Cairo Conferences (SEXTANT)

219 
870.01 AMG/21: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State 

London, December 9, 1943 — 5 p.m.
8552

We again took up the subject matter of the Department’s 7742, December 7, 8 p.m., with Nigel Ronald today. He told us that this was one of the matters which had been discussed at the highest level in North Africa but that the Foreign Office had not yet learned of the decision which had been reached. As soon as they did have this information they would be in a position to reply. Ronald stressed the fact that the Foreign Office was as anxious to settle the matter as was the Department.

BUCKNELL

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I haven’t done enough reading on the US viewpoint to say, but de Gaulle certainly had sandpaper for a soul … as my family used to say about some of our relatives, he could start a fight in an empty house.

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U.S. State Department (December 10, 1943)

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union

Ankara, December 10, 1943

Personal and strictly confidential for the Ambassador:

The recent meeting at Cairo was most helpful in drawing Turkey much closer to the Allies; although nothing definite was agreed upon for the time being. I hope the foregoing gives you the present picture.

STEINHARDT

222

Wow… I don’t know how his wife handled him or whether he had any.

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223

Like: “Vive le Québec libre!” (1967)

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U.S. State Department (December 12, 1943)

868.01/416: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the Secretary of State

Cairo, December 12, 1943 — 10 a.m.
Greek Series 128

I am reliably informed that during a long session on December 8 with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden the King of Greece steadfastly refused to make a declaration proposed by them to the effect that he will not return to Greece unless and until called for by the Constituent Assembly to the formation of which he agreed in his declaration of July 4.

I saw the President on December 3 and advised him regarding this proposal and after he had seen the King he desired me not to associate myself with any effort to force him to a course of action against his will. This I have been careful not to do both before and since. I understand that the President told the King that there was no necessity for him to make any declaration whatever unless he so desired.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In this connection the British appear to have been influenced in taking the attitude they did chiefly by a change in military plans regarding operations in Greece and by the anti-British and anti-King propaganda being spread there to the benefit of the Communist leadership. They hoped to kill this propaganda and deprive this leadership of many recruits by making clear now that no possibility exists of the King’s being forced on the country. Because of the present and probable future Republican makeup of the Greek Government the solution arrived at may be regarded as amounting to much the same thing in effect as the original proposal.

MacVEAGH

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As is common with extra-large personalities, she was reputedly the only one who could tell him he was wrong. Peter Hitchens included this sketch of his personality in an article published by First Things a few years ago:

Only his wife Yvonne was unimpressed by his grandeur, more than once urging him to retire, or puncturing his ambition. During the long, frustrating wilderness years between his wartime glory and his final presidential triumph, he mused to her that he might one day repeat his great rallying call of 1940. Using the rather patronizing endearment “Pauvre Ami,” she declared flatly, “Nobody will follow you.” He snapped back, “Shut up, Yvonne! I am old enough to know what I want to do!” In fact, on that occasion he was wrong and she was right. She even mocked his soldierly abilities. When the general’s aides suggested that they might install a machine gun at their remote, forbidding country home in Colombey, in case of an attack by communists, Yvonne scoffed that her husband would have no idea how to use it. Perhaps she would have.

And:

… he was perhaps the last great man to make it his business to know those things that it is proper for a king to know. He could talk fluently with philosophers and literary novelists. He had a minute knowledge of history: not just that of France, but of Europe and the world. After many, many conversations with Winston Churchill, a large number of them furious quarrels, he concluded that England’s savior was not in fact very intelligent. He believed wartime, with its austerity and tests of manhood, was more virtuous than peacetime. He believed nothing important could be achieved without recklessness. He stood up to people with considerable courage, even when he was a powerless and lonely figure without soldiers, money, or supporters. He once justified his bloody-minded awkwardness by pointing out that if he were not so difficult, he would himself have been a collaborator. He said “If I were easy to work with, I would be on Marshal Petain’s staff.” He had no time for people like himself. He confessed, “I only esteem those who stand up to me but unfortunately I cannot stand them.”

De Gaulle possessed that great chivalrous virtue of being ready to walk unbowed and defiant in front of the powerful, while being gentle and even submissive to the defenseless and weak. He once became so angry with Churchill that he smashed a chair in his presence to emphasize his rage. Likewise, he defied Franklin Roosevelt over and over again. But he would go home after these battles to sing tender love songs to his daughter Anne, who suffered from Down syndrome. The tiny glimpses we have of this part of his life, obtained from the accidental observations of others, tear at the heart. His concern for Anne was entirely private and not at all feigned. After any long absence from home his first act was to rush up to her room. She died, aged twenty, in his arms. At her funeral, he comforted his wife Yvonne with the words, “Maintenant, elle est comme les autres” (“Now she is like the ­others”), which must be one of the most ­moving things said in the whole twentieth century.

Precisely. “Publius” at the old blog Gods of the Copybook Headings put it this way:

De Gaulle was great because he knew how to act the part. Actually doing great things was someone’s else problem. The heavy lifting of the Second World War was done by the Russian foot soldier and the English speaking powers. Objectively, Canada did more to defeat Hitler than France. Being a nation of citizen soldiers, who desperately wanted to get home, we did our bit and went home. This allowed a prima donna like De Gaulle to take the credit for liberating France. In gratitude, the Liberator then travelled to Montreal, some twenty years later, and thanked Canada by trying to destroy it.

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226

The prima donna only insisted that the free french helped in the liberating of France, and she did not try to destroy Canada, but was just stupid at the wrong time and the wrong place.

227

U.S. State Department (December 14, 1943)

893.5151/976: Telegram

The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State

Chungking, December 14, 1943 — 8 p.m.

Urgent
2417.

To Secretary of Treasury from Adler. …

  1. I indicated that the price of United States dollars had become an outstanding issue for all United States Government agencies in China relations and that the working out of a satisfactory arrangement was advisable from point of view of Sino-American relations. Kung replied that “the Generalissimo had said no.” When I inquired again into the possibility of the sale of gold, Kung informed me that Chinese Government sales had been quite small, its policy being to buy back a substantial part of what it had sold to keep up price which is now around CN 13,000 per Chinese oz. selling in Chungking.

  2. Kung intimated that Generalissimo had discussed exchange rate with President in Cairo but did not inform me of content of discussion.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GAUSS

228

The record shows that the prima donna did a lot more than merely “insist” on that one thing. And the prima donna very clearly did try to destroy Canada. There’s a right time to cheer on a terrorist organization while you’re an official guest in the country that organization is pledged to destroy? Do tell.

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229

I do not think that de Gaule was aware of terrorist organisations. I think that he fucked up because French nationaltst ignorance and arogance. I am not defending his actions, but I think it was more stupidity than trying to gain annything.

230

Please help me to find information about this terrorist organisation.

231

U.S. State Department (December 15, 1943)

Report by the Combined Administrative Committee to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Washington, 15 December 1943

Secret
CCS 428 (Revised)

IMPLEMENTATIONS OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944
Availability of resources to meet the requirements of critical strategy

The problem

To examine the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the operations and undertakings indicated in CCS 426/1.

Facts bearing on the problem

The basis of investigation is given in Annex I.

We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine whether the operations decided on at SEXTANT are within our resources, and not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Military operations shall take precedence over civil relief and rehabilitation of occupied territories.

The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between governments concerned.

Conclusions

Ground Forces (Annex II)
The necessary ground forces for approved operations can be made available. Certain types of service units may be a critical factor but in no case should preclude the operations.

Naval Forces (Annex III)
So far as can be foreseen, British and United States naval forces adequate to accomplish all approved operations for 1944 will be available. The situation will be tight particularly as to destroyers, escorts and escort carriers in the early part of the year but should be considerably eased by new construction as the year progresses. The defeat of Germany will make available an increase in naval forces for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.

Air Forces (Annex IV)
The air resources to meet the operations specified in Annex I will be available with the following exceptions:

a. A deficiency in troop carrier squadrons in the Mediterranean if the detailed plan to be made for ANVIL requires more than a one brigade lift.

b. A possible deficiency of land-based aircraft for certain operations in the Pacific if the war with Germany is not concluded in time to release the additional resources required.

c. A possible deficiency of aircraft for the approved lift into China if diversions are made to supply forces operating in North Burma.

Such support can be given to the resistance groups in Europe as will not interfere with the intensification of the bomber offensive.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft (Annex V)
Production of combat loaders, LSTs and LCTs still continues to be the bottleneck limiting the scope of operations against the enemy and our ability to carry out operations will continue to be limited by this fact. In 1944 there should be sufficient landing craft available to carry out approved operations.

The shortage of landing craft impels the earliest practicable release of assault shipping and craft after assaults to permit proper maintenance of material, rest for personnel and reorientation to other assignments.

Supply of Critical Items (Annex VI)
In the absence of detailed plans for certain of the approved operations it is impossible to determine exact requirements for supplies and equipment. Certain shortages will exist as indicated in Annex VI. In no case, however, is it considered that shortages will be so serious as to preclude the mounting of approved operations.

Shipping (Annex VII)
Examination of personnel and cargo shipping position indicates our ability to support approved naval and military operations. In addition it will be noted that provision has been made to execute Operation HERCULES in spring 1944. In the event that this operation is not undertaken, this shipping can be made available for approved operations. While the statement of the shipping position covering the first nine months of 1944 does not include presently indefinable demands or relief requirements except for Italy, there is now no reason to expect any interference with approved military and naval operations. This applies both to personnel shipping as well as to dry cargo resources.

Oil (Annex VIII)
An examination of the oil position has revealed that the most critical petroleum products are 100 octane aviation gasoline and 80 octane motor gasoline. The situation with respect to 100 octane gasoline continues to improve and the gap between production and consumption will be closed during February 1944. It is believed that the indicated shortage of 80 octane motor gasoline will be avoided by using gasolines with lower octane numbers and will be further reduced by continued acceleration of the aviation gasoline plant building program.

In all theaters there continues to exist a shortage of small tankers or small ships suitable for use as such. There appear to be sufficient large oceangoing tankers in existence and coming from new construction to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum products.

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232

Have you genuinely not heard of the FLQ?

Their deadly antics got our current Prime Minister’s father to invoke the War Measures Act and impose martial law in Quebec. Junior did the same thing in Ottawa to break up the “Bouncy Castle Insurrection”, proving that Karl Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon still has validity:

Hegel remarks somewhere that all the events and personalities of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.

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No I had not, thank you.

234

U.S. State Department (December 18, 1943)

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Cairo, December 3 [18], 1943

Dear Marshal Stalin, The weather conditions were ideal for crossing the mountains the day of our departure from Teheran so that we had an easy and comfortable flight to Cairo. I hasten to send you my personal thanks for your thoughtfulness and hospitality in providing living quarters for me in your Embassy at Teheran. I was not only extremely comfortable there but I am very conscious of how much more we were able to accomplish in a brief period of time because we were such close neighbors throughout our stay.

I view those momentous days of our meeting with the greatest satisfaction as being an important milestone in the progress of human affairs. I thank you and the members of your staff and household for the many kindnesses to me and to the members of my staff.

I am just starting home and will visit my troops in Italy on the way.

Cordially yours,
FDR

235

President Roosevelt to the British Minister of Information 

Washington, December 18, 1943

Dear Brendan: Since my return to Washington, I have received a more complete report of the confusions over publicity which arose at Cairo and Teheran.

Whatever the causes, I am greatly disturbed at the results. Not only did the newspapers, news services, and broadcasters of the United States suffer a heavy penalty because they kept confidence and observed the designated release dates, but non-observance elsewhere has engendered bitter reproaches and many charges of bad faith. Such a condition is distinctly damaging to that unity of purpose and action which the conferences at Cairo and Teheran were designed to promote.

I am resolved that we will not risk a repetition. Consequently, I have decided that hereafter no news having a security value will be issued by the Government for future release, but that all such news will be given out instead at the earliest moment consistent with safety, for immediate publication and broadcast. I have issued instructions to that effect to the various departments and agencies.

Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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U.S. State Department (December 20, 1943)

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

December 20, 1943
Translation

Personal and Secret Message to President Roosevelt from Premier Stalin

I thank you for Your letter which Your Ambassador has extended to me on December 18.

I am glad that fate has given me an opportunity to render you a service in Tehran. I also attach important significance to our meeting and to the conversations taken place there which concerned such substantial questions of accelerating of our common victory and establishment of future lasting peace between the peoples.

237 
868.01/427

The President’s special assistant to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 20, 1943
Secret

Dear Cordell: Here is a memo which Eden handed me in confidence in Cairo, which apparently was prepared for Eden by some of his associates prior to his talk with the King of Greece.

Mr. Eden told me that he followed this line of argument with the King and I gather he made it pretty strong.

Cordially yours,
HARRY L. HOPKINS

[Attachment]

The British Embassy accredited to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Cairo, November 25, 1943

Main talking points with the King of the Hellenes

  1. Refer again to your previous conversation when you told the King that the strategical situation had changed and that it was most [un]likely that any but quite inconsiderable British forces would be sent to Greece when the Germans evacuate.

  2. Point out that at the time when we thought a considerable British army would go to Greece to drive the Germans out, we strongly supported your desire to enter Greece with the British and Greek forces. Under the changed conditions such British forces as might go to Greece would be mainly concerned in ensuring law and order and in assisting in the distribution of relief supplies.

  3. It would be essential for the Greek Government to function at the earliest possible date in close association with the British and in an atmosphere as far removed as possible from political controversy. This Government would have to be mainly composed of leading personalities who have lived in Greece during the period of the occupation.

  4. During the whole period of the German occupation acute controversy has continued and grown increasingly strong on the subject of the King’s return before the will of the people has been expressed. The immediate return of the King in the teeth of this opposition would inevitably raise this controversy to fever point, and it would be impossible for the King himself to remain outside political dissension. He would find himself confronted with a situation even more acute than that which led to the Metaxas Dictatorship, and would therefore start under every disadvantage, which would make it impossible for him to return in the role which he and we desire for him – that of a constitutional monarch.

  5. The immediate confusion that will result from the difficult social and economic conditions caused by the occupation will make it essential for the Government [to] be in the hands of a leading personality, who has made his mark through his bold resistance to the Germans within the country. He will have to form an emergency Committee prepared to act firmly and to put down disorder. The first administration to be formed will be of a temporary character to tide over the period until normal conditions can be established and elections held. It would be an undesirable situation for the King, when he first returned to Greece, to be associated directly with an administration bound to become unpopular and unable to accord all those freedoms associated with a constitutional monarchy.

  6. In these circumstances, the King should consider the choice of the most suitable personality to head a Regency Committee in Athens the moment the Germans evacuate. Archbishop Damaskinos is prepared to undertake this responsibility, but must know in advance that he can announce to the Greek people, as soon as the Germans quit Athens, that he has the legal authority of the King for so doing.

  7. There is therefore every advantage for the King, in his own interests as well as those of his country, to make it clear now to his people that he does not intend to return to Greece until such conditions have been established as will allow him to function as a constitutional monarch. He has no desire to return to Greece unless he can so function, but he also has no desire to return unless he is convinced by a clear expression of the people’s will that the system of constitutional monarchy is desired by them.

  8. An immediate declaration to this effect would rally moderate opinion against any attempt made by a small section, who seek to impose their will by force as soon as the Germans leave Athens. This section have made capital out of the failure of the King so far to make such a declaration.

  9. There is reason to believe that if Zervas knew that such a declaration would be made by the King, he would immediately ask that his irregular forces should be incorporated in the Greek regular Army. If this were immediately granted by the King it would act as a magnet to draw large numbers of the officers and men in the ELAS forces to break away from purely sectional political control and make a similar request for incorporation on the same terms as those accorded to Zervas. This would bring the Greek Government in Cairo into close association with the resistance movements inside Greece, and would thereby enormously enhance the authority and prestige of the King and his Government, which would then be reformed to include personalities from Greece and would consequently provide a Government of which Archbishop Damaskinos could avail himself when he set up his Regency Committee in Athens.

British Embassy to Greece, Cairo
25 November, 1943

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U.S. State Department (December 22, 1943)

841d.01/228: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State

London, December 22, 1943 — 4 p.m.
8893.

Personal and secret to the Secretary.

Your 8004, December 18, Department’s 7184, November 13, was held by the Embassy until my return and because of the absence of both Eden and the Prime Minister. I explained the British position on this issue to the President in Cairo, having taken the matter up at great length with the Prime Minister on my journey out there with him. I understood the President would talk with the Prime Minister on this subject but do not know the results of their discussion.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

WINANT