892.24/85: TelegramThe Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, November 8, 1941 — 2 p.m. [Received November 8 — 1:42 p.m.]
509.Department’s 137, November 3, 10 p.m.
The British Minister has informed me that General Chiang Kai-shek has telegraphed the British Commander-in-Chief at Singapore asking that the latter supply all possible planes for use in repelling a Japanese attack on the Burma Road which he is convinced is impending. My colleague seems to think this request will militate against the transfer of planes to Thailand from Singapore.
This would be unfortunate from the standpoint of Thailand which is perhaps more seriously threatened than the Burma Road. The Thai Air Force is very despondent. It is unable to obtain such essentials as replacement parts for the American planes it already possesses. I will furnish full particulars of these in a later telegram.
PECK
740.0011 Pacific War/1104Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 8, 1941.Mr. Secretary:
In the attached memorandum of September 11, Admiral Stark recommends that unless Japan and Russia should be legally at war, we should not acquiesce in any declaration which Japan might issue closing entrance to the Sea of Japan, that we should continue to ship goods to Vladivostok under the United States flag, and that we should provide naval escort for our flag vessels.Admiral Stark suggests that, if the United States were to decide to acquiesce in such a Japanese declaration, our shipping would need to be diverted to ports other than Vladivostok.
Admiral Stark suggests that if Japan could be made aware of our attitude in advance, it might forestall a move by Japan designed to shut off Vladivostok to United States shipping. Keeping in mind the suggestion which you made orally a few days ago that in your conversations with the Japanese Ambassador we might keep before him the fact of this country’s serious interest in certain situations and of the consequences which would ensue should Japan take new steps of aggression, it is suggested that you might care, should an opportune occasion arise during the course of your conversations with the Japanese Ambassador, to bring up the importance which this Government attaches to maintenance of the freedom of the seas in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic and elsewhere and indicate that this question is one of the principal factors in serious concern over Hitler’s program. You might indicate that the principle of freedom of the seas ties in closely, in reference to keeping sea lanes open for extending aid to Russia, with this country’s self-defense effort, which, as the Ambassador knows, constitutes the major effort and policy of the United States at this time.
It is believed that, while we should probably avoid taking any action at this time which could be construed by Japan as a new and express warning, a useful purpose would be served by presenting the matter to the Japanese Ambassador along the lines indicated.
MAXWELL M. HAMILTON
U.S. Department of State (November 10, 1941)
711.94/2431: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 10, 1941 — 7 p.m. [Received November 10 — 2:16 p.m.]
1781.I spoke again today to the Foreign Minister along the line of the second paragraph of the Department’s telegram under reference and the Foreign Minister replied that he could categorically assure me that the Foreign Office had no prior knowledge of the editorial. He denied that the Foreign Office exercised that kind of control over the Japan Times which the American public apparently believed it did, but he said that in view of the paper’s recent editorial he was considering the placing of supervision over material published by the paper. He had suggested in appropriate quarters the undesirability of Japanese papers in general publishing material which would be needlessly provocative to the United States. He then referred to the “violent language” employed by American papers and individuals occupying responsible positions in commenting on Japan, and he said that unless such language could be moderated the papers in this country could not be expected to remain quiet.
I pointed out that whereas the American Government cannot comprise [control?] the free expression of opinion, the Japanese Government has at its disposal effective means of controlling the press.
GREW
794.00/271Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine
Washington, November 10, 1941.Mr. Ballantine:
In accordance with your request, I have considered the Japanese formula with respect to the principle of non-discrimination. Here are a few ideas on the subject.
The implication in the Japanese formula is that they seek special advantages in China because they are denied equal treatment throughout the world. The British have set up an Empire preferential system which makes it difficult for Japanese goods to obtain access to markets comprising a large part of the world’s area and population. The British have used their import position to negotiate clearing and payment agreements which affect Japanese trade adversely in other markets. The French obtained preferences for themselves at Japanese expense whenever possible, including French colonies which are neighbors of Japan in the Far Eastern area. Other countries have pursued similar policies at Japanese expense. The United States itself has obtained preferences to the disadvantage of Japan in the Philippines, a Far Eastern neighbor of Japan’s. We have obtained preferences for our trade in Cuba, to the detriment of Japanese exporters of textiles and other products. Most countries which negotiate commercial agreements involving reductions and tariff and other trade barriers have either discriminated overtly against Japan by not extending the reductions to Japanese products or covertly by thinly-disguised discriminations in the form of highly specialized tariff classifications. In brief, the formula proposed by Japan, as it was doubtless intended to do, calls at once to mind the fact that Japan’s opportunity to trade with the rest of the world has been seriously restricted through the discriminatory practices of foreign powers and the excuse for Japan’s efforts to carve out an area of its own where it can find compensation for discriminations suffered elsewhere.
The indictment implied in the Japanese proposal has, however, a great deal more cogency in relation to the United Kingdom, France, and other countries than it does to the United States, and the main weakness in the Japanese formula lies in this fact. Japan cannot properly ask us to bring about the reform of worldwide discriminatory practices, for which we are not responsible and over which we have little or no control, as a price of obtaining equality of treatment in China. If they were required to narrow down the indictment to discriminations for which we are responsible, our reply would be more easily formulated and a solution might more easily be found.
The terms of the implied Japanese indictment against us can be narrowed down pretty much to the Philippines and Cuba. As regards the former, we have a good answer in view of the plan for eventually putting an end to the Philippine preferences. But we have no very good answer in regard to Cuba. Having thus narrowed down the terms, we must face the question whether to try to counter the Japanese position by some trick of drafting (and I can’t think of any that will do), or to meet the issue.
The issue could be met by telling the Japanese a) that we can’t be held responsible for all the discriminations in the world but that we are ready to talk to them about those for which we are responsible; b) that as regards the Philippines, we have already adopted the policy of eventually eliminating these preferences; that as part of any settlement with Japan we will adhere to this and meanwhile, pending the actual elimination of the preferences, will not create any new ones of any kind; c) as regards Cuba we are prepared, as part of a deal with Japan, to renounce all rights to guaranteed preferences which we get in Cuba; and that our only reasons for not abolishing the preferences we give to Cuban products are 1) our present legal obligations to maintain them, 2) the fact that Cuba’s economy is so largely dependent on them, and 3) the fact that the products on which Cuba gets preferences in this market are not of any great interest to Japan.
From the trade standpoint the benefits obtained would vastly offset the sacrifices we would have to make. Even if we lost the entire Philippine market, its effect on our economy would be small, although particular industries might be hurt somewhat. But the decision has already been made eventually to give up our preferential position in the Philippines and the proposal to Japan would involve nothing new in this respect. In Cuba, some of our producers (e.g., cotton textiles and rice) would suffer so far as that market is concerned from the loss of the preferences, but by and large, propinquity and a solid foothold in that market would retain for us a dominant position there (e.g., see position of United States trade in Caribbean countries in which we have no preferences). These small trade losses resulting from the “open door” in Cuba are to be compared with the huge gains resulting from an “open door” in a country like China.
Other results of such a move would be to further tremendously the cause of non-discrimination throughout the world. This example might be used by other Governments (e.g., the United Kingdom) as justification for similar moves which they might not otherwise dare to make for fear of political opposition. In this hemisphere the results would, I think, be generally good. Countries which object to the preferences would be more inclined to believe our claim that we grant preferences because of the dependence of Cuba’s economy upon them (in view of the vested interests which have been created over the years) if the United States were itself getting nothing out of the arrangement.
All this may sound rather drastic but unless we are prepared in the present state of the world to do some really constructive things in the commercial policy field, liberal trade policies are going to be as dead as the dodo and the chance of laying a solid economic basis for peace will be gone. Domestic politics will allow us to do drastic things in the foreign trade field only in times of international emergency like this when the public has been scared into being foreign-policy-minded, and when wartime production and prices make our producer groups less aggressive. Nevertheless, the Administration would have to face severe criticism from a few special interests if the preferences in Cuba were unilaterally abandoned.
If, as seems quite likely, the Japanese rejected the offer of the open door in Cuba and the Philippines as payment for the open door in the Pacific area, we would have at least demonstrated concretely our good faith and have put the ball back on their side.
711.94/2625Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan
Tokyo, November 10, 1941.The Foreign Minister recalled the conversation which he had had with me on October 30, when he said that he was firmly of the opinion that the maintenance of friendly relations between the United States and Japan was a practicable proposition. He went on to say that he had given constant thought to this matter and that he had determined to put forward every effort to re-establish relations between the two countries on a friendly basis and to maintain peace in the Pacific. It was the purpose of the present Cabinet to continue with the project of establishing a “Greater East Asia” as a contribution toward world peace. Mr. Togo said that ever since he has assumed office he had been intensively studying the documents relating to the conversations which have thus far taken place. Fresh proposals had been formulated and had been sent to Admiral Nomura, who had been instructed to enter into negotiations with the President and the Secretary of State. I interrupted the Foreign Minister to say that our Government had been careful to emphasize that it was engaged in “preliminary and exploratory conversations” with the Japanese Government. Mr. Togo replied that he was well aware of that fact, but that he wondered whether the time had not come to enter into formal and official negotiations. However, he said that he did not wish to press the point.
Mr. Togo went on to say that only recently Mr. Kurusu had been despatched to Washington to assist Admiral Nomura in conducting the conversations. He recalled in this connection that he had asked me to facilitate Mr. Kurusu’s journey to the United States, and that the American Government and I had responded in a manner which was most gratifying. He said that it was everywhere known in Japan that I had striven to promote friendly relations between our two countries and that my efforts in this regard were highly appreciated throughout the country. He intended on his part to spare no effort to cooperate with me with a view to opening up a way for the solution of the problems confronting the two countries which would be mutually acceptable.
What he most keenly felt, the Foreign Minister continued, from reviewing the documents recording conversations which have thus far taken place was that the knowledge and appreciation of the United States with regard to the realities of the situation in the Far East are unfortunately inadequate. Although Mr. Hull had admitted that Japan is a stabilizing force in the Far East, the position taken by the United States throughout the conversations had not been in harmony with that fact. Unless the American Government should take full cognizance of the fact that Japan has been engaged in hostilities with China for four and a half years, then the admission of Japan’s being a stabilizing force in the Far East would have in actuality no meaning. Mr. Togo said that Mr. Hull, in a conversation with Mr. Wakasugi on October 16, recalled that he had told former Ambassador Saito that he recognized Japan as a stabilizing force and would be prepared to express such recognition in an official manner. The Minister went on to say that the population of this country is steadily and rapidly increasing; it was now about 100 million; and it was necessary to assure raw materials necessary for their existence. It was his opinion that unless the American Government realizes this fact as among the realities of the situation, successful conclusion to the conversations would be difficult. During the conversations carried on for a period of more than six months, the Japanese Government had repeatedly made proposals calculated to approach the American point of view, but the American Government for its part had taken no step toward meeting the Japanese position and had yielded nothing — it had perhaps taken a more advanced position. Those being the facts,
…we in Japan are led to wonder what is the degree of sincerity of the American Government in continuing with the conversations.
He said that national sentiment will not tolerate further protracted delay in arriving at some conclusion. Referring to the fact that the Diet is shortly to meet, he emphasized that the position is daily becoming more pressing. He expressed the hope that the American Government would take a statesmanlike position and view the problems to be resolved from the broadest possible viewpoint — that it would try to settle these problems “with one sweep.” It was his opinion that otherwise the prospects of overcoming the present difficulties would be small.
The Foreign Minister went on to say that Japan had already made what were believed to have been the greatest possible concessions. However, the position had been examined by the new Cabinet and the new proposal now being made comprises the maximum possible concessions by Japan. The Minister at this point handed me two pieces of paper (attached hereto) which he described as the new Japanese proposals, and he said that he wished to make two observations as follows:
The new Japanese draft corresponds to the American draft of June 21. It contains the elements of the proposals put forward in the Japanese documents of September 6 and 25, with modifications to meet as far as possible the American position as set forth in the American memorandum of October 2.
The Japanese draft of September 25 was largely based on the American draft of June 21. In the Foreign Minister’s opinion, it contains many unsatisfactory features with regard to both text and substance. However, to expedite the conversations, the Minister had decided to make use of that draft as a basis for a fresh start. He reiterated that this new proposal includes the maximum concessions.
By way of commentary, he said:
a) With regard to the attitudes of the American and Japanese Governments towards the European war, it is the understanding of the Japanese Government that there has been an agreement of views based on the Japanese draft of September 25;b) With regard to the question of non-discrimination in economic matters, it is the belief of the Japanese Government that its new proposal adequately covers the desires of the American Government;
c) With regard to the stationing in and withdrawal of troops from China, which have been the greatest obstacle in bringing the conversations to a successful end, the Japanese Government has, notwithstanding grave domestic difficulties, made a further and what must be regarded as the maximum possible concession. The Japanese Government believes that the American Government will appreciate this further manifestation of Japan’s desire to come to an amicable settlement with the United States:
d) Mr. Hull has intimated that he has already consulted the British Government with regard to the conversations and that he proposes to continue such consultation. British interests in the Far East are admittedly large and would be deeply affected by matters now under discussions between the United States and Japan. The Foreign Minister regards it as necessary that in the event of the sought-for agreement being reached between the United States and Japan there should simultaneously be concluded a similar instrument between Japan and Great Britain. The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that the American Government will persuade the British Government to agree to such simultaneous signature.
The Minister concluded his observations by repeating that he solicited my cooperation to bring about a speedy and satisfactory end to the negotiations. He referred to the question of conversations being carried on in Tokyo paralleling those taking place in Washington, which was touched on at our last meeting. The Minister said that he had no intention of merely duplicating here what would be said in Washington. He believed that there would be no objection on the part of the American Government to holding parallel conversations in Tokyo, but in his view such parallel conversations should be designed to supplement exchanges in Washington of information and of opinion with a view to expediting the progress of the conversations.
At the end of the Minister’s presentation I said that I had no authority to debate the questions approached by the Minister which would be discussed in Washington but that I wished to raise three points as pertinent to those discussions, as follows:
In connection with the Minister’s observation that my Government does not understand the realities of the situation in the Far East I ventured to disagree on the ground that the American Government had been given a perfectly clear conception of the situation and its various factors by this Embassy and, I assumed, by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington;
The term “stabilizing force in East Asia” as applied by the Minister to Japan is open to very wide interpretation;
The Minister’s observation that Japan must have access to necessary supplies penetrates to the center of the whole problem since one of the fundamental purposes of the current conversations is to open a way for Japan to obtain such necessary supplies, together with a free flow of trade and commerce and markets for her industries, but by peaceful means as opposed to the use of force, and that Mr. Hull’s program visualizes precisely these desiderata which are aimed to ensure Japan’s future welfare, prosperity and contentment.
The Foreign Minister remarked that he was quite prepared to admit that the Embassy is endeavoring to report accurately on the situation in the Far East, but that, in view of the position which is being taken by the American Government, he wondered whether the American Government has in fact a correct appreciation of the realities. To illustrate his point, he wished to cite the question of the stationing of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia, which was universally recognized to be a part of China. So far as he knew no one had objected to the presence of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia. With regard to my comment on the phrase “stabilizing force in East Asia,” the Foreign Minister said that there should be a satisfactory interpretation of that phrase from a common-sense point of view. With regard to my observations on the question of assuring to Japan sources of raw materials the Foreign Minister said that this was a question which had been debated over a period of years at Geneva and elsewhere. He did not wish to go into the fundamentals of the question, but he thought that he could advert briefly to the importance of commercial and economic relations between the United States and Japan. The freezing by the United States of Japanese assets had stopped supplies of many important raw materials to Japan. Economic pressure of this character is capable of menacing national existence to a greater degree than the direct use of force. He hoped that the American Government would take into consideration circumstances of this character and realize the possibility that the Japanese people, if exposed to continued economic pressure, might eventually feel obliged resolutely to resort to measures of self-defense.
The Minister went on to say that Japan had been engaged in extensive hostilities for a period of more than four years, and that if Japan were called upon to sacrifice the fruits of such protracted hostilities she must inevitably collapse. If the American Government realizes this fact a speedy conclusion to the conversations will be easy.
I pointed out the apparent inconsistency between the Minister’s emphasis on the insistence of Japan that she retain the fruits of hostilities and Japan’s acceptance of the principle of refraining from aggression and the use of force.
The Foreign Minister replied that Japan is not conducting a war of aggression and that therefore no question arises of her retaining the fruits of aggression. It is his impression that the American Government is now resorting, under the plea of self-defense, to measures over and beyond those that are generally recognized by international law. He expressed the opinion that it might not be out of place for Japan to ask the United States not to put too liberal a construction on the principle of self-defense. In any event, it was his opinion that theoretical discussions would not promote the conversations, which he thought should be pursued along realistic lines.
The conversation then turned to another matter which is covered by a separate memorandum.
JOSEPH C. GREW
711.94/2460Memorandum by the Secretary of State
Washington, November 10, 1941.The Japanese Ambassador, accompanied by Minister Wakasugi, called on the President. The Secretary of State was present at the express wish of President Roosevelt. The Ambassador, after a few preliminary remarks, proceeded to read as under instruction from his Government the following communication:
I am now going to explain to you the salient points of the proposals which my Government has instructed me to submit to your Government. As you will recall, it was on the 25th of September that the Japanese Government, last made its proposals to the United States Government, and, gathering from the observations which the Secretary of State made on them on the 2nd of October and also from the views which were subsequently expressed by the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State Mr. Welles, the greatest difficulties arose from three points, that is:
The application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations,
The attitude of our two Governments toward the European war, and
The question of the stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces.
In regard to the first question, that is, the principle of non-discrimination, my Government has now decided to accept its application in all the Pacific areas, including China, as your Government desires, on the understanding that the principle is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world as well. The Secretary of State has repeatedly pointed out to me that it has been his long-cherished scheme to see the application of the principle throughout the whole world. I therefore hope that the assurance to be given by my Government in this connection will be gratifying to you.
As to the second question, the attitude of our two Governments toward the European war, my Government proposed, in the draft of September 25th, that:
…both Governments will be guided in their conduct by considerations of protection and self-defense.
In this connection I have to inquire if the United States Government is in a position to give an assurance that it has no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on the term “protection and self-defense” that may lead to an abuse of the recognized right based upon it. The Japanese Government would be ready to give a similar assurance on the basis of reciprocity, that is, if the assurance is forthcoming from the United States Government.
In the draft of September 25th referred to, my Government proposed that:
In case the United States should participate in the European war. Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.
It will hardly be necessary to point out in this connection that the fundamental motive for initiating the present conversations was the preservation of peace in the Pacific by all possible means. The present circumstances under which Japan is placed do not permit my Government to go any further to write in black and white than what it proposed in the draft of September 25th which I have just quoted. All I have to ask you is to ‘read between the lines’ and to accept the formula as satisfactory. (Deleted by Ambassador Nomura) You will agree with me that where there is no mutual confidence and trust, a thousand words or letters would not be a satisfactory assurance.
In regard to the third question, the stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces, the formula which my Government wants to submit is as follows:
With regard to the Japanese forces which have been despatched to China in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas of North China and Mengjiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as general peace is restored between Japan and China and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order.
In submitting this formula, the Japanese Government has gone a great deal further than it went previously in that the formula specifies not only the areas in, but also the duration for, which the Japanese Government desires to have its forces remaining in China, clearly indicating that the stationing of the Japanese forces in China is not of a permanent nature. You will readily agree that, while complete and immediate withdrawal of all the Japanese forces from China may be desirable, it is impracticable under the present circumstances. I therefore earnestly hope that you will give favorable consideration from a practical standpoint.
I have been instructed to add that, in regard to the Japanese forces in French Indo-China, the Japanese Government proposes the following formula:
The Japanese Government undertake to respect the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled or an equitable peace is established in East Asia.
The Ambassador then read the following manuscript which he said was an oral statement by him:
I am very glad to be able to see you to-day, because since the resignation of the Cabinet of Prince Konoe, the conversations between the Secretary of State and myself had to be left alone for nearly three weeks — three weeks, even three days, are very precious time under the present circumstances. I am sure you will agree with me that the situation between Japan and the United States must not be left alone to take its own course and drift away beyond rescue.
It is more than six months since the present informal conversations were started. From the very beginning the Japanese Government was very anxious to reach the earliest possible conclusion and the Japanese people placed a great deal of hope on it, but the conversations dragged on and on and, on the other hand, the relations between our two countries became more and more strained, the people of my country becoming more and more impatient.
As viewed from the Japanese side, the Japanese Government has made not a few concessions in its assertion at various stages while the United States Government has, it seemed to the Japanese, remained adamant on its contention and has shown little sign of reciprocation, and thus I must frankly inform you that in certain quarters in my country some skepticism has arisen as to the true intention of the United States Government. Personally I do not like to say it, but it is true. People in my country take the freezing of the assets as an economic blockade and they go even so far as to contend that the means of modern warfare are not limited to shooting. No nation can live without the supply of materials vital to its industries. Reports reaching me from home indicate that the situation is serious and pressing and the only way of preserving peace is to reach some kind of amicable and satisfactory understanding with the United States without any unnecessary loss of time. In the face of these mounting difficulties, the Japanese Government bent all its efforts to continue the conversations and bring about a satisfactory understanding solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific. My Government therefore is now submitting certain proposals as its utmost effort for that purpose, and I shall feel very grateful if I can have the views of your Government on them at the earliest possible opportunity. Suppose we come to an understanding with this country, the psychological effect of it upon our people will mean much more than what is actually written upon the paper, and the policy of our Government will necessarily be guided and dictated thereby. I confidently hope that the views and desires entertained by the Japanese Government are fully shared and reciprocated by your Government.
I may add for your information that in view of the serious situation now prevailing in the relations between our two countries, the Japanese Government is sending over here Ambassador Kurusu to assist me in the present conversations and also that the conversations will be taken up by Foreign Minister Togo with Ambassador Grew in Tokio in a parallel line.
I am afraid I may have used to-day some words which a trained diplomat must not use, but I hope you will kindly forgive my transgression, for it was only because of my earnest wish to keep and direct the relations of our two countries in the course which I believe is best for both of us.
The Ambassador appeared very much in earnest in reading the statement.
The Ambassador made some reference to commercial policy as discussed and proclaimed by the President and Prime Minister Churchill at their sea conference some months ago. He referred complainingly to the fact that the Japanese went into Shantung and were only allowed to remain there some six years, at the end of which time they were requested to move out their troops.
The President then read the following oral statement in reply:
The entire world has been placed in a precarious position as a result of the havoc which has been wrought by the forces of aggression. Our common sense tells us of the extreme need that the world come back to ways of peace. It is the purpose of this Government to do its best in the spirit of fair play to contribute to establishing a basis for peace, stability, and order in the Pacific area. As a means of achieving these objectives it is essential that emphasis be laid upon giving practical effect to a sound philosophy of human welfare. We have often and quite recently made clear publicly what we have in mind in this regard. We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek.
The President also referred orally to his opinion that nations must think one hundred years ahead, especially during the age through which the world is passing, and that the Chinese Government for the past thirty years has been passing through a new experience. He referred to extraterritorial courts and other unusual conditions that had accompanied this new experience of China. If I understood the Ambassador correctly, he said it took three years to develop and dispose of the Shantung problems. The President thereupon replied that the Ambassador, Secretary Hull and himself had only consumed some six months in discussing a solution of our relations and those of other countries in the Pacific and that patience was necessary. The President spoke of a modus vivendi as being not merely an expedient and temporary agreement, but also one which takes into account actual human existence. The Ambassador dwelt briefly again on the question of the Japanese getting out of China by degrees and adding that there would be no annexation, no indemnity, et cetera.
There was nothing said about when the next conversation would take place. The President brought up his program to visit Warm Springs at the end of this week for some ten days. The Ambassador said that Kurusu would be here about Saturday. The President said that, of course, he expected to see Kurusu and confer with the Ambassador and the Minister and their associates. The Ambassador said that Kurusu was only coming to assist him and coming at his request and that he did not have anything new to bring so far as the Ambassador knew.
CORDELL HULL
711.94/25404/35Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 10, 1941.Mr. Wakasugi, Japanese Minister, called by appointment made at his request. Mr. Wakasugi said that the Japanese Ambassador had it in mind this morning to say something to the Secretary which he did not have an opportunity to say because of an interruption and the Japanese Ambassador therefore desired to have an appointment to see the Secretary either this evening or tomorrow morning to take up with the Secretary two points. The first point related to the desire of the Japanese Government to hasten the conversations in view of the pressing situation in Japan and the forthcoming Diet session. The second point related to the suggestion which the Secretary made on November 7 in regard to means for the development on the basis of mutual pledges by China and Japan of a new relationship of conciliation and friendship. Mr. Wakasugi said that the Ambassador had communicated to the Japanese Government the Secretary’s comments on this point, that the Japanese Government had replied that it was very much interested in this suggestion and wondered if it would be possible for the Secretary to develop more fully just what he had in mind.
Mr. Ballantine said that after consulting with the Secretary he would communicate again with Mr. Wakasugi.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
U.S. Department of State (November 11, 1941)
892.24/79: TelegramThe Secretary of State to the Minister in Thailand
Washington, November 11, 1941 — 1 p.m.
145.In connection with consideration which the Department is giving to the question of making available to Thailand certain supplies, the Department requests that you endeavor discreetly to obtain information in regard to specifications and quantities of aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil that might reasonably be made available to the Thai air force under present circumstances. In sending to the Department your report and any recommendation which you may feel in a position to make, you should bear in mind the circumstances that, because of great and increasing demands on this country’s production of high octane gasoline, careful disposition of available supplies is imperative.
HULL
711.94/2432: TelegramThe Counselor of Embassy in China to the Secretary of State
Beiping, November 11, 1941 — 4 p.m. [Received 8:55 p.m.]
348.Kurusu takes following program to Washington: (1) Japan abandons Tripartite Pact; (2) Manchukuo for future discussion; (3) distribution Pacific spheres influence; (4) Japan ceases political, military but not [economic] southward expansion; (5) China returns to status quo ante prior China incident.
He stated Japanese gendarmes desire sabotage any Washington agreement and have placed above information before German Embassy here.
Foregoing obtained from different fairly reliable local contacts by AP representative who has also informed Assistant Military and Naval Attachés who will doubtless inform their departments.
I was told yesterday by a usually well-informed American that he had been reliably informed that there were two groups of high ranking naval officers, namely, the political to which Admirals Nomura and Toyoda belong and the service to which Admiral Oikawa belongs. Oikawa, then Navy Minister, desired to intercept American oil shipments to Vladivostok and risk war with us but was dissuaded by a General Suzuki, presumably President of Cabinet Planning Board.
Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Shanghai, Tokyo.
BUTRICK
711.94/25405/35Documents Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
November 11, 1941If, as seems almost certain, there is no possibility at the present time of reaching with Japan a comprehensive settlement covering the entire Pacific area, it is highly probable that after a certain point further efforts to reconcile differences on the essentials of such a comprehensive settlement will lead only to a rupture of the conversations followed by a further and perhaps sudden deterioration of relations. Such a prospect prompts the question whether it might not be possible to propose some tentative or transitional arrangement the very discussion of which might serve not only to continue the conversations pending the advent of a more favorable situation, even if the proposal is not eventually agreed to, but also to provide the entering wedge toward a comprehensive settlement of the nature sought providing the proposal is accepted by Japan and provided further that China is able to obtain satisfactory terms from Japan.
With these thoughts in mind, there is suggested for consideration a proposal along the lines of the attached draft.
It is probable that the Japanese will not agree to the attached proposal as it stands without considerable modification, and it is even more probable that negotiations between Japan and China under these circumstances will come to nothing. Nevertheless, it is hoped that a proposal along the suggested lines might offer a basis which might keep conversations going for some time longer than otherwise, and if accepted by the Japanese might lead to an eventual comprehensive settlement of a nature compatible with our principles.
It is suggested that the foregoing proposal would have more chance of receiving consideration by the Japanese (and of thus gaining time) if it were presented to them before feelings had become further aroused over fruitless discussion of matters we assume will not be agreed upon.
In presenting the proposal to the Japanese we might say that we offer it with reluctance as we realize that it is of a patchwork nature and imperfect, but that we feel that under the circumstances it is better to have something on which we can hope to build in the future than to end with no agreement at all, as would seem to be otherwise inevitable in view of our present divergencies of views on certain fundamentals.
If the Japanese should decline to consider such a proposal we should be no worse off than we otherwise would have been. At the same time, it is believed that by presenting a proposal of this sort, we should make clear on the record our effort to do everything possible to reach a settlement with Japan. If they do consider it, one point on which they would be most likely to seek modifications would be a provision which would enable them to obtain oil sooner than contemplated in the proposal that we offer them.
In regard to that point, it might be possible to work out an arrangement whereby we could allow them to have petroleum in amounts equivalent to amounts of petroleum products released in Japan for normal peacetime consumption. This would make possible the normal functioning in Japan of buses, commercial trucks, taxis and private automobiles as well as Japanese fishing launches and commercial boats and would emphasize to the Japanese public the advantages of conditions of peace.
(Draft)
I.A. The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a mutual understanding and declaration of intention and policy for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.
B. Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.
C. It is the earnest hope of both Governments that by cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area.
D. Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples of both countries.
E. Both Governments further affirm that in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other Governments are based:
The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
The principle of non-disturbance of the status quo except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.
F. Both Governments have agreed that in order to provide stable peace and to eliminate chronic political instability and recurrent economic collapse, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations through international agreement regulating supply of commodities.
The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance that may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries, and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
(In drafting the abstract principles on which commitments are to be exchanged, an effort has been made to embody those principles to which it is believed the Japanese are readily willing to agree.)
II.A. As initial steps toward the implementation and practical application of the fundamental principles agreed upon, both Governments have agreed to take the following measures:
- The Government of the United States will suggest to the Governments of China and of Japan that they immediately enter into direct amicable negotiation for a peaceful settlement of their differences.
(In offering to extend advice to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they enter into direct negotiations for a settlement of their differences, we would not ask the Japanese to tell us their peace terms. We should, therefore, be in a position to tell the Chinese that our suggestion contains no implication of approval of terms which the Japanese might offer; that we intend to continue our policy of aid to countries which are victims of aggression; and that if the hostilities should be resumed after the armistice, we shall again extend to China all possible aid. In our approach to the Chinese we should make it clear that following a peaceful settlement with Japan, we should expect to extend in the fullest possible measure material and technical assistance to China during the period of reconstruction.)
The Government of Japan will offer to the Government of China an armistice during the period of amicable negotiation.
The Government of the United States during the course of amicable negotiations between China and Japan under an armistice will hold in abeyance shipment of supplies of a military character to China.
The Government of Japan during the course of amicable negotiations between Japan and China under an armistice will refrain from further reenforcement of its expeditionary forces in China and French Indochina and will hold in abeyance shipment of supplies of a military character to those forces.
The Government of the United States upon the conclusion of a peace settlement between Japan and China will immediately enter into negotiations with the Governments of Japan and of China for the resumption of normal trade relations with those Governments; and will undertake now negotiations with Japan for a resumption in trade and commerce in certain commodities and services other than those essential to warfare with a view to reconstruction of normal peacetime industry in Japan.
(The negotiations with Japan for the resumption of normal trade relations, following a peace settlement between Japan and China, would look to an arrangement whereby trade would be restored according to a graduated scale pari passu with the evacuation of Japanese troops from French Indochina and from China and with the re-establishment of nondiscriminatory trade in areas now under Japanese military occupation. For example, there might be provision that with the completion of Japanese evacuation of certain areas such as Indochina or China south of the Yangtze River we might let Japan have certain quantities of desired commodities such as oil and iron.
In the negotiations for an immediate resumption of limited trade in commodities other than war supplies, we should have in mind the dual purpose of setting Japanese factories and shipping facilities to production and services which would aid in meeting our present needs, would assist the transition in Japan from a war to a peace economy, and which would augment the natural popular reaction in favor of peaceful and profitable pursuits. Such a reaction might be expected once hostilities with China have ended and the threat of extended hostilities with the United States somewhat abated. A beginning in this direction might consist of arrangements for the exchange of such Japanese products such as canned crab meat, menthol, camphor, pyrethrum flowers, plaits for hat making, tea and potteries, for American products such as fertilizers, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, cotton and tobacco. Arrangements might also be made for the charter of Japanese [Page 583]vessels, if agreeable to Japan, and for the construction of vessels to American order in Japanese shipyards with steel and other material supplied from the United States.)
- The Governments of Japan and of the United States mutually guarantee that they will not undertake military offensive operations in any direction in the Pacific area.
I. Commitments to be given mutually by the Governments of the United States and Japan.
a) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan subscribe to and actively support the following principles and the practical application thereof as the foundation upon which their relations with all other nations are based:
Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
Non-disturbance of the status quo except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.
b) The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In pursuance of this policy, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which Japan and the United States will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and the development of its own economy. They furthermore agree to cooperate each with the other especially toward obtaining commercial access, on a non-discriminatory basis, by each of them to supplies of such basic commodities as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, and any other commodity the importation of which is essential to each country for the maintenance of its economic life.
c) The Governments of the United States and Japan mutually pledge that they will not seek in any part of the Pacific area political expansion in any direction or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages, or preferences by force.
II. Commitments on the part of the Japanese Government.
a) The Japanese Government, following the cessation of hostilities between China and Japan, will withdraw all of its troops immediately from French Indochina.
b) The Japanese Government will begin at once to put into effect a program for the rapid and progressive restoration of all of the normal activities of nationals of the United States in China and Manchuria and for the progressive relaxation and removal of all restrictions on the activities of nationals of the United States in China which have been imposed directly or indirectly as a result of Japanese military activities in China, and will complete this program as rapidly as possible in order to provide full implementation and practical application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial affairs.
III. Commitments on the part of the Government of the United States.
The Government of the United States will, pari passu with the removal or alterations of those conditions and situations in the Pacific area which gave rise to the taking by it of certain political and economic measures, alter or discontinue those political and economic measures.
711.94/25406/35The British Embassy to the Department of State
Washington, November 11, 1941.At a recent interview in Tokyo, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs told His Majesty’s Ambassador that negotiations with the United States had now been proceeding since last April, and that his experience in such matters made him pessimistic about the outcome of so dilatory a process. In the Privy Council impatience was now taking the place of the hopes originally placed in the discussions, and it was therefore highly desirable to discover some way out before feeling became too exacerbated. Matters were being discussed which were of the utmost concern to British interests and Mr. Togo said he was therefore somewhat surprised that His Majesty’s Government were taking no part in the discussions. While he could understand that in the early stages we might prefer to leave matters in the hands of the United States Government, a point had now been reached where a breakdown might have repercussions upon British interests. The Minister said he had a strong impression that, for reasons best known to themselves, the United States Government were deliberately dragging out the negotiations. If this were so it would of course be impossible for the Japanese Government to continue them.
Speaking for himself, Sir Robert Craigie told the Japanese Foreign Minister that he felt sure that there had been no desire in any quarter deliberately to drag out the negotiations. But as he understood the position, the United States Government had been unable to elicit sufficiently definite assurances and undertakings in regard to Japan’s future intentions, and this might lead to a hitch. The objective under discussion was an ambitious one — namely, the settlement of the situation as a whole — and it was obvious that a task of this magnitude would require time as well as patience on both sides. As regards the attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards the negotiations, Sir Robert Craigie suggested that it was one of helpful expectancy, and that while the Foreign Secretary was desirous of seeing a settlement reached which would be just to all the parties concerned, he was equally anxious not to intervene in any manner likely to hamper the discussions between the United States and Japan.
Upon receipt of the above report of his interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sir Robert Craigie was instructed to speak to him as follows.
Although His Majesty’s Government are not fully acquainted with the details of the conversations which have been taking place, they are aware that the United States Government have been seeking a basis of discussion with the Japanese Government towards a general settlement in the Far East. The British Government believes such a settlement to be in their own best interests as well as those of Japan and it is their earnest desire that it should be achieved. It cannot be expected however that all the giving should be on the British side, and no advantage is seen in entering upon negotiations unless some basis for discussion can be agreed upon in advance which establishes principles upon which agreement will be sought. The British Government have been content to leave this part of the proceedings in the hands of the United States Government who are well aware of the British position. Moreover the United States Government have assured the British Government (and it is believed that they have so informed the Japanese Government) that should actual negotiations become possible the British Government will at once be consulted. At that point the British Government will be very ready to collaborate with the United States and Japanese Governments in seeking a solution of their joint problems.
Sir R. Craigie was further authorised, at his own discretion, to urge upon the Japanese Government the advantage of a supreme effort to reach agreement with the United States, as against the desperate risks to Japan of allowing a situation to develop in which it might no longer be possible to control the issue of peace or war.
U.S. Department of State (November 12, 1941)
711.94/25406/35Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
Washington, November 12, 1941.The British Ambassador called this morning at his request. The Ambassador read to me a memorandum (the text of which is attached herewith) reporting on a recent conversation between the British Ambassador in Tokyo and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I told the Ambassador that, as the Secretary of State had frequently pointed out to the Japanese Government, the British Government would be informed fully of the basis for any projected negotiations between Japan and the United States if the present conversations now in progress gave any definite promise that such negotiations could be undertaken. I communicated to the Ambassador, in that connection, for his information the contents of Ambassador Grew’s telegram to the Department of State, No. 1782, November 10, 8 p.m.
SUMNER WELLES
711.94/2625Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan
Tokyo, November 12, 1941.Mr. Kase called this morning at the request of Mr. Togo to say that while the Foreign Minister of necessity could not with entire freedom tell me certain things directly, he regarded it as of great importance that the Government of the United States should have in mind a completely clear understanding of the situation in this country in so far as it affects the present endeavors of the Japanese Government to reach a settlement of the relations with the United States and for this reason the Minister had asked Mr. Kase to convey to me the following.
Mr. Togo had been “shocked” (a term which Mr. Kase later changed to “concerned”) to receive the impression from the latest reports of the Japanese Ambassador in Washington of his talks with the President and the Secretary of State that the Government of the United States does not fully grasp the urgency of successfully concluding the current conversations in the shortest possible time. Mr. Kase told me that not only does Mr. Togo consider that the preliminary conversations have now entered the stage of negotiation but also that he considers that these negotiations have now reached their final stage since the Japanese Government has already made the greatest possible concessions.
Mr. Kase then went on to say that the last government of Prince Konoe had conducted the conversations with the support of the country as a whole but that the long period of time which had elapsed since their inception without any clear indications of progress had given rise to the opinion in Japan that the Government of the United States was endeavoring to utilize the conversations as a means of concealing the preparations which it was carrying on to complete the encirclement of Japan. While the present Cabinet does not agree with this opinion, however, it has undertaken its present task of reaching an agreement with the United States against a considerable body of opposition and, although despite this opposition it has had the courage to embark on its present efforts and is according its unanimous support to the Foreign Minister in this respect, a very critical and dangerous state of affairs will result should any appreciable delay be encountered in successfully concluding the negotiations. Those elements who are opposed to a continuance of efforts to reach an adjustment with the United States will seize upon any such delay as evidence of the correctness of “their views." Mr. Kase was emphatic in his statement that his remarks in this connection contained no implication of threat whatsoever and should not be so regarded, but should be taken only as a factual statement. Mr. Kase added that Mr. Togo entirely realizes that his own life is at stake, to say nothing of his official position, but that nevertheless he has had the courage to make this final attempt in full cognizance of the consequences of failure.
I told Mr. Kase that his observations were virtually the same both in general and in particular as those which had been made to me during the last Konoye Cabinet both by Admiral Toyoda and by Prince Konoe himself and which of course had been reported in full to my Government. Mr. Kase replied that there was a considerable difference between the present situation and that which had obtained previously, and he again emphasized the vital importance of concluding the negotiations without further delay and reiterated his previous statement that the Japanese Government considered that the final stage of the negotiations had already begun.
At this point I permitted Mr. Kase to read the Department’s telegram No. 728, November 8, 8 p.m., which set forth the Secretary’s interview with Admiral Nomura on November 7. After reading the telegram Mr. Kase said that the account of the conversation contained therein followed very closely Admiral Nomura’s report. He added that Mr. Togo had taken especial note of the suggestion of the Secretary contained in paragraph eight of the Department’s telegram concerning an expression on the part of China of its desire to establish genuinely friendly relations with Japan and the readiness of the Chinese Government to make every effort toward peaceful cooperation with Japan. Mr. Togo was now wondering how this suggestion might be put into actual effect. I told Mr. Kase that, since the point would seem to me to be directly linked with the general program which Mr. Hull envisages for an adjustment of the whole Pacific problem, the Japanese Ambassador might care to discuss the suggestion fully with the Secretary of State.
Mr. Kase then inquired if I had received an account of the conversation on November 10 between the President and the Japanese Ambassador, to which I replied that I had not, adding that the failure of the Department to send me a report probably meant that there had been little difference between the conversation on November 10 with the President and that of the Ambassador with the Secretary of State on November 7. Mr. Kase said that the tenor of the two conversations had been different, to which I replied that I should then probably in due time receive an account of the conversation with the President on November 10.
I then allowed Mr. Kase to read my telegram No. 1782, November 10, 8 p.m., setting forth my interview with Mr. Togo of that date. Mr. Kase said that with the exception of the last sentence in paragraph one the account was completely accurate. With reference to the sentence in question Mr. Kase said that it was not his recollection that Mr. Togo had stated that “he did not wish to press the point” regarding the transference of the conversations into “negotiations”, particularly as Mr. Togo felt strongly that the vital stages of the actual negotiations had begun (According to Mr. Dooman, who was present at that interview and who had noted down the Minister’s remarks, the latter did make, in Japanese, the comment reported in my telegram referred to above, but quite likely this observation did not appear in the official transcript made by Mr. Kase as interpreter).
JOSEPH C. GREW
711.94/2625Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan
November 12, 1941My conversation with Mr. Kase casts doubt as to the credibility of the alleged message which was passed on to me from the Foreign Minister by a prominent Japanese on November 7, as reported in my telegram 1769, November 7, 11 p.m., paragraph numbered one. In view of my conversation today with Mr. Kase, it is possible that the so-called message had been conveyed to me by my informant in somewhat unclear and misleading form. At the time of its delivery it had struck me as somewhat surprising, but as I had not yet at that time had my first real interview with the Foreign Minister I had no grounds on which to question its accuracy. Although it is possible that the alleged message from my informant accurately reflected the Minister’s remarks, which were to be conveyed to me in a purely personal fashion and were not designed to form a part of the official record, even this interpretation is subject to doubt. While it would appear obvious that a continuation of the talks is greatly to be preferred to a complete break-down, nonetheless for the conversations to drag on for a considerable time with no definite progress being made in reconciling the respective positions of the two Governments may well accelerate the creation of the dangerous situation referred to in my various reports of recent months, particularly in my 1736, November 3, 3 p.m. Although I entirely realize that it is still up to Japan to provide the initiative to make possible such progress in the conversations, I do not feel in a position to state whether as asserted by the Japanese Government the proposals which were submitted on November 7 to the Secretary constitute the maximum Japanese concessions.
JOSEPH C. GREW
711.94/25407/35Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 12, 1941.The Japanese Ambassador called in response to a request made by him on November 10 at the Secretary’s apartment. The Secretary referred to the request which had been communicated to him by Mr. Ballantine from the Japanese Minister for a further elaboration of the Secretary’s views in regard to the development of a real friendship between China and Japan, and he said that in response to that request, he had prepared a statement which he then proceeded to hand to the Japanese Ambassador.
The Secretary then said that the general position of this Government in regard to a Pacific settlement had not changed and he assumed that although a new ministry had been formed in Japan, the position of the Japanese Government had not changed. He had said that with a view to there being no misunderstanding, we had drawn up a recapitulation of statements which the Japanese had given us in regard to their position, and we would appreciate it if the Japanese Government could confirm that our assumption was correct. The Secretary then handed the Japanese Ambassador the statement which we had prepared on this subject.
The Ambassador said that his new Government desired him to emphasize the desire of the Japanese Government to expedite a settlement because the internal situation in Japan was difficult, people becoming impatient and a session of the Diet impending. He therefore hoped that within a week or ten days some agreement could be reached. The Secretary commented that we were working as rapidly as possible on the matters which the Japanese Ambassador had presented to the President on November 10 and suggested that it was our view that as soon as we reached a good basis in our exploratory conversations, we could approach the Chinese Government and sound out their attitude. In regard to commercial policy, the Secretary said that there were points in the Japanese Government’s proposal which we did not fully understand, and we assumed that what the Japanese Government had in mind was the same as what we had in mind, namely, to have Japan, Great Britain and other countries get together on a basis of equality and fair treatment. The Secretary went on to say that he expected much difficulty in explaining to the people here the Tripartite alliance situation. The Ambassador replied that Japan’s obligation under the Tripartite alliance was limited, that it was not an offensive and defensive alliance, and that during the time of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Great Britain remained neutral during the war between Japan and Russia.
The Secretary said he would like help in order to enable him to explain Japan’s relationship to the Axis powers, for even though we understood clearly the Ambassador’s attitude and that of the present Japanese Cabinet, there must be considered the possibility of another Government coming into power in Japan. The Secretary went on to point out the increasing gravity of the situation in Europe and the growing distress of European populations, which raised the question how long could Hitler keep those populations crushed down. For this reason, he said, the time was approaching for preparing for a post-war program, a matter in which he felt that the Japanese Government must be interested. He suggested that Japan would want to play a part in a constructive program to meet the after-the-war situation, and that for this reason Japan would probably not want to be tied in with Hitler. He noted that we are trying to keep out of trouble and to that end are making efforts to unite peaceful forces to avert disaster for ourselves.
The Ambassador commented that he anticipated that as time went on Japan would be less and less affected by the Axis ties, just as the importance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance waned after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war.
The Secretary commented that so many statements had been made about the Tripartite Pact that it should be made clear if we are going to start the world on the right course that we are going ahead on a basis of peace.
The Ambassador said in reply that if the proposed agreement were made and applied there would be no question of the use of force by Japan to gain access to materials and markets which she desired.
The Secretary commented that the matter of the Tripartite Pact relationship ought not to be a problem with Japan if we could work out our proposed agreement in other ways.
The Ambassador asked whether it was the Secretary’s idea that the United States would leave to Japan and China to work out their peace terms by themselves. The Secretary replied that we had not yet talked the subject over with the Chinese or the British or Dutch, but we have told them that if we get matters beyond an exploratory stage we should be glad to talk with them. He added that we first want to have something substantial to present to them and that he had said that if we reach a stage of negotiations we will talk with the other Governments and will then talk again with Japan.
The Japanese Minister referred to the two documents which the Secretary had handed the Ambassador and which both the Ambassador and the Minister had just read. With regard to the document relating to mutual conciliation between China and Japan, he asked what the Secretary had in mind as to how the exchange of pledges would come about, as, for example, whether it would be as a result [of] our bringing the Japanese and Chinese together. The Secretary replied that when two neighbors have not been on speaking terms, sometimes they make up as a result of an initiative taken by one or the other and sometimes they are brought together by a mutual friend. One cannot plan always in advance what each of a number of persons will in succession do or say. He said he felt that the main thing now was to dispose of basic matters in regard to the provisions of a peace settlement and that questions of procedure could thereafter be more satisfactorily settled. These points were gone over two or three times, as the Japanese appeared to find difficulty in understanding them, possibly because of a preconception that the Secretary’s suggestion contained more than appeared on its face.
With regard to the second document which related to the question of the present Japanese Government’s general position on the question of peace, the Minister said that we had referred to the Japanese Government’s statement of August 28, whereas the Japanese Government had indicated that it desired to use their September 25 document as the basis for discussions. He said that, with reference to our statement that in conversation with the Under Secretary he had expressed the willingness of the Japanese Government to omit the qualifying phrases contained in the assurances which we had quoted from the August 25 statement, this was a misunderstanding on our part. He said that he was not referring to the August 28 statement but to the September 25 statement and that what he had said to the Under Secretary was that there might have been some unfortunate phraseology in translation which could be improved after comparison with the original Japanese text. He asked whether we would withdraw what we had said in that connection.
The Secretary said he would be glad to do so, and was glad to have the Minister call attention to any misunderstanding.
The Ambassador said that if the proposed agreement was held in abeyance and the United States continued to aid Chiang Kai-shek while Japan was negotiating with Chiang the Chinese would be certain to keep negotiations dragging for an interminable period.
The Secretary said that if we got the China matter started to move it would soon gain momentum, for if Japan should propose terms which seem reasonably fair everybody would want to get aboard. He felt sure that ways could be found for safeguarding each other’s rights by agreement.
The Ambassador commented that if we failed to reach an agreement simply over an unwillingness on the part of China to agree to the Japanese proposals in regard to troops, the situation would then be one in which China held the key to future relations between Japan and the United States which might result in war.
The Secretary replied that whether we exercised our good offices or whether Japan approached China directly we felt that the nature of the settlement which Japan reached with China was one which should be in harmony with the proposed Pacific settlement as a whole. One of the principles, he said, upon which we were proceeding was noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, and the permanent retention of troops of one country in another country was inconsistent with that principle.
The Ambassador disclaimed any desire on the part of Japan to station troops in China permanently.
The Secretary said he felt that the same consideration applied to the retention of Japanese troops in China indefinitely. The Ambassador disclaimed any desire to keep troops in China indefinitely, but he did not offer anything definite on this point.
The Japanese Minister repeated what the Ambassador had earlier said about the desire of the Japanese Government to hear from us as soon as possible in regard to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary replied that we were working as hard as we could on the matter, and after consulting with Mr. Ballantine, said that we hoped we could have something for them day after tomorrow (November 14).
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
711.94/25407/35Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
November 12, 1941Reference is made to the Japanese Ambassador’s request for any further amplification that the Secretary of State might have in mind in connection with the suggestion made by him in informal conversation on November 7 in regard to mutual exchanges of pledges between China and Japan for the establishment of real friendship and collaboration between the two countries.
It will be recalled that the suggestion under reference was prompted by the observation of the Japanese Ambassador that should the Japanese Government agree to withdraw its troops within a definite period from all areas of China the Japanese people would feel that they had nothing to show for the four years and more of heavy sacrifice that they had made and that such an agreement would be regarded as having caused Japan a loss of prestige. The Secretary, in reply to the Japanese Ambassador’s observation, commented that the present world crisis, in which Europe finds itself threatened with anarchy, affords Japan a unique opportunity to enhance its national prestige on a basis of moral force in a way that military might could never accomplish. That is, if the Chinese Government were now to say, either as a result of Japanese initiative or on its own initiative, that China desired a real friendship with Japan and would do everything it reasonably could to collaborate with Japan along peaceful and mutually beneficial lines, could not Japan find it possible to reciprocate in a policy of mutual friendship and conciliation with China? Would not such a policy enable Japan to make a contribution of inestimable value toward arresting the destructive forces which now menace world civilization and to assume a leadership in the world which every peaceful nation would welcome.
What is envisaged would be an implementation of the kind of constructive, liberal and peaceful world program concerning which we have been talking in our exploratory conversations. That program contemplates practical application of basic principles directed toward preservation of order under law, peace with justice, and the social and economic welfare of mankind. It contemplates peaceful collaboration among nations, mutual respect for the rights of all, no aggrandisement, and the adopting of broad-gauge economic policies which would provide liberalization of trade, afford fair access to and development of natural resources and raise living standards to the betterment of all peoples.
Full association by Japan in such a program at this critical moment in world history would give Japan an undoubted position of moral leadership and be a tribute to the far-sighted and enlightened character of its statesmanship.
711.94/25407/35Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
November 12, 1941It will be recalled that the documents communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28, 1941 contained a statement of the position of the Japanese Government in regard to its desire and intention to pursue peaceful courses. That position was set forth in excerpts taken from those, documents as follows:
…Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations…
…In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the Government of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area. For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready: for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the Government of Japan, like the Government of the United States, would be proud to make sacrifices…
With reference to the stationing of Japanese troops in Indochina, it was stated:
…the Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.
Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.
Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indochina is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories.
The statement was made specifically applicable to Thailand as follows:
The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan’s intentions toward Thailand.
Specific reference was also made to the Soviet Union by the Japanese Government as follows:
As regards Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet–Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty…
There was also a comprehensive statement, as follows:
In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation.
With reference to the general program in view, it was stated:
…such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the Government of the United States.
…Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself…
In as much as subsequent to the giving by the Japanese Government of the foregoing statement of its position a new cabinet has come into office in Japan, this Government believes that it would be helpful, in order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding, if the Japanese Government could at this time confirm that the position of the Japanese Government has not changed.
This Government, in its statement to the Japanese Government of October 2, 1941, pointed out that, although we were gratified to receive the statement of the position of the Japanese Government, we found it difficult to understand the need for the qualification by the Japanese Government of its statements of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases. We had in mind such phrases as:
As long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviets-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty.
Without provocation.
Without any justifiable reason.
On October 13 the Japanese Minister, in a conversation with the Under Secretary of State, said that such qualifications were the result of unfortunate phraseology and that the Japanese Government would be willing to omit them. As this conversation took place before the present Japanese Cabinet came into office, it is believed that it would be helpful if the position of the Japanese Government on this point could be clarified and the statement of the Japanese Minister be confirmed.
The foregoing observations are not directed to the new proposals put forward by the Japanese Ambassador on November 7 and November 10, but are set forth merely in an effort to make abundantly clear the basis on which we are proceeding in order that there may be avoided any misunderstanding on the part either of the Japanese Government or of this Government. It has not been and is not the purpose of this Government to enter needlessly into a discussion of details. While presenting these preliminary observations toward ensuring a common understanding, this Government will expect to do everything it can to expedite consideration of the latest proposals of the Japanese Government.
U.S. Department of State (November 13, 1941)
711.94/2440: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 13, 1941 — 3 p.m. [Received November 13 — 2:06 p.m.]
1796.The following is the substance of a telegram sent to the Foreign Office in London by the British Ambassador in Tokyo reporting his conversation on November 11 with the Minister for Foreign Affairs:
I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in the terms of your telegram handing him a note of what I had said to avoid misunderstanding. Minister for Foreign Affairs began by referring to Mr. Churchill’s references to Japan in his speech on Monday, observing that this constituted a “rather strong warning” to his country in connection with the American-Japanese negotiations. His Excellency could not but regard this statement as unfortunate, particularly as the Prime Minister admittedly did not know the details of the negotiations or the stage which they had now reached. The statement appeared to simplify the matter too much and in any case if the Prime Minister’s desire was to facilitate an agreement there were surely other and better ways of doing this. I replied that the Prime Minister had evidently felt that the moment had come when the Japanese Government and people must be left in no doubt as to where we stood. Wars had in the past occurred through misunderstanding and miscalculation and from this point of view there was advantage in clarifying the issues, particularly in view of the threatening language of the Japanese press. Judging from the fragmentary reports of the speech which had reached me, I gathered that the general tone of the references to Japan had been friendly.
Turning to the negotiations themselves, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the situation was, for the reasons given me in our last interview, now one of urgency and must “materialize speedily.” He did not agree that, after nearly seven months of discussion, it was correct to speak of the conversations as still being in the exploratory stage. On the contrary, the Japanese Government regarded them as having assumed the form of negotiations and so informed the United States Government though they had not yet heard their views on this point. The two parties were no longer discussing the meeting but were considering in detail the points for inclusion in instruments which would cover the whole field. The Japanese Government had recently put forward proposals in which they had made their maximum concessions and he earnestly hoped that these would be acceptable to the United States Government. If so the conclusion of an agreement should be possible in a week or ten days — indeed not only possible but necessary. There were only three points now outstanding. Realizing the extent to which British were involved in these discussions, the Japanese Government had expressed the opinion to the United States Government that an agreement with Great Britain should be reached and signed simultaneously with the Japanese-American agreement but had not yet received the United States Government’s answer on this point. Clearly the question of the appropriate moment for His Majesty’s Government to participate in the discussions was one which primarily concerned the united States and British Governments and it was not for him to make any definite proposal on a point which affected Anglo-American relations. Nevertheless he felt it right that you should realize that the negotiations were no longer in the exploratory stage and that things might hereafter move quickly, particularly in view of the forthcoming session of the Diet.
Before leaving I urged upon His Excellency the advantage of a supreme effort being made to bring about an agreement with the United States and added that I could not myself see anything in the situation which demanded so hasty a conclusion of an important negotiation. His Excellency stated no reason for the impatience of the Japanese people but speaking off the record I suggested that the impatience of the Japanese Army would be a more appropriate explanation. The heavy-handed tactics dear to the military mind were not the best suited to a delicate diplomatic situation such as the present and I hoped that His Excellency would do everything in his power to counsel prudence in these quarters which were now seeking to precipitate a crisis.
The text of the note referred to in the first paragraph of the above quoted substance of telegram and the text of the oral urging referred to in the first sentence of the last paragraph thereof are being transmitted to the Department in my immediately following telegram.
GREW
711.94/254033/35Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 13, 1941.Mr. Secretary:
There are attached for your consideration with a view to possible presentation to the Japanese Ambassador tomorrow copies of documents as follows:
A statement in regard to the attitudes of the United States and of Japan to the European war.
A statement in regard to non-discrimination in international commercial relations, accompanied by a draft marked “Unofficial, Exploratory, and Without Commitment” of a joint United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy.
A statement having reference to the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China.
It is suggested that in handing to the Japanese Ambassador the proposed statement in regard to the relations of Japan and of the United States toward the European war, you might make oral comment to the Ambassador condemnatory of Hitler’s policy of world conquest.
With regard to the “United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy”, it is believed that you will wish to have Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Feis, and Mr. Hawkins participate in a conference tomorrow morning to discuss the draft in question.
With regard to the statement on the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China, we feel considerable misgivings about presenting that on this occasion in the light of the Japanese Minister’s approach to Mr. Ballantine of today.
MAXWELL M. HAMILTON
711.94/25409/35Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 13, 1941.Mr. Wakasugi called at his request. Mr. Wakasugi referred to the President’s statement to the Ambassador that the President would be glad to receive Mr. Kurusu and stated that the Embassy had received a telegram from Mr. Kurusu dispatched from Midway stating that he was arriving in Washington Saturday afternoon.
Mr. Wakasugi referred to his statement yesterday to the Secretary that there had been a misunderstanding on our part as to what Wakasugi had said to the Under Secretary on October 13 to which reference was made in the oral statement handed the Japanese Ambassador yesterday. He said that what he had said to Mr. Welles was:
There may be some unfortunate phraseology in the English translation of our instructions as we are not very sure of our English. If there are such phrases the wording might be adjusted.
He said that he had the September 25 document in mind and not the document of August 28 which was delivered while he was away in Japan. He said that the Japanese Embassy had referred the contents of that memorandum to the Japanese Government, deleting therefrom the last four lines on page 3 and the first sentence beginning on page 4 through the word “office” and the last two words in line 4 and all of line 5.
The Minister tried to impress upon Mr. Ballantine the pressing nature of the situation in Japan as the public is becoming impatient and almost desperate. The parliament is meeting Saturday and they hope for some concrete understanding with the United States at once. He said he understood yesterday that we were to give them an answer tomorrow. Mr. Ballantine said that the Secretary had not said this, that what he had said was that we hoped to be in a position to have ready to take up with them some further matters tomorrow. Mr. Wakasugi said he hoped that the Secretary could give the Ambassador tomorrow a clear-cut answer in black and white as to whether the United States Government will accept or not the Japanese proposal of September 25 as modified by their proposals of November 7 and November 10 or whether we want to have some points changed therein or whether our June 21 proposal is our final proposal. He said that time is so pressing that the Japanese wanted to avoid any further interchange of comments on their proposals. Mr. Ballantine said, what are we going to do if we need further clarification as to the intent of your proposals? He referred to the fact that the Secretary had said yesterday that he did not understand what was meant by the latter part of the Japanese proposal in regard to commercial policy. Mr. Wakasugi said that what the Japanese Government meant by saying that they would agree to non-discrimination as applied to China provided that it will be made applicable to all the world was that the principle would be applied by the United States and by Japan and did not refer to the universal application of those principles by all countries. Mr. Ballantine asked whether this was not a very important point to be brought out clearly and authoritatively.
Mr. Wakasugi then said that in all of our documents we had stated that we were still in a stage of informal exploratory discussions whereas the Japanese Government considered that we had now entered formal negotiations especially since, on November 10, the Ambassador had formally presented as under instruction a statement to the President. Mr. Ballantine said that Mr. Wakasugi was fully aware of our position as mentioned again by the Secretary yesterday, that we felt that when our talks had reached a stage where we had something of substance to discuss with China and the other governments concerned we expected to talk with them and then come back to the Japanese, and that then only would a stage of negotiations be reached. Mr. Wakasugi did not seem to be disposed to argue any of these points with Mr. Ballantine but simply asked that they be referred to the Secretary.
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
U.S. Department of State (November 14, 1941)
892.24/86: TelegramThe Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, November 14, 1941 — 7 p.m. [Received November 14 — 3:40 p.m.]
518.The Minister for Foreign Affairs has urgently requested of me that steps be taken to enable the Ministry of Defense to purchase from some American firm 87–octane aviation gasoline to the extent of 10,000 drums of 200 liters each and octane 73 gasoline to the amount of between 2 and 3,000 drums as well as 1,000 drums of aviation lubricating oil for high power engines according to Wright’s specification 5817–A. Apparently these amounts would comprise suitable cargo for shipment from [apparent omission] by the Thai Government’s tanker. The Air Force estimates its consumption of aviation gasoline at 1,000 tons monthly in peace time and 1,200 tons on war basis with lubricants at 5 percent of above.
With the concurrence of the Military and Naval Attachés, I recommend that, if these supplies can be purchased by the Thai Government in Singapore, it be permitted to buy 1 month’s supply of high and low octane gasoline and the specified lubricating oil each month and if shipped from the United States that one shipment be permitted of 3 months’ supply in accordance with the estimate. The Attaches think the Air Force estimate is liberal but not unreasonable in view of the necessity of preparation for hostilities. I may add that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has assured me that in the event of war with Japan what gasoline could not be protected from falling into Japanese hands would certainly be destroyed by the Air Force.
PECK
711.94/254033/35Draft Statement Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 14, 1941.
OralReference is made to the formula proposed in the Japanese Government’s draft of September 25 for dealing with the attitudes of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan toward the European war. That formula was as follows:
Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of world peace.
With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration of world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.
In the statement communicated on November 10 by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States inquiry was made whether the United States Government is in position to give an assurance that it has no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on the term “protection and self-defense” that may lead to an abuse of the recognized right based upon it and it was stated that the Japanese Government would be ready to give a similar assurance on the basis of reciprocity.
It is not clear to the Government of the United States what purpose would be accomplished by the adoption of the suggestion indicated nor is it clear what the Japanese Government means by “too liberal an interpretation.” It is believed that the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the European war has been made very clear in public statements from time to time by the President, the Secretary of State and other high officials of the Government and in Acts of Congress. It would appear to the Government of the United States that the only ambiguity in the situation arises from the relationship of Japan to Germany and Italy under the Tripartite Alliance. In view of the many statements of a disquieting character that have been made in regard to the purposes of the Tripartite Pact, it is believed, if a beginning is to be made to start the world on a sound course, that it should be made clear that this is to be done on a basis of peace. If the proposed settlement covering the Pacific area can be worked out in regard to other points, it is thought that Japan would find it easier to work out a solution of the question of Japan’s relationship to the Axis Powers.
In the statement given to the Japanese Government on October 2 this Government stated that:
With reference to the attitude of each country toward the European war, this Government has noted with appreciation the further step taken by the Japanese Government to meet the difficulties inherent in this aspect of the relations between the two countries. It is believed that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could give further study to the question of possible additional clarification of its position.
In view of the considerations mentioned above this Government still feels that such additional clarification would be helpful.
711.94/254033/35Draft Statement Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 14, 1941.
OralReference is made to the proposed formulae for the withdrawal and stationing of Japanese forces in China and Indochina received from the Japanese Ambassador first on November 7 and again on November 10.
This Government when there has come up for discussion the question of the peace terms the Japanese Government may propose to the Chinese Government for a settlement of their differences has believed it desirable, in view of the basic purpose of our discussions, to make an effort to call attention to the intrinsic value of the practical application of certain fundamental broad-gauge principles.
We have also commented that, without desiring to pass upon the merits of specific terms, it would seem desirable to be reasonably sure in advance that any suggestion to the Chinese Government to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government would be favorably received and would thus contribute to the end in view. We have felt that, in order best to ensure that an approach to the Chinese Government would accomplish its purpose, this Government would want to be in position to reply to any questions of the Chinese Government by pointing out that the terms which the Japanese Government has in mind constitute practical manifestations of the liberal, broad-gauge principles we have discussed.
Consonant with the foregoing, it is suggested that, quite apart from any consideration of the merits of the program or the formula under reference which Japan has now suggested, it would be helpful, in answering questions of the Chinese Government if that Government were approached, to have an indication from the Japanese Government of the tentative program which it proposes to follow in withdrawing its troops from China and French Indochina and in stationing troops in certain areas in China. Such a tentative program, it is suggested, might indicate what percentage of Japanese troops at present in China and French Indochina would be withdrawn immediately, what percentage would be withdrawn at subsequent stages, what percentage of Japanese forces now in China would continue to be stationed in China for a limited period, and the probable duration of that period.
Referring to the fact that in its proposals under reference the Japanese Government has included for the first time during the course of the conversations between the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State the Island of Hainan as a place where Japan desires to station its armed forces for an unspecified period, this Government is constrained to observe that, while it had hoped that the Japanese Government would indicate a desire to move as rapidly as possible toward withdrawal of its armed forces from China, the inclusion of Hainan Island would seem to represent a regrettable expansion of the area in which Japan desires to station its troops in foreign territories.
On October 2, this Government pointed out to the Japanese Government that the procedure under which one country already in military occupation of territory of another country proposed to the second country the continued stationing of its troops in certain of the occupied areas as a basic condition for a peaceful settlement and thus for the withdrawal of other occupationary forces would not seem to be in keeping with the progressive and enlightened courses and principles which we have mentioned and for that reason would not, in our opinion, make for peace or offer prospects of stability. We feel, in the light of the experience of this Government, that such a procedure would not be likely to serve the best interests of Japan or of China.
The Secretary of State in conversations with the Japanese Ambassador has frequently referred to the experiences of this Government in its relations with its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere by way of illustrating the values which we feel flow automatically to a country practically applying the principles and broad-gauge programs we have mentioned.
Ten years ago, the United States was not regarded by the peoples and Governments of the other American Republics with particular regard or esteem. Today, the United States enjoys the most friendly relations of its history with these countries. This remarkable change in attitude from one of indifference and even coolness to one of confidence is the result of a scrupulous respect by the United States for the sovereign rights and attributes of the twenty other American Republics and of according full confidence and trust in them to discharge equitably and fully their sovereign responsibilities.
The application of the Good Neighbor Policy has taken many forms. The United States has withdrawn its Marines from Nicaragua and Panama, abrogated the treaty embodying the so-called Platt Amendment that gave it the right of intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba by negotiating a new treaty, amended its treaty with Panama to relinquish certain rights of interference, eliminated its special privileges with regard to a trans-isthmian canal in Mexico, abandoned its direct financial controls in Haiti and the Dominican Republic and taken a multitude of other steps large and small.
The day-by-day, year-by-year, functioning of this policy has won the confidence and friendship of each one of the other American Republics. This has meant many benefits, tangible and intangible, for the United States.
In the economic field this policy paved the way for the conclusion of trade agreements with twelve of the other American Republics. The negotiation of these agreements would have been far more difficult — indeed, some of them might never have been concluded with success — were it not for the friendly attitude of those countries which was naturally created by mutual confidence and respect. The foreign trade of the United States with the other American Republics increased from $573,800,000 in 1932 to $1,214,830,000 in 1939. Although this expansion in part is attributable to the general world recovery during the period mentioned, a part must also be attributed to the conclusion of the agreements in question, which was, in turn, greatly facilitated by the Good Neighbor Policy.
In the economic field, trade restrictions, many of them discriminatory, have been removed so that today United States commerce enjoys unconditionally the treatment of the most-favored-nation. Today, fair and equitable treatment is the rule for United States interests, whereas formerly those interests encountered many stumbling blocks.
The political relations of the United States have also prospered under this policy of fair dealing, cooperation, and mutual accommodation. Since 1933, there have been five important inter-American meetings. At each one of these meetings complex and knotty problems were presented for consideration, were discussed from every point of view, and finally were resolved satisfactorily to all. Every resolution, convention, or treaty adopted at these five meetings was by unanimity.
The foregoing comment is illustrative of the liberal, progressive and broad-gauge policies and programs which the Government of the United States is convinced offer the only sound hope for stable peace and prosperity and which this Government is also convinced will, if adopted by Japan, bring Japan benefits similar to those which have accrued to the United States.
711.94/11–1441Memorandum by Messrs. Joseph W. Ballantine and Max W. Schmidt, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 14, 1941.We have noticed that the Japanese Government in its draft presented to the American Ambassador at Tokyo on September 25 has throughout that document substituted the words “southwestern Pacific area” for the words “Pacific area” as used in our draft of June 21. For example, we observe that in the preamble, paragraph 6, article 5, the Japanese have substituted the title “Economic Problems in the Southwestern Pacific Area” for the title in our draft of June 21 “Economic Activity of Both Nations in the Pacific Area;" section V of the Japanese draft of September 25 limits the pledges of both Governments to carry on their economic activities in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations and by peaceful means to the “Southwestern Pacific Area;" in Section VI of the Japanese draft of September 25 it is stated that both Governments undertake not to resort to any measures or actions which may jeopardize stabilization of the situation “in the Southwestern Pacific Area."
In our draft of June 21 an effort was made to set forth the basic principles upon which a general settlement of Pacific problems might be reached and the underlying purpose, as we interpret it, of these conversations might be realized, namely, peace in the entire Pacific area. In view of that underlying purpose, Section VI, which was designed to set forth the peaceful intent of both Governments throughout the entire Pacific area represents one of the most important parts of the proposed understanding. For example, in Section VI of our draft of June 21 it was stated that conformably with the controlling policy of the proposed understanding both Governments declared it to be their purpose through cooperative effort to contribute to the maintenance and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and both Governments renounced territorial designs in that area; in Section V of our June 21 draft it was stated that the activities of both Japan and the United States in the Pacific Area would be carried on peacefully and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations; the title of Section V as given in our draft of June 21 was “Economic Activity of Both Nations in the Pacific Area.”
Does not it appear that the Japanese Government in presenting its redraft of September 25 had in mind a limited program as compared with that which this Government had in mind in presenting its June 21 draft and for that matter continues to have in mind in carrying on these conversations? Would it not be desirable for the Japanese Government before seeking a definitive reply from this Government on the basis of the Japanese proposals of September 25 to make clear whether or not it is the desire of the Japanese Government to limit our discussions and any proposals which may be made during those discussions to a small part of the Pacific area or to include the entire area?
On November 7 and again on November 10, the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal in which it was stated, inter alia, that Japan would accept the application “in all the Pacific areas including China” of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations:
…on the understanding that the principle is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world as well.
In Section III of the Japanese draft of September 25, it was stated that economic cooperation between Japan and China following the conclusion of a peace settlement between those two countries would be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of non-discrimination in international commercial relations and:
…also with the principle of especially close relationship which is natural between neighboring countries.
If the Japanese draft of September 25 is to stand there would seem to be some discrepancy between the proposal made on November 7 and 10 and the question of economic cooperation between Japan and China as set forth in the proposal of September 25. Before the position of Japan can be clearly understood it would seem to be desirable to have some clarification of this point.
There are, of course, other questions of detail in the Japanese proposals of September 25 which it is believed would need to be worked out but before considering those details it would seem to be best to remove any possibility of misunderstanding on the more basic questions.
The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in a conversation with Ambassador Grew at Tokyo on November 10 suggested that if an agreement should be reached between Japan and the United States a similar agreement should be concluded at the same time between Japan and Great Britain and he suggested that the American Government might be willing to obtain the assent of the British Government to the conclusion of such an agreement. In view of previous intimations from the Japanese Government that it contemplated only a bilateral agreement with the United States we should like to ask what the Japanese Government has in mind in this connection.
The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has raised with Ambassador Grew and Mr. Wakasugi has raised here with Mr. Ballantine the point in regard to whether we have entered into a state of formal negotiations. As we have stated on many occasions to the Japanese Ambassador, we consider that our conversations are still in an exploratory stage and that when we consider that we have reached a basis for negotiations we shall expect before entering into such negotiations to talk matters over with the Chinese, British and other interested governments.
740.0011 Pacific War/1465The British Embassy to the Department of State
UndatedThe following indications of the possibility of a Japanese attack upon Thailand may be of interest to the State Department.
Sir Robert Craigie reports from Tokyo that several factors point to the early months of next year as the most likely period for any Japanese action against Thailand, provided that the crisis is not precipitated earlier for other reasons.
Sir J. Crosby, in Bangkok, states that the rains cease in Thailand about the middle of November and begin again in May, so that the dry weather thus prevails from December to April inclusive. He adds that in the flat country, which comprises Cambodia and Central Thailand, the soil of the rice fields becomes baked hard during the dry season. He has been told that the improvisation of air fields for temporary use is then not difficult and suggests that, if the Japanese contemplate an attack on Thailand, the most favourable time for it may well be at the beginning of next year.
The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, reports that the present Japanese strength in Cambodia and Cochinchina is about 30,000, including one and possibly two tank regiments. There has been a considerable importation of anti-aircraft artillery, motor transport and transportation material, including small craft capable of use for water transport up to the new frontier at the northern end of Tonla Saidle Lake. A number of aerodromes in the North are known to be equipped with concrete or asphalted runways and can operate at any season. In the South there is an asphalted runway at Tan Son Nhut, and metal runways at Angkor, Phnom Penh and Tourane. Runways being constructed at other aerodromes in the South will cater for the operation of heavy bombers and work is proceeding rapidly.
840.51 Frozen Credits/4350The Assistant Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy
Washington, November 14, 1941.My Dear Mr. Iguchi:
This is in reply to your letter of November 10, 1941 with respect to licenses releasing within the amount agreed upon the official funds for salaries for the month of November of the official Japanese establishments in the United States. Licenses were issued today by the Department of the Treasury releasing the various accounts of the official establishments and personnel which were set forth in the note from the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, no. 280, dated September 24, 1941. The licenses which have been granted cover all payments which are to be made under the arrangement which has been agreed upon. When it is desired to transfer funds to replenish these various accounts, the appropriate procedure would be for the Yokohama Specie Bank to file an application describing the transfer which is to be made. When such applications are filed, the necessary licenses will be granted promptly.Sincerely yours,
DEAN ACHESON
Japanese Foreign Office (November 15, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#774
Re your #1087*
During the conversations with Hull, Wakasugi asked, with regard to the form in which the “B” suggestion should materialize, “or is it your intention to have it conducted by the consular representatives of Japan, the United States, and China?” As you are aware, the Imperial Government is opposed to its taking that course.
Please be aware of the fact that the “B” suggestion was taken up because we thought it might be a short cut to settlement. In other words’ we decided to take it up because we thought it would speed up the procedure. We do not wish to give it even a chance to further complicate and prolong matters.
Bearing this in mind, do everything in your power to not only prevent further complications but to simplify matters as much as possible.
24833
JD-1: 6530 (D) Navy Trans. 11-15-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 6521 (S.I.S. #24787).
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#775
Through my various messages on the subject, you are fully aware of the fact that these talks have gone beyond the preliminary stage and that they are now well within the realm of the “real thing”. It is true that at the time the Konoye statement was dispatched, the negotiations were more or less conducted as preliminary to a meeting of “the leaders”. However, for all practical purposes, the talks had gone beyond the point where they could be termed as being of a “preliminary” nature. By that time, we had centered all of our efforts toward bringing about a speedy termination of the talks. That has been made perfectly clear. I feel sure that the United States too, regardless of what they may have said, recognized this fact from a realistic point of view.
It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature.
Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736* is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.
24834
JD-1: 6531 (D) Navy Trans. 11-15-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 6254 (S.I.S. #24373)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#781
To Ambassador Kurusu.
I wish to express my sympathy on the presumption that you must be experiencing considerable fatigue as a consequence of your long trip by air. Not alone this Minister, but everyone in government circles, feels deep gratitude that you have agreed to tackle the exceedingly difficult problems which confront us. As I said, I realize that your task is a difficult one, but at the same time it is an important one; success or failure will have a great bearing on the rise or decline of our nation.
Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to him. After you have perfect understanding of each other, cooperate with him in an unsparing effort to guide the negotiations to any early settlement. That is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted.
Even after the presentation of the final proposal by us, the U.S. Government apparently continues to show laxness. There are even those who suspect that the United States is intentionally stalling for time. In view of the fact that the crisis is fast approaching, no subsidiary complications can be countenanced even when considering the time element alone. Such an eventuality would make impossible the surmounting of the crisis.
Please familiarize yourself with my various instructions to Ambassador Nomura on this subject, after which do everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation. I beg of you to make every effort to have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacific.
Because of your expressed desires prior to your departure from here, we have not as yet presented our “B” proposal to the United States. We are of the opinion, however, that we had better submit it to them at an early opportunity.
24873
JD-1: #6556 (D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#1095 (In 2 parts, complete)
On this, the 15th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull, (Ballantine was also present), for an interview which lasted about one hour and a half. I shall report in detail subsequently, but in the meantime, I am sending you a resume of the meeting as follows:
The United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the “non-discriminatory treatment in commerce” matter, which I am forwarding to you as separate wire “A”, numbered my message #1096*, separate wire “B”, numbered my message #1097**, contains the text of their proposal involving this matter. (The latter is a proposed joint statement on economic policy and is composed of (1) general policy; (2) Japanese-U. S. relations; and, (3) policies involving the Pacific area).
We stated that we would give these notes our careful study and after requesting our government’s advice, would make a reply. We went on to say that we insist that these talks have now progressed to the negotiations stage.
To this Hull replied that before any settlements can be reached, it is necessary that other countries involved, such as Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, be consulted. This procedure is desired by Japan too, he pointed out. There are reasons, he said, that make it inconvenient for the United States to state that negotiations are being conducted with Japan alone, before they have had a chance to participate therein. He went on to repeat that for those reasons, these talks shall continue to be of an exploratory nature. At the same time, the continuation of these conversations shall not be hampered, he promised.
We then requested that he reply with regard to other matters to which Hull said:
Japan on the one hand is attempting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States, while simultaneously, on the other hand, she is insisting that her military alliance with Germany be maintained. I, personally, can understand Japan’s explanations however, I feel that it would be exceedingly difficult to make the general U.S. public and even of the world, see through the seeming paradox.
For this reason, it is essential that we have the definite word of the new Japanese Cabinet on the peaceful policy. In other words, it is essential that this new Cabinet give definite recognition and approval of the statement submitted by the previous government concerning this matter. On 21 June, we made certain proposals which concerned political stabilization of the entire Pacific area. Even if Japan were to favor limiting this area to only the southwestern Pacific area, the United States would continue to desire that it be made applicable to the entire Pacific area.
Therefore, we shall submit our reply on the other two points only after we have received a reply to the proposal we are submitting to you today.
We therefore stated that our government’s attitude has already been expressed by the contents of our proposal through which it may be seen that there has been no changes therein. However, for the sake of reassurance, we would ascertain this point, we said.
Hull expressed several doubts concerning our relations to the Tripartite Pact. He pointed out that in spite of the Japanese-USSR neutrality pact, it was apparently essential that great armed forces of both countries had to constantly face each other across the Japanese-USSR border. The United States wants no peace of that nature. He went on to say that the United States desires that simultaneously with a peace agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall become a mere scrap of paper.
We, therefore, repeated that part of our proposal which involved that alliance and again pointed out that there need be no clash between U.S.-Japanese peace and the continued existence of that treaty. We went on to say that our government would no doubt be very disappointed at the results of today’s conversations. We then decided: to meet again after I had received my government’s further instructions.
Will you, therefore, please rush your instructions concerning the matters contained herein.
24930
JD-1: 6584 (D) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (2)
*JD-1: 6585 S.I.S. No. 24931.
**JD-1: 6586 S.I.S. No. 24932.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#1098 (In 2 parts, complete)
Let us suppose that the Japanese-U.S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down, and that, as a consequence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The following is my guess as to what would be the relationship between the United States and Japan under such circumstances.
Much, of course, would depend on what move we make and how we make it, but
(a) It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off immediately;
(b) Even if they are not, the same situation as now exists between Germany and the United States-that is, the closing of the consulates and recalling of the Ambassador-will probably be effected. (Through the application of the order freezing the assets, economic relations have already been broken off for all practical purposes). Under such circumstances, only a small staff will remain at the Embassy here. (Please see my separate wire #1099* for my suggestion as to the personnel of such a reduced staff).
I presume that the government has given careful consideration as to the disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here. I would appreciate being advised in confidence of your decision in these matters.
In the event of (b), I presume that the same procedure as was followed in the case of U.S.-Germany will be followed. That is, personnel of the consulates of the respective countries will no doubt be evacuated by mutual consent. We can see that it could be possible for the officials and business men who remained here at that time (they would total about 300 or 400), to be evacuated on another vessel. However, we fear that the number of persons desiring passage will undoubtedly skyrocket. The Consuls will, of course, urge our nationals to remain here even if the worst eventuality should materialize, but we feel that there will be many who, because of various circumstances, will find it impossible to do so.
It will be practically impossible to make a distinction between them and officials and business men. Will you, therefore, give your consideration to sending enough ships to evacuate these people.
In the event of (a) –
-
No doubt some agreement between the United States and Japan will be entered into to guarantee the safe passage of Embassy and Consulate staff members, (agreements will no doubt be entered into with regard to the course of the vessel, markers, and communication methods). (One plan may be to have these officials sent to some half-way point, for example Hawaii, some port in the Aleutian Islands, or, if unavoidable to French Tahiti, on ships belonging to the nation to which they are accredited, and at such prearranged place, have the respective ships exchange passengers). To the representative of what nation do we plan to entrust our national property and to protect the rights of our nationals remaining here? Is it correct to assume that negotiations with the country which has been selected will be completed in Tokyo with the diplomatic representative of that country and in that country by our ambassador or minister?
-
Japanese residents here who are of military age, will undoubtedly be held here. Therefore, a plan to exchange our nationals residing here for Americans residing in Japan is conceivable, but in view of the difference in numbers, it is indeed a very slim hope. Dependence on ships of neutral register, too, would be an exceedingly precarious undertaking should war actually be declared. We would appreciate being advised of the government’s attitude on these points.
25032
JD-1: 6631 (D) Navy Trans. 11-19-41 (2)*JD-1: 6654 (S.I.S. #25033)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#1106 (In 6 parts, complete.)
Chief of Office routing.
The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you in my message #1095*:
Hull said that the United States is making sincere efforts too, and through such efforts, he said, he is now able to present a proposal concerning the commerce problem. So saying, he related to me Note “A”, which was reported to you as my message #1096**.
Hull:
The United States has entered into trade agreements with 22 nations, all of which are based on the status of a “most-favored nation”. Through them trade barriers throughout the world are being removed. There actually are between 1000 and 1200 articles on which tariffs have been substantially reduced. I strongly advocated this policy at the Economic Conference which was held in London some time ago, but because opposition to it was voiced by some, it was not adopted at that time.
(He added that Germany was one of the countries which was opposed to it.)
In this way, the United States desires to apply the non-discriminatory policy over a wide scope. Japan wants that part of the proposal which advocates the application of these terms to the entire Pacific area to be revised so that it will be applicable to the entire world. The United States is unable to guarantee any conditions which are outside of the United States’ sphere of influence. Therefore, I hope that Japan will agree to delete her condition, in which she insists that she will agree to applying the non-discriminatory treatment to the Pacific area only if it is applied to the world.
So saying, he submitted Note “B” which contains the U. S. proposal and which was sent to you as my message #1097***. Wakasugi asked Hull if this was a counter proposal to that part of our proposal which we submitted the other day concerning the three major problems, pertaining to non-discrimination. Hull replied that in its application it covers a wider range, (meaning, apparently, that its contents covers a wider range). I, therefore, advised Hull that we would give it our study and that we would seek our government’s opinion thereon after which I would submit our reply.
I said:
Since official proposals have been submitted by me to the President and the Secretary of State, we feel that these talks should be looked upon as negotiations.
Hull:
Your government may consider those talks as being negotiations today. As I said at our previous meeting, however, the subjects being discussed must be taken up with Britain, Netherlands, and others. Moreover, the Foreign Minister himself told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that it was essential that those countries participate in the negotiations. For these reasons, we feel that it is necessary to hold these preliminary exploratory conversations between Japan and the United States first. It would be inappropriate if we were to consider these talks formal negotiations, because then it would seem as if we were trying to force whatever settlements we reached upon those other nations.
I feel that we should first find the basic principles on which a suitable agreement could be reached, after which, the United States would reveal its attitude to those other countries, and ask them to participate in the final settlement. Thus until we work things out to a point which would seem to be satisfactory to all parties concerned, I shall consider these talks to be exploratory in nature.
From a more practical viewpoint, too, if there were negotiations, the free exchange of opinions between the United States and Japan would be considerably hindered. In Tokyo the Foreign Minister requested to Ambassador Grew that . . . (several lines missing).
In the United States proposal of 21 June, the United States advocates that that part pertaining to the political stabilization be made applicable to the entire Pacific area. Japan wants to limit it to the southwestern Pacific area only. In view of the fact that my talks with Your Excellency concerns the establishment of peace in the entire Pacific area, I find it difficult to understand Japan’s desires to so limit the area. I would like to have this point explained.
He went on to repeat what he has said from time to time before, regarding Japan’s peace policies and her connections in the Tripartite Pact.
Hull, as he did on the previous occasion, requested that the present government of Japan give its definite approval of the spirit of peace contained in our statement of 28 August.
I therefore replied:
The spirit of that statement was contained in our latest proposal and therefore I am convinced that there has been no change in our government’s attitude. We are doing everything in our power to bring about a settlement so that peace may be guaranteed on the Pacific. It is true that the words “southwestern Pacific” appear in the main text of our proposal, but in the preface thereto we made it clear that our aims are to establish and maintain peace on the entire Pacific area.
Hull:
The preface is not a part of the main text and therefore its contents had no binding powers. The only parts which have any binding powers are the contents of the main text.
So saying, he again repeated his doubts as to Japan’s expressed peaceful intentions.
He went on to say that Japan is apparently wanting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States on the one hand while maintaining a military alliance with Germany on the other.
Hull:
I, myself, can understand Japan’s viewpoint and explanations on this matter. The general public, however, are aware only that Japan is allied to Germany and to it-the general public-this has a very militaristic connotation. Should the United States, disregarding what seems to be a paradox, enter into a peace agreement with Japan, the general public and the world in general would probably howl with laughter. We would be in a very difficult position to try to make any explanations.
If Japan succeeds in coming to an agreement with the United States, she would not find it necessary to bold on to the Tripartite Agreement, would it?
While on the one hand Japan is asking that Britain and the Netherlands, which are at war with Germany, to participate in a peaceful agreement which is to be established between Japan and the United States, while on the other she negotiates a military alliance with Germany which is the enemy of Britain and the Netherlands. That is incongruous.
I:
We have already explained our position in the Tripartite Pact in our proposal. As I said before, an alliance and a peace agreement need not necessarily be at odds with each other as may be seen by the example of the Japanese-British alliance. Fundamentally speaking, this alliance in question has peace as its main objective. Germany, too, understands that the alliance would not conflict with peace between Japan and the United States.
Hull:
If Japan insists on adhering to the alliance with Germany even after an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States, we could not explain the apparent paradox to other countries. The United States does not desire a situation such as exists between Japan and the USSR, which in spite of the fact that a Neutrality Pact exists, vast armed forces of each nation must constantly be facing each other across the national boundary. We desire that simultaneously with the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall disappear.
(He called it a “dead letter”).
Wakasugi:
In other words, do you mean that a U.S.-Japanese agreement is an impossibility as long as Japan does not withdraw from the Triple Alliance?
Hull:
A peace agreement and a military alliance must be at odds with each other. Therefore, if and when an understanding is reached between Japan and the United States, I desire that the alliance become a dead letter.
Wakasugi:
May we consider that as your reply to our proposal pertaining to the matter of right of self-defense which is a part of the other two subjects?
Hull:
Our reply to the other two problems will be issued after we receive: Definite assurance that your present government approves the peace policy expressed in a statement issued by the previous government; clarification of the meaning of changing “the entire Pacific area” in the U.S. proposal, to Japan’s proposal’s “southwestern Pacific area”; Japan’s reply to today’s U.S. proposal regarding a joint statement on the economic policy.
I said:
In view of the very critical situation, I am afraid that my government will be very disappointed over your replies.
We agreed to meet again after I had received further instructions from my home government.
Today’s talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion.
Since the above seems to have been fairly clearly established, will you please speedily express your definite approval of the government’s statement involved, so that we may make a reply to their proposal.
25085
JD-1: 6627 (D) Navy Trans. 11-21-41 (2)
*JD-1: 6584 (S.I.S. #24930).
**JD-1: 6585 (S.I.S. #24931 & 25006).
***JD-1: 6586 (S.I.S. #24932 & 25007).
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple-J 19)
Circular #2330
The following is the order and method of destroying the code machines in the event of an emergency.
Note: Three paragraphs giving detailed instructions for the destruction of code machines have not been printed.
Washington relay to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Berne relay to NSW and NLH (Rome and Ankara (?)). Bankok (?) relay to Hanoi.
25235
JD-1: 6752 (D) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J19)
#111
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your “ships in harbor report” irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.
JD-1: 6991 25644 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)
From: Tokyo
To: Manila
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#368
Strictly confidential.
Re your #746*.
Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, and also please make investigations again as to their number.
JD-1: 6753 25236 (H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AR)
*JD-1: 6545 (SIS #24850). Reports 32 B-19 bombers in the Philippines.
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#767
-
It has been ascertained that the ship of my #757*, paragraph 2, was a British transport, the AWATEA which entered port at the same time under convoy, (12000 or 13000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board). Both ships sailed again on the evening of the 14th, destination unknown.
-
On the afternoon of the 14th, 4 destroyers, 11 submarines, 1 minelayer, entered port.
-
Ships in port on the 15th:
A. Manila: MADDO Portland BUKKU BERU BERU** HON WOHOTOSU 8 destroyers 20 submarines 1 minelayer B. Cavite: TON PASU
JD-1:6754 25237 (H) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (AR)
*JD-1: 6503 (SIS #24780). Re movements of U.S. Naval and British Naval craft in Manila area
**BERU repeated.
From: Manila
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#767
We are retransmitting our machine telegram of the 14th with indicator 97720 because of a mistake on the plug board, as follows:
The following is from a report of a Japanese resident in Cebu.
-
At present there are about 300 American and 2,500 Filipino soldiers stationed there. (There are four barracks each with a capacity of about 500 or 600 soldiers.
-
The airport has an area of about 196 acres but is being enlarged (by use of convict labor). About 12 planes (of medium size) used by the Philippine Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12 or 13 American Army planes, (monoplanes – whether they were scout planes or pursuit planes was not clear), are now stationed there. In addition to these there is one large bomber in the hangar (double type, capacity 40 planes).
-
The headquarters of the former patrol force are being used as the commisariate storehouse and all sorts of provisions are being stored there.
-
On the 22nd of September, about 20 American warships anchored on the northwest coast of the Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle of October two destroyers and one cruiser entered Cebu harbor and early this month, one oil supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a camouflaged cruiser of the 10,000 ton class, entered port and anchored for two or three days. It has been recognized that occasionally two or three American ships anchor around the south of Mactan, Bacol, and Panglao.
5 There is an open drydock at MAKUGAA (operated by Chinese) capable of handling ships up to 10,000 tons.
JD-1: 6587 24983 (H) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT)
U.S. Department of State (November 15, 1941)
611.51G31/16: TelegramThe Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France
Washington, November 15, 1941 — noon.
847.With reference to the provisions of our Trade Agreement with France applicable to Indochina, you should address a note of protest to the appropriate French authorities in regard to the preferential treatment accorded to Japanese products enumerated in list A, annexed to the Indochinese-Japanese customs agreement of May 6, and make formal reservation of American rights. A similar instruction has been sent to Saigon.
HULL
811.20 Defense (M)/3764: TelegramThe Consul at Shanghai to the Secretary of State
Shanghai, November 15, 1941 — 9 a.m. [Received 1:18 p.m.]
1688.Estimates of quantities of waste silk in Shanghai range up to 10,000 piculs said to be mostly in Japanese hands with larger quantities up country. Japan military still control exports of all grades of raw silk including waste silk and there is apparently no change in situation whereby permits for export can be secured only if exporter can arrange imports of petroleum or other products desired by Japanese authorities as reported in this Consulate General’s message 1249, September 11, 4 p.m. Thus, a virtual embargo is in force on silk and waste silk shipments to United States and a large British exporter states that its silk shipments to the United Kingdom have been dead for the past 2 months for same reasons. Japan holders of waste silk apparently do not wish to ship to Japan, where there is a demand, as price to be realized is not sufficiently attractive. Hence they prefer to hold stocks here hoping some basis for resumption of usual export trade may be found.
This Consulate General will not encourage exporters to make efforts to develop import link deals with Japanese for waste silk exports unless Department so instructs.
STANTON
740.0011 P.W./621: TelegramThe Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, November 15, 1941 — 2 p.m. [Received 5:40 p.m.]
520.
As signs multiply of Japanese preparations for offensive action in some direction from Indochina and of “allied” measures in opposition, the Thai Government feels increasing anxiety over the part it must play in the struggle. The Government continues to exhort the people to avoid offenses to any nation. The Prime Minister has published a denial that Thailand is pro-British and ungrateful to Japan as asserted in a Japanese news article. The Thai recommendations have refrained from obvious military protective steps lest the Japanese seize on them as pretexts for action. Underlying these feeble efforts to stay out of the impending struggle there is a general conviction that a Japanese attack is coming and that after a futile resistance Thailand must capitulate unless effective [American] and British aid is forthcoming. The Japanese are reported as warning the Thais that this aid will be only “lip service.”
In a very confidential interview on November 13, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me the Government had finally determined to establish a “Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” as was done during the hostilities with Indochina. He said the Government knew the Japanese would demand an explanation and had decided to give no explanation but the general right of self-defense. He [again?] reaffirmed Thai determination to resist invasion and he again pleaded for the gasoline, lubricating oil and airplanes already asked. He stated, however, that Thailand offers in the main a flat terrain, that in about 1 month the ground will be dry and firm enough to bear 10 ton tanks and that successful defense will be extremely difficult and in fact impossible unless Britain and America oppose Japan with their military forces. He said that the Government would feel a little encouragement in facing the struggle if given only a “ray of hope” of British and American armed support.
The Kurusu mission seems to me the final appeal to peaceful measures before Japan pleads vital necessity and further extends her war of conquest. The British Minister has informed me that he has received telegrams indicating that the American Government has promised the Thai Minister that if Japan invades this country and Thailand resists them American assistance will be given similar to that afforded to China. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has not mentioned to me this reported promise. It is a question how long the Thai Government would survive a determined Japanese attack unless they [are strengthened?] by such assistance. There is reliable information that present plans are to remove the capital in an emergency to Chiang Mai, roughly 450 miles from Bangkok, in the comparatively mountainous northwest, 60 [miles?] from the Burma border. The British Minister has casually suggested to me the possibility that the Government might, if it desired, remove to the extreme south and join its forces with the British. Japanese press items reprinted here have recently alleged that the United States had sold this country two naval vessels and two lots of planes, the latter being Martin bombers in the Netherlands East Indies. A Thai communiqué concerning the latest report states that, if the United States were to supply arms, friendly relations with that country would be correspondingly enhanced. I am not aware how much truth underlies these various reports but I venture to observe that munitions supplied by Great Britain and the United States to Thailand in the month that still intervenes before the earliest probable moment of Japanese invasion would be of greater encouragement and assistance toward resistance than if supplied after the country had been demoralized by bombing and military penetration.
In estimating possibilities particular account must be taken of the Prime Minister. It is alleged that the Japanese have access to him through private unofficial sources. It is conceivable that the Japanese might promise Thailand restitution of large portions of Indochina which the Thais regard as “lost territory.” The Thais are passionately devoted to obtaining redress of these “ancient wrongs” and the opportunity might blind them to the danger of becoming a puppet nation of Japan. I recommend that to offset the threats and persuasion applied by Japan and [to?] Thailand and to reinforce their will to resist we immediately supply the Thais with limited planes and fuel and give them an assurance of some sort of military aid in parallel action with Great Britain.
In conclusion I suggest that the American and British effort to prevent Japanese domination of the western Pacific would be strengthened politically by announcing a determination to protect the integrity of Thailand. Otherwise in all the south of China the struggle will relate only to territorial possessions.
PECK