Nelson’s job as WLB head on ‘iffy’ basis
Naval officer placed in command
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Commander tells own story –
Shattering of morale in ‘Merrill’s Marauders’ blamed on bad mistake
Troops misinterpreted Stilwell’s orders, general says in Washington interview
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Harmon: ‘Make me a stenographer! Bah!’ French girl declares
By Dudley Ann Harmon, United Press staff writer
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In Washington –
Anti-speculation proposal beaten
Surplus property bill still debated
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Wife of poet asks alimony
‘Vulgar’ verses sent by ‘mistress,’ she says
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Millett: Parents often at fault in wartime divorces
‘Innocent’ help may cause misery
By Ruth Millett
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Poll: Dewey choice of businessmen of nation
But trend since 1940 has been to Roosevelt
By George Gallup, Director, American Institute of Public Opinion
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Davis calls Dulles ‘highly informed’
Washington –
John Foster Dulles, representative of Republican presidential nominee Thomas E. Dewey in foreign policy discussions here, conferred with a number of Republican Senate members yesterday, including Senator James J. Davis (R-PA).
Mr. Davis, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said their talk concerned post-war international cooperation and world peace and that he found Mr. Dulles “highly informed on the outstanding issues of this problem.”
The Senator said:
Mr. Dulles was particularly anxious to learn the attitude of the people of Pennsylvania regarding the entire matter of post-war international organization and world peace.
Mr. Dulles, between two conferences with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, also conferred with Senator Robert A. Taft (R-OH) and Wallace H. White Jr. (R-ME), both of whom indicated they believe Mr. Hull and Mr. Dulles in accord on fundamentals of post-war security.
Roosevelt in touch with Willkie
Washington (UP) –
Commenting that he sees lots of people privately, President Roosevelt said today that he had been in private contact with Wendell L. Willkie.
Mr. Roosevelt, under news conference questioning, said he knew of no plans for a “private” meeting with the 1940 Republican presidential nominee. Then he went on to say he might meet him, but that no date had been set.
Asked whether he had been in touch with Mr. Willkie, the President said, well, yes; privately.
“Does privately preclude any…” a reporter started to ask. But he was quickly cut off by the President who said, yes, it precluded.
U.S. State Department (August 25, 1944)
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/5
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, August 25, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – FIFTH DAY
Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee
This meeting, the only one held today, was the most important of the entire conversations so far.
a) Relation of the world organization to economic and social matters
This important topic, which when previously raised had been postponed for future discussion, was considered fully for the first time.
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UNITY OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN VIEWS: The British indicated that they are prepared to accept our views that an Economic and Social Council should be created and should be an organ of the Assembly.
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FULL PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF SOVIET VIEWS: The Russians earnestly and exhaustively argued that the League’s experience demonstrates that an intermingling in the same organization of responsibilities for both the maintenance of peace and for economic and social matters will work out to the detriment of security. We presented at length our reasons for believing that the general organization must concern itself with all matters which bear upon the maintenance of conditions conducive to peace. We also urged that our proposal not only accomplishes this but leaves the executive Council free to concentrate on the primary task of security, thus obviating the defects in the League’s structure. We were encouraged by the attention which Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Sobolev paid to our arguments. It was agreed that Ambassador Gromyko would report fully to his Government.
b) Regional organizations
We agreed to postpone consideration of this topic.
c) Composition of the Executive Council
We agreed to postpone consideration of this topic.
d) Expulsion and withdrawal of members
Ambassador Gromyko insisted that the power of expulsion is desirable for the “discipline” of members. The British, as a substitute, proposed suspending the privileges of membership of those states against which action is taken by the Council. This proposal was tentatively accepted, ad referendum.
e) Should the Council make decisions by ⅔ or majority vote?
We stated that we could agree to the British proposal that important questions should be decided by a ⅔ vote (including the unanimous vote of members having permanent seats on the Council). Ambassador Gromyko indicated no dissent and said he would inform his Government.
f) Should parties to a dispute vote?
We agreed to state our views early next week.
g) Composition of military staff committee
The British clarified their proposal and said their military authorities regard it as of very great importance. We agreed to present our view on the British proposal next week. There was also tentative discussion, with little apparent divergence of view, of the question of the supreme commander for joint security forces.
h) International Court of Justice
There appeared to be general agreement (1) that there should be a Court, (2) that the Court should be a part of the Organization, and (3) that there should be no attempt to draft the actual Statute of the Court during these conversations.
i) Authority of Council to make its decisions obligatory
There appeared to be tentative agreement with the British proposal that the Council should have authority to make its recommendation obligatory in any dispute involving a clear threat to peace when all other methods of settlement have failed.
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Lot 60–D 224, Box 56: DO/ConvA/JSC Mins. 1–12
Informal minutes of Meeting No. 5 of the Joint Steering Committee
Washington, August 25, 1944, 11 a.m.
[Extract]
| Present: | Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Jebb of the British group; |
| Ambassador Gromyko, Mr. Sobolev, and Mr. Berezhkov of the Soviet group; | |
| Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Dunn, and Mr. Pasvolsky of the American group. | |
| Mr. Hiss also present, as secretary. |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Committee then proceeded to consider part A of the list of questions which had been prepared by Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Sobolev, and Mr. Jebb yesterday afternoon.
Economic and social questions
Sir Alexander Cadogan pointed out that the British position is that important economic and social questions should somehow be dealt with as a part of the general organization. He said that he understood that the American view was somewhat similar to the British view but that the Soviet view lays emphasis upon the desirability of keeping these questions separate from matters of security. He said that he understood that the reason for the Soviet position was the feeling that the League had been overloaded with matters unrelated to security. He made the point, however, that economic and social questions might lead to acute differences from which there might result threats to security. Consequently, he said, there was need for some liaison in this connection. He suggested that perhaps the Director General of the international organization might effect such liaison.
Ambassador Gromyko then stated that the Soviet Government considers that it is desirable that there be a separate economic organization. He pointed out that the League had actually considered more questions relating to general welfare than it had questions relating to security. He said that estimates prepared by Soviet officials indicated that some 77 percent of the questions dealt with by the League did not relate directly to the maintenance of peace and security. He said that the public in general had the impression that the League had constantly under consideration important matters relating to peace and security when in reality it was usually engaged only in consideration of secondary matters. The Soviet view, he said, is that the primary and indeed the only task of the international organization should be the maintenance of peace and security. This should satisfy the general aspiration for an organization having as its aim the preservation of peace. He added that some kind of liaison may be found between the security organization and other organizations, at least for purposes of information.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he was impressed by Ambassador Gromyko’s emphasis upon the main task of the proposed organization. He said that he did not consider that the various views were very far apart. He said that we are all agreed that the council should have the maintenance of peace as its task but that in the American view there should be only one overall organization. He said that in the American opinion it is desirable that there be “one tent” covering international relations generally. He suggested that perhaps there might be general agreement upon a formula to the effect that from time to time the assembly may create such subsidiary commissions or bodies as it considers necessary to facilitate the maintenance of peace and security. The American group, he said, does not wish to press its suggestion for a definite detailed plan in this connection. For example, the reference to an Economic and Social Council of twenty-four members is merely a suggestion. The American group has an open mind on the whole subject but it does desire that the way be left open for action by the international organization in this general field.
Mr. Pasvolsky then stated certain of the reasons which had led the United States to the conclusion that an Economic and Social Council is desirable. He explained that it had been recognized that one of the difficulties with the League of Nations had been that the League’s Council was charged with the same responsibilities as was the League’s Assembly. Consequently, the League’s Council had had its attention diverted from security questions. Because of the League experience, it appeared desirable to provide that the council should be the primary body charged with the maintenance of peace and security. The assembly should not be an action body in the same sense as should be the council although it also should be concerned to some extent with the question of peace and security. He said that it is the American view that it is desirable to bring within the general scope of international concern as many economic and technical questions as possible. However, this in turn raises the question of the desirability of coordinating the policies of agencies established to deal with such matters. He emphasized that the international organization, in the American view, should not take over these functional agencies. They would remain quite autonomous but by the “tent” to which Mr. Stettinius had referred we would have a means of obtaining the coordination of these various international activities so as to obviate conflicts between agencies. Moreover, there will for some time, probably indefinitely, be various fields of economic and other activities for which no functioning international agencies will be in existence. The international organization, if the American view were to be adopted, would be able to promote better relations in these fields of activity. So long as no serious conflict arises, or is threatened, in regard to these matters, all such activities would be conducted entirely outside the council.
Mr. Stettinius pointed out that last winter President Roosevelt had suggested to Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin the need for an overall steering committee to coordinate economic policy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reading Eagle (August 25, 1944)
Pegler: Roberts Commission issues
By Westbrook Pegler
New York –
The subtle nature of the executive order defining, but also limiting, the duties of the Roberts Commission in its investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster, may have escaped most of the people at the time when the report was published, only 16 days after the attack. The whole country was still stunned. The people wanted information but were willing to concede that many details could not be revealed just then without advantage to the Japanese. Therefore, attention centered on the commission’s sketchy and restricted version of the facts and its conclusions. The preamble evoked no comment, but that preamble, nevertheless, shows that the executive order was a self-serving document so written as to preclude any criticism of the civilian authorities in Washington, including President Roosevelt, the Commander-in-Chief.
The preamble says, “The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide basis for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army and Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy,” and if so, who was responsible?
If President Roosevelt had committed any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment, the commission was not authorized to “provide basis for sound decisions” on that score. He was not of the Army or Navy personnel.
But although the commission had no mission to pass judgment on the conduct of civil authorities in Washington, it did presume to report that the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy had fulfilled their obligations. The report says the Secretaries of War and the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.
The report does not fully demonstrate that this actually was so, and it certainly leaves doubt that Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were thoroughly warned of the “significant implications.” Moreover, it says flatly that the last warning to these commanders, “indicating an almost immediate break in relations,” dispatched from Washington at 6:30 in the morning of Dec. 7, 1941, Honolulu Time, was not delivered until after the attack, which came at 7:55, one hour and 25 minutes later.
The delay is attributed to “conditions beyond control of anyone concerned” but the warning is evaluated as only “an added precaution,” which still would have come too late to be of substantial use. Yet, the fact remains that the two commanders were still under restraints, forbidden to adopt a state of preparation that might have caused alarm among the civilians.
The limitation of the Roberts Commission’s field of inquiry so as to exclude examination of official conduct in Washington obviously blocked access to historic facts which are an important part of the whole story, and should be the property of the people. And, although the commission had no right to pass judgment on Kimmel and Short, considering that it was instructed only to provide a basis for sound decisions, it nevertheless went beyond that limitation in convicting these two men of dereliction. The preamble does not say who was to make those “sound decisions” after it had provided the basis for them. Possibly the public was to make the “sound decisions.” But in that case the commission’s conviction of the two officers, the vindication of the three secretaries in Washington and the implied vindication of the President, were prejudicial to Kimmel and Short and politically favorable to Mr. Roosevelt. The conclusions were gratuitous in two respects, first in exonerating civilians whose conduct was not within its scope. Second, in condemning men who had not been placed on trial or even served with charges according to law.
The report becomes a political issue in a presidential year because it has been introduced into the campaign by Senator Truman, the running mate, on the Democratic ticket, of the President who might be shown by history to have had a share of the responsibility.
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