Radio set future on paper
Designers make lavish promises
By Si Steinhauser
…
Youngstown Vindicator (July 25, 1945)
German planes in fight to end
Luftwaffe took off from Berlin until last hours of battle
By Nat A. Barrows
…
Lawrence: Air Force Day is criticized
Holds Truman’s proclamation slights other services
By David Lawrence
…
Eliot: Japs may act to save their ‘sacred soil’
Defeat of navy could give army chance to quit and still hold head up
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot
…
Gracie Allen Reporting
By Gracie Allen
It seems that when I mentioned grown women wearing little-boy pants yesterday, I only scratched the surface of the clothing mix-up.
And from the looks of things, I’d better not scratch any farther than the surface. For Sen. Homer Ferguson of Michigan told a sympathetic Senate that men are buying and wearing women’s panties because they can’t get men’s shorts and a clothing authority at the University of Illinois charged that teenage girls are using their father’s scarce shirts and work pants.
Poor father! He’ll probably end up playing Lady Godiva. She, at least, had her long blonde tresses to protect her. I don’t know what some of the fathers I know are going to do. They haven’t enough hair on their heads to make a pair of trousers for a potato bug.
U.S. State Department (July 25, 1945)
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, July 25, 1945 — 11:23 p.m.
[Translation]
urgent
1450
Re my telegram No. 1449
At the time of my conference with Lozovsky on the 25th, I stated orally as follows (as indicated at the beginning of my telegram,3 the above was to be sent later to L. in written form):
-
At the meeting with you, the Acting People’s Commissar, last July 13th, I delivered the message from the Emperor and also particularly mentioned His Majesty’s desire to dispatch Prince Konoye. Concerning the above, I received a reply from you in writing on the night of the 18th to the effect that the Government of the USSR could not give a specific answer because there was nothing concrete either in the message of the Emperor or in the Prince’s mission to Moscow.
-
Concerning these matters, I once again made my proposal to you today to make the circumstances clear in the following manner:
The mission of special envoy Konoye, entrusted with the Emperor’s request, is to ask the Government of the USSR to assist in the termination of the war and to explain our concrete intentions on this matter; his mission is at the same time to negotiate on matters which will solidify and improve relations between Japan and the USSR, which should become the basis of our diplomacy for the period during and after the war.
-
In addition to stating the foregoing on instructions from our Government to the Government of the USSR, I repeated that the Emperor especially ordered the Government to dispatch the envoy as the result of His Majesty’s wishes to put an end to the tragedy of additional bloodshed from the continued exchange of fire. The special envoy will explain to the Government of the USSR the concrete intentions of the Japanese relative to the above, and will request its consideration of this matter. Therefore, I hope that the Government of the USSR will give sufficient and favorable consideration to this matter of the envoy and agree to the dispatch of the envoy very soon.
Furthermore, since the Government of the USSR is well aware that ex-Premier Prince Konoye enjoys high trust in the Imperial Court and is prominent in Japanese political circles, I believe it will not be necessary to add my own explanation here.
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, July 25, 1945 — 11:53 p.m.
[Translation]
urgent
1449
Re my telegram No. 1441
On the 25th I met Lozovsky in order to make the proposal contained in my telegram No. 1450, and we continued our conversation as follows:
SATO: As you have already understood from my proposal, the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in a friendly manner relative to the termination of the war, and at the same time will have Prince Konoye explain directly to you the concrete intentions of our Government.
L.: Could you give me the text of the proposal which you have just made? Its content is really important. If you could prepare a written text for me, I should be able to understand it more correctly. It is difficult to expect real accuracy from an oral presentation. It would also be convenient for me to make a report to my Government if I have a written text.
I should like to ask one or two questions: (1) I understand that the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in order to terminate the war, and (2) concerning the above problem Prince Konoye is going to bring us some concrete proposals. Now, are these concrete proposals for the termination of the war or for strengthening Russo-Japanese relations? As this point was not made clear, I should like to have you explain it to me so that I can make a report to my Government.
SATO: As to your latter question, the concrete intentions which Prince Konoye is going to explain to the Soviet Government are, as I understand it, concerned with both of the problems you have just mentioned. In other words, I understand that they are concerned, first, with the request to the Soviet Government for mediation and, second, with the problem of strengthening Russo-Japanese relations. As to your first request, it is outside the instructions which I have received to prepare a written text of the proposal which I made today. However, I shall prepare such a text for your reference on my own initiative and present it to you later, since the problem itself is significant, as you have suggested, and also in due consideration of the fact that the leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin. Needless to say, however, I have to ask you to treat this text as top secret, because of its extremely secret nature. I should also like to mention that Prince Konoye, whose mission I have just explained to you, has our Emperor’s greatest confidence and occupies an eminent position in our Government. Therefore, in my opinion, his mission will cover a vast area: he will ask the Soviet Government for mediation; at the same time he will exchange views concerning problems common to both of our countries. Moreover, he may go into the problem of future relations between the two nations. I believe you will not be wrong in understanding the matter as I have indicated above.
L.: I understand well the secret nature of this problem; I also understand well that what you have conveyed to me, Mr. Ambassador, is very confidential. I will make a report to my Government as soon as I receive your written text. Moreover, I will let you know immediately concerning any instructions I receive from my Government.
SATO: Thank you for your kind help. I personally would also wish to hear from you as soon as possible.
Before leaving, I added the following:
The intention of the Japanese Government, regarding Prince Konoye’s mission, is to ask the Soviet Government’s assistance in terminating the war. I am sure that the intention is good. Therefore, it is my hope that you will be able to make arrangements so that the Soviet Government will have an opportunity to hear directly from the Prince on this matter.
This would have ended today’s meeting. However, I repeated my own explanation of the mission of the special envoy, which appeared to impress L. a great deal. Particularly the fact that our Government has asked the Soviet Government to mediate seemed to arrest his attention. L. listened to our proposal with an earnest and attentive attitude throughout, and promised me an answer from his Government.
Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference
Wednesday, July 25:
0920: Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in the India-Burma Theatre) called on the President at the Little White House.
1000: General Marshall called on the President.
1035: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where they arrived at 1045. Before the conference was called to order, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Generalissimo posed in the Palace garden for still and motion pictures. Photographers (service and civilian) from all three nations were represented.
1100: The Big Three and other delegates entered the conference room and the ninth meeting of the Berlin Conference was called to order by the President. The meeting adjourned at 1200, at which time the President left to return to the Little White House.
Admiral Leahy, accompanied by Rear Admiral H. A. Flanigan, USN, Captain Vardaman, Colonel Rusk, Lieutenant Elsey, Lieutenant Edelstein, Lieutenant Rigdon, and First Lieutenant Vardaman left Babelsberg this morning for a flight to London. They returned to Babelsberg Thursday afternoon.
2000: Ambassador Murphy, Ambassador Caffery, and General Somervell were dinner guests at the Little White House this evening. Dinner music was played by an eight-piece band from the 278th Army Ground Force band with Staff Sergeant Joe Borrelli conducting. Vocal selections were rendered by Pfc Jules Navarra.
Salzburger Nachrichten (July 26, 1945)
Japans stolze Flotte vernichtet
Fünftausend Festungen fliegen täglich gegen Japan
…
Die Konferenz tagt weiter
POTSDAM, 25. Juli (Reuters) – Obwohl Premierminister Churchill, Außenminister Eden und der Führer der Arbeiterpartei Attlee nach England abgereist sind, um dort die Wahlergebnisse abzuwarten, wird die Potsdamer Konferenz fortgesetzt. Dies verstärkt den Eindruck, dass in Potsdam zum allergrößten Teil die ins Einzelne gehende Arbeit der Fachleute ausschlaggebend ist.
Das ging schon aus der Bekanntmachung hervor, dass die drei Außenminister Eden, Byrnes und Molotow gemeinsam die Tagesordnung für die „Großen Drei“ aufsetzen. Man nimmt an, dass Churchill, Stalin und Truman im Verlauf ihrer acht Zusammenkünfte grundsätzliche Entscheidungen getroffen haben, die den großen Fachausschüssen Tag für Tag eine Menge Aufgaben stellen, da diese Beschlüsse in allen Einzelheiten ausgearbeitet werden müssen. Bis zur Rückkehr der britischen Staatsmänner aus England sind diese Fachausschüsse durch ihre. Arbeit Voll und ganz beansprucht, da sie auch für die Vorbereitung von Vorschlägen bezüglich der Fragen, die bisher von den „Großen Drei“ noch nicht behandelt wurden, verantwortlich sind.
Ein Blick auf den offiziellen Bericht über die Krimkonferenz gibt eine klare Vorstellung, welch enorme Kleinarbeit notwendig ist, um Beschlüsse, die in großen Umrissen herausgegeben werden, auszuarbeiten. In Potsdam ist dies noch mehr der Fall, weil es sich jetzt hauptsächlich um die alle Einzelheiten umfassende Ausarbeitung der bereits festgelegten grundsätzlichen Entscheidungen handelt. Überall in Deutschland hat man den Eindruck, dass die Besatzungsbehörden in den schwebenden Fragen zuwarten, bis sie Weisungen von Potsdam erhalten, aus denen sie dann ersehen können, welchen Standpunkt sie einnehmen sollen, und wie weit sie in der Durchführung entscheidender Verwaltungsaufgaben gehen können.
L’Aube (July 26, 1945)
Pétain sortira-t-il de sn silence ?
« Être monté si haut être tombé si bas ! » s’exclame le président Lebrun
…
U.S. State Department (July 26, 1945)
500.CC/7-2645: Telegram
The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
London, July 26, 1945 — 11 a.m.
[Extracts]
Secret
7519
Copre 2
From Gerig for Pasvolsky and Hiss.
Meeting at Potsdam yesterday considered the question of the officers of ExCom (Executive Committee), and PreCo, (Preparatory Committee), Jebb flying over to attend.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
British thinking of proposing that present mandatory powers be provisional members trusteeship council, which together with all other permanent members and elected members, would enable trusteeship council to organize and act provisionally, pending negotiation of agreements. Believe this would be feasible and would hasten and facilitate negotiation of agreements. Soviet raised question at Potsdam of their being a trust power.
500.CC (PC)/7-2845
Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative
[Washington,] July 26, 1945
| Participants: | Mr. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. |
| Mr. John Balfour British Minister |
Mr. John Balfour, British Minister, called upon me this afternoon at his request at my apartment at 2:30. He stated he had just received a wire dated July 26 from London this morning in which he was instructed by the Foreign Office to call on me and inquire whether or not we would be willing to agree to have the chairmanship of the executive committee of the interim commission rotate between the five. He stated that their first position would be to have one chairman, presumably a Soviet chairman, but if they could not agree on one, he asked if we would agree to rotate.
I stated that Mr. Dunn had a memorandum with him at Potsdam on this subject and it was our thinking also that this was the best procedure – we should try for one chairman but if we couldn’t get agreement on one we would then accept rotation. I said, however, that I had heard that Mr. Jebb had flown to Potsdam yesterday on this subject and, of course, our delegation in Potsdam was prepared to deal with the whole subject right there on the ground. He said that was most satisfactory and he would communicate that to the Foreign Office.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to the Navy Department
[Babelsberg,] 26 July 1945
Top secret
priority
Victory 352
This is Lockup. CominCh sends No. 24 to CominCh and CNO Administrative Office for action MilMis Moscow for info. Soviets have agreed to establishment of facilities outlined your 122012 and 171951. Detailed arrangements as to entry of personnel still to be made. Soviets will receive communication and aerological material now. Request tonnage cube place and date of assembly of this material for each station. Advise schedule of Soviet west coast sailings and Hula transfers by which material could be shipped to Petropavlovsk and/or Vladivostok. Possibility of use of east coast sailings for transportation overland via Europe should also be reported. In addition desire detail your plans for transportation via United States aircraft thru Alaska in event Soviet authorize this method of delivery. Send reply MilMis Moscow for action.