711.94/254023/35President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State
Undated6 months
U.S. to resume economic relations — some oil and rice now — more later.
Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or any place South — (Dutch, Brit, or Siam).
Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact even if U.S. gets into European war.
U.S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U.S. to take no part in their conversations.
Later on Pacific agreements.
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711.94/11–2141Draft Prepared by the Adviser on Political Relations
UndatedOutline of a possible agreement
The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake to desist from or refrain from any enlargement of their military establishments at any points in the Pacific outside of territories under their respective sovereignties or mandate.
They also agree not to make any armed advancement from points at which they now have military establishments against any neighboring areas.
They agree to cooperate with a view to obtaining and insuring acquisition of goods and commodities which are needed by either of them from sources in third countries for normal and legitimate economic activities.
They undertake reciprocally to rescind within three months their respective freezing regulations and operations, each so far as the other is directly affected thereby.
They declare themselves committed to principles and a procedure of economic policy as follows: [see draft given to Admiral Nomura on November 15].
They agree that in case either of them embarks upon military activities inconsistent with the provisions of the first paragraph above, the obligations of the other under this agreement shall automatically terminate.
Japanese Foreign Office (November 20, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
20 November, 1941
(Purple-CA)
#806
It seems that your #1136* passed my #798** enroute, but under the circumstances here, we regret that the plan suggested by you, as we have stated in our message would not suffice for saving the present situation.
We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our #798. Please understand this. The Premier also is absolutely in accord with this opinion.
S.I.S. #25038
JD-1: 6663 (F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)
*Not yet available.
**JD-1: 6658.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Ankara
November 20, 1941
J-16
Circular #2364 (Strictly secret)
-
Since the formation of the Cabinet, the Government has been in conference for successive days with the Imperial General Headquarters. They have given due consideration to the development of a fundamental national policy which will correspond to the urgent exigencies of the situation. Insofar as this is concerned, in the conference which took place on the morning of the 5th, decisions were reached covering fundamental policies having to do with the adjustment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States.
-
Insofar as Japanese-American negotiations are concerned, in proceeding upon these negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations on a just basis, conferences have been in progress since the 7th. However, there is great disparity between their opinions and our own. In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is considerable doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations will be reached. Insofar as we are concerned we have lent our maximum efforts in order to bring about a settlement of the negotiations. However, the situation not permitting any further conciliation by us, an optimistic view for the future is not permitted. In the event that negotiations are broken off, we expect that the situation in which Japan will find herself will be extremely critical. The above is for your information alone.
This message is addressed to Switzerland, Turkey and Moscow. Switzerland will transmit to France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and South Africa. Turkey will transmit to Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary.
Army: 25427 Trans. 11/28/41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 20, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1144
At noon on the 20th I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL at the State Department and we talked for an hour and a half. Today we went into a somewhat lengthy explanation of the various subjects taken up in the instructions in your message #798 [a]. On everything else HULL expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion, however, when we came to the part about the United States doing nothing to obstruct our efforts for a comprehensive peace with China, he showed that he was terribly aroused. He said, “So long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG just like it will also be impossible to cut off assistance from Great Britain,” or words to that effect. He said that in any case, after particular study, he would have some views to express.
Army 25137 Trans. 11/22/41 (2)
[a] See S.I.S. #25040. Tokyo says that no further concessions can be made other than the "B" Proposal and if the United States' consent to this cannot be scoured negotiations will have to be broken off.
[Secret]
To: Tokyo
From: Washington
November 20, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)
#1147. Departmental secret
To be handled in Government Code.
(Part 1 of 2)
Our conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as follows: (That day is America’s biggest holiday. They call it “Thanksgiving.” In spite of that, however, Mr. HULL not only agreed to talk with, but seemed glad to see both me and Ambassador KURUSU when we went to call on him.)
First, we explained the various items mentioned in the instructions in your #798 [a]. HULL had only one or two questions about the other parts and expressed hardly any opinions but, when we came to the part where we state that we do not want the United States to do anything to hinder us in bringing about a complete peace over China, he seemed extremely reluctant to consider it. He went on to reiterate what he has always said about the Tri-Partite Alliance. He said that so long as fears emanating from that treaty existed in the heads of the Americans, the United States would find it well-nigh impossible to cease aiding CHIANG KAI-SHEK and that, as we knew, the United States is now opposing the German policy of military expansion which knows no bounds; that on the one hand she is helping Great Britain and on the other hand CHIANG KAI-SHEK; that therefore until we Japanese made it perfectly clear that our policy is to be one of peace, it will be impossible to cease aiding China, just like it will be impossible to stop aiding England. He continued that, leading up to the state of affairs we find today, American interests in Japan, including Manchukuo, had undergone terrible embarrassment.
Army 25179 Trans. 11-24-41 (S)
[a] S.I.S. #25040 which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal "B" to the U. S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 20, 1941
Purple
#1147 (Part 2 of 2) (Departmental Secret)
(To be handled in Government Code.)
KURUSU said, “When I had an interview with the President the other day, he talked as if he would like to act as an introducer. Now if he wants to take the trouble to do this introducing in order to bring about peace, I cannot reconcile it with continued assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK, which actually hinders peace. In other words, it seems quite reasonable to us to ask the President to stop aiding CHIANG if he is going to act as an introducer.” HULL replied, “Well, what the President meant when he said that was that he was pre-supposing that you Japanese would first make it apparent that your fundamental policy was peaceful. Heretofore, influential Japanese statesmen have expressed opinions favorable to HITLER’s military expansion policy, and the American people find it very difficult to believe that Japan is turning peaceful.” I said, “Well, the plan which I proposed today makes no progress whatever on two or three points. However, since the situation is so tense, if the tension between Japan and the United States can be relaxed, be it ever so little, particularly in the southwestern Pacific, and quickly clear the atmosphere, then I think we could go on and settle everything else.” HULL said, “Yes, I understand what you mean thoroughly, but that would be very hard to do. In any case, you and I have on our shoulders a heavy responsibility toward both the Japanese and American people. I might say toward the whole human race.” Mr. HULL’s face assumed a sadly compassionate expression, and he said, "I want to think over this proposal you have brought me fully and sympathetically, and then I want to talk to you again.
Army 25180 Trans. 11/22/41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 20, 1941
Purple
#1148. (To be handled in government code)
Secretary of State HULL, in the conversations I detailed in my #1144 [a], expressed his satisfaction that in the last two or three days Japanese newspaper editorial comment on the United States had become calm. This, doubtless, is due to your great efforts.
Since newspaper editorial comment in this country has become extremely circumspect in conjunction with our conversations, no doubt as a reflection of State Department opinion, I would like to have you continue your efforts in guiding newspaper opinion.
Army 25174 Trans. 11/24/41 (2)
[a] S.I.S. #25137 in which HULL says that so long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy, it will be impossible to stop aiding China.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 20, 1941
J-19
#111
Strictly secret.
Please investigate comprehensively the fleet - - - - - bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.
ARMY 25694 JD 7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
November 20, 1941
J-19
#310
-
On the 19th and 20th, four American cargo ships, one British cargo ship and one tanker, and one French - - - - -, passed across to the Pacific.
-
An American cargo ship and one tanker passed across to the Atlantic.
-
(- - - - - message goes off - - - - -.)
ARMY 26092 (Japanese) Trans. 12/10/41 (2)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Manila
November 20, 1941
Purple
#372 (Strictly Secret)
Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of drift ----- presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay.
Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo.
ARMY 25314 Trans. 11-26-41 (6)
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U.S. Department of State (November 20, 1941)
711.94/254022/35Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 20, 1941.The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that they had referred to their Government the suggestion which the Ambassador had made at a previous meeting in regard to a return to the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into south Indochina last July, and said that they had anticipated that the Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal on that basis. He said, however, that the proposal represented an amplification of the Ambassador’s suggestion. He then read the proposal to the Secretary which was as follows:
[Here follows text of the proposal printed infra]
The Secretary said that he would later examine the proposal, and that he would give sympathetic study to the proposal speaking generally, but that the comments which he was about to make were not directed specifically to the proposal but to the general situation. The Secretary said that Japan had it in its power at any moment to put an end to the present situation by deciding upon an all-out peaceful course; that at any moment Japan could bring to an end what Japan chose to call encirclement. He said that we want to have Japan develop public opinion in favor of a peaceful course. Mr. Kurusu said that if we could alleviate the situation by adopting a proposal such as the Japanese Government had just made it would help develop public opinion. The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government was clearly desirous of peace and that it was trying to show this peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Thailand which adoption of the proposal would accomplish.
The Secretary asked what the Ambassador thought would be the public reaction in this country if we were to announce tomorrow that we had decided to discontinue aid to Great Britain. He said that in the minds of the American people the purposes underlying our aid to China were the same as the purposes underlying aid to Great Britain; that the American people believed that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan of the other half; and that the fact of the Tripartite Alliance and the continual harping by Japanese leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type such as “new order in East Asia” and “co-prosperity sphere” served to strengthen the public in their belief. What was therefore needed, the Secretary pointed out, was the manifestation by Japan of a clear purpose to pursue peaceful courses.
The Ambassador replied that there was no doubt of Japan’s desire for peace, as this was clear from the eagerness of the Japanese Government to reach a settlement of the China affair — and indeed adoption of the Japanese Government’s proposal that he had just presented was designed to bring about speedy settlement of the China affair. He said that the Japanese people after four years of fighting were jaded and that the slogans to which the Secretary had made reference were intended to encourage the Japanese people to push on to victory.
The Secretary said that we of course are anxious to help work this matter out for if we should get into trouble everybody was likely to get hurt.
Mr. Kurusu said that if we could go ahead with the present proposal the Japanese idea would be that we could go on working at fundamentals. He said that Japan has never pledged itself to a policy of expansion. The Secretary observed that the Chinese might have an answer to that point. The Secretary said that our people desired to avoid a repetition in east Asia of what Hitler was doing in Europe; that our people oppose the idea of a “new order” under military control. He said also that the public in this country thinks that Japan is chained to Hitler. Mr. Kurusu asked how Japan could eradicate such a belief as Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Pact. The Secretary said that he did not want to be disagreeable, but he felt he must observe that Japan did not talk that way about the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. Kurusu said something about the Nine Power Treaty being twenty years old and being outmoded. The Secretary said that of course he did not wish to argue the matter. He said that when the Japanese complained about our helping China the public in this country wonders what is underneath the Comintern Pact. He emphasized that Japan is doing this country tremendous injury in the Pacific; that Japanese statesmen ought to understand that we are helping China for the same reason that we are helping Britain; that we are afraid of the military elements led by Hitler. He added that the methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in China were not unlike Hitler’s methods. The Ambassador asked how we could save the situation at this juncture. The Secretary replied that he agreed upon the urgent importance of saving it, but he asked whether the Ambassador thought that the Japanese statesmen could tone down the situation in Japan. Mr. Kurusu said, with reference to the fifth point in the Japanese proposal, that he did not know whether his Government would agree but he thought that that point might be interpreted to mean that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that negotiations were started. The Secretary made no comment on that point but noted that in the last few days there had been marked subsidence in warlike utterances emanating from Tokyo, and he felt that it was indeed a great tribute to the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that so much had been accomplished in this direction within a short space of two days as he felt sure that it was their efforts which had brought this about. He said that if so much had been accomplished within the course of two days, much more could be accomplished in the course of a longer period.
No time was set for the next meeting.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
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711.94/254022/35Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State
November 20, 1941
Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake hot to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indochina where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.
The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.
In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indochina to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.
The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.
The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.
The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.
- The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
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U.S. Department of State (November 21, 1941)
711.94/11–2141Draft Document Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 21, 1941.Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan
Section I: Draft mutual declaration of policy
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:
The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries, and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
Section II: Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan, respectively
A. The Government of the United States proposes to take steps as follows:
To effect normal dispositions of American naval vessels now based on Hawaii, it being understood that this does not involve limiting in any way the freedom of action and of decision of the Government of the United States with regard to the disposition of naval forces of the United States.
To negotiate a multilateral non-aggression pact with Japan, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and the Soviet Union.
To suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that those Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.
To enter into negotiations with the British, Chinese, Dutch, Thai and Japanese Governments for the conclusion of an agreement where under each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.
To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
To endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British Government to give up British extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
To enter into negotiations with Japan for the conclusion of a trade agreement between the two countries, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
To agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds up to $500,000,000 for this purpose, half supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
To remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.
To take steps, upon the conclusion of this agreement and upon the signing of the multilateral nonaggression pact mentioned under item two above, directed toward termination of the Nine Power Treaty relating to Principles and Policies concerning China signed at Washington, February 6, 1922.
B. The Government of Japan proposes to take steps as follows:
To withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China (excluding Manchuria — see separate provision A–3) and from Indochina.
To withdraw all support — military, political, economic — from any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and concessions and rights under the Boxer Protocol.
To enter into discussions with the United States with a view to effecting mutually satisfactory arrangements for the sale or chartering to the United States of such tonnage of Japanese merchant shipping as may be agreed upon; also, for the construction under contract in Japanese shipyards for the United States of vessels, on a cost-plus-twenty-percent basis or such other basis as may be mutually agreeable, it being understood that the United States will sell Japan such raw materials as it may be necessary for Japan to import for these purposes.
To negotiate a multilateral non-aggression pact with the United States, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and the Soviet Union.
To remove the freezing restrictions on American funds in Japan.
711.94/2474Memorandum by the Secretary of State
Washington, November 21, 1941.Ambassador Kurusu called at my hotel apartment at his request. He had no business to take up with me except to refer to the Japanese interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and handed me a draft of a paper which he proposed to sign by way of attempted clarification. I looked at the paper and then asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more on the whole subject of a peaceful settlement to offer. He replied that he did not. I said that I did not think this would be of any particular help and so dismissed it. This was virtually all that was said of importance.
CORDELL HULL
...................
[Annex]Draft letter handed by Mr. Saburō Kurusu to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 20, 1941.Mr. Secretary:
Through several conversation[s] I have had the honor of holding with Your Excellency, I was rather surprised to learn that a deep-seated misconception prevails among your people about the obligation which Japan assumed under the Tripartite Pact.As Your Excellency is fully aware I am the one who signed the said treaty under the instructions of my Government; and I am very happy to make the following statement which I trust will serve to eradicate the aforesaid false impression:
It goes without saying that this treaty can not and does not infringe, in any way, upon the sovereign right of Japan as an independent state.
Besides, as Article III of the Pact stands, Japan is in a position to interpret its obligation freely and independently and is not to be bound by the interpretation which the other high contracting parties may make of it. I should like to add that my Government is not obligated by the aforementioned treaty or any other international engagement to become a collaborator or cooperator in any aggression whatever by any third Power or Powers.
My Government would never project the people of Japan into war at the behest of any foreign Power; it will accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preservation of national life against active injustice.
I hope that the above statement will assist you in removing entirely the popular suspicion which Your Excellency has repeatedly referred to. I have to add that, when a complete Understanding is reached between us, Your Excellency may feel perfectly free to publish the present communication.
I have [etc.]
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711.94/254024/35The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 21, 1941.
Subject: Far Eastern SituationWar Plans Division has made a hasty study from a military viewpoint of your tentative “Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan,” and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for discussion. The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives — the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific, would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British — both of which are highly important.
The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.
War Plans Division suggests the deletion of Par. B.–5. The proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely unacceptable to Russia. The geographical layout in the Manchurian–Siberian area is such that military time and space factors are all in favor of Japan. Furthermore, it would be most difficult to reach an agreement as to what are “equivalent forces” and the measures to be taken to insure that no unauthorized increases are made in those forces. Such an arrangement would increase the vulnerability of the Russian position, particularly in the Maritime Provinces, and at the same time remove the very real threat to Japanese cities of the Russian Air based therein. From the U.S. viewpoint, it is greatly to our advantage to have the possibility of access to Siberian airfields securely guarded by a potential ally.
The paper has been considered as a whole. If major changes are made in its provisions, it is requested that the War Department be given an opportunity to consider the military aspects of such changes.
The Chief of Staff is out of the city and consequently this paper has not been presented for his consideration. War Plans Division believes that he would concur in the views expressed above.
L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General
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711.94/254025/35The Chief of Naval Operations to the Secretary of State
Washington, 21 November 1941. Op–10 Hu
Subject: Comment on “Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan,[”] of November 19, 1941.I respectfully submit the following. Reference is made to similarly numbered sections and paragraphs. Where paragraphs are not mentioned, concurrence is implied.
Par. A–1.Further study of this paragraph confirms the feeling I expressed to you this morning that it is unacceptable. It commits the United States to naval restrictions without imposing compensating naval restrictions on Japan. I think under no circumstances the word “reduce” should be employed, since our naval forces in the Pacific are inadequate and should not have to undergo additional loss of strength. I again note that this paragraph makes no reference to land or air components; I assume this was intentional and of course I wish we could get away with it but I doubt it. If some such paragraph is necessary I suggest a wording approximately as follows:Not to increase United States combatant naval (and military) forces in the Philippines.
I included the (and military) in case they bring the point up and we have to acquiesce. I strongly hope that present plans for Army increases in planes, which will be largely carried out by 1 March, could be excluded from any limitation agreement but this too might have to be accepted.
Par. A–5.As I mentioned this morning I just don’t like the idea of our buying Hongkong from the British and giving it to China. If this is to be done I think the British at least ought to make this contribution to a cause more important for the British Commonwealth than for the United States. Portugal should likewise give up Macao.
Par. A–8 & 9.This is somewhat out of Navy province but I assume that in view of the present unfavorable financial status it has been considered these two paragraphs should be inserted. I can realize their great importance and the desire to have them form an integral part of any agreement that might be reached.
Par. B–l.Change the period to a comma and add the words:…including Hainan, Macao and the islands of the China Sea to the southward of Formosa.
This would include among others the highly important Spratly Islands.
Par. B–2.Suggest the following addition to this paragraph:To refrain from establishing or supporting any government or regime in Indo-China, other than the regularly established French Government.
This is to make clear our objection to any puppet regime, etc.
Par. B–5.I doubt the usefulness of this paragraph believing that it would prove unacceptable to both Russia and Japan. This morning I expressed it—If I were a Russian I would not trust them.
If good faith could be assured there might be something to it. I believe it might better be left out.
Par. B–6.I confirm my comment this morning. I do not believe Japan could accept it and certainly not with regard to their naval vessels; it would be a humiliating procedure from their standpoint; I would not mention it. There might be some chance of utilization of some of their present shipping if world conditions prevent their full utilization of it. However, this merchant shipping is an integral part of Japan’s economic system and was built at great expense and difficulty. At the most the only proposal I would submit would be to buy a specific total of merchant ship tonnage; this might refer only to future construction if present construction could not be obtained. Chartering, as mentioned by some one this morning, might be considered.
General. Not in the paper.The provisions of the paper may be assumed to abrogate the tri-partite treaty on the part of Japan, but if it could be specifically so stated it would be helpful on this side of the water.H. R. STARK
811.711/1649: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 21, 1941 — 8 p.m. [Received November 21 — 6:57 a.m.]
1831.
- Tokyo Asahi this morning reported that the director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, replying on November 20 to an interpellation in a committee of the Lower House, stated that the action of the American authorities in withholding mail from the Tatsuta Maru was:
…an extremely unfriendly act and contravened the understanding which was reached with regard to the sending of the vessel.
At my direction the Counselor called this afternoon on Mr. Yamamoto and inquired whether the Asahi story were correct. Mr. Yamamoto replied that he had submitted to the committee a written reply to a heated interpellation criticizing the Japanese Government for failing to protest to the American Government with regard to the incident; that the story omitted his account of the satisfactory action of the American Government in sending forward the mail on subsequent vessels; but that he had in fact used the words as above quoted. He was informed that the Japanese oral statement delivered to the Department on October 7 made no mention of the carrying of mails and that that fact was admitted on November 4 by the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington. When informed that I desired that a statement be issued by the Foreign Office which would in effect retract the statement above quoted, Mr. Yamamoto said that no correction of his official reply could be made as the Diet had adjourned and he expressed unwillingness to have any correction released by the Foreign Office. He said that he would however be prepared to write me a letter of explanation.
As it is unlikely that any Japanese newspaper would be prepared to publish any statement from the Embassy controverting the reply to the interpellation made by Mr. Yamamoto, I recommend that I be authorized to address to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a formal note taking strong exception to the objectionable statements of Mr. Yamamoto.
GREW
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Japanese Foreign Office (November 21, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
21 November 1941
(Purple)
#810 (Part 1 of 2) (Separate wire)
(Chief of Office routing)
Formal note
I have the honor of addressing this note to you to inform you that my home government has instructed me to forward you a copy of an agreement drawn up between the government of Japan and the government of the United States of America on the…(…)…of this month. At the same time I have the honor to transmit to you the following information:
For the purpose of assuring the maintenance of peace on the Pacific and through that to contribute to the recovery and promotion of peace throughout the world, this agreement was drawn up between Japan and the United States.
The Imperial Government is firmly convinced that the government of your country, like the governments of Japan and of the United States, is vitally interested in the purposes indicated above. We, therefore, beg permission to draw your government’s attention to the contents of this agreement, and particularly to Article One, Article Two, Article Three, Article Four, and Article Six, (Article Six, only if it is included), thereof.
The various articles enumerated above concern, respectively, the political stabilization in the Pacific area; access to materials produced in the Netherlands Indies; the trade relations between Japan and the United States; the China Incident; and, the non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce, (this last, only if it is included in the agreement).
The two governments have made a joint declaration including the above points. We feel that your government and mine could utilize the understandings in the same manner as between Japan and the United States.
Therefore, in the hopes that the aims thus drawn up in this agreement may more fully be realized, the Imperial Government herewith wishes me to advise you that it is prepared to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your government and mine on the specific points enumerated above. We expectantly await your government’s advice that it would be similarly disposed.
Accept, Sir, these renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
-formal close- /s/
25126
(JD-1: 6687) (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
21 November 1941
(Purple)
#810 (Part 2 of 2)
Formal reply
I have the honor of addressing you in order that I may respectfully acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the Agreement on a Joint Understanding which has been drawn up between your government and the government of the United States dated the _ _ _ (…)_ _ _ of this month and your accompanying explanatory note.
Your explanation was to the effect that _ _ _ _ _ _ .
I have the honor to inform you that I am receipt of a reply from my government to the effect that the government of Great Britain (or the Netherlands Government) understands the objectives drawn up in this draft agreement, and in the hope that they may be more fully realized, is disposed to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your country and mine on the points specifically enumerated above.
Accept, Sir, renewed assurances of my highest consideration."
(Leave some space, and then way down at the bottom place:)**
-formal close- /s/
25126
JD-1: 6687 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT)
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[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
21 November 1941
(Purple)
#811
In case you use Proposal “B” for an agreement, as an introductory paragraph please tentatively incorporate the following draft:
The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the United States of America, impelled by their strong desire of preserving peace in the Pacific, and recognizing the vital importance of a frank expression on the part of both countries of a sincere determination to embrace peaceful methods, declare it as their mutual understanding that:
25130
JD-1: 6688 (M) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT)
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[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
21 November 1941
(Purple)
#969
At present, the possibility of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union seems remote. However, it may be that Germany would prefer to avoid being faced with a long term resistance by the USSR, so that she-Germany-may transfer her entire fighting forces to some other part. On the Soviet side, it seems possible that sentiment for peace may develop when she views the situation from the standpoint of reconstruction.
Our relations with the United States may have considerable effect on our southward program, depending, of course, on what turns those relations take. In other words, our relationship with Great Britain and the United States has a great bearing on the future of our national greatness.
For this reason, we would like to avoid the rise of any violence at this time. At the same time, we would like to break up the policy of British-U.S.-USSR joint action. We would, therefore, welcome, if anything, peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. For the purpose of enhancing our position, we would not be opposed to mediating in a peace, if such a course is possible.
Will you, therefore, bearing the above in mind, keep an eye on developments _ _ _ _ (message unfinished).
25171
JD-1: 6731 (D) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (C-NR)
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Japanese Foreign Office (November 22, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple CA (Urgent)
#812
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736 [a]. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you-twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.
Army 25138 Trans. 11/22/41 (S)
[a] See S.I.S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 26th of this month.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple (CA)
#815
The Anti-Comintern Agreement runs out on the 24th, and for some time we have been conferring with the signatories. It has been decided that this agreement shall be in effect for five more years and that on the 25th in Berlin, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukuo, Hungary, and Spain will all six sign the protocol.
Germany, fighting Russia as she is, seems to be thinking about the propagandistic effect of this signing. However, we, for several considerations, intend to handle the matter circumspectly. You know we have Japanese-American relations to think about. This is for your information.
Army 25140 Trans. 11/22/41 (S)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941.
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#816.
So it seems that the United States is reluctant to definitely promise to do nothing to prevent the establishment of peace between Japan and China in accordance with Clause 4 of Proposal “B”. Well, if they will accept our proposal “B”, we will have no objection to letting President ROOSEVELT be our introducer. Through his mediation, on the basis of the American proposal (B) of the 12th, China would be made to express her friendly intentions toward Japan, and, as a result, peace negotiations would ensue. Then as soon as an armistice agreement were established between Tokyo and Chungking, there would be no basis in fact for continuance of American assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Thus, as a result of the mediation which President ROOSEVELT would exercise, CHIANG KAI-SHEK would by the American Government be caused to propose a cessation of hostilities. The American Government accordingly, hoping for the establishment of amicable relations between the Japanese and Chinese, should do her best to support our efforts in this direction and they should make it clear that they will refrain from any act that would hinder us in achieving this objective. Therefore, will you please endeavor to have the Americans accept our “B” proposal and, in case an understanding is reached, please endeavor by the date set in my #812 a to have the President prevail upon CHIANG KAI-SHEK to send us a peace proposal (a very brief one will be all right).
Army 25175 Trans. 11-24-41 (2)
*S.I.S. #25138 in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th.[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941.
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#817
Re your #1144. [a]
I take it that the “B” plan which you proposed on the 20th included the second clause of (5) relative to moving troops from southern to northern French Indochina, and left out (6) concerning non-discrimination in commerce and (7) the Tripartite Treaty. Am I right? Wire me back just as soon as you get this whether or not the Americans took any particular note of the fact that you left out (6) and (7).
Army #25212 Trans. 11-25-41 (S)
*S.I.S. #25137-Ambassador NOMURA says Secretary HULL has expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion except with regard to China. He said that so long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy, it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG.
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
J-19
#321 (Part 1 of 4)
Strictly secret.
I suppose you are already acquainted with these facts but the manner of defending the canal is now as follows:
-
The United States is publishing as though it were utterly true that a Troy horse has been found not only among the foreigners in Panama but also in government circles. However, this country replies that her principle is Panama for Panamanians. ARIAS stated that though Panama was weak, if certain concessions were made to neighboring countries, the United States might be defied. The United States, however, fixed his regime good and proper. At present the canal officials are checking over, one by one, 2,000 Germans, 700 Italians, and 400 Japanese.
-
I hear that the United States has set up in Panama air bases (some of which have - - - - -), anti-aircraft gun bases, and airplane detector bases (some of these detectors are said to be able to discover a plane 200 miles away). Thus we see that in her policy toward South America the United States is now exerting unprecedented pressure.
ARMY 26820 (Japanese) Trans. 12/25/41 (X)
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
J-19
#321 (Part 2 of 4 [a])
Strictly secret.
In spite of the fact that it is in violation of the treaty concluded in 1936, the United States is coercing Panama where the canal is. She is expending vast sums of money there, and if necessary will take still more drastic steps. However the difference in the points of view is forever and eternally a cancer’s growth in the relations of the two countries.
- From the Pacific to the Atlantic coast, between Panama and Colon, there is no thoroughfare. The reason why one has not been constructed, is that the jungle constitutes a natural defense for the canal. As an indication of the United States’ policy of defense, lately they have begun to construct a road even of macadam which will probably go as far as Colon. However it is not yet completed. This is an exceptional case in preparation for the possible destruction of the canal. It also seems that when complete the American continental highway will extend as far as the borders of Colombia, but when this will be is uncertain.
ARMY 26821 (Japanese) Trans. 12/25/41 (X)
[a] Part 3, S.I.S. #26794. Part 1, S.I.S. #26820. Part 4 available, being translated.
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
J19-K9
#321 (Part 3 Of 4 [a])
- The United States Government is going on the assumption that the attack on the Canal will be made from both air and sea. Especially in preparation for a possible attack from the Pacific side, it has reenforced the special fleet recently, as I have already indicated in my telegram. They have mapped out an area 900 (kilometers?), with the center of the radius at Panama, as a patrol area and are constantly patroling it. The Army has built fortifications here and there in the territory of Panama in which there are 16" and 14" gun emplacements. (These forts are equipped with hygienic facilities. The soldiers are indulging in pleasures. The distance - - - - - of the fortifications if - - - - - - - - - - exceeds 1500 (kilometers?).) In addition, they are endeavoring to guard such vital points as locks, spillways, and especially the control tower controlling the spillway on Lake Gatun and the electric plant.
ARMY 26794 (Japanese) Trans. 12/25/41 (2)
[a] Parts 1, 2 and 4 available. Being translated.
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941.
J-19
#321 (Part 4 Of 4 [a])
The anti-air defenses (?) on lock #1, which is now being used, are being improved. (Of course, there are anti-air defenses (?) at lock #3.) The naval defense area, patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene [b] (on ?) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands.
- Present army strength is 47,000; naval, 10,000; air force, 5,000 In addition, it is estimated that there is approximately twice this general total, made up of the families and laborers (excluding Panamanians).
Army 26830 (Japanese) Trans. 12-25-41 (X)
[a] For Parts 1, 2 and 3 of 4 see S.I.S. #26820, #26821 and #26794 which
report American military and naval preparations in the Panama region.
[b] Kana spelling.
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
Purple
#785
- A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.
On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and materiel.
- Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:
Manila – Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isobel; Heron; Wohotosu [a]; Pisu [a]; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.
Cavite – Houston (?); Canopus.
ARMY 25471 Trans. 11/29/41 (6)
[a] Kana gelling.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
Purple
#1158 (Government Code) (Secret outside the Department)
Re your # 817. [a]
As you are aware, I have advised them concerning the first part. Insofar as the latter part of that message is concerned, on the occasion of the interview outlined in my #1147, [b] no reference was made to this matter. However, after they have studied the matter, they will doubtless present some opinions concerning it.
Furthermore, Ambassador KURUSU and myself, at their request, are scheduled to have an interview, as already announced, with Secretary of State HULL, at 8:00 p.m. today, the 22nd.
Army 25181 Trans. 11/24/41 (2)
[a] Available, being worked on.
[b] See S.I.S. #25179-80.
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U.S. Department of State (November 22, 1941)
793.94/17045The Navy Department to the Department of State
Washington, November 22, 1941.The following was received from the Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai November 21, 1941:
At Woosung military supply base intense activity since 15th. Unusual number ships present including former merchant craft averaging 10,000 tons and up. Wednesday 10 transports sailed 8 of which carried troops. Same day 32 additional similar type anchored lower Whangpoo. Landing boats continue part of outgoing equipment. On decks 3 outbound ships observed number creosoted heavy timber trestles in sections each about 60 feet long, 8 thick and same width. Several vessels apparently recently taken over appear to be completing installation machine gun mounts after arrival here. 1,000 troops departed from Swatow last Saturday.
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711.94/2476Draft of Proposed Modus Vivendi With Japan
Strictly Confidential, Tentative and Without Commitment Washington, November 22, 1941.
OralThe representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of the questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.
On November 20, the Japanese Ambassador indicated that the Government of Japan is desirous of going ahead with such a program; that the domestic political situation within Japan is urgent; and that, in order to give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop and promote public sentiment in Japan in support of a comprehensive and liberal program of peace such as has been under discussion between our two Governments, it would be helpful if there could be taken some initial steps toward resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States. At that time the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to create an atmosphere favorable to pursuing the conversations which have been taking place. These proposals contain features which from the point of view of the Government of the United States present difficulties in reference to the broad-gauge principles the practical application of which represents the desires of both Governments as manifested in current conversations. Inasmuch as the Government of the United States desires to contribute to the peace of the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity to continue discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government suggestions as follows:
Modus Vivendi
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein. They undertake reciprocally not to make by force or threat of force, unless they are attacked, any advancement, from points at which they have military establishments, across any international border in the Pacific area.
The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina, not to engage in any further military activities there, including the construction of military facilities, and to limit Japanese military forces in northern French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number in any case would not exceed 25,000 and which number would not be subject to replacement.
The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United States on July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to remove the freezing measures which it imposed in regard to American assets in Japan. Exports from each country would thereafter remain subject to the respective export control measures which each country may have in effect for reasons of national defense.
The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the British and the Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments’ taking, on a basis of reciprocity with Japan, measures similar to those provided for in paragraph three above.
The Government of the United States would not look with disfavor upon the inauguration of conversations between the Government of China and the Government of Japan directed toward a peaceful settlement of their differences nor would the Government of the United States look with disfavor upon an armistice during the period of any such discussions. The fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any such discussions is simply that they be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States.
In case any such discussions are entered into between the Government of Japan and the Government of China, the Government of the United States is agreeable to such discussions taking place in the Philippine Islands, if so desired by both China and Japan.
- It is understood that this modus vivendi is of a temporary nature and shall not remain in effect for a period longer than three months unless renewed by common agreement.
…
[Annex]Strictly Confidential, Tentative and Without Commitment Washington, November 22, 1941.Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan
Section I: Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:
The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
Section II: Steps to he Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan, Respectively
A. The Government of the United States proposes to take steps as follows:
To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact with Japan, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and the Soviet Union.
To suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that those Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.
To enter into negotiations with the British, Chinese, Dutch, Thai and Japanese Governments for the conclusion of an agreement where under each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.
To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
To endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
To enter into negotiations with Japan for the conclusion of a trade agreement between the two countries, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
To agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds up to $500,000,000 for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
To remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.
To take steps, upon the conclusion of this agreement and upon the signing of the multilateral non-aggression pact mentioned under item one above, directed toward termination of the Nine Power Treaty relating to Principles and Policies concerning China signed at Washington, February 6, 1922.
B. The Government of Japan proposes to take steps as follows:
To withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China (excluding Manchuria — see separate provision A–2) and from Indochina.
To withdraw all support — military, political, economic — from any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and concessions and rights under the Boxer Protocol.
To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact with the United States, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and the Soviet Union.
To remove the freezing restrictions on American funds in Japan.
To agree that the provisions of the treaty concluded on September 27, 1940 among Japan, Germany and Italy shall not be interpreted by Japan in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
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711.94/254022/35Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 22, 1941.Mr. Secretary:
With reference to the Japanese proposal of November 20 for a modus vivendi and our memorandum containing suggestions for possible comment that might be made orally to the Japanese in regard to their proposal (copy of which is attached), there are given below additional suggestions for possible comment:With reference to item three in regard to cooperation in obtaining from the Netherlands East Indies materials which our two countries need, it is not clear why the Japanese Government desires to limit this proposal to the Netherlands East Indies. It would appear to us that, if the Japanese Government could see its way clear to adopting our proposal in regard to commercial policy, the field for cooperation by the two countries would not be limited to any one area but would extend to the entire world. It would seem to us that the Japanese proposal takes no account of our broad offer which was renewed in very specific terms in the paper which was given to the Japanese Ambassador on November 15.61 It would seem to us that such a proposal would be open to possible criticism. That is to say that, whereas Japan was insisting on preferential treatment for itself in certain areas, in other areas it was asking for cooperation of the United States in obtaining for Japan the very kind of economic opportunities which Japan was [Page 634]trying to deny to third countries elsewhere. This Government has consistently advocated broadening the basis of world trade not from any selfish point of view but from the point of view of providing stable peace and elimination of chronic political instability and recurrent economic collapse. Such a program would provide means of raising living standards all over the world, thus promoting the well-being of all peoples.
With reference to the provision that the Government of the United States should supply Japan a required quantity of oil, it may be observed that until very recently the United States was supplying Japan with an ever-increasing amount of petroleum products, even to the extent where there was widespread public criticism in the United States of permitting this to continue. The period since 1937 was marked, on the one hand, by a tremendous increase in imports into Japan from the United States of petroleum products and, on the other hand, according to reports reaching us, by a progressive curtailment in the amounts of oil released in that country for normal peacetime consumption. There is no desire in this country to deny to Japan petroleum products needed for its normal economy, but the increased consumption of American petroleum products in Japan for a military purpose brings to the fore a question which we have called to the attention of the Japanese Ambassador, namely, that the Japanese association with the Axis powers is doing the United States tremendous injury.
With regard to the fifth point in the Japanese proposal, you might wish to emphasize again what you said to the Japanese Ambassador on November 20,62 namely, that, when the Japanese complain about our helping China, the public in this country wonders what is underneath the Anti-Comintern Pact; that Japanese statesmen ought to understand that we are helping China for the same reason that we are helping Britain; that we are afraid of the military elements throughout the world led by Hitler; and that the methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in China are not unlike Hitler’s methods. You might then ask what the Ambassador thinks would be the public reaction in this country if we were to announce that we had decided to discontinue aid to Great Britain. You might say that in the minds of American people the purposes underlying our aid to China are the same as the purposes underlying our aid to Great Britain and that the American people believe that there is a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at dividing the world between them.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
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711.94/2475Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Washington, November 22, 1941.The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister and the Netherlands Minister called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later on. I enumerated the high points in the conversations which I have been carrying on with the Japanese officials here since the spring of this year. They are fully set forth in records of my conversations during that time and need not be repeated here.
I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi. I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese Ambassador who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my proposed reply in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal. There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute was more desirable than a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for section. The substitute reply was substantially what is contained in the present final draft, which I am considering handing to the Japanese. Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was somewhat disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China arises not entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is very natural. He did not show serious concern in view of the provision in our proposed modus vivendi which would block a Japanese attack on China in order to destroy the Burma Road. He inquired whether this would commit the Japanese not to further invade China during the coming three months, to which I replied in the negative, adding that this was a question to be decided under the permanent agreement now receiving attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made by the Japanese and that there was probably not one chance in three that they would accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed temporary arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations looking toward a general agreement on the basic questions.
CORDELL HULL
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711.94/2544Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 22, 1941.Participants: Dr. E. Stanley Jones Reverend O. G. Robinson Mr. O. K. Armstrong Mr. MackayDr. Jones, accompanied by Reverend Robinson and Mr. Armstrong, called at the Department at their request and were received by Mr. Mackay.
Dr. Jones said that he had recently conversed with Mr. Terasaki (First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy), who had offered comment in regard to American-Japanese relations which he (Dr. Jones) wished to make known to the Department; that, in brief, Mr. Terasaki had said that Japan, like any other nation engaged in a protracted war, is psychologically “abnormal” and a “little off” in its thinking; that as compensation for its great effort Japan must show some gain; that in fact, Japan is steadily growing weaker; that time is working in favor of the United States and that therefore, according to the “War Party”, Japan must strike soon; that the crux of the problem lies in what in effect is an American “embargo”; that within the field of commodities subject to restriction, petroleum is by far the most important item; that the “embargo” should be lifted at least partially to permit of peace-time trade; that the Japanese should be “given a chance to get out of China by themselves rather than be forced out”; that the Japanese “Peace Party” cannot make headway in the “atmosphere” created by the American “embargo”; and that if the Government of the United States would first “lift the embargo” Japan would then take its troops out of China voluntarily. Dr. Jones added that in making the above comments, Mr. Terasaki gave every evidence of being absolutely honest and straightforward.
Dr. Jones then mentioned his proposal that as a means of settling the Far Eastern problem Japan be given New Guinea, but said that he would not go into the details of the plan as his views had already been communicated to the Department.
Mr. Mackay thanked Dr. Jones for his previously expressed desire to be of assistance to the Department and said that Dr. Jones’ comments in regard to his conversation with Mr. Terasaki would be made known to appropriate officers of the Department.
711.94/254027/35Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 22, 1941.The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at the Secretary’s apartment by appointment made at the request of the Ambassador. The Secretary said that he had called in the representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Pacific area and that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things (meaning Japanese peaceful pledges, et cetera) could be developed in such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing. The Secretary said that these representatives were interested in the suggestion and there was a general feeling that the matter could all be settled if the Japanese could give us some satisfactory evidences that their intentions were peaceful.
The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the representatives of these other countries he found that there had arisen in their minds the same kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the course of the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to the position in which the Japanese Government had left the Ambassador and the Secretary as they were talking of peace when it made its move last July into Indochina. He referred also to the mounting oil purchases by Japan last spring when the conversations were in progress, to the fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those shipments because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the conversations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal civilian consumption.
The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting a threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese statesmen are talking about a peaceful course, whereas in the American press advocacy of a peaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked why was there not some Japanese statesman backing the two Ambassadors by preaching peace. The Secretary pointed out that if the United States and other countries should see Japan coming along a peaceful course there would be no question about Japan’s obtaining all the materials she desired; that the Japanese Government knows that.
The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard to the Japanese proposals he felt that we would consider helping Japan out on oil for civilian requirements only as soon as the Japanese Government could assert control of the situation in Japan as it relates to the policy of force and conquest. He said that if the Ambassador could give him any further assurances in regard to Japan’s peaceful intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with senators and other persons in this country.
Mr. Kurusu said it was unfortunate that there had been a special session of the Diet at this time, as the efforts of the Government to obtain public support had brought out in sharp relief the abnormal state of the present temper of the Japanese people who had been affected by four years of war and by our freezing measures.
The Secretary asked to what extent in the Ambassador’s opinion did the firebrand attitude prevail in the Japanese army. Mr. Kurusu said that it took a great deal of persuasion to induce the army to abandon a position once taken, but that both he and the Ambassador had been pleasantly surprised when the Japanese army acceded to their suggestion in regard to offering to withdraw the Japanese troops from southern Indochina. He said he thought this was an encouraging sign, but that nevertheless the situation was approaching an explosive point.
The Secretary asked whether it was not possible for a Japanese statesman now to come out and say that Japan wanted peace; that while there was much confusion in the world because of the war situation Japan would like to have a peace which she did not have to fight for to obtain and maintain; that the United States says it stands for such ideas; and that Japan might well ask the United States for a showdown on this question.
The Ambassador said he did not have the slightest doubt that Japan desired peace. He then cited the popular agitation in Japan following the conclusion of the peace settlement with Russia in 1905, as pointing to a difficulty in the way of publicly backing a conciliatory course.
The Secretary asked whether there was any way to get Japanese statesmen to approach the question before us with real appreciation of the situation with which we are dealing including the question of finding a way to encourage the governments of other powers concerned in the Pacific area to reach some trade arrangement with Japan. He pointed out that Japan’s Indochina move, if repeated, would further give a spurt to arming and thus undo all the work that he and the Ambassador had done. He suggested that if the United States and the other countries should supply Japan with goods in moderate amounts at the beginning those countries would be inclined to satisfy Japan more fully later on if and as Japan found ways in actual practice of demonstrating its peaceful intentions. He said that one move on Japan’s part might kill dead our peace effort, whereas it would be easy to persuade the other countries to relax their export restrictions if Japan would be satisfied with gradual relaxation.
Mr. Kurusu said that at best it would take some time to get trade moving. The Secretary replied that he understood this but that it would be difficult to get other countries to understand until Japan could convince those countries that it was committed to peaceful ways. Mr. Kurusu said that some immediate relief was necessary and that if the patient needed a thousand dollars to effect a cure an offer of three hundred dollars would not accomplish the purpose. The Secretary commented that if the Japanese Government was as weak as to need all that had been asked for, nothing was likely to save it.
Mr. Kurusu said that Japan’s offer to withdraw its forces from southern Indochina would set a reverse movement in motion.
The Secretary said that the Japanese were not helping as they should help in the present situation in which they had got themselves but were expecting us to do the whole thing.
Mr. Kurusu asked what was the idea of the American Government.
The Secretary replied that although the Japanese proposal was addressed to the American Government he had thought it advisable to see whether the other countries would contribute and he found that they would like to move gradually. The effect of an arrangement between these countries and Japan would be electrifying by showing that Japan had committed herself to go along a peaceful course.
Mr. Kurusu asked what Japan could do. The Secretary replied that if, for example, he should say that he agreed to enter into a peaceful settlement provided that there should be occasional exceptions and qualifications he could not expect to find peaceful-minded nations interested.
The Secretary then asked whether his understanding was correct that the Japanese proposal was intended as a temporary step to help organize public opinion in Japan and that it was intended to continue the conversations looking to the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. Mr. Kurusu said yes.
Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had any further suggestions. The Secretary replied that he did not have in mind any suggestions and that he did not know what amounts of exports the various countries would be disposed to release to Japan. He said that Japan made the situation very difficult, for if Japan left her forces in Indochina, whether in the north, east, south or west, she would be able to move them over night, and that therefore this would not relieve the apprehensions of neighboring countries. The British, for example, would not be able to move one warship away from Singapore.
The Ambassador argued that it would take many days to move troops from northern Indochina to southern Indochina, and he stated that the Japanese desired the troops in northern Indochina in order to bring about a settlement with China. He said that after the settlement of the China affair Japan promised to bring the troops out of Indochina altogether.
The Secretary emphasized again that he could not consider this, that also uneasiness would prevail as long as the troops remained in Indochina, and commented that Japan wanted the United States to do all the pushing toward bringing about a peaceful settlement; that they should get out of Indochina.
Mr. Kurusu observed that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Ambassador Grew that we seemed to expect that all the concessions should be made by the Japanese side.
The Secretary rejoined that Mr. Kurusu had overlooked the fact that in July the Japanese had gone into Indochina. He added that the United States had remained from the first in the middle of the road, that it was the Japanese who had strayed away from the course of law and order, and that they should not have to be paid to come back to a lawful course.
Mr. Kurusu said that this country’s denunciation of the commercial treaty had caused Japan to be placed in a tight corner.
The Secretary observed that Japan had cornered herself; that we had been preaching for the last nine years that militarism was sapping everybody and that if the world were to be plunged into another war there would not be much left of the people anywhere. He said that in 1934 he had told Ambassador Saito that Japan was planning an overlordship in East Asia. The Secretary added that he had tried to persuade Hitler that participation by him in a peaceful course would assure him of what he needed. The Secretary said it was a pity that Japan could not do just a few small peaceful things to help tide over the situation.
Mr. Kurusu asked what the Secretary meant. The Secretary replied that the major portion of our fleet was being kept in the Pacific and yet Japan asked us not to help China. He said we must continue to aid China. He said it was little enough that we were actually doing to help China. The Ambassador commented that our moral influence was enabling Chiang to hold out.
The Secretary said that a peaceful movement could be started in thirty or forty days by moving gradually, and yet Japan pushed everything it wanted all at once into its proposal. The Ambassador explained that Japan needed a quick settlement and that its psychological value would be great.
The Secretary said that he was discouraged, that he felt that he had rendered a real contribution when he had called in the representatives of the other countries, but that he could only go a certain distance. He said he thought nevertheless that if this matter should move in the right way peace would become infectious. He pointed also to the danger arising from blocking progress by injecting the China matter in the proposal, as the carrying out of such a point in the Japanese proposal would effectually prevent the United States from ever successfully extending its good offices in a peace settlement between Japan and China. He said this could not be considered now.
There then ensued some further but inconclusive discussion of the troop situation in Indochina, the Secretary still standing for withdrawal, after which the Ambassador reverted to the desire of the Japanese Government to reach a quick settlement and asked whether we could not say what points in the Japanese proposal we would accept and what points we desired to have modified.
The Secretary emphasized that there was no way in which he could carry the whole burden and suggested that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could spend a little time preaching peace. He said that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday before having his answer there was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to confer again with the representatives of the other governments concerned after they had had an opportunity to consult with their governments. He repeated that we were doing our best, but emphasized that unless the Japanese were able to do a little there was no use in talking.
The Ambassador disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too hard for an answer, agreed that the Secretary had always been most considerate in meeting with the Ambassador whenever an appointment had been requested, and said that the Japanese would be quite ready to wait until Monday.
The Secretary said he had in mind taking up with the Ambassador sometime a general and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in developing and which involved collaboration of other countries.
The Ambassador said that the Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with us to which other powers could subsequently give their adherence.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
840.51 Frozen Credits/4442Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, November 22, 1941.Present effect of the freezing control in the economic control as exercised upon Japan
Effect upon control of imports. Japanese imports into the United States in 1940 were $106,000,000. In the first five months of 1941, they were $52,000,000. Approximately two-thirds of these imports were silk and silk products. The freezing order is our only machinery for controlling imports. If there were no freezing order, but if export controls were continued, there would undoubtedly be a resumption of imports. It seems probable that these would be chiefly silk and silk products. Probably the general level of imports would decrease, since the export controls would diminish the use of the dollars for purchases in this country. However, the Japanese might be anxious to resume silk imports, both because otherwise the market might be permanently lost through the use of substitutes and partly because it might delay the transformation of our textile equipment from silk to synthetic fibres.
Effect of freezing upon export control. Prior to the application of freezing to Japan, American exports to Japan were approximately $10,000,000 per month. The largest items were scrap rubber, raw cotton, and petroleum products. Since the end of July export control has been extended over a considerable range of products. At the present time raw cotton, textile manufactures, and lumber and wood products other than pulp and paper are the chief items not under export control. However, animal and vegetable food products, other than oils and fats, while under export control, may be exported by reason of the existence of general licenses to all destinations, except from the Philippines. It is the imposition of freezing control which prevents these exports to Japan and Japanese-occupied China. Of course, it would be possible to revoke the general licenses and exercise the control through export control rather than through freezing.
Export control in its effect on Japanese trade with other areas. The Japanese oil trade with the Netherlands East Indies was financed largely through the use of dollars. The freezing control has been a factor in stopping this trade. The freezing control also has been a factor in stopping, or greatly limiting, Japanese trade with the other American Republics, since here again payments were made through dollars.
Effect of freezing control upon Japanese assets in the United States. The control has immobilized Japanese deposits in the United States. If it did not exist, presumably a large part of the deposits would be withdrawn. In Japan American deposits are immobilized not merely through freezing control, but through pre-existing exchange control.
Effect upon Chinese stabilization. At the present time the American freezing control is one of the chief instruments — if not the chief instrument — in the attempt to stabilize the Chinese currency and to control imports and exports through Shanghai. If the freezing control did not exist in respect to Japanese assets, these efforts would be made immeasurably more difficult.
DEAN ACHESON
Japanese Foreign Office (November 23, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
23 November 1941
(Purple)
#1159 (In 4 parts, complete)
On the 22nd, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the Secretary of State, Hull. (Ballantine was also present). The resume of our conversation follows:
Hull:
I conferred with the Ambassador and Ministers of Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands on the 22nd.
(The press reports that this conference lasted for about two and a half hours.)
I sought their opinion on the Japanese proposals. They all said that if Japan’s intentions are assuredly pacific, then they would wholeheartedly favor, them. They said that it would be the source of much joy to them to cooperate in the matter of resuming trade relations with Japan under those circumstances.
However, they said, we are not sure of Japan’s real intentions as yet, for while on the one hand she apparently indicates her desire for peace by dispatching a special envoy, the tone of the politicians and press of Japan seems to be in direct opposition.
The diplomats who called on me also pointed out that just prior to the application of the freezing order, Japanese imports of petroleum took a very sudden upward swing, disproving any contention that it was to be used solely for peaceful undertakings, but that it was being stored away by the navy.
They further expressed the opinion that the embargo should be lifted only in slow degrees.
These diplomats, however, said that they would seek their home governments’ instructions regarding the Japanese proposals and would submit their replies by the coming Monday. Upon receiving these advices, I shall make a reply to you.
Thus the Secretary seemed to feel considerable concern over the recent trend of Japan’s public opinion. He pointed out that a clear statement by the Japanese Government of its desire for peace would have a most important reaction on the public opinion of the United States. (Ballantine said that a clear statement of attitude from the government of Japan to the Japanese people, which would of course be cabled abroad, would bear more fruit than propagandistic reports sent through press channels for foreign consumption only) and in turn would have a most favorable bearing on the chances of a settlement He even went on to say that was it not the duty of every politician to strive for peace up to the day before war is found to be unavoidable? The President and the Secretary of State, he said * * * (two or three lines too badly garbled).
I then said:
Leaving British, Australian and Dutch opinions aside for the time being, what is the attitude of the United States itself regarding our proposal?
His subsequent reply, which he made by taking up the proposal paragraph by paragraph, was a complete evasion. However, there were indications that what the United States, Britain, Australia, etc. actually desire is to dissolve the crisis in the south Pacific, so that the fighting powers they have to maintain in this area to keep things under control, may be transferred for action in other parts.
He pointed out that since that is their main objective, the assurances given by Japan in her proposals were insufficient.
I said:
Our troop concentrations m the northern part of French Indochina are aimed at cutting Chungking’s lifeline. Therefore, they are, for the most part, directed towards Yunnan. As such, they do not and are not intended to form a threat to the south Pacific area.
After I pointed out this fact, Kurusu said that the acceptance of our proposal would naturally lead to the conditions desired not only by the United States, but by the other nations he referred to. To this, Hull replied that what these countries desired was a quick turn-about in the situation.
Hull:
With regard to resumption of trade, a rapid change in the situation can be wrought here, too, once Japan’s Pacific intentions have been ascertained. This change for the better can be brought about in a mere matter of days.
Regarding aid to China, Hull said:
We must take into consideration the possibility of a U.S. mediation when considering the possibility of cutting off aid to Chiang. If we promise Japan that we shall cease aiding China, the United States could no longer be considered a fair and neutral party to propose peace between China and Japan.
Moreover, if it is terminated immediately upon the beginning of the negotiations, the promise would be utterly without value. In any event, the so-called ‘aid to Chiang Kai-shek’ is not as great as is commonly publicized.
It is Japan’s desire to improve the situation which has reached a critical stage by first settling the outstanding factors involved. Since that is the desire expressed by your proposals, we cannot at this time concur in Japan’s demands with regard to stopping aid to Chiang.
He went on to say that he did not believe that the time was as yet ripe for the President to suggest peace to China.
I said:
I feel that on Monday the United States will submit some sort of a counter proposal to us. I further feel that this proposal will contain a suggestion that Japan join in some plan to maintain peace on the Pacific and in some kind of a trade agreement. No doubt it will be necessary for the United States and Japan to come to some preliminary agreement, after which it would be submitted to the other countries for their approval.
Kurusu:
If it is intended that a sort of a group be formed by those nations and that if they expect to make it appear as if we were ‘voted down’ by the majority of the voters, we wish to state now that we shall be absolutely unable to accept such a proposal.
25347
JD-1: 6839 (D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (2)
*Part 2 badly garbled; considerable reconstruction work contained.