Rationing comes to Hollywood
Great Gildersleeve will have no more five-egg breakfasts on the silver screen
…
The Pittsburgh Press (January 18, 1943)
Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
With U.S. forces in Algeria – (Jan. 17)
There were a lot of things the Charlotte doctors and nurses hadn’t visualized before they set up their big tent hospital here in the field. The natives, for instance. Arabs in their long gowns come wandering across the plains hoping the miraculous Americans could cure their ailments. So, the hospital has had to set up a separate tent for them. They have local people in there wounded by shrapnel in the first battle. They have one 81-year-old woman whose arm was blown off. They have several patients they’ve done normal operations on.
They had one Arab woman shot through the stomach. Her condition was grave, but on the second morning her husband arrived, said he had to go to work and there wasn’t anybody to take care of the kids, and for her to get the hell home where she belonged. So, she got up and walked out. The doctors don’t think she could have lived through the day. But you know how it is with us Arabs – we don’t like our women gadding about when there’s work at home.
While I was there, a ragged Arab with a long stick came in with his 10-year-old boy. The child had a hideous rash over his neck and face. Through the interpreter, the Arab said he had been praying and praying for the Americans to come, so they could do something for his boy. His belief in us was touching, but the doctors fear the scourge is beyond their ken.
The Army’s Arabic interpreters, incidentally, are completely accidental. They weren’t assigned to the hospital unit by design or anything. It just happened.
One is Pvt. Israel Tabi, of 245 Broome St., New York City. He was born in Yemen, and came to America when he was 20. He’s 35 now, and a house painter by profession. So far as he knows, his parents are still in Arabia, and who can tell, he might see them someday. He says the Arabic spoken here is quite similar to what he knew. I mentioned that he was performing a very valuable service. Pvt. Tabi is volubly patriotic. He said:
I will do anything for my country. Whatever they ask me to do, I will do. I will work day and night. I love my country. I will do anything for it.
The other interpreter is an Egyptian – Pvt. Abraham Casper Leon Saide (pronounced Sadie). He lives at 343½ Seneca St., Buffalo, New York. He is a watch repairer by trade. He was born in Alexandria, Egypt, is now 34, and came to America in 1924. He speaks Turkish, Greek, Egyptian and all those exotic languages. It looks as though Pvt. Saide might have a very useful career ahead of him in the Army.
The hospital already has handled more than 1,000 patients and hasn’t lost a one. The doctors run to the nearest stake and knock on wood when they say it. The surgeons have performed more than 125 operations.
There’s no red tape about whether a patient is legally entitled to enter the hospital or not. They take anybody who comes – soldier, civilian, Arab, Frenchman, anybody. The way they ignore formalities when emergency arises is one of the things that have made me feel so warmly toward this battlefront hospital. The other day we were looking at those round-bellied iron stoves half-buried in the ground in each tent.
I asked the commander, Lt. Col. Bauchspies:
What do you burn in them?
He said:
Wood.
I asked:
Where do you get the wood?
He said:
Steal it.
When you’re saving lives, you don’t requisition and wait; you forage and borrow and even steal if necessary. And nobody stands on rank. Recently, Maj. Gen. Fredendall made an inspection tour through the hospital. Col. Bauchspies croaked hoarsely like a frog.
The general asked:
How did you lose your voice?
The colonel said:
I lost it driving tent pegs.
The general said:
Your guard looks nice. Where did they get those new rifles?
The colonel said:
I daren’t tell you, sir.
The general smiled. And nodded.
1 Like
U.S. State Department (January 18, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| General Marshall | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Admiral King | General Brooke | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Vice Admiral Mountbatten | ||
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Brigadier Jacob |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 18, 1943, 5 p.m.
Secret
The President and the Prime Minister asked the Chiefs of Staff for a report of progress regarding the current conferences.
Sir Alan Brooke stated that after seven days of argument he felt that definite progress had been made. A document is now being prepared setting forth the general strategic policy for 1943. This will be gone over in detail at the C.C.S. meeting on the morning of January 19th.
Sir Alan Brooke summarized the document as follows:
-
A statement that the measures to be taken to combat the submarine menace are a first charge on the resources of the United Nations and provide security for all of our operations.
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A statement that we shall concentrate on the defeat of Germany first which will be followed by the defeat of Japan.
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Our efforts in defeating Germany will be concerned first with efforts to force them to withdraw ground and air forces from the Russian front. This will be accomplished by operations from North Africa by which Southern Europe, the Dodecanese Islands, Greece, Crete, Sardinia, and Sicily will all be threatened, thus forcing Germany to deploy her forces to meet each threat. The actual operation decided upon is the capture of Sicily.
At the same time, we shall go on with preparing forces and assembling landing craft in England for a thrust across the Channel in the event that the German strength in France decreases, either through withdrawal of her troops or because of an internal collapse.
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Operations in the Pacific are to be continued to include the capture of Rabaul and Eastern New Guinea while plans are to be prepared to extend the operations to the Marshall Islands and the capture of Truk if the situation permits.
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Plans and preparations to undertake Operation Anakim late in 1943 are to be instituted at once with the understanding that the United States will assist to make up deficiencies in landing craft and naval vessels needed for this operation. The operation is to be planned for December of 1943 with the view to capturing Burma and opening the Burma Road prior to the monsoon season of 1944.
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The maximum combined air offensive will be conducted against Germany from the United Kingdom. By this and every other available means, attempts will be made to undermine Germany’s morale.
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Every effort will be made, political and otherwise, to induce Turkey to enter the war in order that we may establish air bases there for operations against Rumania.
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Operation Ravenous will be undertaken for the purpose of establishing bridgeheads over the Chindwin River, and also to prepare roads and airfields in northern Burma which will facilitate the mounting of Operation Anakim toward the end of the year. In this connection, Operation Cannibal is now being undertaken with a view to securing air bases in the Akyab area.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that Chiang Kai-shek wishes to postpone his part of Operation Ravenous until there is more naval support in the Bay of Bengal. He added that this was strategically sound as the Chinese operation would be more effective if coordinated as a part of Anakim. He said Ravenous requires no Naval support.
General Marshal then explained that while that part of the Chinese operation which was to consist of an advance from Yunnan could be advantageously postponed, the advance from Ramgarh could well be initiated as part of operation Ravenous in order to provide security for the construction of a road southward from Ledo. However, this will have to have the approval of the Generalissimo.
The Prime Minister then stated that he wished it made clear that if and when Hitler breaks down, all of the British resources and effort will be turned toward the defeat of Japan. He stated that not only are British interests involved, but her honor is engaged. If it were thought well for the effect on the people of the United States of America, the British Government would enter into a treaty or convention with the U.S. Government to this effect.
The President stated that a formal agreement regarding British efforts against Japan was entirely unnecessary. He said, however, that efforts should be made to obtain an engagement from Russia to concentrate on the defeat of Japan after Germany had been eliminated from the war. He thought that Russia would probably want to come in with the United Nations in that event, but he would like to have an expression from them as to whether they will come in and how.
Mr. Churchill then discussed operation Sledgehammer. He thought it should be given a “sharper point” and that plans should be made to undertake it, including the appointment of a Commander and the fixing of a target date. He had not been in favor of such an operation in 1942 but he felt that it was our duty to engage the enemy on as wide a front and as continuously as possible, and as the only way of stopping an operation with the full force of the British Metropolitan air forces and the U.S. air forces in Great Britain is to do a Sledgehammer, he thought we should do everything we could to make the operation possible this summer.
The President agreed with the Prime Minister and further suggested that we join together to build up forces in the United Kingdom. He said that it would be desirable to prepare a schedule of the build-up of forces by month in order that we would know what the potential effort might be at any time, and plans should be made for utilizing this potential at any time that there are signs of Germany’s deterioration.
The Prime Minister then discussed possible operations from the Mediterranean against the Dodecanese. He considered that these might be developed either as feints in order to conceal the location of the main effort against Sicily, or perhaps as a real attack. He had received a message from the three Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East informing him that plans to this effect were under way. He desired that the final document prepared by the Chiefs of Staff covering the strategy for 1943 should include some mention of the Dodecanese.
The Prime Minister said that he felt that General Chennault’s air force in China should be reinforced. He stated that General Wavell concurred in this view.
The President stated that the effects of help to China would be largely political. A small effort to send aid would have a tremendously favorable effect on Chinese morale. The Generalissimo has been disappointed with regard to the Burma operations. He has considerable difficulty in maintaining the loyalty of some of the Chinese provinces. Anything that we can do to help China and to hurt Japan will have a heartening effect on him.
The President stated that reinforcing our air power in China would also be a severe blow to Japan. He said that the Japanese people panic easily. This was especially true at the time of their earthquake. Mr. Grew, the United States Ambassador, in reporting this incident, stated that it was necessary for the Japanese broadcast to adopt every means possible to quiet the people.
The President considered that we should send from 200 to 250 planes to China. This should include heavy bombers which, because of the difficulties of supply, could be based in India. They could be used to operate in raids over Japan proper by refueling in China on their way to and from such missions.
He thought that the United Nations should commit themselves to this line of action and that whoever of the Chiefs of Staff was next to see the Generalissimo, should inform him to this effect.
The President then discussed operations in the Mediterranean. He said we had been extremely fortunate in Operation Torch. He was worried, however, about news concerning the operations against Sicily reaching Germany. To prevent this, he thought that we should give the operations in the Mediterranean some such name as “Underbelly” and continually think of them as being aimed at any one of a number of objectives, knowing secretly all the while, that they were to be toward Sicily.
Admiral King stated that the deception could be well achieved by the use of cover plans. He said that the document that is now in preparation and will be discussed on January 19th goes a long way toward establishing a policy of how we are to win the war. It has taken some days for the Chiefs of Staff to express themselves but in principle they are all agreed. He expressed the opinion that the document being prepared would be approved after a short discussion and with minor amendments. He said that he personally would like to have had it expanded to present a complete concept for concluding the war but that he was well pleased with it as it is.
General Marshall said that when the United States Chiefs of Staff came to the conference, they preferred to undertake Operation Roundup in 1943. The decision, however, has been made to undertake Operation Husky because we will have in North Africa a large number of troops available and because it will effect an economy of tonnage which is the major consideration. It is estimated that possession of the north coast of Africa and Sicily will release approximately 225 vessels which will facilitate operations in Burma, the Middle East, and the Pacific. He felt that the capture of Sicily would do much to improve the air coverage for our shipping in the Mediterranean. This will add considerably to the safety of the passage. He said that Admiral Cunningham and other naval officers had indicated that the capture of Sicily would not be of great benefit in the protection of our convoys, Admiral Cunningham having stated that the possession of Sicily would only make us 5 percent more effective in the protection of convoys.
Sir Charles Portal thought there had been a misunderstanding of Admiral Cunningham’s views. He feels that without Sicily we will lose 15 ships out of 100, or be 85 percent effective. We will lose only 10 ships out of 100, 90 percent effective, with Sicily in our possession. The number of the ships lost is therefore 50 percent greater with Sicily in possession of the Axis.
General Marshall said the second consideration which brought about the decision to operate against Sicily was the possibility of eliminating Italy from the war and thus necessitating Germany’s taking over the present commitments of the Italians.
General Marshall emphasized that Roundup would be a difficult if not impossible operation to undertake once we have committed ourselves to Operation Husky. He said that the United Kingdom maintains a small spearhead of amphibious forces consisting of about 20,000 troops which are available at all times for an operation across the Channel. This force could be augmented by follow-up troops carried in small craft which might be available in England. Unless there is a complete crack in German morale, operations across the Channel will have to be extremely limited. It will be fully as difficult to assemble landing craft following Operation Husky and send them to England as it will be to assemble them after the capture of Rabaul and send them to Burma. Probably three months will be required to accomplish this in either case.
General Marshall said that sudden signs of deterioration of the Axis forces might take two forms; first, a collapse in the interior with the troops initially holding fast; and, second, by the withdrawal of troops from France. In the latter case, we should make every effort to cross the Channel and in doing so, utilize any means that are available. He said the greatest difficulty in setting up strength for Roundup in addition to Operation Husky is the lack of escort vessels and landing craft.
General Marshall then discussed increasing the air force in China. The United States now has an agreement to increase the Chinese air force to the extent to which it can be supplied. The increase will be much more than the force is now. It is contemplated sending a group of heavy bombers which may be used to shuttle back and forth from China to India. There will be 25 to 30 additional medium bombers with the appropriate aircraft to furnish them fighter protection. He emphasized that while we are committed to the buildup of the Chinese air forces, it is a tremendously expensive operation. The air transport planes which must be utilized in their supply could be utilized with great effect elsewhere.
General Marshall said that in the agreements reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, effective measures had been adopted to improve the situation in the Pacific. He said he hoped these were sufficient to insure that we would not again be threatened by a series of crises, since sufficient forces would be made available to insure our maintaining pressure on Japan.
General Marshall said that as summer approaches, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet again to make the necessary readjustments in the decisions made now.
He then discussed the use of United States bombers in England. He thought that they should be under the operational direction of the British, who should prescribe the targets and the timing of attacks. Control of operational procedure and technique should remain under the United States Commanders. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will attempt to prescribe general priorities of bombing objectives.
General Marshall said we should coordinate and improve our methods in combating the submarine menace and that this also would be a subject of discussion during the conferences.
Another vital question before the Combined Chiefs of Staff is how to maintain the Russian forces at their maximum effort both by forcing a withdrawal of German pressure on their front and also by insuring the flow of munitions to them. It is questionable to what extent the United Nations can take the losses of tonnage incidental to escorting the northern convoys. It may be possible to decrease the intervals between convoys or add to the strength of their escorts. However, it is entirely within the power of Germany to administer such losses as to make it necessary to discontinue this route to Russia.
General Marshall said that he does not believe it necessary to take excessive punishment in running these convoys simply to keep Mr. Stalin placated. In any event, lie feels that it would be necessary to inform Mr. Stalin that the convoys would have to be discontinued during Operation Husky.
General Arnold said that the agreements tentatively arrived at would be very helpful from the air point of view. They will facilitate the allocation of aircraft and the development of procedure and technique.
The Prime Minister said that since we have surveyed the whole field of strategy, it will now be necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to go into ways and means by which the adopted strategy can be accomplished. They must determine where risks should be incurred and where the reduction of forces is necessary. This may take several days. It will involve the broad distribution of our resources. He agreed with General Marshall that another meeting should be held before summer and expressed his pleasure to the President of the United States, and to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, for arranging to attend this conference.
The President said that he particularly appreciated having Sir John Dill at the conferences since he would be the individual who would carry on the liaison between the Chiefs of Staff in London and the Chiefs of Staff in Washington between whom he constituted an indispensable link.
Sir Dudley Pound then said that we must go into ways and means of implementing our agreed decisions. Two problems involved are the security of the Atlantic convoys and the extent to which it will be necessary to decrease such security when Operation Husky is undertaken. He said that increased pressure against the submarine menace must be maintained by adequate coverage of our convoys and by striking at places where submarines are manufactured and assembled. If this is done, the situation may be considerably improved by the time operation Husky is undertaken. He agreed with General Marshall that it will be necessary during Operation Husky to discontinue the northern convoys.
The Prime Minister said that this would be an added reason for increasing the tonnage sent to Russia prior to Operation Husky.
Sir Dudley Pound replied that this could be done provided the United States would help in the escort problem.
The President then discussed the possibility of assembling a large number of river and lake craft available in the United States and sending them quietly to Europe in order to transport troops across the Channel in case Germany cracks.
Lord Mountbatten stated that five Great Lakes steamers had already been sent.
The President told Admiral King to survey the situation and see what could be done in this respect.
Sir John Dill expressed his satisfaction over the progress of the present conferences.
The Prime Minister then discussed the situation in Turkey. He said that the British had some right to expect Turkey to enter the war when the Balkans were invaded, but in view of our own weakness to help Turkey they did not press it. Turkey will be in a weak position at the peace table following the war if she has not participated in it. It was possible to give them a guarantee for existing territory, and for their rights over passage through the Dardanelles. The United Nations should be prepared to provide Turkey with antiaircraft, flak, tanks and other mechanized vehicles and also be prepared to send some of this equipment manned with units, since Turkish troops do not handle machinery particularly well. He feels that Turkey might be influenced to enter the war by the successes of Russian troops on the north and those of the United States-United Kingdom troops on the south. At present they are angry with the Bulgarians and it would not be surprising if they did enter the war.
The Prime Minister said that since most of the troops which would be involved in reinforcing Turkey would be British, he asked that the British be allowed to play the Turkish hand, just as the United States is now handling the situation with reference to China. The British would keep the United States advised at all times as to the progress being made.
The President concurred in this view and also said that if Roundup should be undertaken, he felt that it should be under British command.
The Prime Minister said that he thought the question of command in Roundup operation might be determined later, but he agreed that it would be advisable to designate a British commander at this time who could undertake the planning of the operation. In his view, the command of operation should as a general rule be held by an officer of the nation which furnishes the majority of the forces.
He said that in perhaps five weeks six divisions of the 8th Army would enter Tunisia, and it was understood that they would, of course, come under command of General Eisenhower. He thought, however, it would be advisable for General Alexander to be designated as the Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces.
The President and General Marshall both expressed agreement, and the latter said he thought it would be particularly desirable since there would be two British armies involved in the Tunisian front.
Admiral King suggested the possibility of unifying command prior to the 8th Army’s entry into Tunisia, feeling that there were many matters common to both the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the 8th Army which should be coordinated. After discussion, it was agreed that date of appointment should be left for future decision.
General Marshall informed the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff of the great contribution that Admiral Cunningham had made to the success of Operation Torch. He wished to express the appreciation of the United States Chiefs of Staff not only for the skill that Admiral Cunningham had displayed, but also for his spirit of helpfulness and for his cooperation.
The Prime Minister thanked General Marshall and directed that General Marshall’s comments be included in the minutes in order that he could present them to the Cabinet.
After being informed that the agreements arrived at at the conference would be included in a paper, the Prime Minister suggested that one should be drawn up for presentation to Premier Stalin. He felt that the Soviet is entitled to know what we intend to do, but that it should be made clear that the paper expressed our intentions and did not constitute promises.
The President brought up the subject of press releases concerning the current conferences. He said that a photograph should be made of the participants in the conference and be given out with a release date which might be set as the day that he and the Prime Minister departed.
The Prime Minister suggested that at the same time we release a statement to the effect that the United Nations are resolved to pursue the war to the bitter end, neither party relaxing in its efforts until the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan has been achieved. He said that before issuing such a statement, he would like to consult with his colleagues in London.
Field Marshal Dill then asked the President if there were any information concerning General de Gaulle.
The President replied that he had arranged to have General Giraud come here for a conference, but that so far the Prime Minister had been unable to effect such arrangements with General de Gaulle.
The Prime Minister said that General de Gaulle had refused, saying that if the President wished to see him, he would no doubt invite him to come to Washington. De Gaulle had said that he would not meet Giraud in an atmosphere dominated by the High Command of the United Nations. The Prime Minister said that he had sent an invitation to de Gaulle to come, and the invitation had been sent in the name of the President and himself. He indicated to General de Gaulle that if he refused the invitation, it would be necessary for him and the President to consider whether or not he was a leader who merited their support.
The President stated that General Giraud had informed him that there were sufficient French officers and noncommissioned officers in North Africa to enable the French to raise an army of 250,000 men. He thought General Giraud should be instructed to raise such an army, and that we should make every effort to provide him with equipment. He said that General Giraud was desirous of being relieved of some of his civilian responsibilities.
The Prime Minister said that he thought the political representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom should be at all times represented in whatever controlling machinery is set up, and that even General Eisenhower should present his demands to the French Government through civilian representatives, except in those cases where he wished to exercise his prerogatives as a military commander of an occupied country.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the French have a considerable number of French 75 mm. guns on hand together with ammunition. They were to receive the tanks from the British 6th Armored Division when this unit received its Sherman tanks from the United States. He said that there were also some antiaircraft weapons available which can be given to the French. General Marshall stated that he thought it necessary to give the French the best equipment obtainable, and that he proposed to do so from United States resources subject to shipping limitations. His idea was that if we are to equip the French, we must make good units of them.
The President thought it would be desirable to utilize some French units in Operation Husky even if only as a reserve.
The Prime Minister then expressed the hope that the United States would bring to North Africa the remaining three divisions which are scheduled to come here.
General Marshall replied that there had been no change in schedule yet, but that after the complete details for Operation Husky had been worked out, a determination could be made as to what divisions should be brought or what other changes might be made.
Monday, 18 January
The President’s morning callers were Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Commanding the Fifth Army, who arrived at 10:05 and departed at 11:10; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, who conferred with the President and Mr. Hopkins from 10:45 until 12:45; and General George C. Marshall, who called at 12:45 and departed five minutes later.
The Prime Minister lunched with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt at Dar es Saada at 1:15 p.m. and departed at 2:40.
The President left the grounds of his villa for the first time at 4:10 this afternoon.
Here follows a description of the President’s inspection of the Third Battalion of the Thirtieth Infantry Regiment which was guarding the President’s camp.
The President returned to his villa at 4:50, for the Combined Chiefs of Staff were scheduled to confer with him, starting at five o’clock.
The following American and British military representatives of their respective Army, Navy, and Air Forces, conferred with the President, the Prime Minister, and Mr. Hopkins from 5:00 until 6:30 p.m.
| Field Marshal Sir John Dill | General George C. Marshall |
| General Sir Alan F. Brooke | Admiral E. J. King |
| Adm. of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound | Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold |
| Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal | Brig. Gen. John R. Deane |
| Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob |
Shortly before seven o’clock, Mr. Hopkins had the pleasure of seeing his son, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, who had secured leave of absence from the Signal Corps company to which he was attached and which was then engaged in active operations at the front. Sergeant Hopkins went in to pay his respects to the President, and later his father took him to call on the Prime Minister.
Mr. Murphy called just before dinner, but stayed with the President only about five minutes, departing at 7:45.
Mr. Hopkins had accepted an invitation to dine with General Patton this evening, and so he was not present when the President, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lieutenant Franklin Jr. sat down to dinner with their guests for the evening, Admiral McIntire, Captain McCrea, and a young Army Officer, Lieutenant Richard Ryan, a grandson of Thomas Fortune Ryan, and a friend of the family.
The President retired about eleven o’clock.
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff to the President’s Special Assistant
Casablanca, January 18, 1943.
Memorandum for: Mr. Hopkins
We received the following message last night from General Eisenhower:
Yesterday Commander Butcher was told by Mr. Hopkins that the President probably would wish to see the war correspondents before he departs. As virtually all correspondents in this theatre headquarter at Algiers, it would be necessary to fly them to Casablanca. Suggest 15 representative U.S. and British correspondents to be chosen by General McClure. (General McClure handles public relations for General Eisenhower). Please advise whether correspondents desired. If so, when and whether the number is satisfactory.
Will you let me know what the President’s wishes in this matter are so that I may inform General Eisenhower?
FRANK McCARTHY
Lt. Col., GSC
U.S. State Department (January 19, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier General Hull | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Major General Kennedy | |
| Colonel Smart | Air Vice Marshal Slessor | |
| Commander Libby | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Dykes | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Brigadier Jacob | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Grove |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 19, 1943, 10 a.m.
Secret
- Conduct of the War in 1943
(C.C.S. 155)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a draft memorandum prepared as a result of their meeting the previous day. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed.
The Committee:
Approved the memorandum as amended.
- Suggested Procedure for Dealing with the Agenda of the Conference
(C.C.S. 155/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a note, prepared by the Combined Staffs suggesting the procedure to be followed for dealing with the major questions on the agreed Agenda of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 140). Certain alterations were suggested to the tentative program of meetings set out in the annex to these minutes.
The Committee:
Approved the suggested procedure subject to the Annex being revised as agreed at their meeting.
- Strategic Responsibility and Command Set Up for Dakar French West Africa
Admiral King said that no question of land forces was involved in West Africa. Admiral Glassford had proposed that the West African Coast from Cape Bojador to the Western boundary of Sierra Leone should be placed under French naval command. The French naval forces should be responsible for such operations off shore as might be necessary in that area. He understood that M. Boisson and Admiral Collinet were both agreeable to this suggestion.
The proposed arrangement would include the air cover for offshore operations. The difficulty would be the lack of equipment of the French air forces. He suggested that to overcome this difficulty we should set out to familiarize the French with modern aircraft. To do this it would be necessary to give them up to date equipment and adequate training and to include them, so far as possible, in actual operations. He said that the West African coast from Cape Bojador southwards was a British sphere, and his proposal was that the French in their area should work under Admiral Pegram. We should have to decide whether to deal with the French as full allies or whether it would be necessary to exercise some degree of control over them.
Sir Dudley Pound said that he had formed the impression that Admiral Collinet was all out to help and that the arrangement which Admiral Glassford proposed was based on the assumption that the French would fully cooperate.
Sir Charles Portal said that he was in general agreement with the suggestions put forward by Admiral King.
It was essential that all coastal air operations in West Africa should be coordinated by the British Air Commander who would be working in cooperation with the British Naval Commander. He was fully alive to the importance of giving the French airmen at Dakar some equipment to enable them immediately to take a share in air operations in the proposed French sub-area. For this purpose he proposed, subject to the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to allot them 2 Sunderland Flying Boats and 4 Hudson patrol bombers which, to begin with, would be operated by British crews with the more experienced French crews alongside them until they were fit to take over themselves.
He was less anxious about the reliability of the French than about their technical ability and training. So far, they had neither the equipment, training or experience of coastal air operations in modern war. He proposed, therefore, that the less experienced French air crews, together with the appropriate maintenance personnel, should be withdrawn to British training establishments, with the object of forming them, if they turned out to be any good and as soon as the equipment could be made available into two squadrons, one of Catalinas and one of Wellington patrol bombers. He agreed that the equipment of these coastal squadrons in West Africa should be a British responsibility, but pointed out that owing to present shortage of suitable aircraft and the necessity for adequate training of crews, the formation of the proposed two squadrons was not likely to be practicable in the immediate future.
General Arnold said that the United States concept was gradually to draw in French air force personnel as they became trained and equipped for operational work over a period of about a year. He agreed that in French West Africa this would be a British responsibility.
General Marshall said that he was in favor of proceeding with a definite program for reequipping the French forces. This would, of course, imply French acceptance of our organization and training methods, and would inevitably delay the progress of equipping our own forces. He thought, however, that we should do the thing wholeheartedly; and he was prepared, subject to General Eisenhower’s views, to modify the United States program in order to equip French forces up to a strength of 250,000. All the equipment provided for the French would be at the expense of United States troops forming in America. He proposed to make use of French shipping to bring it over.
General Somervell said that General Giraud had agreed to turn over 160,000 tons of French shipping to the Allied pool. Out of this tonnage General Giraud proposed that 85,000 tons should be allocated to meet French civil requirements, leaving 75,000 tons for shipping equipment for the French forces. General Somervell calculated that this would enable them to be equipped at the rate of about one division a month. No allowance was made in this program for the carriage of coal and oil which was at present being shipped by the British.
The Committee:
Agreed:
a) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rio de Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.
b) That subject to (a), a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.
c) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.
- Publication of Results of the Conference
Sir Alan Brooke drew the attention of the Committee to the decision which the President and the Prime Minister had made at their meeting the previous day that:
a) The results of this conference should be communicated to Stalin in the form of a document setting out our intentions for 1943.
b) A communiqué should be prepared for issue to the Press when the conference is finished.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that a small subcommittee should be appointed to draft a suitable document for approval by the Committee at the end of the conference.
The Committee:
Agreed:
To appoint a subcommittee for this purpose consisting of:
- United States Representatives:
- Brigadier General Hull
- Colonel Smart
- Commander Libby
- British Representatives:
- Lt. General Ismay
- Major General Kennedy
- Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Hopkins-Harriman-Poniatowski meeting, morning
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | France | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Count Poniatowski | |
| Mr. Harriman |
Hopkins Notes
[Extracts]
Casablanca, January 19, 1943.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Had a call from Count Poniatowski, who is acting as General Giraud’s civilian aide, who wanted to see me, but I sent for Harriman because I had learned that at one time he had been Harriman’s brother-in-law.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Had a long talk with Count Poniatowski and Harriman. I did not tell him that de Gaulle had refused to come, because the President thinks that is British business and that they should acquaint Giraud of this fact. The Count told me what they proposed to say to de Gaulle in case he came down. It boils down that they are going to tell him that Giraud is going to be the top dog and that they will be glad to play with de Gaulle all around the world in a secondary capacity. He also told me the things he wanted to take up with the President, which included the adequate arming of the French Army, adjustment of exchange rates, the organization of a new French layout with Giraud in charge and de Gaulle No. 2 man, and then some other vague business about French sovereignty. I told him that there would be no trouble with the President about the arming of the French Army and the exchange rates, although I couldn’t say what those rates would be, and that I thought the President thought that Giraud should land on top, but as far as sovereignty is concerned, he is treading on very difficult ground because the President stuck by his position that sovereignty rested exclusively with the French people, and that he would recognize no one, not even Giraud, as representing France. I told Harriman to see the President and tell him what had gone on at this conference, and I went over to see Churchill.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hopkins-Churchill conversation, morning
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Prime Minister Churchill |
Hopkins Notes
[Extracts]
Casablanca, January 19, 1943.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Prime Minister told me he wanted to see me this morning. He had not yet heard from London about de Gaulle and seemed to be unhappy about the President’s decision to close up the conference with the Chiefs of Staff here on Wednesday afternoon.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I found Churchill in bed and he told me that while the second raid on Berlin looked pretty good, the weather had been bad and he was not sure how much damage had been done. He told me that he was sure his forces attacking Tripolitania were much further along than they had anticipated and that that was very good. I asked him what was bothering him about winding up the business with the Chiefs of Staff on Wednesday and he told me that he didn’t have anything specific in mind, that he thought the Chiefs of Staff were going to work out a pretty good agreement. He did tell me, however, that he intended to fly to Cairo as soon as the President left and work out the new Middle East Command with General Wilson in charge, and that he wanted to meet the President of Turkey perhaps in Cyprus, and push him pretty hard on the business of getting Turkey into the war, and giving us some adequate air bases, and to attack Roumanian oil fields. He told me he intended to take the line that Turkey should not wait until the last minute, but that if they were recalcitrant he would not hesitate to tell the Turks that in the event of their remaining out, he could not undertake to control the Russians regarding the Dardanelles and that their position would be intolerable.
I arranged to have dinner with Harriman and Churchill tonight because the President and Elliott are dining with General Patton. The Prime Minister was anxious that the President not tell Giraud that de Gaulle had refused to show up, because he was hoping to get a message from de Gaulle any minute. He said he wanted to come to see the President around five or six o’clock tonight. I went back to the house and told the President that the Prime Minister did not want Giraud told.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roosevelt-Tedder meeting, 11:25 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Air Chief Marshal Tedder |
Roosevelt-Giraud conversation, noon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | France | |
| President Roosevelt | General Giraud | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Captain Beaufre | |
| Mr. Murphy | ||
| Captain McCrea | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt |
McCrea Notes
Secret
Casablanca, 19 January 1943.
The President received General Henri Giraud at 12:00 noon this date. Present also were Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Captain John L. McCrea, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Captain A. Beaufre, Aide-de-camp, to General Giraud.
The President stated to General Giraud that he had been giving consideration to suggesting the formation of a “Committee for the Liberation of France,” to consist of General Giraud, General de Gaulle, and a civilian. The President stated that he recognized the choice of a civilian would no doubt be a matter of some concern to both Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. In this connection, he stated that there were no doubt many Frenchmen who would be unacceptable to Generals Giraud and de Gaulle, and that the important thing to do was to agree on someone of experience as a civil administrator, and unquestioned honesty. The President stated that he did not wish to appear as suggesting anyone, but that he had heard much favorable comment about M. Roger Cambon and M. Boisson. General Giraud stated that M. Petryon [Peyrouton] too had much in his favor. The President stated that under the circumstances, of course, General Giraud would be the senior member of such a committee and that General de Gaulle might be designated as Chief of Staff, or Inspector-General, or some such convenient title. The civilian member of the committee would be the Aide for Civil Administration, and that it was expected this latter member would relieve General Giraud of many of the duties which he now performs in connection with the civil administration. The impression that I gathered was that the formation of such a committee would meet with the approval of General Giraud. “No distractions,” said the General, “should be permitted to interfere with the conduct of the war.”
In response to a question by the President, General Giraud stated that practically all the political prisoners in North Africa had now been set free. It was stated that many of these prisoners had been confined since the start of the war. He stated that the political prisoners remaining in confinement were so held because of other crimes with which they were charged.
The President asked General Giraud that if the value of the franc were re-pegged in North Africa giving a higher value to the franc, would anyone stand to make a fortune out of such a revaluation. Both General Giraud and Mr. Murphy then explained to the President that there were no large money operators in North Africa. It was stated that no doubt a few people would stand to benefit by such a revaluation, but not in an alarming amount. The President then asked if anyone in France with a considerable amount of francs would stand to benefit by such a re-pegging. Both General Giraud and Mr. Murphy then explained to the President that the French Colonial monetary system is entirely divorced from the Bank of France, and that a revaluation such as proposed by the President would affect only the colonial franc and not the franc of the Bank of France.
The President stated that he had met with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the evening of January 18 and that the subject of equipping the North African French Army had been given much consideration. The President stated that he was pleased to inform General Giraud that General Marshall was enthusiastic about the prospects of such an army and that he (General Marshall) had stated to the President that it was his intention to see that such an army was equipped with our latest and best material rather than from our surplus supplies of older material. General Giraud received this statement with much satisfaction and assured the President that a French army so equipped would give a good account of itself against the enemy.
General Giraud then raised the question of propaganda. He stated that propaganda was a well-recognized weapon, but that it had to be used with care. Specifically, he stated that propaganda intended for the French people must be directed by Frenchmen. He admitted that the United Nations had an interest in such propaganda and that it was only right that our interests be given consideration, but that in the final analysis, a Frenchman should pass on propaganda directed towards the French people. To this the President and Mr. Murphy agreed.
At 12:40 p.m., the President and General Giraud withdrew to the terrace where motion and still pictures were made. After a number of shots had thus been made, the President directed Mr. Hopkins, Captain McCrea, and Captain Beaufre to join the party, and additional pictures were made.
At 12:50 p.m., General Giraud and his aide, Captain Beaufre, withdrew.
JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy
Hopkins Notes
[Extract]
Casablanca, January 19, 1943.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I attended the conference between the President, Giraud, Murphy, Captain McCrea, Elliott, and Giraud’s Military Aide, Captain Beaufre. The President laid out to Giraud in a masterful fashion, his concept of French resistance, emphasizing the fighting. McCrea has made complete minutes of this meeting. I gained a very favorable impression of Giraud. I know he is a Royalist and is probably a right-winger in all his economic views, but I have a feeling that he is willing to fight. He is about six feet, two inches and a man of about 63 or 64. He has the appearance of health and vigor. He spoke with a good deal of modesty, but with confidence. Had a feeling that he had made up his mind that he was going to do whatever the President wanted in Africa. Apart from fighting in the war, it is impossible to tell whether or not he has political ambitions. He did not give me that impression except when he stressed later, with great vigor, his determination to head the civil as well as the military areas in Africa.
Giraud speaks no English, but the President’s French seemed to me to be better than usual, and Murphy, who did the interpreting, didn’t have much to do. It was only when the President wanted to be perfectly sure that Giraud knew what he was saying on an important matter, that he had Murphy interpret. Giraud laid out his problem[s], which his aide had previously told me, and the President settled them all to Giraud’s complete satisfaction, but on the sovereignty point he was adamant, and insisted that Giraud, at the moment, act only as a representative in North Africa, and that he not in any sense speak for France, and that the understanding about all other French possessions should be worked out only when de Gaulle arrived. The President and Giraud then went out on the back porch and a flock of Army photographers took pictures of them, and later of McCrea, Giraud’s aide and me with the President and Giraud. On the whole I thought it was a very satisfactory conference and I am sure that Giraud and the President have mutual confidence in each other.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Navy Department (January 19, 1943)
Communiqué No. 255
Pacific and Far East.
U.S. submarines have reported the following results of operations against the enemy in the waters of these areas:
- One destroyer sunk.
- One large cargo ship sunk.
- One medium-sized transport sunk.
- One medium-sized cargo ship sunk.
- One small patrol vessel sunk.
- One large tanker damaged.
- One small cargo ship damaged.
These actions have not been announced in any previous Navy Department communiqué.
Brooklyn Eagle (January 19, 1943)
President orders strikers back to mines in 48 hours
Sees nation injured – threatens to take action if defied
…
Last Japanese stronghold in Papua captured
Remnants of 15,000 army fighting in rags and near starvation
…
1,291 casualties listed by Navy; 36 in Boro, Long Island
14 local men reported dead, 9 missing and 13 wounded between Dec. 16 and 31
…
U.S. subs sink 5 more ships in Pacific zone
Washington (UP) –
U.S. submarines, striking at enemy shipping in the Pacific and far East areas, have sunk five more enemy ships and damaged two others, the Navy announced today.
Ships sunk included were a destroyer, a large cargo ship, a medium-sized cargo ship and a small patrol vessel.
Damaged were one large tanker and one small cargo ship.
Today’s announcements brought to 112 the total of enemy ships sunk as a result of U.S. submarine operations in the Pacific since Pearl Harbor. Twenty-two others have been probably sunk and 29 damaged.