed to feel that our B Proposal was a demand on the United States by Japan, and seemed very displeased. He said there was no cause for Japan’s making such demands, and that he was greatly discouraged in the attitude of Japan of insisting on direct answers when he was trying so hard to arrange a peaceful negotiation between the two countries.

We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk, and at no time became excited, and the opponent’s attitude was also the same.

Hull explained that the United States was following peaceful attitude in the negotiations and he hoped Japan would also follow this peaceful attitude of the United States throughout the negotiations.

25588
JD-1:                                         (Y) Navy Trans. 12-201 (X)
 
*JD-1: 6857 (S.I.S. #25397).
283

Japanese Foreign Office (November 24, 1941)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 24, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)
#821 (Government Code)

  1. It seems that the United States as well as England, Australia, and the Netherlands is not satisfied with evacuation merely from the Southern part of French Indochina. We have gone out of our way to venture this proposal in order to break the deadlock. We absolutely cannot make any further concessions.

  2. Our expectations, as I told you in my #798, [b] go beyond the restoration of Japan-American trade and a return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B with the exception of clauses 6 and 7. Therefore, our demand for a cessation of aid to CHIANG (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition. In view of the fact that this is a just demand, the fact that the government of the United States finds it hard to accept it makes us here in Japan suffer inordinately. Therefore, on the basis of what I told you in my #816, [c] as well as all that has gone before, please make every effort to persuade the Government of the United States.

  3. Insofar as what we propose in Proposal B is concerned, the United States has misconstrued it as our demand. We here in Japan, in view of the extremely critical situation, only hope most earnestly for a speedy settlement. Naturally, that’s all we want. Speaking further on this, it is necessary to warn the United States against enticing England, Australia, the Netherlands, etc., in paving the way for a joint hostile set-up. As you have written, we would like to secure the agreement of other competent countries in accordance with the gist of my #731 [d] at the same time Japan and the United States reach an understanding.

Army 25176 Trans. 11/24/41 (S)

[a] Not available. [Note: There was no superscript "a" in the text used for the electronic version. We will check other versions of this message as times permits. LWJ]
[b] S.I.S. #25040 which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal B to the U.S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.
[c] See S.I.S. #25175.
[d] S.I.S. #24333 in which Tokyo instructs Washington to impress upon the American officials the importance of having Great Britain and the Netherlands also agree to the proposals.
284

[Secret]

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 24, 1941 
Purple (Very Urgent) 
#822. Secret outside the department.

Re my #821. [a]

On the 23rd I asked the American Ambassador in Tokyo to visit me and added the following to what I had told him in my caption telegram: The movement of Japanese troops from southern French Indochina to the north is very important from a military standpoint. The occupation of northern French Indochina is related to the basic settlement of the China incident, whereas the occupation of the southern portion was related to the freezing of funds by England and America. At the present time a total withdrawal of troops is utterly impossible and when the American President, acting as a spokesman for CHIANG KAI-SHEK, brings a proposal of peace to Japan in the China question, if Japan accepts this and enters into negotiations, it is only proper that we demand that America should not interfere with our efforts for peace. The above solution is not only the best, but the only way. Until this point is made clear, it is absolutely incompatible with the sentiment of the Japanese people to settle the Japan-American negotiations and it is impossible for us to understand why America does not agree to this. I have been making the greatest efforts for our new proposal from the standpoint of cooperation with the American peace policy and have tried to cut down our stipulations, making them clear and concise. When these negotiations are established, we intend to pursue an increasingly peaceful policy on this basis. After I had told him this, the Ambassador left at once to cable the gist to his home office.

Army 25177                                           Trans. 11-24-41 (S)
 
*S.I.S. #25176.
285

[Secret]

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 24, 1941 
Purple 
#823 (Restricted Distribution)

For both Ambassadors. The time limit set in my message #812 [a] is in Tokyo time.

Army 25178                                          Trans. 11/24/41 (NR)
JD 6744 
 
*S.I.S. #25138 In which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 28th.

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 24, 1941
J-19
#234 (Part 1 of 2)

Re your #114 [a].

Strictly Secret.

  1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

  2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

  3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.

  4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas seaplane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

[a] Not available.
 
ARMY 26351 (Japanese)                                Trans. 12-16-41 (2)
286 
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
November 24, 1941
J-19
#234 (Part 2 of 2)

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of - - - - -, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the - - - - - area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

ARMY 26352 (Japanese)                               Trans. 12/16/41 (2)
287 
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
November 24, 1941
Purple
#789

  1. Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount of military stores was removed from the “port area” during the “blackout” on the night of the 21st. Forty or fifty civilian buses (carrying the “mark” of the Manila Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal Province district. Investigations are being made to find out if these were loaded with troops.

  2. At about two o’clock in the afternoon of the 22nd, 60 light tanks (carrying one gun, two -----) and 20 ammunition trucks were seen leaving (Quezon Bridge?). These light tanks and ammunition trucks were seen on the 21st grouped near the headquarters of the “port area” military police. It is conjectured that (troops?) arrived on military boats recently entering the harbor. An English language “bulletin” of the 24th stated that a large number of light tanks and ammunition trucks had left at four and six o’clock on the afternoon of the 22nd in transit for Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in Pampanga Province. I believe that these had been landed sometime around the 21st. The final destination of these tanks and trucks is now being investigated.

  3. At present it is seen that there are two or three hundred American army trucks near the “port area” which have been imported at short intervals, creating a hurried atmosphere. Also, troops have newly arrived at (certain places in?) the hills within the city. They are evidently American reinforcements. Feeling among the people in general has become tense.

ARMY 25530 Trans. 12/1/41 (6)

288

U.S. State Department (November 24, 1941)

711.94/2476

Revised Draft of Proposed “Modus Vivendi" With Japan

Washington, November 24, 1941.

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of the questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

On November 18 the Japanese Ambassador stated that the Government of Japan is desirous of continuing the conversations with a view to agreeing upon a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that the domestic political situation in Japan is acute and urgent; that, in order to give the Japanese Government opportunity further to develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a comprehensive and liberal program of peace throughout the entire Pacific area, such as has been under discussion between our two Governments, it would be helpful if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing; and the Ambassador suggested that such modus vivendi include as one of its provisions some initial and temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to create an atmosphere favorable to pursuing the conversations which have been taking place. These proposals contain features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed.

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary modus vivendi, as follows:

Modus Vivendi

  1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.

  2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in Southeastern or Northwestern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.

  3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number in any case shall not exceed 25,000; and not to send additional forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

  4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their peoples:

a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at Japan’s option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan, the movement of which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption of freezing measures, shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.

b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:
i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree.

ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in value per month.

iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum upon a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs to be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

vi) The above stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area.

  1. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in paragraph four above.

  2. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments’ taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph four above.

  3. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

  4. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of three months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period.

...................

[Annex]

Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment
Washington, November 24, 1941.

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan

[Here follows text of Section I as printed under date of November 22.]

Section II: Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

  1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

  2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

  3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China (excluding Manchuria — see separate provision, paragraph six) and from Indochina.

  4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support — militarily, politically, economically — any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

  5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

  1. The Government of the United States will suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that those Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.

  2. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

  3. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

  4. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

  5. Both Governments will agree that no agreement to which either is party shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

  6. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

289

711.94/2476

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, November 24, 1941.

The British Ambassador, the Chinese Ambassador, the Australian Minister and the Netherlands Minister called at my request. I handed each of them a copy of the proposed modus vivendi prepared by us for submission to the Japanese Ambassador. They spent an hour reading it and taking notes to send back to their Governments.

The Chinese Ambassador objected to more than a maximum of 5,000 Japanese troops being left in Indochina. I again stated that General Marshall had a few minutes before expressed to me his opinion that 25,000 troops would be no menace and that, while this Government did not recognize the right of Japan to keep a single soldier in Indochina, we were striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to me that time is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occur — any day after this week — unless a temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated state of public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general agreement.

The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of reducing the proposed figure of 25,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina to 5,000. I pointed out and each of the representatives understood the great advantage it would be to our five countries to have Japan committed to a peaceful course for three months and set forth the advantages to each of having additional time in which to make further preparations, et cetera, et cetera. They seemed to be very much gratified. They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered that none of their Governments had given them instructions relative to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area. And yet I said their Governments, through some sort of preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his Government and that it would support the modus vivendi proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion.

There were other details discussed but they were not of major consequence nor did they constitute anything new in the record.

CORDELL HULL

711.94/2470: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

Tokyo, November 24, 1941 — 8 p.m.
[Received 8:47 p.m.]

1839.

The Ambassador reports for Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles concerning his call on Foreign Minister Togo this afternoon at the request of the latter as follows:

  1. The Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador if he was familiar with the Japanese proposal which was presented on November 20 to the Department and if he was informed of the conversation in substance on November 22 when the proposal was discussed during a call on the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador and Saburō Kurusu. In reply the Ambassador stated that the Japanese proposal had been reported to him, though not the conversation of November 22 as yet. Togo then informed the Ambassador that Secretary Hull had said he had been consulting with the representatives of other interested Governments and the item respecting withdrawal from Southern Indochina of Japanese troops was not satisfactory. Togo continued that Japan made the offer out of sincere solicitude to maintain peace in the Pacific and from anxiety for a way to be found out of the existing difficult situation. Togo said Japan could not withdraw its forces at this time from Northern Indochina because they were despatched there to hasten the China affair’s conclusion. The Minister recalled that the United States and Great Britain had instituted the freezing orders because the stationing in Southern Indochina of Japanese troops was looked upon as a threat to British and American security. He remarked that withdrawing Japanese troops to Northern Indochina evidences Japanese desire for the promotion of a successful conclusion of what he called “negotiations” with the United States. Togo said the withdrawal of Japanese troops at present stationed in French Indochina to the northern part is in any event the maximum concession Japan can make.

  2. The Minister proceeded to comment that one of the serious obstacles to concluding the present negotiations successfully is undeniably the divergence of views of the United States and Japan regarding settlement of the China affair. Togo recalled President Roosevelt’s query sometime ago of the Japanese Ambassador as to what Japan’s attitude would be should General Chiang Kai-shek issue a statement of desire to restore peace with Japan, whereupon the Japanese Government answered that it would be glad for the United States to act as an “introducer” to open the way for direct Japanese-Chinese negotiations. Minister Togo then said if Chiang Kai-shek made a statement as suggested, the Japanese Government’s response would be a statement in similar vein. Japan would be ready thereupon at once to enter into negotiations with China, with the understanding that then the United States would refrain from action prejudicial to restoring peace between China and Japan. Togo stated his inability to appreciate the reasons given by the Secretary of State for not accepting the recent Japanese proposal. Remembering Japan’s sacrifices to date, Togo declared it is not possible successfully to conclude the negotiations without reaching an understanding regarding the cessation by the United States of activities which obstruct a restoration of peace. At this point the Ambassador interrupted the Foreign Minister to say it was not clear to him at what point Japan expects such American activities to cease. Togo replied that he would like President Roosevelt’s suggestion to become a reality. The Foreign Minister wished it to be made clear that Japan expects the cessation of the activities to which he referred as soon as China and Japan begin negotiations, which would occur immediately after General Chiang Kai-shek makes the statement outlined above and after an affirmative response thereto by Japan. Togo said he was unfamiliar with military matters, but it appeared to him that normally hostilities would cease as soon as negotiations were started looking to peace being restored, thereby logically bringing about a situation when it would be unnecessary to have American action which is calculated to aid Chinese military forces.

  3. Togo informed the Ambassador that he was the one who formulated and became responsible for the Japanese proposal presented on November 20 to the United States Government. This proposal was presented as a manifestation of Japan’s desire for cooperation with the American policy of peace. Togo assured the Ambassador that the same cooperative spirit is to prompt Japan’s future policy, which is to be conducted with growing clarity in pursuit of peaceful aims.

  4. The Ambassador reports that the only statement he made to the Foreign Minister was to assure him that his observations would be promptly transmitted to the United States Government.

  5. By way of comment, the Ambassador offers the suggestion that, in case the Japanese Government does not expect suspension of United States aid to China prior to the commencement of Chinese-Japanese peace negotiations, point 4 in the Japanese proposal (i.e., non-interference by the United States in the efforts of Japan to settle the China affair) would appear to be largely to save face.

GREW

711.94/2471: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Washington, November 24, 1941 — 11 p.m.

5392.

From the President to the Former Naval Person.

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us proposals for a modus vivendi. He has represented that the conclusion of such a modus vivendi might give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that the domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal. The proposal calls for a commitment on the part of Japan to transfer to northern Indochina all the Japanese forces now stationed in southern Indochina pending the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of general peace in the Pacific area when Japan would withdraw all its troops from Indochina, commitments on the part of the United States to supply Japan a required quantity of petroleum products and to refrain from measures prejudicial to Japan’s efforts to restore peace with China and mutual commitments to make no armed advancement in the southeastern Asiatic and southern Pacific areas (the formula offered would apparently not exclude advancement into China from Indochina), to cooperate toward obtaining goods required by either in the Netherlands East Indies and to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the adoption of freezing measures.

This Government proposes to inform the Japanese Government that in the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals contain features not in harmony with the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general settlement and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. It is also proposed to offer to the Japanese Government an alternative proposal for a modus vivendi which will contain mutual pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement into areas which would include northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, not to replace those forces, to limit those in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number shall not be subject to replacement and shall not in any case exceed 25,000 and not to send additional forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to $600,000 monthly, petroleum on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in general provided that raw silk constitute at least two-thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic measures. Provision is made that the modus vivendi shall remain in force for three months with the understanding that at the instance of either party the two parties shall confer to determine whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area warrant extension of the modus vivendi.

The British Ambassador has been informed and is informing your Foreign Minister.

This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon. Roosevelt.

HULL

711.94/2471

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, November 24, 1941.

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message to the British Prime Minister containing a description of a proposal for a modus vivendi made by the Japanese Government to this Government and of a suggested alternate modus vivendi which this Government proposes to offer to the Japanese Government.

If you approve of the draft telegram, I shall arrange to have it forwarded.

CORDELL HULL

290

892.24/95

The First Secretary of the British Embassy to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Washington, November 24, 1941.

Dear Mr. Smyth:
As I told you on Saturday, Sir Josiah Crosby has conveyed to the Thai Prime Minister instructions, of which the State Department was given a copy on November 10th, as modified in accordance with our aide-mémoire of November 17th.

Sir Josiah Crosby has since reported that these instructions were received even less well than he expected, and it was clear that the Prime Minister was bitterly disappointed. He concluded the interview by saying that he would do all in his power to avoid war with Japan and would only fight if he must. He apparently told the Minister for Foreign Affairs afterwards that Great Britain would supply nothing more than oil and would leave Thailand to fight Japan alone.

Sir Josiah Crosby takes the view that the Prime Minister will now be more inclined to yield to Japanese pressure upon Thailand, which is increasing, and will silence any protests from the pro-British elements in the Government by saying that he made overtures to Great Britain which had been rejected. Sir Josiah Crosby fears that the possibility of Thailand’s entering the Japanese economic sphere must now be faced, and that a military arrangement can not be excluded.

Yours sincerely,
W. G. HAYTER

291

U.S. State Department (November 25, 1941)

892.24/83½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State

Washington, November 25, 1941.

The British Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request.

The Ambassador said he wished to discuss with me an urgent instruction he had received from his Government concerning Thailand. A message received by the British Foreign Office from Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok, gave as the opinion of the latter that the Thai Government was again becoming very shaky and that unless some practical action were taken by Great Britain and the United States, the Japanese influence would again become preponderant.

The Ambassador said that the aviation gasoline and the artillery given to the Thai Government by the British had been regarded by the former as completely insufficient and had had no appreciably beneficial effect. He stated that the Thai Government was urgently desirous of obtaining airplanes. I replied that if that was the case it would seem to me that the British might use some of the planes allocated by the United States to Great Britain which are now in Singapore and make these available to the Thai Government without publicity by flying them in at night. The Ambassador said that the trouble was that the British Government urgently needed all the airplanes they could get from us for use in Singapore. I said that that was the situation with respect to the United States since, as the Ambassador knew, we were building up as rapidly as possible our air strength in the Philippines, and I had been informed by both General Marshall and Admiral Stark that the planes that we had in the Philippines are infinitely more valuable to us there than they would be in Thailand.

The Ambassador then suggested on behalf of his Government that the situation might be ameliorated by a credit of $10,000,000 to Thailand by the United States. I said that this matter would be given immediate consideration.

SUMNER WELLES

756D.94/191

The Netherland Minister to the Adviser on Political Relations

Washington, November 25, 1941.

Dear Stanley:
Please find enclosed two confidential memoranda for your personal information.

One of the enclosed refers to the possibility of assistance by Australian troops for defense of certain strategic points in the Netherlands East Indies.

In the other memorandum you will find some indications as to the source and the meaning of rumors concerning the presence of Japanese expeditionary forces in the waters of the Netherlands East Indies.

I am enclosing a personal and confidential note, addressed to the Secretary of State, with a memorandum containing the comments of the Netherlands Government on the tentative proposals of Mr. Kurusu.

Believe me [etc.]

A. LOUDON

[Enclosure 1]

The Netherland Legation to the Department of State

Washington, November 14, 1941.

For some time there have been continually rumors, among others from Portuguese source, about movements of Japanese expeditionary forces. There has, however, been nothing positive. In mentioning recently a rumor about approaching expeditionary forces, the object was, therefore, to point out that in view of the existing tension the entry of Japanese forces in the waters of the Netherlands East Indies can only be interpreted as done with aggressive intentions.

[Enclosure 2]

The Netherland Legation to the Department of State

A small number of quarter masters from Australia will be sent to Ambon Koepang and Namlea to prepare quarters in order that in case of hostilities larger forces can be directed to said places. Arrangements for the sending of these forces in case of emergency have already been made.

A limited number of aviation technicians will also proceed to these places.

This matter has been arranged in common understanding between the British, Australian and Netherlands Governments.

292

Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt

Chungking, November 25, 1941.

Lauchlin Currie:
After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador’s conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo’s very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan’s military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any modus vivendi now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President’s fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan’s escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

LATTIMORE

711.93/481½

Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, to the Secretary of State

Washington, November 25, 1941.

I have just received a cable from Owen Lattimore in which he tells me that the Generalissimo is greatly agitated by the report from the Chinese Ambassador following his conference with you. Lattimore makes a point that Chiang Kai-shek’s reliance on America is the foundation of his whole national policy and that this would be destroyed by any loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing on our part while leaving Japan entrenched in China. He draws an analogy to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige in China. Lattimore remarked that he had never really seen Chiang Kai-shek agitated before.

293

711.94/2479

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, November 25, 1941.

The Chinese Ambassador called at his request. He sought to make profuse preliminary explanations, stating among other things that the Foreign Minister of China understood very well the broad international aspects of the Japanese situation as it relates to several countries, including China and the United States, but that the Generalissimo was not so well acquainted with the situation, and hence his reported opposition to our modus vivendi. He then handed me a telegram, dated November 24, 1941, from his Foreign Minister, a copy of which is hereto attached.

I replied that in the first place the official heads of our Army and Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan until they have had an opportunity to increase further their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the second place, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan for conversations with this Government looking toward a broad peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been carrying on conversations and making some progress thus far; and the Japanese are urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of a broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the proposed modus vivendi is really a part and parcel of the efforts to carry forward these general conversations for the reasons that have been fully stated from time to time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador and to others.

I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek ignores that situation which we have taken care of for him and inveighs loudly about another matter relating to the release of certain commodities to Japan corresponding to the progress made with our conversations concerning a general peace agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal would relieve the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area, including Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and also the United States, with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes. All of this relief from menace to each of the countries would continue for ninety days. One of our leading admirals stated to me recently that the limited amount of more or less inferior oil products that we might let Japan have during that period would not to any appreciable extent increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I said that, of course, we can cancel this proposal but it must be with the understanding that we are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a military drive southward.

The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that he would send back to his Government a fuller explanation which he hoped might relieve the situation more or less. Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly spirit.

CORDELL HULL

...............

[Annex]

Telegram From the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chinese Ambassador

Chungking, November 24, 1941.

Reference is made to your telegram of November 22.

After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed rather strong reaction. He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside the Chinese question in its conversation with Japan instead of seeking a solution, and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China. I have explained to him that the Secretary of State has always had the greatest respect for the fundamental principles, and that I believe he has made no concession to Japan. The fact that he inquires of the possibility of a modus vivendi shows that he has not yet revealed anything to the Japanese. We are, however, firmly opposed to any measure which may have the effect of increasing China’s difficulty in her war of resistance, or of strengthening Japan’s power in her aggression against China.

Please inform the Secretary of State.

294

711.94/2477

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, November 25, 1941.

The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me a memorandum, a copy of which is hereto attached. I commented briefly on the impossibility of not letting the Japanese have some oil for strictly civilian use, if we, in turn, are to secure the tremendously valuable commitment by the Japanese not to move on any aggressive course outside of China proper during the next three months. I pointed out to the Ambassador the advantages to China with respect to the Burma Road and its possible destruction and the removal of any menace to the South Sea area which would be of great interest and advantage to Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States as well.

I emphasized that this proposed modus vivendi was really a part of what the Japanese claimed to be a continuance of the same conversations held heretofore relative to a permanent agreement on a peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area. I also pointed out the utter impracticability of requesting a suspension of further military advances in China in addition to the preceding assurances.

The Ambassador referred to the provision in the proposed draft of a modus vivendi limiting the Japanese troops in Indochina to 25,000 and urged that that number be reduced in our draft. I said that we would do the best we could in the matter, that our Army and Navy experts feel that 25,000 in North Indochina would not be a menace to the Burma Road, and that even double that number would not be a serious menace.

CORDELL HULL

...............

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Japanese proposal is clearly unacceptable and the only question appears to be whether:
a) To reject it and (while making it clear that a limited agreement is not ruled out) to leave it to the Japanese to produce a better offer, or

b) to make a counter proposal.

We have complete confidence in Mr. Hull’s handling of these negotiations and he is in the best position to judge which of these two courses is the better tactics. We feel sure that he fully understands that the Japanese will try to force a hurried decision by magnifying the dangers of delay. If having taken this into account he feels it best to put forward a counterproposal we will support this course.

The Japanese proposal should, we feel, be regarded as the opening movement in a process of bargaining. It puts their own desiderata at a maximum and the price at a minimum. If a counterproposal is to be made we suggest that this process should be reversed and that our demands should be pitched high and our price low.

The removal of merely “the bulk” of Japanese troops from Indochina would allow too wide a loophole. It is doubtful whether we should be justified in accepting this as satisfactory and still less in suggesting it. Apart from the desirability of pitching a counterproposal higher than we may obtain, it seems advisable from the Chinese angle so to frame it as to frustrate the possibility of any attack on Kunming during the currency of an interim agreement.

On this basis we would suggest for the consideration of the United States Government that any counterproposal should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indochina not merely of the Japanese “troops” as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval, military and air forces with their equipment and for the suspension of further military advances in China in addition to satisfactory assurances regarding other areas in Southeast Asia, the Southern Pacific and Russia; the quid pro quo being legitimate relaxation of existing economic measures so as to allow the export of limited quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian population, but excluding goods of direct importance to the war potential, in particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no shortage except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course only become effective as and when withdrawal of Japanese armed forces took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of a similar nature from Japan if we required them.

Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the United States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned.

The above represents our immediate reaction, sent without consultation with the Dominion Governments who as in the case of the Netherlands and the Chinese Governments may have other suggestions.

There remains the question raised as to the degree of authority to be delegated to the representatives of the powers concerned in Washington. We are of course anxious to facilitate Mr. Hull’s difficult task in all possible ways. But our economic structure is so complicated (in particular by the necessity of consultation with other parts of the Empire) that we do not think it practicable at this stage to give carte blanche to diplomatic representatives. If the United States Government favour the suggestion which we made above, it will be necessary to define more closely the distinction between goods of importance to the welfare of the Japanese civilian population and those of direct importance to Japan’s war potential, and to consider whether relaxation of economic pressure should be operated by financial control or by barter. After this stage we would be prepared to consider the question of discretion afresh.

295

711.94/2088

The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State

Washington, 25 November, 1941.

Dear Mr. Hull:
Thinking over our conversation this morning I was not quite sure whether I placed quite sufficient emphasis on what I have no doubt would be the strong feeling of His Majesty’s Government in regard to the question of numbers of Japanese troops in Indochina.

I recognize, as you know, to the full your difficulty about total withdrawal, and I also appreciate that it is your wish as much as that of anybody else to keep the numbers as low as possible. I have little doubt that it would be the feeling of my Government that, subject to your fuller knowledge and judgment, it would be wise to start the discussion on as low a figure as possible, and that 25,000 would strike them as an undesirably high figure at which to start discussion.

I have telegraphed to Eden of your proposed addition on this subject in the sense of reserving the position of the United States as to the Japanese right to have any troops in Indochina at all.

Yours very sincerely,
HALIFAX

296

711.94/2559

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State

Washington, November 25, 1941.

The Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation called to see me this afternoon. He said that his Minister, Mr. McCarthy, was in Warm Springs and that he had consequently come himself with a personal and urgent message from his Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King.

He said that Mr. Mackenzie King is very much concerned at the newspaper reports that Secretary Hull has been consulting the Pacific powers, namely Great Britain, the Netherlands, Australia and China, through their representatives in Washington, concerning his conversations with the Japanese Government representatives, and that the Canadian representative had not been included in these conversations. Mr. King felt that Canada was as much a Pacific power as any of those mentioned and was as vitally interested in the outcome of the discussions with Japan as the others and he desired to express his regret and concern that Canada had not been included.

Mr. Hume Wrong mentioned in his own behalf that he believed the Canadian press had taken up this matter and was emphasizing the fact that a Canadian contingent of troops had only recently been sent to Singapore, and that in view of these facts the omission of Canada had created considerable astonishment.

I said that I would immediately lay this message before Secretary Hull. I said, however, that without being familiar with the precise circumstances, I knew of no country for which the Secretary of State had a higher regard than for Canada, nor a greater appreciation of its importance in the Pacific region.

Furthermore, I said that there certainly was no statesman for whom Mr. Hull had a higher personal regard than Mr. Mackenzie King. I said that, without any certainty, I could only assume that the Secretary of State had believed that in view of the constant and close contact between Mr. Mackenzie King and the President, the former had been kept closely apprised by the latter of all developments with regard to the Japanese situation and that for that reason he had not believed it necessary to include a Canadian representative in these discussions.

After discussing the matter with Secretary Hull, I telephoned Mr. Wrong and said that I wished to reiterate what I had previously stated, but also to add that in the hurry and rush of these recent days, Secretary Hull very naturally had called in to conference with him the representatives of the Pacific powers who had been during the past months discussing these Pacific matters with him almost daily. I said the fact that Mr. McCarthy had not been discussing these matters with Secretary Hull was one of the reasons that it had not occurred to Mr. Hull to include a representative of Canada in the conversation, but that Secretary Hull would be more than happy in any future conversations that might be held to see to it that Canada is represented. I emphasized Secretary Hull’s high regard and esteem for Canada and for the Prime Minister, and his regret that any apparent misunderstanding had taken place.

SUMNER WELLES

297

751G.94/404⅔

The Netherland Minister to the Secretary of State

Washington, November 25, 1941.

My Dear Mr. Secretary:
I have the honor to transmit herewith in form of a memorandum the comments of Her Majesty’s Government with regard to the tentative proposals of Mr. Kurusu which you were kind enough to communicate to me last Saturday.

Believe me [etc.]

A. LOUDON

...........

[Enclosure]

The Netherland Legation to the Department of State

Memorandum

Washington, November 25, 1941.

As it seems impossible to discuss at present a final and general agreement, it is necessary that for the reasons expressed by the Secretary of State, it should be endeavored to arrive at a limited and temporary agreement.

In view of the fact that before the occupation of Indochina by Japan no sanctions were applied against the latter, it seems reasonable that if Japan gradually withdraws from Indo-China proportionately sanctions may be lifted to a certain extent, provided, however, that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochina goes so far that the remaining Japanese forces cannot be considered a direct threat of the Netherlands Indies, Malakka, the Philippine Islands and the Burma road.

But even in that event, according to the opinion of the Netherlands Government, sanctions should not be lifted to such an extent that this would constitute an increase of Japan’s war potential. For instance no delivery of high octane gasoline should be allowed, but rice and if necessary low grade oils could be furnished.

The Netherlands Government will be glad to follow the same policy concerning oil deliveries to Japan as applied by the United States. It goes without saying that the license system will remain in operation.

The first point at issue of the Japanese proposals is aiming farther than the above. The Netherlands Government wonders whether it might not be possible to give the following reply:

  1. If it is the intention of Japan to militarily withdraw from China, then there are no objections; if Japan is not willing to do so, then the right to continue to give assistance to China should be reserved.

  2. It should be proposed that Northeast Asia (Russia) be also included in the regions enumerated in point 1 of the Japanese proposal in which regions the powers should agree that no armed advance should take place.

Point 2 of the Japanese proposal has been answered by the above observations.

Ad point 3 of the Japanese proposals. The Netherlands are prepared to treat all countries on the same favored footing provided that no foreign power tries to obtain a preponderant position in the Netherlands Indies to the detriment of other nations and provided that defense requirements be taken into account.

Point 4 and 5 of the Japanese proposals have already been dealt with in the above observations.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that the above gives at least room for discussions with which we fully entrust the Secretary of State especially now that we have been so fully informed by him and since we have been given the opportunity to inform him of our point of view.

As far as the possible reduction of economic pressure on Japan is concerned, consultations with Governor General Starkenborgh and Economic Warfare will be necessary in view of the fact that deliveries of tin and rubber which were originally destined for Japan are now being shipped to the United States.

In general it will not be possible to go further than the final proposals of the Batavia Conference as proposed before the Netherlands-Japanese discussions had been broken off. Moreover as a result of Russian and American purchases, the amounts of tin and rubber offered in the final proposals are no more available.

298

793.94/17001⅘

Dr. T. V. Soong, of China Defense Supplies, Inc., to the Secretary of War

Washington, November 25, 1941.

Dear Mr. Secretary:
I am in receipt of a telegram from General Chiang Kai-shek, copy of which please find enclosed. I shall be grateful if you could see me to discuss the message, or otherwise let me know if you have any reply to give to General Chiang.

With kind regards [etc.]

T. V. SOONG

...........

[Enclosure]

Telegram From General Chiang Kai-shek to Dr. T. V. Soong

Chungking, November 25, 1941

I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram yesterday. Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox and Stimson immediately.

Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency, the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They have even come to a silent but none the less definite understanding with the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone.

We could therefore only request the United States Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies from China is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the breakdown of our resistance. Our more than four years of struggle with the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do not indeed know how history in future will record this episode.

299

711.94/2476

Final Draft of Proposed Modus Vivendi With Japan

Washington, November 25, 1941.

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such modus vivendi include as one of its provisions some initial and temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States.

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed.

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary modus vivendi, as follows:

Modus vivendi

  1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.

  2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.

  3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval, land or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.
    The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the position of the Government of the United States with regard to the presence of foreign troops in that area.

  4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their peoples:

a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at Japan’s option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.

b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:

i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree.

ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in value per month.

iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs will be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

vi) The above stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area.

  1. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in paragraph four above.

  2. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments’ taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph four above.

  3. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

  4. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of three months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period.

There is attached in tentative form a plan of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of the kind of program which this Government has in mind to be worked out during the further conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States while this modus vivendi would be in effect.

[Annex]

Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment
Washington, November 25, 1941.

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan

[Here follows text of Section I as printed under date of November 22 on page 637 and Section II as printed under date of November 24 on page 645, except that the parenthetical section of paragraph 3 was omitted, paragraph 6 was omitted and the subsequent paragraphs renumbered, and the last two paragraphs were revised as follows:]

  1. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

  2. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

300

Japanese Foreign Office (November 25, 1941)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Nanking
25 November 1941
(Purple)
#499

Re your #818*

To Naval authorities:
We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while.

25390 
JD-1: 6848                               (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)
 
*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
25 November 1941
(Purple)
#1177

Re your #792*

In this office we are withholding all reports regarding the content of the Japanese-American negotiations themselves or any predictions regarding the future. The State Department also is exercising extreme caution in its press conferences. Hence the Japanese correspondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news. I have observed particularly this meaningless competition to get the news among the correspondents who have come to Washington from New York. That this senseless competition to gather inaccurate news will not exert a harmful influence on the course of the negotiations themselves is something that I cannot guarantee. In view of this situation I would greatly appreciate it if the Foreign Office would speak a word of caution to the newspapers concerned regarding this useless competition between their special correspondents in collecting news regarding these negotiations. And it would be particularly helpful if the head offices of the newspapers concerned would issue orders direct to their special correspondents along this line.

25434
JD-1:6880                                   (H) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
 
*Not available.