America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

8302

U.S. State Department (February 8, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Rear Admiral Olsen
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Roberts
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Major General Kuter Brigadier General Cabell
Lieutenant General Somervell Brigadier General Lindsay
Vice Admiral Cooke Brigadier General Bessell
Major General Bull Brigadier General Everest
Major General Deane Commodore Burrough
Major General Anderson Colonel Peck
Major General Hull Colonel Lincoln
Major General Wood Colonel Dean
Major General Hill Colonel Bogart
Rear Admiral Smith Colonel Cary
Rear Admiral McCormick Captain Stroop
Rear Admiral Carter Captain McDill
Rear Admiral Duncan Commander Clark
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret

Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overall Review of Cargo and Troop Shipping Position for the Remainder of 1945 (CCS 746/11)

Admiral Leahy said that although the paper was an agreed report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board it appeared to him that the essence of the report was an agreement to reexamine the position when a need for further study arose.

General Somervell said that the necessity for a revision had already arisen, particularly with reference to redeployment plans. On the other hand, he felt that the paper in its present form was entirely satisfactory. Referring to paragraph 4b (1) (d) of the paper he said that during the Committee negotiations the British had insisted upon the submission of the report referred to therein on 1 June.

General Marshall said that if the war ended by 1 April 1945 the combined redeployment plan and the related combined report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and shipping authorities would be too late if submitted on 30 April 1945, as required in the paper.

General Somervell felt that the date for the submission of the report might well be moved up to 1 April.

Admiral King pointed out that the reports could be submitted at any time prior to 30 April. The requirement as stated in the paper was that they should be ready not later than 30 April.

Colonel Lincoln said that as far as the U.S. side was concerned the Planners already had a redeployment paper under way and that they could make this plan available by 1 April.

Admiral Leahy said that a change of the date to 1 April might not be acceptable to the British.

Admiral Smith said that the British members of the combined committees appeared to have no objection to a 1 April date. The date of 30 April had been selected to afford the U.S. Planners ample time to produce their redeployment plan.

General Somervell thought there might be some objection on the part of the British to moving the date up to 1 April. He understood that the British plans for redeployment had not progressed as far as the U.S. plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of CCS 746/11 subject to the change of the date in the third line on Page 4 from 30 April to 1 April.

Employment of War-Weary U.S. Bombers Against Large Industrial Target Areas in Germany (JCS 1150/1)

Admiral Leahy said that in this paper the representative of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, proposed that the question of the employment of war-weary bombers be reopened by recommending that the President address a memorandum on the subject to the Prime Minister. He understood the Prime Minister had instructed the British Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their previous concurrence in the employment of this type of weapon and felt that to request the President to ask the Prime Minister to reverse his stand would be undesirable.

General Anderson explained that there was no intention of launching uncontrolled aircraft indiscriminately against the German countryside. He believed that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the British as to the employment of this weapon. Recent developments had proved that explosive-laden aircraft could be directed against military targets with considerable accuracy and therefore had a definite military value when used against heavily protected underground installations.

General Marshall said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff have no military objection to the project but that certain Cabinet Members had opposed it. He doubted the propriety of having the President press the Prime Minister to urge these Cabinet Members to reverse their position, for heretofore these same Members had supported the British Chiefs of Staff in war measures advocated by the U.S.

In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why this project should not be restricted entirely to France, General Anderson said that while the launchings were to be made in France all of the developments so far had taken place in base installations set up in England and to move these base installations to France would be a waste of effort.

General Kuter pointed out that further development of this project was highly important in view of the prospects of a very profitable employment of this type of weapon against Japanese targets.

Admiral Leahy said the discussion had given him an entirely different conception of the weapon. When this matter first came up, he understood that the aircraft would be launched in the general direction of Germany and that the explosive-laden planes would fall aimlessly when the fuel was exhausted. This he considered an inhuman and barbarous type of warfare with which the United States should not be associated; but now, since it appeared that the missiles could be controlled with a considerable degree of accuracy, he agreed that they could be usefully employed. He inquired why, since the planes employed were American and would be operated under American command, it was necessary to collaborate with the British in their use.

General Kuter said that, in view of the instructions already received on this subject by the British Chiefs of Staff and since the matter had heretofore been dealt with on a combined basis, it would be undesirable for the United States now to employ this weapon unilaterally. Moreover, the bases where the project was being developed were located in England.

Admiral Duncan felt that it would be entirely proper for the United States Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their original proposal to use uncontrolled missiles and present the project as a development of a controlled missile.

General Kuter said that the development of the control of this type of aircraft had progressed very rapidly, and it was essential that this development continue.

In view of the foregoing, Admiral Leahy said that he felt an approach should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for reconsideration at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to bring up for discussion at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to follow, the question of the employment of radio-controlled explosive-laden bombers.

Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meeting (JCS 1227/4 and 1227/5)

Admiral Leahy said that in JCS 1227/4 the Joint Staff Planners suggest certain subjects which the United States Chiefs of Staff should discuss with the Soviet General Staff. In JCS 1227/5 General Deane recommends a series of questions as the basis of the discussions. The Planners’ paper appears to go into considerable detail and to contain items not covered in the questions suggested by General Deane.

Admiral Leahy said that he entertained little hope of engaging in extended conversations with the Soviet General Staff.

General Marshall observed that our success in arranging a meeting with the Soviet Army Staff was a good omen as to the Soviets’ willingness to discuss the matters in which we are interested.

Admiral King said that he favored the approach to the Soviets advanced by the Planners.

General Deane said that he found no fault with the Planners’ paper except that he would not recommend that the status of the MILEPOST project be discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff unless the Soviets first brought up the matter. Moreover, he proposed that the United States Chiefs of Staff refrain from suggesting a Russian strategic air force, inasmuch as it appeared that the aircraft necessary to constitute such a force could not be provided.

General Deane felt that it would be a mistake to bring up the matter of the exchange of weather information in view of the satisfactory progress that had been made so far. The Soviets had met every United States request for the exchange of this information.

General Kuter said that the weather information received so far did not meet the full requirements of the Twentieth Air Force in dealing with Japanese targets and suggested that there should be an increase in the number of weather stations in Siberia.

Admiral Olsen said that the Soviets had encountered considerable difficulty in setting up weather stations in Siberia because of the lack of transportation and communication facilities. They prefer to use their own personnel and equipment and therefore, if it were suggested that more stations be installed, the request should indicate willingness to make U.S. equipment available. He confirmed General Deane’s view that it would be a mistake to insist on a further exchange of weather information on a high level, since negotiations to meet United States requirements could be satisfactorily handled by the United States Mission in Moscow.

General Deane said he had arranged his list of questions with a view to permitting the Soviets to do the talking. The questions were designed to draw out Soviet views. Whether or not the questions were proper ones is a matter for decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to an inquiry by Admiral Leahy, General Deane said that the operations referred to in Question 7 in JCS 1227/5 were those to be initially undertaken by the Soviets if they entered the war against Japan. General Deane felt that the Soviet answer to the first question in his paper would undoubtedly lead to several contributory questions which would cover the points made by the Planners in their paper.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to use both JCS 1227/4 and 1227/5 in their conference with the Soviet General Staff.

8303

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Vorontsov Villa, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Matthews Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hiss Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev
Mr. Page Mr. Jebb Mr. Gromyko
Major Theakstone Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Golunsky

Page Minutes

Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subjects:

  1. WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
  2. YUGOSLAVIAN FRONTIERS
  3. CONTROL COMMISSION IN BULGARIA AND HUNGARY
  4. REPARATIONS
  5. IRAN

World Security Organization

Mr. Eden, who presided, stated that the Foreign Secretaries had been requested to consider two points vis-à-vis the World Security Organization; first, the question of membership which included that concerning the admission of two or three of the Soviet Republics, and, second, the question of the time and place of the meeting.

Mr. Stettinius interjected that there was also the question of exactly which nations should be invited to the initial conference.

Mr. Eden inquired whether anyone desired to initiate the discussion on this general question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he wished to start at the bottom. He said that he would be delighted to invite the great Allies to confer in the United States. He hoped that the President had not shocked the Foreign Secretaries yesterday by mentioning the month of March as the time for the opening of the conference, and he continued that he felt sure that the time could be arranged to fit in with the convenience of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden. However, he was anxious to open the conference at the earliest possible date. Personally, he hoped that it could be held no later than the latter part of April. With respect to the question concerning who would be invited, he recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks there had been considerable talk of inviting the Associated Nations as well as the United Nations. He stated that he had come to the conclusion that it would probably be most satisfactory to limit the invitations to those who had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on the common enemy. With respect to Mr. Molotov’s references to multiple membership for the Soviet Union, it was his feeling, from the standpoint of geographical area and population, that this question should be given sympathetic consideration at the opening conference. He continued that he had thus far been unable in his own mind to decide just how inclusion of these entities could be arranged. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals there was a provision to the effect that each sovereign state had one vote. He had not thus far been able to see clearly how the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. He concluded that he wished again to refer the matter to the President who had said that the subject was most interesting and deserved sympathetic consideration.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had expressed his views on the inclusion of two or three Soviet Republics in the World Organization at the last plenary meeting. He requested Mr. Eden to state his ideas on the other subjects on the World Security agenda.

Mr. Eden stated that he would be glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the conference in the United States. He only wished to enter one caveat. He remarked that Mr. Winant, Mr. Gusev, and himself were getting a little jealous in never having any large conferences in London. If Mr. Molotov and he were to go to the United States for this conference, he hoped that there would be an early meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov supported Mr. Eden’s views with respect to a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

Mr. Eden continued that since some time would be needed to get the Chinese and possibly the French in line, and since the lawyers would need possibly two weeks before the conference opened, he would prefer to postpone the opening of the conference until the second half of April. He pointed out that he would be committed to debates in Parliament before he would be able to go to the United States. After some discussion it was agreed by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden that the conference should open on April 25.

Mr. Molotov had previously accepted the invitation to hold the conference in the United States.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to make a few observations on the inclusion of Soviet Republics in the Organization. He said that he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet position in this respect and would be ready to say so at whatever was considered to be an appropriate moment.

Mr. Molotov interjected “The sooner the better.” Mr. Molotov then pointed out, in relation to the remarks made by Mr. Stettinius, that the President had indicated yesterday that according to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals each Government had one vote. However, Canada and Australia had individual votes and the fact that they were component parts of the British Empire did not prevent them from being individual members of the assembly. He said that amendments had been made to the Soviet constitution which gave the Soviet Republics the right to have contact with foreign states. The Soviet Union was a union of states. The constitution had now been revised to increase the rights of the Republics. The development of relations between the Republics and foreign states, which had already begun, was in this direction and was developing according to democratic principles. He continued that he believed that it would be superfluous to mention the political, economic and military importance of the Ukraine, White Russia and the Lithuanian Republic. He urged that it would be most desirable if agreement could be reached on this question today.

Mr. Molotov then referred to Mr. Stettinius’ statement that only those nations which had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on Germany should be invited to the conference. This immediately gave rise to some questions. Which Polish Government, for example, should be invited.

Mr. Eden immediately interjected that this was a good reason for settling the Polish problem now.

Mr. Molotov continued that certain countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would also be invited. He stated that he would like to check the exact list of states which would attend the conference.

Mr. Stettinius gave Mr. Molotov such a list and pointed out that although Ecuador had recently declared war on Germany it was not included on the list since it had not yet signed the United Nations Declaration.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that if agreement could not be reached on the membership of the organization it should be reported accordingly.

Mr. Eden stated that only the question of the membership of the two Soviet Republics remained open.

Mr. Cadogan pointed out that if a conference were called to complete the work of Dumbarton Oaks and to reach final agreement on a charter, he did not see how any of the original members of the organization could be excluded from the conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the United Nations should meet to complete the charter. New members could be elected at this meeting. He said that he was trying to find a way to arrange for consideration of the Soviet request before the first meeting of the assembly.

Mr. Eden suggested as a possible procedure that the United Nations might meet and might draw up an order of the day which would include the question of extending foundation membership to two Soviet Republics. He said that he was quite ready to agree to this proposal.

Mr. Molotov suggested an amendment to Mr. Eden’s proposal to the effect that the three Foreign Secretaries had agreed that it would be advisable to grant admission to the assembly to two or three Soviet Republics.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was favorably impressed with what Mr. Eden had said. He had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the President this morning and it was, therefore, impossible for him to make any firm commitment. However, he would be glad to discuss the question with the President promptly and hoped and expected that the United States would be able to give a favorable reply before the end of the day. He stated that he would not bring up the question of Poland since he hoped that agreement would be reached on this matter at the present conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that there were a number of other details with respect to Dumbarton Oaks, such as the status of France, how China would be consulted, who would issue the invitations, etc.

Mr. Eden suggested that a sub-committee be set up to study these details and report back to the Foreign Secretaries. Messrs. Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to study these matters.

Yugoslavian Frontiers

Mr. Eden stated that although he did not wish to raise the question of Yugoslavian frontiers with Austria and Italy, he would like to point out that with the occupation of Austria by the Red Army there might well be administrative questions relative to the frontiers which should be handled. For this reason, the British Delegation was submitting a note to the Soviet Delegation on the question.

Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary

Mr. Eden stated that he also wished to discuss the question of a Control Commission in Bulgaria in the light of the decisions reached vis-à-vis the Hungarian Control Commission. It was agreed to confine the present meeting to those matters which had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries by the Chiefs of State for consideration.

Reparations

Mr. Molotov inquired as to when the American and British Delegations would be prepared to discuss the question of reparations.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he would be ready tomorrow.

Mr. Eden added that he hoped that the British side would also be ready.

Iran

Mr. Eden recalled the signing of the Declaration on Iran. He stated that the Allies had signed treaties with Iran in which certain privileges had been granted to them for the duration of the war. In all other respects, however, he felt that the Iranian Government should be the master in its own house and free to make its own decisions. The British Government felt that it was most important to observe this principle – otherwise the Allies might find themselves in competition in Iranian affairs. No one desired that. For this reason, he urged that the Allies refrain from interfering in internal Iranian matters. With respect to oil, Mr. Eden stated that the British Government did not dispute the Soviet need for Iranian oil and that it was no part of British policy to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining oil from Northern Iran. Indeed, the Soviet Union was a natural market for this oil. The British Government did not wish to put any obstacles in the way of the Soviet Union’s obtaining oil concessions if and when the Iranians were prepared to negotiate. He continued that he felt that it should be made known publicly that the Allies would not press the matter concerning oil concessions any further until their troops had been withdrawn from Iran. The British Government was ready to consider at the Crimean Conference the advisability of making some statement which would indicate that the Allies were prepared to start to withdraw their troops earlier than was provided for in the Declaration on Iran. This withdrawal might commence as soon as the supply routes were closed. He believed that if agreement could be reached on this point it would have a good effect on world opinion and would show that the Allies were prepared to carry out the Tehran Declaration.

Mr. Molotov maintained that there were two different questions involved, i.e. those concerning the oil concessions and the withdrawal of Allied troops. With respect to the withdrawal of the troops, this question had never been placed before the Soviet Government until today. He maintained that this was a question of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty signed by Iran. If there were any need to amend this agreement the question should be studied. This would take some time.

With respect to the oil concessions, Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to make a few comments. The Soviet Government had asked Ambassador Ahi what the Iranian attitude would be to a request for concessions. Ahi’s reply had been most favorable. Kavtaradze had then proceeded to Iran to negotiate. In his first conversation with Foreign Minister Saed, the Foreign Minister had taken a favorable position. This was only natural since the granting of concessions was not only to the interests of the Soviet Union, but also to Iran. It was also in compliance with the Declaration of Tehran, since the granting of concessions would assist Iranian economy. This was the first stage of the controversy.

During the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then stated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations. Thereupon, the Medjlis had adopted a decision to the effect that there should be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many Iranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great a hurry and that it was unwise.

Why could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had changed their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no reason why they should not change it back to the first stage. The Soviet Government had endeavored to persuade them to do so. Kavtaradze had returned and the strong-armed methods he had used have subsided. He said that no negotiations were being carried on at the present time and that he did not believe it advisable to pay any special attention to this question now. He suggested that the matter be left alone – that it take its own course. The situation was not acute at the present time.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the United States had no wartime treaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had carried on negotiations for oil concessions but these had been dropped following the Medjlis decision. The firms were consequently in the same position as the Soviets. With respect to the withdrawal of troops from Iran he wished to point out that the American troops there were serving the interests of the Soviet Union in moving Lend-Lease supplies from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was content to leave the question of oil negotiations until the end of the war. He wished fully to support Mr. Eden’s proposals regarding the withdrawal of the Allied troops.

Mr. Eden remarked that the British Government had no opposition to the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet Government.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the United States Government took the same position.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the British had also carried on negotiations with the Iranians, even before the Soviet negotiations had started. As a result of the present attitude of the Iranian Government all of these negotiations were now held in abeyance. He said that if some statement were released, as suggested by him, it might reassure the Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil negotiations. With respect to the renewal [withdrawal] of Allied troops, there was no need to amend the Iranian treaty which stated that Allied troops would be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to withdraw these troops as soon as the supply route was no longer necessary.

Mr. Molotov stated that he believed it might be advisable to limit the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He offered to summon Kavtaradze to the conference to make a report on the Iranian situation.

Mr. Eden stated that he would like to think over what Mr. Molotov had said and added that he might have new suggestions to make at a forthcoming meeting.

8304

Matthews Notes

Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon
  1. Austria-Yugoslav. Must agree on boundary for purpose of admin. Note.
  2. Bulgarian & Hungary Control: Com:
  3. Reparations tomorrow
  4. Iran. –

Oil – no dispute on Sov. to get oil from N. Persia. No obstacle on Rus. concession if & when Pers. are prepared to negotiate. We should all make it known we will not press matters further until Allied Troops withdrawn. We prepared to issue statement prepared to withdraw troops earlier pari passu – when supply route closes. Would show world prepared to carry out Teh decl.

Mol: Eden has 2 pts – different 1. Oil 2. Troops. Troops question new. If necessary to change agreement must be studied & some time needed.

Oil – What was beginning? Negot began by asking Pers. govt attitude on concess N Persia. Answer was attitude would be most favorable Dep. Com Kav went to Iran. Conversation with first position of Said & Shah both favorable. Seemed not only USSR but Persia also inter. Would be econ. assistance to Pers.

Something has changed. No time for details but Govt. said would not continue discussions Persia during war. Mejlis would not discuss. Said decision was taken in a hurry. Why not now a third phase. Why can’t Pers. govt change position again. Trying to persuade them thats all. Kav. has returned home & method which might seem strong has changed. No negot. now but reserve right to take. Why special attention now? Why not let things go their way. Situation not acute.

S. We have no treaty with Our oil concessions also advanced stage & were in same position. Supports Eden on troop withdrawal. Willing to wait till war’s end on concess.

Eden: Reiterates no oppos. to Soviet concession. Does believe some statement might reassure Pers who were frightened at one time and make negotiations easier.

On troop withdrawal no change in treaty necessary. Would help reassure Pers & therefore negot.

Mol: Thinks we should limit ourselves to an exchange of views Might bring in Kavtaradze – he is here in Crimea.

8305

Hiss Notes

Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon

ERS see Ed. →Wire S. Am states act Immediately

For Mins
2/8 Eden Chmn

Eden: 1st World Org. q. 2 q’s referred to us

  1. Q. of membership of 2 or 3 reps of SU
  2. Time & place of conference

AH
Note to Pres
re Art VII

ERS & Ns to be invited

ERS To start at bottom of list 1st I should like take this opportunity invite our great allies to conf in US

Hope Pres didn’t shock you yester. by mentioning March I’m sure time can be arranged to fit in with convenience of Mr Mol & Mr Ed However we are very anxious to have the conf. at earliest poss. time Pers. hope could be held not later than latter part Apr.

As to matter of those to be invited you will recall at D. O. there was much talk as to the Assoc. Ns as well as the Un Ns We have come to the conclusion that taking everything into consid. it would prob. be most satis. to limit those to be invited to those who had signed Un Ns Decl & declared war on our common enemy.

As to Mr. Molotov’s reference to multiple membership for S.U. From standpoint geog. area & pop. it is my feeling this entire q. should be given very sympathetic consid. As to how it could be done immediately at the very first meeting I have not been able to determine in my own mind

In D. O. proposals we wrote in the provision each state have 1 vote. I have not yet been able to see clearly how D. O. proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. I wish again to refer to the Pres’ reaction yesterday to this matter when he said it was most interesting & deserved sympathetic study

Mol. Has expressed his ideas re last q. As to 1st q. like Ed. to state his views

Ed. As regards time & place. Glad to accept the invitation of the U S Govt I only want to enter 1 caveat. Mr Winant, Mr Gusev & I getting little jealous we never have anything in Lon. If Mr Mol & I go to Am for this I hope for an early meeting of For Secs in Lon

ERS Agreed

Mol Quite poss.

Ed. Invitation not ultimatum

ERS Promptly accept

Mol We also

Ed As to time have to get Ch. into line & possibly Fr. Lawyers want 10 days or so I rather think I am committed to debates in Par. before I go I would like myself 2nd half April

ERS around about Apr 15

Ed I would give it a wk more 20 something

Mol Agreed

ERS latter part April?

Mol Agreed

ERS Wanted calendar Suggested Wed Apr 25

Mol. Agrees to both

Ed We mildly prefer second (date) Easter 1st

Agreed April 25

Mol. We accept your invitation to Wash & the date of 25th

Re 3 reps Ed. Definitely sympathetic to their inclusion in Ass. We would be ready to say that at whatever is considered the approp. moment

Mol – As soon as possible

Would like deal with this q. relation to remarks of Mr S. Mr S has reminded us Pres spoke of decs of D. O. & 1 vote. Like ask 1 q. Can & Austr part of U K.

Ed – Of Brit Em

Mol & members of Ass.

The amends to Sov Const which have been accepted Feb last yr give reps rt of immed touch with for. states S U union of states. Const Enlarges rts of reps. In this sense we must develop rels with for. states, this already begun As to their pol, econ, mil importance no use proving what impor. have such reps as U,——Would be very desirable if could arrive at agt & have reach dec. today

Re Proposal made by ERS that Un Ns Decl signers & decl. of war com.

Q. which Pol should be invited

Ed Another reason settle prob.

Mol. Some Ns have no dip. rels with S U

Would like to check up exact no. of states which would take place

ERS read list

Ecuador has recently declared war but has not yet declared war

Ed: laughed

Mol If we cannot arrive at agt re membership must say so & move on to another subject

Ed: all agreed except re 2 reps.

Cad: If you call a conf. to complete D. O. work & to agree finally on the Charter I don’t see how you can exclude any of members of that conf. from the Org.

ERS: The Un. Ns meet to complete a charter & all would be members They could elect new members before 1st meeting of Ass. Trying find way Sov request can be taken before 1st meeting

Ed Un Ns could meet as met last time & could agree amongst other bus. to extend foundation members to include the 2 Sov. Reps. We should be quite ready to agree to that

Mol. Suggests amend, to Ed proposal

We must formulate this q. as he proposed & add we 3 have agreed it would be advisable to give the 2 or 3 Sov. reps. a place in the Ass.

ERS asked Ed q. – Ed restated position

ERS I am favorably impressed with what Mr Ed. has said. I did not have an oppor. of discussing this with Pres this morn. ∴ at this time imp. make any firm commit. However delighted discuss with Pres promptly & would hope & expect U S be able give favorable answer before end of day

Mol. Agreed

Ed. “

Mol We leave now q of Pol. – in hope we reach agt.

Ed. Other items to consider

ERS There are a no. of details. If we could meet tomorrow

Status of Fr., Ch. participant at DO. & must be consulted, form of invitation, how & by whom & when invitations be issued

Ed. We might set up subcom. to prepare this & report to us

ERS A. H., Gromyko, Jebb

Ed. Other items for agenda

  1. Yugoslav frontier – Will put in a note on that

  2. Control Coms., Bul & Hung.
    Mol. Dec. re Hung. Con. Com just arrived at. Other q’s

  3. Iran
    Agreed not try to list q’s still to come up at plenary session

Mol. when can we go on with q. of reparations?

ERS we will be prepared tomorrow to discuss Rep. further

Ed. Hope we will

Iran
Ed At Teheran we signed Decl. re Persia & each made treaties with Iran

About oil – no dispute about SU’s need for oil. No part of our pol. to prevent S.U. from obtaining oil from N. Persia Indeed Sov. Un is a natural market for N. Per. oil. We do not wish to put any obstacle in way of R’s obtaining concession if & when Persians prepared to neg. it. We should all of us make it known that we will not press matters further re oil concessions until Allied troops have been withdrawn from Persia

Ready to consider making some statement indicating we would be prepared to start withdrawal Allied troops earlier than was agreed in treaty – which was conclusion of Eur war.

Mol. 2 diff. q’s oil & Allied troops in Persia

Q of withdrawal of troops was not taken up until today in such a way. Here is q of carrying out the agt already signed by Iran. If there is a nec. to change this agt, some time needed to study

About oil – Negs. began by Rs asking Ir Amb what would be Ir. att. toward Sov concession Said sure answer would be most favorable. Then Dep. Com Kav – went to Iran & talked to Saed. 1st position of Saed quite favorable – same re Shah

Seemed quite natural not only SU but Persia interested in accord with Decl on Iran would be solid assistance to Iran

Second stage – something has changed in Iran. Not now dealing with details but Per. govt said not prepared go on with discussions & Majlis took dec. not give concessions during war. Since then have heard many times from Per. officials dec was unfortunate & taken in hurry

Why can’t there be 3rd stage – return of Per Govt to its 1st opin. If Per. Govt has changed mind in 1 direction what cant change in other dir. What objection? May reopen negs. Brit already have concessions – no inconvenience to Rs & R concession would not be to Brit

Let things go own way. Nothing acute now

ERS Just a word. For the record US has not signed a war-time treaty with Iran. Treaty was Sov-Brit-Iranian treaty. Also certain Am. oil co’s were negotiating & we too were cut short. I wish to support endorse entirely Mr. Eden’s proposal re withdrawal of troops. Only reason Am. troops are in Iran is to serve S U from standpoint supply & movement of Lend-lease.

As to oil we are perfectly contented not to resume negs. till after hostilities end.

Ed: No opposition to Sov. concession

ERS Same is true of U.S.

Ed. We were negotiationg another concession even before R negs began & now all that has come to an end as result of Per. Govts present attitude. Thought statement he proposed might reassure Persians, who were undoubtedly frightened at one time, & make negs easier

As to troops, no need amend treaty which says be withdrawn not later than 6 mos after end hostilities No diff. in Brit withdrawing earlier. Thought might begin when supply line no longer going.

Mol Offered to have Kavtoradge come

Mol. Would like to have limit selves to exch of views

Ed. to think over what Mol. said & may make new suggestions

Mol All of should think

8306

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Yalta, February 8, 1945

List of Items Referred to Foreign Ministers

  1. Inclusion of Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania among initial members of the Organization. (See attached paper)

  2. Date and place of United Nations Conference.

  3. Nations to be invited to United Nations Conference.

Emphasize membership should include all signatories of United Nations Declaration – not just the specific, listed countries which have already signed.

(See attached list)

  1. The policy toward Iran. (See attached paper)
[Attachment 1]

Yalta, February 8, 1945

Arguments Against Inclusion of Any of the Soviet Republics Among the Initial Members

Soviet Republics not Signatories of the United Nations Declaration:
On further thought we have become impressed with the Soviet view that the initial members of the United Nations Organization should be the signatories of the United Nations Declaration. As none of the Soviet Republics are signatories of that Declaration, Mr. Molotov’s proposal that two or three of these Republics be admitted to initial membership would be contrary to that principle.

The Question Should Be Postponed Until the Organization is Formed:
The President indicated in his remarks yesterday at the plenary session that this question should not come up until after the Organization is formed.

Mr. Molotov said yesterday at the plenary session that the Soviet Government had observed the gradual development of international relations of the British dominions. In accordance with the practice followed by the dominions, it would seem to be premature to take the action proposed by Mr. Molotov at this time. We should allow a longer time to elapse and have available more experience as to the international relations of the Soviet Republics before we consider this question.

The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the Organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.

The Soviet Republics are not Sovereign States under International Practice:
The Soviet constitution does not permit the Soviet Republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the Republics are also inconsistent with the Republics being sovereign.

NOTE: India is one of the United Nations. It, too, is not independent. The Soviet representatives will probably argue that if India can be a member so should their three Republics.

The answer: India has for some period past been gradually developing international relations, and is generally regarded as having more of the attributes of separate nationhood than the Soviet Republics.

[Attachment 2]

List of Nations Which Were Invited to the United Nations Conferences at Hot Springs, Atlantic City and Bretton Woods

United Nations
Australia Iran
Belgium Iraq
Bolivia Liberia
Brazil Luxembourg
Canada Mexico
China Netherlands
Colombia New Zealand
Costa Rica Nicaragua
Cuba Norway
Czechoslovakia Panama
Dominican Republic Philippine Commonwealth
El Salvador Poland
Ethiopia Union of South Africa
Greece Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Guatemala United Kingdom
Haiti United States
Honduras Yugoslavia
India
States Associated with the United Nations in the War
Chile Iceland
Ecuador Paraguay
Egypt Peru
France – Provisional Government of the French Republic Uruguay
Venezuela
Observers
Danish Minister at Washington, attending in a personal capacity 
[Attachment 3]

Yalta, February 8, 1945

Policy on Iran

At Malta we agreed with the British on two points:

  1. We should urge the Soviet Government, in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943, to respect the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone negotiations for oil concessions until the termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran.

The Declaration on Iran, which was signed by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at Tehran, expressed desire for the maintenance of Iran’s sovereignty and integrity.

  1. Both Governments should state that when the truck route to Russia across Iran is no longer needed, we would be prepared to begin removing our troops pari passu (i.e., at the same rate).
[Attachment 4]

Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran

December 1, 1943

The President of the United States, the Premier of the USSR, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their worldwide military operations and to the worldwide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

8307

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Kuter Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Somervell General Ismay
Vice Admiral Cooke Admiral Somerville
Rear Admiral McCormick Major General Laycock
Major General Bull Major General Holmes
Major General Anderson Lord Leathers
Major General Hull Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret

Approval of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 186th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overall Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/11)

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had examined this paper and it was acceptable to them with one amendment. They would like to change the date referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 4b (1) (d) on Page 4 of the enclosure from 30 April to 1 April.

Lord Leathers said that this amendment would suit him personally very well if the staffs concerned could prepare the study in time.

Admiral Leahy said that the United States staffs believed this would be possible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were quite prepared to accept the first of April as a target date for the report concerned.

Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke suggested that paragraph 4b (1) of the enclosure required clarification as to the order of priority in which the tasks referred to were to be undertaken. For instance, the fixing of priorities for the continuance of the war against Japan referred to in paragraph 4b (1) (b) might well have to take place before the preparation of the combined redeployment plan or at least concurrently with it.

General Somervell explained that the tasks referred to in paragraph 4b (1) were not set out in the sequence in which they would necessarily be undertaken.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide on the agencies to undertake the preparation of a combined redeployment plan, and the fixing of priority for continuance of the war against Japan. He felt that the Combined Staff Planners and the Combined Administrative Committee, in consultation, would be the best bodies to undertake this work. They would, of course, as set out in paragraph 4b (1) (c) confer with the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the appropriate shipping authorities.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 746/11, subject to the change of the date in the third line on Page 4 from 30 April to 1 April 1945.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners, in collaboration with the Combined Administrative Committee, to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b (1).

c. Invited the combined shipping authorities to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b (2).

Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War (CCS 777/1)

Sir Alan Brooke said there were two points the British Chiefs of Staff would like to make. With regard to Article 6, certain of the Dominion Governments had raised objections to the conclusion of an agreement whereby their prisoners of war should work for the Russians on any but a voluntary basis. He suggested therefore the insertion of the words “on a voluntary basis” after the words “They may also be employed” in the second sentence of Article 6.

As he saw it, the proposed agreement was susceptible to alteration by the State Department or Foreign Office, and all that was required was the assurance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they saw no objection to it in principle.

Admiral Leahy said that he had understood the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree on the wording of the document and recommend its acceptance to the State Department and Foreign Office as a basis for discussion with the Russians.

Replying to a question by General Marshall, Sir Charles Portal explained that the Dominion Governments concerned had pointed out that their forces were enrolled on a voluntary basis and were not conscripts. For political reasons, therefore, they felt it important that such troops who might be prisoners of war, should not be made to work by the Russians except on a voluntary basis.

Admiral Leahy said the proposed amendment was acceptable.

Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke said that the second point which the British Chiefs of Staff wished to put forward was with regard to Article 8. They felt that this article introduced a new subject which had not previously been considered and might not be acceptable to the Russian authorities who might well object to agreeing that their prisoners of war falling into the hands of United States or British troops should, without their consent, be transferred by one of these powers to the other.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that such transfers might be operationally necessary.

Sir Charles Portal said that as he read it, there was nothing in the remainder of the agreement which prohibited such transfers but he regarded it as a matter more for mutual arrangement between the United States and British authorities concerned than for discussion with the Russians.

General Marshall said that he was prepared to agree that paragraph 8 should be deleted.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 777/1 subject to the following amendments:

  • Article 6: In the fifth line, after “employed,” insert “on a voluntary basis.”
  • Article 8: Delete this article and renumber the succeeding article as Article 8.

(Amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 777/2.)

Equipment for Greek Forces (CCS 185th Mtg., Item 2; CCS 768/1; NAF 841)

Sir Alan Brooke reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that at their 185th Meeting, 2 February 1945, it had been agreed that the British would undertake the equipment of an additional 60,000 Greek forces upon receipt from London of certain assurances. The British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to assure the United States Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of the proposals contained in NAF 841:
a. Would not interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe; and
b. Would not result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

The British would therefore go ahead with the equipping of the forces concerned. The British Chiefs of Staff would also formalize this matter by putting out a memorandum on the lines he had just mentioned.

General Marshall said that these assurances were satisfactory.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of NAF 841 would not:

  1. Interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe;
  2. Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U.S. resources.

b. Pursuant to the above, agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841.

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776/1)

Admiral Leahy raised the question of the preparation of the final report to the President and Prime Minister. He understood that such a report would be ready for consideration on the following morning. He understood also that the Prime Minister had suggested a plenary meeting at noon, on Friday, 9 February. He would seek the wishes of the President in this matter.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it might be well for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to meet an hour before the plenary meeting in order to clear any final points with regard to the report itself or any other matters which might arise.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to request a plenary meeting for 1200 hours on Friday, 9 February 1945.
b. Agreed to meet one hour prior to the plenary meeting, whatever the hour selected, to consider the final report.

Operations on the Western Front

General Marshall read out the latest information available on the course of ground and air operations on the Western Front. He felt it of particular interest to note that at the present time there were 49 Allied divisions in the line with 33 in reserve.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the above statement.

8308

Draft Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War as Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret

Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet Armies and U.S. (British) Armies

Preamble

The Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States of America (the Government of His Britannic Majesty) wishing to conclude an agreement on arranging for the care and repatriation of Soviet citizens freed by Allied troops, and for American citizens (British subjects) freed by the Red Army, through their appointed representatives, acting mutually in the authority duly and fully invested in them, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under U.S. (British) command and American citizens (British subjects) liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

U.S. (British) and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

Article 2

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and U. S. (British) repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens (or subjects) are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the over-all administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The relocation of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

Article 3

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent U.S. (British) and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens (or subjects) of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party.

Article 4

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party.

Article 5

Soviet and U.S. (British) military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens (and subjects) of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and U.S. (British) authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and U.S. (British) Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens (or subjects) necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

Article 6

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and U.S. (British) authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labor shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.

Article 7

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens (and subjects). They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens (and subjects) to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens (and subjects) shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

Article 8

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

8309

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret
ARGONAUT 125

Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius.

The text referred to in your number 27, dated February 8, is the British redraft of the Soviet redraft submitted to the British and American Governments on January 20. In origin, it is a SHAEF paper. The British have subsequently made a few changes in it which I feel we can accept without reservation. The British are most anxious to present this draft to the Russians today for their consideration. JCS are in full agreement. I can see no objections to the redraft and have authorized, insofar as we are concerned, tripartite discussions based on it. It does not cover the numbered points mentioned in your reference telegram which were embodied in the Department’s note of February 1 to the Soviet Embassy. The consensus here is that it would be unwise to include questions relative to the protection of the Geneva Convention and to Soviet citizens in the U.S. in an agreement which deals primarily with the exchange of prisoners liberated by the Allied armies as they march into Germany. With respect to “claimants,” notwithstanding the danger of German retaliation, we believe there will be serious delays in the release of our prisoners of war unless we reach prompt agreement on this question.

ARGONAUT, February 9, 1945
8310

Völkischer Beobachter (February 8, 1945)

Westfront im Zeichen sich steigernder Angriffe

…

8311

Der Reichspressechef zur Dreierkonferenz

Berlin, 7. Februar – Vor einem Kreis von Pressevertretern in Berlin befasste sich Reichspressechef Dr. Dietrich mit der zurzeit tagenden Dreierkonferenz, wobei er insbesondere das Schlagwort von der Organisation des Weltfriedens einer eingehenden Betrachtung unterzog und die Tatsache beleuchtete, dass Plutokratie und Bolschewismus die Keimzellen ewiger Kriege sind.

So führte der Reichspressechef aus:

Im Schwarzen Meer, wahrscheinlich auf einem Kriegsschiff, sitzen zurzeit drei Männer zusammen, die wir als die Hauptkriegsschuldigen und größten Kriegsverbrecher aller Zeiten kennen. Sie haben erklären lassen, dass sie sich auf dieser Konferenz zwei Ziele gesetzt hätten:

Sie wollen erstens das deutsche Volk durch ein Agitationsmanöver zur Selbstaufgabe bewegen und zweitens der leichtgläubigen Menschheit die Herbeiführung des ewigen Friedens versprechen.

Das deutsche Volk zur Kapitulation und damit zur Selbstauslöschung zu überreden, ist ihnen in den vergangenen Jahren nicht gelungen und wird ihnen auch jetzt nicht gelingen. Das zweite Hauptziel dieser Konferenz wirft die Frage auf, welche Legitimation gerade diese drei Männer besitzen, vom Frieden zu reden. Nur allzu oft hat die Rauhe Wirklichkeit ihre Versprechungen schon entlarvt. Vor der Unbestechlichkeit der Tatsachen in den „befreiten“ Ländern sind ihre tönenden Worte von der Garantie der Staaten und Selbstbestimmung der Völker, von Friede und Wohlstand, von Freiheit und Völkerbeglückung vor den Augen der ganzen Welt zusammengebrochen.

Schon immer dienten den Plutokraten und Bolschewisten moralische Schlagworte und billige Redensarten dazu, dass in einer Zeit härtesten Kampfes und schwerster Opfer Worte des Friedens eine gangbare Münze zur Täuschung der Massen sind. Es ist heute eine geschichtliche Tatsache, dass das Wort von der Unteilbarkeit des Friedens, das unsere Feinde 1939 ständig im Munde führten, nur dazu gedient hat, den Ausbruch des zweiten Weltkrieges herbeizuführen. Es war jene berüchtigte These, dass der kleine lokale Konflikt notwendig die ganze Welt erfassen und in Brand setzen müsse. Alle Einsichtigen haben damals vor diesem gefährlichen verbrecherischen Schlagwort gewarnt, die Welt, die jetzt in Flammen steht, wird sich dessen erinnern. Eine gleiche Warnung ist heute am Platze, weil wiederum hinter ihren Phrasen in Wirklichkeit die Triebkräfte des Krieges stehen.

Das Gesetz des Kapitalismus ist der Rhythmus der Krise des Konflikts und der sozialen Spannung, aus der es am Ende keinen friedlichen Ausweg mehr gibt. Den Kapitalismus begleitet der Fluch eines vergangenen Zeitalters. Er kann in der Zukunft nur noch das Chaos erzeugen. Die Zerrüttung der Weltwirtschaft, die wir nach Versailles erlebt haben und die den zweiten Weltkrieg vorbereitete, würde ein Kinderspiel sein, verglichen mit dem wirtschaftlichen Inferno, das ein Sieg der kapitalistischen und imperialistischen Staaten heute heraufbeschwören würde.

Das innerste Wesen des Bolschewismus anderseits ist der Zug nach unten. Moskaus Sieg über Europa würde zwangsläufig eine unaufhörliche Kette blutiger Kriege nach sich ziehen, so lange, bis alle Völker der Erde dem Elend unterworfen und auf die niedrigste Stufe der Lebensform und das tiefste soziale Niveau der menschlichen Gesellschaft herabgedrückt wären.

Kapitalismus und Bolschewismus können nicht die Träger des Friedens sein, weil sie die Brutstätten der Kriege sind. Mit Recht schrieb in diesen Tagen der stellvertretende Vorsitzende der britischen Labour-Partei: „Der wirtschaftliche Imperialismus der USA wird innerhalb einer Generation den dritten Weltkrieg bedeuten“ und im englischen Unterhaus fiel in der Debatte über Griechenland das prophetische Wort: „Wir säen die Saat für zukünftige Kriege.“

Das wirkliche Ziel für das die auf der Konferenz Versammelten kämpfen, ist also nicht – wie sie sagen – eine Welt des Friedens, sondern umgekehrt die Verewigung des Krieges! Was sie der Menschheit bringen wollen, ist nicht die Palme dauerhaften Friedens, sondern die Geißel ewigen Krieges!

Sie haben 1939 so lange vom unteilbaren Frieden gesprochen, bis sie den totalen Krieg herbeigeführt hatten. Und wenn sie heute von Organisation des Weltfriedens sprechen, dann bereiten sie in Wirklichkeit den Weltkrieg in Permanenz vor!

Von diesen sich aus den geschichtlichen und logischen Feststellungen zwangsläufig und unwiderlegbar ergebenden Tatbeständen werden Roosevelt, Churchill und Stalin mit Sicherheit nicht sprechen, wenn sie jetzt als die Herolde des ewigen Friedens vor die Öffentlichkeit treten. Diese furchtbaren Wahrheiten werden sie verborgen halten hinter ihren Reden, Kommuniqués und falschen Friedensbeteuerungen, die sie verbreiten lassen.

Wenn sie wirklich von Friedensabsichten erfüllt wären, dann müssten sie feierlich erklären, dass „Friede auf Erden“ nur möglich ist in einer Welt, in der die Vereinigten Staaten ihren kriegsprovozierenden weltwirtschaftlichen Imperialismus aufgeben und sich stattdessen der Beglückung ihres eigenen Volkes zuwenden: dass der Weltfriede nur möglich ist in einer Welt, in der England den von ihm unterjochten großen Völkern in Indien, Arabien und der übrigen Welt die Freiheit und Souveränität zurückgibt, dass niemals Friede auf Erden sein wird, solange innerhalb aller Völker eine fremde, zersetzende Rasse eigene, verbrecherische Ziele verfolgt.**

Ein wahrer Friede ist nur denkbar, wenn die kapitalistische Ausbeutung ebenso unmöglich gemacht ist wie die bolschewistische und deren blutgierigen alles zerstörenden Instinkte. Er ist nur möglich in einer Welt, in der die plutokratischen Vorrechte und die wirtschaftlichen Privilegien beseitigt sind, in der die gleichen Bedingungen des Aufstieges für alle arbeitenden Menschen und Völker gelten.

Wenn es den drei Kriegsverbrechern Ernst wäre mit Ihren Schwindelparolen, dann müssten sie vor aller Welt auch feststellen, dass äußere Verträge des Friedens gar nichts nützen und nur eine Täuschung sind, wenn die bolschewistische Taktik der terroristischen Aushöhlung der Staaten von innen heraus jederzeit ihren blutigen Marsch zur Welteroberung antreten kann; dass die Vernichter der europäischen Kultur nicht ihre Erretter sein können und dass diejenigen, die mit den Bolschewisten paktieren, der Welt nicht den Frieden, sondern den blutigsten Terror bringen werden.

Solange die Welt solche Erklärungen aus dem Munde derjenigen nicht vernimmt, die von Propagandaphrasen überfließen, werden die Menschen um den Frieden betrogen sein!

Das Zeitalter des Friedens beginnt erst, wenn die Triebkräfte der bisherigen Kriege aus der Welt beseitigt sind. Nicht aus den schon so oft katastrophal gescheiterten bankrotten Friedensparolen der Vergangenheit, sondern aus den neuen fortschrittlichen Ideen unserer Zeit, die das Gegeneinander der Nationen in die Bahn für und miteinander lenken, wird der kommende Friede unter den Völkern erstehen. Wie alles wahrhaft Große muss er unter schwersten Opfern errungen und mit äußerster Hingabe erkämpft werden. Mit dem Bollwerk des europäischen Kontinents steht und fällt der Friede der Welt.

8312

Leitartikel: Oststurm über Europa

Von Schadewald

In dem gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt, in dem die Sowjets gegen Europa anstürmen, ist die Frage belanglos, ob Churchill, Roosevelt oder Stalin der geistige Urheber und hartnäckigste Verfechter der Forderung der „bedingungslosen Kapitulation“ ist – sie tragen alle drei die Verantwortung dafür, dass der von den kriegsbeteiligten Völkern ersehnte Frieden in weite Ferne gerückt ist.

Churchill, der alte politische Rosstäuscher, tut so, als ob England es sich leisten könnte, den von ihm angezettelten Krieg unbegrenzt fortzuführen. Dabei hat England weder auf dem europäischen noch auf dem pazifischen Kriegsschauplatz eine Führungsrolle, sondern ist längst zum Nebenpartner degradiert, denn in Westeuropa stehen zweimal mehr Amerikaner als Engländer im Kampf, und im Pazifik werden die Briten von den Yankees nur als unerwünschtes Anhängsel geduldet; ganz zu schweigen von der Sowjetunion, die sich in Europa auf ihre Art zum immer größeren Befremden weiter Kreise der englischen Öffentlichkeit „häuslich einrichtet“ und ohne Rücksicht auf britische Interessen in den baltischen Ländern, Finnland, Polen, Jugoslawien und Griechenland „fertige Tatsachen“ schafft.

Wo sich die anglo-amerikanischen Mächte als „Befreier“ haben feiern lassen, da sind Hunger und Arbeitslosigkeit, Unordnung und Gewaltakte, Elend, Streiks und Massendemonstrationen als Schrittmacher kommunistischer Zersetzung der besetzten Länder Europas eingezogen. Statt Demokratie und Freiheit triumphieren bolschewistische Umtriebe, und Moskaus rührige Agenten bereiten planmäßig durch Ausnutzung der Katastrophenverhältnisse die Sowjetisierung der der Ordnungsmacht Deutschland entzogenen Länder vor. Die europäische Menschheit hat mittlerweile genug Beispiele für die Folgen einer Auslieferung und Unterwerfung unter den Diktaturwillen Stalins; sie kann Vergleiche ziehen, was Moskau in politischer und wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht versprochen hat und was daraus wirklich geworden ist. Tempo und Dynamik der Entwicklung zum politischen und wirtschaftlichen Chaos in den besetzten Ländern Europas werden vom Marschtritt der Sowjetarmee bestimmt.

Aber die Erkenntnis dieser von Moskau geschürten und gesteuerten Entwicklung ist vielen Europäern erst aufgegangen, als die bolschewistische Sturmflut gegen die Grenzen des Deutschen Reiches anbrandete. Soweit musste es erst kommen, um die neutralen Staaten in jene Unruhe zu versetzen, die die Annäherung des bolschewistischen Gespenstes als tödliche Lebensgefahr verursacht. Je stürmischer sich die Schrecken der asiatischen Steppe an das Herz Europas heranwälzen, um so besorgter bückt man in Bern und Stockholm, in Madrid und Lissabon, aber auch in London auf das aus dem Osten heraufziehende Unwetter.

Wenn der deutsche Damm bricht, dann reißt der Bolschewismus die europäische Kultur und Lebensart, das ganze Gefüge der Zivilisation der Menschheit ein, dann wird Europa ein Sklavenmarkt für Elendshaufen verängstigter Menschen. Gezwungen, das verbliebene nationale Leben in der „Weltunion der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken“ aufgehen zu lassen und sich des individuellen Persönlichkeitswertes zugunsten einer Nivellierung und Vermassung zu entäußern, wird nach einer Überwältigung der völkisch bewussten Staaten durch die Menschen- und Materialmassen Moskaus das in der Vielfalt seiner nationalen und sozialen Lebensformen blühende Europa in Trümmer sinken, denn England und die Vereinigten Staaten sind weder gewillt noch haben sie die Macht, der Bolschewisierung des europäischen Kontinents Einhalt zu gebieten.

Gibt es ein eindrucksvolleres Beispiel für das, was Europa vom Kreml erwartet, als das Schicksal des von den anglo-amerikanischen Mächten betrogenen und verratenen Polens? So wenig sich Stalin im Fall Polen von London und Washington in den Arm fallen lässt, so wenig er in Jugoslawien zu Zugeständnissen an die westdemokratischen Wünsche bereit ist, so wenig er in Griechenland, Italien, Frankreich und Belgien den bolschewistischen Machenschaften und realen Machtansprüchen des Kommunismus Zügel anlegt, so wenig wird er das übrige Europa schonen und in seiner Lebensart bestehen lassen, wenn er freien Weg zur Bolschewisierung der seinem Gewaltwillen ausgelieferten Staaten und Völker hat.

Deutschland allein verlegt der bolschewistischen Weltrevolution den Weg, indem es mit dem Aufgebot aller seiner ideellen und materiellen Kräfte dem Ansturm der Sowjetarmeen entgegentritt.

Deutschland führt den Kampf für die europäische Freiheit und die Rettung der Menschheitskultur.

Deutschland opfert sein Letztes, um das deutsche Vaterland, den Lebensstandard Europas und die Gesittung der Welt vor dem Untergang im bolschewistischen Chaos zu bewahren.

Millionen Europäer haben die Bedeutung der deutschen Schicksalsparole „Sieg oder Untergang“ erkannt und sie sich zu eigen gemacht, auch gewisse Kreise Englands fühlen und wissen, was heute im Zeichen der sowjetischen Mammutoffensive auf dem Spiele steht. Wird aber das ganze England das unverantwortliche kriegspolitische Vabanquespiel der Churchillschen Regierung erkennen und begreifen, welches die politischen Folgen einer militärischen Niederlage Deutschlands, einer Auslieferung Kontinentaleuropas an den Bolschewismus sind und was Ostwindüber Europa bedeutet? Churchill wird es erst verstehen, wenn es für England und das Britische Reich zu spät ist!

8313

Italien – ein einziges Chaos

…

8314

Der Kampf um die Hauptstadt der Philippinen

Tokio, 7. Februar – 20 Panzer, 23 Geschütze und 24 Kraftwagen der Amerikaner wurden von japanischen Infanteristen in den letzten 24 Stunden Kampf in den nördlichen Vororten von Manila zerstört oder erbeutet. 1.600 Mann feindliche Truppen wurden getötet. In der Nacht zum 4. Februar griffen japanische Marineinfanterietruppen im nordöstlichen Vorfeld der philippinischen Hauptstadt US-Panzer an und zerstörten nach japanischen Frontberichten zehn Panzer und Panzerwagen.

Eine amtliche Mitteilung des japanischen Hauptquartiers vom Dienstagnachmittag teilt mit:

Teile feindlicher Truppen drangen am 3. Februar abends vom Norden her in ein Gebiet der Stadt Manila ein. Japanische Truppen bekämpften den Feind, wobei sie wichtige Punkte innerhalb und außerhalb der Stadt in Besitz behielten.

Nach einem weiteren Bericht der Japaner haben die Nordamerikaner ihre Truppen auf Luzon am 4. Februar in der Gegend von Ada östlich von Nasugbu durch Absetzen von Luftlandetruppen aus 70 Transportflugzeugen verstärkt.

„Es ist dringend notwendig, dass Japan, China und Mandschukuo ihre gesamte Kraft darauf konzentrieren, die anglo-amerikanischen Feinde zu zermalmen,“ erklärte der neue Botschafter von Mandschukuo bei der chinesischen Nationalregierung, Li Shakeng. In einem Interview, das er im Anschluss an die Überreichung seines Beglaubigungsschreibens den Pressevertretern gab, betonte er, dass er sich voll und ganz für die weitere Festigung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen China und Mandschukuo einsetzen werde. Es sei notwendig, dass die drei ostasiatischen Länder Japan, China und Mandschukuo Hand in Hand arbeiten zur vollständigen Vernichtung der Anglo-Amerikaner und für die Wiedergeburt Ostasiens.

Die Entwicklung der Kämpfe auf Luzon und das Eindringen der Amerikaner in Manila wird von der Tokioter Presse mit der Versicherung kommentiert, dass den Amerikanern auf den Philippinen noch gezeigt würde, „was eine Blutoffensive ist.“

Die Zeitung Asahi meint, dass selbst die Ennahme Manilas durch die Amerikaner dem Feind zwar ein gewisses Propagandamittel in die Hand gebe, aber je näher die feindlichen Truppen an die Stadt herankommen, um so günstiger werde anderseits die dortige Stellung der Japaner, die nur auf die geeignete Gelegenheit zum Losschlagen warten. Yomiuri meint, die Amerikaner wollen auf den Philippinen eine Basis für eine Invasion in Japan selbst schaffen. Japan aber werde den Feind an seiner schwächsten Stelle treffen und ihm hohe Menschenverluste zufügen.

Yamashita verteidigt Manila

Tokio, 7. Februar – General Yamashita, der Oberkommandeur der japanischen Truppen auf den Philippinen und Eroberer von Malaya und Schonan (Singapur), leitet persönlich die Verteidigung von Manila.

8315

Tradition der Sklavenhändler

…

8316

Führer HQ (February 8, 1945)

Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

Im Westteil von Budapest kämpft die Besatzung mit großer Tapferkeit weiter gegen die feindliche Übermacht.

Nördlich der Westbeskiden wurde der zwischen Saybusch und PIess erneut angreifende Feind nach anfänglichem Geländegewinn abgewehrt. Bei Steinau, Glogau und Odereck warfen Gegenangriffe die Sowjets in mehreren Abschnitten zurück. Um kleinere Brückenköpfe des Feindes an der Oder zwischen Fürstenberg und Küstrin wird heftig gekämpft.

Die Besatzungen von Schneidemühl und Posen hielten fortgesetzten sowjetischen Angriffen stand.

Im Raum von Pyritz und Arnswalde fingen unsere Truppen die angreifenden Bolschewisten auf, befreiten in schwungvollem Gegenstoß mehrere verlorengegangene Ortschaften und schossen dabei 30 feindliche Panzer ab. Südwestlich Graudenz warfen Grenadiere den Gegner aus einer Einbruchsstelle und fügten ihm erhebliche Verluste zu. Gegen die Nogatfront und gegen Elbing griff der Feind heftig an. Verbände der Luftwaffe und Seestreitkräfte unterstützten wirkungsvoll den schweren, aber erfolgreichen Abwehrkampf der tapferen Besatzung von Elbing.

In Ostpreußen lag gestern der Schwerpunkt der Schlacht zwischen Wormditt und Heilsberg sowie bei Kreuzburg. Die erneuten Versuche, unsere Front aufzuspalten, scheiterten an dem hartnäckigen Widerstand unserer Truppen.

Im Samland wurde eine um Thierenberg stehende feindliche Kampfgruppe eingeschlossen und vernichtet. Die Bolschewisten verloren bei den schweren Kämpfen in Ostpreußen gestern 52 Panzer und 72 Geschütze.

Im Kurland beseitigten unsere Truppen südöstlich Libau einen Brückenkopf der Sowjets über die Barta.

Im Westen dauern die feindlichen Angriffsvorbereitungen vor unserer Rurfront an. Vorfühlende Stoßtrupps wurden vernichtet, Ansammlungen durch zusammengefasstes Artilleriefeuer wirksam bekämpft. Nach einem örtlichen Einbruch der Amerikaner nördlich der Urfttalsperre stellte ein Gegenangriff von Panzergrenadieren die Lage wieder her. In der Schnee-Eifel konnte der Feind nach heftigen Gefechten seinen Einbruch etwas erweitern. Die Angriffe der 3. amerikanischen Armee an der deutsch-luxemburgischen Grenze blieben im zusammengefassten Feuer aller Waffen verlustreich liegen. Einzelne Brückenköpfe, die der Feind über die Oure hatte bilden können, wurden von unseren Truppen im Gegenangriff zerschlagen. Auch bei und nordwestlich Echternach warfen sie den Gegner unter hohen Verlusten wieder auf das Südufer der Sauer zurück und schnitten dabei eine schwächere Kampfgruppe ab. Bei Remich an der Mosel sind erneut heftige Kämpfe mit angreifenden feindlichen Bataillonen im Gange.

Im Saarbrückenkopf zwischen Forbach und Saargemünd ist die gesamte Hauptkampflinie bis auf unbedeutende Reste wieder in unserer Hand.

Ein stärkerer nächtlicher Angriff an der Nordostfront von St. Nazaire brach in unserem Abwehrfeuer zusammen.

In Mittelitalien kam es auch gestern beiderseits des Sergio zu örtlichen Kämpfen, in deren Verlauf unsere Grenadiere den Feind aus einigen Einbruchsstellen zurückwarfen.

Nordamerikanische Terrorflieger griffen am gestrigen Tage Wien an Britische Verbände warfen Bomben auf Orte im westlichen Reichsgebiet. Nächtliche Angriffe d Briten richteten sich gegen Magdeburg und erneut gegen Orte im westdeutschen Raum. Luftverteidigungskräfte brachten 33 anglo-amerikanische Flugzeuge, in der Mehrzahl viermotorige Bomber, zum Absturz.

Die schlesische 252. Infanteriedivision unter Führung von Generalleutnant Drekmann und die ostpreußische 542. Volksgrenadierdivision unter Führung von Generalleutnant Löwrick haben sich in den schweren Kämpfen vom 31. Jänner bis 2. Februar an der Weichsel durch besondere Standhaftigkeit hervorgetan.

Bei einem Angriff britischer Kampfflugzeuge im Raum Hannover in der Nacht vom 4. zum 5. Februar wurden durch Bombenabwurf auf ein Gefangenenlager nach abschließenden Meldungen 97 französische Offiziere getötet und 120 verwundet.

8317

Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 8, 1945)

FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN

ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section

DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
081100A February

TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT

TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP

(REF NO.)
NONE

(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR

Communiqué No. 306

Allied forces in the area northeast of Monschau have encountered heavily defended minefields between Bergstein and the Kall River. Our infantry elements have advanced more than 1,000 yards to the edge of Kommerscheidt, one-half mile northwest of Schmidt, and our armor has pushed to within 500 yards of Schmidt, west of the town, in this area we have taken 159 enemy pillboxes during the past three days.

Southwest of Schleiden, our forces have cleared the enemy from Hellenthal after several days of fighting in the town against stubborn resistance.

In the area north and northwest of Prüm, our infantry has reached Wascheid, and the towns of Hontheim and Sellerich are in our hands. Southwest of Prüm, we have taken Hollnich.

Our forces have launched attacks across the Our and Sauer Rivers at several places on a front extending from the area northeast of Clervaux to the vicinity of Echternach. The crossings were impeded by high water and enemy obstacles on the eastern bank. We have made gains over the our near Dasburg, four miles east of Clervaux, and in the area of Wallendorf, six miles east of Diekirch. Other infantry elements crossed in the vicinity of Echternach and made gains of more than 800 yards in the area northeast of the town.

Southeast of Remich, our forces have captured Sinz.

East of Saareguemines, an enemy attack by an estimated 100 infantry was repulsed without loss of ground. Our forces raided Buchholz, east of the Hardt Mountains, inflicted casualties and took prisoners.

Our efforts to clear the northern part of Oberhöfen, near Haguenau, were stubbornly resisted. Farther east, our forward elements received considerable fire from Drusenheim.

In the lower Alsace Plain the advance down the corridor between the Rhine and the Rhine-Rhone Canal reached points seven miles south of Neuf-Brisach. The villages of Heiteren, Balgau, and Fessenheim were liberated.

The west bank of the Rhine-Rhone Canal has been entirely cleared of the enemy. Crossings were made near the Ile Napoleon at the junction of the Rhine-Rhone and Huningue Canals.

In the Vosges Mountains organized enemy resistance has been broken. Mopping up of isolated enemy groups continues.

Allied forces in the west captured 2,905 prisoners on 5 February.

Bad weather severely restricted air operations yesterday.

An enemy railhead at Lipp, 16 miles west of Köln, was attacked without loss by a small force of medium bombers.

Escorted heavy bombers struck at objectives in western Germany.

Last night, enemy troops and equipment in Kleve and Goch between the Meuse and the Rhine Rivers were attacked by heavy bombers operating in great strength. Targets at Magdeburg, Kassel, Mainz, Koblenz, Bonn, Hanover, Düsseldorf and Duisburg were struck at by light bombers.

COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/

Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others

ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section

NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409

AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/
8318

U.S. State Department (February 8, 1945)

Meeting of the American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3:00 p.m.

Yusupov Palace, USSR

Present
United States Soviet Union
Fleet Admiral Leahy General of the Army Antonov
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral King Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov (aided by a 2-star admiral)
Major General Kuter

Kuter Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 3 p.m.
Top secret

Admiral Leahy opened the conference with the statement that we would discuss military problems in the Far East and that we required specific data on which to base the long-range planning required by the great distances from the United States to the Pacific Theater.

Admiral Leahy then stated that we have prepared a series of questions on which replies were desired.

General Antonov asked to have all of the questions presented prior to any replies or discussion.

Admiral Leahy then read the questions set forth in the memorandum by the Commanding General, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, “Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meeting,” as stated in JCS 1227/5 (Argonaut), dated 7 Feb 1945. These questions were read as written with the words “or some more suitable area” interpolated in question (3).

After brief discussion on the side with Admiral King, Admiral Leahy posed two additional questions, the first consisting of paragraph 3 of the memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners, “Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meetings” as set forth in JCS 1227/4 (ARGONAUT) 7 February 1945. Admiral Leahy’s second additional question was based on paragraph 7 of the Planners’ paper and asked if arrangements could be made whereby weather information could be made available to the U.S. from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia.

General Antonov opened the period of reply and discussion with the very clear statement that he had no authority to give definite answers or promises or to make decisions on matters pertaining to the Far East. He stated that his comments represented his own personal opinion and views and further that he would refer the questions to Marshal Stalin the same day and would arrange to provide complete and authoritative answers as quickly as possible.

The following replies to questions and discussion ensued:

a. There have been no changes in the Soviet projected plan of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October.

b. With regard to the Soviet requirement for a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start, General Antonov opened with the statement that the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railroad “can be hampered” by the enemy. The Soviets therefore cannot rely on that rail line to support their forces. A maximum effort will be made to keep the Trans-Siberian Railroad in operation. However, the Soviets will require that air and sea routes across the Pacific (mainly sea routes) be kept open. They will particularly require fuel (petroleum products) and foodstuffs.

c. As to basing U.S. Air Forces in Siberia, no discussion could be had until Marshal Stalin’s decision was obtained.

d. U.S. Forces may be required to defend Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia. General Antonov’s words was [were] that the Soviets “will find American help useful.”

e. As to pre-hostilities preparation including construction, reception, and storage of U.S. stock piles in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia, a rather lengthy reply was given including the following points:

  • The Soviets will move much larger forces to the Far East than are now there – these augmented forces will require greatly increased supplies – the Soviet problem will be great to supply their expanded forces and they cannot promise to construct and store materials for American forces. They may need American materials with which to build fuel storage for the Soviet forces. This question could be answered after detailed requirements were known and after a decision had been obtained that U.S. forces would be employed in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia.

f. Entry into Kamchatka by the American Survey Party will be determined by Marshal Stalin.

g. The Soviets will occupy southern Sakhalin as quickly after the beginning of hostilities as possible and will do this without American help. The Soviet Navy will deny Laparousa Strait to the Japanese but it will be difficult to permit friendly surface movements through the Laparousa Strait until a Soviet Navy base and shore artillery are established.

h. This question “Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued” is somewhat garbled in reply. General Antonov stated that he had planned in October to start the movement of troops in early 1945. However, all Soviet troops, including those released from Finland and Latvia are now joined in the battle on the Eastern Front. He stated that the intended troop movements will, therefore, be delayed until the necessary units can be disengaged from the present battle. Later in the conversation, General Marshall expanded the American requirement for firm data on which to base future plans. He explained that necessity had lead the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to relieve their Senior Planners from their global responsibilities to permit them to move to Moscow to concentrate on the Russian-American phase of the war against Japan. He made it very clear that we must have planning basis and that we are security conscious. General Marshall concluded with a forceful statement that specific and constructive planning in Moscow must be pursued. General Antonov stated that he would do his best to improve the planning situation in Moscow.

i. Weather in Siberia was discussed at some length and its relation to the initiation of hostilities. From a ground force view point the most difficult conditions would be experienced during the thaw and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month, July and August is also undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned, weather would be most favorable in September, October and November. At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September.

j. Authority to obtain weather stations would be discussed with Marshal Stalin.

Admiral Kuznetsov presented his desire to take over ships from the U.S. at Dutch Harbor or Kodiak but accepted Admiral King’s statement that Cold Bay was more desirable and would be used. Some discussion followed and it was concluded that Russian crews could be moved from Murmansk to the east coast of the U.S. by returning convoys and then to be moved by rail to the west coast. However, the provision of American shipping to move these crews to Cold Bay was not viewed with favor by Admiral King.

Except for the immediately preceding conversation, the Russians had no questions to ask.

General Marshall presented a summary of recent operations – gave to General Antonov a written statement as to our views of the combat effectiveness of German divisions after the Ardennes battle and left with the Russians our estimate of Japan’s strength in the Pacific.

Air Marshal Khudyakov presented a Russian version of the agreement to create a restricted zone for air operations on the Russian front.

Upon adjourning General Antonov stated that he would see Marshal Stalin forthwith and would inform the U.S. Chiefs of Staff as to when we might expect the next meeting to receive official and definite replies to our questions.

Dictated to and transcribed by T/Sgt George J. Lang. General Kuter’s notes and Sgt Lang’s shorthand notes have been destroyed.

L. S. KUTER
Major General, USA

Six (6) copies prepared with distribution to the individuals indicated below:
General Marshall 3 copies
General Deane 1 copy
General Hull 1 copy
General Kuter 1 copy
8319

Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations

Yalta, 8 February 1945
Top secret

Subject: QUESTIONS POSED BY ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV AT THE U.S.-RUSSIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING THURSDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 8.

  1. (a) Question. What has been determined about the transfer of ships to the Russians (presumably with reference to the MILEPOST program).

    (b) Answer. It is difficult to be definite until we know more about the U-boat offensive in the Atlantic. However, it would seem practicable to work out a schedule of deliveries on a step-by-step basis in which the later deliveries may have to be delayed because of the U-boat situation in the Atlantic.

  2. (a) Question. If Dutch Harbor is not a suitable place for the transfer of ships to the Russians and for the training of Russian crews, the second preference would be Kodiak. What is your view?

    (b) Answer. After thorough review of all considerations, it has been decided that Cold Bay is the best place to effect the delivery of ships to the Russians and the training of Russian crews.

NOTE: Admiral Kuznetsov was unfamiliar with Cold Bay but when the location was pointed out to him he accepted it.

  1. (a) Question. We wish to transfer crews from Murmansk by utilizing convoys returning from Murmansk to the United States, thence by rail across the United States to the West Coast, and thence to Cold Bay. Can you manage this?

    (b) Answer. It would seem practicable to move Russian crews as far as the West Coast of the United States in the manner you describe, but it will be extremely difficult to move them from the West Coast to Cold Bay because of the very bad shipping situation in the Pacific. The matter will require the closest examination and the answer must be understood to be very uncertain at this time.

NOTE: Admiral Kuznetsov made no offer for the movement of the Russian crews from the West Coast to Cold Bay in Russian ships, which matter should be taken up further with the Russians.

NOTE: After the Staff meeting adjourned, I asked the Russian Admiral how many men, total, they wish to move from Murmansk to Cold Bay. His reply was about 3,000. I suggested if they were moved in detachments suitable to the accommodations in the ships of the convoys returning from Murmansk, it would make the problem more easy of solution – and, as well, it would facilitate their transfer by rail across the United States and, further, their transfer from the West Coast of the United States to Cold Bay. I added that such an arrangement would fit in well with the proposed schedule of delivery of ships on a step-by-step basis.

  1. Copies of this memorandum will be given to the distribution list below. All agencies that are involved are urged to pursue this matter to an acceptable solution.

E. J. KING
Fleet Admiral, USN

Distribution List
* Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
* General Somervell
* General Kuter
* General Deane
* Admiral Olsen
* Admiral Horne
* Admiral Edwards
* Admiral Cooke
* Admiral Duncan
* Admiral McCormick
* Admiral Land
8320

Memorandum by the Commanding General, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union

7 February 1945
Top secret (special distribution)
JCS 1227/5
(ARGONAUT)

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meeting

References:
a. JCS 1176 Series
b. JCS Memo for Info No. 360

It is recommended that in your meeting with the Soviet Staff you obtain their commitments or opinions, as appropriate, on the following subjects:

  1. Have there been any changes in Soviet projected plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October?

  2. Will the Soviets require a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start?

  3. Will agreement be given for operation of U.S. air forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area?

  4. Will U.S. forces be required for defense of Kamchatka?

  5. Will the Soviets make pre-hostility preparations including construction, and reception and storage of U.S. stockpiles in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia?

  6. Can the Kamchatka survey party depart from Fairbanks by 15 February 1945?

  7. Will the Soviets occupy southern Sakhalin and when? If so, will they cover passage of LaPerouse Strait?

  8. Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued?

8321

Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners

7 February 1945
Top secret (special distribution)
JCS 1227/4
(ARGONAUT)

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meeting

References:
a. JCS 1176 Series
b. JCS Memo for Information No. 360

  1. In the following paragraphs the Joint Staff Planners have set forth the various subjects and questions which it is considered should be brought up at the meeting and in so doing have used the phraseology which might be suitable for presenting each subject to the Red General Staff. Most of these have been presented previously in various papers and are repeated here for convenience of the Chiefs of Staff.

  2. The President asked Marshal Stalin two questions, saying he would appreciate an early reply at this conference. The first was:

Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia?

The second was:

Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?

If the Red Army Staff gives an encouraging reply on basing the strategic air forces, suggest they be asked for agreement to entry of a U.S. survey party in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area at an early date, details to be worked out with the Mission.

  1. On the assumption Russia can be ready to enter the war against Japan three months after the end of the German war as indicated by Marshal Stalin in October, how would the weather and season of the year affect the beginning operations in Eastern Siberia?

  2. Do you estimate that you are liable to need any U.S. assistance in defending Kamchatka once war breaks out with Japan?

    Do you consider you will be able to develop bases in Kamchatka, particularly air bases, before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan?

    In connection with the foregoing, the United States Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum concerning the Kamchatka survey party. We consider it most important that this survey party get under way in the very near future. Will you give us your thoughts on our memorandum? (See Appendix “A” for copy of memorandum.)

  3. In connection with your plan of operations in Eastern Siberia, do you intend to take the southern half of Sakhalin?

    If so, do you think you will be able to open the La Perouse Strait to shipping?

  4. The United States Chiefs of Staff have sent you a memorandum (see Appendix “B”) in which we state our feeling as to the importance of combined planning in Moscow between your representatives and our planning group. We hope you will agree with our views and would like to hear any comments or suggestions you have.

  5. In connection with our operations accurate information on weather is most important. This information will be equally necessary to your air forces as well as to ours operating over Japan. The United States Chiefs feel it important that they obtain weather information from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia and request that you arrange this.

  6. Providing the Red Staff elects to discuss MILEPOST requirements, it is suggested that the substance of JCS Memo for Information No. 360 be given the Red General Staff verbally.

  7. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that in the discussion of the above subjects, the United States Chiefs of Staff make clear to the Russians that:

    a. Amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 are remote.

    b. If the Russians indicate a desire for a supply route across the North Pacific, the United States Chiefs indicate they expect facilities for basing U. S. strategic air forces in Eastern Siberia in connection with the opening of any such route.

Appendix “A”

Memorandum from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Representatives of the Soviet General Staff

In order that there be complete understanding on the arrangements for the entrance into Kamchatka of the United States Reconnaissance Party, the composition of which by name has already been furnished the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is requested that the Soviet General Staff indicate agreement to the following:

a. the reconnaissance party will have access to any part of the area.

b. Transportation to, from, and within the area will be furnished by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

c. Full information and assistance will be furnished by local Soviet authorities.

d. Free and rapid communication between the party and U.S. military authorities will be permitted and arranged for by the Soviets.

It is further urged that arrangements be completed in time to permit the departure of this party from Fairbanks, Alaska, not later than 15 February 1945.

Appendix “B”

Memorandum from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Representatives of the Soviet General Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted with satisfaction the initiation of combined planning in Moscow. The work of this combined group is of the utmost importance to the planning and coordination of our operations for the defeat of Japan.

The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that special effort should be made on both sides to expedite this combined planning by a full, free and frank exchange of information, data and ideas between members of the combined group. Preparation of combined studies and estimates for presentation to the respective Chiefs of Staff should be pushed forward without delay.

The United States Chiefs ask for your agreement to these views and for any comments or suggestions which you may care to make.