711.94/254013/25Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 15, 1941.The Japanese Ambassador called by appointment made at his request at the Secretary’s apartment. The Secretary referred to the Japanese proposal in regard to commercial policy which the Ambassador had presented on November 7 and November 10 and offered oral comment along the line of the oral statement which, together with the draft of a joint United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy, he then handed to the Ambassador. The Secretary emphasized the advantageous and worthwhile character to Japan of participation by Japan in a program such as that envisaged in the draft. The Japanese Ambassador said that he could not comment upon that matter but that he would refer it to his Government. The Japanese Minister asked whether this proposal constituted our answer to the Japanese Government on the question of non-discrimination in international commercial relations which had been outstanding in our conversations. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. The Japanese Minister then said that the Japanese Government desired our reply on the two other outstanding questions, namely, the question of Japan’s relations with the Tripartite Pact and the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China. The Ambassador then stated that he also wanted to bring up the point that the Japanese Government considered that we were now engaged in actual negotiations and not in merely exploratory conversations as the American Government had contended. The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate note of what the Secretary was about to say, replied that if we are to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area he could do this only on the basis of carrying on [Page 732]exploratory conversations until we reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to the Dutch and say to them that he believes that the attitudes of Japan and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation. He said also that it would be impossible for him to collaborate with those other countries until we had got things on a satisfactory basis; that otherwise they might read in the newspapers that he was negotiating with Japan on matters affecting them without their being consulted. The Ambassador made no comment.
The Secretary went on to point out that notwithstanding the fact that the conversations between the Secretary and the Ambassador had related to a settlement covering the entire Pacific area and our draft of June 21 had made this clear, the Japanese proposals of September 25 narrowed the application of nondiscrimination and of peace to the southwestern Pacific area. The Ambassador replied that the question of peace in the entire Pacific area was covered in the preamble of their draft, but the Secretary pointed out that what was said in the body of the document rather than in the preamble governed. The Secretary added that he would like to know the attitude of the Japanese Government on this point.
The Secretary then said that the Japanese Foreign Minister in his conversation with Ambassador Grew on November 10 had indicated that the Japanese Government desired to conclude an agreement with the British simultaneously with concluding an agreement with this country, and yet the Japanese Government expected us to answer at once the Japanese Government’s proposals. He suggested that there was some inconsistency between the instructions which the Japanese Ambassador was being asked to carry out here and what the Foreign Minister had in mind in regard to the British. The Secretary then commented that the Ambassador said that Japan wants an answer now, but that the Secretary felt that the Japanese Government ought to come and tell us whether it intends to adopt peaceful courses. The Ambassador said that there was no doubt about the desire of the Japanese Government to have peace in the Pacific and that Japan had freedom of decision and would make its own interpretation of its obligations under the alliance.
The Secretary asked whether if the Japanese Government should enter into agreement with us the alliance would be automatically abandoned. Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether we were asking that the Tripartite Pact be denounced. The Ambassador said that he understood what the Secretary had said to mean abandoned in the sense of becoming a dead letter. The Secretary rejoined that, just as the Ambassador had suggested, could we assume that if the Japanese [Page 733]Government entered into an agreement with us the Tripartite Pact would automatically become a dead letter, for supposing that he went to the British and the Dutch and said that Japan was willing to enter on a peaceful program but at the same time desired to adhere to a fighting alliance with Germany, what would the British and Dutch say? He asked how he could make the British believe in Japan’s peaceful intentions while Japan was proclaiming its adherence intact to a military alliance with Germany. He pointed out that it would be very difficult for him to make the people of this country and the people of all peaceful nations believe that Japan was pursuing a peaceful course so long as Japan was tied in an alliance with the most flagrant aggressor who has appeared on this planet in the last 2,000 years. The Ambassador commented that the public had so much confidence in the Secretary that they would accept the agreement with us if the Secretary recommended it. The Secretary replied that if we went into an agreement with Japan while Japan had an outstanding obligation to Germany which might call upon Japan to go to war with us this would cause so much turmoil in the country that he might well be lynched. The Secretary pointed out that, notwithstanding the existence of a neutrality pact between Japan and Russia, large Japanese armies in Manchuria were facing Russian armies in Siberia. The Secretary said that what we had in mind was an agreement which would promote mutual trust and enable us to get away from the expansion of military preparations, and what he desired was a clear-cut unequivocal agreement which would remove the doubts that Japan was trying to face two ways in order that we could remove distrust between nations in the Pacific area. The Secretary said that, so long as Japan insisted that it would make its own interpretation of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact in the event that the United States through self-defense was obliged to take up arms against Germany, it would be very difficult for the world to see that Japan’s clear intention was to adopt peaceful courses. The Secretary said he would like to know whether, when an agreement is reached with us, Japan’s connection with the Tripartite Pact would automatically disappear.
The Japanese Minister asked the Secretary whether what he had said was the answer of this Government on the question of Japan’s relations with the Tripartite Pact. The Secretary replied that when we got an answer from the Japanese Government in regard to its attitude on the point that he had raised about the Tripartite Pact becoming automatically a dead letter in case we entered into an agreement with Japan we would be better able to make reply. The Japanese Ambassador said that he was afraid that the American Government did not trust the Japanese Government whereas there was [Page 734]no material difference between the policies of the present Japanese Government and the previous Japanese Government, notwithstanding the fact that the Prime Minister was a military man. The Secretary replied that the new Government in Japan seems to take the attitude that we must reply at once to their points, but that we do not feel that we should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese Government under circumstances where the United States has been pursuing peaceful courses throughout and the Japanese Government is the one which has been violating law and order. The Secretary said, in conclusion, that when we hear from the Japanese Government concerning its position on the points we had raised with them two days ago on their peaceful intentions and when we could clear up the question of non-discrimination, as suggested in our proposal of today, and also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that we could sit down like brothers and reach some solution of the question of stationing Japanese troops in China. The Secretary emphasized at the same time that we did not desire any delay and that we were working as hard as we could to bring about a wholly satisfactory and broad settlement.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
711.94/254019/25Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
November 15, 1941The Japanese Government has stated that it:
…recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.
The underlined portion of the statement sets forth a condition the meaning of which is not entirely clear. It is assumed, however, that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to ask the Government of the United States to assume responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside of its sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the consent and cooperation of all other Governments.
The principle of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment has for many years been the cornerstone of the commercial policy of the United States. Since the First World War, this principle has been embodied in virtually every commercial treaty concluded by this Government. Since 1934, when the United States embarked upon an extensive program of commercial agreements for the reduction of trade barriers, it has constantly applied this principle. In twenty-two agreements this Government has on its part reduced duties on over a thousand classifications of the American tariff, and it has extended these reductions to Japan and all other countries of the world with only two exceptions. These exceptions have been countries whose commercial practices represented a flagrant departure from the principle of non-discriminatory treatment. The withholding of trade-agreement concessions from those countries was itself a step in furtherance of the policy of non-discrimination since the purpose was to create inducement for the abandonment of discriminatory practices. One of the countries from which the benefit of such concessions had been withheld abandoned its flagrant discriminatory measures, and the United States at once extended to that country the benefit of the duty reductions made in its trade agreements.
The Government of the United States has not only placed its own trade relations with foreign countries on an unconditional most-favored-nation basis, but has sought consistently to further the application of that policy throughout the world. On every appropriate occasion it has urged upon other countries the adoption of non-discriminatory policies and has sought to bring about the progressive elimination of preferences and discriminations of all kinds.
In the twenty-two trade agreements above referred to, the Government of the United States has obtained from foreign countries commitments respecting the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers on thousands of products. These concessions affect products which are imported not only from the United States but from other countries as well. The Government of the United States has neither sought nor accepted commitments whereby these benefits would be restricted to imports from the United States. On the contrary, it has obtained these reductions in the trade barriers of foreign countries on the assumption and expectation that they would be extended to other supplying countries. Indeed, as part of its general policy of nondiscrimination in international trade, it has advocated the extension to all countries of the concessions made in such agreements. In this way the reduction of trade barriers which results from a program of trade agreements such as that pursued by the United States is given the widest possible effect and makes the maximum contribution to the building up of world trade from which all nations benefit.
It is believed that, if Japan would devote itself to wholehearted cooperation in furthering the policy of non-discrimination as practiced and advocated by the Government of the United States and as practiced and advocated for many years by the Government of Japan, a long forward step would be taken toward attaining the objective which the Japanese Government’s statement under reference has in view.
In the light of the foregoing, the Government of the United States raises question whether in the view of the Japanese Government there is need of the proviso under discussion, namely, “on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well,” and whether the proviso might not be omitted.
As a practical manifestation of the way in which the Government of the United States has applied and is prepared to apply the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, there is offered for consideration as a purely tentative suggestion a draft of a possible United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy. It is understood, of course, that agreement as to such a declaration is subject to agreement on the other points involved in a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area as a whole and that this Government would expect, before entering into negotiations on such a possible United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy, to discuss the matter with the British Government and with other specially interested governments.
[Annex]Draft Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
Unofficial, exploratory and without commitmentJoint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy
I. General policy
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake to cooperate fully in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, to eliminate all forms of discrimination in international commercial relations, and in general to work toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which all countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure, through peaceful trade processes, the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its economy.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake that each of them shall make its appropriate contribution toward the creation of the type of international economic relations envisaged above.
As important steps in that direction, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan shall establish between themselves and shall seek to establish in the Pacific area the economic relationships indicated below.
II. The United States-Japan relationship
The United States and Japan undertake to inaugurate, as rapidly as practicable, measures toward restoring the commercial, financial and other economic relationships between them to a normal basis.
The United States and Japan agree to enter into discussions looking toward the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement between the two countries.
It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities for its own use subject to such restrictions or limitations as may be required by each for its own security and self-defense. It is understood that both governments will apply any such restrictions or limitations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.
III. Policy in the Pacific Area
Complete control over its economic, financial and monetary affairs shall be restored to China.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake not to seek in China any preferential or monopolistic commercial or other economic rights for themselves or their nationals, but to use all their influence toward securing from China commercial treatment for themselves no less favorable than that accorded to any third country and full cooperation in the promotion of the general policy stated in the first paragraph of this Declaration.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake to suggest to the Chinese Government that it inaugurate, with foreign assistance where necessary, a comprehensive program of economic development, a full opportunity to participate in which shall be accorded the United States and Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.
The relations which the United States and Japan, respectively, will seek to establish with other countries of the Pacific area shall be governed by the basic principles set forth in this Declaration; and the Governments of the United States and of Japan agree to urge those countries, wherever feasible, to undertake comprehensive programs of economic development with full opportunity to participate in such programs, in so far as foreign assistance may be requested, accorded to the United States and to Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.
740.0011 European War 1939/16775President Roosevelt to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth
Washington, November 15, 1941.My dear President Quezon:
It is with much pleasure and gratification that I have read your letter of October 18, 1941, assuring me of the wholehearted loyalty and support of the Philippine Government and people in whatever the immediate future may hold in store for the Philippines and the United States.In times such as these it is particularly gratifying to learn of the cordial manner in which you, General MacArthur and Admiral Hart are collaborating in making preparations for the defense of the Philippines.
It is my earnest hope that the contingency for which preparations are being made will never arise. However, in the light of recent history it would be worse than criminal not to be fully prepared for all eventualities, and I wish you to know that your expressions of loyalty and support and the manifestations of cooperation shown by your government and people are highly gratifying and helpful to me and to the American people in these times of uncertainty and danger.
Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
711.94/2527Memorandum by Mr. John F. Stone, of the Office of the Secretary of State
Washington, November 15, 1941.The War Department has received the following report from the Commanding General at Honolulu:
Mr. Keswick, secretary to Duff Cooper, who traveled from the Far East to the Pacific Coast with Kurusu, and who is continuing on to Washington and London as a courier, states that Kurusu’s mission to this country is to confirm reports that the United States Government is not bluffing; that if there is any weakness in our attitude the Japanese Government will continue on its path of aggression in a bigger and better way; but that if Kurusu and his Government are convinced of the strength and determination of the American Government, there is a strong possibility that there will be no further hostile actions on the part of the Japanese Government.
The foregoing was telephoned to me by Colonel Bratton, who suggested the possible advisability of a member of the Department talking with Keswick while he is here in Washington and before he leaves for London.
JOHN F. STONE
711.94/254033/35Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State
November 15, 1941Points raised orally on November 15 by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador (not included in written “oral statement”)
The Japanese, in their proposal of September 25, in the economic sections and in the section in regard to peaceful intent, limit the scope of the agreement to the “southwestern Pacific area.” Our draft of June 21 included the entire “Pacific area.”
Does not this indicate that the Japanese Government, in presenting its redraft of September 25, had in mind a more limited program than we had and have in mind? Would it not be desirable for the Japanese Government to clarify whether it desires our discussions and proposals to cover the entire Pacific area or a small part thereof before seeking a definitive reply to its proposals by this Government?
There are, of course, other questions of detail in the Japanese proposal of September 25 which need clarification.
The Japanese have urged an immediate and definitive reply to their proposals and have also urged that a simultaneous agreement be made with Great Britain. These two desires of the Japanese Government would not seem to be consistent.
We still consider our discussions with the Japanese to be informal exploratory conversations and not negotiations.
711.94/254012/35Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 15, 1941.With reference to the call which Mr. Kurusu is to make upon you in company with the Japanese Ambassador on November 17, Mr. Kurusu may regard this first call as purely ceremonial and may not wish to initiate any discussion. Should the occasion appear opportune, however, you may wish to offer comments along lines as follows:
We cannot afford to make light of the tremendous seriousness of the present world situation confronting us. I want to repeat and to emphasize what I said to Admiral Nomura on November 10. The entire world has been placed in a precarious position as a result of the havoc which has been wrought by the forces of aggression. Our common sense tells us of the extreme need that the world come back to ways of peace. It is the purpose of this Government to do its best in the spirit of fair play to contribute to establishing a basis for peace, stability, and order in the Pacific area. As a means of achieving these objectives it is essential that emphasis be laid upon giving practical effect to a sound philosophy of human welfare. We have often and quite recently made clear publicly what we have in mind in this regard.
We are fully aware that it may require time for Japan to turn to courses of peace. The American people and Government, especially the President and the Secretary of State, have been very patient. We are ready and willing to continue to be patient, to endeavor to work out a broad-gauge peaceful settlement, and to afford every practicable opportunity to Japan to turn to courses of peace.
It is tremendously important that no statesman and no country miscalculate the attitude and the position of the American people and Government. The American people and Government are fully alive to the sinister menace which all peace-loving countries are facing from Hitlerism and courses of aggression. This country has been slow in arousing itself to the dangers of Hitlerism. Today we are fully aware of those dangers and are thoroughly aroused. Our national effort is primarily and in ever-increasing measure being devoted toward defeat of Hitlerism. We are determined to protect and preserve our national security against Hitlerism.
A victorious Hitler would constitute a menace to all other nations, including Japan. Our opposition to courses of aggression and to the program of Hitlerism stands firm. We are entirely convinced that Hitlerism will be defeated.
We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek.
In view of the general character of these suggested comments no need is perceived of giving the Ambassador a written record of what you say to him.
711.94/11–1541Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations
UndatedProposal: A truce or standstill agreement whereby the countries actually or potentially engaged in hostilities in the Pacific area undertake each to refrain for ninety days from any movement or use of armed force against any of the other parties.
It is assumed that along with this proposal there goes proposal of a provision that Japan shall reduce her armed forces in Indochina to the number which she had there on July 26, 1941 and shall not send new contingents of armed forces or matériel to that area.
It is understood that the plan also contemplates an undertaking by the United States to suggest to the Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those governments enter into direct negotiations with a view to ascertaining whether there exists a basis for peaceful settlement of the difficulties existing between them.
It is further understood that the proposal outlined in the first paragraph above is not to be construed as calling for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China.
Comment
It is our belief that if such plan is offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government, the matter should be handled by the Department of State rather than as a project personally put forward by the President to the Emperor.
It is our belief that the Japanese Government would not accept such a plan in its entirety but in all probability would respond with an approach through their Foreign Office suggesting that the project be made a subject of discussion; and that the Japanese Government would contend for a termination of American aid to China or for a very substantial lifting of the restrictions upon exports which are in effect in this country in so far as Japan is concerned, or both, or for cessation of American, British and Dutch defensive preparations in the southern Pacific, or all of these.
It is our belief that if the matter took such a turn, there would result an impairment of the President’s prestige and of this Government’s position in negotiation and in defense of its position: we would be unable to accept the amendments which the Japanese Government offered and thus would have the onus of failure of the project.
Japanese Foreign Office (November 16, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
# ----
For your Honor’s own information.
-
I have read your #1090 [a], and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.
-
What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. [b] Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, [c] and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.
Army 24878 Trans. 11/17/41 (S)
[a] For Part 1, see S.I.S. #24877. For Part 2, see S.I.S. #24857 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.
[b] S.I.S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in resolving a settlement with the United States.
[c] S.I.S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple
#782 (To be handled in government code.)
Re your #1083. [a]
-
Please give the following reply to them regarding the question of recognition:
the various points in the statement made by the Japanese Government on August 28, which is included in the American oral statement, (quote only the points given in the said oral statement) were also included in our proposals of September 6 and 25, and the present cabinet also has no objection to recognizing them as they stand. However, these points have been given on the assumption that the Japanese-American negotiations would reach an agreement. Naturally, therefore, should the negotiations end in a failure, these points would not be binding on Japan alone. We wish to have this clearly understood. -
Regarding the general question of use of force, the expression “without provocation” was used in the reply of the Japanese Government made on August 28. In the same reply, relative to the Soviet question, we used the words “as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty” and then in our proposal of September 6, we used the words “without any justifiable reason.” Now all these expressions mean fundamentally the same thing. The reason for our having gone somewhat into detail concerning the Soviet Union is that we found it necessary to do so in view of the connection between the existence of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty and the Russo-German war.
In short, we had stipulated the “qualification” which we as an independent country should necessarily and naturally state. It goes without saying that this qualification by no means either limits nor minimizes our peaceful intentions.
Army 24879 Trans. 11/17/41 (S)
[a] See S.I.S. #24785-88, inclusive. The text of an oral statement given to Ambassador NOMURA by Secretary Hull at the conference on the 12th.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 16, 1941
(Purple)
#1107 (Departmental Secret) (Strictly Secret)
-
I sent ARMSTRONG to the State Department on the 15th to have him feel out the atmosphere (see my #1029 [a]). ARMSTRONG then informed TERASAKI that during the last two days something happened, apparently, to make the President strongly desire the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States. (I dare say, however, that the attitude of the United States toward us is just about the same as always and that this is just a ripple on the sea. Nevertheless, as we have heard the same thing from other quarters, I send it to you for what it may be worth.)
-
ARMSTRONG, furthermore, said that the advent of Ambassador KURUSU is having a very good effect. (The newspapers, too, in general, have been showing considerable good feeling. Two or three days before Ambassador KURUSU arrived at his post, not only did news articles become quite friendly toward him, but the press interviews in every place drew, in general, the most favorable comments. Will you also, therefore, direct public opinion along these lines.)
Army #24978 Trans. 11/19/41 (2)
[a] S.I.S. #24475 which describes the organization of a committee for the promotion of friendly relations between Japan and America in which TERASAKI is liaison agent and through ARMSTRONG keeps in contact with the State Department.
U.S. Department of State (November 16, 1941)
711.94/11–1641Draft Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
November 16, 1941Outline of an agreement
a) That Japan shall forthwith desist from any and all offensive military operations: offensive military operations to mean launching of new offensive movements in any area and enlargement of Japanese military establishments at any points outside of Japanese territory (among such areas and points being Manchuria, China, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya and insular areas not under Japanese sovereignty or mandate).
b) That the United States shall within six months relax its embargoes upon trade with Japan.
That the two countries shall within six months rescind, reciprocally, their respective freezing regulations and operations, each so far as the other is concerned.
(A provision for economic policy — on the lines of the draft of such a provision given to Admiral Nomura on November 15).
That in case Japan embarks upon any further offensive military operations the obligations of the United States under this agreement shall automatically terminate.
Japanese Foreign Office (November 17, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
17 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#783
Re your #1110*
We have no objections to have it apply to the entire Pacific area. Therefore, we shall not object to your deleting the word “southwestern” from Article 6 of our proposal of 25 September.
24881
JD-1: 6560 (D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT)
*Not available.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
17 November 1941
(Purple)
#784
Re your #1096*
By “in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world”, we mean that the Imperial Government desires that said principle would be applied uniformly throughout the world. Upon the realization of this hope, we anticipate that the principle will be applied on China as well.
We do not imply that the United States shall be held responsible for any violations of this principle outside of the United States’ sphere of influence.
Even before the outbreak of this European war, the trend was away from the above mentioned basic principle. Since the outbreak of this war, practically all traces of the principle have been obliterated Under these circumstances it would be only one with a very unrealistic view of the situation who could expect any fruit from an attempt to apply the principle to China alone.
Japan is not refusing to apply the principle on China on the grounds that a few nations in the world refuse to comply. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of the nations therein are in favor of the principle.
(Through an error, the serial number 781 was applied on two messages**. Will you please give the number 781-B to that message dated the 16th which contained information for Your Excellency only).
24880
JD-1: 6561 (D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT)
*Not yet available.
**One available thus far. Dated. 16 November; JD-1: 6556 (S.I.S. #24873).
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo.
17 November 1941
(Purple)
#1127
The most emphasis in the talks between Hull, I, and Ambassador Kurusu on the 18th, (lasting about three hours), was placed on matters pertaining to the Triple Alliance. Hull, in his customary manner, denounced the Hitlerian policy of expansion through armed force. He pointed out that as long as Japan is tied up with such a policy through the Tripartite Pact, it would be difficult to adjust Japanese-U.S. relations.
Kurusu then said that it would be impossible to comply if he was demanding of Japan that she abrogate the Tripartite Pact. He also pointed out that the alliance was not aimed at expansion through the force of arms.
Hull said that he was in no position to tell Japan to abrogate the Pact but that as long as there is no substantiating proofs of the real aims of the pact, it serves absolutely no purpose.
Then I and Kurusu explained that it was an impossibility to settle such a basic point in any specified time limit. However, to ease the exceedingly critical situation, the first step would be to mutually return to the situation which existed prior to the date on which the freezing of assets order was put into effect, (in other words, Japan would withdraw from south French Indochina and the United States would rescind her order to freeze the assets). Talks should then be continued in a more congenial atmosphere, we suggested.
He did not seem particularly receptive to this suggestion. He said that if the government of Japan could make it clear that it wants to pursue a course of peace, then the United States would confer with the British on the subject of returning to the conditions which existed prior to the time that the freezing order went into effect. It is essential, however, that under those conditions, Japan continue to pursue a peaceful policy with ever increasing vigor.
There were indications that Hull, because of his usual cautious nature, was somewhat influenced by the exaggerated reports carried in the press regarding the Premier’s speech in the Diet in which he expressed the three basic principles of international relations and intention of increasing the troops in French Indochina.
Details will be sent in a subsequent message.
25170
JD-1: 6722 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo
17 November 1941
(Purple)
#1113
At 10:30 a.m. on the 17th I called on Secretary of State Hull accompanied by Kurusu, following which we both had an interview with the President at 11:00 which lasted for about an hour and 15 minutes. Today’s conference was largely concerned with formalities and we did not get down to business. However, I stated that the intentions of the Japanese Government were peaceful, however as we see it the situation is very acute. To this the President replied that America also desired to preserve the peace of the Pacific. (In regard to maintaining peace in the Pacific I could see that he was outlining some formula in his mind). I will wire the details in a subsequent telegram.
25028
JD-1: 6648 (H) Navy Trans. 11-19-41 (7)
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
17 November 1941
(Purple)
#1114
Schmitt’s report:
On the evening of the 16th, we had Schmitt try to feel out the State Department’s attitude. He reports that he talked with his good friend Williamson (secretary to Assistant Secretary of State Hurley) According to him, Williamson, the stumbling points in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations are the Tripartite Pact and the matters pertaining to the China incident. A solution in so far as it involves the actual points is apparently quite possible from both the United States and Japanese viewpoints. The difficulty seems to be a more spiritual one-that is, the suspicion that the United States harbors of Japan. The United States bases its suspicion on the fear that the German and Japanese military cliques will apply pressure and prevail upon the Japanese Government. In other words, the United States believes that there is a possibility that immediately subsequent to the establishing of a U.S.-Japanese accord, the Japanese Government may be forced by Germany or by the Japanese military to pursue a course entirely different from that charted by the accord.
Compared to the above obstacles, the solution of the economic problems, of which the petroleum question is one phase, is indeed a very simple matter.
25133
JD-1: 6693 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 17, 1941
(Purple)
#1118 (Part 1 of 5. [a]) (To be handled in government code)
On the morning of the 17th at half-past ten, I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL. First HULL said:
After the last war there were no able statesmen; therefore, a situation like the present one came about. What we have to think about now is saving the world from this sort of extremity."
KURUSU replied:
I am in entire agreement with what you say. Fortunately, the United States and Japan, who have not yet participated in this war, have a grave responsibility on their shoulders for working in this direction. However, before we can talk about that, there are some things which have to be settled between Japan and the United States. Still, if we do not engage in concrete negotiations, we cannot get anywhere.
(Then he went on briefly to tell how he had come to the United States at the behest of the Premier and Your Excellency.)
Then he continued:
The Premier earnestly hopes for a settlement between Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, he seems to be rather hopeful beyond expectation. There are at present three problems causing a deadlock between Japan and the United States: They are: Equality in commerce, the Tripartite Agreement, and evacuation. The Premier seems to be very hopeful of a settlement concerning the first two. However, when it comes to the third question-that of evacuation-he seems to entertain great concern.
Army 25091 Trans. 11/21/41 (1)
[a] Part 2, S.I.S. #24940; Part 3 not available; Parts 4 and 5, S.I.S.
No. 25084.
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 17, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1118 (Part 2 of 5) [a]
Since the time had come to meet the President and since HULL had expressed his wish to continue the conversation in the presence of the President, we all left our seats. Together with Secretary HULL, I went to see the President at 11:00 a.m.
KURUSU began his conversation by saying:
As I had already told Secretary HULL, the present Cabinet is very much interested in the Japanese-American negotiations. You, Mr. President, as a statesman, no doubt well understand in what frame of mind the Japanese people are after four years of experience in the China incident. While on my way to this country I noticed-though I am not by any means an expert in making such observations-that the situation is militarily strained in Hongkong, Manila and in other islands. The situation is so tense that we cannot tell when an explosion would occur and, even if it occurred, of what benefit would such a situation be to the United States and Japan? (The President showed that he felt the same way.) To be sure Japan wishes that the Japanese-American negotiations would prove to be a success. However, the time element must be taken into consideration. Delaying the solution avails Japan nothing since in the meantime conditions, both militarily and economically, would become less favorable to her if she is to defend herself. The Premier also seems to be quite hopeful that all of the three questions, namely, that of the Three Power Alliance and Pact and the question of withdrawing troops would be settled. [b] However, he is very much worried over the question of withdrawing troops.
Army 24940 Trans. 11/18/41 (M)
[a] Part 1 3, 4 and 6 not available.
[b] Translator's note: Apparently the writer neglected to include in the three questions that of nondiscrimination in trade.
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
17 November 1941
(Purple)
#1118 (Part 3 of 5)
The President:
A long time ago, Secretary of State Bryan once said:
There is no last word between friends.
There have been many so-called “non-aggression pacts” in the past, but all of them are now out of date. I believe, however, that by the establishing of some general understanding between the United States and Japan, the situation may be saved.
Kurusu:
That would seem to be very acceptable from my point of view. From my way of looking at it, apparently the main difficulties in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations to date, have been over the problem of what to do about Japan’s connections with the Tripartite Pact, and what to do about the various claims that the United States has made with regard to the method in which the China Incident should be settled. In the final analysis, it would seem as if adjusting these two points is the main problem at hand at the present time.
With regard to the Tripartite problem, Japan is bound by certain duties under the terms of that instrument. Moreover, she must consider her dignity and honor as a great power. Because of these considerations, it is impossible for her to violate the terms of an alliance. Since the United States has been strongly insisting right along that international agreements must be adhered to, I cannot believe that the United States is urging us to do so now. I feel doubly sure of this where the Tripartite Pact is concerned since the basic objectives of that pact are the prevention of the war’s spreading and the maintenance of peace.
Under these circumstances, it seems as though it should be possible to coordinate and adjust the two problems so as to bring about a settlement. Please understand, however, that no proposal, regardless of how good it may sound, can be accepted by Japan if the terms contained therein cannot be put into effect.
The President:
With regard to the China problem, I have been advised that Japan finds the withdrawal of troops from China a very difficult undertaking. The United States is not trying to intervene or mediate in the problems of Japan and China. I don’t know whether there is such a word in the parlance of diplomats or not, but the United States’ only intention is to become an “introducer.”
25129
JD-1: 6643 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-11 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
17 November 1941
(Purple)
#1118 (Parts 4 and 5 of 5) (Parts 1, and 3, not available).
(For Part 2 see JD-1: 6643) (S. I. S. 24940).
Kurusu:
Concerning Japan’s duties to go to war under the terms of the Tripartite Pact, Japan has stated that Japan alone will determine this. The United States apparently interprets this to mean that Japan will wait until the United States is deeply involved in the battle on the Atlantic and then stab the United States in the back. This is not the case. There have been indications in the past that there are those in the United States who have been laboring under the erroneous belief that Japan would move at Germany’s demands; that Japan was merely Germany’s tool. Japan issued the statement that she would act in accordance with Japan’s decisions alone, for the purpose of correcting this misapprehension.
In any event, if at this time a great understanding between the United States and Japan with regard to the Pacific can be reached as described by the President, such an understanding would far outshine the Tripartite Pact. Under such circumstances, I feel confident that all doubts you may harbor regarding the application of the Tripartite Pact would automatically and completely melt away.
At this point, Hull broke in, and after describing Germany’s policy of conquest, said:
Suppose that Germany succeeds in conquering England and then establishes various subservient governments in South America. Suppose after that that Germany attacks the United States with the British fleet. If the United States waits till then, it would be too late regardless of what she tries to do. That is why the United States must prepare her defenses now and this is what the United States calls her rights under defense. There is no reason why Japan cannot see this.
Thus did Hull go over his theory again.
The President:
The map I referred to in my speech the other day, which described German policy in Central and South America, was an authentic map. Its source was the German Government circles.
Kurusu:
Mr. President, a while ago you made reference to the general relationship between Japan and the United States. As long as we are speaking of peace on the Pacific, and since at least one side of the western hemisphere is on the Pacific, the various countries in Central and South America must be covered when we speak of the Pacific area. It would be impossible for Japan to be a partner in any project aimed at disturbing the peace of the western hemisphere.
You say that people would give voice to their disapproval should these negotiations lead to a successful settlement between us on the grounds that Japan would be promising the United States peace while on the other hand she would be carrying the spear for Germany. From the beginning, however, the Japanese Government has been saying that should a just peace be established on the Pacific, she would withdraw her troops from French Indochina. If, therefore, matters progress to that point, this withdrawal should satisfy the general public of the United States as actual proof of Japan’s peaceful intentions.
In any event, I am convinced that the immediate objective is to successfully and speedily come to an agreement on the various problems now being discussed at present between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull.
Hull:
I favor the continuation of these talks. Heretofore, I and Ambassador Nomura have met and talked on numerous occasions but we always seem to come to a certain point and then start going around and around the same circle. I would welcome your-Kurusu’s-attacking this point from a different angle.
The President expressed his approval of this, and said:
I am planning to remain in Washington until this Saturday (the 24th). I shall be glad to discuss matters with you and Secretary Hull at any time before then.
25804
JD-1: 6654 (D) Navy Trans. 11-21-41 (1)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
17 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#785
Re your #1097*
-
The contents of 3 of paragraph 2 pertaining to Japanese-U.S. relations, seems to be about the same as the terms contained in the supplementary provision of the United States’ 21 June proposal. In view of the fact that “materials necessary for one’s own country’s safety and for self-defense” shall be an exception, there is a danger that even after the agreement is entered into, they will put some restrictions on the exporting of petroleum. We cannot accept that phraseology, therefore, unless they agree not to restrict exports on articles needed by us which will be clearly listed.
-
Regarding sub-sections 1 and 2 of paragraph 3 of that message which concerns the policy on the Pacific area: Under paragraph 5 of the basic terms of Japanese-Chinese peace which was appended to our 25 September proposal**, regarding economic cooperation, there is no objection to a third country’s engaging in economic activities in China as long as it is conducted on a fair basis. Our proposal is aimed at our having the right to develop and have access to natural resources vital to national defense. In view of the great sacrifices made by Japan in the past four and a half years, this is but a natural demand.
If, therefore, the United States recognizes the basic forms of our peace with China, and if the contents of your message #1096*** and sub-sections 1 and 2 of the paragraph referred to, are meant to be the basis from which a permanent policy is to be established subsequent to the establishment of peace under the terms set forth by us, we shall give it our favorable consideration.
If, on the other hand, the contents of your message #1096*** and sub-sections 1 and 2 of the referred to message (1097*) are aimed at making us alter the basic peace terms, the Imperial Government finds them absolutely unacceptable.
-
Re the same paragraph 3:
It is feared that the terms included in this paragraph will lead to joint supervision of finances and credit in China. Since this conflicts with the fundamental principles of the New Order policy of the Empire, (please point out that these terms conflict with the basic principles that the United States has been proclaiming of late, too), for that reason, it is impossible for us to give our approval thereto. -
After all is said and done, the various paragraphs noted above are apparently parts of a proposal which is attempting to completely disregard our sacrifices during four and a half years of war. Settlement based on this proposal is absolutely out of the question. Since the United States herself has stated that this was an unofficial and exploratory proposal which has no binding powers, please lead the United States to completely abandoning it and to proceed, using our proposal of 25 September as the basis on which to do so.
24937
JD-1: 6589 (D) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 6586 (S.I.S #24932)
**JD-1: 5360 (S.I.S #22550-51)
***JD-1: 6585 (S.I.S #24931)
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
17 November 1941
(Purple)
#769
On the morning of the 17th the
MADDO*
Portland
J** 10 ships
M*** 1 ship
left port. Destination unknown.
JD-1: 6761 25244 (H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AR)
*Marblehead?
**May be garble for "D"-destroyer.
***Minelayer.
From: Hong Kong (Yano)
To: Ottawa
17 November 1941
(J19)
Unnumbered
Hong Kong to Tokyo #542
There have been rumors to the effect that the Canada army troops would soon be sent to the Orient.
On the 16th (morning) a Canadian Pacific line steamer came in port guarded by a British warship. This ship had on board about 1000 Canadian soldiers, who were entered in the Kuryushinho barracks.
These troops are Canadian volunteers and are of mixed nationality. They are keeping the strength, etc. of this division a secret, but according to reports another 2000 are expected.
Relayed to Canton, Ottawa. Relay to Shanghai and Nanking.
JD-1: 6874 25431 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (CN)
U.S. Department of State (November 17, 1941)
794.00/268: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 17, 1941 — 4 p.m. [Received November 17 — 11:06 a.m.]
1811.Foreign Minister’s speech.
Fundamental Japan’s foreign policy aims at establishment peace in East Asia based on justice, and as result this policy, Japan has unceasingly developed since Meiji restoration. In past 70 years Japan has faced several crises, and is now endeavoring accomplish new East Asian order as contribution toward world peace. Three Power Pact brought into being because Germany, Italy have similar views, and in little more than year has contributed toward construction new orders [in] Asia and Europe, as well as prevention of spread of war.
Manchukuo’s strength is increasing and 13 powers have recognized it. In China, Chungking is being subjugated. Japan[’s] policy is to co-operate with China and [upon?] basis treaty concluded for that purpose. Cooperation with Nanking will increase.
In North, Japan has striven to prevent spread of war to East and concluded Japanese-Soviet pact for that purpose. Japan is determined to prevent development [of] peace disturbance factors, and simultaneously to protect rights [and] interests Japan.
In South, Government mediated that Indochina dispute and established economic-political relations with Indochina. Also concluded protocol for joint defense Indochina to meet threat against that country which menaced security Japan. Yoshizawa despatched to draw still closer bonds of friendship. Relations with Thailand also becoming closer.
But third powers disseminate malicious propaganda, accusing Japan of aggression in those regions, and when Japanese troops entered Southern Indochina in accordance defense protocol, Britain, United States regarded step as menace and froze assets which was tantamount rupturing economic relations. They also established encircling positions with cooperation Netherlands Indies, Chungking. Thus international situation increasing in tension and existence Empire affected. Government has exerted utmost efforts preserve peace. Since outbreak China affair, relations with United States deteriorated, which unless checked would end in catastrophe, causing suffering in Pacific and entire world.
Solicitous for peace as ever, the Japanese Government have, since April last, carried on conversations with the Government of the United States with a view to bringing about a fundamental adjustment of the Japanese-American relations. The former Cabinet endeavored earnestly to reach a successful conclusion of the negotiations, in view particularly of the tension in the situation which had been accentuated since the summer of this year, but an agreement of views was not reached between the two countries.
The present Cabinet, in order to avert the international crisis and preserve the peace of the Pacific, decided also to continue the negotiations which are still in progress. I regret to say that I have not the liberty of revealing at this juncture the details of the negotiations. But I think an amicable conclusion is by no means impossible if the Government of the United States are, on the one hand, genuinely solicitous for world peace as are the Imperial Government and, on the other, understand Japan’s natural requirements and her position in East Asia and consider the situation as it exists there in the light of realities. Moreover, the views of the two countries have generally been made clear through the conversations which have now lasted more than 6 months, and consequently I believe it must be evident to the United States Government that, viewed even from the technical angle, there is no necessity of spending much time on the negotiations hereafter.
Such being the circumstances, the Japanese Government are bending their best efforts to the successful conclusion of the negotiations, but there is naturally a limit to our conciliatory attitude. Should an occasion arise such as might menace the very existence of the Empire or compromise the prestige of Japan as a great power, it goes without saying that Japan must face it with a firm and resolute attitude. For my part, I am taking charge of the negotiations with a firm resolve regarding this point.
Japan faces unprecedented situation and entire nation must unite. National defense and diplomacy are inseparable, and internal and external politics are counterparts. Never before has there been greater need for mobilizing nation’s strength.
GREW
711.94/254015/35Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 17, 1941.Mr. Secretary:
In connection with the meeting which will take place with the Japanese on November 18, it is suggested that you may care to bring up the following points:
- As Mr. Kurusu knows, we have gone over very exhaustively in our conversations the various questions involved in the proposed settlement between the United States and Japan and have examined these questions from every angle. It will be helpful to have a fresh point of view on the matter and for this reason we would like to hear all the suggestions which Mr. Kurusu may have in mind to offer.
What Mr. Kurusu may have to say in response to your drawing him out in this way might take up most of the time of the meeting. Opportune occasion may arise, however, for you to bring up any or all of the following points:
We have noted the contents of the two documents which the Japanese Ambassador presented on November 17. In one of these documents the Japanese Government confirms as expressing its general purpose certain excerpts from a statement of the Japanese Government delivered to the President on August 28. While we still do not see the need of the qualifying phrases, the statement of the Japanese Government serves to clarify the point that the present Japanese Government’s attitude in this respect is the same as that of the previous Japanese Government. In the other document there was expressed the willingness of the Japanese Government to apply the principle of political stabilization to the entire Pacific area and to omit the word “southwestern” in the text of Article VI of its proposal of September 25, We wish to inquire whether the Japanese Government would be willing to omit the word “southwestern” throughout the document.
We shall await with interest the reactions of the Japanese Government to our proposal of November 15 on economic policy. We feel that if we can reach agreement on that aspect of a Pacific settlement it will be helpful toward enabling us to dispose of the other outstanding questions.
The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has on various occasions spoken to the American Ambassador of the latest Japanese proposals as representing material concessions on the part of the Japanese Government and has intimated that this Government was not adopting a concessive attitude. From the outset of our conversations we have talked about a comprehensive and consistent peaceful program. We have neither asked for anything for ourselves nor have we felt that from the long-swing interests of both countries there was any room for compromise on the principles essential to establishing and maintaining such a comprehensive peaceful program. Entirely apart from this aspect of the question, however, it is not clear what the Japanese Government has in mind when it says that its recent proposals represent concessions.
It would be a very fine thing at this time if Japanese industry could be put actively to work in pursuance of the program for the promotion of peace. There are many ways in which, if we could reach an agreement with Japan on the economic program, Japanese factories could be put into operation for the production of commodities needed by the United States and by other peaceful countries in connection with this program. The problem of demobilizing large numbers of armed forces and making room for the men thus demobilized in peaceful pursuits always presents difficulties, but it is felt that the situation now is exceptionally advantageous for such demobilization in view of the great existing need throughout the world for the products of industry.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
711.94/254015/35Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, November 17, 1941.An approach to the problem of eliminating tension with Japan and insuring defeat of Germany
I. ForewordIt is becoming increasingly evident that “all out” diplomatic preparedness is as important an instrument of defense as is adequate military preparedness. Military activity may win battles, diplomatic activity can make the fighting of these battles unnecessary; military victories can gain raw material and equipment and can weaken the enemy, diplomatic victories can achieve similar gains. Without major diplomatic victories Germany could not have attained her spectacular success. Had they not suffered major diplomatic defeats neither England nor France would be in their present predicaments.
An “all out” effort involves in diplomacy as in military strategy the fullest use of every economic and political advantage. Just as our military forces in preparation for an “all out” defense or in actual warfare must make intelligent use of our geographical position, our rich resources, our vast labor power, technical equipment and democratic traditions, so must diplomacy utilize those advantages to the full if it is to have any chance of success.
We are rich — we should use more of our wealth in the interests of peace and victory. We are powerful — we should be willing to use our power before our backs are to the wall. We need no nation’s lands — we should make full use of that fact. We keep our national pledges — now is the time that record of integrity should stand us in good stead. We are protected by two oceans — let us exploit that protection while distance is still a potent barrier. We are a democracy — let us take full advantage of the strength of just covenants openly arrived at.
If ever there was a time when diplomacy could secure its most brilliant victories for the United States, now is that time! The longer we wait the less chance will we have to use diplomacy as an aid to our defense. The patterns of relationship jell; plans become irrevocable; opportunities lost are gone forever. A nation committed irrevocably to a course of action loses the power to exercise choice, to accept offers and make conditions.
If the President were to propose something like the appended agreement and the Japanese accept, the whole world would be electrified by the successful transformation of a threatening and belligerent powerful enemy into a peaceful and prosperous neighbor. The prestige and the leadership of the President both at home and abroad would skyrocket by so brilliant and momentous a diplomatic victory — a victory that requires no vanquished, a victory that immediately would bring peace, happiness and prosperity to hundreds of millions of Eastern peoples, and assure the subsequent defeat of Germany!
The proposal is workable and could be spectacularly successful, if Japan could be induced to accept the arrangement, and the great advantages it offers to Japan, and the fact that the likely alternative is war might induce Japan to accept the arrangement.
The proposal is given below only in bare outline and in only enough detail to indicate the essential points. What is most needed at this moment is not a carefully worked out program, but rather a decision to employ an all-out diplomatic approach in the current discussions with the Japanese.
II. Self-evident propositions concerning United States and Japan
War between the United States and Japan would cost thousands of lives, billions of dollars; would leave the vanquished country bitter and desirous of revenge; would foster social disruption, and would not insure peace during our children’s lives, nor permanently solve troublesome problems now standing between the two countries.
The United States prefers a just and peaceful settlement to war as a means of settling international difficulties, and is willing to go more than half way to settle peaceably the issues that stand in the way of more friendly intercourse between the two countries.
The United States recognizes that Japan, because of the special nature of its economy, is greatly in need of opportunities for increased foreign trade, and in need of capital to repair the ravages of four years of warfare, and in need of assured sources of basic raw materials.
The United States recognizes that our immigration laws have in fact unjustly discriminated against the Japanese people.
The United States believes that in the long run the interests of both the Japanese people and the American people can best be served by establishing fair and peaceful conditions under which Japan and her neighbors can prosper.
The United States is rich enough in funds, raw material, equipment, and technical skill to build, if necessary, and maintain a Navy and air force ten times as strong as that which Japan can build, and the United States is, because of numerous circumstances, powerful enough to destroy Japan should the United States be forced against her will to take up arms against Japan.
Should Japan force the United States to fight, Japan would have actively arrayed against her not only the United States but the British Empire, Netherlands East Indies, China, and probably Russia. In addition, the peoples of Indochina, Thailand, Manchuria and Korea would become much more difficult for Japan to control. In such a war victory for Japan would be impossible.
Defeat of Japan would bring bankruptcy, revolution and chaos in Japan. It would cost Japan her empire and her navy, and leave her a fourth-rate power with little chance of regaining her present world position for decades to come.
The United States wishes so much to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and destruction and to attain friendship between the Japanese and the American people, that it will pay well to help Japan’s economy back to a peaceful and healthy basis.
The United States believes there is no basic obstacle to permanent and more friendly relations between the United States and Japan and believes that the Japanese people will welcome an opportunity to restore peace, to reconstruct Japan’s industry and trade, and to promote friendly relations with her neighbors on a basis fair both to Japan’s needs and the needs of her neighbors.
The United States wishes to help China maintain her independence and attain peace so that she may go forward in her political and economic development, so unfortunately interrupted a few years ago.
And finally — and of most immediate importance—
- The United States wishes to concentrate as soon as possible her naval force in the Atlantic so as to be prepared for any emergency against a potential enemy with whom there is no current basis for friendship.
III. Proposed agreementBecause of the foregoing facts, the United States proposes to enter into an Agreement with Japan at once under which the United States and Japan will agree to do certain things, as follows:
A. On her part, the United States Government proposes to do the following:
To withdraw the bulk of the American naval forces from the Pacific.
To sign a 20-year non-aggression pact with Japan.
To promote a final settlement of the Manchurian question.
To actively advocate the placing of Indochina under the Government of a joint British, French, Japanese, Chinese and American Commission, which will insure most-favored-nation treatment for those five countries until the European War is ended, and which will govern the country primarily in the interests of the Indochinese people.
To give up all extra-territorial rights in China, and to obtain England’s agreement to give up her extra-territorial rights to China, and give Hong Kong back to China.
To present to Congress and push for enactment a bill to repeal the Immigration Act of 1917 [1924] which prohibits immigration into the United States of Japanese, and place the Japanese and the Chinese on the same basis as other peoples.
To negotiate a trade agreement with Japan, giving her (a) most-favored-nation treatment and (b) such concessions on imports as can be mutually satisfactorily arranged, including an agreement to keep raw silk on the free list for 20 years.
To extend a $2 billion 20-year credit at 2 percent interest, to be drawn upon at the rate not to exceed $200 million a year except with approval of the President of the United States.
To set up a $500 million stabilization fund half supplied by Japan and half by the United States, to be used for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.
To remove the restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.
To use its influence to the full to attempt to eliminate sources of potential friction between Japan and her neighbors, and to assure Japan access to the raw materials of the world on the same basis as now enjoyed by United States and Great Britain.
B. On its part, the Japanese Government proposes to do the following:
Withdraw all military, naval, air police forces from China (boundaries as of 1931) from Indochina and from Thailand.
Withdraw all support — military, political, or economic — from any government in China other than that of the national government.
Replace with yen currency at a rate agreed upon among the Treasuries of China, Japan, England and United States all military scrip, yen and puppet notes circulating in China.
Give up all extra-territorial rights in China.
Extend to China a billion yen loan at 2 percent to aid in reconstructing China (at rate of 100 million yen a year).
Withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided USSR withdraws all her troops from the Far Eastern front except for an equivalent remainder.
Sell to the United States up to three-fourths of her current output of war material — including naval, air, ordnance and commercial ships on a cost-plus 20 percent basis as the United States may select.
Expel all German technical men, military officials and propagandists.
Accord the United States and China most-favored-nation treatment in the whole Japanese Empire.
Negotiate a 10-year non-aggression pact with United States, China, British Empire, Dutch Indies (and Philippines).
C. Inasmuch as the United States cannot permit the present uncertain status between the United States and Japan to continue in view of world developments, and feels that decisive action is called for now, the United States should extend the above offer of a generous and peaceful solution of the difficulties between the two countries for only a limited time. If the Japanese Government does not indicate its acceptance in principle at least of the proffered terms before the expiration of that time, it can mean only that the present Japanese Government prefers other and less peaceful ways of solving those difficulties, and is awaiting the propitious moment to attempt to carry out further a plan of conquest.
IV. Advantages to Japan and United States of such an agreementThe advantages accruing to each government are listed below:
A. To the United States
In the event that Japan elected to reject the offer of peaceful solution under terms herein indicated, the United States would have a clearer idea of what to expect and would therefore know better how to shape her own policy.
Our naval power will be greatly increased at once by the freeing of our Pacific fleet for duty elsewhere.
We would be able to send more of our equipment to England and Russia without increasing our vulnerability to an attack from the East.
We will have stopped the war in China and have regained for her her freedom.
We will have paved the way for a substantial increase in postwar trade.
We would greatly strengthen the Allied position vis-à-vis Germany.
We will have saved ourselves from a war with Japan.
The money it would cost us would be a very small part of what we would save by not having to fight Japan, or by not having to be prepared for a two-ocean war.
A prosperous Japan and China can greatly help to restore our normal trade, and thus make easier our own transition to a peace time economy.
Insure for ourselves an increased supply of tin, antimony and wood, oil and rubber from the Far East.
Handicap Germany in its present military campaign and at the same time give great moral encouragement to the British and Russian people.
Finally, military and naval experts who now fear a “two front” naval threat will be more enthusiastic about all-out help to England and Russia. There will be much less cause to oppose the administration’s foreign policy.
B. To Japan
Instead of being confronted with prospect of a more serious war and certain defeat in the end, she can have peace at once.
She can proceed at once to shift from a war economy to peace economy and at the same time experience prosperity rather than a serious depression.
She can withdraw from the China incident without loss of “face”.
She can strengthen her currency and reduce her public debt.
Her foreign trade will greatly increase.
She can devote her energies and capital to reconstructing Japan, building up Manchuria, and developing new trade possibilities at a time when other countries are engaged in war or preparation for war.
She will at one stroke have solved some of her thorniest problems in her international relations.
She will avoid the social disruption that is bound to take place in Japan after an expanded and prolonged war effort.
The one danger inherent in the proposed concessions is that if accepted by Japan it would provide her with a breathing space during which she could greatly strengthen her military and economic potential. She might then be a greater threat to us a year or two hence than she is now.
Against that possibility are the following factors:
Owing to the scarcity of many raw materials she will not be able to expand her navy and air force during the next year nearly as much as we can — particularly in view of the provision in the agreement that we can buy 80 percent of her current output of armaments.
The next two years are crucial for us. If we can obtain the release of the Russian, British and American forces now being tied up in the Far East by Japan’s threatening, we will have done more to strengthen United Kingdom and Russia vis-à-vis Germany than we could with a whole year’s output of planes and tanks and ships.
The Japanese people would be so relieved by the settlement of the China “incident”, and the end of the threat of war with major powers, and would be so happy at the cessation of economic strangulation and the emergence of real prosperity, that it is hardly likely that any military clique could stir up significant trouble for years to come.
Altogether, the likelihood of Japan’s strengthening her position and re-entering the world scene as a belligerent aggressor in the next few years seems very slim — provided Germany is defeated.
It would, of course, be necessary to obtain Congressional approval before making definite offers, but through preliminary confidential conferences with leaders of both parties and with appropriate committees, the ground could be quickly prepared so that negotiations could go forward.
A completed document could in a week or two be offered to the Japanese Government. The world, including the Japanese people, would know the motives and the contents of our offer. If the Japanese Government would not accept, it would have at least the great advantages of (1) clarifying our own policy and rallying support behind the President, (2) create serious division in Japan.
If the Japanese Government were to indicate its tentative acceptance in principle, the President could at once call a conference in Washington to be attended by Chinese, British, Russian, and possibly Dutch East Indian and Philippine representatives. Inasmuch as all the important concessions are to be made by United States and Japan, the participation of other governments in the conference need not complicate negotiations.
The above-proposed program of mutual concessions can be successful only if certain vital concessions are not left out. If adopted with those concessions peace in the Pacific would be gained, whereas if adopted without them “appeasement” would be the result, the threat of war would not be averted, and an exceptional opportunity to settle the issue on terms favorable to defeat of Germany would be lost.
Minimum concessions to be obtained from Japan should be withdrawal of troops from the mainland of Asia and sale to us of the bulk of her current production of armaments. If we do not achieve this, we shall not obtain any significant relief to allied military forces in the east while we would be making it possible for Japan to strengthen herself for possible later aggression when the situation is more propitious for aggressive acts on her part. The minimum objectives must be to free the American, British and Russian forces from the Pacific.
711.94/2447: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
[Substance]Tokyo, November 17, 1941 — 8 p.m. [Received November 17 — 2:09 p.m.]
1814.The Ambassador, referring to his previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p.m., final sentence, emphasizes the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese theater of operations. He is taking into account, therefore, the probability of the Japanese exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative. He advises his Government accordingly of the importance of not placing the major responsibility in giving prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included, since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and secondary military information. The Embassy would not expect to obtain any information in advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press; the observation of military movements is not possible by the few Americans remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe); and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop concentrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria and Formosa, while troop dispositions since last July’s general mobilization have, according to all other indications available, been made with a view to enabling the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the Pacific southwest or in Siberia or in both.
The Ambassador expresses the Embassy’s full realization that the present most important duty perhaps is to detect any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned above and states that every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. He adds that the Embassy’s field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, the United States Government is advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much as possible the likelihood of the Embassy’s ability to give substantial warning.
GREW
711.94/11–1741Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 17, 1941.Proposal for the exchange of certain territories in the Pacific for Japanese ships
A. Agreement might be reached between the United States and Japan (with the assent of the other countries concerned) along the following lines:
I. Japan to have the right to purchase one or all of the following territories:
a) Northern Sakhalin (belonging to the USSR)
b) Tonkin (Northern French Indochina, belonging to the French Government)
c) New Guinea
The western part (belonging to the Netherlands)
The southeastern part (Papua) (under the Government of Australia)
The northeastern part (now administered by Australia under a mandate from the League of Nations). (The mandate for this territory might be transferred to Japan, Australia being compensated for a relinquishment of its rights by Japan.)
II. The United States to assist Japan in obtaining funds for the purchase of these territories through a loan of a stipulated part of the purchasing price, the remainder of the purchase price to be found by Japan.
III. Japan to reimburse the United States through the transfer to this Government of merchant ships or possibly warships.
B. Agreement might be reached between the United States, China and Japan providing for the purchase of all or part of Manchuria from China, Japan to obtain the funds from the United States in return for the sale to the United States of ships.
Agreement B might form a part of Agreement A or either might be reached independently.
Either or both of these agreements would of course be reached only in conjunction with an agreement on the part of Japan to withdraw its forces from China, and follow general courses of peace.
Note in regard to Tonkin:
The armistice agreement of June 22, 1940 between France and Germany apparently contains no provision prohibiting the sale of any of the French colonies.[Here follows final paragraph same as final paragraph in revised memorandum printed as enclosure to the document, infra.]
711.94/254014/35Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 17, 1941.The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary’s office to present Mr. Kurusu in pursuance of an appointment made at the Ambassador’s request.
After the Ambassador had presented Mr. Kurusu and appropriate amenities had been exchanged, the Secretary complimented Mr. Kurusu upon the way he had handled his relations with the public since coming to this country. The Secretary then spoke highly of the respect and confidence in which the Secretary and his associates hold the Japanese Ambassador.
The Secretary then went on to say that, from the point of view of the long-swing interests of both Japan and the United States, he felt that there should be no conflict in the real interests of the two countries. He referred then to the short-sighted nationalistic statesmanship that developed in Europe and in the United States after the World War which he said was responsible for the troubles from which the world is now suffering. He expressed the hope that our two countries could pursue a wise, far-sighted statesmanship and in this way do something to contribute to put the world back on peaceful courses. He pointed to the fact that Hitler was holding down one or two hundred million people in Europe at the point of the bayonet and observed that this was a situation we do not like to see perpetuated in this world.
Mr. Kurusu said that there appeared to be an unfortunate impression that in certain quarters in this country the new Prime Minister, being a military man, had an outlook and attitude which was different from that of the previous Prime Minister, but that Kurusu himself had been agreeably surprised when he discussed policies with General Tojo and found him to be sincerely desirous of reaching an agreement with the United States. He said he wished to tell the Secretary off the record that when General Tojo had been commanded to form a cabinet, Tojo had invited Kurusu to take an important position in the cabinet but that Kurusu had declined because he had thought, having read the announcement that the Konoye cabinet had fallen on account of important differences within the cabinet as to methods of executing national policy, that General Tojo intended to discontinue the conversations with the United States. Kurusu said that later on he had discussed with General Tojo the matter of his present mission and he was fully reassured of the General’s desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the United States. Kurusu said that in the three important points on which differences have developed in our conversations General Tojo seemed to be optimistic in regard to the prospects of eliminating the differences in respect to nondiscrimination and the relations of the two countries toward the European war, but that the General felt that on account of the difficulty of withdrawing Japanese troops from China in a short time this problem would be one which would present greater difficulties.
The conversation was interrupted at this point owing to the approach of the hour for the President’s reception of the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu.
The Ambassador handed the Secretary two documents which the Ambassador said were the Japanese Government’s reply to the points we had raised on (1) Japan’s peaceful intentions and (2) on narrowing down the scope of the proposed understanding.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
711.94/254014/35Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State
Washington, 17–11–1941.Reference is made to the oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 12, 1941 and, under instructions from his Government, the Japanese Ambassador states as follows:
The all [sic] points contained in the excerpts which the Secretary of State quoted in the oral statement are embodied in the proposals which the Japanese Government made to the United States Government on the 6th and 25th of September last and the present Japanese Cabinet also has no objection whatever to confirming these points as expressing its general purport. It is, however, to be taken for granted that such confirmation has the successful conclusion of the present negotiations between the Japanese and United States Governments as its prerequisite, and that is, failing by any chance such successful conclusion, the Japanese Government is naturally not to be left bound by its commitment on the points above mentioned.
In regard to the phrases quoted in the oral statement as modifying the peaceful intent of the Japanese Government, it is to be explained that the phrases in question were after all for the purpose of expressing one and the same intent and that, in the case of Soviet Russia in particular, a more or less detailed stipulation was made out of considerations of the existing Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and its relation to the war between Germany and Soviet Russia. These phrases were used only in order to express the qualification which is due to and necessary for an [sic] sovereign state and were not intended to limit or narrow down in any way the peaceful intentions of the Japanese Government.
711.94/2466Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State
Washington, 17–11–1941.The Japanese Ambassador has been authorized to state that the Japanese Government has no objection whatever to apply the principle of political stabilization to the entire area of the Pacific and that the Japanese Government is willing to eliminate the word “southwestern” from the text of Article VI of its proposal of September 25.
711.94/2466Memorandum by the Secretary of State
Washington, November 17, 1941.I accompanied Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Saburo Kurusu to the White House in order that the latter might be received by the President.
Following several minutes of an exchange of courtesies and formalities, the President brought up the more serious side by referring to the misunderstandings and matters of difference between our countries and made clear the desire of this country, and he accepted the statement of the Japanese Ambassador that it was the desire of Japan equally, to avoid war between our two countries and to bring about a settlement on a fair and peaceful basis so far as the Pacific area was concerned.
Ambassador Kurusu proceeded with one line of remarks that he kept up during the conversation and that was that we must find ways to work out an agreement to avoid trouble between our two countries. He said that all the way across the Pacific it was like a powder keg, and again he repeated that some way must be found to adjust the situation.
Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth, which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace arrangement would not for a moment be taken seriously while all of the countries interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this country with no other motive except self-defense has recognized that danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten, twenty-five or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when Japan is asked about whether this is self-defense, she indicates that she has no opinion on the subject — I said that I cannot get this view over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties in connection with this country’s relations with Japan.
The President remarked that some time ago he proclaimed a zone around this hemisphere, 300 miles out in the sea in some places and 1,100 miles in others. The President added that this was self-defense.
I then said that Ambassador Nomura and I have been proceeding on the view that the people of the United States and Japan alike are a proud and great people and there is no occasion for either to attempt to bluff the other and we would not consider that bluffing enters into our conversations, which are of genuine friendliness.
The President brought out a number of illustrations of our situation and the Japanese situation as it relates to Germany and our self-defense which serve to emphasize our position and to expose the sophistry of the Japanese position.
Ambassador Kurusu said that Germany had not up to this time requested Japan to fight; that she was serving a desirable purpose without doing so — this must have meant that she was keeping the American and British Navies, aircraft, et cetera, diverted.
The further question of whether the United States is on the defensive in the present Pacific situation came up by some general discussion in reference to that situation by Ambassador Kurusu, and the President and I made it clear that we were not the aggressors in the Pacific but that Japan was the aggressor.
At another point I said that the belief in this country is that the Japanese formula of a new order in greater East Asia is but another name for a program to dominate entirely, politically, economically, socially and otherwise by military force all of the Pacific area; that this would include the high seas, the islands and the continents and would place every other country at the mercy of very arbitrary military rule just as the Hitler program does in Europe and the Japanese in China. The Ambassador made no particular comment.
There was some effort by Ambassador Kurusu to defend their plan of not bringing the troops out of China. Placing the Japanese on the defensive, the President said that the question ought to be worked out in a fair way considering all of the circumstances and relative merits of the matters involved; and that at a suitable stage, while we know that Japan does not wish us to mediate in any way, this Government might, so to speak, introduce Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with the remaining or detailed adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been determined.
Ambassador Kurusu strongly stated that it would be most difficult to bring all the troops out of China at once.
Ambassador Kurusu said that we, of course, desired to bring up both sides of matters existing between our two countries and he said that we would recall that when the Japanese went into Shantung during the World War, this Government insisted that she get out. I replied that my own country opposed a policy of this seizure of new territory by any country to the fullest extent of its ability to do so; that it declined to take a dollar of compensation or a foot of territory for itself; that it insisted that the world must turn over a new leaf in this respect or nations would be fighting always for territory and under modern methods of war would soon destroy and utterly impoverish each other; that in any event his country fared well in this respect.
The question of our recent proposal on commercial policy was brought up by us and Ambassador Kurusu said he had not examined it and that he had forgotten much of the technical side of commercial policy since he was in the Foreign Office. The President made very pertinent and timely reference to the destructive nature of armaments and the still more destructive effects of a permanent policy of armaments which always means war, devastation and destruction. He emphasized the point that there is from the long-term point of view no difference of interest between our two countries and no occasion, therefore, for serious differences.
All in all, there was nothing new brought out by the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu. Ambassador Kurusu constantly made the plea that there was no reason why there should be serious differences between the two countries and that ways must be found to solve the present situation. He referred to Prime Minister Tojo as being very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment notwithstanding he is an Army man. The President expressed his interest and satisfaction to hear this. The President frequently parried the remarks of Ambassador Nomura and also of Ambassador Kurusu, especially in regard to the three main points of difference between our two countries. There was no effort to solve these questions at the conference. The meeting broke up with the understanding that I would meet the Japanese representatives tomorrow morning.
CORDELL HULL
Japanese Foreign Office (November 18, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
18 November 1941*
(Purple)
#1131 (Part 1 & 2 of 5)
(Foreign Office Secret)
(Chief of Office routing)
On the 18th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull at 10:30 in the morning and we conversed for two hours and forty-five minutes.
Hull (in his customary tone):
I am one who worried about Hitler’s activities right from the beginning. However, at that time, no one paid any attention. He is a man who does not know how to stop once he starts. The United States will no doubt become his objective in the near future.
(So saying, he repeated his theory which he expounded on the 17th).
In the event that Hitler continues to be victorious, Japan should be thinking of his coming on to the East Asiatic stage. If Japan doesn’t see this for herself, I can’t feel sorry for her.
(He continued in his usual vein, bringing up again a description of the ‘confused era (?)’ and the turn about in Germany’s attitude toward the Soviet Union).
The basis of the national policy of the United States is and will be the maintenance of peace. Therefore, it is impossible for the United States to ever condone the policies of Hitler which depends on expansion through the force of arms.
As long as Japan is tied to Hitler by means of the Tripartite Pact, there shelf be great difficulties in adjusting Japanese-U.S. relations.
Placing emphasis on Japan’s part in the Tripartite Pact the Secretary went on to describe his point of view.
Hull:
Even if an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States at this time, it would be impossible at this time to shake the general U.S. public’s conviction that, as Germany is pursuing a policy of expansion by force of arms, Japan is doing likewise in the Far East.
Of the extremists in the United States, there are those who even say that the United States has become Hitler’s partner in his policy of aggression, through her relationship with Japan.
Even if some agreement is reached between Japan and the United States under present circumstances, it could mean no more than the existing agreement between Japan and the USSR, under which, the agreement notwithstanding, enormous forces, which are constantly being increased, have to be facing each other at all times.
Unless the fundamental trouble is removed, it will be impossible to expect any progress in our talks.
Kurusu:
If something is impossible to do, it simply can’t be done, regardless of what fancy words may be used to dress it up.
Even if you tell us to abrogate, or at least to make ineffective, the Tripartite Pact at this time, that is something that is impossible for us to do.
Hull:
The United States is not in a position to demand that you nullify the effect of the Tripartite Pact. The only thing I say is that although I can comprehend the circumstances making it possible for Japan to maintain the status quo of her relationship to the Tripartite Pact and at the same time seek an agreement with the United States, in view of the nature of the United States, it is impossible to completely disregard the effects of public opinion.
Kurusu:
The alliance in question does not advocate, or even condone, expansion through the force of arms.
Hull:
If that is the case, it is a useless instrument unless some definite proof as to its purposes are presented.
Nomura:
It would be difficult to do so within any limited time. The situation in the southwestern Pacific area is at present very critical. To counter Japan’s sending of troops to French Indochina, Britain is increasing her armed forces in Singapore while the United States is doing likewise in the Philippine Islands.
25143
JD-1: 6664 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (1)
*Translator's note: Date is evidently the 18th, though the first two parts were encoded with key for 17th.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
Purple
#1131 (Part 3 Of 5) [a] (To be handled in government code.)
If we both undertake to increase our military strength at any time, something which we would regret might occur. Therefore, since even though we keep fighting each other with broad, idealistic arguments there would be no end to them, let us first relax this tension for the time being. To do this we should return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing order. I mean Japan should evacuate southern French Indo-China, and in return the United States should rescind the freezing order. If the atmosphere is calm in this manner, there will be no need of sending warships to Singapore or strengthening military facilities in the Philippines. Then we would like to confine these talks.
HULL said,
While we are not yet agreed on fundamental questions, it would be futile to do what you say as a temporary stop-gap measure. We hope that as first of the East Asiatic nations, Japan will take the leadership for a policy of peace. However, if a policy of armed conquest is to dominate Japan, we will consider it a danger to world peace, and we will not, by any means, yield. (To this both I and Ambassador KURUSU had something to say). If the leaders of the Japanese Government will show that they will exert a peaceful policy in any event, why then in turn, I will not object to getting in touch with Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., and consider returning to the status prior to the exercise of the freezing order. However, this is so that Japanese politics will turn more and more toward a peaceful trend.
Army 25086. 11/21/41 (1)
[a] Part 1 and 2 not available.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
Purple
#1131 (Part 4 of 5) (To be handled in government code)
Concerning the China question, HULL asked a question about the stationing of troops. I explained what you said in Proposal A of your #726 [a] (of course, I didn’t mention the twenty-five years you spoke of), and HULL let it go at that. Referring again to the China question, he said that England, the Netherlands and China had all contacted him, and KURUSU wanted to know on what points they were concerned. HULL said that he assumed that Great Britain was mainly interested in the principle of equality of treatment in commerce; that it was the same in the case of the Netherlands; and as for China, she merely spoke in generalities without going into definite matters. Now concerning the principle of equality of treatment, the following conversation took place: HULL:
Have you received any reply from Tokyo on our proposal of the 15th?
(See my #1095. [b])
KURUSU:
Well, we have a general answer, but further study is necessary. I haven’t enough to tell you yet. You seem to mean that the United States can’t bear the responsibility of other countries.
Well, aren’t we pretty much in the same position? Until peace is established between Japan and China, we could say the same thing about the China question, I think. You see, Japan and the United States are in different economic positions. You Americans are in an advantageous position relative to the various nations when it comes to commercial negotiations. We do not have the advantageous bargaining position that you have.
Army 25087 Trans. 11/21/41 (1)
[a] S.I.S. Nos. 24334, 5, 6, 7.
[b] S.I.S. #24930 which gives an explanation of the U.S.'s stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1131 (Part 5 of 5) (To be handled in government code)
There is a remarkable difference between the extent to which the economy of the United States depends on foreign trade and that to which ours does. You cannot measure them by the same rule. When the economic set-up is suddenly disrupted, great turbulence ensues. Take, for example, the question of controlled exchange in North China. If that were abolished now, the economy of a hundred million Chinese would be thrown into chaos. Now out of consideration of the welfare of the Chinese people alone, we could not do such a thing as that.
HULL:
I well understand that. When I was insisting on the principle of equality of treatment in commerce, I had the postwar situation in mind. I rather think that in post-war economic reconstruction, probably the principle of non-discrimination will be an all-encompassing one. What I would like to see is Japan and the United States working together for the principle of non-discrimination. Now all along I’ve fought against the preferential system of the British Empire resulting from the Ottawa Conference, and now we are talking it over with England. I don’t want you to tell any body about this, but don’t you know, only lately Great Britain is coming around to my point of view.
(In this connection, see the newspaper article quoted in separate wire #1132. [a])
Army 25088 Trans. 11/21/41 (1).
[a] Not available.
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
18 November 1941 (Probable date of drafting)
19 November 1941 (Intercepted)
(Purple) #1129
Re your #784* and my #1106**.
During my talks with Hull on the 18th it became evident that he is thinking about readjusting the economic situation of the world after the conclusion of this war and that he has only a passing interest in the various problems of China. Furthermore, there are indications that the matter prognosticated by Ambassador Kurusu in the separate message, is also being given consideration by Hull.
As a matter of routine, of the three points contained in our Proposal “A”. they are apparently desirous of first disposing the matter pertaining to non-discriminatory treatment. In view of this attitude on this subject, unless we delete from our Formula “A” that part which follows after “on the understanding”, (as you are aware, Konoe’s message contained no such qualification), and give them a more definite agreement, I fear that the progress of our talks may be impeded. This is, of course, not in accordance with our policy of a speedy settlement. Since our formula concerning non-discrimination is also contained in our “B” proposal, unless we reach an agreement on this point now, I fear that our Proposal “B” will not help matters any.
I realize thoroughly that there are domestic issues which make it very difficult. Please give your consideration to the deletion of that part which follows “on the understanding”, etc.
25241
JD-1: 6758 (D) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (1)
*JD-1: 6561 (S.I.S. #24880) Explanation of phrase "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world." We mean that it shall apply uniformly throughout the world. China included. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of the nations are in favor of the principle. **JD-1: 6627 (S.I.S. #25085) "The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you previously."
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(18 November-probable date of drafting)
(19 November-intercepted)
#1133 (In 2 parts, complete)
From Kurusu.
-
According to Ambassador Nomura’s and my own observations, the President is maintaining a very self-composed attitude outwardly, but he seems also to be very much in earnest in regard to effecting an understanding between Japan and the United States. Therefore, we must exercise great care just now against forming a hasty conclusion that they are merely deferring in order not to seem to swallow our proposals at a gulp, and also against taking any steps that might prove irretrievable.
-
As a result of the revision of the neutrality act, the attention of the United States has turned more than ever toward the Atlantic of late, and a determination is being strengthened to be ready even for a war with Japan if necessary. However, there seems to be a desire to be reassured as to their rear by negotiations with our country. Herein seems to be the chief reason why both in the conference with the President on the 17th and in the one with Secretary Hull on the 18th the point of emphasis was on the Three Power Pact, and there was more insistence than heretofore on this. In other words, the United States, in order to give the American people the impression that an estrangement is taking place between Japan and Germany, would make use either of a joint declaration by Japan and the United States regarding non-discrimination in trade, or of having Japan become party to a treaty on problems similar to those on which negotiations are now in progress between Britain and the United States, or again, of a message from our country giving a declaration of peace policies, as was suggested by Secretary Hull in conference on the 18th.
-
Of course, any sudden change in the present status of Japanese-German relations would be out of the question, but in view of the above mentioned situation I feel that it is most essential that we do everything we can to fully reassure the United States and let them become more and more involved in the Atlantic areas, and thus place us in a favorable position, not only for effecting a settlement of the China incident, but also, in regard to the international situation following the war.
In regard to the question as to whether after the war Britain and America will not turn their weapons toward oppressing us, in our conference on the 17th, I explained about the bitter experience that came to us after the former world war, and frankly told them how some of our nation have felt in regard to Britain and the United States. To this the President replied that the treaty now under consideration would “cover all” such points.
- In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think there will be difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in harmony with the wishes of the Americans, I feel that as a stop-gap for the present, we should ask them to consider our strong desires for a “time limit” in connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese-American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present deadlock, as them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also for assurances regarding imports of a specified amount of oil.
In the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I suggested the resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July, but in view of the progress of negotiations thus far, the Americans will likely not consent to this merely for our agreeing to not forcefully invade any territory aside from French Indochina as per Proposal “B” or for our promise in vague terms of evacuation of troops from French Indochina. Please have your mind made up to this. I desire instructions re “time limit” and as we desire to press for a speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at once.
25242
JD-1: 6759 (F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
Purple
#1134 (Part 1 of 2) [a]
Re my #1131 [b].
In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indochina.
HULL, showing considerable reluctance replied,
After Japan has clearly demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain, the Netherlands and other interested powers.
In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather, exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan’s peace plans insofar as they pertain to the Tripartite Alliance. With regard to other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal “B” immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if we went on with our discussions of Proposal “A”. Therefore, looking at it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to presenting of Proposal “B” it would be more advisable to reach a practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in Proposal “B” and then to try to proceed with the solution of other questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.
Army 25090 Trans. 11/21/41 (2)
[a] Part 2 in S.I.S. #25243.
[b] See S.I.S. #25086.
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(18 November-Probable date of drafting)
(19 November-Intercepted)
#1134 (Pt 2 of 2) (This message should probably be #1128).
It is true that the Konoe government reiterated its approval of the government’s statement referred to here. However, that statement carried several supplementary notes, some of which apparently aroused the suspicion of the United States. These supplementary notes were of such character that even if they are not written down in black and white, they would naturally become applicable under the rights of self-defense in the event that to do so becomes necessary.
Please therefore issue a statement as that of the new government’s, in which there are no provisional notes, and which express our peaceful policies.
The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises in effect. It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and materials are made available to us.
Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133*. (Hull told me that he would be glad to see me at any time. However, the day after tomorrow, the 20th, is a major holiday here, so if you could make it possible for me to make a reply tomorrow, it would be very convenient for me.)
25243
JD-1: 6760 (D) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (2)
*JD-1: 6759 (S.I.S. #25242).
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 18, 1941
Purple
#788 (Strictly Secret)
Re your #1098. [a]
-
It is hard to prophesy the future course of events, but in the case of “B” if we carry out the first sailing proposal in my #786 [a] for: (a) the remaining officials; (b) such persons as must absolutely not be held back; (c) company employees; and (d) all residents who were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched, the matter can be satisfactorily handled. We will at this sailing have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as members of their staffs who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail. The number of those who actually embarked at the first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applicants. The reason was, doubtless, nostalgia and a reluctance to part with their property.
-
Will you secretly, therefore, suitably advise the several consuls to take the following steps: (a) to help our citizens who remain behind to work together for the common good; (b) to destroy immediately such secret documents and so forth as are in the possession of Japanese companies and chambers of commerce.
-
We are now studying ways and means of cooperation between our diplomatic officials and our consulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of our high offices in case of “B”. We will negotiate concerning the latter here in Tokyo.
-
I am wiring you next a plan for reducing the members of staffs.
Army 24976 Trans. 11/19/41 (S)
[a] Not available.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
Purple CA
#1135 (Departmental Secret)
On the evening of the 17th, both of us went to call on a certain cabinet member and this is what he told us:
The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no ill will towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. Now the great majority of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, in principle approve of a Japanese American understanding. If Japan would now do something real, such as evacuating French Indochina, showing her peaceful intentions, the way would be open for us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to the re-establishment of normal trade relations. The Secretary of State cannot bring public opinion in line so long as you do not take some real and definite steps to reassure the Americans.
Army 25089 Trans. 11/21/41 (2)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 18, 1941
J-19
#113
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area “N”, Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay Honolulu, [a] and the Areas Adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)
ARMY 25773 Trans. 12/5/41 (S)
[a] Probably means Mamala Bay.
From: Panama (Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
J-19
#300
-
On the 18th, one British ship and one Netherlands vessel of approximately 17,000 tons went through the Canal in the direction of the Pacific. One 10,000 ton British vessel and one American ship went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic.
-
One destroyer and one submarine are undergoing repairs in Cristobal.
ARMY 25774 Trans. 12/5/41 (2)
From: Manila
To: Tokyo
18 November 1941
(Purple)
#757
-
The CA heavy cruiser of my #753* was the Portland.
-
On the morning of the 13th a British destroyer of the Defender type entered port.
-
It has been ascertained that 8 (or 4?) of the nine submarines of my #742* are of the 129 class. They have entered port here recently but the exact date is uncertain.
JD-1: 6503 24780 (H) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (S-22)
*Not available.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Singapore
November 18, 1941
Purple
#353
----- ----- that a squadron consisting of eight ships of the 15,000 ton class and ten other boats set out from port on November 4th with about 10,000 British troops, including many aviators heading for the Malay States. Therefore, please pay particular attention to the above.
ARMY 25221 Trans. 11-25-41 (6)
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
J-19
#222
- The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 [a] on that day.
Area A [b]- A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
Area C [c] - 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
- On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks “KS”. 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D [d].
[a] Available, dated November 14. Code under study.
[b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
[c] East Loch.
[d] Middle Loch.
- At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single-file at a distance of 1000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.
Relayed to - - - - -.
ARMY 23817 Trans 12/6/41 (2)
U.S. Department of State (November 18, 1941)
711.94/254017/35Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 18, 1941.Mr. Secretary:
Herewith another idea which might possibly be of constructive value in your discussions with the Japanese Ambassador. The proposal might cause Japan to feel that she was being given sufficient “face” to enable her to agree in good faith to remove all her troops from China.At first blush the proposal may appear to represent “appeasement”. However, Japan would under the proposal sell to the United States ships which we very much need. Also, the sale by Japan of such ships to us at this time would mean a very practical step by Japan away from her Axis alliance with Germany.
The Australians and the Dutch would be perturbed by such a proposal, especially at first glance. However, it is also to their interest that additional shipping be made available to us and that Japan’s offensive striking power be lessened.
We would of course have to discuss this with the Australians and the British (and the Dutch if their territory should be involved) before making any mention of the proposal to the Japanese.
I send this forward in the light of your request that we explore all possibilities.
MAXWELL M. HAMILTON
711.94/2467Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Washington, November 18, 1941.The British Minister called at my request. I said that I had engaged in a lengthy conference with the two ranking Japanese representatives, including Mr. Kurusu, who is here for the purpose of carrying on conversations with this Government. I added that the conversation related to the question of a proposed peaceful settlement for the Pacific area. I stated that nothing was agreed upon at this meeting and that the discussion included the subject of two opposing policies — of conquest by force on the one hand and a policy of peace, law and order on the other. I went on to say that the three main points on which we have encountered serious difficulties in former conversations with Ambassador Nomura, namely, the bringing of Japanese troops out of China, the Tripartite Pact and certain phases of commercial policy, were discussed at length; but that the Japanese made no concessions on the troop matter or on the matter of the Tripartite Pact. I told the Minister that the Japanese finally inquired whether a brief temporary partial arrangement could not be worked out that would enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along the lines of peace rather than of military action. This would also include the idea of Japan’s coming out of China. They said while the United States and maybe Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should be so disposed on consultation, would to a partial extent relax embargoes on exports to Japan, Japan on its part would correspondingly take steps in the direction of a peaceful policy and in organizing and educating its public opinion in support of such a policy during the next few months. The Japanese suggested further that the whole question of a general peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be gradually developed and public opinion in Japan would enable them to meet us more satisfactorily themselves, and presumably satisfactorily to us, on the more difficult questions such as removing their troops from China and the Tripartite Pact. They did not, however, make any definite commitments as to just how far they would comply with our position with respect to these two points.
I said to the British Minister that I had made it clear to the Japanese that if their Government cared to present something on this point, I would give it consideration in the event it appeared to be feasible of consideration, but that I could make no promise, and that if it should be deemed feasible, I would confer with the British, the Dutch, the Chinese and the Australians about any phase of the matter in which they would be interested to which they would give consideration. I also said to the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan decides on a peaceful policy rather than a policy of force and conquest, we could not get far in any kind of discussion but that I could understand why they might need a little time to educate public opinion, as stated.
CORDELL HULL
740.0011 European War 1939/16848Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Washington, November 18, 1941.The Chinese Ambassador called at my request and I gave him the substance of my statement to the British Minister a few minutes before, except that I did not refer specifically to the last remarks between me and the Japanese officials about a temporary arrangement such as I described in my talk with the British. This matter was not immediately pertinent to the Chinese angle.
CORDELL HULL
711.94/2528Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
Washington, November 18, 1941.The British Minister, Sir Ronald I. Campbell, called to see me this afternoon at his request.
Sir Ronald gave me a message from Lord Halifax asking whether I considered it desirable for Lord Halifax to have an interview with Mr. Kurusu before he left Washington, or, should Mr. Kurusu intend leaving Washington before Friday, the day of Lord Halifax’s expected return from Canada, whether Sir Ronald Campbell should have a talk with him in order that the point of view of the British Government might be made clear to him along lines identical with those taken by Secretary Hull in his conversations.
I replied by saying that I thought it was entirely unlikely that Mr. Kurusu would leave Washington before Friday and that the desirability of the proposed conversation could later be determined in the light of developments which took place in the course of Secretary Hull’s conversations with the Japanese envoys.
It was agreed that I would communicate later in the week to the British Embassy our wishes in this regard.
SUMNER WELLES
711.94/2463a: TelegramThe Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan
Washington, November 18, 1941 — 10 p.m.
756.For the Ambassador and the Counselor only.
On November 18, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request. The Secretary reviewed what he had previously said in regard to the inconsistency between Japan’s alignment with the Axis and participation by Japan with us in a peaceful program. He dwelt on Hitler’s untrustworthiness, on the likelihood of Hitler’s betraying Japan and on the inevitability of a continued strengthening of armaments by the nations unless we had a clear-cut agreement making plain our peaceful purposes. He referred to our efforts to contribute to the establishment of a peaceful world and cited our forthcoming withdrawal from the Philippines and our decision to bring our Marines out of China. He emphasized our desire to work out a settlement with Japan, but that we have nothing to offer except our friendship in the way of bargaining. He discussed briefly our commercial policy and our efforts to induce other countries to reduce tariff barriers. Referring to the expressed desire of Japanese spokesmen to have a controlling influence in Eastern Asia he emphasized that no controlling influence of any value could be achieved or maintained by force. He reviewed what we have accomplished in South America through our friendly policies. The Ambassador tried to draw a parallel between our present relations with Russia and Japan’s alignment with Germany but the Secretary replied that although we are not in sympathy with the Soviet ideologies our desire to defeat Hitler renders us desirous of obtaining help wherever we can obtain it.
The Secretary said that he did not know whether we could achieve a satisfactory agreement with Japan but that he felt that it would be better for us to take the consequences of failure to reach an agreement rather than to go beyond a certain point. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu kept reverting to the points that the two Governments should now try to do something to tide over the present situation, that it might be possible later on for Japan to come around to a more liberal policy, but that they were unable to promise anything further on the part of their Government at the present time.
The Secretary pointed out that it was important to make a start now with the program of reconstruction and get fundamental principles firmly established for otherwise selfish elements would prevent a liberal policy from being realized and we would be unable to gain the confidence of peace-loving people.
Asked whether the Secretary had a concrete formula in regard to the Japanese–Axis situation, the Secretary said that this was a matter for Japan to work out in some way which would be convincing to the American people.
Pressed further by the Japanese for suggestions the Secretary said that if the Japanese should now veer away from coming out in a clear-cut manner on commercial policy, a course in China in harmony with principles of peace and on the question of Japan’s Axis relationship, this Government would be left in an indefensible position if it should attempt to support the proposed settlement.
The Ambassador dwelt on the difficulty of bringing about a rapid change in the course of the Japanese Government and suggested if the situation could now be checked it might be possible gradually to move in the direction of the courses advocated by this Government. Mr. Kurusu spoke of the feeling, which had been caused in Japan by our freezing regulations, that Japan was obliged to fight while it still could. The Secretary asked again whether something could not be worked out by Japan on the Tripartite Pact and what the Ambassador had in mind in regard to the Chinese situation. Only vague and general statements were made by the Japanese in reply to these questions. The Secretary repeated to Mr. Kurusu what he had previously said to the Ambassador about the status of our conversations. When the Secretary mentioned that the British and other governments had a rightful interest in the problems involved, Mr. Kurusu endeavored to draw the Secretary out on the problems in which each government was interested but the Secretary merely said that he had not discussed the matter with those governments and what he might think would be merely an assumption on his part. Mr. Kurusu said that under the circumstances mentioned by the Secretary the relations between the United States and Japan would be at the mercy of Great Britain and China. The Secretary said that there would be no point in our talking to these other governments until we had obtained something substantial in the way of a basis for an agreement. Mr. Kurusu suggested that the situation was so pressing that it might get beyond control. The Secretary agreed and pointed out that our difficulties were augmented by the announcement by Japanese leaders of programs based upon force.
The Secretary asked how many troops Japan wanted to keep in China. The Ambassador said perhaps about 90 percent would be withdrawn but he did not reply directly to a question as to how long Japan wanted to retain the remaining 10 percent there. The Secretary referred to the fact that the presence of these troops was a source of trouble and mentioned that there was a very large number of cases in which American interests had suffered from them.
The Secretary said that it was incumbent upon the Japanese Government to make an extra effort to take the situation in hand and to find some way of extricating Japan from the difficulty in which it had placed itself. The Secretary adverted to the exceptionally favorable opportunity which was offered at the present time for Japan to put her factories to work to produce goods needed by peaceful countries if only Japan could get invasion and war out of its mind.
The Ambassador observed that our conversations had been protracted and it might be helpful if our Government could give the Japanese some hope as our country was strong and great. The Secretary said that the United States had made no threats, that the Japanese armed forces in China do not seem to appreciate whose territory they are in.
In reply to a suggestion that certain Japanese circles considered that we have been responsible for delay the Secretary said that we could more rightfully accuse the Japanese of delays, that he had consistently been available promptly to the Ambassador, and he referred especially to the interruption caused in our conversations by Japan’s movement into Indochina.
Mr. Kurusu asked whether we desired that the status quo ante be restored or what we expected Japan to do. The Secretary replied that if Japan was unable to do anything on the three outstanding points we had discussed, he could only leave to Japan the question of what Japan could do. He added that we desired to see Japan contribute to world leadership for a peaceful program and he felt that the long-swing interests of the two countries were identical. The Secretary asked to what extent it would enable Japan to move along peaceful courses if there should be a relaxation of freezing. The Ambassador suggested the possibility of going back to the status existing prior to Japan’s move into southern French Indochina. The Secretary commented that if we should adopt some modifications of our freezing on the strength of a measure by Japan such as the Ambassador had suggested, the question might arise whether the Japanese troops withdrawn from Indochina would be diverted to some equally objectionable move elsewhere and he added that it would not be easy for him to persuade this Government to go to any great length in relaxing freezing measures unless this Government could be convinced that Japan had definitely embarked on a peaceful course and had abandoned courses of aggression. The Ambassador said that Japan would go as far as it could along a first step as the Japanese were tired of fighting China.
The Secretary said that he would confer with the Dutch and British to ascertain their attitude toward a suggestion such as that offered by the Ambassador.
HULL
711.94/254013/35Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 18, 1941.The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called on the Secretary, by appointment made at their request, at the Department.
After some preliminary remarks the Secretary took up the question of Japan’s relations with the Axis. He pointed out that the public would place their own interpretation upon the implications of a situation wherein on the one hand Japan had an agreement with us and on the other was in an alliance with the Axis powers. He said that our people do not trust Hitler and furthermore we feel that it would be inevitable that Hitler would eventually, if he was successful, get around to the Far East and double-cross Japan. The Secretary cited the instance when Germany, after having concluded an anti-Comintern pact with Japan had surprised Japan later on by entering into a non-aggression pact with Russia and finally went back on the non-aggression pact by attacking Russia. The Secretary said that he presumed Japan did not know in advance what Germany’s intentions were any more than we did. The Secretary expressed great doubt that any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan at the same time had an alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut agreement making self-evident our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He pointed out that we are coming out of the Philippines in 1946 and that we are now bringing our marines out of China and in this way we are trying to make a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world based on law and order. He said that this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. Our commercial program was one, he said, calling for a maximum production and distribution of goods. The Secretary pointed out also that we are even now engaged in efforts to induce the British Empire to reduce its Empire preferences. He said that what we desire is to put our people back to work in a way that can never be accomplished through permitting armies to overrun countries. The Secretary observed that many Japanese spokesmen had spoken of Japan’s desire to have a controlling influence in Eastern Asia, but the only kind of controlling influence which was worth anything was one that could not be achieved or maintained by the sword. He dwelt briefly upon what we have accomplished in South America through our peaceful policies and through renouncing the employment of gunboats and armed forces. The Secretary made it clear that we recognized that under present emergency conditions we cannot carry out to perfection our commercial policy which must be modified to meet war conditions, but we can at least establish the principles. The Secretary said, going back to the situation with regard to Japan’s relations with the Axis, that a difficult situation was created thereby as far as our public was concerned — as, for example, when telegrams of congratulations were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits some atrocity.
The Japanese Ambassador observed that the United States and Russia were not pursuing parallel courses and yet we are aligned with Russia at the present time. He also said he appreciated very well the relations we had developed with South America but that, although Japan would like to imitate us, Japan was not in a position to be so magnanimous — as, for example, in the matter of extending substantial lend-lease aid to other countries… The Secretary then added that he frankly did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences. The Ambassador then said that Japan is now hard-pressed and that the Secretary was well aware of how desirous Japan was to reach some agreement with the United States.
Mr. Kurusu said that he had served five years as Director of the Commercial Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office and that he was familiar with the developments in Japan’s commercial policy. He said that the situation with respect to the Empire preferences was one of the factors which had influenced Japan to go into the Axis camp. He said that the United States was an economically powerful country and that the United States was, therefore, in a much better position than was Japan to enter into commercial bargaining. Furthermore, Japan was much more dependent than was the United States upon foreign trade. He felt that what the two Governments should now do would be to achieve something to tide over the present abnormal situation. He referred, for example, to the exchange control situation which had been developed in Japanese-occupied China and expressed the view that that situation could not be done away with in a short time. He said that perhaps after the war was over it might be possible to adopt a more liberal policy but that he was unable to promise anything on the part of his Government. The Secretary asked whether Japan could not now agree in principle on commercial policy. Mr. Kurusu made no direct reply but went on to say that in the early years of American intercourse in the Far East our main interest was in commerce and not religious and cultural activities; that we had pursued a course of idealism, but with American occupation of the Philippines the situation changed somewhat and the United States tied itself in with the European concert of nations.
Turning to the question of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kurusu said that he could not say that Japan would abrogate the Tripartite Pact but that Japan might do something which would “outshine” the Tripartite Pact.
The Secretary pointed out that unless peacefully minded nations now start their program of reconstruction it will be impossible to get such a program started later on because the selfish elements would get control of the situation and prevent the materialization of a liberal policy. Therefore, he said it was necessary to get the fundamental principles established so that we might begin to enable the peaceful forces, which were now demoralized, to assert a leadership. Unless we pursue such a course, the Secretary noted, we shall not be able to obtain the confidence of peacefully minded people when the time for putting into effect a reconstruction program arrives. Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had a concrete formula for dealing with Japan’s relations with the Axis alliance. The Secretary made it clear that this was a matter for Japan to work out. He said that if we could get a peaceful program firmly established, Hitler ought to be asked not to embarrass us too much. He asked whether Japan could not work it out in some way which would be convincing to the American people. He said that if it goes the wrong way every peaceful nation will redouble its defensive efforts. The Secretary emphasized again that the public would be confused in regard to a survival of a relationship between Japan and the Axis while Japan had an agreement with the United States.
The Ambassador asked whether it was not important now to make some understanding to save the situation. The Secretary said he agreed but that he felt that the Tripartite Pact was inconsistent with the establishment of an understanding.
Mr. Kurusu asked what could the Secretary suggest. The Secretary said that if we mix the Tripartite Pact with an agreement with the United States it will not be possible to get many people to follow us. The Secretary said that the question arises whether Japanese statesmen desire to follow entirely peaceful courses with China or whether they desire to face two ways. The Secretary went on to say that if the Japanese should back away from adopting a clear-cut position with regard to commercial policy, with regard to a course in China consistent with peaceful principles and with regard to Japanese relations to the European war this would leave us in an indefensible position in regard to the proposed agreement. We would have to say that the Japanese Government is unable to get its politicians into line.
The Ambassador repeated that the situation in Japan was very pressing and that it was important to arrest a further deterioration of the relations between the two countries. He suggested that if this situation could now be checked an atmosphere would develop when it would be possible to move in the direction of the courses which this Government advocated. He pointed out that big ships cannot turn around too quickly, that they have to be eased around slowly and gradually.
The Secretary replied that if we should sit down and write an agreement permeated with the doctrine of force it would be found that each country would be entirely distrustful and would be piling up armaments, as countries cannot promote peace so long as they are tied in in any way with Hitler.
Mr. Kurusu pointed out that a comprehensive solution cannot be worked out immediately, that he could make no promises. He said that our freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and a feeling that Japan had to fight while it still could. If we could come to some settlement now, he said, it would promote an atmosphere which would be conducive to discussing fundamentals. The Secretary asked if he did not think that something could be worked out on the Tripartite Pact. The Ambassador said that he desired to emphasize that Japan would not be a cat’s-paw for Germany, that Japan’s purpose in entering into the Tripartite alliance was to use it for Japan’s own purposes, that Japan entered the Tripartite Pact because Japan felt isolated. The Secretary observed that it would be difficult to get public opinion in this country to understand the situation as Mr. Kurusu had described it.
He then asked what the Ambassador had in mind in regard to the Chinese situation and whether the Japanese stood for no annexations, no indemnities, respect for China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of equality. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative.
The Secretary then said that while he had made this point already clear to the Ambassador he wished to make it clear also to Mr. Kurusu, that whereas the Japanese Government desired to consider our talks negotiations rather than exploratory conversations, the Secretary felt that without having first reached a real basis for negotiations, he was not in a position to go to the British or the Chinese or the other governments involved, as these governments had a rightful interest in these problems. Mr. Kurusu tried to get the Secretary to specify in just which problems each of the respective governments were interested but the Secretary said that he had not yet, for manifest reasons, discussed these problems with these other governments and anything that he might say would be just an assumption on his part. Mr. Kurusu then said that under such circumstances United States-Japanese relations would be at the mercy of Great Britain and China. The Secretary replied that he believed and must repeat that we must have something substantial in the way of a basis for an agreement to take to these governments for otherwise there would be no point in talking to them. Mr. Kurusu said that the situation was so pressing that it might get beyond our control. The Secretary agreed that that was true but he pointed out that the fact that Japan’s leaders keep announcing programs based upon force adds to our difficulties. He said he would like to leave the Hitler situation to the Japanese Government for consideration.
Turning to the China situation the Secretary asked how many soldiers the Japanese wanted to retain in China. The Ambassador replied that possibly 90 per cent would be withdrawn. The Secretary asked how long the Japanese intended to keep that remaining 10 per cent in China. The Ambassador did not reply directly to this but he invited attention to the fact that under the existing Boxer Protocol Japan was permitted to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area. The Secretary pointed out that the question of the Japanese troops in China was one in which there were many elements of trouble. American interests even had suffered severely from the actions of the Japanese forces and we had a long list of such instances. The Secretary made mention of the great patience this Government had exercised in the presence of this situation. He said the situation was one in which the extremists seemed to be looking for trouble and he said that it was up to the Japanese Government to make an extra effort to take the situation by the collar. He said also that the United States and Japan had trusted each other in the past, that the present situation was one of Japan’s own making and it was up to the Japanese Government to find some way of getting itself out of the difficulty in which it had placed itself. The Secretary went on to say that the situation was now exceptionally advantageous for Japan to put her factories to work in producing goods which are needed by peaceful countries if only the Japanese people could get war and invasion out of mind. The Ambassador said that our conversations had been protracted and if the American Government could only give the Japanese some hope with regard to the situation it might be helpful. He added that our country was great and strong. The Secretary replied that our Government has not made any threats and he has exercised his influence throughout to deprecate bellicose utterances in this country. He added that the Japanese armed forces in China do not appear to realize whose territory they are in and that the people in this country say that Hitler proposes to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan proposes to take charge of the other half and if they should succeed what would there be left for the United States? Mr. Kurusu suggested that Japan would have to move gradually in China, that one step might lead to another and that what was important now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course. The Secretary asked what was in Mr. Kurusu’s mind. In reply to a suggestion that it was felt in Japanese circles that we have been responsible for delay the Secretary pointed out that we could more rightly accuse the Japanese of delays, that he had met with the Japanese Ambassador promptly every time the latter had asked for a meeting and had discussed matters fully with him. The Secretary added that when Japan’s movement into Indochina in July took place this had caused an interruption of our conversations and it was then that the Secretary could no longer defend the continued shipments of petroleum products to Japan, especially as for the past year he had been under severe criticism in this country for not having cut off those shipments. Mr. Kurusu asked whether we wanted the status quo ante to be restored or what we expected Japan to do. The Secretary replied that if the Japanese could not do anything now on those three points — getting troops out of China, commercial policy and the Tripartite agreement — he could only leave to Japan what Japan could do. The Secretary said that it is our desire to see Japan help furnish a world leadership for a peaceful program and that he felt that Japan’s long-swing interests were the same as our interests. The Ambassador said that he realized that our Government was suspicious of the Japanese Government but he wished to assure us that Japan wanted to settle the China affair notwithstanding the fact that Japan desired to keep a few troops in China for the time being. The Secretary then asked again what the Japanese had in mind. Mr. Kurusu said that it was Japan’s intention to withdraw Japanese troops from French Indochina as soon as a just Pacific settlement should be reached and he pointed out that the Japanese Government took the Burma Road situation very seriously. The Secretary asked, if there should be a relaxation of freezing, to what extent would that enable Japan to adopt peaceful [Page 750]policies. He explained that what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence. The Ambassador said that our position was unyielding and that it was Japan’s unyielding attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek which had stiffened Chinese resistance against Japan. He asked whether there was any hope of a solution — some small beginning toward the realization of our high ideals. The Secretary replied that if we do not work out an agreement that the public trusts the arming of nations will go on; that the Japanese Government has a responsibility in the matter as it has created the conditions we are trying to deal with. The Ambassador then suggested the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the date in July when, following the Japanese move into southern French Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect. The Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn from French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. The Secretary said that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long way in removing the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of fighting China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the British and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered by the Japanese Ambassador. In reply to a question by the Secretary the Ambassador replied that the Japanese Government was still studying the questions of commercial policy involved in our proposal of November 15. He said he assumed that what we had in mind was a program for dealing with the situation after the war. The Secretary replied in the affirmative, so far as the full operation of a sound program is concerned, but added that it should now be agreed upon as to principles.
When asked by the Secretary as to when the Ambassador would like to confer with us again the Ambassador said that he would get in touch with his Government and would communicate to the Secretary through Mr. Ballantine.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
Japanese Foreign Office (November 19, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J 19)
Circular #2353
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language shortwave news broadcast.
- In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*
- Japan-USSR relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**
- Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
25432
JD-1: 6875 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)
*East wind rain.
**North wind cloudy.
***West wind clear.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J 19)
Circular #2354
When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
- If it is Japan-U.S. relations, “HIGASHI”.
- Japan-Russia relations, “KITA”.
- Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.); “NISHI”.
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.
25392
JD-1: 6850 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#798
Re my #797*
The condition outlined by them namely “After the peaceful policies of Japan have been made more definite”, we imagine would naturally have reference to the question of the three-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan will withdraw her troops from Southern Indochina, and that then the U.S. will go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for the U.S. to bring up rather complicated terms.
On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indochina, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up to the B** proposal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your message, then to push on for an understanding.
The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797*, #800,*** and #801****) will please present our B** proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions can be made.
If the U.S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off, therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best efforts.
We note what you say in your #1133***** and #1134*****, but in these negotiations consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this office. We would emphasize this.
S.I.S. #25040
JD-1: 6658 (F) Navy trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 6657.
**JD-1: 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1: 6528.
***JD-1: 6660.
****JD-1: 6661.
*****Not yet available
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#799 (In 2 parts, complete)
In the proposal for a joint declaration by Japan and the United States, given in your #1096*, there are many points to which it would be difficult for the Imperial Government to give consent, as I have already cabled you. Secretary Hull’s advocacy of a reciprocal trade agreement stated in the same dispatch, we can consent to as something he has advocated for many years, but we imagine it would have as many as possible of the opinions of the State Department’s China specialists woven into it. Therefore, if we were to go into a discussion of each of these particulars, we would have to give up hopes of the possibility of reaching a settlement in a short time, (see my #736**). Now that matters have progressed this far, we think the only way to reach a full solution is to conclude an agreement now on a few absolutely essential items in order to prevent matters from going from bad to worse by long-view political adjustments, thus first of all avoiding the danger of an outbreak of war.
Therefore you will please delete from my #780***, paragraph 6 (nondiscrimination in trade) and paragraph 7 (the Tripartite Agreement) and add my #801**** as item 2 of paragraph 5, and hand this to Secretary Hull. This will “drop” the question of non-discrimination in international trade which has heretofore been an important pending problem between the two countries, and in view of the United States attitude regarding troops stationed in China, this will be made the subject of conversations between Japan and China, in an effort to ease up the present tension. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ item 2: the transfer of troops from southern French Indo-China to the northern part, is an important concession we would venture to make for the sake of speeding the agreement, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ in order to save the situation and with President Roosevelt’s immediate (this should mean within one week) approval, have it ready for signatures of both countries.
Furthermore if they insist, it will be all right to agree to the _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ of 6 and 7 (non-discrimination in trade and _ _ _ _ _ Tripartite Treaty) of my #780***, but because of the reasons stated in your #1129*****, in regard to our attitude to these two questions, we cannot change my #784******. (As Hull at present does not seem to be taking so much account of matters in China, I think he (or we) will not insist on deleting from “on the understanding” on.
In regard to paragraph 7 (the Tripartite Treaty) see the latter part of my #800*******.
25035
JD-1: 6659 (F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 6585 (S.I.S. #24931 and 25006).
**JD-1: 6254 (S.I.S. #24373).
***JD-1: 6555 (S.I.S. #24872).
****JD-1: 6661 (S.I.S. #25037).
*****Not available.
******JD-1: 6561 (S.I.S. #24880).
*******JD-1: 6660 (S.I.S. #25036).
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#800
Re my #799*
Re paragraph 1 of my #781**.
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific includes the Netherlands East Indies and Thai, but does not include China. Re item 2 of paragraph 3. All the main items shall be considered and settled by the two governments before signatures are affixed to this agreement. Please bear in mind that paragraph 4 means the cessation of all help to Chiang Kai-shek by the United States.
Re paragraph 5. Article 2 (my #801***) is an important concession we venture to make for the sake of speeding the conclusion of the agreement.
Re paragraph 6. We could not agree to the principle of no discrimination in trade being applied only to China, as I have stated in my #784****.
Re paragraph 7, item 2, the explanation of our attitude ( _ _ _ self-defense _ _ _ ) in the event of the United States entering the. European war. _ _ _ in such a case the Empire would _ _ _ as to whether or not there had been an attack _ _ _ the interpretation of the provision of the Tripartite Treaty. You may make it clear that there are no secret agreements in the Three Power Treaty. (However, you will please withhold your explanation of this item until you see prospects of this agreement materializing).
25036
JD-1: 6660 (F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1: (S.I.S. #25035).
**JD-1: 6556 (S.I.S. #24373).
***JD-1: 6661 (S.I.S. #25037).
****JD-1: 6561 (S.I.S. #24880).
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(Purple) (Eng.)
#801
The government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indochina to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
25037
JD-1 6661 (M) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
19 November 1941
(Purple)
#1136
I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality. There are now three ways which the Empire might take-
-
Maintain the status quo.
-
Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.
-
Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggression arrangement.
No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. In other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it differs from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time involved.
No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. My #1134* of yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by the government is beyond my power of comprehension, but as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by four years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a large scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary “truce” now in the spirit of “give and take” and make this the prelude to greater achievements to come later.
I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary to my message of yesterday.**
25248
JD-1: 6769 (F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)
*JD-1: 6665.
**Wash-Tok #1138 (JD-1: 6771) says: "At the end of my message #1136 (S.I.S. #25250) please add 'please convey the above to the (Prime ?)Minister' ".
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
19 November 1941
(Purple)
#1140
Re your #791*
- We assume that the date, 25 November, mentioned in your message #736**, is an absolutely unalterable one. We are making all our arrangements with that as the basis.
We are also in receipt of your instructions concerning your conversations with the British Ambassador (your message #763***).
In view of those, we have been hinting to the United States that it is of much importance that we receive some definite reply within ten days and that it is impossible for us to continue with the negotiations if there is any further delay.
At a time when we are thus pressing them for an early reply, I feel that it would do us great harm were we to announce that we are having ships, with all the accompanying dark implications, leave on or about the 25th or 26th. We feel that such a statement by us would lead to their having doubts of the determined front we have been putting up. We feel that such a step would not be in accordance with your repeated instructions to bring about an early settlement.
In view of these facts, I beg of you to reconsider the matter.
If it is impossible to do so, please let us postpone our making that announcement for at least four or five days to permit us to see how the talks are progressing.
After you have given these points your consideration, please advise us.
-
The number of persons connected with business firms who still remain here and who wish to return to Japan does not warrant the sending of a ship at this time. If it is for the purpose of taking our nationals home from Panama, we feel that a ship sent to South America could be rerouted for them.
-
If the final decision is reached to have the ship sent here, there will be no difficulty in arranging matters for the evacuating of government officials and their wives. However, there will no doubt be much complication if it is your intention to have all men connected with business firms depart. We feel that it would be necessary that the home offices of these people should be notified, and that the said home offices should in turn send notifications and instructions to their personnel on the scene.
Please give these points your consideration.
25142
JD-1: 6708 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)
*Not available.
**JD-1: 6254.
***JD-1: 6416.
U.S. Department of State (November 19, 1941)
711.94/254021/35Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 19, 1941.Mr. Secretary:
In case the Japanese should ask you today for further clarification or amplification of the attitude you expressed in response to the suggestion made by the Japanese Ambassador as to whether we could do anything for them in the way of trade should Japan withdraw from Indochina, it is suggested that you offer comment along lines as follows:As has been indicated on numerous occasions to the Japanese Ambassador we appreciate the difficult situation with which liberal-minded leaders are faced in Japan in dealing with public opinion and we have indicated also that we are prepared to be patient while the Japanese Government is taking steps to develop a public opinion in favor of a broad-gauge program in the Pacific area such as the one we have been talking about. We have also indicated that this Government would be prepared to be helpful in any appropriate way in assisting the Japanese Government in this matter. By way of assisting toward strengthening the position of the Japanese Government vis-à-vis public opinion, I would be prepared to discuss with the Japanese Government, through you, a proposal for a resumption of limited trade between Japan and the United States as a provisional and tentative measure during the continuance of our conversations provided that the Japanese Government would forthwith desist from augmenting its armed forces in Indochina and forthwith begin withdrawal from Indochina of the forces which it has placed there, undertake to complete that withdrawal as rapidly as possible, and undertake not to use these forces during the continuance of these conversations in offensive military operations anywhere. It would be assumed, of course, by this Government that the statements which have been given by the Japanese Government in regard to its peaceful intentions would still stand.
It is probable that the Japanese Government would not agree to make the withdrawals above referred to unless we would agree to remove entirely our freezing restrictions. If we agree to remove our freezing restrictions, the Japanese should agree reciprocally and simultaneously to remove theirs. FE is of the opinion that it would be worth doing this for the gains that would be achieved. FE would of course not contemplate any alteration of our present export controls.
711.94/254020/36Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 19, 1941.Mr. Secretary:
There is attached a revision of the proposal which was sent to you by Mr. Morgenthau. (The proposal still of course needs further revision and elaboration.)I think that the proposal is the most constructive one which I have yet seen. I have shown the proposal to all of the senior officers of FE, and all of them concur in that view.
I urge that most careful consideration be given promptly to the proposal. To that end I suggest that copies of the proposal be made available to Admiral Stark and to General Marshall and that you arrange to confer with them in regard to the matter as soon as they have had an opportunity to examine the proposal.
MAXWELL M. HAMILTON
............................
[Annex]Draft Document Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan
A. On its part the Government of the United States proposes to take the following steps:
To reduce to a normal footing American naval forces now in Pacific waters, without of course limiting in any way the freedom of action and of decision of the Government of the United States with regard to the disposition of naval forces of the United States.
To negotiate a multilateral non-aggression pact with Japan, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and Soviet Russia.
To suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that those Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.
To enter into negotiations with the British, Chinese, Dutch, Thai and Japanese Governments for the conclusion of an agreement where under each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories most-favored-nation treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.
To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
To endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British Government to give up British extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
To use its influence toward causing the British Government to cede Hong Kong to China. (This provision might take the form of an undertaking to use our influence with the British Government to cause the British Government to sell Hong Kong to China, the purchase price to be loaned China by the United States.)
To recommend to Congress enactment of legislation to amend the Immigration Act of 1924 so as to place all peoples of all races on a quota basis.
To negotiate a trade agreement with Japan, giving Japan (a) most-favored-nation treatment and (b) such concessions on Japanese imports into the United States as can be mutually satisfactorily arranged, including an agreement to bind raw silk on the free list.
To enter into a joint declaration between the United States and Japan with regard to commercial policy along the lines of the draft handed the Japanese Ambassador on November 15.
- To extend to Japan a $2,000,000,000 20-year credit at 2 percent interest, to be drawn upon at the rate not to exceed $200,000,000 a year except with approval of the President of the United States.
(Note: The United States should be prepared to extend a similar credit to China.)
(Note: This provision presumably would require Congressional approval.)
- To set up a $500,000,000 stabilization fund half supplied by Japan and half by the United States, to be used for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.
(Note: The United States should be prepared to act similarly in regard to China.)
(Note: This provision may require Congressional approval.)
- To remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.
B. On its part the Government of Japan proposes to take the following steps:
To withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China (excluding Manchuria — see separate provisions) and from Indochina.
To withdraw all support — military, political, economic — from any government or regime in China other than the Government of the National Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
To replace with yen currency at a rate to be agreed upon among the Treasuries of China, Japan, Great Britain and the United States all Japanese military scrip, yen and local regime notes circulating in China.
To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and concessions and rights under the Boxer Protocol.
To withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided USSR withdraws all her troops from the Far Eastern front except for an equivalent remainder.
To sell to the United States… tons of Japanese merchant shipping, to be delivered to the United States within three months of the signing of the present agreement; also, to sell to the United States up to 50 percent of Japan’s current output of shipping, including naval and commercial ships, on a cost-plus-20-percent basis as the United States may select, it being understood that the United States will sell Japan such raw materials as it may be necessary for Japan to import for these purposes.
To negotiate a multilateral non-aggression pact with the United States, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and Soviet Russia.
To remove the freezing restrictions on American funds in Japan.
711.94/2463: TelegramThe Chargé in Germany to the Secretary of State
Berlin, November 19, 1941 — noon. [Received 1:18 p.m.]
4136.Reliable information has reached the Embassy to the effect that the sending of Kurusu to Washington has caused embarrassment and resentment to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin and that Ambassador Oshima is insisting to the German Government that Japan intends to go ahead in the south regardless of what Kurusu may arrange in Washington. Oshima is said to believe that the situation is more favorable for Japan now than it will be later and that the United States will not at present do anything to stop a Japanese attack on the Burma Road or the Netherlands East Indies.
These views on the part of the Japanese Ambassador may reflect partly the pains taken by the Germans to impress Japanese circles in Berlin with the magnitude and conclusive character of their victories in Russia but it is possible that he has also been influenced by the realization that any real change of Japanese policy in the direction of moderation would make his personal position difficult both here and at home.
Repeated to Rome and Tokyo.
MORRIS
711.94/2463b: TelegramThe Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China
Washington, November 19, 1941 — 3 p.m.
273.For the Ambassador only.
I asked the Chinese Ambassador to call on November 18 and informed him that I had had a long conference with the two ranking Japanese representatives in regard to the question of the proposed settlement for the Pacific area. I added that nothing was agreed upon although we had discussed two opposing policies — conquest by force and peace, law and order. I told the Ambassador that I had informed the Japanese that we would be glad to consider whatever the Japanese Government cared to present providing it appeared feasible and that should whatever the Japanese Government had to say be considered feasible we would then confer with the Chinese, the Australians, the British and the Dutch on such phases of the matter as would be of interest to those countries. I told the Ambassador that I had emphasized to the Japanese that while I could appreciate Japan’s need for time to educate its public opinion it would be impossible for us to make substantial progress in any discussion until Japan decided to follow peaceful courses rather than courses of force and conquest.
HULL
711.94/254019/35Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 19, 1941.The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Secretary’s apartment. After about fifteen minutes of general conversation the Ambassador said that he and Mr. Kurusu had reported to their Government their conversation of yesterday with the Secretary and were momentarily expecting instructions, and that in fact a telegram had already come in but it had not yet been decoded. They said that they would wish to confer with the Secretary perhaps tomorrow, but would at least expect to communicate with him tomorrow in regard to a further appointment. They expressed satisfaction with what the Secretary had said to the press in regard to yesterday’s conversation and the Secretary remarked that the press seemed to be satisfied.
The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador felt about the possibilities. The Ambassador said that yesterday he had made the suggestion in regard to a restoration of the status which prevailed before the Japanese move into south Indochina in the latter part of July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated our freezing measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if something could be done on his suggestion, it would serve to relieve that tension and tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador contemplated that if a proposal such as the Ambassador had suggested were carried out we would go on with the conversations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Secretary expressed the view that this might enable the leaders in Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in favor of a peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take some time.
The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the Japanese desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing measures. The Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in mind, in connection with the continuation of our conversations, further efforts to iron out the important points on which our views had not so far diverged. The Ambassador agreed. He observed, however, that the views of the Japanese Government with regard to the Tripartite Pact had been fully expressed by the Japanese Government; that is to say, that their intentions to maintain peace in the Pacific were already made clear in their draft statement of September 25, but that they could not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance and were bound to carry out their obligations. The Secretary suggested that one way in which the Japanese could be helpful would be to let the Russian forces in the Far East and the British forces at Singapore go back to Europe. The Secretary said that his suggestion was by way of illustration how much Japan was hindering us. The Secretary added that if Hitler were helping the world the situation would be different, but the fact was that he was injuring all of us.
The conversation then turned for a few minutes to the situation in Russia and Germany’s prospects. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu expressed the view that there seemed to be no likelihood of an early Russian defeat or of a collapse of Stalin’s regime. The Ambassador said that he had been much surprised at the strength Stalin had shown in holding his government together and he also spoke with admiration of the stubbornness of Russian defense. The Ambassador also expressed the view that he saw no prospect of Germany’s being able in the future to launch a successful invasion of England. The Secretary asked, if Germany could not conquer Stalin, could not invade England, and was faced with the hostility of the many millions in Europe which were being held in subjection by Germany, what would be the outcome for Germany. The Ambassador expressed no clear-cut views on this point. The Secretary suggested that if the Japanese Government could prevail over the views of the Japanese war party it should be possible to work out something with us. The Ambassador made a further reference to Japan’s being bound by the Tripartite Pact, whereupon the Secretary asked whether Japan was not equally bound by the neutrality pact with Russia. The Ambassador replied that if Japan was faithful to the Tripartite Pact it must be equally faithful to the neutrality pact as they were both equally binding. The Ambassador dwelt at some length upon the point that Japan was getting nothing out of the Tripartite Pact except American resentment. Mr. Kurusu then expressed the view that although he did not see any prospect of another Brest-Litovsk in the Russo-German situation, Japan would be very apprehensive of such a development as it would mean a combined Russo-German advance on the Far East.
The Secretary referred to the need of looking forward to the time for rebuilding the world and said that, if the Japanese militant leaders keep control of Japanese policy, they would deprive us of a chance of stabilizing the world and laying down a progressive program. The Ambassador said that the United States was likely at the end of the war to be in a position of overwhelming strength, but he intimated that we might impair our strength if we sent forces to Africa. There then ensued some discussion of Hitler’s efforts to gain control of the seas and the Secretary emphasized that this country is determined to keep Hitler from getting control of the seas no matter how long it took us. He expressed the view that if Hitler had striven only for limited objectives he might have had a better chance for success than he now has because of his unlimited program of conquest. The Secretary said that if the Japanese could tell Hitler to be reasonable — Mr. Kurusu interrupted at this point and said that he thought that Hitler would be willing to enter into peace negotiations. The Secretary replied that he was speaking figuratively; that what he meant was abandonment entirely by Hitler of his program of conquest. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then rose to take leave and as they did so the Secretary emphasized again that all we can do is to stand firm on our basic principles.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE