America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

8309

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret
ARGONAUT 125

Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius.

The text referred to in your number 27, dated February 8, is the British redraft of the Soviet redraft submitted to the British and American Governments on January 20. In origin, it is a SHAEF paper. The British have subsequently made a few changes in it which I feel we can accept without reservation. The British are most anxious to present this draft to the Russians today for their consideration. JCS are in full agreement. I can see no objections to the redraft and have authorized, insofar as we are concerned, tripartite discussions based on it. It does not cover the numbered points mentioned in your reference telegram which were embodied in the Department’s note of February 1 to the Soviet Embassy. The consensus here is that it would be unwise to include questions relative to the protection of the Geneva Convention and to Soviet citizens in the U.S. in an agreement which deals primarily with the exchange of prisoners liberated by the Allied armies as they march into Germany. With respect to “claimants,” notwithstanding the danger of German retaliation, we believe there will be serious delays in the release of our prisoners of war unless we reach prompt agreement on this question.

ARGONAUT, February 9, 1945
8310

Völkischer Beobachter (February 8, 1945)

Westfront im Zeichen sich steigernder Angriffe

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8311

Der Reichspressechef zur Dreierkonferenz

Berlin, 7. Februar – Vor einem Kreis von Pressevertretern in Berlin befasste sich Reichspressechef Dr. Dietrich mit der zurzeit tagenden Dreierkonferenz, wobei er insbesondere das Schlagwort von der Organisation des Weltfriedens einer eingehenden Betrachtung unterzog und die Tatsache beleuchtete, dass Plutokratie und Bolschewismus die Keimzellen ewiger Kriege sind.

So führte der Reichspressechef aus:

Im Schwarzen Meer, wahrscheinlich auf einem Kriegsschiff, sitzen zurzeit drei Männer zusammen, die wir als die Hauptkriegsschuldigen und größten Kriegsverbrecher aller Zeiten kennen. Sie haben erklären lassen, dass sie sich auf dieser Konferenz zwei Ziele gesetzt hätten:

Sie wollen erstens das deutsche Volk durch ein Agitationsmanöver zur Selbstaufgabe bewegen und zweitens der leichtgläubigen Menschheit die Herbeiführung des ewigen Friedens versprechen.

Das deutsche Volk zur Kapitulation und damit zur Selbstauslöschung zu überreden, ist ihnen in den vergangenen Jahren nicht gelungen und wird ihnen auch jetzt nicht gelingen. Das zweite Hauptziel dieser Konferenz wirft die Frage auf, welche Legitimation gerade diese drei Männer besitzen, vom Frieden zu reden. Nur allzu oft hat die Rauhe Wirklichkeit ihre Versprechungen schon entlarvt. Vor der Unbestechlichkeit der Tatsachen in den „befreiten“ Ländern sind ihre tönenden Worte von der Garantie der Staaten und Selbstbestimmung der Völker, von Friede und Wohlstand, von Freiheit und Völkerbeglückung vor den Augen der ganzen Welt zusammengebrochen.

Schon immer dienten den Plutokraten und Bolschewisten moralische Schlagworte und billige Redensarten dazu, dass in einer Zeit härtesten Kampfes und schwerster Opfer Worte des Friedens eine gangbare Münze zur Täuschung der Massen sind. Es ist heute eine geschichtliche Tatsache, dass das Wort von der Unteilbarkeit des Friedens, das unsere Feinde 1939 ständig im Munde führten, nur dazu gedient hat, den Ausbruch des zweiten Weltkrieges herbeizuführen. Es war jene berüchtigte These, dass der kleine lokale Konflikt notwendig die ganze Welt erfassen und in Brand setzen müsse. Alle Einsichtigen haben damals vor diesem gefährlichen verbrecherischen Schlagwort gewarnt, die Welt, die jetzt in Flammen steht, wird sich dessen erinnern. Eine gleiche Warnung ist heute am Platze, weil wiederum hinter ihren Phrasen in Wirklichkeit die Triebkräfte des Krieges stehen.

Das Gesetz des Kapitalismus ist der Rhythmus der Krise des Konflikts und der sozialen Spannung, aus der es am Ende keinen friedlichen Ausweg mehr gibt. Den Kapitalismus begleitet der Fluch eines vergangenen Zeitalters. Er kann in der Zukunft nur noch das Chaos erzeugen. Die Zerrüttung der Weltwirtschaft, die wir nach Versailles erlebt haben und die den zweiten Weltkrieg vorbereitete, würde ein Kinderspiel sein, verglichen mit dem wirtschaftlichen Inferno, das ein Sieg der kapitalistischen und imperialistischen Staaten heute heraufbeschwören würde.

Das innerste Wesen des Bolschewismus anderseits ist der Zug nach unten. Moskaus Sieg über Europa würde zwangsläufig eine unaufhörliche Kette blutiger Kriege nach sich ziehen, so lange, bis alle Völker der Erde dem Elend unterworfen und auf die niedrigste Stufe der Lebensform und das tiefste soziale Niveau der menschlichen Gesellschaft herabgedrückt wären.

Kapitalismus und Bolschewismus können nicht die Träger des Friedens sein, weil sie die Brutstätten der Kriege sind. Mit Recht schrieb in diesen Tagen der stellvertretende Vorsitzende der britischen Labour-Partei: „Der wirtschaftliche Imperialismus der USA wird innerhalb einer Generation den dritten Weltkrieg bedeuten“ und im englischen Unterhaus fiel in der Debatte über Griechenland das prophetische Wort: „Wir säen die Saat für zukünftige Kriege.“

Das wirkliche Ziel für das die auf der Konferenz Versammelten kämpfen, ist also nicht – wie sie sagen – eine Welt des Friedens, sondern umgekehrt die Verewigung des Krieges! Was sie der Menschheit bringen wollen, ist nicht die Palme dauerhaften Friedens, sondern die Geißel ewigen Krieges!

Sie haben 1939 so lange vom unteilbaren Frieden gesprochen, bis sie den totalen Krieg herbeigeführt hatten. Und wenn sie heute von Organisation des Weltfriedens sprechen, dann bereiten sie in Wirklichkeit den Weltkrieg in Permanenz vor!

Von diesen sich aus den geschichtlichen und logischen Feststellungen zwangsläufig und unwiderlegbar ergebenden Tatbeständen werden Roosevelt, Churchill und Stalin mit Sicherheit nicht sprechen, wenn sie jetzt als die Herolde des ewigen Friedens vor die Öffentlichkeit treten. Diese furchtbaren Wahrheiten werden sie verborgen halten hinter ihren Reden, Kommuniqués und falschen Friedensbeteuerungen, die sie verbreiten lassen.

Wenn sie wirklich von Friedensabsichten erfüllt wären, dann müssten sie feierlich erklären, dass „Friede auf Erden“ nur möglich ist in einer Welt, in der die Vereinigten Staaten ihren kriegsprovozierenden weltwirtschaftlichen Imperialismus aufgeben und sich stattdessen der Beglückung ihres eigenen Volkes zuwenden: dass der Weltfriede nur möglich ist in einer Welt, in der England den von ihm unterjochten großen Völkern in Indien, Arabien und der übrigen Welt die Freiheit und Souveränität zurückgibt, dass niemals Friede auf Erden sein wird, solange innerhalb aller Völker eine fremde, zersetzende Rasse eigene, verbrecherische Ziele verfolgt.**

Ein wahrer Friede ist nur denkbar, wenn die kapitalistische Ausbeutung ebenso unmöglich gemacht ist wie die bolschewistische und deren blutgierigen alles zerstörenden Instinkte. Er ist nur möglich in einer Welt, in der die plutokratischen Vorrechte und die wirtschaftlichen Privilegien beseitigt sind, in der die gleichen Bedingungen des Aufstieges für alle arbeitenden Menschen und Völker gelten.

Wenn es den drei Kriegsverbrechern Ernst wäre mit Ihren Schwindelparolen, dann müssten sie vor aller Welt auch feststellen, dass äußere Verträge des Friedens gar nichts nützen und nur eine Täuschung sind, wenn die bolschewistische Taktik der terroristischen Aushöhlung der Staaten von innen heraus jederzeit ihren blutigen Marsch zur Welteroberung antreten kann; dass die Vernichter der europäischen Kultur nicht ihre Erretter sein können und dass diejenigen, die mit den Bolschewisten paktieren, der Welt nicht den Frieden, sondern den blutigsten Terror bringen werden.

Solange die Welt solche Erklärungen aus dem Munde derjenigen nicht vernimmt, die von Propagandaphrasen überfließen, werden die Menschen um den Frieden betrogen sein!

Das Zeitalter des Friedens beginnt erst, wenn die Triebkräfte der bisherigen Kriege aus der Welt beseitigt sind. Nicht aus den schon so oft katastrophal gescheiterten bankrotten Friedensparolen der Vergangenheit, sondern aus den neuen fortschrittlichen Ideen unserer Zeit, die das Gegeneinander der Nationen in die Bahn für und miteinander lenken, wird der kommende Friede unter den Völkern erstehen. Wie alles wahrhaft Große muss er unter schwersten Opfern errungen und mit äußerster Hingabe erkämpft werden. Mit dem Bollwerk des europäischen Kontinents steht und fällt der Friede der Welt.

8312

Leitartikel: Oststurm über Europa

Von Schadewald

In dem gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt, in dem die Sowjets gegen Europa anstürmen, ist die Frage belanglos, ob Churchill, Roosevelt oder Stalin der geistige Urheber und hartnäckigste Verfechter der Forderung der „bedingungslosen Kapitulation“ ist – sie tragen alle drei die Verantwortung dafür, dass der von den kriegsbeteiligten Völkern ersehnte Frieden in weite Ferne gerückt ist.

Churchill, der alte politische Rosstäuscher, tut so, als ob England es sich leisten könnte, den von ihm angezettelten Krieg unbegrenzt fortzuführen. Dabei hat England weder auf dem europäischen noch auf dem pazifischen Kriegsschauplatz eine Führungsrolle, sondern ist längst zum Nebenpartner degradiert, denn in Westeuropa stehen zweimal mehr Amerikaner als Engländer im Kampf, und im Pazifik werden die Briten von den Yankees nur als unerwünschtes Anhängsel geduldet; ganz zu schweigen von der Sowjetunion, die sich in Europa auf ihre Art zum immer größeren Befremden weiter Kreise der englischen Öffentlichkeit „häuslich einrichtet“ und ohne Rücksicht auf britische Interessen in den baltischen Ländern, Finnland, Polen, Jugoslawien und Griechenland „fertige Tatsachen“ schafft.

Wo sich die anglo-amerikanischen Mächte als „Befreier“ haben feiern lassen, da sind Hunger und Arbeitslosigkeit, Unordnung und Gewaltakte, Elend, Streiks und Massendemonstrationen als Schrittmacher kommunistischer Zersetzung der besetzten Länder Europas eingezogen. Statt Demokratie und Freiheit triumphieren bolschewistische Umtriebe, und Moskaus rührige Agenten bereiten planmäßig durch Ausnutzung der Katastrophenverhältnisse die Sowjetisierung der der Ordnungsmacht Deutschland entzogenen Länder vor. Die europäische Menschheit hat mittlerweile genug Beispiele für die Folgen einer Auslieferung und Unterwerfung unter den Diktaturwillen Stalins; sie kann Vergleiche ziehen, was Moskau in politischer und wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht versprochen hat und was daraus wirklich geworden ist. Tempo und Dynamik der Entwicklung zum politischen und wirtschaftlichen Chaos in den besetzten Ländern Europas werden vom Marschtritt der Sowjetarmee bestimmt.

Aber die Erkenntnis dieser von Moskau geschürten und gesteuerten Entwicklung ist vielen Europäern erst aufgegangen, als die bolschewistische Sturmflut gegen die Grenzen des Deutschen Reiches anbrandete. Soweit musste es erst kommen, um die neutralen Staaten in jene Unruhe zu versetzen, die die Annäherung des bolschewistischen Gespenstes als tödliche Lebensgefahr verursacht. Je stürmischer sich die Schrecken der asiatischen Steppe an das Herz Europas heranwälzen, um so besorgter bückt man in Bern und Stockholm, in Madrid und Lissabon, aber auch in London auf das aus dem Osten heraufziehende Unwetter.

Wenn der deutsche Damm bricht, dann reißt der Bolschewismus die europäische Kultur und Lebensart, das ganze Gefüge der Zivilisation der Menschheit ein, dann wird Europa ein Sklavenmarkt für Elendshaufen verängstigter Menschen. Gezwungen, das verbliebene nationale Leben in der „Weltunion der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken“ aufgehen zu lassen und sich des individuellen Persönlichkeitswertes zugunsten einer Nivellierung und Vermassung zu entäußern, wird nach einer Überwältigung der völkisch bewussten Staaten durch die Menschen- und Materialmassen Moskaus das in der Vielfalt seiner nationalen und sozialen Lebensformen blühende Europa in Trümmer sinken, denn England und die Vereinigten Staaten sind weder gewillt noch haben sie die Macht, der Bolschewisierung des europäischen Kontinents Einhalt zu gebieten.

Gibt es ein eindrucksvolleres Beispiel für das, was Europa vom Kreml erwartet, als das Schicksal des von den anglo-amerikanischen Mächten betrogenen und verratenen Polens? So wenig sich Stalin im Fall Polen von London und Washington in den Arm fallen lässt, so wenig er in Jugoslawien zu Zugeständnissen an die westdemokratischen Wünsche bereit ist, so wenig er in Griechenland, Italien, Frankreich und Belgien den bolschewistischen Machenschaften und realen Machtansprüchen des Kommunismus Zügel anlegt, so wenig wird er das übrige Europa schonen und in seiner Lebensart bestehen lassen, wenn er freien Weg zur Bolschewisierung der seinem Gewaltwillen ausgelieferten Staaten und Völker hat.

Deutschland allein verlegt der bolschewistischen Weltrevolution den Weg, indem es mit dem Aufgebot aller seiner ideellen und materiellen Kräfte dem Ansturm der Sowjetarmeen entgegentritt.

Deutschland führt den Kampf für die europäische Freiheit und die Rettung der Menschheitskultur.

Deutschland opfert sein Letztes, um das deutsche Vaterland, den Lebensstandard Europas und die Gesittung der Welt vor dem Untergang im bolschewistischen Chaos zu bewahren.

Millionen Europäer haben die Bedeutung der deutschen Schicksalsparole „Sieg oder Untergang“ erkannt und sie sich zu eigen gemacht, auch gewisse Kreise Englands fühlen und wissen, was heute im Zeichen der sowjetischen Mammutoffensive auf dem Spiele steht. Wird aber das ganze England das unverantwortliche kriegspolitische Vabanquespiel der Churchillschen Regierung erkennen und begreifen, welches die politischen Folgen einer militärischen Niederlage Deutschlands, einer Auslieferung Kontinentaleuropas an den Bolschewismus sind und was Ostwindüber Europa bedeutet? Churchill wird es erst verstehen, wenn es für England und das Britische Reich zu spät ist!

8313

Italien – ein einziges Chaos

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8314

Der Kampf um die Hauptstadt der Philippinen

Tokio, 7. Februar – 20 Panzer, 23 Geschütze und 24 Kraftwagen der Amerikaner wurden von japanischen Infanteristen in den letzten 24 Stunden Kampf in den nördlichen Vororten von Manila zerstört oder erbeutet. 1.600 Mann feindliche Truppen wurden getötet. In der Nacht zum 4. Februar griffen japanische Marineinfanterietruppen im nordöstlichen Vorfeld der philippinischen Hauptstadt US-Panzer an und zerstörten nach japanischen Frontberichten zehn Panzer und Panzerwagen.

Eine amtliche Mitteilung des japanischen Hauptquartiers vom Dienstagnachmittag teilt mit:

Teile feindlicher Truppen drangen am 3. Februar abends vom Norden her in ein Gebiet der Stadt Manila ein. Japanische Truppen bekämpften den Feind, wobei sie wichtige Punkte innerhalb und außerhalb der Stadt in Besitz behielten.

Nach einem weiteren Bericht der Japaner haben die Nordamerikaner ihre Truppen auf Luzon am 4. Februar in der Gegend von Ada östlich von Nasugbu durch Absetzen von Luftlandetruppen aus 70 Transportflugzeugen verstärkt.

„Es ist dringend notwendig, dass Japan, China und Mandschukuo ihre gesamte Kraft darauf konzentrieren, die anglo-amerikanischen Feinde zu zermalmen,“ erklärte der neue Botschafter von Mandschukuo bei der chinesischen Nationalregierung, Li Shakeng. In einem Interview, das er im Anschluss an die Überreichung seines Beglaubigungsschreibens den Pressevertretern gab, betonte er, dass er sich voll und ganz für die weitere Festigung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen China und Mandschukuo einsetzen werde. Es sei notwendig, dass die drei ostasiatischen Länder Japan, China und Mandschukuo Hand in Hand arbeiten zur vollständigen Vernichtung der Anglo-Amerikaner und für die Wiedergeburt Ostasiens.

Die Entwicklung der Kämpfe auf Luzon und das Eindringen der Amerikaner in Manila wird von der Tokioter Presse mit der Versicherung kommentiert, dass den Amerikanern auf den Philippinen noch gezeigt würde, „was eine Blutoffensive ist.“

Die Zeitung Asahi meint, dass selbst die Ennahme Manilas durch die Amerikaner dem Feind zwar ein gewisses Propagandamittel in die Hand gebe, aber je näher die feindlichen Truppen an die Stadt herankommen, um so günstiger werde anderseits die dortige Stellung der Japaner, die nur auf die geeignete Gelegenheit zum Losschlagen warten. Yomiuri meint, die Amerikaner wollen auf den Philippinen eine Basis für eine Invasion in Japan selbst schaffen. Japan aber werde den Feind an seiner schwächsten Stelle treffen und ihm hohe Menschenverluste zufügen.

Yamashita verteidigt Manila

Tokio, 7. Februar – General Yamashita, der Oberkommandeur der japanischen Truppen auf den Philippinen und Eroberer von Malaya und Schonan (Singapur), leitet persönlich die Verteidigung von Manila.

8315

Tradition der Sklavenhändler

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8316

Führer HQ (February 8, 1945)

Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

Im Westteil von Budapest kämpft die Besatzung mit großer Tapferkeit weiter gegen die feindliche Übermacht.

Nördlich der Westbeskiden wurde der zwischen Saybusch und PIess erneut angreifende Feind nach anfänglichem Geländegewinn abgewehrt. Bei Steinau, Glogau und Odereck warfen Gegenangriffe die Sowjets in mehreren Abschnitten zurück. Um kleinere Brückenköpfe des Feindes an der Oder zwischen Fürstenberg und Küstrin wird heftig gekämpft.

Die Besatzungen von Schneidemühl und Posen hielten fortgesetzten sowjetischen Angriffen stand.

Im Raum von Pyritz und Arnswalde fingen unsere Truppen die angreifenden Bolschewisten auf, befreiten in schwungvollem Gegenstoß mehrere verlorengegangene Ortschaften und schossen dabei 30 feindliche Panzer ab. Südwestlich Graudenz warfen Grenadiere den Gegner aus einer Einbruchsstelle und fügten ihm erhebliche Verluste zu. Gegen die Nogatfront und gegen Elbing griff der Feind heftig an. Verbände der Luftwaffe und Seestreitkräfte unterstützten wirkungsvoll den schweren, aber erfolgreichen Abwehrkampf der tapferen Besatzung von Elbing.

In Ostpreußen lag gestern der Schwerpunkt der Schlacht zwischen Wormditt und Heilsberg sowie bei Kreuzburg. Die erneuten Versuche, unsere Front aufzuspalten, scheiterten an dem hartnäckigen Widerstand unserer Truppen.

Im Samland wurde eine um Thierenberg stehende feindliche Kampfgruppe eingeschlossen und vernichtet. Die Bolschewisten verloren bei den schweren Kämpfen in Ostpreußen gestern 52 Panzer und 72 Geschütze.

Im Kurland beseitigten unsere Truppen südöstlich Libau einen Brückenkopf der Sowjets über die Barta.

Im Westen dauern die feindlichen Angriffsvorbereitungen vor unserer Rurfront an. Vorfühlende Stoßtrupps wurden vernichtet, Ansammlungen durch zusammengefasstes Artilleriefeuer wirksam bekämpft. Nach einem örtlichen Einbruch der Amerikaner nördlich der Urfttalsperre stellte ein Gegenangriff von Panzergrenadieren die Lage wieder her. In der Schnee-Eifel konnte der Feind nach heftigen Gefechten seinen Einbruch etwas erweitern. Die Angriffe der 3. amerikanischen Armee an der deutsch-luxemburgischen Grenze blieben im zusammengefassten Feuer aller Waffen verlustreich liegen. Einzelne Brückenköpfe, die der Feind über die Oure hatte bilden können, wurden von unseren Truppen im Gegenangriff zerschlagen. Auch bei und nordwestlich Echternach warfen sie den Gegner unter hohen Verlusten wieder auf das Südufer der Sauer zurück und schnitten dabei eine schwächere Kampfgruppe ab. Bei Remich an der Mosel sind erneut heftige Kämpfe mit angreifenden feindlichen Bataillonen im Gange.

Im Saarbrückenkopf zwischen Forbach und Saargemünd ist die gesamte Hauptkampflinie bis auf unbedeutende Reste wieder in unserer Hand.

Ein stärkerer nächtlicher Angriff an der Nordostfront von St. Nazaire brach in unserem Abwehrfeuer zusammen.

In Mittelitalien kam es auch gestern beiderseits des Sergio zu örtlichen Kämpfen, in deren Verlauf unsere Grenadiere den Feind aus einigen Einbruchsstellen zurückwarfen.

Nordamerikanische Terrorflieger griffen am gestrigen Tage Wien an Britische Verbände warfen Bomben auf Orte im westlichen Reichsgebiet. Nächtliche Angriffe d Briten richteten sich gegen Magdeburg und erneut gegen Orte im westdeutschen Raum. Luftverteidigungskräfte brachten 33 anglo-amerikanische Flugzeuge, in der Mehrzahl viermotorige Bomber, zum Absturz.

Die schlesische 252. Infanteriedivision unter Führung von Generalleutnant Drekmann und die ostpreußische 542. Volksgrenadierdivision unter Führung von Generalleutnant Löwrick haben sich in den schweren Kämpfen vom 31. Jänner bis 2. Februar an der Weichsel durch besondere Standhaftigkeit hervorgetan.

Bei einem Angriff britischer Kampfflugzeuge im Raum Hannover in der Nacht vom 4. zum 5. Februar wurden durch Bombenabwurf auf ein Gefangenenlager nach abschließenden Meldungen 97 französische Offiziere getötet und 120 verwundet.

8317

Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 8, 1945)

FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN

ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section

DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
081100A February

TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT

TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP

(REF NO.)
NONE

(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR

Communiqué No. 306

Allied forces in the area northeast of Monschau have encountered heavily defended minefields between Bergstein and the Kall River. Our infantry elements have advanced more than 1,000 yards to the edge of Kommerscheidt, one-half mile northwest of Schmidt, and our armor has pushed to within 500 yards of Schmidt, west of the town, in this area we have taken 159 enemy pillboxes during the past three days.

Southwest of Schleiden, our forces have cleared the enemy from Hellenthal after several days of fighting in the town against stubborn resistance.

In the area north and northwest of Prüm, our infantry has reached Wascheid, and the towns of Hontheim and Sellerich are in our hands. Southwest of Prüm, we have taken Hollnich.

Our forces have launched attacks across the Our and Sauer Rivers at several places on a front extending from the area northeast of Clervaux to the vicinity of Echternach. The crossings were impeded by high water and enemy obstacles on the eastern bank. We have made gains over the our near Dasburg, four miles east of Clervaux, and in the area of Wallendorf, six miles east of Diekirch. Other infantry elements crossed in the vicinity of Echternach and made gains of more than 800 yards in the area northeast of the town.

Southeast of Remich, our forces have captured Sinz.

East of Saareguemines, an enemy attack by an estimated 100 infantry was repulsed without loss of ground. Our forces raided Buchholz, east of the Hardt Mountains, inflicted casualties and took prisoners.

Our efforts to clear the northern part of Oberhöfen, near Haguenau, were stubbornly resisted. Farther east, our forward elements received considerable fire from Drusenheim.

In the lower Alsace Plain the advance down the corridor between the Rhine and the Rhine-Rhone Canal reached points seven miles south of Neuf-Brisach. The villages of Heiteren, Balgau, and Fessenheim were liberated.

The west bank of the Rhine-Rhone Canal has been entirely cleared of the enemy. Crossings were made near the Ile Napoleon at the junction of the Rhine-Rhone and Huningue Canals.

In the Vosges Mountains organized enemy resistance has been broken. Mopping up of isolated enemy groups continues.

Allied forces in the west captured 2,905 prisoners on 5 February.

Bad weather severely restricted air operations yesterday.

An enemy railhead at Lipp, 16 miles west of Köln, was attacked without loss by a small force of medium bombers.

Escorted heavy bombers struck at objectives in western Germany.

Last night, enemy troops and equipment in Kleve and Goch between the Meuse and the Rhine Rivers were attacked by heavy bombers operating in great strength. Targets at Magdeburg, Kassel, Mainz, Koblenz, Bonn, Hanover, Düsseldorf and Duisburg were struck at by light bombers.

COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/

Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others

ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section

NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409

AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/
8318

U.S. State Department (February 8, 1945)

Meeting of the American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3:00 p.m.

Yusupov Palace, USSR

Present
United States Soviet Union
Fleet Admiral Leahy General of the Army Antonov
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral King Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov (aided by a 2-star admiral)
Major General Kuter

Kuter Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 3 p.m.
Top secret

Admiral Leahy opened the conference with the statement that we would discuss military problems in the Far East and that we required specific data on which to base the long-range planning required by the great distances from the United States to the Pacific Theater.

Admiral Leahy then stated that we have prepared a series of questions on which replies were desired.

General Antonov asked to have all of the questions presented prior to any replies or discussion.

Admiral Leahy then read the questions set forth in the memorandum by the Commanding General, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, “Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meeting,” as stated in JCS 1227/5 (Argonaut), dated 7 Feb 1945. These questions were read as written with the words “or some more suitable area” interpolated in question (3).

After brief discussion on the side with Admiral King, Admiral Leahy posed two additional questions, the first consisting of paragraph 3 of the memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners, “Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meetings” as set forth in JCS 1227/4 (ARGONAUT) 7 February 1945. Admiral Leahy’s second additional question was based on paragraph 7 of the Planners’ paper and asked if arrangements could be made whereby weather information could be made available to the U.S. from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia.

General Antonov opened the period of reply and discussion with the very clear statement that he had no authority to give definite answers or promises or to make decisions on matters pertaining to the Far East. He stated that his comments represented his own personal opinion and views and further that he would refer the questions to Marshal Stalin the same day and would arrange to provide complete and authoritative answers as quickly as possible.

The following replies to questions and discussion ensued:

a. There have been no changes in the Soviet projected plan of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October.

b. With regard to the Soviet requirement for a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start, General Antonov opened with the statement that the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railroad “can be hampered” by the enemy. The Soviets therefore cannot rely on that rail line to support their forces. A maximum effort will be made to keep the Trans-Siberian Railroad in operation. However, the Soviets will require that air and sea routes across the Pacific (mainly sea routes) be kept open. They will particularly require fuel (petroleum products) and foodstuffs.

c. As to basing U.S. Air Forces in Siberia, no discussion could be had until Marshal Stalin’s decision was obtained.

d. U.S. Forces may be required to defend Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia. General Antonov’s words was [were] that the Soviets “will find American help useful.”

e. As to pre-hostilities preparation including construction, reception, and storage of U.S. stock piles in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia, a rather lengthy reply was given including the following points:

  • The Soviets will move much larger forces to the Far East than are now there – these augmented forces will require greatly increased supplies – the Soviet problem will be great to supply their expanded forces and they cannot promise to construct and store materials for American forces. They may need American materials with which to build fuel storage for the Soviet forces. This question could be answered after detailed requirements were known and after a decision had been obtained that U.S. forces would be employed in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia.

f. Entry into Kamchatka by the American Survey Party will be determined by Marshal Stalin.

g. The Soviets will occupy southern Sakhalin as quickly after the beginning of hostilities as possible and will do this without American help. The Soviet Navy will deny Laparousa Strait to the Japanese but it will be difficult to permit friendly surface movements through the Laparousa Strait until a Soviet Navy base and shore artillery are established.

h. This question “Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued” is somewhat garbled in reply. General Antonov stated that he had planned in October to start the movement of troops in early 1945. However, all Soviet troops, including those released from Finland and Latvia are now joined in the battle on the Eastern Front. He stated that the intended troop movements will, therefore, be delayed until the necessary units can be disengaged from the present battle. Later in the conversation, General Marshall expanded the American requirement for firm data on which to base future plans. He explained that necessity had lead the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to relieve their Senior Planners from their global responsibilities to permit them to move to Moscow to concentrate on the Russian-American phase of the war against Japan. He made it very clear that we must have planning basis and that we are security conscious. General Marshall concluded with a forceful statement that specific and constructive planning in Moscow must be pursued. General Antonov stated that he would do his best to improve the planning situation in Moscow.

i. Weather in Siberia was discussed at some length and its relation to the initiation of hostilities. From a ground force view point the most difficult conditions would be experienced during the thaw and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month, July and August is also undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned, weather would be most favorable in September, October and November. At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September.

j. Authority to obtain weather stations would be discussed with Marshal Stalin.

Admiral Kuznetsov presented his desire to take over ships from the U.S. at Dutch Harbor or Kodiak but accepted Admiral King’s statement that Cold Bay was more desirable and would be used. Some discussion followed and it was concluded that Russian crews could be moved from Murmansk to the east coast of the U.S. by returning convoys and then to be moved by rail to the west coast. However, the provision of American shipping to move these crews to Cold Bay was not viewed with favor by Admiral King.

Except for the immediately preceding conversation, the Russians had no questions to ask.

General Marshall presented a summary of recent operations – gave to General Antonov a written statement as to our views of the combat effectiveness of German divisions after the Ardennes battle and left with the Russians our estimate of Japan’s strength in the Pacific.

Air Marshal Khudyakov presented a Russian version of the agreement to create a restricted zone for air operations on the Russian front.

Upon adjourning General Antonov stated that he would see Marshal Stalin forthwith and would inform the U.S. Chiefs of Staff as to when we might expect the next meeting to receive official and definite replies to our questions.

Dictated to and transcribed by T/Sgt George J. Lang. General Kuter’s notes and Sgt Lang’s shorthand notes have been destroyed.

L. S. KUTER
Major General, USA

Six (6) copies prepared with distribution to the individuals indicated below:
General Marshall 3 copies
General Deane 1 copy
General Hull 1 copy
General Kuter 1 copy
8319

Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations

Yalta, 8 February 1945
Top secret

Subject: QUESTIONS POSED BY ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV AT THE U.S.-RUSSIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING THURSDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 8.

  1. (a) Question. What has been determined about the transfer of ships to the Russians (presumably with reference to the MILEPOST program).

    (b) Answer. It is difficult to be definite until we know more about the U-boat offensive in the Atlantic. However, it would seem practicable to work out a schedule of deliveries on a step-by-step basis in which the later deliveries may have to be delayed because of the U-boat situation in the Atlantic.

  2. (a) Question. If Dutch Harbor is not a suitable place for the transfer of ships to the Russians and for the training of Russian crews, the second preference would be Kodiak. What is your view?

    (b) Answer. After thorough review of all considerations, it has been decided that Cold Bay is the best place to effect the delivery of ships to the Russians and the training of Russian crews.

NOTE: Admiral Kuznetsov was unfamiliar with Cold Bay but when the location was pointed out to him he accepted it.

  1. (a) Question. We wish to transfer crews from Murmansk by utilizing convoys returning from Murmansk to the United States, thence by rail across the United States to the West Coast, and thence to Cold Bay. Can you manage this?

    (b) Answer. It would seem practicable to move Russian crews as far as the West Coast of the United States in the manner you describe, but it will be extremely difficult to move them from the West Coast to Cold Bay because of the very bad shipping situation in the Pacific. The matter will require the closest examination and the answer must be understood to be very uncertain at this time.

NOTE: Admiral Kuznetsov made no offer for the movement of the Russian crews from the West Coast to Cold Bay in Russian ships, which matter should be taken up further with the Russians.

NOTE: After the Staff meeting adjourned, I asked the Russian Admiral how many men, total, they wish to move from Murmansk to Cold Bay. His reply was about 3,000. I suggested if they were moved in detachments suitable to the accommodations in the ships of the convoys returning from Murmansk, it would make the problem more easy of solution – and, as well, it would facilitate their transfer by rail across the United States and, further, their transfer from the West Coast of the United States to Cold Bay. I added that such an arrangement would fit in well with the proposed schedule of delivery of ships on a step-by-step basis.

  1. Copies of this memorandum will be given to the distribution list below. All agencies that are involved are urged to pursue this matter to an acceptable solution.

E. J. KING
Fleet Admiral, USN

Distribution List
* Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
* General Somervell
* General Kuter
* General Deane
* Admiral Olsen
* Admiral Horne
* Admiral Edwards
* Admiral Cooke
* Admiral Duncan
* Admiral McCormick
* Admiral Land
8320

Memorandum by the Commanding General, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union

7 February 1945
Top secret (special distribution)
JCS 1227/5
(ARGONAUT)

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meeting

References:
a. JCS 1176 Series
b. JCS Memo for Info No. 360

It is recommended that in your meeting with the Soviet Staff you obtain their commitments or opinions, as appropriate, on the following subjects:

  1. Have there been any changes in Soviet projected plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October?

  2. Will the Soviets require a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start?

  3. Will agreement be given for operation of U.S. air forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area?

  4. Will U.S. forces be required for defense of Kamchatka?

  5. Will the Soviets make pre-hostility preparations including construction, and reception and storage of U.S. stockpiles in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia?

  6. Can the Kamchatka survey party depart from Fairbanks by 15 February 1945?

  7. Will the Soviets occupy southern Sakhalin and when? If so, will they cover passage of LaPerouse Strait?

  8. Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued?

8321

Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners

7 February 1945
Top secret (special distribution)
JCS 1227/4
(ARGONAUT)

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meeting

References:
a. JCS 1176 Series
b. JCS Memo for Information No. 360

  1. In the following paragraphs the Joint Staff Planners have set forth the various subjects and questions which it is considered should be brought up at the meeting and in so doing have used the phraseology which might be suitable for presenting each subject to the Red General Staff. Most of these have been presented previously in various papers and are repeated here for convenience of the Chiefs of Staff.

  2. The President asked Marshal Stalin two questions, saying he would appreciate an early reply at this conference. The first was:

Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia?

The second was:

Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?

If the Red Army Staff gives an encouraging reply on basing the strategic air forces, suggest they be asked for agreement to entry of a U.S. survey party in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area at an early date, details to be worked out with the Mission.

  1. On the assumption Russia can be ready to enter the war against Japan three months after the end of the German war as indicated by Marshal Stalin in October, how would the weather and season of the year affect the beginning operations in Eastern Siberia?

  2. Do you estimate that you are liable to need any U.S. assistance in defending Kamchatka once war breaks out with Japan?

    Do you consider you will be able to develop bases in Kamchatka, particularly air bases, before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan?

    In connection with the foregoing, the United States Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum concerning the Kamchatka survey party. We consider it most important that this survey party get under way in the very near future. Will you give us your thoughts on our memorandum? (See Appendix “A” for copy of memorandum.)

  3. In connection with your plan of operations in Eastern Siberia, do you intend to take the southern half of Sakhalin?

    If so, do you think you will be able to open the La Perouse Strait to shipping?

  4. The United States Chiefs of Staff have sent you a memorandum (see Appendix “B”) in which we state our feeling as to the importance of combined planning in Moscow between your representatives and our planning group. We hope you will agree with our views and would like to hear any comments or suggestions you have.

  5. In connection with our operations accurate information on weather is most important. This information will be equally necessary to your air forces as well as to ours operating over Japan. The United States Chiefs feel it important that they obtain weather information from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia and request that you arrange this.

  6. Providing the Red Staff elects to discuss MILEPOST requirements, it is suggested that the substance of JCS Memo for Information No. 360 be given the Red General Staff verbally.

  7. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that in the discussion of the above subjects, the United States Chiefs of Staff make clear to the Russians that:

    a. Amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 are remote.

    b. If the Russians indicate a desire for a supply route across the North Pacific, the United States Chiefs indicate they expect facilities for basing U. S. strategic air forces in Eastern Siberia in connection with the opening of any such route.

Appendix “A”

Memorandum from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Representatives of the Soviet General Staff

In order that there be complete understanding on the arrangements for the entrance into Kamchatka of the United States Reconnaissance Party, the composition of which by name has already been furnished the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is requested that the Soviet General Staff indicate agreement to the following:

a. the reconnaissance party will have access to any part of the area.

b. Transportation to, from, and within the area will be furnished by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

c. Full information and assistance will be furnished by local Soviet authorities.

d. Free and rapid communication between the party and U.S. military authorities will be permitted and arranged for by the Soviets.

It is further urged that arrangements be completed in time to permit the departure of this party from Fairbanks, Alaska, not later than 15 February 1945.

Appendix “B”

Memorandum from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Representatives of the Soviet General Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted with satisfaction the initiation of combined planning in Moscow. The work of this combined group is of the utmost importance to the planning and coordination of our operations for the defeat of Japan.

The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that special effort should be made on both sides to expedite this combined planning by a full, free and frank exchange of information, data and ideas between members of the combined group. Preparation of combined studies and estimates for presentation to the respective Chiefs of Staff should be pushed forward without delay.

The United States Chiefs ask for your agreement to these views and for any comments or suggestions which you may care to make.

8322

Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, 3:30 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Marshal Stalin
Mr. Harriman Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 3:30 p.m.
Top secret

Air Bases in the Far East

The President said that with the fall of Manila the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bonins and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come to make plans for additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4,000,000 men in their army and he hoped by intensive bombing to be able to destroy Japan and its army and thus save American lives.

Marshal Stalin said he did not object to the United States having bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikolaevsk. He said the first was on the lower reaches of the Amur River and the second at its mouth. He said that in regard to the bases on Kamchatka he thought we would have to leave that until a later stage since the presence of the Japanese Consul there made it difficult at this time to make the necessary arrangements. At any rate, he added, the other two bases in the Maritime Provinces were nearer.

Marshal Stalin added that there had been one phrase in regard to “commercial routes” in the President’s letter on the subject which had not been clear to him.

The President said he had had in mind the importance of the supply routes across the Pacific and Eastern Siberia to the Soviet Union and he felt that once war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union it would become very important but also very difficult to get by the Japanese Islands.

Marshal Stalin indicated that he recognized the importance of these supply routes and again repeated that he had no objection to the establishment of American bases in the Maritime provinces.

The President handed the Marshal a paper in which it was requested that the Soviet staff be instructed to enter into planning talks with the United States staff.

Marshal Stalin indicated that he would give the necessary instructions.

Use of airfields and survey of bomb damage in Eastern and Southeastern Europe

The President said he had two questions of a military nature relating to Europe which he wished to take up with the Marshal. He then handed to Marshal Stalin two papers in English which were translated into Russian.

The first was a request that the United States Air Force be allowed to use certain airfields in the vicinity of Budapest in order to carry out bombing operations against the Germans. The President said that at the present time the American bombers based in Italy had to make a long and hazardous flight over the Alps in order to reach Germany.

The second paper contained a request that a group of United States experts be permitted to make surveys of the effects of bombing in the areas liberated or occupied by the Red Army in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, similar to the surveys that had been made at Ploesti. The paper asked that this group be permitted to proceed at once since it was important to examine the damage while the evidence was still fresh and the people who had been there during the bombing still were on the spot.

Marshal Stalin said he could grant both these requests and would immediately give the necessary orders.

Sale of Ships to the Soviet Union after the War

Marshal Stalin mentioned that Mr. Stettinius had told Mr. Molotov there was a possibility that the United States would have surplus shipping property after the war which might be sold to the Soviet Union.

The President said that this would require some changes in legislation which he hoped to work out so that surplus shipping after the war not needed by the United States and Great Britain could be transferred on credit without any interest. He said after the last war the mistake had been made of attempting to charge interest for the disposal of surplus property but it had not worked. His idea was to transfer the ships for a fixed sum on credit which would include the cost of the ship less the cost of depreciation, so that in twenty years the entire credit would be extinguished. He said that the British had never sold anything without commercial interest but that he had different ideas.

Marshal Stalin expressed gratification at the President’s statement and said this shipping would greatly ease the task of the Soviet Union in the future.

The President replied that he hoped the Soviet Union would interest itself in a large way in the shipping game.

Marshal Stalin said that he thought the President’s idea was a very good one and also that Lend-Lease was a remarkable invention, without which victory would have been delayed. He said that in former wars some allies had subsidized others but this had offended the allies receiving the subsidies and had led to difficulties. Lend-Lease, however, produced no such resentment, and he repeated his opinion of the extraordinary contribution of Lend-Lease to the winning of the war.

The President replied that four years ago, when having a rest on his small yacht, he had thought and thought of a way to help the Allies and at the same time avoid the difficulties inherent in loans, and had finally hit upon the scheme of Lend-Lease.

Far East: Russian Desires

Following the discussion of certain military questions involved in the Far East, Marshal Stalin said that he would like to discuss the political conditions under which the USSR would enter the war against Japan. He said he had already had a conversation on this subject with Ambassador Harriman.

The President said he had received a report of this conversation, and he felt that there would be no difficulty whatsoever in regard to the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands going to Russia at the end of the war. He said that in regard to a warm water port in the Far East for the Soviet Union, the Marshal recalled that they had discussed that point at Tehran. He added that he had then suggested that the Soviet Union be given the use of a warm water port at the end of the south Manchurian railroad, at possibly Dairen on the Kwantung peninsula. The President said he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss this matter with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, so therefore he could not speak for the Chinese. He went on to say that there are two methods for the Russians to obtain the use of this port; (1) outright leasing from the Chinese; (2) making Dairen a free port under some form of international commission. He said he preferred the latter method because of the relation to the question of Hong Kong. The President said he hoped that the British would give back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and that it would then become an internationalized free port. He said he knew Mr. Churchill would have strong objections to this suggestion.

Marshal Stalin said there was another question and that involved the use by the Russians of the Manchurian railways. He said the Czars had use of the line running from Manchouli to Harbin and from there to Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as the line from Harbin running east to Nikolsk-Ussurisk connecting there with the Khabarovsk to Vladivostok line.

The President said that again, although he had not talked with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek on the subject, there were again two methods of bringing this about: (1) to lease under direct Soviet operation; (2) under a commission composed of one Chinese and one Russian.

Marshal Stalin said that it is clear that if these conditions are not met it would be difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was entering the war against Japan. They understood clearly the war against Germany which had threatened the very existence of the Soviet Union, but they would not understand why Russia would enter a war against a country with which they had no great trouble. He said, however, if these political conditions were met, the people would understand the national interest involved and it would be very much easier to explain the decision to the Supreme Soviet.

The President replied that he had not had an opportunity to talk to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and he felt that one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world in twenty-four hours.

Marshal Stalin agreed and said he did not think it was necessary yet to speak to the Chinese and that he could guarantee the security of the Supreme Soviet. He added that it would be well to leave here with these conditions set forth in writing agreed to by the three powers.

The President indicated that he thought that this could be done.

Marshal Stalin went on to say that in regard to the Chinese, T. V. Soong was expected to come to Moscow at the end of April, and he said that when it was possible to free a number of Soviet troops in the west and move twenty-five divisions to the Far East he thought it would be possible to speak to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek about these matters.

Marshal Stalin said that in regard to the question of a warm water port the Russians would not be difficult and he would not object to an internationalized free port.

Trusteeships

The President then said he wished to discuss the question of trusteeships with Marshal Stalin. He said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He said the only experience we had had in this matter was in the Philippines where it had taken about fifty years for the people to be prepared for self-government. He felt that in the case of Korea the period might be from twenty to thirty years.

Marshal Stalin said the shorter the period the better, and he inquired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea.

The President replied in the negative, to which Marshal Stalin expressed approval.

The President then said there was one question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he felt that they might resent this.

Marshal Stalin replied that they would most certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime Minister might “kill us”. In his opinion he felt that the British should be invited.

The President then said he also had in mind a trusteeship for Indochina. He added that the British did not approve of this idea as they wished to give it back to the French since they feared the implications of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the British had lost Burma once through reliance on Indochina, and it was not his opinion that Britain was a sure country to protect this area. He added that he thought Indochina was a very important area.

The President said that the Indochinese were people of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese, and were not warlike. He added that France had done nothing to improve the natives since she had the colony. He said that General de Gaulle had asked for ships to transport French forces to Indochina.

Marshal Stalin inquired where de Gaulle was going to get the troops.

The President replied that de Gaulle said he was going to find the troops when the President could find the ships, but the President added that up to the present he had been unable to find the ships.

Internal Conditions in China

The President said that for some time we had been trying to keep China alive.

Marshal Stalin expressed the opinion that China would remain alive. He added that they needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai-shek and although there were some good people in the Kuomintang he did not understand why they were not brought forward.

The President said General Wedemeyer and the new Ambassador, General Hurley, were having much more success than their predecessors and had made more progress in bringing the communists in the north together with the Chungking government. He said the fault lay more with the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government than with the so-called communists.

Marshal Stalin said he did not understand why they did not get together since they should have a united front against the Japanese. He thought that for this purpose Chiang Kai-shek should assume leadership. He recalled in this connection that some years ago there had been a united front and he did not understand why it had not been maintained.

8323

Fifth plenary meeting, 4:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Foreign Secretary Eden Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hopkins Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Maisky
Mr. Byrnes Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman Sir Edward Bridges Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Matthews Mr. Jebb Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Hiss Mr. Wilson
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Dixon
Major Birse

Bohlen Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

Subjects:

  • WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
  • POLAND
  • PERIODIC MEETINGS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
  • YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE

The President opened the meeting by stating that he understood the Foreign Secretaries could report complete success and he wished to congratulate them on their work and to ask Mr. Eden to report to the Conference.

Mr. Eden then read the report of that morning’s meeting of the Foreign Secretaries:

Report by Foreign Secretaries to Plenary Meeting of Conference on World Organization questions

  1. The Foreign Secretaries met on February 8
    (a) To consider the question of membership of [in] the World Organization of two (or three) of the Republics of the Soviet Union,

    (b) To recommend what states should be invited to the proposed United Nations Conference, and

    (c) To recommend the time and place at which that Conference should be held.

  2. It was decided to make the following recommendations to the Plenary Meeting:
    (a) The United Nations Conference on the proposed World Organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America,

    (b) The United Nations, as they existed on February…, 1945, i.e. those who had at that date signed the United Nations Declaration, would be the only states invited to the Conference on World Organization. It will be for the Conference to determine the list of original members of the Organization. At that stage the Delegates of the U.K. and USA will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics.

  3. The Foreign Ministers’ meeting has established a sub-committee to examine further details in connection with the proposals for a World Organization and will report shortly to the Plenary Meeting.

Mr. Eden concluded by saying that they were glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the meeting on April 25 in the United States. He added that he hoped that the next meeting of Foreign Ministers would, therefore, take place in London. Mr. Eden stated, in commenting on the report, that the British Delegation did not think it right for others to share the status of United Nations membership merely in order to participate in the Conference, but he understood that the United States Delegation had other views. He said a sub-committee was considering the details.

Marshal Stalin said that among the states which would be represented at the conference there were ten who had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He said that it was somewhat strange for the Soviet Government to attempt to build future world security with states which did not desire to have diplomatic relations with it. He asked what could be done about this matter.

The President replied that he knew that most of these states would like to have relations with the Soviet Union but had just not gotten around to doing anything about it. There were a few, however, where the reasons were different and where the influence of the Catholic Church was very strong. He said that he would like to point out, however, that the Soviet Union had sat down with these states at Bretton Woods and UNRRA conferences.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was correct but that at this conference they were to consider the vital question of the establishment of world security.

The President then said that he would have to go back a bit into history. Three years ago the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, had told these few American Republics that it was not necessary to declare war on Germany but only to break diplomatic relations. Therefore, there were five or six South American countries who felt that they had taken the advice of the United States Government and were, therefore, in good standing. It was a fact, he added, that these states had helped us a great deal in the war effort. He said, speaking frankly, this advice had been a mistake and that a month ago the Secretary of State had brought up with him this embarrassing question. As a result, he had sent letters to the presidents of these six countries urging them to declare war against the common enemy. Ecuador had already done so and Peru’s declaration could be expected at any time, and he hoped the others before long.

Marshal Stalin then inquired about Argentina.

The President said that we are considering a conference of United Nations and Associated Nations who had helped in the war effort.

Marshal Stalin said he had no love for Argentina but he felt that there was a contradiction in logic. He inquired what was the criteria [sic] for admission of states and mentioned in this connection Turkey. He said he felt there were nations who had really waged war and had suffered, and there were others who had wavered and speculated on being on the winning side.

The President replied that it was his idea that only those Associated Nations who had declared war should be invited and he suggested that the time limit should be the first of March.

Marshal Stalin agreed with this suggestion.

The Prime Minister said he recommended the President’s suggestion that only those countries who had declared war would be invited. He said he sympathized with the point of view of Marshal Stalin and pointed out that many countries had played a poor part. He felt, however, there would be some advantage of having a whole new group of nations declare war on Germany for the effect on German morale.

The President remarked that in addition to the South American countries there was, of course, Iceland, the newest of the United Nations Republics.

The Prime Minister said that in the case of Egypt, she had on two occasions wished to declare war but had been advised against it by the British Government, who had felt that it would be more useful and convenient to have Egypt a non-belligerent in order to protect Cairo from systematic bombings. He said that the Egyptian army had rendered good service to the cause. They had maintained good order, guarded bridges, etc. He felt that if Egypt now desired to declare war, she should have the opportunity. He said Iceland had rendered valuable service at a time when the United States had not entered the war and had permitted the entry of British and United States troops, thus violating her neutrality in a marked manner, at the same time assuring a vital lane of communications to the British Isles.

Marshal Stalin remarked that this did not apply to former enemy states who had recently declared war on Germany.

The President and The Prime Minister heartily agreed.

The Prime Minister said that he certainly did not include Eire among the possible candidates, since they still maintained German and Japanese missions. He said he would refer to a new one that would not be greeted with universal approbation, namely Turkey. Turkey, however, had made an alliance with Great Britain at a very difficult time, but after the war had been in progress she had discovered she would not be up-to-date for modern war. Her attitude had been friendly and helpful, although she had not taken the chance provided them a year ago to enter the war.

Marshal Stalin replied that if Turkey declared war before the end of February he agreed to her being invited to the conference.

The Prime Minister expressed gratification with the Marshal’s attitude.

The President then said that there remained the question of Denmark, that they had been overrun by the enemy in one night and that the King had been virtually a prisoner and that only the Danish Minister in Washington, Mr. De Kauffman had voiced the sentiments which he knew all Danes felt and had repudiated the actions of his government.

Marshal Stalin observed that he thought Denmark should wait.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed and the latter added that once she was liberated, she would certainly have the right to join the organization.

Marshal Stalin remarked, however, that Denmark had let the Germans in.

Marshal Stalin then said he hoped that in the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers it would be possible to name the Soviet Republics, that is, the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics. This was accepted.

Mr. Molotov then asked would it not facilitate the admission of these two Soviet Republics as members of the assembly if they signed the United Nations Declaration before the first of March.

The President reverting to the list of countries to be invited to the conference proposed that it be the United Nations, the Associated Nations and Turkey, provided the latter declared war before the first of March and signed the United Nations Declaration.

The Prime Minister remarked that it would not seem quite right to him to take in small countries who had done so little, simply by the expedient of their declaring war and to exclude the two Soviet Republics from the meeting. He said he had very much in mind the martyrdom and sufferings of the Ukraine and White Russia.

Marshal Stalin said he also thought it was illogical and stated that although the three Powers had agreed to recommend that the Ukraine and White Russia be members of the assembly, might not the fact that they had not signed the United Nations Declaration serve as an excuse for excluding them.

The President and Mr. Stettinius assured Marshal Stalin that this would not occur.

The Prime Minister remarked that he had preferred confining the conference to the United Nations but if others would be added he thought the Soviet Republics should also be added.

Marshal Stalin said “I don’t want to embarrass the President, but if he will explain his difficulties we will see what can be done.”

The President then said that it was a technical question but an important one. Up to the present they had been discussing the question of invitations to separate states, that is, new countries to be added to the list but that now it was not a question of a new country but of giving one of the Great Powers three votes instead of one in the assembly and that he felt that was a matter which would be put before the conference and that we had all three agreed to support the Soviet request.

Marshal Stalin inquired would it not be all right if the Ukraine and White Russia signed the United Nations Declaration.

The President replied that he did not think this would overcome the difficulty.

Marshal Stalin then said he withdrew his proposal.

The President expressed gratification at the Marshal’s decision.

The Prime Minister then remarked that he had had time to study yesterday’s report of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and that he could give it his approval.

The President then turned to the question of the proposals which he had sent to the British and the Soviet Delegations this morning in regard to Poland. He said he had noticed they were very close to those of Mr. Molotov but would like to have his comments.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether the last point of the President’s proposal in regard to the recognition of a Government of National Unity would mean that the London Government would then disappear.

The Prime Minister replied that when we recognize the new government, we would of course withdraw our recognition of the London Government.

Marshal Stalin replied that when we recognized the new government, what would happen then to the property and resources of the London Government. Would they remain in the possession of Arcieszewski?

The Prime Minister replied that he thought that the withdrawal of recognition would take care of that and, [sic.]

The President said that in his opinion the property would go to the new government.

There was then declared a short recess.

The Prime Minister said that the British had put in a paper on Poland but that he did not know whether it had been studied by the other Delegations. He said that with some slight amendments, if a decision in principle was reached he was prepared to accept the President’s proposals which have been under discussion.

Mr. Molotov said he had some observations to make on the President’s proposals. He said that their proposals made yesterday had been based on certain realities existing in Poland. It was impossible to ignore the existence of the present Polish government and he said that the Soviet Government had felt that it would be useful to have discussions on the basis of enlarging that government with the addition of other democratic elements from within Poland and abroad. He said that the Lublin, or Warsaw, government stands at the head of the Polish people and enjoys great prestige and popularity in the country. The Poles would never agree to any solution which would greatly change the Provisional Government. We might have some success if we start from the basis that the present Provisional Government should be enlarged. The people who now compose the Polish Provisional Government have been closely connected with the great events of the liberation of Poland, but Messrs. Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Witos have not been directly connected with these events. Therefore, if we wish to achieve a practical result it should be done on the basis of the enlargement of the present government, but how many and who they should be is the subject we should talk about. He said his observations apply not only to the question of a new government but also to the proposed presidential committee. It was a difficult question, admittedly, but it stemmed from the Polish people, and he said he had grave doubts as to whether it would be feasible. He said we might be creating additional difficulty through a presidential committee since there already existed a national council, Kavaya Rada, which of course could be enlarged. He was sure, however, that it was better to discuss the whole question on the basis of the existing situation. It must be borne in mind that both the National Council and Provisional Government are temporary, and he had noted in all three proposals one common point of view, namely the holding of free elections in Poland, but during the temporary period pending such elections it was extremely important to insure stable rule in Poland.

Mr. Molotov said in regard to the question of frontiers he was glad to note the complete agreement on the eastern boundary, namely the Curzon Line with slight modifications, but he also noted that on the western boundary there was no unanimity. He said that they knew that the Provisional Government stood for the western frontier as outlined in the Soviet proposals. He added that they will have to ask the Poles about this, but he was in no doubt that they would categorically support this frontier.

Mr. Molotov said with reference to negotiations in Moscow between himself, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr we are all agreed it would be desirable to have these three talk with the Poles. He said that in so far as he knew, the Provisional Government always sent three persons to speak for the Government – Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, and General Rola-Zymierski. As for the Poles from the other side, it seems to him that the President’s proposals yesterday seemed more acceptable. He said he did not exclude the possibility that some Poles from abroad could be involved, but he is not a bit sure about Mikolajczyk, especially after the autumn talks in Moscow. Yesterday the President had proposed five names. He thought it would be a good idea to invite the three members of the Provisional Government mentioned above and two from the President’s list of other Poles submitted yesterday.

The President inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant that the presidential committee or an interim government should be avoided.

Mr. Molotov replied that he thought it would be better to avoid the presidential committee and to enlarge the National Council and the Provisional Government. He and Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald could discuss the question of how to enlarge the Council and Government with three representatives from the Polish Provisional Government and two persons from the President’s list of other Poles. The results of these discussions could then be submitted to the three Governments. He concluded that he had only discussed the American proposals and had not touched on the Prime Minister’s ideas.

The Prime Minister said that we were now at the crucial point of this great conference. He said we would be found wanting by the world should we separate recognizing different Polish governments. This would be accepted by the world as evidence of a breach between Great Britain and the United States on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand, with lamentable consequences in the future. It was stamping this conference with a seal of failure, and nothing else we did here would overcome it. He admitted, on the other hand, that we take different views of the same basic facts. According to the information of the British Government, the Lublin, or Warsaw, government does not commend itself to the overwhelming masses of the Polish people, and it is certainly not accepted abroad as representative of the people. If the British Government brushed aside the London government and went over to the Lublin government there would be an angry outcry in Great Britain. There was, in addition, the problem of the Poles outside Poland. He reminded the conference that on the Western and Italian fronts there was a Polish army of about 150,000 men who had fought steadily and very bravely for our cause. He did not believe that this army would be reconciled to the transfer of the British Government’s support from the government with which it had dealt since the beginning of the war. It would be regarded as an act of betrayal of Poland. As Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov knew, he had no special feeling for the Polish government in London, which in his opinion had been foolish at every stage, but a formal act of transfer of recognition would cause the very greatest consequences. He pointed out that the group forming the new provisional government was only about one year old.

The Prime Minister made it clear that, speaking only for Great Britain, it would be said that the British Government had given away completely on the frontiers, had accepted the Soviet view and had championed it. To break altogether with the lawful government of Poland which had been recognized during all these five years of war would be an act subject to the most severe criticism in England. It would be said that we did not know what was going on in Poland – that we could not even get anyone in there to find out what was going on and that we had accepted in toto the view of the Lublin government. Great Britain would be charged with forsaking the cause of Poland and he was bound to say that the debates in Parliament would be most painful and he might add most dangerous to Allied unity. He added that all the above was on the supposition that they might find it possible to agree to Mr. Molotov’s proposal. He said if they were to give up the London government it must be evident that a new start had been made on both sides from equal terms. Before such transfer of recognition His Majesty’s Government would have to be convinced that a new government, representative of the Polish people, had been created, pledged to an election on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot with the participation of all democratic parties and the right to put up their candidates. When such elections were held in Poland, he said Great Britain would salute the government which emerges without regard for the Polish government in London. He concluded with the statement that it is the interval before such elections that is difficult and alarming.

Mr. Molotov suggested that perhaps the talks in Moscow might give some result, but it was very difficult to discuss the Polish question without participation with the Poles.

The Prime Minister remarked it was frightfully important that agreement should be reached on the question and that we should part over a signed agreement.

The President said we were all agreed on the necessity of free elections and that the only problem was how Poland was to be governed in the interval.

Marshal Stalin said that he had heard complaints from the Prime Minister that he had no information in regard to the situation in Poland. Mr. Churchill could get this information and he did not see why Great Britain and the United States could not send their own people into Poland. He said in regard to the popularity of the Provisional Government he could assure the conference that the people running the government were popular. The three leaders, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski had not fled from Poland but had stayed on in Warsaw and had come from the underground. It is necessary to bear in mind the psychology of people under occupation – their sympathies are with those who stayed and not with those who left the country. Marshal Stalin said that he did not claim that the men in the Provisional Government were geniuses – indeed, it is possible that there are cleverer people in the Polish government in London – he did not know. Perhaps the feeling of the Polish people in this respect was somewhat primitive, but it exists. What puzzles the Polish people is that a great event – the liberation of their country by the Red Army has occurred. This changes the mentality of the people. For many years the Poles had hated the Russians and with reason, since three times the Czarist government had participated in the partitioning of Poland. With the advance of the Soviet troops the liberation of Poland had changed the attitude of the Polish people toward Russia and old resentments had disappeared and good will had taken their place. He said it was his impression that the driving out of the Germans by the Red Army had been received by the Poles in the light of a great national holiday. The people had been surprised that the Polish government in London had not had any part in this great holiday. They inquire, “We of the National Council and Provisional Government participated in this holiday, but where are the London Poles?” These two circumstances lay at the base of the great popularity of the members of the Provisional Government, although they may not be great men. He said he did not think we could ignore these facts nor fail to take into account the feelings of the people. Mr. Churchill worries that we will leave here without an agreement. What therefore can we do? We have different information – the best method, therefore, would be to summon the Poles from the different camps and to learn from them. It would, of course, be better if free elections could be held right off, but up to now the war has prevented this, but the day is drawing near, however, when such elections could take place and the people could express their view in regard to the Provisional Government. He said he saw little difference between the position of de Gaulle and that of the Polish Provisional Government. Neither had been elected, and he could not say which one enjoyed the greatest degree of popularity – yet we all had dealt with de Gaulle and the Soviet Government concluded a treaty with him. Why should we be so different with regard to the Polish government, and why could we not deal with an enlarged Polish government. He added that de Gaulle had done nothing to arouse popular enthusiasm, whereas the Polish government had carried out a number of land reforms that had been most popular. The situation is not so tragic as Mr. Churchill pictured it. He felt the situation could be settled if we concentrated on the essential points. He said it would be better to deal with the reconstruction of the Provisional Government rather than to attempt to set up a new one. He said he felt Mr. Molotov was right, and rather than a presidential committee we might agree on increasing the Provisional Government.

The President asked how long it would be, in the Marshal’s opinion, before elections could be held in Poland.

Marshal Stalin replied it might be possible in a month provided no catastrophes occurred on the front and the Germans began to beat them.

The Prime Minister said of course they would welcome free elections but would not ask for anything that would hamper military operations.

The President proposed that the matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers for study, and this was agreed to.

The Prime Minister said there was one small matter he wished to bring up before adjournment, and that was the periodic meeting of Foreign Ministers every three months.

The President said he was in favor of this idea, but he knew that Mr. Stettinius was very busy with some of the Latin American countries and he felt it would be best to say they would meet when necessary and not fix any definite period for the meetings.

The Prime Minister said he hoped that the first of these meetings could be in London, to which the President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

Marshal Stalin then said he had one small matter which he would like to bring up. He would like to know what is holding back the formation of a unified government in Yugoslavia. He would also like to know what was going on in Greece. He said he had no intention of criticizing British policy there but he would merely like to know what was going on.

The Prime Minister said that Greece would take a great deal of time to explain and he would reserve it for the next meeting. He said in regard to Yugoslavia that the King had been persuaded, or even forced, to agree to a regency. Subasic was leaving soon, if he had not left already, for Yugoslavia to appoint the regents and form the government. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Eden tells him that there are two slight amendments, which he will take up with Mr. Molotov, to the agreement reached between Subasic and Tito. He added that he had always made it plain, both privately and publicly, that if the King would not agree to a regency he would be bypassed. He felt that in regard to the two amendments, if Marshal Stalin had said two words to Tito the matter would be settled.

Marshal Stalin replied that Tito is a proud man and he now was a popular head of a regime and might resent advice.

The Prime Minister replied that he felt that Marshal Stalin could risk this.

Marshal Stalin answered that he was not afraid.

The Prime Minister said that in regard to Greece he was hopeful peace would come on the basis of amnesties except for those who committed crimes against the laws of war. He doubted that a government of all the parties could be established since they hated each other so much.

Marshal Stalin said that the Greeks had not yet become used to discussion and therefore they were cutting each others’ throats.

The Prime Minister concluded he would be glad to give information on Greece. He said that recently Sir Walter Citrine and five members of the trades unions had gone to Greece and they might have their report. He said that they had had rather a rough time in Greece and they were very much obliged to Marshal Stalin for not having taken too great an interest in Greek affairs.

Marshal Stalin repeated that he had no intention of criticizing British actions there or interfering in Greece, but merely would like to know what was going on.

The conference adjourned until four p.m. tomorrow.

8324

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 4 p.m.
2/8 After the noon meeting of {Tel. to Dept re Assoc. Ns}
For Sees, Jebb, Gromyko & A H
met as committee to discuss Un Ns
Conference procedure. A. H. ex- 2/8
Plenary
4.30 p m
plain ed State Dept views but said Pres.
had not approved. After lunch before
plenary session ERS cleared all with Pres.
& A H told Gromyko & sent word to Jebb

Pres called on Eden to report for For Mins

Ed: We met to consider etc. & read his report

re place Ed. repeated his statement of this morning that next meeting of For Mins be held in Lon & that seemed to meet with a measure of approval

Ed: Reason for saying those who are members now should be invited was to prevent nations from becoming Un Ns Just to be invited Understands Am. Del. has different view

St: I have the list of states which declared war on Ger I count this no. into official members of the Ass. Among these are 10 which have no dip. rels with S.U. We will together with them build up world security——

Pres: I think many of them will be glad to recog & est. dip. rels with S U. Haven’t got round to it yet. In few is very strong Cath. Church influence At same time we recognize most of these who have not exch. dip. rels with Sov Un. have sat with Sov Un at Bretton Woods & other dip. conferences held.

St.: That’s right but on other hand is very diff. build up world sec. with countries which don’t recog. Sov Un

Pres: Easiest way to est. complete dip rels. is to invite them. That involves matter of history which should be explained. 3 yrs. ago Actg Sec State Welles told number of these states not nec. to declare on Ger. but should break all rels. So there are 5 or 6 of these which expect to be invited – & are in good standing Sec. of State has embarrassed me further by bringing this to my attention 1 month ago. As a result I sent a letter to the 6 pres. of these 6 reps explaining that if they wanted to be invited they should declare war on either Japan or Ger. Ecuador has declared war but hasn’t had chance sign Un Ns decl. Paraguay will soon. Peru, Venezuela etc (not Chile, soon) Will be embarrassing if not invited. In meantime in past 4 yrs. all of these nations have helped us in waging war because large part of raw materials for munitions of war came from them.

Result is I’m in a somewhat diff. position

St: Not discussed today

Pres: We have phrase Associated Ns meaning nations which have broken rels but haven’t declared war.

The list of nations which Mr Stett gave to Mr Molotov at lunch today

St. asked about Argentine

Pres: Not an assoc. nation

St: If “associates” come in that would include Argentina. Would include Turkey

Pres. My idea & it would save my life would be to invite those who have are on the list who have helped us on condition that they declare war.

St: Before or after they declare war

Pres: Before, put a time limit, say 1st of March

St: Agreed

Church: I am glad to say these nations would be required to declare war before they would be invited to the Conf. Of course I feel like Marshall St that some of them have played a poor part, waiting to see who would win. Now it’s quite safe they would like to come in Will have depressing effect on Ger to realize another batch has come in. Might also have effect on other hostile belligerents to see how whole world is turning ag. them

Pres: I should like to add one name to list for sake of clarity – newest rep. in world Iceland

Church: re Eg. HMG feel special resp. On 2 occasions were willing to declare war It was more convenient to us to have them stay formally neutral

Pres: In other words you’re in same fix I’m in

Church Also I must say on behalf of Eg that when enemy was only 30 miles from capital Egyptian Army rendered service, guarded bridges, communs & generally was more helpful than if she had declared war & made Cairo subject to air bombardment ∴Feel if Eg. now feels she wanted to declare war she should have the opportunity

Iceland also rendered very val. services. At a time when the U.S. had not herself had entered the war she admitted Brit & US troops, violated her neutrality in a marked fashion & guarded a life line across the Atlantic. I think those two have certainly a case provided they declare war

Is it intended any nation which declares war.

Pres: no, only the Assoc Ns

(Italy, Ireland – no)

Church: I shall mention a name which I think will cause universal satisfaction – Turkey T. made an alliance with us before the war at a very dangerous time. But when the war broke out, after it had been going on little while, T’s found their army was not equipped with any of weapons that decide modern battles. But att. has been friendly although they would not take the opportunity which was offered to us yr. ago

St. says all right if by end of Feb. It will declare war

Ger. is not yet defeated war & war hardly will terminate by end of Feb.

Pres: One other case – curious case.

Den. was invaded. Has been under Ger. domination since

Only one man claimed to represent Den. was the the Dan. Min. in Wash. He could not declare war but he disowned acts of his own govt

Would be with us 100% if they could

Church: Have they agreed to the independence of Iceland?

I do not think it is of very great importance. I think Mar & Pres are quite right in letting anyone come to the party who declares war by end of month

St & Denmark could wait

Pres Yes

Church: She would have a perfect right to come if she is able to speak

Pres Amend Un Ns & also those of assoc. powers & T. who declare war by Mar 1

Church All who declare war

Ed. Un Ns as they exist on the 1st of Mar.

Church:

Pres Ger. or Japan

Common enemy

Mol Would it not facilitate position of Sov. Reps if they would sign Decl. of Un Ns before 1st of Mar.

Pres I think its easier to take the list we’ve got. San Marino & Andorra might sign, nations like that

Church. What is the position

St: But T is not fighting

Pres: read list of Assoc. Ns & T only if they declare war

Mol: If Uk & Byelo-R sign decl before 1st of Mar.

Pres. That had been settled in this formula We are prepared to support them.

St. I propose to name the Reps, which would be invited: Uk & Byelo-R. To call them by name in this protocol and secondly I propose that they should sign the Decl of Un Ns before 1st of Mar. Change the protocol

Church Delay invitations to two states of Sov. Un till we are all met If so many new ones are to be brought in now be confusing

St: I have point out that’s not quite logical. 3 great powers agree to seat White R & Uk But some might say they haven’t signed

Church: Two R states should be treated same as other late arrivals

St. I wouldn’t like to embarrass Pres. What is his difficulty. I might withdraw my proposal

Pres: Only technical. We have been discussing admitting other people. Uk & Wh R are not other people they are here already. We & UK will support it. We change SU from 1 vote to 3 right here. Why 3, why not 4, 5, 6?

St. Withdrew his request. But names of the two republics should be in the report

Poland

8325

Matthews Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

The President asked Mr. Eden to read the report of the meeting of the foreign ministers for today. This was followed by a lengthy discussion with respect to the world organization. Notes on this part of the session are being written by Mr. Hiss.

President: Has Mr. Molotov had time to read the proposal I have made with regard to Poland?

Stalin: I have received it.

President: Just to make it clear let me read it. (President reads the proposal. Copy attached.)

Stalin: Does this mean that you would withdraw recognition from the London government?

President: Yes.

Prime Minister: (Explains that with the recognition of a new interim government recognition would be transferred from the London government to that regime.)

Stalin: What about the property of the London government?

President: That automatically would go to the new government.

Prime Minister: I had prepared an alternate suggestion but since discussion has already begun on the President’s proposal I would rather continue on that.

Molotov: I should like to make a few remarks on the proposal of the President and the Prime Minister. Our proposal of yesterday came from a concrete foundation. We think it would be useful to have discussions on the Polish question on the basis of the present government being extended. We cannot ignore that fact – that the present government exists at Warsaw. It is now at the head of the Polish people and has great authority. It has been enthusiastically [received] by the Polish people. If we put forward a proposal to ignore this fact we might be placed in a position where the Poles themselves could not agree. If we start on the basis that the present government could be enlarged, the basis of probable success is more secure. Those now in the provisional government are closely connected with great national events taking place in Poland. This is not true of Mikolajczyk, Grabski, Romer and Witos. Those names are not linked with decisive events in Poland. If we wish to reach a practical end we must take as the basis that the present government be enlarged. How many and who should be taken in is the question to be discussed by us. There may be differences but in any event it depends upon the Poles now working in liberated Poland. The President proposes a new thought, namely agreement not only on the government but on a presidential commission. I have some doubts on that. I am afraid instead of one we will then have two difficult problems – that of the government and that of the presidential committee. This will increase our difficulties not decrease them. There is a national council, a representative body of Poland which could also be enlarged. We could discuss how this could be done. It would be better to talk on the basis of the existing situation and then how to improve it. Therefore, my conclusions are how to enlarge and by what basis the national council. The national council and government are temporary and provisional. All three proposals have one end in view, namely to secure as soon as possible free elections. That is the best way to build up stable rule in Poland which we all consider of fundamental importance. On the frontier question with regard to the east, we are in complete agreement. On the west there is no unanimous feeling. But I know that the Poles and the Polish government are definitely in favor of a frontier on the Neisse River. Of course we can ask them but I have not the slightest doubt of their desire. Also about holding negotiations in Moscow between myself, Harriman and Clark Kerr, I think there is full agreement.

The Poles usually select three people, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and General Yelinski [Rola-Żymierski?]. Usually all three take part. Then there are those to be invited from the other side whom the President proposed yesterday. With some people the provisional government would not like to talk at all, for instance Mikolajczyk. Since his visit to Moscow relations have greatly deteriorated. The President proposed to invite two of the five mentioned. I agree that two of the five should be invited. If three of the provisional government, one I have mentioned and two of those mentioned in the President’s letter be invited, negotiations could be started. That is my proposal.

President: I should like to keep the presidential committee and then there is the question of election.

Molotov: It would be better to avoid the presidential committee and to enlarge the national council. I think the two ambassadors and I could discuss how to enlarge the council. Any proposals to be finally adopted by the committee of three would of course be submitted to the three governments. My remarks have been addressed to the American proposal since the Prime Minister agreed to this.

Prime Minister: Of course we are at the crucial point of this great conference. This is the question for which the world is waiting. If we accept that each recognize separate governments this will be interpreted all over the world as a sign of cleavage between the Soviet government on the one hand and the U.S. and British governments on the other. The consequences would be most lamentable in the world and would stamp the conference as a failure. On the other hand, I take a different view about the basic facts on some of them. According to our information, the present Lublin, now Warsaw, government does not commend itself to the vast majority of the Polish people. We feel that it is not accepted abroad as representative. If we were to brush away the London government and lend all our weight to the Lublin government there would be a world outcry. As far as we can see, the Poles outside Poland would make a united protest. We have an army of 150 thousand Poles who are fighting bravely. That army would not be reconciled to Lublin. It would regard our action in transferring recognition as a betrayal. As Molotov and the Marshal know, I do not agree with the London government’s action. They have been very foolish. But the formal act of transfer of recognition to a new government would cause the very Gravest criticism. It would be said that the British government had given away completely on the eastern frontier and had accepted the Soviet view. It would be said that we have broken altogether with the lawful government of Poland which we have recognized during the five years of war. It would be said that we have no knowledge of conditions in Poland. We cannot enter the country and must accept the statements of the Lublin government. Therefore, it would be charged in London that we are forsaking the cause of Poland. Debates would follow in Parliament which would be most painful and embarrassing to unity of the allies if we were to agree. The proposals of Mr. Molotov do not go nearly far enough. If we give up the Poles in London it should be for a new start on both sides, more or less on equal terms. Before His Majesty’s Government could leave its present position on continuing recognition of the London Government we would have to be satisfied that the new government was fairly representative of the Polish nation. I agree that this can be only a view because we do not know the facts. Our doubts would be removed by elections with full secret ballot and free candidacies to be held in Poland. But it is the transfer before then which is causing so much anxiety to us. That is all I have to say.

Molotov: Perhaps the discussions in Moscow will have a useful result. It is difficult to consider the Polish question without the presence of Poles.

Prime Minister: It is frightfully important that this conference separate on a note of agreement. We must struggle precisely for that.

President: From another hemisphere I should like to say that we are agreed on free elections. The only problem is how to govern in the meantime for a relatively few months.

Stalin: The Prime Minister complains that he has no real information and no means to receive it.

Prime Minister: Certain information but–

Stalin: It does not coincide with ours. I think Great Britain and the United States can have their own sources of information there whenever they like. What is the basis of the popularity of the provisional government? I can assure you that these people are really very popular. Bierut and Osobka-Morawski and General Rola-Zymierski – They are the people who did not leave Poland. They have come from the underground. We should bear in mind the peculiar mentality of those who live under occupation. The Polish people consider these three as those who stayed. It may be that Arczieczeski has in his government clever people but they are not liked in Poland because during the time of stress they did not seek the underground. Perhaps this attitude is a little primitive but it must be taken into consideration. What troubles the Polish people? It is a great consolation that their country has been liberated by the Red Army. This has completely changed their psychology. The Poles for many years have not liked Russia because Russia took part in three partitions of Poland. But the advance of the Soviet Army and the liberation of Poland from Hitler has completely changed that. The old resentment has completely disappeared. Now there is good will toward Russia. It is natural that the Polish people are delighted to see the Germans flee their country and to feel themselves liberated. My impression is that the Polish people consider this a great historic holiday. The population is surprised, even astounded, that the people of the London government do not take any part in this liberation. Members of the provisional government they see there, but where are the London Poles? These two circumstances produce the fact that the members of the Warsaw government, though they may not be great men, enjoy great popularity. Cannot we take account of this fact? We cannot ignore it – the feelings of the Polish people. You are afraid also that we may separate before agreement. We have different information and have reached different conclusions. Perhaps to begin with we should call the Poles of the two different camps to hear them and learn from them. We are agreed to the fact that the Polish government must be democratically elected. It is much better to have a government based on free elections. But until now the war has prevented elections. The day for them is near but until then we must deal with the provisional government. It is like that of de Gaulle who is also not elected. Who is more popular, de Gaulle or Bierut? We have considered it possible to deal with de Gaulle and make treaties with him. Why not deal with an enlarged Polish provisional government? We cannot demand more of Poland than of France. So far, the French government has not carried out any reforms to create enthusiasm. The Polish government has carried out a great reform which gives it great popularity. If we approve this government without prejudice we can find a solution. We will not attach too much importance to secondary matters and concentrate on the primary ones. It is better to reconstruct than to create a new government. Molotov is right. We could not talk about a presidential committee without Poles. Perhaps they would agree. But as a result of their amour propre and feelings, the prestige of the provisional government is greatly increased. If we do not talk to them they would accuse us of being occupiers and not liberators.

President: How long before elections could be held?

Stalin: In about one month unless there is a catastrophe on the front and the Germans defeat us. (smiling) I do not think this will happen.

Prime Minister: Free elections would of course settle the worries of the British government at least. That would supersede at a stroke all questions of legality. Of course, we must not ask anything that would impair military operations But if it is possible to learn the opinion of the population in Poland in one or even two months no one could object.

President: That is why it is worth pursuing the subject. I move that we adjourn our talks until tomorrow. I suggest that meanwhile the matter be referred to the three foreign secretaries. They are very effective.

Molotov: The other two will outvote me. (laughing)

Prime Minister: I have one bit of business before we separate. It would be a great advantage if we could set up permanent measures for consultation of the foreign secretaries. I think they should meet every three or four months to clear up difficulties between us.

President: I think the idea is O.K. but my foreign secretary has all South America to take care of too. I think we should make it as often as necessary rather than a specific period.

Prime Minister: I should also like to suggest that the first meeting be held in London. (This was agreed to)

Stalin: I have two small questions to raise. First the fact that the formation of the new united government in Yugoslavia has been delayed. I should like to know why. Also there are all sorts of rumors with regard to Greece. I have no criticism to make but I should like to know what is going on.

Prime Minister: It would take too long to talk about Greece now. I could talk about it for hours. As for Yugoslavia the King has been persuaded, indeed forced, to sign agreement with regard to the regency. Subasic and the other members of the government leave for Belgrade any day now. They are merely held up by weather delays. My policy has never varied as I have stated in the House. If the King makes trouble we must take care of it. But he has signed I understand the regency act and Subasic is going out to Belgrade immediately. I am hopeful that peace will come on the basis of amnesty but they hate each other so much that they cannot keep their hands off each other in Yugoslavia.

Stalin: (Smiling) They are not yet accustomed to discussions. Instead they cut each other’s throats. I notice that Tito also seems to be very popular in the country.

Prime Minister: I invited Sir Walter Citrine to go out with five trade unionists but I have not yet seen their report. I believe that he had a rather rough time. I thank the Marshal for his help.

Stalin: On Greece I only wanted to know for information. We have no intention of intervening there in any way.

The meeting adjourned.

8326

The President’s Special Assistant to the President

Yalta, February 8, 1945

Mr. President: The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Welles that it would be difficult for us to defend their coasts against Japan. That is Welles excuse.

HARRY

8327

U.S. Delegation Memorandum on the Foreign Ministers’ Report to the Fifth Plenary Meeting

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 4 p.m.

The report by the Foreign Secretaries was accepted, subject to paragraph 2(b) being amended to read as follows:

The United Nations as they exist on 8 February, 1945, and such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945, would be the only States invited to the conference on World Organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e. the Ukraine and White Russia.

8328

U.S. Proposal on Poland

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

The proposals submitted by Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish question in reply to the President’s letter to Marshal Stalin dated February 6, 1945, have been given careful study.

In regard to the frontier question, no objection is perceived to point One of the Soviet proposals, namely, that the eastern boundary of Poland should be the Curzon line with modifications in favor of Poland in some areas of from five to eight kilometers.

In regard to point Two, while agreeing that compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia south of the Koenigsberg line, Upper Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder, there would appear to be little justification to the extension of the western boundary of Poland up to the Western Neisse River.

In regard to the proposals of the Soviet Government concerning the future Government of Poland, it is proposed that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr be authorized on behalf of the three Governments to invite to Moscow Mr. Bierut, Mr. Osubka-Morawski, Bishop Sapieha, Mr. Vicente Witos, Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Grabski to form a Polish Government of National Unity along the following lines:

  1. There will be formed a Presidential Committee of three, possibly consisting of Mr. Bierut, Mr. Grabski and Bishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential office of the Polish Republic.

  2. This Presidential Committee will undertake the formation of a government consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish provisional government in Warsaw; from other democratic elements inside Poland, and from Polish democratic leaders abroad.

  3. This interim government, when formed, will pledge itself to the holding of free elections in Poland as soon as conditions permit for a constituent assembly to establish a new Polish constitution under which a permanent Government would be elected.

  4. When a Polish Government of National Unity is formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition as the Provisional Government of Poland.