Admiral King doubted whether Germany could be defeated before 1944. He felt that her defeat could only be effected by direct military action rather than by a failure in her morale. Was it necessary, however, to accept that we could do nothing in Northern France before April 1944?
Sir Charles Portal said that this depended entirely on Germany’s power of resistance. If we concentrated everything we could on Germany this year, it was possible that we might cause her to crumble and thus be able to move into Germany with comparatively small forces. Until this condition had been produced, however, some 20 divisions would get us nowhere on the Continent. A factor which must not be forgotten was the terrific latent power of the oppressed people which could only come into play when the crumbling process started. At that moment, however, their efforts might contribute greatly to the final collapse. He did not see Germany fighting on and on, completely surrounded by the armed forces of the Allies. A point would come at which the whole structure of Germany and the Nazi Party would collapse, and this moment might well come during the current year. It was essential therefore to have ready a plan and some resources in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack. In order to produce the crack, however, we must keep up the maximum pressure on Germany by land operations; air bombardment alone was not sufficient.
In further discussion the importance of deciding the requirements and availability of escort vessels was emphasized. These appeared to be one of the principal limiting factors.
Admiral King said that there was no reserve of escort vessels but if Operation Husky were decided upon, the United States and British Navies would have to find the escort vessels somehow just as they had in the case of Torch.
After some further discussion,
The Committee:
Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to reexamine the British plan for Husky in the light of the American and British resources of all kinds that can be made available for it, and to calculate the earliest date by which the Operation could be mounted.
- Supplies to Russia
Sir Dudley Pound recapitulated the factors governing PQ convoys to North Russia. With the present resources of the Home Fleet not more than one 30-ship convoy could be run every 40 to 42 days. Each convoy had to contain two oilers, leaving a net total of 28 cargo ships. With more destroyers it would be possible to “double-end” the convoys, reducing cycle to 27 days instead of 40-42. For this purpose about 12 destroyers would be required from the U.S. Navy. He wished to emphasize, however, that if the Germans employed their surface ships boldly and kept up the same amount of air and U-boats as last year, it was within their power to stop the PQ convoys altogether.
General Somervell reviewed the general problem of supplying Russia. The northern route was at present the best since the turn-round was shortest. The turn-round on the Persian Gulf route was about five months. Some fifteen ships a month are now being used on this route but the flow was restricted by port and inland transportation deficiencies. Once the Mediterranean was opened some relief might be given by the use of Haifa and the overland route from there to Bagdad. For this purpose additional heavy trucks for the road haul would be needed. U.S. Technical troops were being dispatched to Persia to improve the trans-Persian transportation facilities, and it was hoped to increase these to about 10,000 tons per day. If this could be achieved, 40 ships a month instead of 15 could be sent into the Persian Gulf.
The sea route from Seattle to Vladivostok was also being used for non-military supplies and raw materials. Twelve ships manned by the Russians were now working this route, and it was hoped to add 10 ships a month in the future. The use of this route naturally depended on non-interference by the Japanese.
All these potential increases in shipping to Russia naturally would have to be found by cutting down elsewhere. If the opening of the Mediterranean saved some million and a half tons of shipping, this would provide a surplus for the purpose; but there appears to be no other sources. It should be possible for Great Britain and the United States to keep the pipeline full even if these potential increases were made. The maximum tonnage might be as high as 10 million tons per annum; the target for the current year was 4 million but it was doubtful if it would be reached. One million deadweight tons of supplies for Russia were awaiting shipment now in U.S. ports.
Sir Alan Brooke observed that one unsatisfactory feature of the whole business of supplying Russia was their refusal to put their cards on the table. It might well be that we were straining ourselves unduly and taking great risks when there was no real necessity to do so.
- Employment of French Forces in North Africa
General Marshall asked for the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the employment of French divisions. The United States Chiefs of Staff felt that they can be effectively used and that their use will effect a considerable economy of force. The French divisions regarded as being the best must be reequipped as soon as practical. This, however, has political complications which must be resolved.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed that we should exploit the use of French troops in North Africa to the maximum, particularly for garrison work. We should have to provide them with a considerable quantity of antiaircraft weapons. Their usefulness would depend greatly on whether we could establish a satisfactory French government. Good leadership was required to rekindle in them the desire to fight. Too many of the French were only waiting for the end of the war.
General Marshall asked what the effect would be on Spain if French troops were stationed opposite the border of Spanish Morocco. There seemed no doubt that some very useful French divisions could be formed in North Africa.
Sir Alan Brooke thought that it would be wise to keep U.S. forces on the Spanish border as well as French troops. This would tend to allay Spanish suspicions of the French intentions and at the same time remove any temptation from the Spanish to cross the frontier if they thought the French troops of inferior quality.