Editorial: No facts to bear out hopes that war is nearing its end
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LaMotta, Wright victories complicate ring picture
Wilson a big flop and lightweight tests lose caste as Peralta blows
By Harold Parrott
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U.S. State Department (January 16, 1943)
Meeting of Roosevelt with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Mr. Hopkins | ||
| Mr. Harriman | ||
| General Marshall | ||
| Admiral King | ||
| Lieutenant General Arnold | ||
| Lieutenant General Somervell | ||
| Rear Admiral Cooke | ||
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | ||
| Brigadier General Deane |
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 16, 1943, 5 p.m.
Secret
Admiral King informed the President that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been attempting to obtain the British Chiefs of Staff’s concept as to how the war should be won. He said that the British have definite ideas as to what the next operation should be but do not seem to have an overall plan for the conduct of the war.
General Marshall stated that the planners are making a study of what is required in the Pacific in order to maintain constant pressure on the Japanese and keep the initiative in that theatre. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been particularly concerned with the strategic concept for 1943. They have had discussions on the Burma operations and also whether an immediate operation should be planned for the Mediterranean or for the Continent or both. He stated that the planners had been instructed to estimate the earliest possible date that an operation against Sicily could be mounted in order that the Chiefs of Staff could determine what residue of force would be available for operations on the Continent and if such operations would be advisable this year.
General Marshall stated that the most critical factors in the coming operations are the availability of landing craft, the time necessary for amphibious training, and the availability of escort vessels.
He stated that there will be excess troops available in North Africa when the Axis powers have been expelled from North Africa and that this is one of the chief reasons why Operation Husky appears to be attractive.
The British have estimated that the operations against Sicily cannot be mounted prior to August but feel that there is a possibility of moving this date up to sometime in July.
General Marshall said that the question being determined is whether we can undertake an operation against the continent together with Operation Husky or separately and at a later date. The British maintain a spearhead in the United Kingdom for an operation against the continent in the event of a crack in German morale. This includes enough landing craft to move four brigade groups and, additionally, the British are putting motors in approximately 1,000 barges which they will use, together with other small craft to bring in troops following the spearhead.
The President asked how many troops were in England at this time, to which General Marshall replied that there was one trained division and about 140,000 to 150,000 men. He said that by next summer we can have six to nine divisions in the United Kingdom, and the British will have thirteen.
General Marshall quoted Sir Charles Portal as saying a crack in Axis morale may come at any time because of the explosive elements existing in the populations of the occupied countries. Sir Charles Portal feels that if such an explosion comes, it will start in the interior of Germany but will finally reach the frontline troops who will desire to return to their families. In this case, an occupation of the continent would be comparatively simple.
General Marshall said that training for amphibious operations is the most critical factor which we have to face. The training must be of much higher quality than that given for Torch. He quoted General Eisenhower as saying that he believed that there must be an invasion on the continent but that it would require a minimum of 12 divisions, which is double previous estimates. General Eisenhower also feels that there is a need for more training. Other limiting factors to any proposed operation are the necessities of combating the submarine menace and for the delivery of supplies to Russia.
An operation against Sardinia can be accomplished about six weeks earlier than one against Sicily, but the results will have little effect in improving the shipping situation through the Mediterranean. The only positive result to be received from the capture of Sardinia would be the ability to bomb Italy and perhaps the southern coast of France.
General Arnold pointed out that there would be much better air coverage for Operation Husky than could be given to Operation Brimstone. The President asked where the Germans had the best defence.
General Marshall replied that their defence in Sicily was better than that in Sardinia and that by summer it might be expected that the Germans would have 6 to 8 divisions there. General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed on the necessity of placing adequate troops in rear of Turkey to be prepared to reinforce her for a resistance to Axis invasion.
The President remarked that Turkey’s entry into the war was a diplomatic question, to which General Marshall replied that he felt that the concentration should be made regardless of whether Turkey came into the war or not.
Admiral King said that in our endeavors to obtain a definite strategic concept from the British Chiefs of Staff it had become apparent that they intended using the geographic and manpower position of Russia to the maximum. This necessitates making every effort to maintain the flow of supplies to Russia and also to divert German air and ground troops from the Russian front. He added that the British make no mention of where or when a second front on the continent should be established. The President said that we now have a protocol with the Russians which involves a certain delivery of munitions to them and that this shall probably be continued on the same scale when the present protocol expires.
Admiral King stated that British convoys by the northern route are set up for 30 ships every 42 days. With an additional 12 destroyers this could be improved to a rate of 30 ships each 27 days. He stated that he did not believe we should base our plans too largely on a contemplated German crack-up. It now appeared that a real Round-Up operation is not feasible before April, 1944 because of British lack of enthusiasm.
General Marshall said that British would undertake an operation Sledgehammer if they saw signs of a break in German morale. This would be followed by a makeshift Round-Up operation. He said the British feel that they cannot gather the means for a real thrust against the continent in 1943, and that Admiral Pound states that no operation should be undertaken after August. It is apparent that British cooperation cannot be obtained unless there are indications of the Germans weakening.
Admiral King stated that if the operations on the Mediterranean and on the Russian front caused the Germans to withdraw their forces from France, the British would be willing to seize this opportunity to invade the continent.
General Marshall informed the President that the British were not interested in occupying Italy, inasmuch as this would add to our burdens without commensurate returns.
The President expressed his agreement with this view.
General Marshall stated that in his opinion we may be able to obtain a decision from the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning the operations in the Pacific by January 17th and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that Operation Husky should be undertaken, but they had not yet informed the British to this effect.
The President stated that from the political point of view he thought it would be extremely wise to send more airplanes to China. He felt that they could be used to great advantage there and if periodic bombing raids over Japan could be undertaken, they would have a tremendous morale effect on the Chinese people. General Arnold stated that he agreed with this view but wished to see for himself whether or not an increased air force in China could be supplied.
The President then stated that he thought it was desirable to set up additional transport planes to insure a supply of a larger air force in China.
General Marshall said that transport planes now allocated to China are sufficient and that we must be extremely careful about making additional allocations. He pointed out that, in addition to China, we would receive demands for transport planes from Russia. We would need a considerable number for the Operation Husky and also for General MacArthur’s forces in the Pacific.
The President suggested the possibility of preparing two or three plans and making all preparations to carry them out, but leaving the decision as to the objective until a later date.
Admiral Cooke pointed out that if planes [plans?] were made for Operation Husky the objective could readily be changed to either the Dodecanese, Crete or Sardinia.
The President said he would like to have some flexibility to the plans in case it became apparent that Turkey might enter the war. In that case we could then adopt the objective which would fit in best with this development.
General Marshall stated he did not feel that the Operation Husky would interfere with Turkey’s entering into the war, but rather that a success in Sicily might be an added inducement to her to join with us.
The President then directed the discussion to Russia. He said that he had received information that the Russians did not desire any of our personnel and also indicated that they would not welcome General Bradley’s mission to make a survey of the available air facilities in Siberia.
He asked General Somervell about the supply situation to Russia.
General Somervell replied that the Persian port is capable of handling 15 ships per month. The road and rail facilities are capable of handling about 10,000 tons per day which are sufficient to handle the freight from 40 ships per month, and efforts are now being made to expand the port facilities to make this possible. He then went on to describe to the President several overland routes to Russia, all of which are limited by the availability of truck transportation.
The President asked what might happen if Turkey remained neutral but permitted our transporting munitions and bombs through her territory.
General Somervell replied that certain routes could be made available by this means, but if they were used it would be necessary to establish a truck assembly plant in that area. He added that he thought this should be done, and that all available routes into Russia should be used.
The President asked General Somervell if truck bodies could be manufactured in the Near East, to which General Somervell replied that lumber would have to [be?] obtained from India.
Mr. Harriman stated that until a truck assembly plant could be constructed, the one now at Cairo could be used.
Admiral King stated that the last convoy to Murmansk arrived without loss of any of its 16 cargo ships, but that one destroyer had been sunk and another damaged. He stated that we could help Russia more if they would help us to do so.
The President asked if we were getting as much information from Southern Europe as are the British. General Marshall replied that he would have this investigated (A message was sent to G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, asking for a report as to the amount of intelligence received out of Southern Europe by U.S. Intelligence Agencies and how our efforts in this regard compared with those of the British).
General Marshall then informed the President that the British had agreed to transfer their Valentine tanks from the 6th Armored Division to the French as soon as the British had received our Sherman tanks. He also stated he thought it necessary to equip the best French divisions rapidly.
General Marshall then informed the President regarding a decision which had been made by General Eisenhower concerning the Tunisian operations. A drive towards Sfax which had been planned for January 24th has been called off. This was necessary because the British First Army on the north could not attack until March 15th and General Alexander could not attack Rommel’s forces on the south until February 15th. It was decided that the attack against Sfax might be premature and expose them to an attack from the north by German Tunisian forces and from the south by Rommel. Instead, General Eisenhower is to hold his First Armored Division in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist either Alexander’s forces in the south or the First British Army in the north, and the attack against Sfax will be made by infantry units at a later date, to be coordinated by General Eisenhower and General Alexander.
The President then asked General Somervell about the general supply situation. General Somervell replied that the greatest shortages in North Africa were in road machinery and motor transportation. Both of these are now being sent to North Africa. The machinery is needed to improve the railroads and also for the construction and improvement of airfields. Efforts are also being made to bring in needed locomotives.
The President then asked about the civilian supply situation. General Somervell replied that it was being handled satisfactorily, except that valuable cargo space was being utilized by some of the civilian agencies in the United States in sending unnecessary and ridiculous items.
The President then informed the Chiefs of Staff that Admiral Robert in Martinique had received a message from Laval to sink his ships immediately upon receiving evidence that the United States intended action against Martinique. Laval required Robert to give him an answer at once. Robert informed Laval within four hours that he would comply with his orders. This definitely eliminates the possibility of our obtaining the use of French shipping now in Martinique.
Admiral Cooke then informed the President that the British were becoming conscious of the fact that the United States was engaged in a war in the Pacific and described his discussions with the British Staff Planners who recognized the necessity for adequate means being provided to handle the Pacific situation. He stated, however, that he did not feel that the British Chiefs of Staff were as yet convinced of this necessity. The Chiefs of Staff feel that we should maintain the status quo and simply hold, whereas the planners recognize that a constant pressure must be kept on the Japanese and that every effort must be made to keep China in the war. The Planners admit the possibility of the Chinese dropping out of the war.
The President then discussed the proposed operations in Burma. General Marshall informed him that just as he felt that we had convinced the British that Operation Ravenous should be undertaken, the Generalissimo had declined to participate. The reason given by the Generalissimo is that the British refuse to place a naval force in the Bay of Bengal to interrupt the Japanese line of communications. The Generalissimo feels that a definite commitment to this effect had been made by the Prime Minister in a talk last year before the Pacific Council. General Marshall said that the Prime Minister probably had the Anakim operation in mind.
Admiral Cooke stated that the British have no intention of undertaking an operation to recapture Burma in the present dry season.
General Marshall pointed out that the Chinese, particularly General Hsiung, had been loud in their complaints about failures to assist them, and now that we offer them assistance, they refuse our help.
Saturday, 16 January
During the morning, the President had a number of callers, and for the sake of brevity, they are indicated as follows:
| Called | Departed | |
|---|---|---|
| 9:55 | The Prime Minister | 11:25 |
| 10:45 | The Rt. Hon. H. Macmillan (British Resident in N. Africa) | 11:20 |
| 10:50 | Mr. Robert Murphy | 11:20 |
| 11:00 | Lt. General Eisenhower | 11:15 |
The President, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lt. Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. were joined at luncheon today by Captain George Durno, Air Transport Command, who for many years before entering the Army, had covered the White House for the International News Service. Following luncheon, Chief Photographer’s Mate, Black, took some moving pictures and a number of still photographs at the luncheon party.
From 5:00 until 7:00 p.m., the following listed persons conferred with the President:
- General George C. Marshall
- Admiral E. J. King
- Lt. General H. H. Arnold
- Lt. General B. B. Somervell
- Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr.
- Brigadier General A. W. Wedemeyer
- Brigadier General John R. Deane
- Mr. Averell Harriman
The evening dinner party was somewhat unusual. Five members of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAACs) had been invited to take dinner with the President, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Col. Roosevelt, Lt. Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. and Captain George Durno of the Air Transport Command. Their names are listed below:
| Captain Louise Anderson | WAAC |
| Captain Ruth Briggs | WAAC |
| Captain Mattie Pinette | WAAC |
| Captain Martha Rogers | WAAC |
| Captain Alene Drezmal | WAAC |
At 11:00 p.m., upon invitation of the President, the Prime Minister, General Alexander, Mr. Harriman, and Commander Thompson joined what was now an after-dinner party, departing at two o’clock the following morning.
No doubt, it may be safely said that not even by the wildest stretch of the imagination, could any of these Service ladies have foreseen that one evening, in a country far from their native land, they would be dining with the President of the United States, and later would be joined by the Prime Minister of Great Britain.
The Pittsburgh Press (January 16, 1943)
Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
With U.S. forces in Algeria – (Jan. 15)
The American nurses — and there are lots of them — have turned out just as you would expect: wonderfully. Army doctors, and patients too, are unanimous in their praise for them. Doctors tell me that in that first rush of casualties they were calmer than the men.
One hospital unit had a nurse they were afraid of. She had seemed neurotic and hysterical on the way down. The head doctor detailed another nurse just to watch her all through the hectic first hours of tending the wounded. But he needn’t have. He admits now she was the calmest of the lot.
The head of one hospital, a full colonel who was in the last war, worked in the improvised hospitals set up at Arzew to tend the freshly wounded. He says they worked 36 hours without sleep, with wounded men lying around knee-deep, waiting for attention. He says not a soul in the outfit cracked up or got flustered.
He says:
You’re so busy you didn’t think about it being horrible. You aren’t yourself. Actually you seem to become somebody else. And after it’s over, you’re thrilled by it. Gosh, I hope I’m not stuck in a base hospital. I want to get on to the front.
The Carolina nurses of the Evacuation Hospital about which I have been writing have taken it like soldiers. For the first ten days they had to live like animals, even using open ditches for toilets, but they never complained.
At this tent hospital, one nurse is always on duty in each tentful of 20 men. She has medical orderlies to help her. In bad weather, the nurses wear Army coveralls, but Lt. Col. Rollin Bauchspies, the hospital commandant, wants them to put on dresses once in a while, for he says the effect on the men is astounding. The touch of femininity, the knowledge that a woman is around, gives a wounded man courage and confidence and a feeling of security. And the more feminine she looks, the better.
Only about 100 of the hospital’s 700 patients were wounded men. The others are just sick with ordinary things such as flu, appendicitis, sprains. They’ve got a whole tentful of mumps, and a few cases of malaria and dysentery.
At the far end of the hospital, behind an evil-looking barricade of barbed wire, is what Col. Bauchspies called “Casanova Park.” Back there are 150 soldiers with venereal disease.
I asked:
What’s the barbed wire for? They wouldn’t try to get out anyhow.
The colonel said:
It’s just to make them feel like heels. There’s no damned excuse for a soldier getting caught nowadays unless he just doesn’t care. When he gets a venereal he’s no good to his country and somebody else has to do his work. So I want him to feel ashamed, even though he does get the finest medical treatment at the same time.
The wounded soldiers are now mostly able to be on their feet. On warm days they come out in their bathrobes and sit for hours in the sun, out in the stubblefield. Most of them are getting a good tan. At night they play cards on their bunks, by the light of lanterns hanging from the ridgepoles. The usual bunkhouse profanity is strangely absent from those tents, for there is always a nurse around.
The boys like to talk about their experiences. I’ve spent much time with a tentful of men wounded in the harbor battle at Oran, and they recount the fight by the hour.
The deafened soldier I wrote about the other day – Sgt. Ralph Gower – is in this hospital. I’ve been back to talk to him several times. He grows more remarkable every time you see him. I don’t know what the boys will do without him when he leaves. They call him “the wee sergeant.” They picked up the “wee” when they were training in Scotland, and it has been tagged onto him ever since. The other day he said, with his deadpan Arkansas expression:
I’m glad I’m deaf so I won’t have to listen to that damned “wee sergeant” stuff anymore.
Though wounded veterans by now, and alive only by a miracle, those patients are just the ordinary American boys they always were, friendly and enthusiastic and sensible. Only occasionally do you find one who seems affected by his experiences – one officer broods over having lost so many of his men, another deafened boy stays to himself and refuses to try to learn lip-reading.
But on the whole, they are just as normal as though nothing had happened. They haven’t been paid and they can’t get trace of their friends and they don’t know where they’ll be sent, but still, they don’t complain except just a little, and they say very calmly that they guess it’s enough just to be alive.
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U.S. State Department (January 17, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Lieutenant General Arnold | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Commander Libby | Major General Kennedy | |
| Air Chief Marshal Slessor | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Dykes | ||
| Brigadier General Deane |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
January 17, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret
- The Eastern Theater
General Marshall proposed discussing a paper prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners regarding the forces needed in the Pacific Theater in 1943.
The British Chiefs of Staff stated that they would like to have an opportunity to study the paper before discussing it in detail.
General Marshall pointed out that in their discussions with the British Planners, the United States Planners were told that the British did not feel that Anakim was possible of accomplishment during the dry season of 1943-1944. He said that the United States Chiefs of Staff are particularly concerned about the timing of this operation because of the seriousness of the situation regarding China.
Admiral King added that Operation Anakim was also of importance with regard to our strategy in defeating Japan.
Sir Alan Brooke said that there were two stumbling blocks to Operation Anakim in 1943. These are naval cover and the assemblage of landing craft in sufficient time to permit adequate training. He felt the land forces could be found but that it would be difficult to assemble the landing craft following Operation Husky.
Sir Dudley Pound said that in order to do Operation Torch, it had been necessary to withdraw a considerable force from the Eastern Fleet and that it was probable the same conditions would pertain in operations undertaken in other theaters in 1943.
Admiral King said that Anakim was at least ten months off. He added that to postpone the date would put us in a critical situation. It is absolutely essential that we utilize China’s geographical position and their manpower and Anakim is a step in this direction.
Admiral Cooke said that he felt the operation could be started in November or December of 1943 and the actual landings be made in January. He said that there would be considerable landing craft available from production between April of 1943 and January of 1944. Some of this additional landing craft will be available for Burma in October. Therefore, the requirements for landing craft could probably be met. As for the naval force, he considered that we would only need carriers, destroyers, and cruisers. He did not feel that battleships would be necessary if the Japanese were being contained by the United States Fleet in the Pacific. The real bottleneck is the availability of shipping.
Admiral King said that he definitely considered that Operation Anakim must be aimed at in 1943 and carried through if the situation permits.
Sir Dudley Pound considered in such an important operation that battleship cover would be necessary.
Admiral King again pointed out that the operation would not be undertaken for at least ten months. By this time the destroyer program should be well along, the submarine menace should be reduced, and the shipping situation much improved through increased production and the opening of the Mediterranean. To postpone the operation in 1943 would result in not undertaking it for almost two years.
General Marshall then informed the Chiefs of Staff of a message which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had sent to the President in which he regretted that Chinese troops would not be able to participate in Operation Ravenous, the reasons being that the British ground forces are inadequate and that the British will not agree to engage the Eastern Fleet in the Bay of Bengal to interrupt the Japanese line of communications.
Lord Louis Mountbatten stated that the British Chiefs of Staff agree that the Burma Road must be opened and that the entire question is one of the availability of resources.
Admiral King said that the United States Chiefs of Staff recognize Germany is our prime enemy and that their strategy does not envisage a complete defeat of Japan before defeating Germany. He added, however, that every effort must be applied which will put us in a position of readiness from which we can operate against Japan after Germany has been defeated.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed to this unless the attainment of such positions of readiness would delay or jeopardize the defeat of Germany.
General Marshall said that he felt it was a question of creating more than positions of readiness as far as the Japanese are concerned. We must maintain the initiative against them by offensive moves on our part. The present operations in the South Pacific are tremendously expensive in merchant vessels, naval vessels, and escorts. The situation is also fraught with the possibility of a sudden reverse and the consequent loss of sea power. He said that he is most anxious to open the Burma Road, not so much for the morale effect on China as for the need to provide air support to China for operations against Japan and Japanese shipping. He said the expensive operations in which we are now engaged in the South Pacific react on everything else the United Nations attempt to do whether it be in the Mediterranean, the United Kingdom, or elsewhere. He discussed the situation in the Pacific as being so critical as to make it appear at one time that Operation Torch would have to be called off. He also stated that unless Operation Anakim could be undertaken, he felt that a situation might arise in the Pacific at any time that would necessitate the United States regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater.
General Marshall spoke of our commitments in the Pacific, of our responsibilities, with particular reference to the number of garrisons we have on small islands and the impossibility of letting any of them down. He insisted that the United States could not stand for another Bataan. He said that he is desirous of undertaking the Burma operation in order to reduce our hazards in the Pacific and thus undertake the campaign against Germany.
General Marshall spoke of other commitments in the Pacific that are serious but in which we have been willing to accept the hazards. In this connection he pointed to the Japanese operation in the Aleutians and the necessity of protecting the Hawaiian-Midway line of communications. In these instances, he felt that, while we were vulnerable to Japanese attack, support from the United States could be furnished quickly because of the relatively short distances involved.
General Marshall informed the Chiefs of Staff that the President is desirous of giving additional air support to China. This will be done because of the psychological results to be achieved despite the fact that it is a tremendously expensive operation.
Admiral King pointed out that the demands in the Pacific are enormous and continuous. Many of the demands are made by Australia, a Dominion of the British Commonwealth. Australia is in the area of the United States strategic responsibility and most of our efforts have been devoted to protecting its line of communications. He said, in this connection, that the political and military situations are interlocked and these factors must be considered together when deciding what operations are to be undertaken. He repeated that we must place ourselves in positions of readiness for the time when all the resources of the United Nations will be brought against Japan.
- Iceland
General Marshall asked for the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the size of the garrison which should be maintained in Iceland. At the present time there were some 40,000 United States’ ground troops in the island and two squadrons of fighter aircraft, together with a squadron of naval patrol craft. He was anxious to cut down these numbers.
Sir Dudley Pound said that the British garrison had been about 22,000 men. In his view an invasion of Iceland by the Germans was quite out of the question. Taking into account the general attitude of the Germans and their unwillingness to risk their ships without heavy air cover in Northern waters, he did not think even a tip and run raid was at all likely. It was possible, of course, that they might change their policy, but the only object of a German attempt to seize the island would be to deny it to us as an air base. Our possession of it made our control of the Northern exit to the Atlantic more secure. It seemed much more likely that if the Germans wished to adopt a more active policy, they would use their surface ships against our convoys rather than for a hazardous expedition against Iceland. These were his first thoughts and he would like to have a more considered opinion prepared for the United States Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral King was in general agreement with the views of Sir Dudley Pound. He pointed out that the German situation had greatly changed during the last six months.
The Committee:
Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would prepare for the information of the United States Chiefs of Staff a memorandum setting out their views on the defense of Iceland.
- Russian Air Assistance for PQ Convoys
Admiral King suggested that more should be done to induce the Russians to attack the German air forces in Northern Norway which were such a menace to the Murmansk convoys. The German air bases were out of range from the United Kingdom but the Russians could undoubtedly do something if they wished to. The Murmansk route was the most important of the four routes for Russian supplies, and he felt we ought to press the Russians to give us more assistance.
Sir Dudley Pound said that the British had pressed the Russians in 1942 to assist with escorts and with air attack. They did provide some assistance with escorts, but always found some reason for not sending their surface ships out as far as Bear Island where the danger was greatest. Whatever they might undertake to do, however, it would be quite unsafe to rely on their promises, and reduce the scale of our own protection.
As regards air, the British Mission had pressed the Russians hard for assistance, and the Prime Minister had also communicated with Mr. Stalin. In the end some Russian Army bombers had been sent North to attack the German airdromes. Such action, however, was only of very limited value. It would be no use asking them to attack the German ships since they were untrained in this work. Two British squadrons of Hampdens had been sent up to North Russia last year. At the beginning of the winter the British personnel had been withdrawn, and these were now maimed by the Russians. Recently, however, when the Lutzow and Hipper came out, the Russians failed to take any action against them with these aircraft, although asked to do so.
Sir Charles Portal said that the Germans had some seven airfields between Bodo and Petsamo, all well defended. The Russians had three airfields in the Murmansk-Archangel area. Bombing of airfields was very unprofitable. For example, Malta had only three airfields within 100 miles of Sicily but a very large force of German bombers had been quite unable to prevent us using them. Whatever they did, the Russians would not be able to stop the German air reconnaissance. Medium bombers and long-range fighters for their escorts would be required for the purpose; German fields were out of range of dive-bombing attack.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the possibility of amphibious operations to capture the German airfields had been most exhaustively examined by the British Staffs, but they had not been found practicable. The effect of Torch, however, had been very great in causing withdrawals of German aircraft from Norway. Their present strength was only about 53 aircraft all told, whereas they had had up to 300 previously.
Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that one of the greatest difficulties was that the convoys were open to attack for about ten days. This enabled the Germans to reinforce their airfields in Northern Norway from elsewhere before the convoy was out of the danger zone.
Roosevelt-Noguès conversation, noon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | France | |
| President Roosevelt | General Noguès | |
| Mr. Murphy | ||
| Major General Patton | ||
| Brigadier General Wilbur | ||
| Captain McCrea | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt |
McCrea Notes
Casablanca, January 17, 1943.
Memorandum for the President’s Files
At 1200 this date, the President received M. General Chas. A. Noguès, Resident General at Rabat. Also present were Major General G. S. Patton Jr., Commanding General, 1st Armored Corps; Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, 1st Armored Corps; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, North African Forces; Captain John L. McCrea, Naval Aide to the President, and Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, Air Corps Reserve.
The President greeted General Noguès with the remark that:
I am very pleased to meet you, General, and I must say that you look exactly like your photograph.
The General stated that all of Morocco was very proud to have the President here and that the President’s presence in Morocco was a source of much surprise to the General.
The President stated that he did not speak very good French and so therefore thought that the conversation should be carried on with the aid of Brigadier General Wilbur, as interpreter. The conversation started out thus, but before long the President and General Noguès were conversing freely in French.
The President stated that he trusted that North Africa had seen the last of the Germans for some time, to which the General readily agreed. The President inquired as to the attitude of the Germans resident in North Africa during the period of the Armistice. General Noguès stated that at all times they were haughty and overbearing, and that everyone was glad to see them depart. He also stated that they were now being well cared for by the French in various concentration camps.
General Patton remarked that the fine cooperation existing between the French and ourselves was largely due to the splendid cooperation which General Noguès had given us. The President remarked that he felt that the newspapers had been making much out of a situation which did not exist, namely, that there was confusion and misunderstanding between the French, the Americans and the British in North Africa, and that the period for “name calling is now over.” General Noguès assured the President that everyone was most anxious to cooperate with the United States forces, looking towards the ultimate defeat of the enemy.
The President requested General Noguès’ advice as to whether or not, he, the President, should ask the Sultan of Morocco to call on him. Specifically, the President asked if it would be in order for him to entertain the Sultan at lunch or dinner. To this, both General Noguès and General Patton replied that it would be a most gracious thing for the President to do, and that it would definitely cement relations between the Arabs and ourselves. It was then explained that amongst the Arabs no higher compliment can be paid than to invite one to break bread. General Noguès stated that it was equivalent to becoming one’s blood brother or fighting a campaign with him. In other words, it cemented relations between the host and guest. The President stated that he would despatch an invitation to the Sultan which he trusted could be delivered in time for the Sultan to make preparations to come to Casablanca. At this point, General Patton stated that the letter should be delivered by no one less than a General officer, in company with General Noguès. The President stated that when the letter was ready to go, he would give it to his Naval Aide, as his personal representative, who would go in company with an Army general and General Noguès, and deliver the letter to the Sultan.
Discussion was had about the progress being made in repairing ships that were sunk in Casablanca harbor incident to the occupation. As to this, General Noguès could remark only generally, stating that he was not familiar with the details of such repairs. It was stated, however, by General Patton, that it would be most difficult to make repairs to these ships unless in some way they could be moved to American shipyards; that the conversion of the metric system plans to our units of measurement would be a job that would require at least a year’s work. Conversation along this line was further pursued in connection with our field pieces and small arms. It was remarked by General Patton that much of our field piece ammunition was interchangeable with the French, but that the small arms situation was another matter. It would be much the easier, the General stated, to equip the French troops with small arms of our manufacture.
The matter of political prisoners was then discussed. General Noguès stated that for the most part the Jews had now been released from the concentration camps. It was also stated that the Jews, especially those in Algeria, had raised the point that they wish restored to them at once the right of suffrage. The President stated that the answer to that was very simple, namely, that there just weren’t going to be any elections, so the Jews need not worry about the privilege of voting. Mr. Murphy remarked that the Jews in North Africa were very much disappointed that “the war for liberation” had not immediately resulted in their being given their complete freedom. The President stated that he felt the whole Jewish problem should be studied very carefully and that progress should be definitely planned. In other words, the number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population. Such a plan would therefore permit the Jews to engage in the professions, at the same time would not permit them to overcrowd the professions, and would present an unanswerable argument that they were being given their full rights. To the foregoing, General Noguès agreed generally, stating at the same time that it would be a sad thing for the French to win the war merely to open the way for the Jews to control the professions and the business world of North Africa. The President stated that his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over fifty percent of the lawyers, doctors, school teachers, college professors, etc., in Germany, were Jews.
At 12:45 p.m., General Noguès, accompanied by General Patton and Brigadier General Wilbur, withdrew to proceed to the villa occupied by Prime Minister Churchill.
Note: Shortly after the above interview started, General Patton whispered to Captain McCrea that General Noguès was scheduled to see the Prime Minister at 12:15 p.m.; that he, General Patton, had been informed by the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff, to this effect. General Patton asked whether or not he should make an announcement to the President at 12:15 about the scheduled conference with Mr. Churchill. To this, Captain McCrea replied that under no circumstances should he make such an announcement, and that the President would indicate when his conversation with General Noguès was at an end. About 12:30, General Patton again stated to Captain McCrea that he felt that he should indicate that the hour for the Prime Minister’s conference with General Noguès had passed, and that the party should proceed to the Prime Minister’s villa. Captain McCrea again told General Patton that under no circumstances should such an announcement be made. Upon the conclusion of General Noguès’ conference with the President, Captain McCrea informed the President as to what had taken place between General Patton and him.
JOHN McCREA
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon, 1:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt |
U.S. Navy Department (January 17, 1943)
Communiqué No. 253
South Pacific.
On January 15:
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During the evening, enemy planes bombed U.S. positions on Guadalcanal Island. Minor material damage was inflicted and some casualties among our troops were suffered.
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U.S. ground forces continued to advance slowly against determined enemy resistance.
On January 16, during the early afternoon, a force of “Marauder” medium bombers (Martin B-26) with “Airacobra” (Bell P-39) and “Warhawk” (Curtiss P-40) escort bombed Japanese positions at Munda, on New Georgia Island. A number of hits were scored in the target area.
Brooklyn Eagle (January 17, 1943)
U.S. smashes 30 Jap planes in Solomons
Fliers blast 3 destroyers, cargo vessel
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Allied fliers rip enemy in Tunisia
Communiqué tells of 23 planes downed, seven of them transports – Axis reports tank battle
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Demands Hull be summoned on Flynn choice
Bridges lists 34 who should testify – hearing to open Wednesday
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America First speaker held as draft violator
Haase seized after he tells U.S. attorney he prefers arrest to service in U.S. Army
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48-hour week proposed for all war plants
UAW official suggests 4-point plan for full utilization of labor
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Mme. Chiang to be White House guest
Mme. Chiang Kai-shek of China will be a guest at the White House after she has been treated for sinus trouble at an unnamed Manhattan hospital, it was revealed yesterday.
The wife of the Chinese Generalissimo had her wisdom teeth removed at the hospital, where she and her staff occupy an entire floor that is guarded by federal agents. The Office of Censorship until now had kept strict silence as to her whereabouts.
Among her few visitors has been Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of the President.