Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

[NormanStewart]

Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic

Secret

1. Pursuant to the Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with respect to Germany, signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945, wherein it is stated, in Article 13(b), that the Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements, the European Advisory Commission has, in accordance with its terms of reference, considered certain of the more urgent of these additional requirements. Accordingly, it submits herewith, for consideration and approval by the four Governments, an Agreement regarding certain Additional Requirements to be imposed upon Germany.

2. It will be recalled that the Commission agreed in March 1944, when discussing the terms of surrender of Germany, that certain broad political and economic requirements should be imposed upon Germany at the time of, or shortly after, the surrender, in addition to the mainly military requirements to be contained in the Instrument or Declaration of Surrender. The most important military requirements were announced in the Declaration of 5th June, 1945. The Commission believes that the enclosed Agreement on Additional Requirements, representing the agreed views of the four Governments, will furnish guidance to the Allied Representatives regarding additional measures to be imposed on Germany. The Commission accordingly recommends that the Agreement on Additional Requirements, as soon as it is approved by the four Governments, be transmitted to the Allied Representatives in Berlin. The Commission recommends that the four Governments authorize the Allied Representatives to decide whether publication of this document shall be in whole or in part.

3. The Commission has several comments to make with regard to certain specific provisions in the Agreement on Additional Requirements.

   a) The Commission recommends that in exercising control over German research relating to war or the production of war material, as set forth in sub-paragraph 13(b), the Allied Representatives should, when they consider conditions in Germany appropriate, supplement this provision by issuing the following order to the German people:

   All research, experimentation, development or other study relative to war or the production of war material, whether in public or private establishments, factories, technological institutions, laboratories or elsewhere, is hereby abolished and forbidden in future.

   b) The Commission recommends that in giving effect to the provisions of sub-paragraph 15(b) the Allied Representatives should also require the German authorities to hand over, for delivery to the Allied Government concerned, any drawings, plates and other special technical equipment utilized directly for the production of monetary tokens for issue by Germany in territories formerly occupied by her or elsewhere.

   c) In connection with the provisions of sub-paragraph 16(b) the Commission recommends that all property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to any country, other than Germany and the countries referred to in sub-paragraph 16(a), which has at any time since 1st September, 1939, been at war with any of the United Nations, be taken under the provisional control of the Allied Representatives and preserved, pending subsequent transfer to the countries of ownership under arrangements to be worked out with the appropriate Allied Control Commissions or organs in those countries.

   d) In connection with the execution of the provisions of subparagraph 26(a), the Commission recommends to the four Governments approval of the following understanding:

   Vessels of the United Nations surrendered to the Allied Representatives in accordance with sub-paragraph 26 (a) will be returned by the Allied Representatives to the respective Allied States which own or owned, or whose nationals own or owned, such vessels. Nothing in this provision shall alter in any manner any existing agreements and procedures among any of the United Nations with respect to the pooling of the vessels surrendered by Germany under the provisions of sub-paragraph 26 (a).

   e) In connection with the execution of the provisions of paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 19, the Commission invites the attention of the four Governments to the great importance of effecting as full and as prompt restitution as possible of the property which has been looted by the Germans from occupied Allied countries. It points out the urgency of providing the Allied Representatives in Germany with guidance concerning the principles and procedures which should govern the restitution of looted Allied property, in accordance with the Declaration made at London on 5th January, 1943 on Enemy Acts of Dispossession.

4. During the consultations which the European Advisory Commission has carried on, under instructions of the four Governments, with representatives of the European Allied Governments concerning the Declaration of 5th June, 1945, these Governments have expressed, both in writing and orally, their great interest in the additional requirements which are to be imposed upon Germany. In view of this concern, the Commission recommends that the four Governments instruct it to communicate the Agreement on Additional Requirements, upon its approval by the four Governments, to the interested Allied Governments. In so doing the Commission would point out to the representatives of those Governments that these additional requirements do not purport to be complete and will be supplemented by specific orders and instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives.

Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:
JOHN G. WINANT

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:
Т. CAКCИН

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:
RONALD I. CAMPBELL

Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the European Advisory Commission:
R. MASSIGLI

Lancaster House, London, SW1
25th July, 1945

[Accompaniment]

Secret

Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Certain Additional Requirements to Be Imposed on Germany

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic have reached the following agreement regarding instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives in Germany:

We, the Allied Representatives, Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of occupation of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, pursuant to the Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany, signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945, hereby announce certain additional requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply, as follows:

Section I

1. All German land, naval and air forces, the SS, SA, SD and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in accordance with methods and procedures to be laid down by the Allied Representatives.

2. All forms of military training, military propaganda and military activities of whatever nature, on the part of the German people, are prohibited, as well as the formation of any organization initiated to further any aspect of military training and the formation of war veterans’ organizations or other groups which might develop military characteristics or which are designed to carry on the German military tradition, whether such organizations or groups purport to be political, educational, religious, social, athletic or recreational or of any other nature.

Section II

3. (a) German authorities and officials in all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on 31st December, 1937, and in any areas within those frontiers indicated at any time by the Allied Representatives, will comply with such instructions as to withdrawing therefrom as they may receive from the Allied Representatives.

   (b) The German authorities will issue the necessary instructions and will make the necessary arrangements for the reception and maintenance in Germany of all German civilian inhabitants of the territories or areas concerned, whose evacuation may be ordered by the Allied Representatives.

   (c) Withdrawals and evacuations under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will take place at such times and under such conditions as the Allied Representatives may direct.

4. In the territories and areas referred to in paragraph 3 above, there shall immediately be, on the part of all forces under German command and of German authorities and civilians, a complete cessation of all measures of coercion or forced labour and of all measures involving injury to life or limb. There shall similarly cease all measures of requisitioning, seizure, removal, concealment or destruction of property. In particular, the withdrawals and evacuations mentioned in paragraph 3 above will be carried out without damage to or removal of persons or property not affected by the orders of the Allied Representatives. The Allied Representatives will determine what personal property and effects may be taken by persons evacuated under paragraph 3 above.

Section III

5. The Allied Representatives will regulate all matters affecting Germany’s relations with other countries. No foreign obligations, undertakings or commitments of any kind will be assumed or entered into by or on behalf of German authorities or nationals without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

6. The Allied Representatives will give directions concerning the abrogation, bringing into force, revival or application of any treaty, convention or other international agreement, or any part or provision thereof, to which Germany is or has been a party.

7. (a) In virtue of the unconditional surrender of Germany, and as of the date of such surrender, the diplomatic, consular, commercial and other relations of the German State with other States have ceased to exist.

   (b) Diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of service missions in Germany of countries at war with any of the four Powers will be dealt with as the Allied Representatives may prescribe. The Allied Representatives may require the withdrawal from Germany of neutral diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of neutral service missions.

   (c) All German diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of German service missions abroad are hereby recalled. The control and disposal of the buildings, property and archives of all German diplomatic and other agencies abroad will be prescribed by the Allied Representatives.

8. (a) German nationals will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving German territory except as authorised or directed by the Allied Representatives.

   (b) German authorities and nationals will comply with any directions issued by the Allied Representatives for the recall of German nationals resident abroad, and for the reception in Germany of any persons whom the Allied Representatives may designate.

9. The German authorities and people will take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety, maintenance and welfare of persons not of German nationality and of their property and the property of foreign States.

Section IV

10. The German authorities will place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives the whole of the German inter-communication system (including all military and civilian postal and telecommunication systems and facilities and connected matters), and will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for placing such inter-communication systems under the complete control of the Allied Representatives. The German authorities will comply with any instructions give[n] by the Allied Representatives with a view to the establishment by the Allied Representatives of such censorship and control of postal and telecommunication and of documents and other articles carried by persons or otherwise conveyed and of all other forms of inter-communication as the Allied Representatives may think fit.

11. The German authorities will comply with all directions which the Allied Representatives may give regarding the use, control and censorship of all media for influencing expression and opinion, including broadcasting, press and publications, advertising, films and public performances, entertainments and exhibitions of all kinds.

Section V

12. The Allied Representatives will exercise such control as they deem necessary over all or any part or aspect of German finance, agriculture (including forestry), production and mining, public utilities, industry, trade, distribution and economy generally, internal and external, and over all related or ancillary matters, including the direction or prohibition of the manufacture, production, construction, treatment, use and disposal of any buildings, establishments, installations, public or private works, plant, equipment, products, materials, stocks or resources. Detailed statements of the subjects to which the present provision applies, together with the requirements of the Allied Representatives in regard thereto, will from time to time be communicated to the German authorities.

13. (a) The manufacture, production and construction, and the acquisition from outside Germany, of war material and of such other products used in connection with such manufacture, production or construction, as the Allied Representatives may specify, and the import, export and transit thereof, are prohibited, except as directed by the Allied Representatives.

    (b) The German authorities will immediately place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives all research, experiment, development and design directly or indirectly relating to war or the production of war material, whether in government or private establishments, factories, technological institutions or elsewhere.

14. (a) The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany) of the German State, its political subdivisions, the German Central Bank, State or semi-State, provincial, municipal or local authorities or Nazi organisations, and those situated outside Germany of any person resident or carrying on business in Germany, will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives. The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany), of such private companies, corporations, trusts, cartels, firms, partnerships and associations as may be designated by the Allied Representatives will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

    (b) The German authorities will furnish full information about the property, assets, rights, titles and interests referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, and will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may give as to their transfer and disposal. Without prejudice to any further demands which may be made in this connection, the German authorities will hold at the disposal of the Allied Representatives for delivery to them at such times and places as they may direct all securities, certificates, deeds or other documents of title held by any of the institutions or bodies mentioned in subparagraph (a) above or by any person subject to German law, and relating to property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated in the territories of the United Nations, including any shares, stocks, debentures or other obligations of any company incorporated in accordance with the laws of any of the United Nations.

    (c) Property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany will not be removed outside Germany or be transferred or disposed of to any person resident or carrying on business outside Germany without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

    (d) Nothing in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above shall, as regards property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany, be deemed to prevent sales or transfers to persons resident in Germany for the purpose of maintaining or carrying on the day-to-day national life, economy and administration, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph 19 (b) and (c) below and to the provisions of the Declaration or of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

[NormanStewart]

15. (a) The German authorities and all persons in Germany will hand over to the Allied Representatives all gold and silver, in coin or bullion form, and all platinum in bullion form, situated in Germany, and all such coin and bullion situated outside Germany as is possessed by or held on behalf of any of the institutions or bodies mentioned in sub-paragraph 14 (a) above or any person resident or carrying on business in Germany.

    (b) The German authorities and all persons in Germany will hand over in full to the Allied Representatives all foreign notes and coins in the possession of any German authority, or of any corporation, association or individual resident or carrying on business in Germany, and all monetary tokens issued or prepared for issue by Germany in the territories formerly occupied by her or elsewhere.

16. (a) All property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities, or held for or belonging to the nationals of any such country, or of any persons resident or carrying on business therein, will be taken under control and will be preserved pending further instructions.

    (b) All property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to private individuals, private enterprises and companies of those countries, other than Germany and the countries referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, which have at any time since 1st September, 1939, been at war with any of the United Nations, will be taken under control and will be preserved pending further instructions.

    (c) The German authorities will take all necessary steps to ensure the execution of the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) and (b) above, will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for that purpose, and will afford all necessary information and facilities in connection therewith.

17. (a) There shall, on the part of the German authorities and people, be no concealment, destruction, scuttling or dismantling of, removal or transfer of, nor damage to, ships, transport, ports or harbours, nor to any form of building, establishment, installation, device, means of production, supply, distribution or communication, plant, equipment, currency, stocks or resources, or, in general, public or private works, utilities or facilities of any kind, wherever situated.

    (b) There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, suppression or alteration of any documents, records, patents, drawings, specifications, plans or information, of any nature, affected by the provisions of this document. They shall be kept intact in their present locations until further directions are given. The German authorities will afford all information and facilities as required by the Allied Representatives in connection therewith.

    (c) Any measures already ordered, undertaken or began contrary to the provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will be immediately countermanded or discontinued. All stocks, equipment, plant, records, patents, documents, drawings, specifications, plans or other material already concealed within or outside Germany will forthwith be declared, and will be dealt with as the Allied Representatives may direct.

    (d) Subject to the provisions of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, the German authorities and people will be responsible for the preservation, safeguarding and upkeep of all forms of property and materials affected by any of the said provisions.

    (e) All transport material, stores, equipment, plant, establishments, installations, devices and property generally, which are liable to be surrendered or delivered under the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, will be handed over intact and in good condition, or subject only to ordinary wear and tear and to any damage caused during the continuance of hostilities which it has proved impossible to make good.

18. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with, or dealings with or for the benefit of, countries at war with any of the United Nations, or territories occupied by such countries, or with any other country or person specified by the Allied Representatives.

Section VI

19. (a) The German authorities will carry out, for the benefit of the United Nations, such measures of restitution, reinstatement, restoration, reparation, reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation as the Allied Representatives may prescribe. For these purposes the German authorities will effect or procure the surrender or transfer of such property, assets, rights, titles and interests, effect such deliveries and carry out such repair, building and construction work, whether in Germany or elsewhere, and will provide such transport, plant, equipment and materials of all kinds, labour, personnel, and specialist and other services, for use in Germany or elsewhere, as the Allied Representatives may direct.

    (b) The German authorities will also comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give relating to property, assets, rights, titles and interests located in Germany belonging to any one of the United Nations or its nationals or having so belonged at, or at any time since, the outbreak of war between Germany and that Nation, or since the occupation of any part of its territories by Germany. The German authorities will be responsible for safeguarding, maintaining, and preventing the dissipation of, all such property, assets, rights, titles and interests, and for handing them over intact at the demand of the Allied Representatives. For these purposes the German authorities will afford all information and facilities required for tracing any property, assets, rights, titles or interests.

    (c) All persons in Germany in whose possession such property, assets, rights, titles and interests may be shall be personally responsible for reporting them and safeguarding them until they are handed over in such manner as may be prescribed.

20. The German authorities will supply free of cost such German currency as the Allied Representatives may require, and will withdraw and redeem in German currency, within such time limits and on such terms as the Allied Representatives may specify, all holdings in German territory of currencies issued by the Allied Representatives during military operations or occupation, and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the Allied Representatives.

21. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as may be issued by the Allied Representatives for defraying the costs of the provisioning, maintenance, pay, accommodation and transport of the forces and agencies stationed in Germany by authority of the Allied Representatives, the costs of executing the requirements of unconditional surrender, and payment for any relief in whatever form it may be provided by the United Nations.

22. The Allied Representatives will take and make unrestricted use (whether inside or outside Germany) of any articles referred to in paragraph 12 above which the Allied Representatives may require in connection with the conduct of hostilities against any country with which any of their respective Governments is at war.

Section VII

23. (a) No merchant ship, including fishing or other craft, shall put to sea from any German port except as may be sanctioned or directed by the Allied Representatives. German ships in ports outside Germany shall remain in port and those at sea shall proceed to the nearest German or United Nations port and there remain, pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.

    (b) All German merchant shipping, including tonnage under construction or repair, will be made available to the Allied Representatives for such use and on such terms as they may prescribe.

    (c) Foreign merchant shipping in German service or under German control will likewise be made available to the Allied Representatives for such use and on such terms as they may prescribe. In the case of such foreign merchant vessels which are of neutral registration, the German authorities will take all such steps as may be required by the Allied Representatives to transfer or cause to be transferred to the Allied Representatives all rights relative thereto.

    (d) All transfer to any other flag, service or control, or the vessels covered by sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) above, is prohibited, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.

24. Any existing options to repurchase or reacquire or to resume control of vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered by Germany during the war will be exercised as directed by the Allied Representatives. Such vessels will be made available for use by the Allied Representatives in the same manner as the vessels covered by subparagraphs 23 (b) and (c) above.

25. (a) The crews of all German merchant vessels or merchant vessels in German service or under German control will remain on board and will be maintained by the German authorities pending further instructions from the Allied Representatives regarding their future employment.

    (b) Cargoes on board any such vessels will be disposed of in accordance with instructions given to the German authorities by the Allied Representatives.

26. (a) Merchant ships, including fishing and other craft of the United Nations (or of any country which has broken off diplomatic relations with Germany) which are in German hands, wherever such ships may be, will be surrendered to the Allied Representatives, regardless of whether title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise. All such ships will be surrendered in good repair and in seaworthy condition in ports and at times to be specified by the Allied Representatives, for disposal as directed by them.

    (b) The German authorities will take all such steps as may be directed by the Allied Representatives to effect or complete transfers of title to such ships regardless of whether the title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise. They will secure the discontinuance of any arrests of or proceedings against such ships in neutral ports.

27. The German authorities will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the destruction, dispersal, salvaging, reclamation or raising of wrecked, stranded, derelict or sunken vessels, wherever they may be situated. Such vessels salvaged, reclaimed or raised shall be dealt with as the Allied Representatives direct.

28. The German authorities will place at the unrestricted disposal of the Allied Representatives the entire German shipping, shipbuilding and ship repair industries, and all matter and facilities directly or indirectly relative or ancillary thereto, and will provide the requisite labour and specialist services. The requirements of the Allied Representatives will be specified in instructions which will from time to time be communicated to the German authorities.

Section VIII

29. The German authorities will place at the unrestricted disposal of the Allied Representatives the whole of the German inland transport system (road, rail, air and waterways) and all connected material, plant and equipment, and all repair, construction, labour, servicing and running facilities, in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Representatives.

30. The production in Germany and the possession, maintenance or operation by Germans of any aircraft of any kind, or any parts thereof, are prohibited.

31. All German rights in international transport bodies or organisations, and in relation to the use of transport and the movement of traffic in other countries and the use in Germany of the transport of other countries, will be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Allied Representatives.

32. All facilities for the generation, transmission and distribution of power, including establishments for the manufacture and repair of such facilities, will be placed under the complete control of the Allied Representatives, to be used for such purposes as they may designate.

Section IX

33. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give for the regulation of movements of population and for controlling travel or removal on the part of persons in Germany.

34. No person may leave or enter Germany without a permit issued by the Allied Representatives or on their authority.

35. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give for the repatriation of persons not of German nationality in or passing through Germany, their property and effects, and for facilitating the movements of refugees and displaced persons.

Section X

36. The German authorities will furnish any information and documents, and will secure the attendance of any witnesses, required by the Allied Representatives for the trial of

    (a) the principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offences;

    (b) any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against his national law and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representative;

    and will give all aid and assistance for these purposes.

37. The German authorities will comply with any directions given by the Allied Representatives in regard to the property of any person referred to in sub-paragraphs 36 (a) and (b) above, such as its seizure, custody or surrender.

38. Any person referred to in sub-paragraph 36 (b) above who may be apprehended or surrendered to the Allied Representatives will be handed over immediately, on demand, to the Government of the United Nation concerned.

Section XI

39. The National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) is completely and finally abolished and declared to be illegal.

40. The German authorities will comply promptly with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the abolition of the National Socialist Party and of its subordinate organizations, affiliated associations and supervised organizations, and of all Nazi public institutions created as instruments of Nazi domination, and of such other organizations as may be regarded as a threat to the security of the Allied forces or to international peace, and for prohibiting their revival in any form; for the dismissal and internment of Nazi personnel; for the control or seizure of Nazi property and funds; and for the suppression of Nazi ideology and teaching.

41. The German authorities and German nationals will not allow the existence of any secret organizations.

42. The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the repeal of Nazi legislation and for the reform of German law and of the German legal, judicial, administrative, police and educational systems, including the replacement of their personnel.

43. (a) The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the rescinding of German legislation involving discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions, and for the cancellation of all legal or other disabilities resulting therefrom.

    (b) The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue regarding the property, assets, rights, titles and interests of persons affected by legislation involving discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions.

44. No person shall be prosecuted or molested by the German authorities or by German nationals on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions, or on account of any dealings or sympathies with the United Nations, including the performance of any action calculated to facilitate the execution of the Declaration or of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

45. In any proceedings before any German Court or authority judicial notice shall be taken of the provisions of the Declaration and of all proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions issued thereunder, which shall override any provisions of German law inconsistent therewith.

Section XII

46. Without prejudice to any specific obligations contained in the provisions of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, the German authorities and any other person in a position to do so will furnish or cause to be furnished all such information and documents of every kind, public and private, as the Allied Representatives may require.

47. The German authorities will likewise produce for interrogation and employment by the Allied Representatives upon demand any and all persons whose knowledge and experience would be useful to the Allied Representatives.

48. The Allied Representatives will have access at all times to any building, installation, establishment, property or area, and any of the contents thereof, for the purposes of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, and in particular for the purposes of safeguarding, inspecting, copying or obtaining any of the desired documents and information. The German authorities will give all necessary facilities and assistance for this purpose, including the service of all specialist staff, including archivists.

Section XIII

49. In the event of any doubt as to the meaning or interpretation of any term or expression in the Declaration and in any proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions issued thereunder, the decision of the Allied Representatives shall be final.

The above text of the Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on certain Additional Requirements to be imposed on Germany has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 25th July, 1945.

Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:
JOHN G. WINANT

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:
Т. CAКCИН

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:
RONALD I. CAMPBELL

Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the European Advisory Commission:
R. MASSIGLI

Lancaster House, London, SW1
25th July, 1945

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (July 25, 1945)

Churchill back in London, faces tight squeeze in vote

Political forecasters say Prime Minister’s party will poll only 40 percent of ballots

…

[NormanStewart]

Big Three awaits Churchill’s election fate

Truman to review troops at Frankfurt
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

…

[NormanStewart]

U.S. troops move into Vienna

Entry believed result of Potsdam parley

…

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (July 25, 1945)

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 25, 1945 — 11:23 p.m.
[Translation]
urgent

1450

Re my telegram No. 1449

At the time of my conference with Lozovsky on the 25th, I stated orally as follows (as indicated at the beginning of my telegram,3 the above was to be sent later to L. in written form):

1. At the meeting with you, the Acting People’s Commissar, last July 13th, I delivered the message from the Emperor and also particularly mentioned His Majesty’s desire to dispatch Prince Konoye. Concerning the above, I received a reply from you in writing on the night of the 18th to the effect that the Government of the USSR could not give a specific answer because there was nothing concrete either in the message of the Emperor or in the Prince’s mission to Moscow.

2. Concerning these matters, I once again made my proposal to you today to make the circumstances clear in the following manner:

   The mission of special envoy Konoye, entrusted with the Emperor’s request, is to ask the Government of the USSR to assist in the termination of the war and to explain our concrete intentions on this matter; his mission is at the same time to negotiate on matters which will solidify and improve relations between Japan and the USSR, which should become the basis of our diplomacy for the period during and after the war.

3. In addition to stating the foregoing on instructions from our Government to the Government of the USSR, I repeated that the Emperor especially ordered the Government to dispatch the envoy as the result of His Majesty’s wishes to put an end to the tragedy of additional bloodshed from the continued exchange of fire. The special envoy will explain to the Government of the USSR the concrete intentions of the Japanese relative to the above, and will request its consideration of this matter. Therefore, I hope that the Government of the USSR will give sufficient and favorable consideration to this matter of the envoy and agree to the dispatch of the envoy very soon.

   Furthermore, since the Government of the USSR is well aware that ex-Premier Prince Konoye enjoys high trust in the Imperial Court and is prominent in Japanese political circles, I believe it will not be necessary to add my own explanation here.

[NormanStewart]

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 25, 1945 — 11:53 p.m.
[Translation]
urgent

1449

Re my telegram No. 1441

On the 25th I met Lozovsky in order to make the proposal contained in my telegram No. 1450, and we continued our conversation as follows:

SATO: As you have already understood from my proposal, the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in a friendly manner relative to the termination of the war, and at the same time will have Prince Konoye explain directly to you the concrete intentions of our Government.

L.: Could you give me the text of the proposal which you have just made? Its content is really important. If you could prepare a written text for me, I should be able to understand it more correctly. It is difficult to expect real accuracy from an oral presentation. It would also be convenient for me to make a report to my Government if I have a written text.

I should like to ask one or two questions: (1) I understand that the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in order to terminate the war, and (2) concerning the above problem Prince Konoye is going to bring us some concrete proposals. Now, are these concrete proposals for the termination of the war or for strengthening Russo-Japanese relations? As this point was not made clear, I should like to have you explain it to me so that I can make a report to my Government.

SATO: As to your latter question, the concrete intentions which Prince Konoye is going to explain to the Soviet Government are, as I understand it, concerned with both of the problems you have just mentioned. In other words, I understand that they are concerned, first, with the request to the Soviet Government for mediation and, second, with the problem of strengthening Russo-Japanese relations. As to your first request, it is outside the instructions which I have received to prepare a written text of the proposal which I made today. However, I shall prepare such a text for your reference on my own initiative and present it to you later, since the problem itself is significant, as you have suggested, and also in due consideration of the fact that the leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin. Needless to say, however, I have to ask you to treat this text as top secret, because of its extremely secret nature. I should also like to mention that Prince Konoye, whose mission I have just explained to you, has our Emperor’s greatest confidence and occupies an eminent position in our Government. Therefore, in my opinion, his mission will cover a vast area: he will ask the Soviet Government for mediation; at the same time he will exchange views concerning problems common to both of our countries. Moreover, he may go into the problem of future relations between the two nations. I believe you will not be wrong in understanding the matter as I have indicated above.

L.: I understand well the secret nature of this problem; I also understand well that what you have conveyed to me, Mr. Ambassador, is very confidential. I will make a report to my Government as soon as I receive your written text. Moreover, I will let you know immediately concerning any instructions I receive from my Government.

SATO: Thank you for your kind help. I personally would also wish to hear from you as soon as possible.

Before leaving, I added the following:

The intention of the Japanese Government, regarding Prince Konoye’s mission, is to ask the Soviet Government’s assistance in terminating the war. I am sure that the intention is good. Therefore, it is my hope that you will be able to make arrangements so that the Soviet Government will have an opportunity to hear directly from the Prince on this matter.

This would have ended today’s meeting. However, I repeated my own explanation of the mission of the special envoy, which appeared to impress L. a great deal. Particularly the fact that our Government has asked the Soviet Government to mediate seemed to arrest his attention. L. listened to our proposal with an earnest and attentive attitude throughout, and promised me an answer from his Government.

[NormanStewart]

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Wednesday, July 25:

0920: Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in the India-Burma Theatre) called on the President at the Little White House.

1000: General Marshall called on the President.

1035: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where they arrived at 1045. Before the conference was called to order, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Generalissimo posed in the Palace garden for still and motion pictures. Photographers (service and civilian) from all three nations were represented.

1100: The Big Three and other delegates entered the conference room and the ninth meeting of the Berlin Conference was called to order by the President. The meeting adjourned at 1200, at which time the President left to return to the Little White House.

Admiral Leahy, accompanied by Rear Admiral H. A. Flanigan, USN, Captain Vardaman, Colonel Rusk, Lieutenant Elsey, Lieutenant Edelstein, Lieutenant Rigdon, and First Lieutenant Vardaman left Babelsberg this morning for a flight to London. They returned to Babelsberg Thursday afternoon.

2000: Ambassador Murphy, Ambassador Caffery, and General Somervell were dinner guests at the Little White House this evening. Dinner music was played by an eight-piece band from the 278th Army Ground Force band with Staff Sergeant Joe Borrelli conducting. Vocal selections were rendered by Pfc Jules Navarra.

[NormanStewart]

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 26, 1945)

Die Konferenz tagt weiter

POTSDAM, 25. Juli (Reuters) – Obwohl Premierminister Churchill, Außenminister Eden und der Führer der Arbeiterpartei Attlee nach England abgereist sind, um dort die Wahlergebnisse abzuwarten, wird die Potsdamer Konferenz fortgesetzt. Dies verstärkt den Eindruck, dass in Potsdam zum allergrößten Teil die ins Einzelne gehende Arbeit der Fachleute ausschlaggebend ist.

Das ging schon aus der Bekanntmachung hervor, dass die drei Außenminister Eden, Byrnes und Molotow gemeinsam die Tagesordnung für die „Großen Drei“ aufsetzen. Man nimmt an, dass Churchill, Stalin und Truman im Verlauf ihrer acht Zusammenkünfte grundsätzliche Entscheidungen getroffen haben, die den großen Fachausschüssen Tag für Tag eine Menge Aufgaben stellen, da diese Beschlüsse in allen Einzelheiten ausgearbeitet werden müssen. Bis zur Rückkehr der britischen Staatsmänner aus England sind diese Fachausschüsse durch ihre. Arbeit Voll und ganz beansprucht, da sie auch für die Vorbereitung von Vorschlägen bezüglich der Fragen, die bisher von den „Großen Drei“ noch nicht behandelt wurden, verantwortlich sind.

Ein Blick auf den offiziellen Bericht über die Krimkonferenz gibt eine klare Vorstellung, welch enorme Kleinarbeit notwendig ist, um Beschlüsse, die in großen Umrissen herausgegeben werden, auszuarbeiten. In Potsdam ist dies noch mehr der Fall, weil es sich jetzt hauptsächlich um die alle Einzelheiten umfassende Ausarbeitung der bereits festgelegten grundsätzlichen Entscheidungen handelt. Überall in Deutschland hat man den Eindruck, dass die Besatzungsbehörden in den schwebenden Fragen zuwarten, bis sie Weisungen von Potsdam erhalten, aus denen sie dann ersehen können, welchen Standpunkt sie einnehmen sollen, und wie weit sie in der Durchführung entscheidender Verwaltungsaufgaben gehen können.

[NormanStewart]

L’Aube (July 26, 1945)

Entracte à Potsdam

Churchill à Londres, Truman à Francfort

…

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (July 26, 1945)

500.CC/7-2645: Telegram

The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs

London, July 26, 1945 — 11 a.m.
[Extracts]
Secret

7519
Copre 2

From Gerig for Pasvolsky and Hiss.

Meeting at Potsdam yesterday considered the question of the officers of ExCom (Executive Committee), and PreCo, (Preparatory Committee), Jebb flying over to attend.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

British thinking of proposing that present mandatory powers be provisional members trusteeship council, which together with all other permanent members and elected members, would enable trusteeship council to organize and act provisionally, pending negotiation of agreements. Believe this would be feasible and would hasten and facilitate negotiation of agreements. Soviet raised question at Potsdam of their being a trust power.

[NormanStewart]

500.CC (PC)/7-2845

Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative

[Washington,] July 26, 1945

Participants:	Mr. E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
	Mr. John Balfour British Minister

Mr. John Balfour, British Minister, called upon me this afternoon at his request at my apartment at 2:30. He stated he had just received a wire dated July 26 from London this morning in which he was instructed by the Foreign Office to call on me and inquire whether or not we would be willing to agree to have the chairmanship of the executive committee of the interim commission rotate between the five. He stated that their first position would be to have one chairman, presumably a Soviet chairman, but if they could not agree on one, he asked if we would agree to rotate.

I stated that Mr. Dunn had a memorandum with him at Potsdam on this subject and it was our thinking also that this was the best procedure – we should try for one chairman but if we couldn’t get agreement on one we would then accept rotation. I said, however, that I had heard that Mr. Jebb had flown to Potsdam yesterday on this subject and, of course, our delegation in Potsdam was prepared to deal with the whole subject right there on the ground. He said that was most satisfactory and he would communicate that to the Foreign Office.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

[NormanStewart]

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to the Navy Department

[Babelsberg,] 26 July 1945
Top secret
priority

Victory 352

This is Lockup. CominCh sends No. 24 to CominCh and CNO Administrative Office for action MilMis Moscow for info. Soviets have agreed to establishment of facilities outlined your 122012 and 171951. Detailed arrangements as to entry of personnel still to be made. Soviets will receive communication and aerological material now. Request tonnage cube place and date of assembly of this material for each station. Advise schedule of Soviet west coast sailings and Hula transfers by which material could be shipped to Petropavlovsk and/or Vladivostok. Possibility of use of east coast sailings for transportation overland via Europe should also be reported. In addition desire detail your plans for transportation via United States aircraft thru Alaska in event Soviet authorize this method of delivery. Send reply MilMis Moscow for action.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the U.S. and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m.

Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam

	Present
United States		Soviet Union
General of the Army Marshall		Army General Antonov
Fleet Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov
General of the Army Arnold		Marshal of Aviation Falaleyev
Lieutenant General Hull		Lieutenant General Slavin
Vice Admiral Cooke		Admiral Kucherov
Major General Norstad
Major General Deane
Rear Admiral Gardner
Rear Admiral Maples
Captain McDill
	Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Moore
	Interpreters
Lieutenant Chase		Major Evsekov

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 26, 1945, 3 p.m.
Top secret

GENERAL ANTONOV asked General Marshall if he would preside at the meeting.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated the honor but under the circumstances he suggested General Antonov preside and he hoped that he would accept.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if General Marshall had had an opportunity to become acquainted with the answers to the five questions General Marshall had given him at the meeting on 24 July (See Annex to these minutes). He said that Generalissimo Stalin had handed the written answers to President Truman yesterday at eleven o’clock a.m.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was sorry that he had not seen the answers which had been prepared by General Antonov.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the first question as follows:

The Soviet Command agrees to establish in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk radio stations for transmitting weather data in accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 23 July 1945. The Soviet Command is ready to accept and use the radio stations and equipment proposed in that letter for the above purpose.

As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the stations, we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a great deal of experience in working with American radio stations.

In addition to these two stations, we shall increase the network of local stations in order to give better information on weather.

When the reading of the answer to the first question was completed, GENERAL ANTONOV asked if he should proceed to read the answers to the remaining questions. GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to discuss the answer to each question as it was read.

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were disappointed that American personnel was not acceptable for liaison purposes at the central weather stations, since they felt that it would increase the efficiency of the Russian effort as well as our own. He thought, therefore, that we should request reconsideration of this point. If American personnel were used, he said that it was the intention to have 18 officers and 42 enlisted men at Khabarovsk and 9 officers and 24 enlisted men at Petropavlovsk. He had a memorandum relating to the details of equipment and personnel which he thought the Russian High Command should have for use in connection with the reconsideration requested.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that Russian personnel had had experience in the use of the equipment and in the communication procedure in the vicinity of Sevastopol and Odessa as well as near Murmansk. The proposal to use Russian personnel had been made because it had been considered that the operation of these stations would then be more simple. However, if the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on American personnel at these stations, there would be no objection to employing them.

ADMIRAL KING then gave General Antonov the memorandum he had previously mentioned.

GENERAL ANTONOV pointed out that he had not received an answer as to whether the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on the use of American personnel.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to use American personnel and pointed out that the major service rendered by this personnel would be to U.S. naval forces and to the strategic air forces. For this reason he thought that American personnel would be more satisfactory.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the first question could then be considered solved and American liaison personnel would be employed at the stations under discussion.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the second question as follows:

Separate zones of naval and air operations are to be set up for the United States and the USSR in the Sea of Japan. The boundary between these zones will be along the lines connecting Cape Boltina on the coast of Korea to point 40° north 135° east to point 45° 45’ north 140° east thence along the parallel 45° 45’ north to the line connecting Cape Crillon (Kondo) (on the southern tip of southern Sakhalin) with Cape Soya Missaki (Soyasaki) (on the northern tip of Hokkaido).

The USSR naval and air forces will operate north of this line. United States naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine craft and for aviation.

Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line may be subject to change.

United States naval and air operations north of this boundary line and Soviet naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject to coordination.

In the Sea of Okhotsk there shall be a zone of mutual operations for the naval and air forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Operations in the Okhotsk Sea will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.

In the Bering Sea there shall be a zone of mutual operations of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from Cape Dezhnev to Diomede Island and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the USSR and the United States to parallel 51° 30’ north and thence through 50° 35’ north 157° east; thence to 49° 50’ north 156° 20’ east and thence along the parallel 49° 50’ north to the Fourth Kurile Strait.

The remainder of the Bering Sea as well as bordering regions of the Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the United States Fleet.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the line of demarcation for sea and air operations in the Sea of Japan was acceptable.

ADMIRAL KING said that he desired to confirm the proposed conditions in the Sea of Okhotsk. He said he understood that this sea would be free for operations of both the United States Navy and the Navy of the Soviet Union and that coordination would be arranged through mutual understanding and cooperation. He asked also if the area to the north of the red line shown on the chart prepared by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, and described in the answer to the second question, was subject to joint control by the United States and the Soviet Navies, in the same manner as in the Sea of Okhotsk.

Admiral King’s understanding was confirmed by ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with this understanding, the proposals by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable.

GENERAL ANTONOV repeated that the areas as set forth in answer to the second question were for both sea and air operations, and there was agreement on this answer.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the third question as follows:

The boundary line between operational zones of the United States and Soviet air forces in Korea and Manchuria shall be as follows: Cape Boltina, Changchun, Liaoyuan, Kailu, Chihfeng, Peking, Tatung and thence along the southern boundary of Inner Mongolia.

United States aviation will operate south of this line including all the above-named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. United States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated.

GENERAL ARNOLD said he would like to call attention to the fact that the boundary line as proposed by the Russian Chiefs of Staff would deprive the United States air forces of certain railroad centers and lines of communication north of the line as targets unless each individual mission were arranged for separately. He asked if the United States air forces could send missions north of the boundary line within 24 hours after application had been made to the local Russian authorities. He thought that if his understanding as to local coordination was correct, the desired operations of the United States air forces could be worked out satisfactorily. He called the attention of the Russian Chiefs of Staff to the range of the heavy bombers, medium bombers, and light bombers, as indicated on a map which he presented, and pointed out where the United States bombing effort could be made effective to the north of the boundary line.

AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the boundary line suggested by the Russian Chiefs of Staff was to the northward of the principal railroad junctions. These junctions would therefore be available to attack by the United States air forces. If it became necessary to attack targets to the north of the line, reliable communications would permit arrangements to be made within 24 hours. Since, however, the communication might not always be reliable, this question might involve some difficulties.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with the understanding that if the means of communication for coordinating attacks north of the boundary line were too slow, the question of its position would be discussed again, the proposals made by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable. However, he said, there was an additional matter he would like to raise in regard to both the second and third questions previously discussed. This concerned the flight of individual reconnaissance aircraft, and he asked that the Russian Chiefs of Staff comment on this point.

AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that it was considered that as a general rule, the boundary proposed should apply to reconnaissance aircraft as well as to bombing flights. When necessary to fly reconnaissance aircraft beyond the boundary line, the flight should be coordinated through the liaison officers.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the fourth question as follows:

The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with military operations of the Soviet Union against Japan, to establish liaison groups between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet liaison groups with General Mac Arthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition, in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission.

American liaison groups will be located with the Soviet High Commander in the Far East, Marshal Vassilievski, in Khabarovsk; and with the commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yemashev, in Vladivostok.

The Soviet Command is ready to accept the radio-teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposal of the Russian Chiefs of Staff appeared entirely acceptable, but he wished to ask if it was the intention that the liaison groups to be provided should make it possible for immediate coordination of operations. He asked if operations in the Sea of Okhotsk, for example, or in any other special area, would normally be referred to Washington and Moscow, or whether the necessary decisions would be made in the field with the minimum delay.

GENERAL ANTONOV replied that Marshal Vassilievski is the commander in chief of all forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Marshal Vassilievski had authority to solve all questions of local coordination which were included in the tasks assigned him by the High Command of the Soviet Union. He said that similarly Admiral Yemashev is the commander in chief of all Russian naval forces in the Pacific. He said that these two officers would be able to solve the questions of coordination of action within the limits of the questions and answers which were being discussed here.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the statement of General Antonov made the answer to the fourth question entirely acceptable.

GENERAL ANTONOV then referred back to the third answer and asked if the question of liaison was now clear.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that his question had concerned the employment of reconnaissance aircraft and that he considered the question of liaison as provided for in the fourth answer entirely satisfactory. He said, moreover, that as the operations proceeded he hoped that there would develop such an intimacy in liaison that we would find later that the commanders in the field would develop an even greater intimacy. This would of course depend on them.

GENERAL ANTONOV read the answer to the fifth question as follows:

The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as far as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personnel of the above-mentioned ships and planes.

For this purpose we can designate:
a. Naval ports
In the Japanese Sea, Port Nakhodka (America Strait); in the Okhotsk and Bering Sea regions – Nikolaevsk, on the Amur, and Petropavlovsk, on Kamchatka.

b. Airfields
In the region of Vladivostok, in the region of Alexandrovsk on Sakhalin Island and in the region of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposals of the Russian Chiefs of Staff were entirely acceptable.

GENERAL ARNOLD asked if the matter of identification of aircraft at the Russian airbases which would be available to United States aircraft would be handled as a local matter. He said that sometimes a plane was so disabled that it was necessary to come into a landing field from any direction, identifying itself by radio signal only.

AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the names of airfields, methods of approach, corridors and other details would be furnished and that the requirements of the aircraft and personnel upon landing would be provided. He said that a disabled aircraft, after making a certain signal, could land from any direction without other formality. Aircraft crews should be instructed, however, not to fly over such ports as Vladivostok, because of the danger of being fired upon by anti-aircraft batteries.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that his inquiry was in regard to whether arrangements of this nature would be made locally, to which AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV replied that the principle was being established here, and that the details would be determined on the spot by the commanders in the field.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he now considered that the five questions given him by General Marshall on 24 July had been answered. He wished, however, to make an additional statement in regard to them. He said that he considered that all of the arrangements provided for under the five questions would come into being on the entry of Russia into the war against Japan.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked if it would be possible to get the communication equipment discussed in the first question into Siberia before that date, or if it would be necessary to wait until after Russia had entered the war.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that preliminary arrangements for the liaison wireless stations could be made beforehand, and that agreements could be reached with reference to each particular question raised.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the meeting on 24 July, Admiral King had pointed out that after the seizure of Kyushu communications might be opened from Kyushu to Vladivostok. This line of communications was very important, since the Straits of Tsushima could be used throughout the year, whereas the route through the Kuriles and through La Perousse Strait was closed during part of the year by ice. He asked General Marshall when the invasion of Kyushu would take place and when the opening of the sea route from the south could be expected.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the occupation of Kyushu depended on three factors. The first was the movement of troops from Europe. This was being done as rapidly as possible, and engineering troops were being moved first in order to prepare the way for the full application of air power. The movement involved two oceans and one continent, and although we could not be certain of carrying out the entire movement on schedule, and were now somewhat behind on both personnel and cargo, he hoped that all difficulties would be overcome. The second factor was the movement of large amounts of supplies from the Solomons, New Guinea, and Halmahera, north to the Philippines and Okinawa, to be loaded on assault ships for the tremendous amphibious effort against Kyushu. The third factor was the recent withdrawal of our divisions engaged in the Philippines and Okinawa from heavy fighting, and the problem of rehabilitation and training for the next operation.

Finally, he said, the weather conditions in the area made landings in September and early October too hazardous to undertake, although this was not a controlling factor as to date. At the present time he expected the landing on Kyushu to take place the last part of October.

GENERAL MARSHALL said further that the assault on Japan by naval and air forces which would extend also to Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula would be continued and increased. By these means he anticipated that by the time of the landing on Kyushu we will have destroyed Japanese oil, other material production, and communications, and will have virtually destroyed the Japanese air force. He said that Admiral King has added that the Japanese Navy would be destroyed as well. He said that all plans for the operation against Kyushu were complete, shipping was being assembled, the construction of bases was proceeding at top speed, and the operations of the United States Fleet and all air forces would proceed with increased vigor from now on. He thought, however, that the Tsushima Strait could not be opened before the end of October. The difficulties of opening Tsushima Strait would involve the sweeping of the passage for mines. The most serious threat to these operations would be from Japanese suicide planes which had caused us so much difficulty in previous operations.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be much pleased if the route to Vladivostok via Tsushima Strait could be opened in October since by that time communications through the Kuriles and La Perousse Strait would be closed by ice.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood and appreciated the urgent necessity to the Russian Chiefs of Staff of opening the southern route and said that we would do all in our power to clear the straits as early as possible. General Marshall said that Admiral King had pointed out that the operations to open Tsushima Strait could not take place until after the landing in Kyushu and until after our air forces were established in northwestern Kyushu. It would be necessary, of course, for our minesweepers to have adequate air cover during their operations in clearing the straits of mines. The time required to establish the necessary airfields would depend to a large degree on Japanese resistance in Kyushu and the straits might not be opened until the middle of December or about six weeks after the first landing on Kyushu. He pointed out that we would make every effort to expedite the operation for the benefit of our forces as well as for the benefit to the Russians. He wanted to make this point clear since he desired to avoid any misunderstanding as to our capabilities in clearing Tsushima Strait for traffic to Vladivostok.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read a memorandum which he said related to this discussion and which gave the progress, from partial reports, covering the last ten days of naval and air action against Japan.

GENERAL ANTONOV expressed his appreciation for the information contained in the memorandum read by General Marshall.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to furnish to the Russian Chiefs of Staff, until operations against Japan were commenced by the Soviet Union, a weekly report of operations similar to that contained in the memorandum, through General Deane or his naval associate. Thereafter, reports of such operations would be furnished through the commanders in the field.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be glad to receive this information and asked if there were any other questions to be considered at this meeting.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that directions had been given to furnish the Russian Chiefs of Staff with copies of the minutes of this meeting in order to provide a means of determining if there was a mutual understanding of the conversations which had taken place. In the absence of comment by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, it would be assumed that the record was a correct basis for understanding and guidance.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would examine the minutes and if he had any comment he would inform the United States Chiefs of Staff thereof.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was planned that he, Admiral King and General Arnold would leave for the United States tomorrow. Admiral Leahy would remain until the conference was completed. He said that the principal assistants of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Cooke, General Hull and General Norstad would remain at the conference to handle any matters that might arise. He said that if he, Admiral King and General Arnold leave tomorrow as planned, he desired to take this occasion to express for the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the opportunity afforded to discuss these important matters with the Russian Chiefs of Staff. He was gratified that they had been able to reach decisions so satisfactory to all.

GENERAL ANTONOV also expressed his pleasure and satisfaction over the results of the conference and said that he hoped that his close contact with General Marshall would be continued in the future so that all questions that might arise might be settled promptly. He then gave General Marshall a map showing the areas which had been considered in the discussion.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he regretted that through a misunderstanding the United States Chiefs of Staff had not received the answers to the five questions and were, therefore, not well prepared for the afternoon’s discussion. He thanked General Antonov for his patience in reading the answers which he had presented.

[NormanStewart]

Third meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, afternoon

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
Mr. Cannon	Mr. Hayter	Mr. Gromyko
		Mr. Golunsky

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645

The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Director of European Affairs

[Babelsberg,] July 26, 1945

Memorandum

The third meeting of the Committee to consider the second and third points of the paper on Liberated Europe was held this afternoon.

On point 2 (freedom of the press) we could only reaffirm that the divergence between our position, generally supported by the British, and the Soviet position left no alternative but to report the disagreement back to the respective Foreign Ministers. The British representative (Mr. Hayter) attempted to put through a new text, but even this, a watered-down modification of ours, was rejected by the Russians (Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Golunski). The Russian proposal, attached hereto, is of course impossible. The first paragraph is just not true, and the second paragraph talks only of better facilities for foreign correspondents, subject to “security” restrictions which Mr. Gromyko admitted may involve political censorship. The text ignores completely the question of freedom of the domestic press.

On point 3 (procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary) the Russians repeated their earlier argument that this is now superfluous in view of their proposals made in the respective capitals which would grant us and the British a better position. After a brief discussion of the points requiring elucidation it was clear that there will not be time to work out all these details during the present Conference. We finally drew up a statement to be shown to our respective delegations, as a basis for the discussion at tomorrow’s meeting. It reads as follows:

The Three Governments have taken note that the Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. These proposals include provisions for regular and frequent meetings of the three representatives, improved facilities for British and American representatives, and prior joint consideration of directives. Subject to elaboration of details which will be worked out through diplomatic channels the three Governments consider that these proposals constitute a basis for the future work of the Allied Control Commissions, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries.

[NormanStewart]

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645

The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Director of European Affairs

[Babelsberg,] July 26, 1945
[Extract]

Memorandum

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

If any of the delegations are willing to accept this text, note that either the British or the Soviet representative will propose a suitable passage to cover Finland.

If we accept something along the lines of the foregoing text, the title must be changed. We might propose:

Statement on Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary (and Finland).

Copies of the Soviet proposals [on revising the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania], to which reference is made above have been handed to us here. Translations of these for Hungary and Rumania are attached. We have been informed that the proposals for Bulgaria and Finland are identical with those for Rumania.

By way of comment it may be said:

1. Our representatives on the Allied Control Councils as well as the Department, seem to think these proposals give us most of what we wanted. I agree.

2. We have in mind some requests for elucidation as well as some desirable additions. We might submit them to the Soviet Delegation here in the form of a personal letter. Though we could hardly expect a reply here, this would perhaps be better tactics than to start fresh through diplomatic channels. I think we could prepare a statement of these items in a couple of hours. Can we handle here the question of concurrence of the Joint Chiefs? If not, the delay of clearance through the Department might make it too late to get the letter into Soviet hands before the Conference closes.

3. The Soviet proposal for Hungary would give us what purports to be a status of concurrence in decisions of the Allied Control Council, i.e., a fairly full tripartite status in matters of policy at least. In working for revision we should try to obtain this same status as regards Rumania and Bulgaria, thus achieving uniformity in a region where our interests are identical for the three countries, and where the military reasons for a distinction no longer apply.

4. We may have to make some concession from our position of full tripartite participation. The substance of our desiderata would be achieved, however, if we obtain effective consultation prior to the issuance of directives.

[NormanStewart]

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 26, 1945]
[Translation?]

Proposed Soviet Redraft of Paragraph 2 of the Paper on Liberated Europe (Freedom of the Press)

The Conference takes note of the fact that now the representatives of the press of the Allied countries in the countries liberated from German invaders have received the opportunity to work in normal conditions and to describe on a large scale in the press the situation in these countries.

At the same time in view of the termination of the war in Europe conditions have been created which permit to grant greater facilities for the work of the representatives of the allied press in the countries with which armistice agreements have been concluded, provided the interests of the security of allied occupational forces in these countries be observed.

[NormanStewart]

Harriman-Grabski conversation

	Present
United States		Poland
Mr. Harriman		Vice President Grabski
		Deputy Prime Minister Gomulka
		Mr. Modzelewski
		Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczvk
		Mr. Zebrowski

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

July 26, 1945
[Translation]

Notes of a Discussion with Mr. Harriman on July 26, 1945

Persons present: from the American side --Ambassador Harriman and his secretary; from the Polish side --Professor Grabski, Messrs. Gomułka, Modzelewski, Mikołajcyzk, and interpreter Żebrowski.

MR. HARRIMAN takes the floor and asks for a short time to speak because of a meeting which is to follow, and he asks that his talk be considered confidential. As we know, the Americans now have to feed about 7 million people. At the same time, one of the most terrible wars is being waged 7,000 miles from home in the Pacific. They are aware of the fact that they will have to help Europe. Those 7 million people are mostly Germans in the American occupation zone – prisoners of war and also people of various nationalities who are in their occupation zone. The … American nation does not wish to allow any people in the world to starve in time of peace. In making their territorial claims the Poles broached a controversial issue concerning food and raw materials needed by European nations. The territories occupied by the Soviet Union in Germany and the territories claimed by Poland were a source of food supplies for the rest of the German population. There is a shortage of coal in the world. Russia has a coal shortage as well as a food shortage. France, Belgium, and the Netherlands also experience such shortages. Polish Silesia used to supply coal to Berlin. Italy is short of coal, and in such circumstances the United States has to export 7 million tons of coal annually, although its production is not sufficient for domestic needs. England cannot export coal if it is to maintain its present level of industrial production, but it does export coal at present. At this time of controversy over raw materials and food, the Poles announce their claims with regard to sources of supply for food, coal, zinc, and similar raw materials. They announce their claim to a territory formerly inhabited by 8 to 9 million Germans. The Czechs announced their claim with regard to the expulsion of 2 million Germans, the Hungarians of half a million.… At present Messrs. Harriman, Matthews, and Clayton are having their own private discussions with President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes in order to formulate the position of the American Delegation with regard to the Polish problem. He also knows that similar discussions concerning the Polish problem are going on within the British Delegation. The problem must be settled somehow at the meeting of the Three. One thing has already been settled positively so far, namely, that all of the Three Powers will actively help in the repatriation of the Poles from the west. From the legal point of view, the problem of boundaries must wait until the end of the war.… But the problem of a legal settlement of the situation at a peace conference is one thing, and the problem of establishing a Polish administration in the western territories and of securing the harvest and organizing industrial production is something else. The Russians cannot do it; it has to be done by the Poles. If they are to do it and start production on a large scale, they must repatriate their population from areas behind the Curzon Line and from the west. Yesterday’s conference, however, showed clearly that until the next harvest Poland cannot export food, yet it has to export raw materials such as coal, zinc, etc., to meet the needs of other countries, and obviously for payment.…

MR. HARRIMAN then expresses thanks for the invitation proffered on behalf of the Government to visit the western territories of Poland and promises to make this visit after the Conference, not only as an ambassador but also as a friend of Poland.

In closing, I said to Mr. Harriman, half jokingly, that Poland should not take a beating because of a quarrel between the Allies concerning food. With regard to that problem the interests of Poland must be preserved above all.

[NormanStewart]

First meeting of the Protocol Subcommittee

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
Mr. Dunn	Mr. Brook	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Ward	Mr. Kozyrev
Mr. Cohen	Mr. Dean	Mr. Lavrentyev
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Yost

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2645

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 26, 1945

Meeting of Protocol Subcommittee, July 26, 1945

Mr. Gromyko was elected chairman of the subcommittee.

It was agreed that the Protocol of the Berlin Conference should follow exactly the form of the Protocol of the Crimea Conference.

1. It was agreed that the title of the first heading should be “Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers” which should be followed by the text which has already been approved by the Conference. There would then be inserted the approved text of the invitation to be sent by the three governments to the Governments of China and France.

2. It was agreed that the title of the second heading should be “The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period” and that this should be followed by two sections “(A) Political Principles” and “(B) Economic Principles.” The first of these subheadings would be followed by the text already approved.

3. It was agreed that the third section would have to do with Poland and that the title of the section would be suggested by the USSR. This would be followed in the first instance by the text on the Polish question already approved by the Conference.

A draft of these first three headings of the Protocol is attached hereto.

It was agreed that the following subjects would be dealt with under succeeding headings:

• IV Tangier
• V Iran
• VI Western Frontier of the USSR.
• VII Territorial Trusteeship
• VIII Government in Austria
• IX Turkey and the Straits

The exact title of all of these will be subject to further consideration. The text will be supplied by the Delegations which raised the questions before the Conference. In other words, the Soviet Delegation will present texts on Tangier, the Western Frontier of the USSR, Territorial Trusteeship and Government in Austria. The British Delegation will present texts on Iran and Turkey and the Straits.

It was also agreed that decisions taken by the subcommittee are purely tentative and subject to revision after the various representatives have consulted their foreign ministers.

The next meeting of the subcommittee was fixed for Friday, July 27, immediately after the Big Three meeting.

[NormanStewart]

Conversations among U.S. officials regarding war criminals, 9 p.m.

	Present
Secretary Byrnes		Colonel Cutter
Mr. Justice Jackson		Mrs. Douglas
Mr. McCloy		Colonel Gill
Brigadier General Betts		Colonel Gerhardt
Miss Fite		Major Coleman
Mr. Fahy

740.00116 EW/7-2745

The Assistant Secretary of War to the Secretary of State

Washington [Babelsberg], 27 July 1945
Confidential

Dear Mr. Secretary I send you herewith a copy of our minutes of the conference held in your office yesterday evening on war crimes.

Sincerely yours,
JOHN J MCCLOY

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conference in the Office of the Secretary of State, 2 Kaiser Strasse, Babelsberg, 26 July 1945 at 2100 Hours

Present: The Secretary of State, Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, Mr. John J. McCloy (Assistant Secretary of War), Brigadier General Ed C. Betts (J. A., ETO), Miss Katherine Fite, State Department, Mr. Charles Fahy (USGCC Legal Adviser), Colonel R. Ammi Cutter (Office of The Assistant Secretary of War), and Mrs. Douglas (Mr. Justice Jackson’s secretary)

Mr. Justice Jackson reviewed the course of his negotiations with the Russians, French and British in an attempt to reach a protocol governing the trial of the principal war criminals. He also urged that there be established promptly a policy and procedure on the surrender of war criminals and renegades requested by any of the United Nations or by Italy. The substance of the pending IPCOG paper on the subject was reported by Mr. McCloy, Miss Fite and Colonel Cutter.

The following decisions of policy were made by the Secretary of State after full discussion:

1. With respect to the surrender of war criminals and renegades requested by the United Nations or by Italy, the Secretary of State took the position that this matter should be dealt with by the U.S. military commander having custody of the demanded prisoner. The U.S. commander should make surrender upon presentation of a request from such a government, accompanied by a reasonably full statement that charges were pending or had been made that the prisoner had committed acts constituting either a war crime or an offense constituting him a traitor or renegade. In cases of doubt the military commander should refer the matter to the Control Council to be disposed of without reference to Washington, unless political or other guidance was affirmatively desired by the U. S. representative on the Control Council. (It was understood that Mr. Justice Jackson, Mr. McCloy, General Betts, and the others would go over the pending IPCOG paper on war criminals and the pending EAC paper on United Nations Renegades and Quislings and determine whether these papers in all particulars complied with the policy mentioned above).

   Mr. McCloy pointed out that this decision to leave the matter to the decision of the military commander was in some degree a departure from the United States’ traditional policy of affording asylum to political offenders. Despite this the Secretary of State expressed the opinion that the only practical place for the decision of these questions was in the field, where the military commander had full access to the facts, under a policy which left him free in cases of doubt to throw the request into the Control Council for decision.

2. With respect to the arrangements being negotiated by Mr. Justice Jackson, the Secretary of State expressed the view that Mr. Justice Jackson should not make any sacrifices of or deviations from principle, either as to the place of trial, procedure, or definition of the criminal offenses. He should not make any agreement which he felt in any way derogated from fundamental axioms of justice. He should make reasonable attempts to reach an agreement for complete Russian participation on a sound basis. If he found it impossible within a fairly short time to effect such an agreement, satisfactory to him, the Secretary of State would approve his reaching an agreement with the Russians and the others, or any of them, but preferably including the Russians, defining in general terms the criminal offenses to be tried and providing for the trial by each nation (or any group of one or more of the four nations) of the criminals in their own custody, in accordance with procedures satisfactory to the nations conducting the trials. Secretary Byrnes suggested that there was ample reason for adopting this view (which could be duly explained to the public at the proper time) in (1) the administrative difficulties (due to language, differences in the national jurisprudences, etc.) of a four-party trial; (2) in the inevitable delays in reaching agreement; and (3) in the necessity for speedy trials on a basis which the United States would regard as fair.

3. With respect to the substance of the protocol for the trial of the principal war criminals, the Secretary of State expressed the view that this was in general a matter committed by the President to Mr. Justice Jackson and to be decided by him. In this respect he referred to such matters as the substantive law to be applied, definitions of crimes, provisions governing procedure, etc.

Following the meeting above-mentioned, a further meeting was held at #1 Dom Strasse with all of the above present, except Mr. Byrnes. In addition, there were present Colonel Gill, Colonel Gerhardt and Major Coleman.

It was agreed:

1. That the IPCOG paper on War Criminals and the SWNCC paper on United Nations Renegades and Quislings conformed to the policy stated by the Secretary of State and could be carried out in detail by the U.S. Military Government, which properly under the directive could prescribe regulations as to the form of requests, the extent to which proof of the existence of charges of war crimes should be required, and the standards for determining when the request should be referred to the Control Council;

2. that the matter of requests by former satellite nations should be considered further, but that probably they should be granted (in the absence of unusual circumstances) where concurred in by the U.S. representative on the Control Council of the former satellite; and

3. that the regulations governing requests worked out by the Control Council or the U.S. Zone Commander should be communicated to the other United Nations through diplomatic channels.