Casablanca Conference

10

Roosevelt-Leathers conversation, 7 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Lord Leathers
Mr. Harriman
11 
Friday, 15 January

The day started with a long conference in the President’s bedroom. The following persons were present:

  • General Geo. C. Marshall
  • Admiral E. J. King
  • Lt. General H. H. Arnold
  • Brig. General J. R. Deane
  • Mr. Harry Hopkins
  • Mr. Averell Harriman

This conference had lasted from ten o’clock until 12:30. It was followed by a one-thirty luncheon in the President’s villa. Mr. Churchill, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Commander Thompson, and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt lunched with the President.

At 3:00 p.m. the Prime Minister and his personal aide, Commander Thompson, took their departure in company with Mr. Harriman.

At 3:55 p.m., Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA, Commander U.S. Armed Forces in North Africa, called on the President. Shortly after five o’clock, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, North African Forces visited the President and remained for ten minutes, departing at 5:30 p.m.

Preparatory to a conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, scheduled for 5:30 p.m., the Prime Minister arrived at the President’s villa and introduced to the President the following listed British officers:

  • General H.R.L.G. Alexander, Commander Middle East Forces
  • Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
  • Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay Office of the Minister of Defense

From 5: 30 until 7:00 p.m. the following listed persons conferred as a group with the President and Prime Minister Churchill in the President’s villa:
Field Marshal Sir John Dill General George C. Marshall
General H.R.L.G. Alexander Admiral E. J. King
General Sir Alan F. Brooke Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder Lt. Gen. D. D. Eisenhower
Adm. of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound Brig. Gen. John R. Deane
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

Following the departure of the above-listed conferees, Mr. Harriman and Lord Leathers called on the President and remained for half an hour, departing at 7:35 p.m.

During the afternoon, Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., USNR, had been informed of his father’s arrival at Casablanca and he accordingly took up quarters in “Dar es Saada,” thus making the household four persons – The President, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. These four were joined at dinner in the President’s villa this evening by General Marshall, Lt. General Eisenhower, and Mr. Robert Murphy.

The President retired at 11:40.

12

U.S. State Department (January 16, 1943)

Roosevelt–Churchill conversation, 9:55 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Murphy Mr. Macmillan
Lieutenant General Eisenhower
13

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
General Marshall General Brooke
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Lieutenant General Ismay
Colonel Smart Major General Kennedy
Commander Libby Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes 

January 16, 1943, 10:30 a.m.

Secret
  1. The North African Situation

Sir Alan Brooke gave an account of a conference between General Alexander and General Eisenhower regarding the coming operations in Tunisia and Libya. General Eisenhower had planned an offensive against Sfax to be launched on January 24th. The Plan presented some difficulties. The 1st Army cannot attack prior to March 15th. The British 8th Army expects to take Tripoli by January 24th. At that time they will be out of fuel for their vehicles and a certain amount of reorganizing will be necessary. It is probable that the 8th Army will not be able to attack Rommel’s forces on the Mareth line prior to February 15th. Thus they will be too late to take advantage of the favorable situation created by General Eisenhower’s attack on Sfax and consequently Rommel will be free for a period of time to operate against General Eisenhower’s southern forces and perhaps force him to withdraw from Sfax. This might be coupled with a German attack from the north which would place General Eisenhower’s southern forces in an extremely precarious position.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that it had been decided that the Sfax attack would be canceled. Instead, raids would be conducted against the German line of communications from Sfax but the bulk of General Eisenhower’s forces consisting of the 1st Armored Division, reinforced, would be held in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist General Alexander in his attack on Rommel’s forces or to assist the 1st Army to the north. The Sfax attack might be accomplished later and, if so, it would be timed by agreement between General Alexander and General Eisenhower who will confer frequently.

  1. The Strategic Concept for 1943 in the European Theater

General Marshall stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff were anxious to learn the British concept as to how Germany is to be defeated. It has been the conception of the United States Chiefs of Staff that Germany must be defeated by a powerful effort on the continent, carrying out the Bolero-Roundup plans. Aid to Russia is regarded as being of paramount importance in order to assist the Russian Army to absorb the strength of the German ground and air forces.

He said we must devise means to enable Russia to continue aggressively through 1943 by providing them with supplies. The amount of such supplies and the methods of delivering them must be determined upon. The German air and ground forces brought to bear against Russia must be reduced. Any method of accomplishing this other than on the Continent is a deviation from the basic plan. The question is then to what extent must the United Nations adhere to the general concept and to what extent do they undertake diversions for the purpose of assisting Russia, improving the tonnage situation, and maintaining momentum.

In commenting on the British presentation of their plans for the Mediterranean, General Marshall stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to have further information on the following points:

a) Were not the East-West communications in northern Europe, which the British consider capable of moving seven divisions every twelve days, subject to severe interference by heavy air attacks from England?

b) If the Mediterranean operations were undertaken and there were a break in the German strength, might it occur so rapidly that full advantage could not be taken of it? It was, therefore, desired that the British Chiefs of Staff expand on what the tonnage savings from the Mediterranean operations might be in order to determine if they were worth the costs involved?

c) What would be the effects of Mediterranean operations on the timing of the United Nations concentrations in England? In General Eisenhower’s opinion, it was unwise to count on further use of landing craft used in the initial landings for any other operation. A fifty or seventy-five percent loss should be anticipated. General Eisenhower also thought that operations on the Continent to establish a bridgehead would require more divisions than had originally been thought necessary.

d) What were the relative merits of undertaking an operation against Sicily or Sardinia, particularly in regard to the effects on tonnage, and the development of forces in the United Kingdom?

e) Was an operation against Sicily merely a means towards an end or an end in itself? Is it to be a part of an integrated plan to win the war or simply taking advantage of an opportunity?

General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed that every effort must be made to build up forces to support Turkey in order to be able to reinforce her for resistance against the Axis powers and to secure the use of her airfields for bombing operations by the United Nations.

He thought that if operations are to be undertaken in the Mediterranean, they should be financed by the troops now in North Africa. One of the strongest arguments for undertaking such an operation is that there will be an excess of troops in North Africa once Tunisia has been cleared of the Axis forces.

Admiral King stated that he thought it most important to determine how the war is to be conducted. The percentage of the war effort to be applied to Germany and to Japan must be determined as well as over-all plans for the defeat of each. He asked if Russia is to carry the burden as far as the ground forces are concerned; also, if the United Nations were to invade the Continent, and when. He said that since Europe is in the British area of strategic responsibility, he would like to hear their views on these questions. He thought it should be decided whether a planned step-by-step policy was to be pursued or whether we should rely on seizing opportunities.

General Arnold stated that he was interested to know whether an attack on Sicily was to be a means to an end or an end in itself and what relation such an attack would have to the whole strategic conception.

General Marshall said that, when planning for Gymnast, we were attempting to undertake an operation “on a shoestring.” He said we then changed to the Bolero-Roundup concept and had to prepare for Sledgehammer because of the strong possibility of a Russian collapse last autumn. Troop concentrations had been started and production programs rearranged for Bolero. This created difficult complications. The naval program was upset because of the necessity to undertake the construction of landing craft. It was then decided to undertake Operation Torch in which great risks were involved but in which we have been abnormally fortunate.

General Marshall described the difficulties with which the United States Chiefs of Staff were faced over questions of priorities in production. It was essential to fix our strategic policy as carefully as possible in order to avoid production difficulties.

General Marshall thought it important that we now reorient ourselves and decide what the “main plot” is to be. Every diversion or side issue from the main plot acts as a “suction pump.” He stated that the operations against Sicily appeared to be advantageous because of the excess number of troops in North Africa brought about by the splendid efforts of the British 8th Army. However, before deciding to undertake such an operation, he thought it necessary to determine just what part it would play in the over-all strategic plan.

Sir Alan Brooke said that on the Continent Russia is the only ally having large land forces in action. Any effort of the other allies must necessarily be so small as to be unimportant in the over-all picture. He felt that ground operations by the United States and the United Kingdom would not exert any great influence until there were definite signs that Germany was weakening.

General Marshall stated that it was desirable to force the enemy to meet us in air combat. He asked Sir Alan Brooke to discuss the effects of air superiority of the United Nations on the operations of ground troops of the Continent. He felt that if a bridgehead were established and Germany did not attempt to meet our air superiority, the bridgehead could be expanded. On the other hand, if they did meet our air superiority, it would necessitate withdrawing large air forces from the Russian front.

He referred to a suggestion by Mr. Molotov that we send a ground force to the Continent sufficient to divert forty German divisions from the Russian front. He said that this was out of the question and that our aim should be to weaken the German air power in the Russian theater rather than the ground forces.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that with limited ground forces, he did not believe that we could constitute sufficient threat in Northern France to the Germans to force them to withdraw much of their air power from the Russian front. The Germans have forty-four divisions in France, some of which have been moved south as a result of Operation Torch. However, the Germans still have sufficient strength to overwhelm us on the ground and perhaps hem us in with wire or concrete to such an extent that any expansion of the bridgehead would be extremely difficult. Moreover, we cannot undertake any operation in Northern France until very late in the summer of 1943. Since, therefore, we cannot go into the Continent in force until Germany weakens, we should try to make the Germans disperse their forces as much as possible. This can be accomplished by attacking the German allies, Italy in particular. This would result in a considerable shortage of German troops on the Russian front. An effort should be made to put Italy out of the war, largely by bombing attacks on the north from the United Kingdom and in the south from North Africa and Sicily.

Our policy should be to force Italy out of the war and bring Turkey in. If Italy were out of the war, Germany would be forced to occupy that country with a considerable number of divisions and also would be forced to replace Italian divisions in other Axis occupied countries such as Yugoslavia and Greece.

Preparations for an attack against Sicily would be known to the Germans and would necessitate the dispersing of their forces to meet any of the capabilities of our amphibious forces. They would have to be prepared to meet us in Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, Greece and the Dodecanese, and this would give great opportunity for deception plans. He felt that this would cause a much greater withdrawal of strength from the Russian front than any operations which we might undertake across the channel. The protection of the sea route alone would bring on a considerable air battle in the Mediterranean which will give relief to the Russian front. Airplanes which normally leave Russia during the winter months and participate in operations in the Mediterranean would be unable to return to the Russian front in the spring.

Sir Alan Brooke said that at the same time as operations against Sicily were being undertaken, there must be a continued build-up of the United Nations forces in the United Kingdom. These must be prepared to undertake the final action of the war as soon as Germany gives definite signs of weakness.

Sir Alan Brooke did not believe we could undertake any further operations in Italy from Sicily in 1943, unless Italy collapsed completely. We should be very careful of accepting any invitation to support an anti-Fascist insurrection. To do so might only immobilize a considerable force to no useful purpose.

Sir Alan Brooke did not feel that air operations against the German and French railway systems in the north would be particularly effective or do anything more than impose delay. There were so many alternative routes. On the other hand, operations against the north-south railway lines, particularly those in Italy, could be made effective because of the close proximity of the lines to the shore which makes them vulnerable to commando raids as well as to air action.

Sir Dudley Pound discussed the effects that taking Sardinia and Sicily would have on the passage of convoys. He said that securing either of these islands will not have as much effect as securing Tunisia. He anticipated that when Tunisia is gained, we shall be able to convoy thirty cargo ships through the Mediterranean every ten days which will result in the release of two hundred and twenty-five ships for other purposes. The route would not be safe for personnel ships or tankers. The capture of Sardinia would have little effect on the movements of shipping. On the other hand, the capture of Sicily would enable us to move troop convoys as well as cargo convoys through the Mediterranean with relative safety. The troop convoys, however, will, in the future, be limited almost entirely to replacement troops for the Middle East.

He stated that there will also be a saving in tankers because of the possibility of supplying the necessities for oil in the Mediterranean from Haifa rather than bringing oil from the United States.

Sir Alan Brooke recapitulated the comparative merits of an attack on Sardinia and Sicily as follows: The loss of Sicily would be a much heavier blow to Italy than Sardinia and would effectively secure the sea route through the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it was a much more ambitious operation and would have to be mounted later. Sardinia was a smaller undertaking, and could be mounted earlier. It would provide an excellent air base for attack on Industrial Italy, particularly if Corsica were taken as well.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if Sicily had to be taken later in the year and if the Germans in consequence were able to reinforce it more strongly, it would be a much tougher nut to crack. On the other hand, once in possession of the Sicilian airfields we could make it very difficult indeed for the Axis to reinforce the island. The railways along the Italian coasts in the two [toe?] were vulnerable to air attack and raiding; and there were narrow defiles leading from the port of Messina in the island itself.

Sir Charles Portal referred to the suggestion that we might be able to offset inferiority in land forces in Northern France by the greatly superior air forces which could be operated from the United Kingdom. So far as the Brest Peninsula was concerned, no fighter support could be given from the United Kingdom, since it was out of range. The Cherbourg Peninsula was better from this point of view and offered some possibilities as a preliminary operation. Nevertheless, with the limited air facilities in the Peninsula we should probably find ourselves pinned down at the neck of the Peninsula by ground forces whose superiority we should be unable to offset by the use of air. We should certainly be opposed by strong German air forces there. Once we were committed in Northern France the Germans would quickly bring up their air forces from the Mediterranean, realizing that we could not undertake amphibious operations on a considerable scale both across the channel and in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, by threatening in the Mediterranean we should cause a far greater dispersion of German air forces.

Sir Charles Portal said that in his view it was impossible to map out a detailed plan for winning the war, but Germany’s position, if we knocked out Italy, would undoubtedly be most serious. Her ability to continue the fight depended on (a) the possession of the necessary resources and (b) the will to fight on. As regards resources, her main shortages at present were oil and air power. We had no exact knowledge of her oil position, but if she had not succeeded in gaining the Caucasus oil, and if her synthetic oil plants were attacked by precision bombing in daylight, there could be little doubt that her forces would rapidly become immobilized from lack of oil.

As regards her air forces, calculations had been made by the British Air Intelligence Staffs of German deficiencies under the following hypotheses:

  • Case A – Italy fighting and Germany continuing the offensive in Caucasia.
  • Case B – As for A, but Italy knocked out.
  • Case C – Italy fighting and Germany holding a shortened line in Russia by withdrawing to Rostov.
  • Case D – As for C, but Italy not fighting.

German deficiencies in June 1943 were calculated as follows:

Case Deficiencies in First Line Aircraft Deficiencies in Divisions
A 1700 34
B 2250 54
C 700 9
D 1250 30

Germany’s will to fight depended largely on her confidence in ultimate success. If we and the Russians began to score continual successes against Germany, which she could not defeat owing to her lack of means, she would begin to realize that the prospects were hopeless. She might be faced with the dilemma of withdrawing all her troops from France and concentrating in the East against Russia. The way to defeat Germany, therefore, seemed to be to take every chance of attacking her oil supplies; to increase the air bombardment of Germany itself with its inevitable results on German morale, and on industrial capacity and its effect in producing heavy casualties in her population and great misery by the destruction of their dwellings. If we could achieve as well a series of successes, even though these might be comparatively small in extent, it seemed fairly certain that a point would be reached at which Germany would suddenly crack. No one, however, could say precisely when or how the collapse would come.

Admiral King said he understood the general concept of the British Chiefs of Staff was to make use of Russia’s geographical position and her reserves of manpower to make the main effort on land against Germany and to support Russia by diverting as many German forces as possible from the Eastern front. This raised the question as to whether we should not give Russia larger supplies of equipment.

Once the North African coast had been cleared it seemed that we should have a surplus of troops in North Africa and the Mediterranean whom we could not readily move elsewhere. It seemed therefore economical to use them in that area if possible. Sicily seemed undoubtedly to offer a greater dividend though its cost would be higher than Sardinia. The question was whether we could afford to delay so long before taking further offensive action against Germany and whether the Russians would be satisfied unless a “second front” was opened in France. The chief bottleneck seemed to be the provision of landing craft. Operations in Norway seemed to be worth examining though they would almost inevitably lead to a demand from Sweden for assistance and equipment.

As regards the Brest Peninsula, it was worth noting that once we were established there, U.S. troops could be moved in direct from America without the need for trans-shipment in the United Kingdom. The effect of capturing Brest on the U-boat war needed careful consideration.

Sir Charles Portal said that Brest was one of the four Biscay ports used by the Germans as U-boat bases, but he doubted whether the possession of the peninsula would greatly assist the proposed heavy bomber attacks on Lorient, La Pallice and Bordeaux. All these were within easy range of the United Kingdom and to operate against them from the Brest Peninsula would involve putting in additional facilities there. The airfields in the peninsula were likely to be fully employed in the air defense of the area and direct support of the army, leaving nothing to spare for fighter escorts for daylight bombing attacks on the Biscay ports.

The next point discussed was the effect of Mediterranean operations on Bolero. Sir Alan Brooke said that the number of divisions which the British Chiefs of Staff calculated could be made available by September 15th for operations from the United Kingdom into Northern France were:

  • 21-24 if the Mediterranean were closed down
  • 16-18 if Mediterranean operations were undertaken

If the capture of Sicily were undertaken, the number of landing craft left available for operations in Northern France would be less Sir Dudley Pound observed that all Calculations of the number of divisions available for operations in Northern France were based or the date of September 15th. In his view this was too late since the weather was liable to break in the third week in September and it was essential to have a port by then. The first assault should not be later than August 15th.

General Marshall inquired whether considerable numbers of landing craft would not be required for the maintenance of Sicily after it was taken.

Sir Charles Portal said that once Sicily had been occupied the air defense of the ports should present no particular difficulty. We were able to put large ships into Malta which was very exposed to ah attack. The number of enemy airfields in the toe of Italy was small and fighters on the Sicilian airdromes should be able to deal with dive bombers.

Lord Louis Mountbatten then reviewed the British landing craft situation. Available landing craft were being allocated broadly as follows:

a) A group in the United Kingdom of the smaller types of cross-channel craft sufficient to lift 4 brigade groups with their vehicles, of 7 brigade groups loaded for raids when very few motor vehicles would be taken.

b) A group in the Western Mediterranean sufficient to lift 1 brigade group complete.

c) A similar group in the Eastern Mediterranean.

d) A group in India sufficient to train 1 brigade group, but not enough to lift the brigade group if it had to undertake actual operations.

e) An oversea assault force, as a strategic reserve, sufficient to lift 6 brigade groups. The personnel would be carried in combat loaders but they could not all be put ashore in the first flight as the ships could not carry sufficient landing craft for the purpose.

Every attempt was being made to organize landing craft bases in the U.K. so as to give the maximum flexibility and thus allow for a change of plan. The switch over from Roundup to Torch had caused great difficulties owing to the fact that bases prepared for Roundup were in the South of England whereas Scottish bases had to be used for Torch.

Lord Louis Mountbatten observed that he was working on the assumption that any U S. troops would be carried in landing craft manned by the U.S. In the Torch landings the majority of U.S. forces at Oran and Algiers had been landed in British manned craft. He emphasized the need for working out allocations of landing craft well ahead owing to the long time involved in training the necessary crews.

General Somervell said that the introduction of the LST and the LCI necessitated considerable change in our ideas about landing craft; the former carried some 150 infantry as well as tanks, and the latter 250 infantry. He calculated that if all the available landing craft were concentrated in North Africa we should be able to lift a total of some 80,000 men by April. Allowing for the use of 105-foot and 50-foot craft as well, this lift would probably increase to about 90,000 in June. If this force of landing craft were used for a second and third ferrying flight, on a short sea crossing, their lift would probably be about 60,000 in the second flight and 45,000 in the third flight, allowing for inevitable casualties in craft. He considered the use of these landing craft, working to beaches, a sounder proposition than the risking of large ships under air attack. The latter should be reserved for the long ocean hauls.

To transfer landing craft from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for a subsequent operation later in the year presented considerable problems. It was certainly essential to have considerable numbers of landing craft in the United Kingdom well in advance for training purposes.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Joint Planners had calculated August as the earliest date for the attack on Sicily. If the whole operation were mounted from North Africa in order to save escorts, the date would be postponed until the end of August. His own view was that, even under the latter condition, the date might be advanced to July. Assuming that the attack be launched about July 20th, he expected that we might gain control of the Island within about six weeks.

General Marshall inquired when, on the above assumptions, there would be sufficient landing craft in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in Germany.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that three months would have to be allowed from the time when the landing craft could be dispensed with to the time when they would be ready for action again in the United Kingdom. The large types of sea-going landing vessels presented no difficulty but small 50-foot craft were essential for the assault landing. Both the United States and British Planners were agreed that it was not possible to use the large craft for the first flights. These small craft had to be collected from the site of operations, transported to Scotland, distributed for repair, reassembled and then again transported by ship to the South of England for a Continental operation.

There would be in England, however, at all times the assault force to which he had previously referred which could lift 4 Brigade Groups with their transport for an assault against heavy opposition. In addition, for the follow-up troops, a great number of landing barges and small coasting vessels were being prepared. The spearhead would not be affected at all by operations in the Mediterranean and would always be kept intact. Any landing craft recovered from the Mediterranean would therefore be in the nature of a bonus.

Admiral King said that the intended use of combat loaders for an assault on Sicily greatly disturbed him. He had hoped that it would be possible to use the larger types of landing craft instead. He feared that a large number of these valuable combat loaders would be lost in the operation.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that in the Husky plan all available LST’s and LCI’s would be used, but in addition, 26 combat loaders were required for the assault troops. Of these, the British could provide half.

Admiral King pointed out that the two main factors in winning the war were manpower and munitions. In respect to military manpower, the British Commonwealth had presumably mobilized practically up to the limit. The United States at the present time had reached about 60% of their contemplated strength in military manpower though the position had not yet completely stabilized. His own guess at Russia’s position was that she had mobilized about 80% of available military manpower. China’s resources in manpower were still relatively untouched, and India likewise was scarcely tapped.

As regards munitions, the greatest potential lay in the United States. Next came Great Britain, but she could not supply the full needs of the British Commonwealth farces. Russia was more self-supporting than at first appeared likely but had to receive a considerable amount of assistance from the Allies. From the munitions point of view, China and India were liabilities since their available manpower enormously exceeded their industrial production.

In the European theater Russia was most advantageously placed for dealing with Germany in view of her geographical position and manpower; in the Pacific, China bore a similar relation to the Japanese. It should be our basic policy to provide the manpower resources of Russia and China with the necessary equipment to enable them to fight. With this in mind, the United States Chiefs of Staff set great store by Operation Ravenous. It seemed likely that one of the major British contributions to the defeat of Japan would be to complete the reconquest of Burma and the opening of the Burma Road.

General Marshall observed that, with regard to Operation Ravenous , Chiang Kai-shek had now withdrawn from his undertaking to move in from Yunnan on the grounds that Field Marshal Wavell could only provide very limited British forces and there would be no British naval strength in the Bay of Bengal to cut the Japanese reinforcements route to Rangoon. General Stilwell was certainly placed in a very difficult position at the present time.

Discussion then turned on the need for long-range planning in order that production policy could be coordinated with strategy.

General Arnold pointed out that if operations in the Mediterranean were undertaken, the seizure of Brest, in the British view, would not be possible this year. Further, that even if Cherbourg or Brest were taken, our forces would not be able to break out for a further invasion of the Continent. It looked very much as if no Continental operations on any scale were in prospect before the spring of 1944. We should have to decide not only what we were going to do in 1943 but also in 1944 since otherwise, owing to the time lag, our priorities in production might be wrongly decided.

Sir Alan Brooke expressed the view that we should definitely count on reentering the Continent in 1944 on a large scale.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that production plans could never follow strategy precisely since the situation changed so frequently in war. The best that could be hoped for was to take broad decisions on major questions and these would always be in the nature of compromises. For example, when considering the possibility of reentering the Continent, it had been decided that we must treat it as a fortress and that heavy initial bombardment would be required to break into it. It had therefore been decided to give very high priority to the production of heavy bombers which would be used to soften up Germany before the invasion of the Continent.

Further discussion then followed on the possibility of a German crack in 1943.

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Sir John Dill felt that there was quite a possibility of beating Germany this year. We should therefore strain every nerve to effect this since the sooner we beat Germany the sooner we could turn on Japan. We must not let Japan consolidate her position for too long. Japan certainly could not be beaten this year, but Germany might.

Admiral King doubted whether Germany could be defeated before 1944. He felt that her defeat could only be effected by direct military action rather than by a failure in her morale. Was it necessary, however, to accept that we could do nothing in Northern France before April 1944?

Sir Charles Portal said that this depended entirely on Germany’s power of resistance. If we concentrated everything we could on Germany this year, it was possible that we might cause her to crumble and thus be able to move into Germany with comparatively small forces. Until this condition had been produced, however, some 20 divisions would get us nowhere on the Continent. A factor which must not be forgotten was the terrific latent power of the oppressed people which could only come into play when the crumbling process started. At that moment, however, their efforts might contribute greatly to the final collapse. He did not see Germany fighting on and on, completely surrounded by the armed forces of the Allies. A point would come at which the whole structure of Germany and the Nazi Party would collapse, and this moment might well come during the current year. It was essential therefore to have ready a plan and some resources in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack. In order to produce the crack, however, we must keep up the maximum pressure on Germany by land operations; air bombardment alone was not sufficient.

In further discussion the importance of deciding the requirements and availability of escort vessels was emphasized. These appeared to be one of the principal limiting factors.

Admiral King said that there was no reserve of escort vessels but if Operation Husky were decided upon, the United States and British Navies would have to find the escort vessels somehow just as they had in the case of Torch.

After some further discussion,

The Committee:
Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to reexamine the British plan for Husky in the light of the American and British resources of all kinds that can be made available for it, and to calculate the earliest date by which the Operation could be mounted.

  1. Supplies to Russia

Sir Dudley Pound recapitulated the factors governing PQ convoys to North Russia. With the present resources of the Home Fleet not more than one 30-ship convoy could be run every 40 to 42 days. Each convoy had to contain two oilers, leaving a net total of 28 cargo ships. With more destroyers it would be possible to “double-end” the convoys, reducing cycle to 27 days instead of 40-42. For this purpose about 12 destroyers would be required from the U.S. Navy. He wished to emphasize, however, that if the Germans employed their surface ships boldly and kept up the same amount of air and U-boats as last year, it was within their power to stop the PQ convoys altogether.

General Somervell reviewed the general problem of supplying Russia. The northern route was at present the best since the turn-round was shortest. The turn-round on the Persian Gulf route was about five months. Some fifteen ships a month are now being used on this route but the flow was restricted by port and inland transportation deficiencies. Once the Mediterranean was opened some relief might be given by the use of Haifa and the overland route from there to Bagdad. For this purpose additional heavy trucks for the road haul would be needed. U.S. Technical troops were being dispatched to Persia to improve the trans-Persian transportation facilities, and it was hoped to increase these to about 10,000 tons per day. If this could be achieved, 40 ships a month instead of 15 could be sent into the Persian Gulf.

The sea route from Seattle to Vladivostok was also being used for non-military supplies and raw materials. Twelve ships manned by the Russians were now working this route, and it was hoped to add 10 ships a month in the future. The use of this route naturally depended on non-interference by the Japanese.

All these potential increases in shipping to Russia naturally would have to be found by cutting down elsewhere. If the opening of the Mediterranean saved some million and a half tons of shipping, this would provide a surplus for the purpose; but there appears to be no other sources. It should be possible for Great Britain and the United States to keep the pipeline full even if these potential increases were made. The maximum tonnage might be as high as 10 million tons per annum; the target for the current year was 4 million but it was doubtful if it would be reached. One million deadweight tons of supplies for Russia were awaiting shipment now in U.S. ports.

Sir Alan Brooke observed that one unsatisfactory feature of the whole business of supplying Russia was their refusal to put their cards on the table. It might well be that we were straining ourselves unduly and taking great risks when there was no real necessity to do so.

  1. Employment of French Forces in North Africa

General Marshall asked for the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the employment of French divisions. The United States Chiefs of Staff felt that they can be effectively used and that their use will effect a considerable economy of force. The French divisions regarded as being the best must be reequipped as soon as practical. This, however, has political complications which must be resolved.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that we should exploit the use of French troops in North Africa to the maximum, particularly for garrison work. We should have to provide them with a considerable quantity of antiaircraft weapons. Their usefulness would depend greatly on whether we could establish a satisfactory French government. Good leadership was required to rekindle in them the desire to fight. Too many of the French were only waiting for the end of the war.

General Marshall asked what the effect would be on Spain if French troops were stationed opposite the border of Spanish Morocco. There seemed no doubt that some very useful French divisions could be formed in North Africa.

Sir Alan Brooke thought that it would be wise to keep U.S. forces on the Spanish border as well as French troops. This would tend to allay Spanish suspicions of the French intentions and at the same time remove any temptation from the Spanish to cross the frontier if they thought the French troops of inferior quality.

2 Likes
15

Meeting of Roosevelt with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 p.m.

Present
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Brigadier General Deane

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes 

January 16, 1943, 5 p.m.

Secret

Admiral King informed the President that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been attempting to obtain the British Chiefs of Staff’s concept as to how the war should be won. He said that the British have definite ideas as to what the next operation should be but do not seem to have an overall plan for the conduct of the war.

General Marshall stated that the planners are making a study of what is required in the Pacific in order to maintain constant pressure on the Japanese and keep the initiative in that theatre. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been particularly concerned with the strategic concept for 1943. They have had discussions on the Burma operations and also whether an immediate operation should be planned for the Mediterranean or for the Continent or both. He stated that the planners had been instructed to estimate the earliest possible date that an operation against Sicily could be mounted in order that the Chiefs of Staff could determine what residue of force would be available for operations on the Continent and if such operations would be advisable this year.

General Marshall stated that the most critical factors in the coming operations are the availability of landing craft, the time necessary for amphibious training, and the availability of escort vessels.

He stated that there will be excess troops available in North Africa when the Axis powers have been expelled from North Africa and that this is one of the chief reasons why Operation Husky appears to be attractive.

The British have estimated that the operations against Sicily cannot be mounted prior to August but feel that there is a possibility of moving this date up to sometime in July.

General Marshall said that the question being determined is whether we can undertake an operation against the continent together with Operation Husky or separately and at a later date. The British maintain a spearhead in the United Kingdom for an operation against the continent in the event of a crack in German morale. This includes enough landing craft to move four brigade groups and, additionally, the British are putting motors in approximately 1,000 barges which they will use, together with other small craft to bring in troops following the spearhead.

The President asked how many troops were in England at this time, to which General Marshall replied that there was one trained division and about 140,000 to 150,000 men. He said that by next summer we can have six to nine divisions in the United Kingdom, and the British will have thirteen.

General Marshall quoted Sir Charles Portal as saying a crack in Axis morale may come at any time because of the explosive elements existing in the populations of the occupied countries. Sir Charles Portal feels that if such an explosion comes, it will start in the interior of Germany but will finally reach the frontline troops who will desire to return to their families. In this case, an occupation of the continent would be comparatively simple.

General Marshall said that training for amphibious operations is the most critical factor which we have to face. The training must be of much higher quality than that given for Torch. He quoted General Eisenhower as saying that he believed that there must be an invasion on the continent but that it would require a minimum of 12 divisions, which is double previous estimates. General Eisenhower also feels that there is a need for more training. Other limiting factors to any proposed operation are the necessities of combating the submarine menace and for the delivery of supplies to Russia.

An operation against Sardinia can be accomplished about six weeks earlier than one against Sicily, but the results will have little effect in improving the shipping situation through the Mediterranean. The only positive result to be received from the capture of Sardinia would be the ability to bomb Italy and perhaps the southern coast of France.

General Arnold pointed out that there would be much better air coverage for Operation Husky than could be given to Operation Brimstone. The President asked where the Germans had the best defence.

General Marshall replied that their defence in Sicily was better than that in Sardinia and that by summer it might be expected that the Germans would have 6 to 8 divisions there. General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed on the necessity of placing adequate troops in rear of Turkey to be prepared to reinforce her for a resistance to Axis invasion.

The President remarked that Turkey’s entry into the war was a diplomatic question, to which General Marshall replied that he felt that the concentration should be made regardless of whether Turkey came into the war or not.

Admiral King said that in our endeavors to obtain a definite strategic concept from the British Chiefs of Staff it had become apparent that they intended using the geographic and manpower position of Russia to the maximum. This necessitates making every effort to maintain the flow of supplies to Russia and also to divert German air and ground troops from the Russian front. He added that the British make no mention of where or when a second front on the continent should be established. The President said that we now have a protocol with the Russians which involves a certain delivery of munitions to them and that this shall probably be continued on the same scale when the present protocol expires.

Admiral King stated that British convoys by the northern route are set up for 30 ships every 42 days. With an additional 12 destroyers this could be improved to a rate of 30 ships each 27 days. He stated that he did not believe we should base our plans too largely on a contemplated German crack-up. It now appeared that a real Round-Up operation is not feasible before April, 1944 because of British lack of enthusiasm.

General Marshall said that British would undertake an operation Sledgehammer if they saw signs of a break in German morale. This would be followed by a makeshift Round-Up operation. He said the British feel that they cannot gather the means for a real thrust against the continent in 1943, and that Admiral Pound states that no operation should be undertaken after August. It is apparent that British cooperation cannot be obtained unless there are indications of the Germans weakening.

Admiral King stated that if the operations on the Mediterranean and on the Russian front caused the Germans to withdraw their forces from France, the British would be willing to seize this opportunity to invade the continent.

General Marshall informed the President that the British were not interested in occupying Italy, inasmuch as this would add to our burdens without commensurate returns.

The President expressed his agreement with this view.

General Marshall stated that in his opinion we may be able to obtain a decision from the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning the operations in the Pacific by January 17th and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that Operation Husky should be undertaken, but they had not yet informed the British to this effect.

The President stated that from the political point of view he thought it would be extremely wise to send more airplanes to China. He felt that they could be used to great advantage there and if periodic bombing raids over Japan could be undertaken, they would have a tremendous morale effect on the Chinese people. General Arnold stated that he agreed with this view but wished to see for himself whether or not an increased air force in China could be supplied.

The President then stated that he thought it was desirable to set up additional transport planes to insure a supply of a larger air force in China.

General Marshall said that transport planes now allocated to China are sufficient and that we must be extremely careful about making additional allocations. He pointed out that, in addition to China, we would receive demands for transport planes from Russia. We would need a considerable number for the Operation Husky and also for General MacArthur’s forces in the Pacific.

The President suggested the possibility of preparing two or three plans and making all preparations to carry them out, but leaving the decision as to the objective until a later date.

Admiral Cooke pointed out that if planes [plans?] were made for Operation Husky the objective could readily be changed to either the Dodecanese, Crete or Sardinia.

The President said he would like to have some flexibility to the plans in case it became apparent that Turkey might enter the war. In that case we could then adopt the objective which would fit in best with this development.

General Marshall stated he did not feel that the Operation Husky would interfere with Turkey’s entering into the war, but rather that a success in Sicily might be an added inducement to her to join with us.

The President then directed the discussion to Russia. He said that he had received information that the Russians did not desire any of our personnel and also indicated that they would not welcome General Bradley’s mission to make a survey of the available air facilities in Siberia.

He asked General Somervell about the supply situation to Russia.

General Somervell replied that the Persian port is capable of handling 15 ships per month. The road and rail facilities are capable of handling about 10,000 tons per day which are sufficient to handle the freight from 40 ships per month, and efforts are now being made to expand the port facilities to make this possible. He then went on to describe to the President several overland routes to Russia, all of which are limited by the availability of truck transportation.

The President asked what might happen if Turkey remained neutral but permitted our transporting munitions and bombs through her territory.

General Somervell replied that certain routes could be made available by this means, but if they were used it would be necessary to establish a truck assembly plant in that area. He added that he thought this should be done, and that all available routes into Russia should be used.

The President asked General Somervell if truck bodies could be manufactured in the Near East, to which General Somervell replied that lumber would have to [be?] obtained from India.

Mr. Harriman stated that until a truck assembly plant could be constructed, the one now at Cairo could be used.

Admiral King stated that the last convoy to Murmansk arrived without loss of any of its 16 cargo ships, but that one destroyer had been sunk and another damaged. He stated that we could help Russia more if they would help us to do so.

The President asked if we were getting as much information from Southern Europe as are the British. General Marshall replied that he would have this investigated (A message was sent to G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, asking for a report as to the amount of intelligence received out of Southern Europe by U.S. Intelligence Agencies and how our efforts in this regard compared with those of the British).

General Marshall then informed the President that the British had agreed to transfer their Valentine tanks from the 6th Armored Division to the French as soon as the British had received our Sherman tanks. He also stated he thought it necessary to equip the best French divisions rapidly.

General Marshall then informed the President regarding a decision which had been made by General Eisenhower concerning the Tunisian operations. A drive towards Sfax which had been planned for January 24th has been called off. This was necessary because the British First Army on the north could not attack until March 15th and General Alexander could not attack Rommel’s forces on the south until February 15th. It was decided that the attack against Sfax might be premature and expose them to an attack from the north by German Tunisian forces and from the south by Rommel. Instead, General Eisenhower is to hold his First Armored Division in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist either Alexander’s forces in the south or the First British Army in the north, and the attack against Sfax will be made by infantry units at a later date, to be coordinated by General Eisenhower and General Alexander.

The President then asked General Somervell about the general supply situation. General Somervell replied that the greatest shortages in North Africa were in road machinery and motor transportation. Both of these are now being sent to North Africa. The machinery is needed to improve the railroads and also for the construction and improvement of airfields. Efforts are also being made to bring in needed locomotives.

The President then asked about the civilian supply situation. General Somervell replied that it was being handled satisfactorily, except that valuable cargo space was being utilized by some of the civilian agencies in the United States in sending unnecessary and ridiculous items.

The President then informed the Chiefs of Staff that Admiral Robert in Martinique had received a message from Laval to sink his ships immediately upon receiving evidence that the United States intended action against Martinique. Laval required Robert to give him an answer at once. Robert informed Laval within four hours that he would comply with his orders. This definitely eliminates the possibility of our obtaining the use of French shipping now in Martinique.

Admiral Cooke then informed the President that the British were becoming conscious of the fact that the United States was engaged in a war in the Pacific and described his discussions with the British Staff Planners who recognized the necessity for adequate means being provided to handle the Pacific situation. He stated, however, that he did not feel that the British Chiefs of Staff were as yet convinced of this necessity. The Chiefs of Staff feel that we should maintain the status quo and simply hold, whereas the planners recognize that a constant pressure must be kept on the Japanese and that every effort must be made to keep China in the war. The Planners admit the possibility of the Chinese dropping out of the war.

The President then discussed the proposed operations in Burma. General Marshall informed him that just as he felt that we had convinced the British that Operation Ravenous should be undertaken, the Generalissimo had declined to participate. The reason given by the Generalissimo is that the British refuse to place a naval force in the Bay of Bengal to interrupt the Japanese line of communications. The Generalissimo feels that a definite commitment to this effect had been made by the Prime Minister in a talk last year before the Pacific Council. General Marshall said that the Prime Minister probably had the Anakim operation in mind.

Admiral Cooke stated that the British have no intention of undertaking an operation to recapture Burma in the present dry season.

General Marshall pointed out that the Chinese, particularly General Hsiung, had been loud in their complaints about failures to assist them, and now that we offer them assistance, they refuse our help.

16 
Saturday, 16 January

During the morning, the President had a number of callers, and for the sake of brevity, they are indicated as follows:

Called Departed
9:55 The Prime Minister 11:25
10:45 The Rt. Hon. H. Macmillan (British Resident in N. Africa) 11:20
10:50 Mr. Robert Murphy 11:20
11:00 Lt. General Eisenhower 11:15

The President, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lt. Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. were joined at luncheon today by Captain George Durno, Air Transport Command, who for many years before entering the Army, had covered the White House for the International News Service. Following luncheon, Chief Photographer’s Mate, Black, took some moving pictures and a number of still photographs at the luncheon party.

From 5:00 until 7:00 p.m., the following listed persons conferred with the President:

  • General George C. Marshall
  • Admiral E. J. King
  • Lt. General H. H. Arnold
  • Lt. General B. B. Somervell
  • Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr.
  • Brigadier General A. W. Wedemeyer
  • Brigadier General John R. Deane
  • Mr. Averell Harriman

The evening dinner party was somewhat unusual. Five members of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAACs) had been invited to take dinner with the President, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Col. Roosevelt, Lt. Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. and Captain George Durno of the Air Transport Command. Their names are listed below:
Captain Louise Anderson WAAC
Captain Ruth Briggs WAAC
Captain Mattie Pinette WAAC
Captain Martha Rogers WAAC
Captain Alene Drezmal WAAC

At 11:00 p.m., upon invitation of the President, the Prime Minister, General Alexander, Mr. Harriman, and Commander Thompson joined what was now an after-dinner party, departing at two o’clock the following morning.

No doubt, it may be safely said that not even by the wildest stretch of the imagination, could any of these Service ladies have foreseen that one evening, in a country far from their native land, they would be dining with the President of the United States, and later would be joined by the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

17

U.S. State Department (January 17, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
General Marshall General Brooke
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Lieutenant General Ismay
Commander Libby Major General Kennedy
Air Chief Marshal Slessor
Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 17, 1943, 10:30 a.m.

Secret
  1. The Eastern Theater

General Marshall proposed discussing a paper prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners regarding the forces needed in the Pacific Theater in 1943.

The British Chiefs of Staff stated that they would like to have an opportunity to study the paper before discussing it in detail.

General Marshall pointed out that in their discussions with the British Planners, the United States Planners were told that the British did not feel that Anakim was possible of accomplishment during the dry season of 1943-1944. He said that the United States Chiefs of Staff are particularly concerned about the timing of this operation because of the seriousness of the situation regarding China.

Admiral King added that Operation Anakim was also of importance with regard to our strategy in defeating Japan.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there were two stumbling blocks to Operation Anakim in 1943. These are naval cover and the assemblage of landing craft in sufficient time to permit adequate training. He felt the land forces could be found but that it would be difficult to assemble the landing craft following Operation Husky.

Sir Dudley Pound said that in order to do Operation Torch, it had been necessary to withdraw a considerable force from the Eastern Fleet and that it was probable the same conditions would pertain in operations undertaken in other theaters in 1943.

Admiral King said that Anakim was at least ten months off. He added that to postpone the date would put us in a critical situation. It is absolutely essential that we utilize China’s geographical position and their manpower and Anakim is a step in this direction.

Admiral Cooke said that he felt the operation could be started in November or December of 1943 and the actual landings be made in January. He said that there would be considerable landing craft available from production between April of 1943 and January of 1944. Some of this additional landing craft will be available for Burma in October. Therefore, the requirements for landing craft could probably be met. As for the naval force, he considered that we would only need carriers, destroyers, and cruisers. He did not feel that battleships would be necessary if the Japanese were being contained by the United States Fleet in the Pacific. The real bottleneck is the availability of shipping.

Admiral King said that he definitely considered that Operation Anakim must be aimed at in 1943 and carried through if the situation permits.

Sir Dudley Pound considered in such an important operation that battleship cover would be necessary.

Admiral King again pointed out that the operation would not be undertaken for at least ten months. By this time the destroyer program should be well along, the submarine menace should be reduced, and the shipping situation much improved through increased production and the opening of the Mediterranean. To postpone the operation in 1943 would result in not undertaking it for almost two years.

General Marshall then informed the Chiefs of Staff of a message which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had sent to the President in which he regretted that Chinese troops would not be able to participate in Operation Ravenous, the reasons being that the British ground forces are inadequate and that the British will not agree to engage the Eastern Fleet in the Bay of Bengal to interrupt the Japanese line of communications.

Lord Louis Mountbatten stated that the British Chiefs of Staff agree that the Burma Road must be opened and that the entire question is one of the availability of resources.

Admiral King said that the United States Chiefs of Staff recognize Germany is our prime enemy and that their strategy does not envisage a complete defeat of Japan before defeating Germany. He added, however, that every effort must be applied which will put us in a position of readiness from which we can operate against Japan after Germany has been defeated.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed to this unless the attainment of such positions of readiness would delay or jeopardize the defeat of Germany.

General Marshall said that he felt it was a question of creating more than positions of readiness as far as the Japanese are concerned. We must maintain the initiative against them by offensive moves on our part. The present operations in the South Pacific are tremendously expensive in merchant vessels, naval vessels, and escorts. The situation is also fraught with the possibility of a sudden reverse and the consequent loss of sea power. He said that he is most anxious to open the Burma Road, not so much for the morale effect on China as for the need to provide air support to China for operations against Japan and Japanese shipping. He said the expensive operations in which we are now engaged in the South Pacific react on everything else the United Nations attempt to do whether it be in the Mediterranean, the United Kingdom, or elsewhere. He discussed the situation in the Pacific as being so critical as to make it appear at one time that Operation Torch would have to be called off. He also stated that unless Operation Anakim could be undertaken, he felt that a situation might arise in the Pacific at any time that would necessitate the United States regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater.

General Marshall spoke of our commitments in the Pacific, of our responsibilities, with particular reference to the number of garrisons we have on small islands and the impossibility of letting any of them down. He insisted that the United States could not stand for another Bataan. He said that he is desirous of undertaking the Burma operation in order to reduce our hazards in the Pacific and thus undertake the campaign against Germany.

General Marshall spoke of other commitments in the Pacific that are serious but in which we have been willing to accept the hazards. In this connection he pointed to the Japanese operation in the Aleutians and the necessity of protecting the Hawaiian-Midway line of communications. In these instances, he felt that, while we were vulnerable to Japanese attack, support from the United States could be furnished quickly because of the relatively short distances involved.

General Marshall informed the Chiefs of Staff that the President is desirous of giving additional air support to China. This will be done because of the psychological results to be achieved despite the fact that it is a tremendously expensive operation.

Admiral King pointed out that the demands in the Pacific are enormous and continuous. Many of the demands are made by Australia, a Dominion of the British Commonwealth. Australia is in the area of the United States strategic responsibility and most of our efforts have been devoted to protecting its line of communications. He said, in this connection, that the political and military situations are interlocked and these factors must be considered together when deciding what operations are to be undertaken. He repeated that we must place ourselves in positions of readiness for the time when all the resources of the United Nations will be brought against Japan.

  1. Iceland

General Marshall asked for the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the size of the garrison which should be maintained in Iceland. At the present time there were some 40,000 United States’ ground troops in the island and two squadrons of fighter aircraft, together with a squadron of naval patrol craft. He was anxious to cut down these numbers.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British garrison had been about 22,000 men. In his view an invasion of Iceland by the Germans was quite out of the question. Taking into account the general attitude of the Germans and their unwillingness to risk their ships without heavy air cover in Northern waters, he did not think even a tip and run raid was at all likely. It was possible, of course, that they might change their policy, but the only object of a German attempt to seize the island would be to deny it to us as an air base. Our possession of it made our control of the Northern exit to the Atlantic more secure. It seemed much more likely that if the Germans wished to adopt a more active policy, they would use their surface ships against our convoys rather than for a hazardous expedition against Iceland. These were his first thoughts and he would like to have a more considered opinion prepared for the United States Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral King was in general agreement with the views of Sir Dudley Pound. He pointed out that the German situation had greatly changed during the last six months.

The Committee:
Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would prepare for the information of the United States Chiefs of Staff a memorandum setting out their views on the defense of Iceland.

  1. Russian Air Assistance for PQ Convoys

Admiral King suggested that more should be done to induce the Russians to attack the German air forces in Northern Norway which were such a menace to the Murmansk convoys. The German air bases were out of range from the United Kingdom but the Russians could undoubtedly do something if they wished to. The Murmansk route was the most important of the four routes for Russian supplies, and he felt we ought to press the Russians to give us more assistance.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British had pressed the Russians in 1942 to assist with escorts and with air attack. They did provide some assistance with escorts, but always found some reason for not sending their surface ships out as far as Bear Island where the danger was greatest. Whatever they might undertake to do, however, it would be quite unsafe to rely on their promises, and reduce the scale of our own protection.

As regards air, the British Mission had pressed the Russians hard for assistance, and the Prime Minister had also communicated with Mr. Stalin. In the end some Russian Army bombers had been sent North to attack the German airdromes. Such action, however, was only of very limited value. It would be no use asking them to attack the German ships since they were untrained in this work. Two British squadrons of Hampdens had been sent up to North Russia last year. At the beginning of the winter the British personnel had been withdrawn, and these were now maimed by the Russians. Recently, however, when the Lutzow and Hipper came out, the Russians failed to take any action against them with these aircraft, although asked to do so.

Sir Charles Portal said that the Germans had some seven airfields between Bodo and Petsamo, all well defended. The Russians had three airfields in the Murmansk-Archangel area. Bombing of airfields was very unprofitable. For example, Malta had only three airfields within 100 miles of Sicily but a very large force of German bombers had been quite unable to prevent us using them. Whatever they did, the Russians would not be able to stop the German air reconnaissance. Medium bombers and long-range fighters for their escorts would be required for the purpose; German fields were out of range of dive-bombing attack.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the possibility of amphibious operations to capture the German airfields had been most exhaustively examined by the British Staffs, but they had not been found practicable. The effect of Torch, however, had been very great in causing withdrawals of German aircraft from Norway. Their present strength was only about 53 aircraft all told, whereas they had had up to 300 previously.

Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that one of the greatest difficulties was that the convoys were open to attack for about ten days. This enabled the Germans to reinforce their airfields in Northern Norway from elsewhere before the convoy was out of the danger zone.

18

Roosevelt-Noguès conversation, noon

Present
United States France
President Roosevelt General Noguès
Mr. Murphy
Major General Patton
Brigadier General Wilbur
Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

McCrea Notes

Casablanca, January 17, 1943.

Memorandum for the President’s Files

At 1200 this date, the President received M. General Chas. A. Noguès, Resident General at Rabat. Also present were Major General G. S. Patton Jr., Commanding General, 1st Armored Corps; Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, 1st Armored Corps; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, North African Forces; Captain John L. McCrea, Naval Aide to the President, and Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, Air Corps Reserve.

The President greeted General Noguès with the remark that:

I am very pleased to meet you, General, and I must say that you look exactly like your photograph.

The General stated that all of Morocco was very proud to have the President here and that the President’s presence in Morocco was a source of much surprise to the General.

The President stated that he did not speak very good French and so therefore thought that the conversation should be carried on with the aid of Brigadier General Wilbur, as interpreter. The conversation started out thus, but before long the President and General Noguès were conversing freely in French.

The President stated that he trusted that North Africa had seen the last of the Germans for some time, to which the General readily agreed. The President inquired as to the attitude of the Germans resident in North Africa during the period of the Armistice. General Noguès stated that at all times they were haughty and overbearing, and that everyone was glad to see them depart. He also stated that they were now being well cared for by the French in various concentration camps.

General Patton remarked that the fine cooperation existing between the French and ourselves was largely due to the splendid cooperation which General Noguès had given us. The President remarked that he felt that the newspapers had been making much out of a situation which did not exist, namely, that there was confusion and misunderstanding between the French, the Americans and the British in North Africa, and that the period for “name calling is now over.” General Noguès assured the President that everyone was most anxious to cooperate with the United States forces, looking towards the ultimate defeat of the enemy.

The President requested General Noguès’ advice as to whether or not, he, the President, should ask the Sultan of Morocco to call on him. Specifically, the President asked if it would be in order for him to entertain the Sultan at lunch or dinner. To this, both General Noguès and General Patton replied that it would be a most gracious thing for the President to do, and that it would definitely cement relations between the Arabs and ourselves. It was then explained that amongst the Arabs no higher compliment can be paid than to invite one to break bread. General Noguès stated that it was equivalent to becoming one’s blood brother or fighting a campaign with him. In other words, it cemented relations between the host and guest. The President stated that he would despatch an invitation to the Sultan which he trusted could be delivered in time for the Sultan to make preparations to come to Casablanca. At this point, General Patton stated that the letter should be delivered by no one less than a General officer, in company with General Noguès. The President stated that when the letter was ready to go, he would give it to his Naval Aide, as his personal representative, who would go in company with an Army general and General Noguès, and deliver the letter to the Sultan.

Discussion was had about the progress being made in repairing ships that were sunk in Casablanca harbor incident to the occupation. As to this, General Noguès could remark only generally, stating that he was not familiar with the details of such repairs. It was stated, however, by General Patton, that it would be most difficult to make repairs to these ships unless in some way they could be moved to American shipyards; that the conversion of the metric system plans to our units of measurement would be a job that would require at least a year’s work. Conversation along this line was further pursued in connection with our field pieces and small arms. It was remarked by General Patton that much of our field piece ammunition was interchangeable with the French, but that the small arms situation was another matter. It would be much the easier, the General stated, to equip the French troops with small arms of our manufacture.

The matter of political prisoners was then discussed. General Noguès stated that for the most part the Jews had now been released from the concentration camps. It was also stated that the Jews, especially those in Algeria, had raised the point that they wish restored to them at once the right of suffrage. The President stated that the answer to that was very simple, namely, that there just weren’t going to be any elections, so the Jews need not worry about the privilege of voting. Mr. Murphy remarked that the Jews in North Africa were very much disappointed that “the war for liberation” had not immediately resulted in their being given their complete freedom. The President stated that he felt the whole Jewish problem should be studied very carefully and that progress should be definitely planned. In other words, the number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population. Such a plan would therefore permit the Jews to engage in the professions, at the same time would not permit them to overcrowd the professions, and would present an unanswerable argument that they were being given their full rights. To the foregoing, General Noguès agreed generally, stating at the same time that it would be a sad thing for the French to win the war merely to open the way for the Jews to control the professions and the business world of North Africa. The President stated that his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over fifty percent of the lawyers, doctors, school teachers, college professors, etc., in Germany, were Jews.

At 12:45 p.m., General Noguès, accompanied by General Patton and Brigadier General Wilbur, withdrew to proceed to the villa occupied by Prime Minister Churchill.

Note: Shortly after the above interview started, General Patton whispered to Captain McCrea that General Noguès was scheduled to see the Prime Minister at 12:15 p.m.; that he, General Patton, had been informed by the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff, to this effect. General Patton asked whether or not he should make an announcement to the President at 12:15 about the scheduled conference with Mr. Churchill. To this, Captain McCrea replied that under no circumstances should he make such an announcement, and that the President would indicate when his conversation with General Noguès was at an end. About 12:30, General Patton again stated to Captain McCrea that he felt that he should indicate that the hour for the Prime Minister’s conference with General Noguès had passed, and that the party should proceed to the Prime Minister’s villa. Captain McCrea again told General Patton that under no circumstances should such an announcement be made. Upon the conclusion of General Noguès’ conference with the President, Captain McCrea informed the President as to what had taken place between General Patton and him.

JOHN McCREA

19

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon, 1:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt
20

Roosevelt-Giraud conversation, 4:20 p.m.

Present
United States France
President Roosevelt General Giraud
Mr. Murphy
Major General Clark
Captain McCrea

McCrea Notes 

Casablanca, January 17, 1943.

Memorandum for the President’s Files

At 4:20 p.m., January 17, 1943, the President received General Henri Giraud, Commander of the French Armies in North Africa. Present also were Lieutenant General Wayne M. [Mark W.] Clark, U.S. Army, Minister Robert D. Murphy and Captain John L. McCrea, U.S. Navy.

After pleasantries had been exchanged, the conversation got down to specific cases. General Giraud early stated that there was only one thing that mattered in all the activity of today and that was the future of France. He stated that in his judgment, all personal ambitions should be subordinated to this thought and that he for one was most willing to do this. He stated that he believed there should be no discussions on a political level and that the civil administrations of French possessions and protectorates in Africa should remain as they are now established. Here followed a discussion of sovereignty, the President pointing out that sovereignty in the United States and in the nation of France rested in the people; this in distinction to sovereignty in Great Britain, which rests in the King. The President pointed out that as a legalistic and constitutional matter it was quite correct to say that there could be no change in the French civil setup until such time as the people of France were able to exercise their inherent rights in this regard. The President stated that, for example, in his judgment M. Lebrun was still the President of France regardless of the fall of the French government and that he would remain the President of France until the French people had an opportunity to again exercise their political rights. To the foregoing, General Giraud agreed.

The President stated that the discussion could therefore be narrowed down to two items. First, the establishment of an army by the French to assist in throwing the enemy out of the French protectorates in Africa and out of the French home land, and second, a determination on the part of all concerned that there will be no political discussions until the country has been freed of the enemy. Enlarging on the first point, the President asked General Giraud if, in his judgment it would be possible for French North Africa to raise and support an Army of 400,000 men. To this, General Giraud replied in the negative, stating that while troops were available, equipment and white officers and white non-commissioned officers were not available. The President stated that he had been informed by General Noguès that many French officers and non-commissioned officers were surreptitiously leaving France and crossing the Pyrenees into Spain, and that the problem seemed to be to get them to North Africa. The President stated that Spain had set a very fine precedent in permitting the Roumanian King, Carol, and his mistress, Magda Lupescu, to “escape” into Portugal, from whence it was possible for them to proceed to the Western Hemisphere. In this regard, General Giraud remarked that Spain desperately needed phosphates from North Africa, and an agreement might be concluded whereby for every shipload of phosphates the Spaniards got, North Africa in return would receive a shipload of Army evacuees.

The President then remarked that he felt it would be a very splendid thing if Generals Giraud and de Gaulle could get together and handle the military situation for Africa, and together with a leading civilian, from a “Committee for the Liberation of France.” General Giraud met the suggestion with enthusiasm. He stated that he was very certain that he and General de Gaulle could work out some military arrangement. General Giraud asked if there were any objection to bringing Madagascar, Reunion, etc., into the African picture. The President stated that he felt that for the time being, all French territory outside the African continent should be excluded from the agreement. This, the President pointed out, would permit de Gaulle to continue in control of the territory over which he now exercises such control, it would permit Robert, as Vichy representative, to continue in control of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, etc., etc. “It just occurs to me that by so doing, a number of untoward situations may be thus avoided.” The President stated that with the inauguration of the “Committee for the Liberation of France,” the French Imperial Council should be disbanded. General Giraud remarked that he was already satisfied with the manner in which M. Boisson was administering Dakar and General Noguès was administering Rabat, but that Algeria represented a different situation; that there was no one at the moment whom he thought capable of administering that area.

The President asked General Giraud as to the Jewish situation in Algeria. This was discussed at some length and the President set forth to General Giraud his views as he had done in this connection to General Noguès. General Giraud did not think the Jewish problem an insurmountable one.

General Giraud then asked that he be permitted to express to the President his great admiration for the Atlantic Charter, adding that he felt that pronouncement held great hope for all occupied countries and small countries throughout the world.

General Giraud spoke at length about the continental campaign to crush Germany for once and for all. He stated that in his judgment, on the conclusion of this war, Germany should be occupied. He said that this had also been his conviction at the end of the last war. The President stated that it was well known that both General Foch and General Pershing wanted to occupy Germany, but that this was denied for political considerations, and that the unwisdom of this policy had long ago become apparent to all. General Giraud then dramatically stated that it would be observed that he wore no ribbons or decorations; that he had foresworn wearing them until he could march down Unter Den Linden at the head of the occupational forces of Germany.

At the President’s suggestion, General Giraud then told in detail of his escape from Germany and his subsequent escape from France to North Africa. The details of the General’s escape from Germany are fantastic and could hardly be conceived by a writer of fiction.

At 5:30 p.m., the interview terminated with much cordiality, and General Giraud, General Clark and Mr. Murphy withdrew to proceed to the villa occupied by the Prime Minister.

JOHN McCREA

21

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner, 8 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Harriman Lord Leathers
Admiral King Admiral Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell

Admiral King, recounting his conversation with the Prime Minister the previous evening, said that Mr. Churchill had committed himself to undertaking Anakim in 1943 and that he was agreeable to operation Ravenous, concerning which there still remains the question of Chinese cooperation. They had thoroughly discussed the submarine situation and Mr. Churchill appeared agreeable to giving highest priority to bombing the submarine bases, building yards, and assembly points, although he said the United States must help. The Prime Minister objected to our ‘putting the cart before the horse’ with respect to Pacific operations, and said we had refused to give the British accurate information as to our landing craft program and as to our dispositions in the Pacific. He appeared greatly concerned over our stand with respect to Pacific operations. With respect to the Burma operation, Admiral King had tried to explain to the Prime Minister his concept regarding the geographical position and manpower of China. The President was anxious to get additional airplanes to General Chennault, which could not be supplied unless the upper Burma Road is opened. Admiral King understands the purpose of Ravenous to be to open this upper Burma Road in order to improve communications to China. He feels that Chiang Kai-shek should be urged to move at once.

22 
Sunday, 17 January

The first important caller of the day was M. General Charles A. Noguès, Resident General at Rabat, who had been met by Captain McCrea upon arrival at Casablanca. The General was ushered into the President just at noon. General Noguès was accompanied by Major General G. S. Patton Jr., Commanding General First Armored Corps, Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, First Armored Corps, and Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief North African Forces. Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt was also present during this conference. At 12:45 General Noguès, accompanied by General Patton and Brigadier General Wilbur, withdrew to the Prime Minister’s villa. (Note: Conference notes, made by Captain McCrea, recorded separately),

Following the departure of General Noguès, the Prime Minister called at the President’s villa at 1:30 and remained for luncheon with the President and Mr. Hopkins, taking his departure at 2:50 p.m.

At 3:30 p.m., Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Commanding General Fifth Army, called on the President, to depart momentarily at four o’clock. At 4:14 p.m., he returned, escorting General Henri Giraud, Commander of the French Armies in North Africa, who had an appointment to confer with the President. The President conferred with General Giraud from 4:20 until 5:30, General Clark, Minister Murphy, and Captain McCrea also being present during this meeting. (Note: Conference notes, made by Captain McCrea, recorded separately).

Upon the termination of the conference, General Giraud, General Clark, and Minister Murphy withdrew to the Prime Minister’s villa.

At eight o’clock in the evening, the Prime Minister, Lord Leathers, Admiral Cunningham, Admiral King, Lt. General Somervell, and Mr. Harriman dined with the President and his household. Following dinner, the main subject of the conversation was “shipping”, lasting until one o’clock in the morning when the President’s dinner guests took their leave.

23

U.S. State Department (January 18, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
General Marshall General Brooke
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill Admiral Cunningham
Rear Admiral Cooke Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Hull Major General Kennedy
Colonel Smart Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Commander Libby Captain Lambe, RN
Brigadier Stewart
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod
Lieutenant Colonel Howkins
Brigadier Jacob
Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 18, 1943, 10:30 a.m.

Secret
  1. Operations in Burma
    (C.C.S. 154)

At the request of General Marshall, Admiral Cooke discussed the landing craft situation in regard to Operation Anakim. He said the United States Planners had estimated the number of landing craft of types built by the United States which would be required for Operation Anakim would be available in November 1943. These requirements can be made available from United States production and they will be in addition to allocations of landing craft already made. There has been uncertainty as to what the production of landing craft would be because of the necessity of revising the whole production program in the United States.

Sir Alan Brooke asked if this number of landing craft would be available over and above those needed in all other operations under consideration, including Roundup.

Admiral Cooke replied that the landing craft which would be made available for Anakim would be from United States production that will be too late for other operations in 1943 which are being considered.

Lord Louis Mounbatten stated that the British will be unable to man additional landing craft beyond those for which they are asking.

Sir Alan Brooke then described the proposed Operation Anakim. The operation must start by the middle of December in order to clear up the communications to the north after the capture of Rangoon. To protect the flank it would be necessary to occupy Moulmein and the airports on the west coast of Thailand. It will be necessary to protect the east flank to prevent the Japanese from coming in from Thailand by routes that are capable of sustaining a maximum of five divisions, in order to insure that once in Burma, our forces remain there. Thereafter, it will also be necessary to maintain adequate air and naval cover to keep open the lines of communication to Rangoon.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that naval forces must be built up for the operation. As far as air power is concerned, 18 squadrons will be available and can be provided. The landing craft is the most ticklish question. Landing craft training establishments have now been provided for two brigade groups in the Mediterranean and one in India. There is also a mobile overseas reserve but it will take three months to move this after it completes operations either in the Mediterranean or operations from the United Kingdom. He believed that the necessary shipping could be made available but that the two main bottlenecks were naval coverage and landing craft.

Admiral King stated that we can count on shipping some landing craft from the Southwest Pacific to Burma together with operating crews. These could probably be made available in Burma in November. While the operation was at least ten months off, he did not see why necessary naval coverage could not be assembled, either by having the United States relieve the British from naval missions elsewhere so that they could furnish the Burma coverage, or by supplying the deficiency from the United States naval units to participate in the Burma operation. He stated that he was willing to commit himself to assisting the British in these operations.

Admiral King stated that our use of landing craft in the Pacific would be in the Rabaul operations primarily. Operations beyond Rabaul would not require landing craft of the types needed for Rabaul. The Rabaul operations would be completed long before Anakim would be mounted. He added that even though we had gone beyond Rabaul in the Pacific, the operations could be curtailed or lessened in order to insure the success of Anakim in view of its importance.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the possibility of securing help from the Pacific altered the whole situation as far as the British were concerned and that with the assistance of the United States, he thought that the necessary landing craft could be assembled.

General Marshall then asked Sir Alan Brooke to discuss the relation between Operation Ravenous and Operation Anakim.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Operation Cannibal now being undertaken was for the purpose of securing the airport in Akyab. This is necessary in order to furnish air support for future operations. He described Akyab as a locality in no man’s land lightly garrisoned by both sides.

He described Operation Ravenous as one to improve the line of communications preparatory to Operation Anakim, in order to drive in from the North at the same time as the offensive from the South. A British corps is to secure bridgeheads over the Chindwin River and improve the road between Imphal and Kalewa, to connect it with the Chindwin River for use as a supply line to the South. The Ramgarh force was to advance on Myitkyina from Ledo which will also enable us to build a road between these two points. This road will be of value in supplying our forces in Operation Anakim and also will be used as a connecting road to join with the main Burma Road into China.

Sir Alan Brooke gave a résumé of the present conditions of roads in Burma which indicated that all are badly in need of improvement. He said that all of the component operations of Ravenous are independent of each other. The operation of the British 2nd Corps from Imphal is thus independent of the action taken by the Chinese Ramgarh and Yunnan forces. The improvement of the road from Ledo was only possible to the extent of the advance made by the Ramgarh force.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Anakim is now definitely on the books, is being planned, and should be put to the front. With the assistance from the United States Navy in providing landing craft, the operation would be feasible.

Lord Louis Mountbatten then discussed again the question of landing craft with particular reference to paragraph 9(d) of C.C.S. 154. In reply to a question from General Marshall, he stated that the assault force in England would remain there as a permanent spearhead in case of a crack in German morale. The overseas assault force contains sufficient landing craft to undertake the operation in Burma by October 1st provided that they had not been used in operations elsewhere. If they had been so used, their use in Burma would be delayed for a period of three months following the termination of the operation in which they had been engaged. He added, however, that with the assistance promised by Admiral King from the South Pacific, he felt that sufficient landing craft could be assembled to mount Anakim.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that the amphibious operations in Anakim would have to be supported by aircraft based on carriers.

Admiral King said the main point was that we should plan to do Anakim in 1943.

The Committee:
a) Agreed that all plans and necessary preparations should be made for the purpose of mounting Anakim in 1943.

b) Agreed that the actual mounting of Operation Anakim would be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the summer of 1943 (preferably not later than July) in the light of the situation then existing.

c) Took note that if Anakim is mounted in 1943, the United States will assist in making up deficiencies in the necessary landing craft and naval forces by diversion from the Pacific Theater, and in merchant shipping, if necessary.

  1. The Situation to Be Created in the Eastern Theater (The Pacific and Burma) in 1943
    (C.C.S. 153 and 153/1)

Sir Alan Brooke stated that the British Chiefs of Staff took exception to paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 153 in that it did not provide that Germany must be defeated before undertaking the defeat of the Japanese.

General Marshall stated that, in his opinion, the British Chiefs of Staff wished to be certain that we keep the enemy engaged in the Mediterranean and that at the same time maintain a sufficient force in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in the German strength either from the withdrawal of their forces in France or because of lowered morale. He inferred that the British Chiefs of Staff would prefer to maintain such a force in the United Kingdom dormant and awaiting an opportunity rather than have it utilized in a sustained attack elsewhere. The United States Chiefs of Staff know that they can use these forces offensively in the Pacific Theater. He felt that the question resolved itself into whether we would maintain a large force in the United Kingdom awaiting an opportunity or keep the force engaged in an active offensive in the Pacific.

General Marshall said that the number of troops used in the Pacific would not have much effect on the build-up of forces in the United Kingdom. The conflict arises chiefly in the use of landing craft and shipping. He said that to a large measure the shipping used in the Pacific is already committed and, therefore, could not be made available for a build-up of forces in the United Kingdom and the necessity of maintaining them. These forces are at the end of a long line of communications and the question arises as to whether we should let them remain there precariously or do something to improve their situation.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that we have reached a stage in the war where we must review the correctness of our basic strategic concept which calls for the defeat of Germany first. He was convinced that we cannot defeat Germany and Japan simultaneously. The British Chiefs of Staff have arrived at the conclusion that it will be better to concentrate on Germany. Because of the distances involved, the British Chiefs of Staff believe that the defeat of Japan first is impossible and that if we attempt to do so, we shall lose the war.

He said that having decided that it is necessary to defeat Germany first, the immediate question is whether to attempt to do so by an invasion of Northern France or to exploit our successes in North Africa. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that an all-out Mediterranean effort is best but that it must be “all-out.”

He said the British Chiefs of Staff appreciate the position in the Pacific and that they will do everything they can to meet it but that they feel we must give first consideration to the defeat of Germany. This can be done by finishing Tunisia and then operating in the Mediterranean so as to draw the maximum number of German ground and air forces from the Russian front. In undertaking operations in the Mediterranean, assistance from the United States is necessary. He felt that if we do not maintain constant pressure on Germany, they will be given an opportunity to recover and thus prolong the war.

General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff do not propose doing nothing in the Mediterranean or in France; they have no idea that we should not concentrate first on defeating Germany. The question that is to be decided is how this can best be accomplished. On the other hand, it is the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the war should be ended as quickly as possible, which cannot be accomplished if we neglect the Pacific theater entirely and leave the Japanese to consolidate their gains and unnecessarily strengthen their position.

General Marshall said that he advocated an attack on the Continent but that he was opposed to immobilizing a large force in the United Kingdom, awaiting an uncertain prospect, when they might be better engaged in offensive operations which are possible.

General Marshall stated that it was apparently agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to give Russia every possible assistance and to endeavor to bring Turkey into the war. His primary concern with the operations in the Pacific was to insure that our positions would be so strengthened as to provide us with the means for necessary operations rather than to continue conducting them on a “shoestring.” He felt that this would ultimately reduce the necessity for tonnage in the Pacific and this was his chief reason for advocating operations in Burma.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff certainly did not want to keep forces tied up in Europe doing nothing. During the build-up period, however, the first forces to arrive from America could not be used actively against the enemy; a certain minimum concentration had to be effected before they could be employed. His point was that we should direct our resources to the defeat of Germany first. He agreed as to the desirability of Anakim since it appeared that for this operation we could use forces available in the theater without detracting from the earliest possible defeat of Germany. This conception was focused in paragraph 2(c) of the British Joint Planning Staff’s paper (C.C.S. 153/1) in which it was stated that we agreed in principle with the U. S. strategy in the Pacific “provided always that its application does not prejudice the earliest possible defeat of Germany.”

Admiral King pointed out that this expression might be read as meaning that anything which was done in the Pacific interferred with the earliest possible defeat of Germany and that the Pacific theater should therefore remain totally inactive.

Sir Charles Portal said that this was certainly not the understanding of the British Chiefs of Staff who had always accepted that pressure should be maintained on Japan. They had, perhaps, misunderstood the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and thought that the point at issue was whether the main effort should be in the Pacific or in the United Kingdom. The British view was that for getting at Germany in the immediate future, the Mediterranean offered better prospects than Northern France. For this purpose, they were advocating Mediterranean operations with amphibious forces while concentrating, so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, on building up a large heavy bomber force, which was the only form of force that could operate continuously against Germany.

General Marshal said that he was most anxious not to become committed to interminable operations in the Mediterranean. He wished Northern France to be the scene of the main effort against Germany – that had always been his conception.

Sir Charles Portal said that it was impossible to say exactly where we should stop in the Mediterranean since we hoped to knock Italy out altogether. This action would give the greatest support to Russia and might open the door to an invasion of France.

General Marshall pointed out that extended operations in the Mediterranean as well as the concentration of forces in England for the invasion of Northern France might well prevent us from undertaking operations in Burma; he was not at all in favor of this. Moreover, American forces at present in the Southwest Pacific were desperately short at present of their immediate requirements.

Admiral King said that we had on many occasions been close to a disaster in the Pacific. The real point at issue was to determine the balance between the effort to be put against Germany and against Japan, but we must have enough in the Pacific to maintain the initiative against the Japanese. The U.S. intentions were not to plan for anything beyond gaining positions in readiness for the final offensive against Japan. He felt very strongly, however, that the details of such operations must be left to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, who were strategically responsible for the Pacific theater. He did not feel this was a question for a decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted before the British undertook operations in Madagascar and French Somaliland – nor did they expect to be; but the same considerations applied to the details of operations in the Pacific.

In his view there would be plenty of forces in the theater for all necessary operations in the Mediterranean and it was now determined that such operations should be undertaken. The operations contemplated in the Pacific, however, would have no effect on what could be done in the Mediterranean or from the United Kingdom.

Sir Charles Portal said that the British Chiefs of Staff would be satisfied if they could be assured of this point. Their fear was that the result of extended operations in the Pacific might be an insufficient concentration in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in Germany.

General Marshall pointed out that the whole concept of defeating Germany first had been jeopardized by the lack of resources in the Pacific. Heavy bombers set up to go to the United Kingdom had had to be diverted to the South Pacific to avoid disaster there. Fortunately disaster had been avoided; but if it had occurred, there would have been a huge diversion of U.S. effort to the Pacific theater. The U.S. had nearly been compelled to pull out of Torch and the decision to spare the necessary naval forces from the Pacific had been a most courageous one on the part of Admiral King. A hand-to-mouth policy of this nature was most uneconomical. He was anxious to get a secure position in the Pacific so that we knew where we were. The recon-quest of Burma would be an enormous contribution to this and would effect ultimately a great economy of forces.

Discussion then turned on the operations proposed to secure the Pacific theater, which were set out in C.C.S. 153.

Sir Alan Brooke said that in the British view it would be sufficient to stop at Rabaul and Anakim and that to go on to Truk would take up too much force. There would inevitably be large shipping losses in the course of such operations, which would be a continuous drain on our resources.

Admiral King pointed out that the proposed operations would be carried out one after the other. After Rabaul had been captured, the same forces might be employed to go on to the Marshalls. Rabaul might be taken by May and Anakim could not start before November. During the intervening months, surely the troops in the theater should not be allowed to remain idle but should be employed to keep up pressure on the Japanese and maintain the initiative. Only by this means could we offset the advantage which the Japanese had in their possession of interior lines. Operations into the Marshalls could be stopped at any point desired and were not an unlimited commitment which had to be seen through to the end. It might well be that Truk would, after all, be found impossible to capture this year.

General Marshall said that there seemed general agreement as to the need for the capture of Rabaul and the desirability of Anakim. Could it not be agreed that operations should be continued as far as Truk if it were possible with the forces available at that time? There should be no question of sacrificing Anakim for Truk.

Sir Charles Portal said he would not like to be committed to Anakim, even with forces released after the capture of Rabaul, without first reviewing whether some other operation more profitable to the war as a whole might not be desirable. For example, to take an extreme case, suppose after the capture of Rabaul a good opportunity arose, owing to a crack in Germany, of breaking into France. Should we refuse to take advantage of it because we were already committed to Anakim?

General Marshall felt that if such a situation arose we should certainly seize the opportunity. He agreed that a further meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be necessary in the summer to decide these questions.

Sir Alan Brooke proposed that at the present time we should limit our outlook in the Pacific to Rabaul, which should certainly be undertaken, and to preparations for Anakim, the decision to launch this being taken later. Similarly, any decision on Truk should be deferred.

Admiral King pointed out that the effect of this would be strictly to limit commitments in the Pacific, although the British Chiefs of Staff apparently contemplated an unlimited commitment in the European theater.

General Marshall agreed that a decision on Anakim and Truk could be left until later. He pointed out that C.C.S. 153 merely proposed a series of operations which might be carried out in 1943 with the means available.

Admiral King said that on logistic grounds alone it would be impossible to bring forces from the Pacific theater to the European theater. Anakim was not therefore an alternative to operations in the European theater.

General Somervell supported this view. He pointed out that, once Rabaul had been seized, ships would be required to maintain the garrison there and these could be employed to exploit success by minor operations against other islands.

As regards landing craft, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had committed themselves to supply a large proportion of the craft needed for Anakim. Operations against the Pacific Islands required combat loaders and not the tank-landing ships and tank-landing craft which were needed elsewhere.

Admiral Cooke said that a very large proportion of the U.S. shipping in the Pacific was needed for the maintenance of the Fleet, which was operating 7,000 miles from its home bases. This requirement would continue whether or not operations against Truk were undertaken. U.S. production of LSTs would shortly amount to about fifteen per month. These could not be ready in time for Mediterranean operations in the summer, but would be available for Anakim. As regards land forces, the figure of 250,000 put down in C.C.S. 153 included 150,000 men now in movement or set up to move, and another two divisions which he understood were already earmarked for operations in Burma this year from India. This left a total of only some 50,000 men additional for the whole Pacific theater.

Sir Charles Portal reiterated that it would be unwise to accept a definite commitment for Anakim now since a favorable situation might arise in Europe during the year which would make operations in the European theater more profitable than anything in the Pacific.

Admiral King said that forces set out in C.C.S. 153 constituted the minimum necessary to maintain pressure on the Japanese. Although the forces in the Pacific were primarily for defensive purposes, many of them could be used simultaneously for minor offensives, such as air bombardment of Japanese bases. Favorable opportunities might then be seized for exploitation.

General Marshall suggested that paragraph 11 (c) of C.C.S. 153 could be revised to read “seizure and occupation of Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands up to and including Truk with the resources available in the theater.”

(The meeting adjourned at this point.)

On the resumption of their meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft note setting out tentative agreements which appeared to have been reached in the preceding discussion.

After some further discussion,

The Committee:
a) Invited General Ismay and General Hull to redraft this note to include further points which had been raised.

b) Instructed the Secretaries to circulate this draft for discussion at the next meeting.

  1. Escort Vessels

Sir Dudley Pound emphasized the need for the Combined Chiefs of Staff having before them a proper survey of the escort vessel position before taking any final decision on operations during the coming year. He recapitulated the British needs for additional escorts in the Atlantic and pointed out that considerable U.S. assistance would be required not only in the Atlantic but also for Husky if that operation were undertaken. When escorts were withdrawn for an operation such as Torch or Husky, they were absent from their normal duties for about four months. It took at least one month to collect them beforehand from the various convoys on which they were working and a similar period to redistribute them after the operation. Experience in Torch had shown that it was not possible to release them from the operation itself under about two months.

Admiral King said that with the U.S. and U.K. construction coming out during the next six months, the position should be easier by July, when Husky was to be launched. He thought it should be possible to find additional escorts for the Atlantic as well as those required for Husky. If the use of combat loaders for Husky could be cut to the minimum, escort requirements would be correspondingly reduced.

Sir Dudley Pound said that new construction in the U.K. was comparatively small during the first half of 1943 and would do little more than make good recent heavy losses.

Admiral Cooke said that the examination of the escort position by the British Joint Planning Staff was progressing well but it appeared that the total number of U.S. and British escort vessels would not be sufficient to provide any surplus after providing for normal convoy work. Any operations undertaken would therefore involve accepting increased losses in normal convoys. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would have to decide what losses would be acceptable.

The discussion then turned on the relation of PQ convoys to Mediterranean operations.

Sir Dudley Pound said that one problem was whether a 30-ship convoy every forty days would be considered sufficient for Russia or whether we should be pressed, as we had been in the past, to increase Russian deliveries. The worst three months were from February to the middle of May when daylight hours were increasing and the channel was restricted by ice. Later in the year the ice retreated and although the days were longer, the passage of convoys became less dangerous.

General Marshall felt that we should not again risk the same heavy losses which had been sustained on the Russian convoys in 1942. Such losses were likely to cripple our whole offensive effort against the enemy. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should include a reference to this effect in the note which was being drafted. One alleviating factor was the improvement in the Persian Gulf route which would offset reductions on the Murmansk route.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the Prime Minister had made it clear to Mr. Stalin that we might have to call off PQ convoys if the scale of German attack became too heavy. If warning was given of our intention to stop the convoys, there was likely to be heavy pressure to increase deliveries during the early part of the year, when, as he had previously explained, conditions were most difficult. This meant either increasing the size of the convoys or reducing the cycle. The dangers which we were likely to face this year were much greater than last year.

24
  1. Potentialities of Polish Forces

Sir Alan Brooke, in answer to a question by General Marshall, said that the Polish forces consisted (1) of a “secret” army inside Poland and (2) of regular Polish troops outside the country. As regards the first, there was a definite organization of determined men; with leaders, though they were almost entirely unarmed. Their intelligence service had been good, but recently many of their agents had been caught by the Germans and less information about German forces was now coming out from Poland. General Sikorski claimed that by the use of this organization he could do great damage on the Polish railways to interrupt German communications at a critical moment. There could be no doubt that this secret army would play a valuable part in the final rising against Germany, particularly if combined with similar action in adjacent Balkan countries. There was always a danger of a premature rising, however.

The Polish forces outside Poland consisted of an armored division and a parachute brigade with certain other units in the United Kingdom and 2 divisions and 2 brigade groups in the Middle East. General Sikorski’s conception was to get some of these troops into Poland to supplement the secret army. The difficulty was the method of transport, on which General Sikorski was rather vague. He envisaged the use of air transport and parachutes, but there were obvious limitations in this.

General Marshall inquired whether any steps had been taken to meet a request of General Sikorski for the bombing of an area in Poland from which the Germans were clearing out all Polish inhabitants under circumstances of great brutality.

Sir Charles Portal said the Poles had been informed that this operation was impracticable, but steps would be taken to publicize the presence of Polish air forces in the raids on Berlin which might be considered partly as a reprisal on behalf of Poland.

  1. Raids on Berlin

Sir Charles Portal gave details of the recent raids on Berlin, and estimated that, making all allowance for the comparative sizes of London and Berlin and the time interval, the two raids on Berlin on successive nights had hit Berlin about twice as hard as London had been hit in the two heaviest raids of April and May 1941. The aggregate losses in the two Berlin raids amounted to 6 percent, the figure expected being 10 percent. The effect of the raids would be largely morale though there were important electrical works in the area attacked. They would be a great encouragement to the Russians as well as the Poles.

(Sir Andrew Cunningham entered the meeting at this point.)

  1. Naval Situation in the Western Mediterranean

Admiral Cunningham said that the Germans might threaten our shipping passing through the Straits of Gibraltar by U-boats and by aircraft and coast defense guns from Southern Spain. He considered the risk from U-boats was comparatively small. The Germans had never been able to maintain many U-boats in the Straits where currents made their operation difficult. The danger from aircraft would be no less than to coastal convoys along the east coast of England. Provided we had fighters established in the airfields of Spanish Morocco, we should be able to deal with this threat. Coast defense guns constituted the greatest danger, but only experience would show how bad this would be. The guns were supposed to have Radar range-finding apparatus but we had means of jamming this which would probably be effective. The guns would have to be neutralized by counter-battery from the southern shore and by air bombardment.

He thought that ships with a speed of 11 knots and upwards would get through the Straits without heavy losses even with the Germans in Southern Spain provided we held Spanish Morocco. Even without it, we should be able to get some convoys through by night. The Planning Staffs at Algiers had been examining the problem and their preliminary conclusions were that if we seized Majorca we should be able to prevent the Germans building up a large air strength in Southern Spain.

Sir Dudley Pound said that in spite of the German coast defense guns on the French shore of the Straits of Dover, we had not lost a ship from them. The range, however, was some 38,000 yards, whereas the distance across the Straits of Gibraltar was only about half that.

Sir Alan Brooke said that a plan had been prepared for seizing Southern Spain with a force of about six divisions. It would not be possible, however, to do this at the same time as Husky. It must be remembered that even if the Spaniards offered no resistance at all it would take some time for the Germans to become fully established in Southern Spain.

Admiral Cunningham, referring to the possibility of capturing Sicily, said that he did not anticipate very heavy shipping losses in the operation but the actual assault of the beaches would be a very expensive operation. He did not consider that the possession of the island would very greatly add to the security of the sea route through the Mediterranean. If we were in Sicily, he would estimate this route as being 90 percent or more secure; without Sicily, it would be about 85 percent secure, once we held the whole of the North African coast.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that from the air point of view the possession of Sicily would make a very considerable difference. If the Germans were not in the island, it would be difficult for them to operate against our shipping at all; they would have to use bases in Sardinia and the mainland of Italy, which were a considerable distance from the Narrows.

Admiral Cunningham then described the naval situation in the Tunisia area. The Germans had made heavy attacks on Bône on three successive days damaging four merchant ships and a cruiser, but the defenses were now much improved and our cruisers were still operating from the port. We had at first sunk about one ship a day, but the Germans were getting far too many ships into Tunisia now. We should be able to inflict much greater damage on them as soon as we had fully organized our arrangements. Steps were now being taken to block the channel between the Italian minefields with our own mines.

25

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:15 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt
26

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Admiral of the Fleet Pound
General Marshall Field Marshal Dill
Admiral King General Brooke
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes 

January 18, 1943, 5 p.m.

Secret

The President and the Prime Minister asked the Chiefs of Staff for a report of progress regarding the current conferences.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that after seven days of argument he felt that definite progress had been made. A document is now being prepared setting forth the general strategic policy for 1943. This will be gone over in detail at the C.C.S. meeting on the morning of January 19th.

Sir Alan Brooke summarized the document as follows:

  1. A statement that the measures to be taken to combat the submarine menace are a first charge on the resources of the United Nations and provide security for all of our operations.

  2. A statement that we shall concentrate on the defeat of Germany first which will be followed by the defeat of Japan.

  3. Our efforts in defeating Germany will be concerned first with efforts to force them to withdraw ground and air forces from the Russian front. This will be accomplished by operations from North Africa by which Southern Europe, the Dodecanese Islands, Greece, Crete, Sardinia, and Sicily will all be threatened, thus forcing Germany to deploy her forces to meet each threat. The actual operation decided upon is the capture of Sicily.

At the same time, we shall go on with preparing forces and assembling landing craft in England for a thrust across the Channel in the event that the German strength in France decreases, either through withdrawal of her troops or because of an internal collapse.

  1. Operations in the Pacific are to be continued to include the capture of Rabaul and Eastern New Guinea while plans are to be prepared to extend the operations to the Marshall Islands and the capture of Truk if the situation permits.

  2. Plans and preparations to undertake Operation Anakim late in 1943 are to be instituted at once with the understanding that the United States will assist to make up deficiencies in landing craft and naval vessels needed for this operation. The operation is to be planned for December of 1943 with the view to capturing Burma and opening the Burma Road prior to the monsoon season of 1944.

  3. The maximum combined air offensive will be conducted against Germany from the United Kingdom. By this and every other available means, attempts will be made to undermine Germany’s morale.

  4. Every effort will be made, political and otherwise, to induce Turkey to enter the war in order that we may establish air bases there for operations against Rumania.

  5. Operation Ravenous will be undertaken for the purpose of establishing bridgeheads over the Chindwin River, and also to prepare roads and airfields in northern Burma which will facilitate the mounting of Operation Anakim toward the end of the year. In this connection, Operation Cannibal is now being undertaken with a view to securing air bases in the Akyab area.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that Chiang Kai-shek wishes to postpone his part of Operation Ravenous until there is more naval support in the Bay of Bengal. He added that this was strategically sound as the Chinese operation would be more effective if coordinated as a part of Anakim. He said Ravenous requires no Naval support.

General Marshal then explained that while that part of the Chinese operation which was to consist of an advance from Yunnan could be advantageously postponed, the advance from Ramgarh could well be initiated as part of operation Ravenous in order to provide security for the construction of a road southward from Ledo. However, this will have to have the approval of the Generalissimo.

The Prime Minister then stated that he wished it made clear that if and when Hitler breaks down, all of the British resources and effort will be turned toward the defeat of Japan. He stated that not only are British interests involved, but her honor is engaged. If it were thought well for the effect on the people of the United States of America, the British Government would enter into a treaty or convention with the U.S. Government to this effect.

The President stated that a formal agreement regarding British efforts against Japan was entirely unnecessary. He said, however, that efforts should be made to obtain an engagement from Russia to concentrate on the defeat of Japan after Germany had been eliminated from the war. He thought that Russia would probably want to come in with the United Nations in that event, but he would like to have an expression from them as to whether they will come in and how.

Mr. Churchill then discussed operation Sledgehammer. He thought it should be given a “sharper point” and that plans should be made to undertake it, including the appointment of a Commander and the fixing of a target date. He had not been in favor of such an operation in 1942 but he felt that it was our duty to engage the enemy on as wide a front and as continuously as possible, and as the only way of stopping an operation with the full force of the British Metropolitan air forces and the U.S. air forces in Great Britain is to do a Sledgehammer, he thought we should do everything we could to make the operation possible this summer.

The President agreed with the Prime Minister and further suggested that we join together to build up forces in the United Kingdom. He said that it would be desirable to prepare a schedule of the build-up of forces by month in order that we would know what the potential effort might be at any time, and plans should be made for utilizing this potential at any time that there are signs of Germany’s deterioration.

The Prime Minister then discussed possible operations from the Mediterranean against the Dodecanese. He considered that these might be developed either as feints in order to conceal the location of the main effort against Sicily, or perhaps as a real attack. He had received a message from the three Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East informing him that plans to this effect were under way. He desired that the final document prepared by the Chiefs of Staff covering the strategy for 1943 should include some mention of the Dodecanese.

The Prime Minister said that he felt that General Chennault’s air force in China should be reinforced. He stated that General Wavell concurred in this view.

The President stated that the effects of help to China would be largely political. A small effort to send aid would have a tremendously favorable effect on Chinese morale. The Generalissimo has been disappointed with regard to the Burma operations. He has considerable difficulty in maintaining the loyalty of some of the Chinese provinces. Anything that we can do to help China and to hurt Japan will have a heartening effect on him.

The President stated that reinforcing our air power in China would also be a severe blow to Japan. He said that the Japanese people panic easily. This was especially true at the time of their earthquake. Mr. Grew, the United States Ambassador, in reporting this incident, stated that it was necessary for the Japanese broadcast to adopt every means possible to quiet the people.

The President considered that we should send from 200 to 250 planes to China. This should include heavy bombers which, because of the difficulties of supply, could be based in India. They could be used to operate in raids over Japan proper by refueling in China on their way to and from such missions.

He thought that the United Nations should commit themselves to this line of action and that whoever of the Chiefs of Staff was next to see the Generalissimo, should inform him to this effect.

The President then discussed operations in the Mediterranean. He said we had been extremely fortunate in Operation Torch. He was worried, however, about news concerning the operations against Sicily reaching Germany. To prevent this, he thought that we should give the operations in the Mediterranean some such name as “Underbelly” and continually think of them as being aimed at any one of a number of objectives, knowing secretly all the while, that they were to be toward Sicily.

Admiral King stated that the deception could be well achieved by the use of cover plans. He said that the document that is now in preparation and will be discussed on January 19th goes a long way toward establishing a policy of how we are to win the war. It has taken some days for the Chiefs of Staff to express themselves but in principle they are all agreed. He expressed the opinion that the document being prepared would be approved after a short discussion and with minor amendments. He said that he personally would like to have had it expanded to present a complete concept for concluding the war but that he was well pleased with it as it is.

General Marshall said that when the United States Chiefs of Staff came to the conference, they preferred to undertake Operation Roundup in 1943. The decision, however, has been made to undertake Operation Husky because we will have in North Africa a large number of troops available and because it will effect an economy of tonnage which is the major consideration. It is estimated that possession of the north coast of Africa and Sicily will release approximately 225 vessels which will facilitate operations in Burma, the Middle East, and the Pacific. He felt that the capture of Sicily would do much to improve the air coverage for our shipping in the Mediterranean. This will add considerably to the safety of the passage. He said that Admiral Cunningham and other naval officers had indicated that the capture of Sicily would not be of great benefit in the protection of our convoys, Admiral Cunningham having stated that the possession of Sicily would only make us 5 percent more effective in the protection of convoys.

Sir Charles Portal thought there had been a misunderstanding of Admiral Cunningham’s views. He feels that without Sicily we will lose 15 ships out of 100, or be 85 percent effective. We will lose only 10 ships out of 100, 90 percent effective, with Sicily in our possession. The number of the ships lost is therefore 50 percent greater with Sicily in possession of the Axis.

General Marshall said the second consideration which brought about the decision to operate against Sicily was the possibility of eliminating Italy from the war and thus necessitating Germany’s taking over the present commitments of the Italians.

General Marshall emphasized that Roundup would be a difficult if not impossible operation to undertake once we have committed ourselves to Operation Husky. He said that the United Kingdom maintains a small spearhead of amphibious forces consisting of about 20,000 troops which are available at all times for an operation across the Channel. This force could be augmented by follow-up troops carried in small craft which might be available in England. Unless there is a complete crack in German morale, operations across the Channel will have to be extremely limited. It will be fully as difficult to assemble landing craft following Operation Husky and send them to England as it will be to assemble them after the capture of Rabaul and send them to Burma. Probably three months will be required to accomplish this in either case.

General Marshall said that sudden signs of deterioration of the Axis forces might take two forms; first, a collapse in the interior with the troops initially holding fast; and, second, by the withdrawal of troops from France. In the latter case, we should make every effort to cross the Channel and in doing so, utilize any means that are available. He said the greatest difficulty in setting up strength for Roundup in addition to Operation Husky is the lack of escort vessels and landing craft.

General Marshall then discussed increasing the air force in China. The United States now has an agreement to increase the Chinese air force to the extent to which it can be supplied. The increase will be much more than the force is now. It is contemplated sending a group of heavy bombers which may be used to shuttle back and forth from China to India. There will be 25 to 30 additional medium bombers with the appropriate aircraft to furnish them fighter protection. He emphasized that while we are committed to the buildup of the Chinese air forces, it is a tremendously expensive operation. The air transport planes which must be utilized in their supply could be utilized with great effect elsewhere.

General Marshall said that in the agreements reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, effective measures had been adopted to improve the situation in the Pacific. He said he hoped these were sufficient to insure that we would not again be threatened by a series of crises, since sufficient forces would be made available to insure our maintaining pressure on Japan.

General Marshall said that as summer approaches, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet again to make the necessary readjustments in the decisions made now.

He then discussed the use of United States bombers in England. He thought that they should be under the operational direction of the British, who should prescribe the targets and the timing of attacks. Control of operational procedure and technique should remain under the United States Commanders. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will attempt to prescribe general priorities of bombing objectives.

General Marshall said we should coordinate and improve our methods in combating the submarine menace and that this also would be a subject of discussion during the conferences.

Another vital question before the Combined Chiefs of Staff is how to maintain the Russian forces at their maximum effort both by forcing a withdrawal of German pressure on their front and also by insuring the flow of munitions to them. It is questionable to what extent the United Nations can take the losses of tonnage incidental to escorting the northern convoys. It may be possible to decrease the intervals between convoys or add to the strength of their escorts. However, it is entirely within the power of Germany to administer such losses as to make it necessary to discontinue this route to Russia.

General Marshall said that he does not believe it necessary to take excessive punishment in running these convoys simply to keep Mr. Stalin placated. In any event, lie feels that it would be necessary to inform Mr. Stalin that the convoys would have to be discontinued during Operation Husky.

General Arnold said that the agreements tentatively arrived at would be very helpful from the air point of view. They will facilitate the allocation of aircraft and the development of procedure and technique.

The Prime Minister said that since we have surveyed the whole field of strategy, it will now be necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to go into ways and means by which the adopted strategy can be accomplished. They must determine where risks should be incurred and where the reduction of forces is necessary. This may take several days. It will involve the broad distribution of our resources. He agreed with General Marshall that another meeting should be held before summer and expressed his pleasure to the President of the United States, and to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, for arranging to attend this conference.

The President said that he particularly appreciated having Sir John Dill at the conferences since he would be the individual who would carry on the liaison between the Chiefs of Staff in London and the Chiefs of Staff in Washington between whom he constituted an indispensable link.

Sir Dudley Pound then said that we must go into ways and means of implementing our agreed decisions. Two problems involved are the security of the Atlantic convoys and the extent to which it will be necessary to decrease such security when Operation Husky is undertaken. He said that increased pressure against the submarine menace must be maintained by adequate coverage of our convoys and by striking at places where submarines are manufactured and assembled. If this is done, the situation may be considerably improved by the time operation Husky is undertaken. He agreed with General Marshall that it will be necessary during Operation Husky to discontinue the northern convoys.

The Prime Minister said that this would be an added reason for increasing the tonnage sent to Russia prior to Operation Husky.

Sir Dudley Pound replied that this could be done provided the United States would help in the escort problem.

The President then discussed the possibility of assembling a large number of river and lake craft available in the United States and sending them quietly to Europe in order to transport troops across the Channel in case Germany cracks.

Lord Mountbatten stated that five Great Lakes steamers had already been sent.

The President told Admiral King to survey the situation and see what could be done in this respect.

Sir John Dill expressed his satisfaction over the progress of the present conferences.

The Prime Minister then discussed the situation in Turkey. He said that the British had some right to expect Turkey to enter the war when the Balkans were invaded, but in view of our own weakness to help Turkey they did not press it. Turkey will be in a weak position at the peace table following the war if she has not participated in it. It was possible to give them a guarantee for existing territory, and for their rights over passage through the Dardanelles. The United Nations should be prepared to provide Turkey with antiaircraft, flak, tanks and other mechanized vehicles and also be prepared to send some of this equipment manned with units, since Turkish troops do not handle machinery particularly well. He feels that Turkey might be influenced to enter the war by the successes of Russian troops on the north and those of the United States-United Kingdom troops on the south. At present they are angry with the Bulgarians and it would not be surprising if they did enter the war.

The Prime Minister said that since most of the troops which would be involved in reinforcing Turkey would be British, he asked that the British be allowed to play the Turkish hand, just as the United States is now handling the situation with reference to China. The British would keep the United States advised at all times as to the progress being made.

The President concurred in this view and also said that if Roundup should be undertaken, he felt that it should be under British command.

The Prime Minister said that he thought the question of command in Roundup operation might be determined later, but he agreed that it would be advisable to designate a British commander at this time who could undertake the planning of the operation. In his view, the command of operation should as a general rule be held by an officer of the nation which furnishes the majority of the forces.

He said that in perhaps five weeks six divisions of the 8th Army would enter Tunisia, and it was understood that they would, of course, come under command of General Eisenhower. He thought, however, it would be advisable for General Alexander to be designated as the Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces.

The President and General Marshall both expressed agreement, and the latter said he thought it would be particularly desirable since there would be two British armies involved in the Tunisian front.

Admiral King suggested the possibility of unifying command prior to the 8th Army’s entry into Tunisia, feeling that there were many matters common to both the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the 8th Army which should be coordinated. After discussion, it was agreed that date of appointment should be left for future decision.

General Marshall informed the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff of the great contribution that Admiral Cunningham had made to the success of Operation Torch. He wished to express the appreciation of the United States Chiefs of Staff not only for the skill that Admiral Cunningham had displayed, but also for his spirit of helpfulness and for his cooperation.

The Prime Minister thanked General Marshall and directed that General Marshall’s comments be included in the minutes in order that he could present them to the Cabinet.

After being informed that the agreements arrived at at the conference would be included in a paper, the Prime Minister suggested that one should be drawn up for presentation to Premier Stalin. He felt that the Soviet is entitled to know what we intend to do, but that it should be made clear that the paper expressed our intentions and did not constitute promises.

The President brought up the subject of press releases concerning the current conferences. He said that a photograph should be made of the participants in the conference and be given out with a release date which might be set as the day that he and the Prime Minister departed.

The Prime Minister suggested that at the same time we release a statement to the effect that the United Nations are resolved to pursue the war to the bitter end, neither party relaxing in its efforts until the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan has been achieved. He said that before issuing such a statement, he would like to consult with his colleagues in London.

Field Marshal Dill then asked the President if there were any information concerning General de Gaulle.

The President replied that he had arranged to have General Giraud come here for a conference, but that so far the Prime Minister had been unable to effect such arrangements with General de Gaulle.

The Prime Minister said that General de Gaulle had refused, saying that if the President wished to see him, he would no doubt invite him to come to Washington. De Gaulle had said that he would not meet Giraud in an atmosphere dominated by the High Command of the United Nations. The Prime Minister said that he had sent an invitation to de Gaulle to come, and the invitation had been sent in the name of the President and himself. He indicated to General de Gaulle that if he refused the invitation, it would be necessary for him and the President to consider whether or not he was a leader who merited their support.

The President stated that General Giraud had informed him that there were sufficient French officers and noncommissioned officers in North Africa to enable the French to raise an army of 250,000 men. He thought General Giraud should be instructed to raise such an army, and that we should make every effort to provide him with equipment. He said that General Giraud was desirous of being relieved of some of his civilian responsibilities.

The Prime Minister said that he thought the political representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom should be at all times represented in whatever controlling machinery is set up, and that even General Eisenhower should present his demands to the French Government through civilian representatives, except in those cases where he wished to exercise his prerogatives as a military commander of an occupied country.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the French have a considerable number of French 75 mm. guns on hand together with ammunition. They were to receive the tanks from the British 6th Armored Division when this unit received its Sherman tanks from the United States. He said that there were also some antiaircraft weapons available which can be given to the French. General Marshall stated that he thought it necessary to give the French the best equipment obtainable, and that he proposed to do so from United States resources subject to shipping limitations. His idea was that if we are to equip the French, we must make good units of them.

The President thought it would be desirable to utilize some French units in Operation Husky even if only as a reserve.

The Prime Minister then expressed the hope that the United States would bring to North Africa the remaining three divisions which are scheduled to come here.

General Marshall replied that there had been no change in schedule yet, but that after the complete details for Operation Husky had been worked out, a determination could be made as to what divisions should be brought or what other changes might be made.

27 
Monday, 18 January

The President’s morning callers were Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Commanding the Fifth Army, who arrived at 10:05 and departed at 11:10; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, who conferred with the President and Mr. Hopkins from 10:45 until 12:45; and General George C. Marshall, who called at 12:45 and departed five minutes later.

The Prime Minister lunched with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt at Dar es Saada at 1:15 p.m. and departed at 2:40.

The President left the grounds of his villa for the first time at 4:10 this afternoon.

Here follows a description of the President’s inspection of the Third Battalion of the Thirtieth Infantry Regiment which was guarding the President’s camp.

The President returned to his villa at 4:50, for the Combined Chiefs of Staff were scheduled to confer with him, starting at five o’clock.

The following American and British military representatives of their respective Army, Navy, and Air Forces, conferred with the President, the Prime Minister, and Mr. Hopkins from 5:00 until 6:30 p.m.
Field Marshal Sir John Dill General George C. Marshall
General Sir Alan F. Brooke Admiral E. J. King
Adm. of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal Brig. Gen. John R. Deane
Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

Shortly before seven o’clock, Mr. Hopkins had the pleasure of seeing his son, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, who had secured leave of absence from the Signal Corps company to which he was attached and which was then engaged in active operations at the front. Sergeant Hopkins went in to pay his respects to the President, and later his father took him to call on the Prime Minister.

Mr. Murphy called just before dinner, but stayed with the President only about five minutes, departing at 7:45.

Mr. Hopkins had accepted an invitation to dine with General Patton this evening, and so he was not present when the President, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lieutenant Franklin Jr. sat down to dinner with their guests for the evening, Admiral McIntire, Captain McCrea, and a young Army Officer, Lieutenant Richard Ryan, a grandson of Thomas Fortune Ryan, and a friend of the family.

The President retired about eleven o’clock.

28

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff to the President’s Special Assistant

Casablanca, January 18, 1943.

Memorandum for: Mr. Hopkins

We received the following message last night from General Eisenhower:

Yesterday Commander Butcher was told by Mr. Hopkins that the President probably would wish to see the war correspondents before he departs. As virtually all correspondents in this theatre headquarter at Algiers, it would be necessary to fly them to Casablanca. Suggest 15 representative U.S. and British correspondents to be chosen by General McClure. (General McClure handles public relations for General Eisenhower). Please advise whether correspondents desired. If so, when and whether the number is satisfactory.

Will you let me know what the President’s wishes in this matter are so that I may inform General Eisenhower?

FRANK McCARTHY
Lt. Col., GSC

29

U.S. State Department (January 19, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
General Marshall General Brooke
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Hull Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Major General Kennedy
Colonel Smart Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Commander Libby
Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob
Lieutenant Colonel Grove

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 19, 1943, 10 a.m.

Secret
  1. Conduct of the War in 1943
    (C.C.S. 155)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a draft memorandum prepared as a result of their meeting the previous day. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed.

The Committee:
Approved the memorandum as amended.

  1. Suggested Procedure for Dealing with the Agenda of the Conference
    (C.C.S. 155/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a note, prepared by the Combined Staffs suggesting the procedure to be followed for dealing with the major questions on the agreed Agenda of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 140). Certain alterations were suggested to the tentative program of meetings set out in the annex to these minutes.

The Committee:
Approved the suggested procedure subject to the Annex being revised as agreed at their meeting.

  1. Strategic Responsibility and Command Set Up for Dakar French West Africa

Admiral King said that no question of land forces was involved in West Africa. Admiral Glassford had proposed that the West African Coast from Cape Bojador to the Western boundary of Sierra Leone should be placed under French naval command. The French naval forces should be responsible for such operations off shore as might be necessary in that area. He understood that M. Boisson and Admiral Collinet were both agreeable to this suggestion.

The proposed arrangement would include the air cover for offshore operations. The difficulty would be the lack of equipment of the French air forces. He suggested that to overcome this difficulty we should set out to familiarize the French with modern aircraft. To do this it would be necessary to give them up to date equipment and adequate training and to include them, so far as possible, in actual operations. He said that the West African coast from Cape Bojador southwards was a British sphere, and his proposal was that the French in their area should work under Admiral Pegram. We should have to decide whether to deal with the French as full allies or whether it would be necessary to exercise some degree of control over them.

Sir Dudley Pound said that he had formed the impression that Admiral Collinet was all out to help and that the arrangement which Admiral Glassford proposed was based on the assumption that the French would fully cooperate.

Sir Charles Portal said that he was in general agreement with the suggestions put forward by Admiral King.

It was essential that all coastal air operations in West Africa should be coordinated by the British Air Commander who would be working in cooperation with the British Naval Commander. He was fully alive to the importance of giving the French airmen at Dakar some equipment to enable them immediately to take a share in air operations in the proposed French sub-area. For this purpose he proposed, subject to the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to allot them 2 Sunderland Flying Boats and 4 Hudson patrol bombers which, to begin with, would be operated by British crews with the more experienced French crews alongside them until they were fit to take over themselves.

He was less anxious about the reliability of the French than about their technical ability and training. So far, they had neither the equipment, training or experience of coastal air operations in modern war. He proposed, therefore, that the less experienced French air crews, together with the appropriate maintenance personnel, should be withdrawn to British training establishments, with the object of forming them, if they turned out to be any good and as soon as the equipment could be made available into two squadrons, one of Catalinas and one of Wellington patrol bombers. He agreed that the equipment of these coastal squadrons in West Africa should be a British responsibility, but pointed out that owing to present shortage of suitable aircraft and the necessity for adequate training of crews, the formation of the proposed two squadrons was not likely to be practicable in the immediate future.

General Arnold said that the United States concept was gradually to draw in French air force personnel as they became trained and equipped for operational work over a period of about a year. He agreed that in French West Africa this would be a British responsibility.

General Marshall said that he was in favor of proceeding with a definite program for reequipping the French forces. This would, of course, imply French acceptance of our organization and training methods, and would inevitably delay the progress of equipping our own forces. He thought, however, that we should do the thing wholeheartedly; and he was prepared, subject to General Eisenhower’s views, to modify the United States program in order to equip French forces up to a strength of 250,000. All the equipment provided for the French would be at the expense of United States troops forming in America. He proposed to make use of French shipping to bring it over.

General Somervell said that General Giraud had agreed to turn over 160,000 tons of French shipping to the Allied pool. Out of this tonnage General Giraud proposed that 85,000 tons should be allocated to meet French civil requirements, leaving 75,000 tons for shipping equipment for the French forces. General Somervell calculated that this would enable them to be equipped at the rate of about one division a month. No allowance was made in this program for the carriage of coal and oil which was at present being shipped by the British.

The Committee:
Agreed:
a) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rio de Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.

b) That subject to (a), a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.

c) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.

  1. Publication of Results of the Conference

Sir Alan Brooke drew the attention of the Committee to the decision which the President and the Prime Minister had made at their meeting the previous day that:

a) The results of this conference should be communicated to Stalin in the form of a document setting out our intentions for 1943.

b) A communiqué should be prepared for issue to the Press when the conference is finished.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that a small subcommittee should be appointed to draft a suitable document for approval by the Committee at the end of the conference.

The Committee:
Agreed:
To appoint a subcommittee for this purpose consisting of:

  • United States Representatives:
    • Brigadier General Hull
    • Colonel Smart
    • Commander Libby
  • British Representatives:
    • Lt. General Ismay
    • Major General Kennedy
    • Air Vice Marshal Slessor