811.7194/12Memorandum of Conversations, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 3, 1941.Mr. Iguchi telephoned this morning and stated that his Embassy had received a cable from the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu to the effect that United States postal authorities there had received orders not to permit mails scheduled for the Taiyo Maru to be sent on that vessel which was due to depart for Japan November 4. Mr. Iguchi inquired as to the purpose of such orders and requested appropriate information in the premises. Mr. Atcheson stated that he would look into the matter and let Mr. Iguchi know. Mr. Iguchi stated that he would be absent from the Embassy for a period and upon his return he would telephone to Mr. Atcheson again.
Mr. Atcheson subsequently learned from Mr. Keating of IN that the mails which were being withheld from the Taiyo Maru were first-class mails only; that this action was taken in accordance with the procedure worked out whereunder first-class mails for the Far East would pass through British territory to be censored; and that second-and third-class mails would go forward on the Taiyo Maru.
Mr. Iguchi later telephoned to Mr. Atcheson again. Mr. Atcheson stated that he had made inquiries in regard to this matter; that as Mr. Iguchi knew, wartime conditions and shortage of ships and changes in shipping schedules had recently caused delays in the forwarding of mails and alterations in the procedures followed in the forwarding of mails; that he understood that the Post Office Department was undertaking the formulation of new procedures for the forwarding of mails and it appeared that while second-and third-class mails would be sent on the Taiyo Maru, the first-class were of a category falling within the new general procedure. Mr. Iguchi said that he had assumed that something of the sort was the case and he inquired whether it would be all right for his Embassy to cable the Consulate General at Honolulu to have the Taiyo Maru sail therefrom on schedule without the first-class mails in question. Mr. Atcheson stated that this would seem to be appropriate as the postal authorities would not, of course, wish to delay the vessel’s departure. Mr. Iguchi said that he would send a message to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu and would have the vessel sail on time.
U.S. Department of State (November 4, 1941)
840.51 Frozen Credits/4168: TelegramThe Counselor of Embassy in China to the Secretary of State
Peiping, October 31, 1941 — 2 p.m. [Received November 4 — 8:42 p.m.]
335.Reciprocal arrangement for unfreezing blocked official accounts. With the exception of the Consulate General at Mukden, Embassy has received no reply to its circular telegram of October 4 (repeated to Department) indicating that any American official establishment or employee in Japanese-occupied areas has a bank account in China which is subject to retaliatory freezing measures. Particulars required from Mukden were furnished the Embassy in Tokyo [on] October 6.
So far as the Embassy is aware, none of the retaliatory freezing measures in force in China has been abolished or modified in favor of American official establishments and personnel to such an extent that if such establishments and personnel had accounts in a bank in China those accounts would be as free from restrictions on withdrawals and investments as are the accounts in the United States of Japanese official establishments and personnel. In short, the arrangement for reciprocal treatment is not in effect in China.
Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking and Tokyo.
BUTRICK
711.94/11–441Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 4, 1941.Mr. Wakasugi presented a keen analysis of the situation on which he reported to his government.
I feel moved to call attention especially to his expression of the opinion that the United States is willing to make a settlement only if the conditions are acceptable to it; to his expression of doubt whether the United States will make any concessions from the position which it took in the documents of June 21 and October 2; his expression of opinion that the United States is not so anxious to enter into an agreement as to be willing to sacrifice any of her “terms;” his belief that Japan should not expect any further counter proposals from us; his opinion that if the Japanese insist upon their freedom of action they must have their minds made up that the negotiations will be terminated and relations be severed; and his recommendation that the new Cabinet lay Japan’s cards on the table.
From the telegrams from Tokyo to Washington, I deduce that the Japanese Foreign Minister is deliberately somewhat overemphasizing the gravity of the situation in Japan for psychological effect upon us and the British.
711.94/2625Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan
Tokyo, November 4, 1941.Before leaving for Hong Kong via Canton by Japanese plane early tomorrow morning, Mr. Kurusu called to see me this evening. He said that he has been studying the official papers in connection with his mission to the United States ever since he had been told, only yesterday, of the Foreign Minister’s desire that he proceed to Washington. Mr. Kurusu informed me that he is going simply to help the Japanese Ambassador in the present difficult situation by bringing a fresh point of view and in order that no possible stone be left unturned in the endeavor to bring to a successful conclusion the conversations being conducted between the Japanese and American Governments.
Mr. Kurusu said that he was taking with him as his secretary Mr. Shiroji Yūki who, as Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, has been most helpful to the Embassy and is familiar with the development of the conversations in Washington.
JOSEPH C. GREW
711.94/25401/35Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 4, 1941.Shortly before midnight of November 3, Mr. Dooman, Counselor of our Embassy at Tokyo, telephoned me. He referred to previous telegrams relating to the desire of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to send a person to the United States to assist Admiral Nomura in the discussions. He said that the Japanese Government wished to send Mr. Kurusu.
Note:
Saburō Kurusu, formerly Japanese Ambassador to Belgium and later to Germany, returned to Japan some months ago via the United States.Mr. Dooman said that the Japanese Government wished to have Kurusu depart for the United States as soon as possible; that the Japanese Government inquired whether it would be feasible for arrangements to be made whereby Mr. Kurusu could get passage on the clipper due to leave Hong Kong the morning of November 5, which would entail delaying the departure of the clipper from Hong Kong for about two days, or, alternatively, that Kurusu proceed to Saipan, from Saipan to Guam by a Japanese vessel, probably a destroyer, and board the trans-Pacific clipper at Guam. Mr. Dooman said that they would like to get a reply back within a few hours. I commented that it was midnight here, that it might be very difficult to get in touch with the proper people, and that I did not know whether it would be practicable to do anything on such short notice.
Mr. Dooman then said that Mr. Grew had received from the Japanese Foreign Minister a message to the following effect: Delay in bringing the conversations to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion will only aggravate the situation which is already tense. Please accept this as though it were a message communicated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Hull in person.
Mr. Dooman said that it was urgently hoped that we would give the question of the trip prompt attention (I am not sure whether this was the American Embassy’s hope or the hope of the Japanese Foreign Minister).
I told Mr. Dooman that we would see what could be done in the matter.
[Here follow details concerning arrangements for Mr. Kurusu’s air travel.]
MAXWELL M. HAMILTON
894.00/1145The Netherland Legation to the Department of State
Washington, November 4, 1941.The following facts about Japan…
- Tojo is Minister of War as well as of the Interior under which resorts [sic] national defense;
- One of his first acts was a clean-up of the Police in Tokyo;
- The choice of the other members of the cabinet who are not politically prominent is to be considered as a superfluous administrative complement of the cabinet;
…seem to prove the truth of the following theory: that differences of opinion about foreign policy have not been the real reason for the resigning of the Konoe cabinet. This resignation, however, has been the immediate consequence of the attack on Minister Hiranuma. The attack on Hiranuma can be considered as part of a large plot to which belonged many of the so-called younger officers and leading men of the Police of Tokyo. The assailant was a member of a secret society, called “The Black Dragon.” Their aim was a government which would immediately start military action against Russia and the United States. The Prime Minister and his ministers realized that they were not the people to guarantee control of the younger officers and that only a military man of high authority could control the increasing revolutionary spirit. The new cabinet, nevertheless, is more or less a compromise. The fascist element has almost found the realization of its desire, i.e. military dictatorship. One may have doubts as to whether they will accept Tojo as a stepping-stone towards the dictatorship they want. Any sign of rapprochement on the part of the democracies will give strength to the extremists because it will be explained as weakness on their part and as a proof that the extremists are right and that Japan can strike without danger. Therefore, the best guarantee against Japan’s entry into the war remains the undiminished maintenance of economic measures.
U.S. Department of State (November 5, 1941)
793.94/16970: TelegramThe Counselor of Embassy in China to the Secretary of State
Beiping, October 31, 1941 — 2 p.m. [Received November 5 — 3:17 a.m.]
334.The following is a summary of a memorandum of remarks to Leighton Stuart by one of his Chinese friends whose opinions on Japanese politics he has learned to respect. Stuart says that this Chinese is in contact with many Japanese leaders and is popularly regarded as a traitor but Stuart feels that he is honestly keeping [seeking] the welfare of both Chinese and Japanese.
All Japan wishes to end the China affair and from the Japanese point of view the Tojo Cabinet, like the Konoe Cabinet, is organized for peace rather than war. While the Konoe Cabinet was primarily navy, the Tojo Cabinet is primarily army; thus the army which started the China conflict is given a chance to end it. Japan is opportunist and will move either north or south depending on European developments. Only a conviction of real danger of a clash with the United States will stop her. The Tojo Cabinet will continue diplomatic efforts in various directions until next crisis leads to its downfall and succeeding Cabinet will be definitely either more moderate or so remilitaristical [as] seems expedient. Japan’s policy has always been to break up China into separate units as most suitable to Japan’s desired hegemony. Japan can carry on as at present for another year. As regards the China affair, Japan’s main interest is to save her honor (face) and economic gains in North China while a great problem is how to liquidate Wang Jingwei. A continuance of the present American policy of increasing pressure with sufficient free play to encourage the Liberals while avoiding undue provocation of extremists will ultimately bring Japan to a settlement without war with the United States.
It seems to me that Japan is so deeply entrenched in North China that little faith could be placed in any commitments she might make to give up her economic control of this area, particularly if Japanese troops were permitted to remain in China either temporarily or permanently.
Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking.
BUTRICK
711.94/2413: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 5, 1941 — 11 p.m. [Received November 5 — 8:58 a.m.]
1752.For the Secretary and Under Secretary.
As the news of Kurusu’s departure for the United States has already leaked from the Foreign Office, the Foreign Office will tonight announce to the press that he is going to Washington to cooperate with Ambassador Nomura in connection with the current conversation.
GREW
711.94/2421a: TelegramThe Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan
Washington, November 5, 1941 — 7 p.m.
716.The American press has widely circulated a report that the “Foreign Office-controlled Japan Times and Advertiser” published on November 5 a sweeping seven-point program of demands which Japan makes of this country for resolving the tense situation in the Pacific. You are authorized in your discretion and if opportune in your contacts with officials of the Foreign Office to offer informal comment along lines as follows:
The Japan Times and Advertiser is believed by the interested American public to be the official English language mouthpiece of the Japanese Foreign Office and any comment appearing in that journal is interpreted by many Americans as representing the views of the Japanese Government. The uncompromising and truculent tone of articles of the sort appearing on November 5 lends color to the suspicions of many Americans in regard to Japanese official policies and objectives and considerably strengthens the position of critics of Japan. Accordingly, such articles are not conducive to the creation of conditions of public opinion either in Japan or the United States favorable to an adjustment of relations or solution of common problems between Japan and the United States.
You should, of course, avoid any appearance of attempting to influence articles published by Japanese newspapers and merely indicate to the Foreign Office in a spirit of helpfulness the natural reaction in this country to newspaper articles of that sort.
HULL
894.00/1145Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations
Washington, November 5, 1941.Baron van Boetzelaer handed me this paper this morning, saying that he had already handed a copy of it to Mr. Dean Acheson. Van Boetzelaer explained, with the help of some questions on my part (!), that it represented in effect an unofficially expressed opinion entertained by and informally communicated from the highest governmental circles in the Netherlands East Indies.
Comment: In my opinion, the statement of facts is approximately accurate and the views expressed in the concluding sentences are sound.
STANLEY K. HORNBECK
711.94/2406Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations
Washington, November 5, 1941.The reasoning in this telegram, as in many which have preceded it, runs to the general effect that, although Japan misbehaves, we must not apply strong pressures to Japan — because that would probably cause Japan to do things which would bring on war, in which case the fault would be ours; rather, we must conciliate Japan, by making concessions; but, in doing this, we must not recede one inch from our fundamental principles. Mr. Grew says:
It is equally far from my intention for a single moment to advocate so-called “appeasement” on the part of the United States or that our Government should in the slightest degree recede from the fundamental principles which it has laid down as a basis for the adjustment and conduct of international relations including our relations with Japan. Methods may be flexible but with principles there should be no compliance [compromise].
Query (again): Might it not be appropriate for us to ask the Tokyo Embassy to give us its concept of what might be the provisions of a “settlement” between the United States and Japan — in harmony with and applying the above.
STANLEY K. HORNBECK
Japanese Navy Department (November 5, 1941)
From: Japanese Naval General Staff
To: ALCON
Date: 5 Nov. 1941
Navy Order No. 1
By Imperial Order, the Chief of the Naval General Staff orders Yamamoto Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets as follows:
-
Expecting to go to war with the United States, Britain and the Netherlands early in December for self-preservation and self-defense, the Empire has decided to complete war preparation.
-
The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary operational preparations.
-
Its details will be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
U.S. Department of State (November 6, 1941)
892.6176/23: TelegramThe Secretary of State to the Minister in Thailand
Washington, November 6, 1941 — 1 p.m.
140.The Department confirms that the arrangements between Rubber Reserve Company and the British Government provide that payments by the East Asiatic Company shall be made in sterling, but that half of the rubber so purchased will be resold by the British Government to Rubber Reserve for dollars, and that the dollars so acquired by the British Government will be resold to the Thai Government for sterling at the official rate of exchange. The Department and the British Embassy here feel that the procedure by which the dollars are to be made available to the Thai Government should be settled by you in consultation with the Thai Government and the British Minister. Rubber Reserve is willing to pay the dollars either to the British Government, or upon order of the British Government, directly to the Thai Government. The Department does not desire the creation of a special account if by that term it is intended that withdrawal from the account will be in any way restricted. The Department does approve, however, of an allocation of the dollars between the Thai Government and the local banks such as that suggested in your 483. Rubber Reserve Company will make such dollars available as soon as the rubber has been shipped from Thailand, and as soon as it is in receipt of wired advice from you stating that you have received appropriate bill of lading endorsed on board ocean carrying vessel consigned to Rubber Reserve Company, USA, port; it being understood that title to the rubber so purchased by Rubber Reserve Company shall not pass, nor shall such rubber be at risk of Rubber Reserve, until issuance of said bill of lading endorsed on board ocean carrying vessel. You are requested to forward said bill of lading to Department by first air mail. Please consult your British colleague as to their details of payment.
Chargeable to Rubber Reserve in accordance with Section V–45, Foreign Service Regulations.
HULL
740.0011 P.W./604: TelegramThe Consul at Saigon (Browne) to the Secretary of State
Saigon, November 3, 1941 — 3 p.m. [Received November 6 — 9:25 p.m.]
123.While increasing secrecy surrounds Japanese troop movements, the consensus of opinion among qualified observers is that not more than 32,000 are now stationed in southern Indochina, distributed roughly as follows: Cambodia 10,000, Saigon 8,000, Cochinchina apart from Saigon 12,000, coastal areas of Nha Trang and Cam Ranh 2,000. The same observers place the number of Japanese troops in Tonkin at 18,000, including most recent arrivals, making a total of 50,000 for Indochina. It is believed that this figure should be considered a maximum.
With regard to aircraft, little accurate information can be obtained but reliable sources estimate a maximum of 150 of which the large majority consists of bombers. They are now concentrated mainly at Saigon.
Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department, Chungking, Beiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo. Repeated to Bangkok.
BROWNE
892.24/83: TelegramThe Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, November 6, 1941 — 5 p.m. [Received 10:04 p.m.]
504.
Both the British Minister and I in suggesting that 24 fighter planes be transferred to Thailand from Singapore, had in mind their replacement from the United States. I have asked the Naval Attaché now in Singapore to report whether surplus planes exist there.
I venture to suggest below factors relevant to a consideration of American policy with respect to Thailand. Whatever may have been the Thai feeling toward Japan during the Indochina incident, the Government and people now undoubtedly dread and desire to escape Japanese domination in any form. Following the Japanese move into Southern Indochina in July, a policy of resistance was adopted and the Government was [strengthened?] in this by press reports of August 6 and 7, quoting the Secretary of State as asserting that the United States would regard American security and possessions in the Pacific as threatened by Japanese demands for military advantages in Thailand and quoting the British Foreign Secretary as stating that threats to the independence of this country would endanger the security of Singapore. (See Legation’s telegram No. 403, August 8, 3 p.m.). This opposition is being maintained in spite of the admitted fact that without extraneous aid forcible resistance to the expected Japanese invasion could result only in making the country a battlefield in the destruction of cities and military centers by bombing and military occupation of a large area. Opposition has consisted in rejecting Japanese importunities that the country join the “co-prosperity sphere”, recognize the Nanking régime, and grant commercial credits and a rubber export quota. It is fair to say that this stubborn opposition to Japanese schemes has been of considerable advantage to the United States and Great Britain because if Japan had acquired a dominant position in this country it would have had a favorable position from which to negotiate for seaports and airfields and to obstruct American and British access to the tin and rubber resources here. If Thailand had in any important particular during recent months sided with Japan as the self styled champion of Asia against American and British imperialism the benefit of Japan’s program would have been immense. As things stand Great Britain has been left undisturbed in control of three fourths of the tin output and our joint rubber purchases begun October 18 are proceeding at the rate of over 3,000 tons monthly. Our extensive missionary enterprises are continuing without the molestation they have encountered in Japanese controlled areas. The military implications of a possible Japanese domination of this country whether acquired by intimidation or invasion seem to concern us in a general way because of the possible advantage to Japanese strategy and in particular as threatening American aid to Thailand through Burma but on the whole military considerations concern Great Britain more than the United States. The United States during the progress of hostilities is under no specific obligation to assist Thailand to maintain its independence whatever may be our future obligations under general pronouncements once victory over aggression is achieved.
I have been informed of the purport of reply from the British Government to the inquiry of the Thai Prime Minister concerning British intended action in the event of a Japanese invasion. Apparently this draft can be reduced to an undertaking to give Thailand aviation gasoline and lubricating oil for military purposes at once, the 36 pieces of artillery over a period of about 9 months and a promise to occupy Southern Thailand with armed forces when the invasion takes place in the north. Disregarding other considerations this seems a small return to make for the practical advantages we are receiving and for the risk Thailand is incurring through repudiation of Japanese overtures. If it could be done it would certainly be preferable to preserve this country as a political and military entity rather than to envisage partition of the country as a temporary expedient. Moreover, it happens that the British owned tin mines and all the rubber plantations are in the south and if they were saved and the bulk of the country abandoned to Japan a hostile propaganda would allege this to be proof of our merely selfish aims in the Orient.
Indochina and Thailand will be dry and suitable for military activities from January to April inclusive. Presumably bombing and parachute attacks could take place at any time. In the meantime those leaders who support a policy of independence in this country must fight the counsels of despondency and of expediency. In China Japan has overwhelmed areas and armies many times greater than those of Thailand. No amount of supplies given [the] country or courage on its own part could guarantee successful resistance to a determined Japanese assault. But the public and private utterances of officials here incline me strongly to believe that if we assist the Government to acquire the aviation gasoline, lubricating oil, and fighter planes for which it is pressing there will be no surrender until forcible resistance has been tried and has failed. This will give us valuable respite to prepare for further developments. If the Japanese were to be convinced not only that invasion would be opposed by Thailand with force but would meet with serious retaliation from the United States and Great Britain there is strong probability that the studied invasion would be abandoned altogether. I venture the further suggestion that if our attempt to prevent Japan’s southward expansion were inspired by the aim of preserving the independence of Thailand as well as saving our own possessions the cause of democracy would derive greater advantage from the effort than otherwise since this dual purpose would convince the people of Asiatic countries that we are champions of their liberty.
PECK
892.24/91The Department of State to the British Embassy
Washington, November 6, 1941.
Aide-MémoireReference is made to two memoranda, dated October 25, 1941, left with the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, on October 27, by the British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, in regard to the situation of Thailand and to the question of making available war materials to the Government of Thailand.
For some weeks it has been the policy of the Government of the United States to give sympathetic consideration to priority and export applications filed on behalf of the Thai Government and, whenever practicable in the face of the very great and urgent demands from other areas upon this country’s production, take favorable action upon such applications.
On August 18, the Secretary of State, in reply to the Thai Minister’s oral inquiry as to the attitude of this Government toward Thailand in case Thailand should be attacked and endeavor in good faith to defend itself, commented that the United States has been aiding China in many ways against the aggression of Japan and that in the contingency mentioned this Government would place Thailand in the same category as China.
With regard to the proposal of the British Government to offer to release to the Thai Government certain howitzers and field guns with accompanying ammunition conditional on the acceptance by the Thai Government of a number of military instructors, question is raised whether a stipulation that the Thai Government accept military instructors might not be interpreted by the Japanese Government as contrary to the political accord between the Japanese Government and the Thai Government arrived at in connection with the Japanese Government’s mediation of the Thai-French Indochinese border controversy, and thus serve as a pretext to the Japanese Government for the exertion of additional pressure upon Thailand.
With regard to the question of aircraft, information has been received that the American Naval and Military Attachés at Bangkok are under the impression that there may be certain airplanes at Singapore in excess of the number which can, with the trained pilots available there, be used to advantage. The suggestion is offered that the British may wish to consider the release to Thailand of a number of these planes. Should that be not practicable, there is offered the further suggestion that, if the British Government, after weighing its own needs and the needs of Thailand and taking into account all political and military factors, should decide to make available to Thailand from planes being supplied to it from this country a certain number of planes, this Government would be agreeable to such an arrangement.
With regard to the question of aviation gasoline and lubricating oil for the Thai Air Force, this matter is being looked into and we shall expect to make reply on this point in the near future.
U.S. Department of State (November 7, 1941)
740.0011 European War 1939/16438: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 6, 1941 — 8 p.m. [Received November 7 — 12:45 a.m.]
1759.The Department will no doubt appreciate the difficulty of our assessing the accuracy of reports from sources with which we are not in contact. The question of the weight which might be attached to such reports depends in considerable measure on the accuracy of previous reports from the same sources, on the degree to which such sources might or might not be interested in the propagating of alarmist reports of movements on the part of Japanese forces, and on other factors. We at this Embassy are constantly on the alert for indications of future Japanese military operations in new theatres, such forecasts as we have made have been substantially accurate, and we will continue to communicate immediately to the Department any developments or credible reports presaging Japanese military operations in new theatres.
With regard to the “second and third” official view cited in the Department’s telegram under reference, that Japanese offensive in eastern Siberia would occur by November 4, obviously requires no comment. We have under study the question of Japanese relations with Soviet Russia and we expect to despatch a telegram on this subject in the near future.
With regard to the first and second “official view” we have ourselves reported to the Department that the Japanese are pressing the French to provide accommodations for an increase to about 75,000 men of the Japanese forces in Tonkin. A high Japanese official, apparently by inadvertence, disclosed to me on October 10 that the mission of this large force would be to invade Yunnan from Indochina, to interrupt the sending of supplies to China from Burma. This was probably the plan under consideration at that time, but we must not exclude the possibility that the apparent inadvertence may have been carefully planned as a feint to distract attention from plans for an attack elsewhere. The French Military Attaché in Tokyo ridicules the possibility of a successful attack on Yunnan from Indochina, the character of the terrain precluding any large scale operations, and he affirms that the reinforcements are intended for an attack on Thailand. Our Naval Attaché was recently told by an informant whom he considers trustworthy that the Japanese are prepared to attack Thailand. The Department will recall (Department’s 685, October 22, noon) that it received a substantially similar report which originated from a source thought to be well-informed.
In the absence of tangible evidence of preparations for military operations, such as concentrations of troops and supplies, movements of transports, and so on, the only way in which we can assess the accuracy of reports such as those above cited is to determine whether or not predicted Japanese attacks as of specified future dates in new areas fit in with Japanese political objectives as modified from time to time by changing conditions.
The efforts of Japan to reach an understanding with the United States are clear evidence that the progressive deterioration of her economic and industrial strength is becoming the controlling factor. The recent economic measures taken against Japan by the United States and other countries have made Japan exclusively dependent on her reserves for most of the primary materials necessary for the conduct of war. She has lost the greater part of her foreign trade, her industries are running down, and her financial resources are approaching depletion. If her conflict with China is long continued, her reserves will have become diminished if not exhausted.
Japan today is on the one hand seeking to extricate herself by peaceful means from the position in which she finds herself, and on the other hand preparing, in the event of failure to emerge peacefully from that position, to seize that area which will provide the raw materials which she will most need, notably oil, tin and rubber. The area within which there exist in substantial quantities many of the most important of the primary materials is the Southwest Pacific. Whether or not Japan when confronted with the need for making a decision, will attack in that area is a matter of opinion.
We therefore conclude that undue importance should not be attached to dates specified for future Japanese military operations, but that a more reliable indication of the probabilities of Japanese military movements is offered by the progress or failure of the exploratory conversations with the American Government and of other developments in the political field.
The Military Attaché and, in the absence of the Naval Attaché, the Assistant Naval Attaché concur in the above.
The Department may wish to review our 1015, July 17, 11 a.m. Important developments have since occurred but may, for the considerations put forward in that telegram, well be found relevant in the present circumstances.
GREW
740.0011 P.W./605: TelegramThe Consul at Hanoi to the Secretary of State
Hanoi, November 3, 1941 — 5 p.m. [Received November 7 — 3:40 a.m.]
171.As of today and based on information from military authorities, it is estimated that there are approximately 17,000 Japanese troops and 35 airplanes in Tonkin. So far as can be ascertained there are no Japanese troops garrisoned in Laos, but a number of Japanese reconnaissance parties have recently traveled widely in that region and there are there at the present time a number of Japanese civilians who probably belong to the military. The same sources estimate the Japanese troops in the south at about 26,500 and the airplanes at 75 (30 at Saigon) — making a total of 43,500 troops and 110 airplanes in Indochina. During the last week only a few hundred Japanese troops were landed at Haiphong, but according to my informants there are indications that the Japanese will again begin to land important numbers at that port. It is noted that a considerable number of horses and […] trucks have been landed at Haiphong. The small number of airplanes is of little importance as planes can fly from Hainan in a few hours.
Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department; Chungking, Beiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai. Repeated to Bangkok.
REED
711.94/2422: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 7, 1941 — 7 p.m. [Received November 7 — 6:54 p.m.]
1765.Meeting the Foreign Minister this afternoon informally at the Soviet Embassy’s reception, I took occasion to offer the informal comment authorized. I furthermore said that the truculent and aggressive substance and tone of the Japanese press toward the United States at present was, in my personal opinion, doing immense harm to American-Japanese relations. Mr. Toshi Go, editor of the Japan Times and Advertiser, later told me that the Foreign Minister had repeated to him what I had said. In the last few days I have said the same thing to several prominent Japanese. Matsumoto, head of Dōmei, told me tonight, after a similar talk with him, that we may expect an immediate change in the tone of the Japanese press.
GREW
711.94/2423: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 7, 1941 — 10 p.m. [Received November 7 — 8:14 p.m.]
1768.For the Secretary and Under Secretary.
Mr. Toshi Go, editor of the Japan Times and Advertiser, today told me that he himself had written the editorial in the issue of November 5 on his own responsibility with a view to presenting Japan’s maximum demands which he assumed would be far beyond the more moderate proposals to be presented to the United States by the Japanese Government. He, however, told a Japanese informant that he had written the editorial to register disapproval of the secrecy which had surrounded the exploratory conversations in Washington. I told Toshi Go of the great harm to American-Japanese relations which, in my opinion, he had done, and that it seemed to me to be utterly absurd and inconsistent to create such a hostile atmosphere especially at the moment of sending a special emissary to Washington. Toshi Go replied that when he wrote and published the editorial under reference he was not aware of the sending of Kurusu to Washington.
Talking informally yesterday with Mr. Bellaire, Tokyo correspondent of the United Press, Mr. Takata, head of Nichi Nichi, replied as follows to Bellaire’s inquiry whether the present state of tension in American-Japanese relations might lead to the outbreak of hostilities: Japan has no intention of going to war, being unable in the present situation even adequately to supply its troops.
Japan will continue to negotiate with the United States and the only development which might prevent a settlement by a negotiated agreement would be some major German victory which Japan does not now anticipate will occur. With regard to the virulent press campaign against the United States and against the alleged ABCD economic encirclement of Japan, Takata said that the Japanese Government had turned the campaign on and that it would be up to the Government to turn it off.
GREW
711.94/2625Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan
Tokyo, November 7, 1941.I received a visit today from a leading Japanese who maintains close contacts with the present government and who said he was calling at the request of Mr. Togo, the Foreign Minister. My informant told me that inasmuch as the Foreign Minister felt he could not express himself to me with the freedom which he desired, he was taking this means of sending me indirectly a suggestion along the following lines: The Tojo government has decided the limits to which it will be possible to go in an endeavor to meet the desires of the United States, but nevertheless should these concessions be regarded as inadequate by the Government of the United States it is of the highest importance that the Washington conversations be continued and not permitted to break down.
My informant then went on to express what he declared were his own personal opinions but which may or may not reflect the opinions of the Foreign Minister. He stated that if the present situation which was having a calamitous effect upon Japan were continued, the Japanese Government in the course of time would be compelled to agree to accept the views of the United States if only in order to prevent the breakdown of the conversations in Washington. I told my informant, and requested him to pass it on to Mr. Togo, that the present bellicose and violent tone of the Japanese press in regard to the United States, such as in particular the editorial published in the Japan Times and Advertiser on November 5 and the article in the evening Nichi Nichi yesterday which charged that the United States was talking like a harlot, and others, were rendering more difficult our efforts to adjust relations between our two countries in view of public opinion in the United States which naturally regards these truculent articles, and especially those of the Japan Times and Advertiser which is known to express the attitudes of the Japanese Foreign Office, as accurately reflecting the opinion of the Japanese Government. My informant promised to repeat my observations to Mr. Togo and to draw his attention to the articles in question.
My informant said that too much attention should not be paid to Japanese newspapers and added metaphorically that frightened dogs bark and the greater the fright the louder the bark, and that at present the military party in Japan are frightened by the prospects opening up before them. He went on to say that it is a mistake for the United States to regard the Japanese as adults. In reality they are children and should be treated accordingly. Their confidence can be gained by a friendly gesture or word. The Germans have correctly diagnosed this aspect of Japanese psychology and have utilized it successfully.
In conclusion my informant again urged that irrespective of future developments the Washington conversations must not be permitted to break down since in such an event he was fearful of some drastic and fateful results.
JOSEPH C. GREW
711.94/25403/35Memorandum of a Conversation
Washington, November 7, 1941.The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary’s apartment. Before the Ambassador had said anything in regard to the purpose of his call, the Secretary took up with the Japanese Ambassador the question of three American missionaries who had been taken into custody by the Manchurian authorities at Harbin, as referred to in a separate memorandum.
The Secretary then went on to say that situations like that relating to the missionaries referred to and the publication in this country of various press reports of utterances in the Japanese press advocating extremist policies increased our difficulties over here in connection with our discussions with the Japanese Government. He said that various people keep coming to him, refer to these reports and then ask how this Government can expect to improve relations with Japan in view of a situation such as the reports under reference revealed.
The Ambassador said that since the advent of the new Cabinet he had not sought to talk with the Secretary as he had had no definite instructions and as he consequently did not wish to take up the Secretary’s time. He said that he had now received instructions and that in accordance therewith he desired to resume the conversations.
The Ambassador said that the new Cabinet in Japan had deliberated very carefully upon the various provisions of a proposed settlement between our two Governments and had examined very carefully our draft of June 21 with a view to making the utmost concessions that they could make, having due regard for the situation in the Far East and of the attitude of public opinion in Japan. He referred to the three principal questions on which our respective views had diverged and he said that, with regard to two of those questions, namely, Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Pact and nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, he thought that it would not be difficult to reconcile our views. In regard to the question of the desire of the Japanese Government to retain for some time a certain number of troops in North China and Inner Mongolia, he said he realized that difficulties of reaching an agreement were greater.
The Ambassador then went on to say that in view of the gravity of the situation he was very conscious of his responsibility and in order to minimize the possibility of any blunder on his part he had asked the Japanese Government for the assistance of an experienced diplomatist and that in accordance with his request the Government was sending Mr. Kurusu to assist him. The Ambassador expressed the hope that in view of Mr. Kurusu’s personal ambassadorial rank the President would receive Mr. Kurusu.
The Ambassador then handed the Secretary a document, copy of which is attached, containing formulas captioned as follows:
Disposition of Japanese forces
A) Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof:
B) Stationing of Japanese forces in French Indochina and the withdrawal thereof:
Principle of non-discriminationThe Secretary glanced over the document and inquired what proportion of the Japanese troops now in China Japan would propose to retain there. The Japanese Ambassador replied that, as the Secretary was aware, Japan already had the right under the Boxer Protocol to station troops in the Beiping and Tientsin areas; that as the Soviets had troops in Outer Mongolia the stationing of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia was desired as an “equipoise” to those troops. The Ambassador, without making any direct reply to the Secretary’s specific question, went on to refer to armed forces maintained by other countries in China and he said also that when Chiang Kai-shek first entered Shanghai the British had asked the Japanese to take joint action with them at Shanghai, but that the Japanese had declined to do so. He said that notwithstanding the moderate attitude of the Japanese, the Japanese soon thereafter became the object of a bitter Chinese boycott campaign.
The Secretary said that, although he had told the Chinese Ambassador that we were having exploratory conversations with the Japanese, he had not acquainted the Chinese Ambassador with any of the substance of the points we were discussing. He then recalled to the Japanese Ambassador that, as he had on numerous occasions said to the Japanese Ambassador, we proposed before entering into any formal negotiations to discuss the matter with the Chinese and the British and the Dutch. The Secretary said that an idea had just occurred to him which he had so far discussed with no one, namely, supposing the Chinese were now to say that they desired a real friendship with Japan and would do everything in their power to work together along peaceful ways, would not this be a wonderful opportunity for Japan to launch forth on a real new order, an order in which Japan would gain her real moral leadership in the Far East? At a time when Hitler was leading his people over a precipice and when Europe was threatened with anarchy, would not the adoption by Japan of a new policy of conciliation and friendship with China not maintained at a sword’s point provide Japan with a real opportunity for progressive leadership in which Japan and the United States could cooperate to save the world? The Ambassador and Mr. Wakasugi appeared to be very much impressed with this suggestion and said that they would refer it to their Government for its consideration. The Ambassador said that he was personally convinced of the wisdom of the Secretary’s policies and that when he went back to Japan and retired he would use his influence in a direction away from outmoded ideas such as would call for the retention of Japanese troops in China. The Secretary reviewed again the advantages which this Government had derived from renouncing its previous policies of stationing armed forces in Latin-American countries. He mentioned the great increase that had taken place in United States trade with those countries. He expressed the conviction that if Japan should adopt a broad-gauge liberal policy in relation to China Japan would derive incalculable advantage in the way of trade and prosperity.
With reference to the question of Japan’s relations to the Axis powers, the Secretary expressed the hope that some concrete statement could be worked out which would help us. The Ambassador expressed the view that, considering the attitude of the Japanese Government which manifestly desired to maintain peace in the Pacific area, it did not seem to him that any further statement was necessary than had already been made. The Secretary pointed out that such manifestations of the attitude of the present Japanese Cabinet might not cover the situation should some new government come into power in Japan.
The Ambassador expressed the hope that, in view of the urgency of the matter, as the Japanese Government considered the situation critical at home, we would expedite our study of the document which the Ambassador had left with us. The Ambassador added that he had been instructed to present his views to the President and asked the Secretary if he would be so kind as to arrange an appointment. The Ambassador said that he would not take up much of the President’s time but would present him with a written document in order to conserve the President’s time. The Secretary said that he would be glad to comply with the Ambassador’s request. He asked the Ambassador whether the document which the Ambassador had presented was to be taken in conjunction with the previous documents which had been exchanged. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Ambassador said that there was our document of June 21 and their document of September 25. The Secretary added “and our document of October 2.”
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
892.24/91Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations
Washington, November 7, 1941.Reference, the question of planes for Thailand; the aide-mémoire handed to Sir Ronald Campbell on November 6; and especially Bangkok’s telegram 504, November 6, 5 p.m.
In handing to Sir Ronald Campbell the aide-mémoire under reference I stated that the reply therein contained to the British Government’s inquiry need not put an end to consideration by my Government and Sir Ronald’s Government of the question of planes for Thailand. I said that it seemed to us that as a matter of practical procedure and of political practicability, it would be more feasible for the British than for us to put planes into Thailand. I pointed out that in either case the planes would be American planes. The British could set them down in Thailand more quickly and with less publicity than could we.
In the light of developments in Indochina and of the approach made to us by Chiang Kai-shek, the pressure both upon this country and upon the British of supplying aid to China is increased. It seems to me that at this moment it is highly desirable that we and the British make a special and extra effort to reinforce the morale and the capacity to resist of both the Chinese and the Thais. In both cases the maximum of advantage would flow from direct supplying of planes by the British, with the indirect supplying by us. This might be effected by a conclusion of an arrangement whereunder we might undertake that for every plane which the British supply from Singapore or Burma or India we will send to the British one or more planes by way of replacement.
It is of course a fact that for each plane that we send to the Far Eastern and Indian Ocean theaters, we send one less plane to the European and Mediterranean theaters. However, the number called for in order to produce certain psychological and military effects in the Far Eastern situation is small and the potential advantages of such investments in that area are large.
There would be warrant for urging upon the British a release of some planes from Singapore even if it could not be arranged that replacement would be made immediately from this country. We have been placing substantial air forces at Manila, and every plane that we send there contributes substantially toward increasing the security of Singapore. In the light of the combined British, Dutch and American preparations of the past few months in the general area under consideration, the likelihood of a Japanese attack upon Singapore or the Malay Peninsula has been greatly diminished. At this point the British might well move planes from Singapore into China and into Thailand, with some arrangement for a recall in certain eventualities, without great risk so far as Singapore is concerned (but, of course, with substantial risk so far as Hong Kong is concerned).
11.94/25403/35Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State
November 7, 1941
(Tentative translation)Disposition of Japanese forces
A) Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof:
With regard to the Japanese forces that have been despatched to China in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas in North China and Mengjiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as general peace is restored between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order.B) Stationing of Japanese forces in French Indochina and the withdrawal thereof:
The Japanese Government undertakes to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled or an equitable peace is established in East Asia.Principle of non-discrimination
The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.
U.S. Department of State (November 8, 1941)
740.0011 European War 1939/16460: TelegramThe Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State
Chungking, November 7, 1941 — 4 p.m. [Received November 8 — 2:55 a.m.]
441.The reports referred to reflect the uncertainty and the division and revision of opinion prevailing in official circles, here, are [and?] I have no doubt elsewhere, regarding the problem of anticipating future Japanese military moves.
I doubt whether the Japanese themselves could now say when or where or in what direction they will eventually move, if at all.
Magruder is absent in Burma. The Military and Naval Attachés and I do not feel that we have sufficiently dependable information at this isolated post to warrant an estimate:
…as to which and how many of these anticipated attacks the Japanese may be about to make.
After consultation, I offer the following comment:
The Japanese are obviously prepared for an attack on Siberia but whether and when they make such an attack would seem to depend largely on political developments in eastern Europe and on political and other considerations. Russian opinion here is to the effect that as the season of cold weather advances a large scale attack by the Japanese on Siberia becomes less likely but they might attempt an attack on the Maritime Provinces. I am of the opinion that Japan will endeavor to obtain concessions from Russia, believing that Russia does not desire a clash with Japan on the eastern front and may therefore be willing to come to terms.
The Japanese forces now in Indochina are not believed to be sufficiently strong to permit an immediate attack in any direction, but according to reports they are daily being strengthened. Their immediate purpose may be to reform their position in Indochina while operating elsewhere. It is possible however that they are preparing for an attack on Thailand or on Yunnan and possibly an attack on Burma. An attack on Thailand might possibly, and an attack on Burma would certainly, involve Japan in a conflict with Great Britain and perhaps others.
An attack on Yunnan is considered by the Chinese as the logical objective of the Japanese concentration in Indochina. Such a move is less likely to involve Japan with other powers and it would have as its important objective the gutting [cutting?] of the Burma Road and China’s line of supply. Such an expedition would be difficult and probably costly but it is considered to be feasible, especially with air support. The expedition must operate during the dry season from November to March. Therefore if it is to be undertaken, it should be started in the very near future.
It is regarded as certain that whether or not the Japs embark upon a land expedition into Yunnan to cut the Burma [Road—] and it can be cut effectively only by such a measure [—] the Japanese will establish and maintain a strong air concentration in Northern Indochina to attack the Burma Road and to attack the American volunteer or any other air force entering Yunnan for the protection of the Road. There is not at the moment a heavy Japanese air force concentration in Northern Indochina but it is our understanding that airfields in that area are now being completed and a substantial air force could then reach fields rapidly from outside points.
GAUSS
892.24/84: TelegramThe Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, November 8, 1941 — 1 p.m. [Received November 8 — 9:20 a.m.]
508.The Thai Ministry of Defense is extremely anxious to purchase a small number of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns with ammunition. The Legation has informed the applicants that it is extremely improbable that any such supplies could be made available from the United States but at their earnest request consented to telegraph an inquiry. I request the Department’s instruction.
PECK
711.94/2427: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 8, 1941 — 7 p.m. [Received November 8 — 9:25 a.m.]
1772.In view of the unrestrained tone of the Japanese press during the past week in its numerous articles devoted to discussion of the United States and foreign policy, it is significant that the flow of invective appears suddenly to have ceased, judging by this morning’s newspapers. Aside from one relatively mild editorial in the Miyako regarding the Kurusu mission and Japanese-American conversations, the papers confine their comment to subjects which, from our point of view, are quite innocuous.
GREW