Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

Fourth plenary meeting, 4:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hopkins Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Maisky
Mr. Byrnes Sir Edward Bridges Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman Mr. Jebb Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Matthews Mr. Wilson Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Hiss Mr. Dixon
Mr. Bohlen Major Birse

Bohlen Minutes

February 7, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subject[s]:

  1. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

  2. POLAND

  3. WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION

  4. ZONE OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY FOR FRANCE AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE CONTROL COMMISSION

The President said in regard to the Polish question he wished again to emphasize that he was less interested in the tracing of the frontier lines than he was in the problem of the Polish Government. He said that he did not attach any importance to the continuity or legality of any Polish Government since he thought in some years there had in reality been no Polish Government. He added that before proceeding with the Polish question he understood that Mr. Molotov had a report on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers today.

Mr. Molotov then read the results of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, as follows:

Decisions Adopted at the Meeting of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden

February 7, 1945

Regarding the Dismemberment of Germany

(a) A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Matthews were entrusted with the preparation of the final draft of Article 12 of the instrument “unconditional surrender of Germany” having in view the insertion in the text of Article 12 of the word “dismemberment.”

(b) The study of the question of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Eden, Mr. Winant and F. T. Gusev.

Regarding the Zone of Occupation in Germany for France

(a) The allotment to France of a zone in Germany to be occupied by French occupational forces has been agreed upon.

(b) As regards the question of the participation of France in the Control Commission, V. M. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius feel [it] desirable to refer the question to the EAC. Mr. Eden considers it necessary to discuss this question now and to give France a place on the Control Commission.

Regarding the Reparations to be Exacted from Germany

(a) It was agreed that in the paragraph one of the Soviet proposals mention should be made of sacrifices borne.

(b) It was decided that the residence of the Reparations Committee should be in the City of Moscow. It was agreed that the Committee should begin its work immediately upon the approval of the principles of the exacting of the reparations.

(c) It was decided that the discussion of the two documents relating to the matter of the reparations which have been submitted by V. M. Molotov, first, regarding the basic principles of exacting the reparations from Germany, and, second, regarding the organization of an Allied Reparations Committee, should be continued at the Crimean Conference.

The President said that we are all grateful for the productive work of the three Foreign Ministers.

The Prime Minister added that he joined the President in thanking the Committee for their fruitful work but he said that since he had only heard their report orally he would wish to study the English translation, although, except for one point, he felt that he would be in complete agreement.

The President inquired whether the document included Mr. Eden’s reservation on France, to which Mr. Eden replied in the affirmative.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Government was unconvinced by the argument that it would be possible to accord a zone to the French without participation in the Control Commission. If the French were given a zone without participation they would cause endless trouble. If we were strict in our zones, they might be lenient in theirs and vice versa. He felt that it was of the utmost importance that there should be uniformity in the treatment of Germany by the three or four Allies. He repeated that he felt the Control Commission for Germany would be a subordinate instrument as was the case in Italy, although we recognized that the German Commission would have more important tasks. He said he wished to make it clear that he did not consider that French participation in the Control Commission would give them any right to attend a conference such as this one, at least for the time being. He said he must state frankly that he found the arguments on the subject somewhat futile since it was obvious that France would accept no zone unless they were given participation in the Control Commission and he for one thought that they were right. He felt it was no good to refer the question to the European Advisory Commission which was a weaker body and particularly as France was represented on the Commission and only a deadlock could result with the French and British on one side and the Russians and Americans on the other. He therefore was of the opinion that the matter should be settled here, but it still required further study.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether the Prime Minister meant that it should be settled now or later.

The Prime Minister answered that it should be done now, but at some later stage of this Conference.

The President then observed that would it not be better to postpone it for two or three weeks instead of two or three days.

The Prime Minister answered that he felt that once they had separated after this Conference it would be difficult to settle the question.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the three Governments had been able to settle a good many things by correspondence. Marshal Stalin then said that in the European Advisory Commission they could at least have the benefit of the French opinion which was not represented here.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The President said that he agreed that France should not join this body but he was doubtful whether this would keep them quiet. He then suggested that they go on with the Polish question.

Marshal Stalin stated that he had received the President’s letter containing the suggestion that they summon here from Lublin two representatives from the Lublin Government and two representatives from other elements of Polish public opinion and that in the presence of these four Poles they should endeavor to settle the question of a new interim government for Poland which would be pledged to hold free elections when conditions permitted. He said he noted that there were three personalities from London, namely, Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, who had been mentioned by the President as possible members of this new government. He said he had received the President’s letter only an hour and a half ago and he had endeavored to reach the Lublin Poles by telephone but had been informed that they were away in Cracow and Lutz [Łódz?]. He had attempted to ascertain their opinion. As to the others, he was not sure that they could be located in time for them to come to the Crimea and he mentioned in this connection especially Vicenta Witos and Sapieha. The Marshal added that Mr. Molotov has worked out some proposals on the Polish question which appeared to approach the President’s suggestions, but that these proposals were not typed out. He suggested, therefore, that they proceed to the consideration of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and he would ask Mr. Molotov to state the views of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Molotov said that yesterday we have heard Mr. Stettinius give a full report and explanations of the President’s proposals and that this report and explanation had been satisfactory and had made the issue clear to the Soviet Delegation. He said that they had always also followed closely Mr. Churchill’s remarks on the subject. He added that after hearing Mr. Stettinius’ report and Mr. Churchill’s remarks, which had clarified the subject, the Soviet Government felt that these proposals fully guaranteed the unity of the Great Powers in the matter of preservation of peace. Since this had been the main Soviet purpose at Dumbarton Oaks and they felt that the new proposals fully safeguarded this principle, he could state that they were entirely acceptable and that they had no comments to offer. He felt that there was full agreement on this subject. Mr. Molotov said that there was one question raised at Dumbarton Oaks, mainly [namely?] that of participation of the Soviet Republics as initial members of the World Organization. He said the Soviet views were known as were those of the British and American Governments. He said the Soviet views were based on the constitutional changes which had occurred in February of last year and he did not think that this Conference should ignore this request.

It was not the Soviet intention to raise the question in the same form as had been done at Dumbarton Oaks, but they would be satisfied with the admission of three or at least two of the Soviet Republics as original members. These three Republics were the Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian and he felt that three or at any rate two should have the right to participate as original members. He said that it was superfluous to explain the size, population and importance of the Ukraine, White Russia or Lithuania or their importance in foreign affairs. He said that as these three Republics had borne the greatest sacrifices in the war and were the first to be invaded by the enemy, it was only fair, therefore, that these three or at any rate two be original members. He said that the Soviet Government put these proposals before the President and the Prime Minister and hoped that they would be accepted.

The President then inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant members of the Assembly.

Mr. Molotov replied “yes,” that they should be included among other members of that body. The Dominions of the British Commonwealth have gradually and patiently achieved their place as entities in international affairs. He said he felt that it was only right that three, or at least two, of these Soviet Republics should find a worthy place among the members of the Assembly. Their sacrifices and contributions to the war earned them this place. He said in closing that he wished to repeat that he fully agreed with the President’s proposals and withdrew any objections or amendments but would request that three, or at least two, of the Soviet Republics mentioned above be given a chance to become equal members of the World Organization.

The President said he was very happy to hear from Mr. Molotov the agreement of the Soviet Government to his proposals on voting in the Council. He felt that this was a great step forward which would be welcomed by all the peoples of the world. He said that he thought the next step was to consider the question of summoning a conference to organize the setting up of the World Organization. He said he thought that this conference could take place at the end of March, although it might be physically possible to do it within the next four weeks. He added that he had been greatly interested in what Mr. Molotov had said in regard to the participation of the Soviet Republics. He added that the British Empire, the USSR and the United States were very different in structure and in tradition. The British Empire, for example, had many large units, such as Canada, Australia, etc. The USSR had a different national structure. The United States had one language and one Foreign Minister. He felt, therefore, that Mr. Molotov’s suggestion should be studied, particularly in the light of the possibility that if the larger nations were given more than one vote it might prejudice the thesis of one vote for each member. He mentioned that certain countries are large in area, though small in population and referred in this connection to Brazil which he said was smaller than the USSR but larger than the United States. On the other hand, there were some countries that were small in area but large in population, such as Honduras and Haiti. He also mentioned the fact that there were a number of nations associated with the United Nations, such as Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Iceland, and others, which had broken relations with Germany but which were not at war. He concluded with the statement that he felt that the important thing was to proceed with the plans for a conference to set up the World Organization and that the question of the admission of countries not members of the United Nations could be considered either at that time or after the organization was in operation. He said he suggested, therefore, that the question raised by Mr. Molotov should be studied by the Foreign Ministers who might also make recommendations as to the time and place of the conference and as to what nations should be invited.

The Prime Minister said he would like to express his heartfelt thanks to Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov for this great step forward which he felt would bring joy and relief to the peoples of the world. On the question of membership of the Soviet Republics, he said this had been put before us for the first time. He said he must agree with the President that the United States and the British Empire were different, that during the last twenty-five years the Self-Governing Dominions have taken their place in world affairs and have worked for peace and, if he might say so, for the furtherance of Democratic processes. The Dominions had come into the war when Great Britain declared war against Germany, knowing full well the weakness of Great Britain at that time. Great Britain had had no means of forcing them into this decision and into which [sic] they knew they could not often be consulted on major matters. He said that Great Britain could not agree to any organization which would reduce the status of the Dominions or exclude them from participation. That is why, Mr. President, the Prime Minister said, he had great sympathy with the Soviet request. His heart went out to mighty Russia which though bleeding was beating down the tyrants in her path. He said he could understand their point of view, as they were represented by only one voice in comparison with the British organization which had a smaller population, if only white people were considered. He was glad, therefore, that the President had made an answer to the Soviet proposal which in no way constituted a final negation. He added, however, that he could not exceed his authority and as he had just heard this proposal he would like to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary and possibly communicate it to London and he asked Marshal Stalin to excuse him as he could not give a precise answer today.

The President remarked that his recommendations had been somewhat different. He had merely meant that the Foreign Ministers should study the question as well as that of the time and place of the conference and who should be invited.

The Prime Minister said that he did not disagree with the President’s suggestions but he felt that the Foreign Ministers had already had a good deal of work thrust upon them. He said he must speak frankly and say that he foresaw difficulties in attempting to hold a meeting as soon as March. The battle would be at its height and more soldiers would be involved than at any time of the war. British domestic problems would be very pressing and their Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, would be greatly occupied in Parliament. He also wondered whether the state of the world and in Europe in particular was not such as to make very difficult a meeting of all of the United Nations. He doubted whether any representatives at such conference would be able to have behind them the full thought of the vital forces of their countries.

The President observed that he had only in mind a meeting to organize the setting up of the world organization, and that the world organization itself would probably not come into being for from three to six months after the conference.

The Prime Minister said that he had in mind the fact that some nations in March would still be under the German yoke and would be represented by governments in exile whose authority in regard to their own people would be questionable. Other countries would be starving and in misery, such as Holland. France would be there with a loud voice. There would be other countries represented there who had not suffered at all in the war and who had not lost a man. He wondered how such a gathering could really undertake the immense task of the future organization of the world.

The President repeated his proposal, namely, that the Foreign Ministers could consider (1) the Soviet proposal regarding membership, (2) the date and place of the conference, and (3) what nations should be invited.

The Prime Minister said he had no object[ion] to the Foreign Ministers discussing this point but he said he must emphasize that this was no technical question but one of great decision. With this qualification, he agreed to the President’s proposal.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the Foreign Ministers will not make decisions but merely report to the Conference.

There was a short intermission at this point.

The Prime Minister said that he proposed that the Foreign Ministers should consider the question of Iran and other matters of perhaps secondary importance but which should be considered.

The President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

The President then said, jokingly, that he hoped that forestry would be one of the points considered since he had not seen a tree in his visit last year to Tehran. He went on to say that he thought Iran was a good example of the type of economic problem that might confront the world if we are to bring about expansion of world trade and greater exchange of goods. He said that Persia did not have the purchasing power to buy foreign goods, and if expansion of world trade was to occur measures must be considered for helping those countries like Persia that did not have any purchasing power. He mentioned that before the advent of the Turks, Persia had had plenty of timber and thus plenty of water and her people had been reasonably prosperous, but that he personally had never seen a poorer country than Persia was at the present time. He therefore very much hoped that the new world organization would conduct a world-wide survey with a view to extending help to countries and areas that did not have sufficient purchasing power, either in cash or in foreign exchange.

The President added that there was a parallel, he thought, in Europe in that certain countries had adequate supplies of power, such as coal and water power, and those countries had cheap and abundant electric power, whereas other countries within fifty miles had neither. He felt that this situation was wrong. He mentioned that in the Soviet Union and its various republics consideration had been given to the problem of a country as a whole, and in the United States the TVA had the same idea. He mentioned that in the region of the TVA electric current was sold at the same price throughout the area. He concluded that, having said his piece, he would now refer to Mr. Molotov for his proposals in regard to the Polish question.

Mr. Molotov then read his proposals in regard to the Polish question, as follows:

  1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5-8 kilometers in favor of Poland.

  2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the South along the River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (Western).

  3. It was deemed desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government some democratic leaders from Polish émigré circles.

  4. It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments.

  5. It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as was mentioned above in paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the polls for organization by general voting of permanent organs of the Polish Government.

  6. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Governments.

After reading the proposals, Mr. Molotov said he would like to add that they had attempted to reach the Poles in Poland by telephone but they had been unable to do so and it was apparent that time would not permit the carrying out of the President’s suggestion to summon the Poles to the Crimea. He said he felt that the proposals he had just put forward went far toward meeting the President’s wishes.

The President replied that he must say he felt progress had been made in the light of Mr. Molotov’s suggestions. He said there was just one word he did not like and that was “émigré.” He said he did not see any necessity to go to émigrés since you could find enough Poles in Poland for the purpose. He repeated what he had said yesterday, namely that he did not know any of the Poles in the Poland government in London and he knew only Mr. Mikolajczyk. He concluded by saying he would like to have an opportunity, with Mr. Stettinius, to study Mr. Molotov’s proposals, to which Marshal Stalin agreed.

The Prime Minister said he shared the President’s dislike of the word “émigré.” The word had originated during the French revolution and meant in England a person who had been driven out of a country by his own people. He said in the case of the Poles this wasn’t true, since they had left their country as a result of the brutal German attack. He therefore preferred in place of the word “émigré” to refer to them as “Poles temporarily abroad.” He said in regard to the second point of Mr. Molotov’s proposals he would always support the movement of Polish frontiers to the west since he felt they should receive compensation, but not more than they can handle. He said it would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it got indigestion. He said he felt that there was a considerable body of British public opinion that would be shocked if it were proposed to move large numbers of Germans, and although he personally would not be shocked he knew that that view existed in England. He said he felt if it were confined to East Prussia, six million Germans probably could be handled quite aside from moral grounds, but the addition of the line west of the Neisse would create quite a problem in this respect.

Marshal Stalin remarked that most Germans in those areas had already run away from the Red Army.

The Prime Minister said this, of course, simplified the problem, and in regard to the question of space in Germany for these deported persons he felt that the fact that Germany had had six to seven million casualties in this war and would probably have a million more would simplify that problem.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Germans might well have one or possibly two million more casualties.

The Prime Minister said that he wasn’t afraid of the problem of transfer of populations provided that it was proportioned to the capacity of the Poles to handle it and the capability of the Germans to receive them. He felt, however, that it needs study, not only in principle but as a practical matter. He said he had one other comment. In the Soviet proposal some reference should be made to other democratic leaders from within Poland itself.

Marshal Stalin agreed and the words “and from inside Poland” were added at the end of paragraph 3 of the Soviet statement.

The Prime Minister then concluded that he agreed with the President that it would be well to sleep on this problem and take it up tomorrow, but he did feel that some progress had been made.

At the President’s suggestion the meeting was adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow afternoon.

Matthews Minutes

February 7, 1945, noon
Top secret

President: I think we should take up the Polish question. When we concluded our meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin had explained his views. I have nothing special to add to what I said yesterday. I think it is particularly important to find a solution of the governmental question. I am not so concerned with frontiers. I am likewise not so concerned on the question of the continuity of the government. There hasn’t really been any Polish government since 1939. It is entirely in the province of the three of us to help set up a government – something to last until the Polish people can choose. I discard the idea of continuity. I think we want something new and drastic – like a breath of fresh air. But before we go on with Poland I think Mr. Molotov should report to us on the meeting of the three foreign ministers.

Molotov reads his report.

Prime Minister: I wish to thank the committee for their labor. I am in general agreement with the report with a single exception. However, I should like to see in writing what has been decided as I have only now been orally informed of what took place. On the question of giving the French a zone but not a place on the control commission His Majesty’s Government remains quite unconvinced. No solution has been found for controlling the French while they are controlling the Germans. If the French decide to accept the task of having a zone and wish to be tiresome they could produce conditions in their zone which would cause trouble in the other zones. If we decide to be strict they could be lenient. If we decide to be lenient they could be strict. I firmly believe that there must be uniformity in treatment of Germany between the four allies or there will be endless bitter disputes. I regard the Allied Control Commission as a subordinate instrument to the will of the governments. In principle, it is no more than the Allied Commission in Italy but they have a much more important task. I do not think that giving France a place on the control machinery gives any right to the French to sit in on these meetings of the three of us. But all this argument seems to me futile. I feel sure that the French will take no zone unless they are given participation on the control council. I must say I think they are right. Who would they get their directions from? For this reason I feel that the proposed plan will not work. Likewise, I feel that there is no use handing over what we cannot settle here to a weaker body such as the European Advisory Commission where the French are sitting. So why not settle it here. I suggest that we should give the question further study and settle it here.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

President: Shall we go on with the discussion of Poland?

Stalin: I have received the President’s message. It contains a proposal to call from Poland two representatives of the Lublin government and two from the opposite camp, so that in our presence these four would settle the question of the new Polish government. If this is successful, the new provisional government should in the shortest possible time organize elections in Poland. This message of the President’s also proposes that some more Poles from London – Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski, should also take part in the new government. I received this letter an hour and a half ago. I immediately gave instructions to find Bierut and [Osóbka-]Morawski so that I could talk with them on the phone. The result was that at the moment they are outside Warsaw at Lodz or Cracow but they will be found and I must ask them how to find the representatives on the other side and what they think of the possibility of their coming. I can then tell how soon they will arrive. If Vicente Witos or Sapieha could come here it would facilitate a solution but I do not know their addresses. I am afraid we have not sufficient time. Meanwhile, Molotov has prepared a draft to meet in a certain extent the President’s proposal. Let us hear it when it arrives as the translation is not yet finished. Meanwhile, we might talk of Dumbarton Oaks.

Molotov here gave his explanation of the Russian acceptance of our voting procedure and of their request for the inclusion of three representatives in the assembly. This is being covered by Mr. Hiss’s notes.

The President made some remarks on the low purchasing power of Persians and other nations which he stated was another reason for organizing the world organization. He likewise threw out the idea of setting up a TVA for Europe. Mr. Moltov’s proposal then arrived.

Molotov: I have here the proposals which I should like to make. (He reads them.) We are still trying to telephone the Polish leaders but without success and I am afraid there will not be time for them to come to this conference. That makes it impossible to try the President’s proposal. On the other hand I think these proposals meet the President’s wishes.

President: I think we are making definite progress. I should like to wait until tomorrow to study these proposals and to talk them over with the Secretary of State and officials of the State Department. There is one word in them I do not like. That is “émigré.” It is not necessary to take *émigrés. There may be people who are now in Poland who are now satisfied. May we postpone discussion?

Stalin: Yes, certainly.

Prime Minister: I share the President’s dislike of the word “émigré.” It was applied during the French Revolution to people driven out by their own countrymen, but the Poles were driven out by a brutal enemy. With regard to the frontier on the River Neisse I should like to say a word. I have always qualified a movement west by the Poles, but say that the Poles should be free to take territory but not more than they wish or can manage. I do not wish to stuff the Polish goose until it dies of German indigestion. I also feel conscious of the large school of thought in England which is shocked at the idea of transferring millions of people by force. Personally I am not shocked but much of the opinion in England is. However, the exchange of Greeks and Turks was a great success but that only involved two million. If the Poles take East Prussia and Silesia that means moving six millions. That is manageable but there will be big arguments against it still.

Stalin: There will be no more Germans there for when our troops come in the Germans run away and no Germans are left.

Prime Minister: Then there is the problem of how to handle them in Germany. We have killed six or seven million and probably will kill another million before the end of the war.

Stalin: One or two?

Prime Minister: Oh I am not proposing any limitation on them. So there should be room in Germany for some who will need to fill the vacancy. I am not afraid of the problem of the transfer of populations as long as it is in proportion to what the Poles can manage and what can be put in the place of the dead in Germany.

I have only one other comment. It is a reference in Mr. Molotov’s plan to the utilization of some democratic leaders from émigré circles. Would Marshal Stalin be willing to add “and some within Poland itself.” This was also suggested in the President’s message.

Stalin: Yes, that is acceptable.

Prime Minister: Well, I am in agreement with the President’s suggestion that we should sleep on this till tomorrow.

Stalin: I likewise find this acceptable.

The meeting is adjourned until four tomorrow.

Hiss Notes

February 7, 1945, noon

“Crimea Conf.”

Plenary

2/7 4:10 p. m.

Ed Page – added to Mol. report – given to Chip

D. O.

Mol. – Yesterday heard full report from ERS We are satisfied with this report & we have got some explanations (to ask). After this report & after these explanations certain q’s became much clearer We paid much atten to what Church told us After report of ES & remarks of Church the q is considerably clarified for us In the light of these explanations & remarks we believe it would secure the unan. of 3 powers in guar. p. & sec. after the war. Our position in the qs of D. O. essentially was to secure max. of unity among 3 gt. powers in q of p & sec after the war. We believe the decs. taken at D. O & modifications suggested by Pres will secure collab by all nations great & small after war. … we consider the proposals which were presented as acceptable to us We believe that now there is reach full agt & clarity among ourselves I have to touch upon one q. which was raised in D. O. but not decided yet. This is the q about particip of Sov. Reps in the org. of sec. You know our point of view It is based on the modifs carried out in our Const. in Feb of last yr. We explained our point of view & know the point of view of US Govt & Brit Govt We consider its fair that should not pass these qs without notice but do not raise this q now in same form as in D. O.

We would consider it fair that at least 3 of our Reps or perhaps 2 be accepted as orig members. Have in mind Ukraine, Byelo Russia & Lith. Those 3 or at any rate 2 have full rts to be considered orig. members.

Ukraine’s Importance, pop., econ importance all well known I don’t want to go into detail in describing also import, of B-R & Lith also from point of view of for. rels These reps made the greatest sacrifices in this war The peoples of U,-B-R & Lith have suffered very much in this war & were 1st to be invaded Would be fair of these 3 or at any rate 2 be accepted as orig. members. The Sov Govt requests Pres & PM these 3 or at least 2 be accepted among other Un. Ns I would like to mention in this connection that the domins of Brit crown approached int. rels gradually & showed great patience. This gives us the example & reason to withdraw our orig. proposal advanced at D. O. & propose now 3 or at least 2 be accepted as orig. members. Among members of Ass. these few reps certainly should find place due them. Their role & sacrifices in this war entitle

Pres. Much gratified at what Mol. has said in acceding to the gen. plan That is making real progress. Next thing we have consider is timing What is next step. Invitations will go out to all nations that have had a place in this war

Church – the Ger War Pres Yes

Pres No use talking much further about Un Ns We are all agreed except it has not been set up. Next we should invite all nations to assemble. Gt. sentiment in US be held soon as possible – end of Mar., 1st of April

Physically repres. of Un Ns could meet in 4 wks – 1 month. Personally I think that quicker q of Un Ns meeting is determined, quicker we can take up what Mr Mol has said which is very interesting to me. But that in itself will mean the later meetings after the organ. is set up As a practical matter when we have this organizing meeting whom shall we ask? Nations in the war or those associated but not in the war. For instance shall we invite – – The assoc. nations have broken rels with Ger. but have not declared war. We Read list. We’ve got to decide who we’re going to invite What we have heard from Mr Mol. gives me a very great int. in matter of a vote for Uk, Wh. R, Lith. We 3 M. St., P. M & I have different views because our terrs. are so very different The Brit Em has great pops like Austr, Can., S Af Sov Govt has great masses of pop. like 3 areas Mol mentioned. US is contiguous – no colonies, const. provides for 1 For Min. Those things require study, require study of q of more than 1 vote for the larger nations in the world. In same way certain nations have large terrs. Brazil smaller than S. U but larger than U. S. In same way many small countries like Haiti, Honduras & we should consider whether by giving any govt more than 1 vote we would break down prin of 1 vote for each. ∴ if we can agree on gen plan for meeting to organ. U Ns we can consider these q’s by For Mins or at the meeting of the organizers

Pres: For Mins have so successful suggested q. of voting in Ass. be referred to For Mins. Also to recommend time & place of a conf.

Church: I should like to express my heartfelt thanks to Mar. St. & Sov Govt for the enormous step they have taken to put forward D. O. I’m sure the agt of the 3 gt powers such as has already been expressed around this table will give joy & relief to thinking people around the world. On the q of voting membership of the Ass., it has been put before us in quite a new form by our R. friends & allies

Everyone I’m sure will feel that here again a very remarkable advance to gen. agt. has been made. I must fully agree with the Pres that the position of the US & of the Brit Em. are different. We have our 4 selfgoverning domins, that for nearly a quarter of a century have played a part in the organ. of p. which broke down before the present war. All these 4 doms have worked for p & for democratic purposes & all without hesitation sprang into the war when we declared it though they knew how weak we were. We had no means of compelling them & no rt. to give them any summons but they came freely in a matter in which they could only be partially consulted. We could never agree to any system which excluded them from the position they have held & justified for over ¼ of a century. It is for this very reason that I could not listen to the proposal of the Sov Govt without a feeling of profound sympathy. My heart goes out to mighty Russia, bleeding from her wounds & conquering & beating down the tyrant in her path. I should feel that a nation so great with 180,000,000 people would perhaps have cause to look at our Brit org with a questioning eye if they had but one vote when their nos. far exceed our own, speaking of whites. I was very glad that the Pres made an answer which could in no way be considered a final neg. to the consideration of this proposal. I must not however exceed my own personal auth. We have only just heard this new proposal & I should like to discuss it with the For Sec & possibly send a tel. to the Brit. War Cab. We only want to see done what is rt & fair. ∴ I will ask the Mar. to excuse me if I do not give precise final answer on behalf of HMG here today. I will not lose time.

Pres My motion was a little different It did not call for a dec. today. Refer the study to For Mins & second where it should be held & who should be invited.

Church Very glad – we are putting great deal on them – very large & simple Re meeting suggested by Pres I shouldn’t think it desirable hold it so early as March. In Mar. we shall be at the very height of the battle on both the fronts, more millions of soldiers will be engaged than ever before. Our dom. problems in Eng are very complicated with shortage of labor, housing & need of supplying fighting forces at the front. We also have a Par which is in active life from day to day & claims large share of the atten. of the Mins. incl. For Sec.

We are now already a quarter thru Feb I wonder also whether state of the world & Eur. particularly is such as not to make a meeting diff. of all the Un Ns If they are charged with the most tremendous tasks of the future will they have behind them the full thought of their people. Will they have anything left over after vital needs of the war are met. I wonder what the aspect of the Ass. would wear. Could premiers be present?

Pres: This is not a meeting of the Ass. – only of the organizing conf.

Church But they would be same people How many of the nations there will still be in the bondage of the Gers. We do not know how they will represent their people. Another group will be starving in their frightful misery amid the scenes of war. Holland will be there with her ghastly ruins. Fr. will be there with a loud voice. With all these agonized communities will also be joined a large no. of nations who have not suffered at all in the war. Ns that have not even declared war. I can not think that the meeting of such an ass. would be free from the danger of becoming chaotic. Some ns will be screaming in agony & others will be calmly weighing the problems of the future. I see particular diffs for an early meeting so far as Brit. is concerned

Church Position in Eng though perfectly calm & steady is governed by our own const. We may have a gen. election impending. May have new parliament to carry with us, may have entirely new set of ministers

Will always do our best to comply with the Pres. wishes but I feel it absolutely nec. to put on record the very great diff. which I see, practically And I should be very disappointed if the settlement of the membership of Ass was postponed till new meeting of Un Ns can be held

Pres again propose to refer to For Mins to study membership & date & place of meeting & who should be invited

Stalin agreed

Church I said earlier no objection to it being discussed by For Mins but is not a technical matter but one of large & broad dec. Not at all sure matters will be advanced by the discussion

St. 3 Mins will meet, discuss & report

Agreed

(Intermission)

Church. proposed Iran be remitted to For Mins

→{ (Pres says to ERS he can cable Chiang & get consent re voting immediately }
He would not consult France, merely invite Fr. to the meeting} While waiting for Molotov’s paper on Pol.

Pres. raised q. of int. economics – another reason for early estab. of Un Ns Org – should be some way of getting ns that have no purchasing power to get some – historically Persia well wooded before Turks came – no erosion, water – today poorest place I have ever seen in the world. That is why I hope new Un Ns Org. will concern itself with those countries that have no money with which to get goods While on this subject – parallel one – in Eur. some areas have coal, cheap power & light from water. Why favoritism to those who have coal & water or cheap elec. light rates when others 50 miles away have no water, no light Sov. govts. all the Soviets are all thinking in terms like that. We are thinking in terms like that – TVA

Poland

Mol. In E. Curzon line, 5-8 Kms digression in some regions in favor of Pol.

In W. from Stettin along Oder, then along Neisse

Add some emigres to Pol. Govt

Allies recog. Pol Govt now

Prov. Govt. hold elections soon as possible

Mol, Harr., Clark-Kerr to consider & report enlarging Pol. Govt President’s proposals

Can’t reach Poles by phone in time to come here

Pres. We are making real progress

Wants ERS study this tonight.

Knows one word he doesn’t like – “emigre”

Not nec. take emigres Like to have S. D. study it until tomorrow Church Agrees with Pres re “emigre”

Re Neisse – we have always qualified movement of Pol. frontier to W that they shouldn’t take much more than they wish or can take care of. Great pity to stuff Pol. goose so full of Ger. food that he died of indigestion. Large school of opin. shocked by transferring many millions of people by force. I am not. Referred to success of Gk-Turk transfers after last war – but only ½ million

If take E. Pr. Silesia up to Oder means 6,000,000 Gers. That might be managed with modern facilities

St. Says there are no more Gers there. Where our troops come in they find no Gers.

Church We have killed 5 or 6 mil. prob. another million before the end. There ought to be room in Ger. for people transferred They will be needed to fill vacancies So not afraid of prob. of transferring pop. so long as proportioned.

Draft of Letter from President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

February 7, 1945, noon
DRAFT

My Dear Marshal Stalin, I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determinations that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osobka Morawski from the Lublin government and also any two of the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski [Zulawski], Professor Buyak [Bujak], and Professor Kutzeba [Kutrzeba]. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland, the United States Government, and I am sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to disassociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Yalta, February 6, 1945
Top secret

My Dear Marshal Stalin: I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osobka-Morawski from the Lublin government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The President’s Special Assistant to the President

Yalta, February 7, 1945

Mr. President I think you should try to get this referred to Foreign ministers before there is trouble.

HARRY

The President’s Special Assistant to the President, and Reply by the President

Yalta, February 7, 1945

All of the below refers to Churchill’s opposition to early calling of conference of United Nations.

There is something behind this talk that we do not know of its basis.

Perhaps we better to wait till later tonight what is on his mind.

All this is rot! local politics

I am quite sure now he is thinking about the next election in Britain.

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Top secret
ARGONAUT 51

Top secret and personal for Ambassador Winant from Secretary Stettinius.

In view of certain discussions here, please take no repeat no action with regard to our position on French participation in German affairs until further instructions.

War Department please furnish copy of above message to Acting Secretary of State Grew, Washington, for his information and notify him above relates to sentence fourth from end of his number 21 to Secretary Stettinius.

ARGONAUT, February 7, 1945

The Pittsburgh Press (February 7, 1945)

Roosevelt likely to skip London

LONDON, England (UP) – Visits by President Roosevelt to London and Paris following the “Big Three” conference appeared unlikely today.

Well-informed sources said Mr. Roosevelt had declined an invitation from King George and Queen Elizabeth to be a guest with Mrs. Roosevelt at Buckingham Palace.

The President was understood to have pleaded that the pressure of business awaiting him in Washington would not permit him to visit London at this time.

High French and Allied diplomatic sources in Paris believed there was also no basis for reports that the President would visit the French capital.

With the French smarting at being left out of the “Big Three” talks, this would be the worst possible psychological moment for the President to visit Paris, informants said.

U.S. State Department (February 7, 1945)

Agreed Text of Preliminary Yalta Press Release

Yalta, February 7, 1945

Crimean Conference Press Release

Statement for the press and radio released at 4:30 o’clock p.m., Eastern War Time Wednesday, February 7, 1945.

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, the three foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with their Allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding continuously.

The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain Peace.

A communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference.

Approved by Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. Released simultaneously in Washington, London and Moscow.

Log of the Trip

Wednesday, February 7, 1945

1300: Lunch at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Mr. Flynn and General Watson.

1610: The Fourth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:

For the U.S. For Great Britain For the USSR
The President. The Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius. Mr. Eden. Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy. Mr. Cadogan. Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins. Mr. Clark Kerr. Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes. Mr. Jebb. Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman. Mr. Bridges. Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss. Mr. Dixon.
Mr. Bohlen. Major Birse.

This meeting adjourned at 2000.

2030: Dinner at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and Mr. Stettinius.

U.S. State Department (February 8, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Rear Admiral Olsen
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Roberts
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Major General Kuter Brigadier General Cabell
Lieutenant General Somervell Brigadier General Lindsay
Vice Admiral Cooke Brigadier General Bessell
Major General Bull Brigadier General Everest
Major General Deane Commodore Burrough
Major General Anderson Colonel Peck
Major General Hull Colonel Lincoln
Major General Wood Colonel Dean
Major General Hill Colonel Bogart
Rear Admiral Smith Colonel Cary
Rear Admiral McCormick Captain Stroop
Rear Admiral Carter Captain McDill
Rear Admiral Duncan Commander Clark
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret

Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overall Review of Cargo and Troop Shipping Position for the Remainder of 1945 (CCS 746/11)

Admiral Leahy said that although the paper was an agreed report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board it appeared to him that the essence of the report was an agreement to reexamine the position when a need for further study arose.

General Somervell said that the necessity for a revision had already arisen, particularly with reference to redeployment plans. On the other hand, he felt that the paper in its present form was entirely satisfactory. Referring to paragraph 4b (1) (d) of the paper he said that during the Committee negotiations the British had insisted upon the submission of the report referred to therein on 1 June.

General Marshall said that if the war ended by 1 April 1945 the combined redeployment plan and the related combined report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and shipping authorities would be too late if submitted on 30 April 1945, as required in the paper.

General Somervell felt that the date for the submission of the report might well be moved up to 1 April.

Admiral King pointed out that the reports could be submitted at any time prior to 30 April. The requirement as stated in the paper was that they should be ready not later than 30 April.

Colonel Lincoln said that as far as the U.S. side was concerned the Planners already had a redeployment paper under way and that they could make this plan available by 1 April.

Admiral Leahy said that a change of the date to 1 April might not be acceptable to the British.

Admiral Smith said that the British members of the combined committees appeared to have no objection to a 1 April date. The date of 30 April had been selected to afford the U.S. Planners ample time to produce their redeployment plan.

General Somervell thought there might be some objection on the part of the British to moving the date up to 1 April. He understood that the British plans for redeployment had not progressed as far as the U.S. plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of CCS 746/11 subject to the change of the date in the third line on Page 4 from 30 April to 1 April.

Employment of War-Weary U.S. Bombers Against Large Industrial Target Areas in Germany (JCS 1150/1)

Admiral Leahy said that in this paper the representative of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, proposed that the question of the employment of war-weary bombers be reopened by recommending that the President address a memorandum on the subject to the Prime Minister. He understood the Prime Minister had instructed the British Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their previous concurrence in the employment of this type of weapon and felt that to request the President to ask the Prime Minister to reverse his stand would be undesirable.

General Anderson explained that there was no intention of launching uncontrolled aircraft indiscriminately against the German countryside. He believed that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the British as to the employment of this weapon. Recent developments had proved that explosive-laden aircraft could be directed against military targets with considerable accuracy and therefore had a definite military value when used against heavily protected underground installations.

General Marshall said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff have no military objection to the project but that certain Cabinet Members had opposed it. He doubted the propriety of having the President press the Prime Minister to urge these Cabinet Members to reverse their position, for heretofore these same Members had supported the British Chiefs of Staff in war measures advocated by the U.S.

In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why this project should not be restricted entirely to France, General Anderson said that while the launchings were to be made in France all of the developments so far had taken place in base installations set up in England and to move these base installations to France would be a waste of effort.

General Kuter pointed out that further development of this project was highly important in view of the prospects of a very profitable employment of this type of weapon against Japanese targets.

Admiral Leahy said the discussion had given him an entirely different conception of the weapon. When this matter first came up, he understood that the aircraft would be launched in the general direction of Germany and that the explosive-laden planes would fall aimlessly when the fuel was exhausted. This he considered an inhuman and barbarous type of warfare with which the United States should not be associated; but now, since it appeared that the missiles could be controlled with a considerable degree of accuracy, he agreed that they could be usefully employed. He inquired why, since the planes employed were American and would be operated under American command, it was necessary to collaborate with the British in their use.

General Kuter said that, in view of the instructions already received on this subject by the British Chiefs of Staff and since the matter had heretofore been dealt with on a combined basis, it would be undesirable for the United States now to employ this weapon unilaterally. Moreover, the bases where the project was being developed were located in England.

Admiral Duncan felt that it would be entirely proper for the United States Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their original proposal to use uncontrolled missiles and present the project as a development of a controlled missile.

General Kuter said that the development of the control of this type of aircraft had progressed very rapidly, and it was essential that this development continue.

In view of the foregoing, Admiral Leahy said that he felt an approach should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for reconsideration at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to bring up for discussion at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to follow, the question of the employment of radio-controlled explosive-laden bombers.

Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meeting (JCS 1227/4 and 1227/5)

Admiral Leahy said that in JCS 1227/4 the Joint Staff Planners suggest certain subjects which the United States Chiefs of Staff should discuss with the Soviet General Staff. In JCS 1227/5 General Deane recommends a series of questions as the basis of the discussions. The Planners’ paper appears to go into considerable detail and to contain items not covered in the questions suggested by General Deane.

Admiral Leahy said that he entertained little hope of engaging in extended conversations with the Soviet General Staff.

General Marshall observed that our success in arranging a meeting with the Soviet Army Staff was a good omen as to the Soviets’ willingness to discuss the matters in which we are interested.

Admiral King said that he favored the approach to the Soviets advanced by the Planners.

General Deane said that he found no fault with the Planners’ paper except that he would not recommend that the status of the MILEPOST project be discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff unless the Soviets first brought up the matter. Moreover, he proposed that the United States Chiefs of Staff refrain from suggesting a Russian strategic air force, inasmuch as it appeared that the aircraft necessary to constitute such a force could not be provided.

General Deane felt that it would be a mistake to bring up the matter of the exchange of weather information in view of the satisfactory progress that had been made so far. The Soviets had met every United States request for the exchange of this information.

General Kuter said that the weather information received so far did not meet the full requirements of the Twentieth Air Force in dealing with Japanese targets and suggested that there should be an increase in the number of weather stations in Siberia.

Admiral Olsen said that the Soviets had encountered considerable difficulty in setting up weather stations in Siberia because of the lack of transportation and communication facilities. They prefer to use their own personnel and equipment and therefore, if it were suggested that more stations be installed, the request should indicate willingness to make U.S. equipment available. He confirmed General Deane’s view that it would be a mistake to insist on a further exchange of weather information on a high level, since negotiations to meet United States requirements could be satisfactorily handled by the United States Mission in Moscow.

General Deane said he had arranged his list of questions with a view to permitting the Soviets to do the talking. The questions were designed to draw out Soviet views. Whether or not the questions were proper ones is a matter for decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to an inquiry by Admiral Leahy, General Deane said that the operations referred to in Question 7 in JCS 1227/5 were those to be initially undertaken by the Soviets if they entered the war against Japan. General Deane felt that the Soviet answer to the first question in his paper would undoubtedly lead to several contributory questions which would cover the points made by the Planners in their paper.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to use both JCS 1227/4 and 1227/5 in their conference with the Soviet General Staff.

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Vorontsov Villa, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Matthews Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hiss Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev
Mr. Page Mr. Jebb Mr. Gromyko
Major Theakstone Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Golunsky

Page Minutes

Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subjects:

  1. WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
  2. YUGOSLAVIAN FRONTIERS
  3. CONTROL COMMISSION IN BULGARIA AND HUNGARY
  4. REPARATIONS
  5. IRAN

World Security Organization

Mr. Eden, who presided, stated that the Foreign Secretaries had been requested to consider two points vis-à-vis the World Security Organization; first, the question of membership which included that concerning the admission of two or three of the Soviet Republics, and, second, the question of the time and place of the meeting.

Mr. Stettinius interjected that there was also the question of exactly which nations should be invited to the initial conference.

Mr. Eden inquired whether anyone desired to initiate the discussion on this general question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he wished to start at the bottom. He said that he would be delighted to invite the great Allies to confer in the United States. He hoped that the President had not shocked the Foreign Secretaries yesterday by mentioning the month of March as the time for the opening of the conference, and he continued that he felt sure that the time could be arranged to fit in with the convenience of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden. However, he was anxious to open the conference at the earliest possible date. Personally, he hoped that it could be held no later than the latter part of April. With respect to the question concerning who would be invited, he recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks there had been considerable talk of inviting the Associated Nations as well as the United Nations. He stated that he had come to the conclusion that it would probably be most satisfactory to limit the invitations to those who had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on the common enemy. With respect to Mr. Molotov’s references to multiple membership for the Soviet Union, it was his feeling, from the standpoint of geographical area and population, that this question should be given sympathetic consideration at the opening conference. He continued that he had thus far been unable in his own mind to decide just how inclusion of these entities could be arranged. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals there was a provision to the effect that each sovereign state had one vote. He had not thus far been able to see clearly how the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. He concluded that he wished again to refer the matter to the President who had said that the subject was most interesting and deserved sympathetic consideration.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had expressed his views on the inclusion of two or three Soviet Republics in the World Organization at the last plenary meeting. He requested Mr. Eden to state his ideas on the other subjects on the World Security agenda.

Mr. Eden stated that he would be glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the conference in the United States. He only wished to enter one caveat. He remarked that Mr. Winant, Mr. Gusev, and himself were getting a little jealous in never having any large conferences in London. If Mr. Molotov and he were to go to the United States for this conference, he hoped that there would be an early meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov supported Mr. Eden’s views with respect to a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

Mr. Eden continued that since some time would be needed to get the Chinese and possibly the French in line, and since the lawyers would need possibly two weeks before the conference opened, he would prefer to postpone the opening of the conference until the second half of April. He pointed out that he would be committed to debates in Parliament before he would be able to go to the United States. After some discussion it was agreed by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden that the conference should open on April 25.

Mr. Molotov had previously accepted the invitation to hold the conference in the United States.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to make a few observations on the inclusion of Soviet Republics in the Organization. He said that he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet position in this respect and would be ready to say so at whatever was considered to be an appropriate moment.

Mr. Molotov interjected “The sooner the better.” Mr. Molotov then pointed out, in relation to the remarks made by Mr. Stettinius, that the President had indicated yesterday that according to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals each Government had one vote. However, Canada and Australia had individual votes and the fact that they were component parts of the British Empire did not prevent them from being individual members of the assembly. He said that amendments had been made to the Soviet constitution which gave the Soviet Republics the right to have contact with foreign states. The Soviet Union was a union of states. The constitution had now been revised to increase the rights of the Republics. The development of relations between the Republics and foreign states, which had already begun, was in this direction and was developing according to democratic principles. He continued that he believed that it would be superfluous to mention the political, economic and military importance of the Ukraine, White Russia and the Lithuanian Republic. He urged that it would be most desirable if agreement could be reached on this question today.

Mr. Molotov then referred to Mr. Stettinius’ statement that only those nations which had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on Germany should be invited to the conference. This immediately gave rise to some questions. Which Polish Government, for example, should be invited.

Mr. Eden immediately interjected that this was a good reason for settling the Polish problem now.

Mr. Molotov continued that certain countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would also be invited. He stated that he would like to check the exact list of states which would attend the conference.

Mr. Stettinius gave Mr. Molotov such a list and pointed out that although Ecuador had recently declared war on Germany it was not included on the list since it had not yet signed the United Nations Declaration.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that if agreement could not be reached on the membership of the organization it should be reported accordingly.

Mr. Eden stated that only the question of the membership of the two Soviet Republics remained open.

Mr. Cadogan pointed out that if a conference were called to complete the work of Dumbarton Oaks and to reach final agreement on a charter, he did not see how any of the original members of the organization could be excluded from the conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the United Nations should meet to complete the charter. New members could be elected at this meeting. He said that he was trying to find a way to arrange for consideration of the Soviet request before the first meeting of the assembly.

Mr. Eden suggested as a possible procedure that the United Nations might meet and might draw up an order of the day which would include the question of extending foundation membership to two Soviet Republics. He said that he was quite ready to agree to this proposal.

Mr. Molotov suggested an amendment to Mr. Eden’s proposal to the effect that the three Foreign Secretaries had agreed that it would be advisable to grant admission to the assembly to two or three Soviet Republics.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was favorably impressed with what Mr. Eden had said. He had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the President this morning and it was, therefore, impossible for him to make any firm commitment. However, he would be glad to discuss the question with the President promptly and hoped and expected that the United States would be able to give a favorable reply before the end of the day. He stated that he would not bring up the question of Poland since he hoped that agreement would be reached on this matter at the present conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that there were a number of other details with respect to Dumbarton Oaks, such as the status of France, how China would be consulted, who would issue the invitations, etc.

Mr. Eden suggested that a sub-committee be set up to study these details and report back to the Foreign Secretaries. Messrs. Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to study these matters.

Yugoslavian Frontiers

Mr. Eden stated that although he did not wish to raise the question of Yugoslavian frontiers with Austria and Italy, he would like to point out that with the occupation of Austria by the Red Army there might well be administrative questions relative to the frontiers which should be handled. For this reason, the British Delegation was submitting a note to the Soviet Delegation on the question.

Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary

Mr. Eden stated that he also wished to discuss the question of a Control Commission in Bulgaria in the light of the decisions reached vis-à-vis the Hungarian Control Commission. It was agreed to confine the present meeting to those matters which had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries by the Chiefs of State for consideration.

Reparations

Mr. Molotov inquired as to when the American and British Delegations would be prepared to discuss the question of reparations.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he would be ready tomorrow.

Mr. Eden added that he hoped that the British side would also be ready.

Iran

Mr. Eden recalled the signing of the Declaration on Iran. He stated that the Allies had signed treaties with Iran in which certain privileges had been granted to them for the duration of the war. In all other respects, however, he felt that the Iranian Government should be the master in its own house and free to make its own decisions. The British Government felt that it was most important to observe this principle – otherwise the Allies might find themselves in competition in Iranian affairs. No one desired that. For this reason, he urged that the Allies refrain from interfering in internal Iranian matters. With respect to oil, Mr. Eden stated that the British Government did not dispute the Soviet need for Iranian oil and that it was no part of British policy to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining oil from Northern Iran. Indeed, the Soviet Union was a natural market for this oil. The British Government did not wish to put any obstacles in the way of the Soviet Union’s obtaining oil concessions if and when the Iranians were prepared to negotiate. He continued that he felt that it should be made known publicly that the Allies would not press the matter concerning oil concessions any further until their troops had been withdrawn from Iran. The British Government was ready to consider at the Crimean Conference the advisability of making some statement which would indicate that the Allies were prepared to start to withdraw their troops earlier than was provided for in the Declaration on Iran. This withdrawal might commence as soon as the supply routes were closed. He believed that if agreement could be reached on this point it would have a good effect on world opinion and would show that the Allies were prepared to carry out the Tehran Declaration.

Mr. Molotov maintained that there were two different questions involved, i.e. those concerning the oil concessions and the withdrawal of Allied troops. With respect to the withdrawal of the troops, this question had never been placed before the Soviet Government until today. He maintained that this was a question of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty signed by Iran. If there were any need to amend this agreement the question should be studied. This would take some time.

With respect to the oil concessions, Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to make a few comments. The Soviet Government had asked Ambassador Ahi what the Iranian attitude would be to a request for concessions. Ahi’s reply had been most favorable. Kavtaradze had then proceeded to Iran to negotiate. In his first conversation with Foreign Minister Saed, the Foreign Minister had taken a favorable position. This was only natural since the granting of concessions was not only to the interests of the Soviet Union, but also to Iran. It was also in compliance with the Declaration of Tehran, since the granting of concessions would assist Iranian economy. This was the first stage of the controversy.

During the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then stated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations. Thereupon, the Medjlis had adopted a decision to the effect that there should be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many Iranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great a hurry and that it was unwise.

Why could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had changed their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no reason why they should not change it back to the first stage. The Soviet Government had endeavored to persuade them to do so. Kavtaradze had returned and the strong-armed methods he had used have subsided. He said that no negotiations were being carried on at the present time and that he did not believe it advisable to pay any special attention to this question now. He suggested that the matter be left alone – that it take its own course. The situation was not acute at the present time.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the United States had no wartime treaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had carried on negotiations for oil concessions but these had been dropped following the Medjlis decision. The firms were consequently in the same position as the Soviets. With respect to the withdrawal of troops from Iran he wished to point out that the American troops there were serving the interests of the Soviet Union in moving Lend-Lease supplies from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was content to leave the question of oil negotiations until the end of the war. He wished fully to support Mr. Eden’s proposals regarding the withdrawal of the Allied troops.

Mr. Eden remarked that the British Government had no opposition to the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet Government.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the United States Government took the same position.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the British had also carried on negotiations with the Iranians, even before the Soviet negotiations had started. As a result of the present attitude of the Iranian Government all of these negotiations were now held in abeyance. He said that if some statement were released, as suggested by him, it might reassure the Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil negotiations. With respect to the renewal [withdrawal] of Allied troops, there was no need to amend the Iranian treaty which stated that Allied troops would be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to withdraw these troops as soon as the supply route was no longer necessary.

Mr. Molotov stated that he believed it might be advisable to limit the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He offered to summon Kavtaradze to the conference to make a report on the Iranian situation.

Mr. Eden stated that he would like to think over what Mr. Molotov had said and added that he might have new suggestions to make at a forthcoming meeting.

Matthews Notes

Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon
  1. Austria-Yugoslav. Must agree on boundary for purpose of admin. Note.
  2. Bulgarian & Hungary Control: Com:
  3. Reparations tomorrow
  4. Iran. –

Oil – no dispute on Sov. to get oil from N. Persia. No obstacle on Rus. concession if & when Pers. are prepared to negotiate. We should all make it known we will not press matters further until Allied Troops withdrawn. We prepared to issue statement prepared to withdraw troops earlier pari passu – when supply route closes. Would show world prepared to carry out Teh decl.

Mol: Eden has 2 pts – different 1. Oil 2. Troops. Troops question new. If necessary to change agreement must be studied & some time needed.

Oil – What was beginning? Negot began by asking Pers. govt attitude on concess N Persia. Answer was attitude would be most favorable Dep. Com Kav went to Iran. Conversation with first position of Said & Shah both favorable. Seemed not only USSR but Persia also inter. Would be econ. assistance to Pers.

Something has changed. No time for details but Govt. said would not continue discussions Persia during war. Mejlis would not discuss. Said decision was taken in a hurry. Why not now a third phase. Why can’t Pers. govt change position again. Trying to persuade them thats all. Kav. has returned home & method which might seem strong has changed. No negot. now but reserve right to take. Why special attention now? Why not let things go their way. Situation not acute.

S. We have no treaty with Our oil concessions also advanced stage & were in same position. Supports Eden on troop withdrawal. Willing to wait till war’s end on concess.

Eden: Reiterates no oppos. to Soviet concession. Does believe some statement might reassure Pers who were frightened at one time and make negotiations easier.

On troop withdrawal no change in treaty necessary. Would help reassure Pers & therefore negot.

Mol: Thinks we should limit ourselves to an exchange of views Might bring in Kavtaradze – he is here in Crimea.

Hiss Notes

Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon

ERS see Ed. →Wire S. Am states act Immediately

For Mins
2/8 Eden Chmn

Eden: 1st World Org. q. 2 q’s referred to us

  1. Q. of membership of 2 or 3 reps of SU
  2. Time & place of conference

AH
Note to Pres
re Art VII

ERS & Ns to be invited

ERS To start at bottom of list 1st I should like take this opportunity invite our great allies to conf in US

Hope Pres didn’t shock you yester. by mentioning March I’m sure time can be arranged to fit in with convenience of Mr Mol & Mr Ed However we are very anxious to have the conf. at earliest poss. time Pers. hope could be held not later than latter part Apr.

As to matter of those to be invited you will recall at D. O. there was much talk as to the Assoc. Ns as well as the Un Ns We have come to the conclusion that taking everything into consid. it would prob. be most satis. to limit those to be invited to those who had signed Un Ns Decl & declared war on our common enemy.

As to Mr. Molotov’s reference to multiple membership for S.U. From standpoint geog. area & pop. it is my feeling this entire q. should be given very sympathetic consid. As to how it could be done immediately at the very first meeting I have not been able to determine in my own mind

In D. O. proposals we wrote in the provision each state have 1 vote. I have not yet been able to see clearly how D. O. proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. I wish again to refer to the Pres’ reaction yesterday to this matter when he said it was most interesting & deserved sympathetic study

Mol. Has expressed his ideas re last q. As to 1st q. like Ed. to state his views

Ed. As regards time & place. Glad to accept the invitation of the U S Govt I only want to enter 1 caveat. Mr Winant, Mr Gusev & I getting little jealous we never have anything in Lon. If Mr Mol & I go to Am for this I hope for an early meeting of For Secs in Lon

ERS Agreed

Mol Quite poss.

Ed. Invitation not ultimatum

ERS Promptly accept

Mol We also

Ed As to time have to get Ch. into line & possibly Fr. Lawyers want 10 days or so I rather think I am committed to debates in Par. before I go I would like myself 2nd half April

ERS around about Apr 15

Ed I would give it a wk more 20 something

Mol Agreed

ERS latter part April?

Mol Agreed

ERS Wanted calendar Suggested Wed Apr 25

Mol. Agrees to both

Ed We mildly prefer second (date) Easter 1st

Agreed April 25

Mol. We accept your invitation to Wash & the date of 25th

Re 3 reps Ed. Definitely sympathetic to their inclusion in Ass. We would be ready to say that at whatever is considered the approp. moment

Mol – As soon as possible

Would like deal with this q. relation to remarks of Mr S. Mr S has reminded us Pres spoke of decs of D. O. & 1 vote. Like ask 1 q. Can & Austr part of U K.

Ed – Of Brit Em

Mol & members of Ass.

The amends to Sov Const which have been accepted Feb last yr give reps rt of immed touch with for. states S U union of states. Const Enlarges rts of reps. In this sense we must develop rels with for. states, this already begun As to their pol, econ, mil importance no use proving what impor. have such reps as U,——Would be very desirable if could arrive at agt & have reach dec. today

Re Proposal made by ERS that Un Ns Decl signers & decl. of war com.

Q. which Pol should be invited

Ed Another reason settle prob.

Mol. Some Ns have no dip. rels with S U

Would like to check up exact no. of states which would take place

ERS read list

Ecuador has recently declared war but has not yet declared war

Ed: laughed

Mol If we cannot arrive at agt re membership must say so & move on to another subject

Ed: all agreed except re 2 reps.

Cad: If you call a conf. to complete D. O. work & to agree finally on the Charter I don’t see how you can exclude any of members of that conf. from the Org.

ERS: The Un. Ns meet to complete a charter & all would be members They could elect new members before 1st meeting of Ass. Trying find way Sov request can be taken before 1st meeting

Ed Un Ns could meet as met last time & could agree amongst other bus. to extend foundation members to include the 2 Sov. Reps. We should be quite ready to agree to that

Mol. Suggests amend, to Ed proposal

We must formulate this q. as he proposed & add we 3 have agreed it would be advisable to give the 2 or 3 Sov. reps. a place in the Ass.

ERS asked Ed q. – Ed restated position

ERS I am favorably impressed with what Mr Ed. has said. I did not have an oppor. of discussing this with Pres this morn. ∴ at this time imp. make any firm commit. However delighted discuss with Pres promptly & would hope & expect U S be able give favorable answer before end of day

Mol. Agreed

Ed. “

Mol We leave now q of Pol. – in hope we reach agt.

Ed. Other items to consider

ERS There are a no. of details. If we could meet tomorrow

Status of Fr., Ch. participant at DO. & must be consulted, form of invitation, how & by whom & when invitations be issued

Ed. We might set up subcom. to prepare this & report to us

ERS A. H., Gromyko, Jebb

Ed. Other items for agenda

  1. Yugoslav frontier – Will put in a note on that

  2. Control Coms., Bul & Hung.
    Mol. Dec. re Hung. Con. Com just arrived at. Other q’s

  3. Iran
    Agreed not try to list q’s still to come up at plenary session

Mol. when can we go on with q. of reparations?

ERS we will be prepared tomorrow to discuss Rep. further

Ed. Hope we will

Iran
Ed At Teheran we signed Decl. re Persia & each made treaties with Iran

About oil – no dispute about SU’s need for oil. No part of our pol. to prevent S.U. from obtaining oil from N. Persia Indeed Sov. Un is a natural market for N. Per. oil. We do not wish to put any obstacle in way of R’s obtaining concession if & when Persians prepared to neg. it. We should all of us make it known that we will not press matters further re oil concessions until Allied troops have been withdrawn from Persia

Ready to consider making some statement indicating we would be prepared to start withdrawal Allied troops earlier than was agreed in treaty – which was conclusion of Eur war.

Mol. 2 diff. q’s oil & Allied troops in Persia

Q of withdrawal of troops was not taken up until today in such a way. Here is q of carrying out the agt already signed by Iran. If there is a nec. to change this agt, some time needed to study

About oil – Negs. began by Rs asking Ir Amb what would be Ir. att. toward Sov concession Said sure answer would be most favorable. Then Dep. Com Kav – went to Iran & talked to Saed. 1st position of Saed quite favorable – same re Shah

Seemed quite natural not only SU but Persia interested in accord with Decl on Iran would be solid assistance to Iran

Second stage – something has changed in Iran. Not now dealing with details but Per. govt said not prepared go on with discussions & Majlis took dec. not give concessions during war. Since then have heard many times from Per. officials dec was unfortunate & taken in hurry

Why can’t there be 3rd stage – return of Per Govt to its 1st opin. If Per. Govt has changed mind in 1 direction what cant change in other dir. What objection? May reopen negs. Brit already have concessions – no inconvenience to Rs & R concession would not be to Brit

Let things go own way. Nothing acute now

ERS Just a word. For the record US has not signed a war-time treaty with Iran. Treaty was Sov-Brit-Iranian treaty. Also certain Am. oil co’s were negotiating & we too were cut short. I wish to support endorse entirely Mr. Eden’s proposal re withdrawal of troops. Only reason Am. troops are in Iran is to serve S U from standpoint supply & movement of Lend-lease.

As to oil we are perfectly contented not to resume negs. till after hostilities end.

Ed: No opposition to Sov. concession

ERS Same is true of U.S.

Ed. We were negotiationg another concession even before R negs began & now all that has come to an end as result of Per. Govts present attitude. Thought statement he proposed might reassure Persians, who were undoubtedly frightened at one time, & make negs easier

As to troops, no need amend treaty which says be withdrawn not later than 6 mos after end hostilities No diff. in Brit withdrawing earlier. Thought might begin when supply line no longer going.

Mol Offered to have Kavtoradge come

Mol. Would like to have limit selves to exch of views

Ed. to think over what Mol. said & may make new suggestions

Mol All of should think

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Yalta, February 8, 1945

List of Items Referred to Foreign Ministers

  1. Inclusion of Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania among initial members of the Organization. (See attached paper)

  2. Date and place of United Nations Conference.

  3. Nations to be invited to United Nations Conference.

Emphasize membership should include all signatories of United Nations Declaration – not just the specific, listed countries which have already signed.

(See attached list)

  1. The policy toward Iran. (See attached paper)
[Attachment 1]
Yalta, February 8, 1945

Arguments Against Inclusion of Any of the Soviet Republics Among the Initial Members

Soviet Republics not Signatories of the United Nations Declaration:
On further thought we have become impressed with the Soviet view that the initial members of the United Nations Organization should be the signatories of the United Nations Declaration. As none of the Soviet Republics are signatories of that Declaration, Mr. Molotov’s proposal that two or three of these Republics be admitted to initial membership would be contrary to that principle.

The Question Should Be Postponed Until the Organization is Formed:
The President indicated in his remarks yesterday at the plenary session that this question should not come up until after the Organization is formed.

Mr. Molotov said yesterday at the plenary session that the Soviet Government had observed the gradual development of international relations of the British dominions. In accordance with the practice followed by the dominions, it would seem to be premature to take the action proposed by Mr. Molotov at this time. We should allow a longer time to elapse and have available more experience as to the international relations of the Soviet Republics before we consider this question.

The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the Organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.

The Soviet Republics are not Sovereign States under International Practice:
The Soviet constitution does not permit the Soviet Republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the Republics are also inconsistent with the Republics being sovereign.

NOTE: India is one of the United Nations. It, too, is not independent. The Soviet representatives will probably argue that if India can be a member so should their three Republics.

The answer: India has for some period past been gradually developing international relations, and is generally regarded as having more of the attributes of separate nationhood than the Soviet Republics.

[Attachment 2]

List of Nations Which Were Invited to the United Nations Conferences at Hot Springs, Atlantic City and Bretton Woods

United Nations
Australia Iran
Belgium Iraq
Bolivia Liberia
Brazil Luxembourg
Canada Mexico
China Netherlands
Colombia New Zealand
Costa Rica Nicaragua
Cuba Norway
Czechoslovakia Panama
Dominican Republic Philippine Commonwealth
El Salvador Poland
Ethiopia Union of South Africa
Greece Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Guatemala United Kingdom
Haiti United States
Honduras Yugoslavia
India
States Associated with the United Nations in the War
Chile Iceland
Ecuador Paraguay
Egypt Peru
France – Provisional Government of the French Republic Uruguay
Venezuela
Observers
Danish Minister at Washington, attending in a personal capacity
[Attachment 3]
Yalta, February 8, 1945

Policy on Iran

At Malta we agreed with the British on two points:

  1. We should urge the Soviet Government, in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943, to respect the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone negotiations for oil concessions until the termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran.

The Declaration on Iran, which was signed by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at Tehran, expressed desire for the maintenance of Iran’s sovereignty and integrity.

  1. Both Governments should state that when the truck route to Russia across Iran is no longer needed, we would be prepared to begin removing our troops pari passu (i.e., at the same rate).
[Attachment 4]

Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran

December 1, 1943

The President of the United States, the Premier of the USSR, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their worldwide military operations and to the worldwide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Kuter Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Somervell General Ismay
Vice Admiral Cooke Admiral Somerville
Rear Admiral McCormick Major General Laycock
Major General Bull Major General Holmes
Major General Anderson Lord Leathers
Major General Hull Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret

Approval of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 186th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overall Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/11)

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had examined this paper and it was acceptable to them with one amendment. They would like to change the date referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 4b (1) (d) on Page 4 of the enclosure from 30 April to 1 April.

Lord Leathers said that this amendment would suit him personally very well if the staffs concerned could prepare the study in time.

Admiral Leahy said that the United States staffs believed this would be possible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were quite prepared to accept the first of April as a target date for the report concerned.

Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke suggested that paragraph 4b (1) of the enclosure required clarification as to the order of priority in which the tasks referred to were to be undertaken. For instance, the fixing of priorities for the continuance of the war against Japan referred to in paragraph 4b (1) (b) might well have to take place before the preparation of the combined redeployment plan or at least concurrently with it.

General Somervell explained that the tasks referred to in paragraph 4b (1) were not set out in the sequence in which they would necessarily be undertaken.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide on the agencies to undertake the preparation of a combined redeployment plan, and the fixing of priority for continuance of the war against Japan. He felt that the Combined Staff Planners and the Combined Administrative Committee, in consultation, would be the best bodies to undertake this work. They would, of course, as set out in paragraph 4b (1) (c) confer with the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the appropriate shipping authorities.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 746/11, subject to the change of the date in the third line on Page 4 from 30 April to 1 April 1945.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners, in collaboration with the Combined Administrative Committee, to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b (1).

c. Invited the combined shipping authorities to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b (2).

Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War (CCS 777/1)

Sir Alan Brooke said there were two points the British Chiefs of Staff would like to make. With regard to Article 6, certain of the Dominion Governments had raised objections to the conclusion of an agreement whereby their prisoners of war should work for the Russians on any but a voluntary basis. He suggested therefore the insertion of the words “on a voluntary basis” after the words “They may also be employed” in the second sentence of Article 6.

As he saw it, the proposed agreement was susceptible to alteration by the State Department or Foreign Office, and all that was required was the assurance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they saw no objection to it in principle.

Admiral Leahy said that he had understood the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree on the wording of the document and recommend its acceptance to the State Department and Foreign Office as a basis for discussion with the Russians.

Replying to a question by General Marshall, Sir Charles Portal explained that the Dominion Governments concerned had pointed out that their forces were enrolled on a voluntary basis and were not conscripts. For political reasons, therefore, they felt it important that such troops who might be prisoners of war, should not be made to work by the Russians except on a voluntary basis.

Admiral Leahy said the proposed amendment was acceptable.

Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke said that the second point which the British Chiefs of Staff wished to put forward was with regard to Article 8. They felt that this article introduced a new subject which had not previously been considered and might not be acceptable to the Russian authorities who might well object to agreeing that their prisoners of war falling into the hands of United States or British troops should, without their consent, be transferred by one of these powers to the other.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that such transfers might be operationally necessary.

Sir Charles Portal said that as he read it, there was nothing in the remainder of the agreement which prohibited such transfers but he regarded it as a matter more for mutual arrangement between the United States and British authorities concerned than for discussion with the Russians.

General Marshall said that he was prepared to agree that paragraph 8 should be deleted.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 777/1 subject to the following amendments:

  • Article 6: In the fifth line, after “employed,” insert “on a voluntary basis.”
  • Article 8: Delete this article and renumber the succeeding article as Article 8.

(Amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 777/2.)

Equipment for Greek Forces (CCS 185th Mtg., Item 2; CCS 768/1; NAF 841)

Sir Alan Brooke reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that at their 185th Meeting, 2 February 1945, it had been agreed that the British would undertake the equipment of an additional 60,000 Greek forces upon receipt from London of certain assurances. The British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to assure the United States Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of the proposals contained in NAF 841:
a. Would not interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe; and
b. Would not result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

The British would therefore go ahead with the equipping of the forces concerned. The British Chiefs of Staff would also formalize this matter by putting out a memorandum on the lines he had just mentioned.

General Marshall said that these assurances were satisfactory.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of NAF 841 would not:

  1. Interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe;
  2. Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U.S. resources.

b. Pursuant to the above, agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841.

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776/1)

Admiral Leahy raised the question of the preparation of the final report to the President and Prime Minister. He understood that such a report would be ready for consideration on the following morning. He understood also that the Prime Minister had suggested a plenary meeting at noon, on Friday, 9 February. He would seek the wishes of the President in this matter.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it might be well for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to meet an hour before the plenary meeting in order to clear any final points with regard to the report itself or any other matters which might arise.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to request a plenary meeting for 1200 hours on Friday, 9 February 1945.
b. Agreed to meet one hour prior to the plenary meeting, whatever the hour selected, to consider the final report.

Operations on the Western Front

General Marshall read out the latest information available on the course of ground and air operations on the Western Front. He felt it of particular interest to note that at the present time there were 49 Allied divisions in the line with 33 in reserve.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the above statement.

Draft Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War as Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret

Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet Armies and U.S. (British) Armies

Preamble

The Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States of America (the Government of His Britannic Majesty) wishing to conclude an agreement on arranging for the care and repatriation of Soviet citizens freed by Allied troops, and for American citizens (British subjects) freed by the Red Army, through their appointed representatives, acting mutually in the authority duly and fully invested in them, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under U.S. (British) command and American citizens (British subjects) liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

U.S. (British) and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

Article 2

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and U. S. (British) repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens (or subjects) are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the over-all administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The relocation of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

Article 3

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent U.S. (British) and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens (or subjects) of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party.

Article 4

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party.

Article 5

Soviet and U.S. (British) military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens (and subjects) of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and U.S. (British) authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and U.S. (British) Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens (or subjects) necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

Article 6

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and U.S. (British) authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labor shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.

Article 7

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens (and subjects). They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens (and subjects) to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens (and subjects) shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

Article 8

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Leningrad, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret
ARGONAUT 125

Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius.

The text referred to in your number 27, dated February 8, is the British redraft of the Soviet redraft submitted to the British and American Governments on January 20. In origin, it is a SHAEF paper. The British have subsequently made a few changes in it which I feel we can accept without reservation. The British are most anxious to present this draft to the Russians today for their consideration. JCS are in full agreement. I can see no objections to the redraft and have authorized, insofar as we are concerned, tripartite discussions based on it. It does not cover the numbered points mentioned in your reference telegram which were embodied in the Department’s note of February 1 to the Soviet Embassy. The consensus here is that it would be unwise to include questions relative to the protection of the Geneva Convention and to Soviet citizens in the U.S. in an agreement which deals primarily with the exchange of prisoners liberated by the Allied armies as they march into Germany. With respect to “claimants,” notwithstanding the danger of German retaliation, we believe there will be serious delays in the release of our prisoners of war unless we reach prompt agreement on this question.

ARGONAUT, February 9, 1945

Völkischer Beobachter (February 8, 1945)

Der Reichspressechef zur Dreierkonferenz

Berlin, 7. Februar – Vor einem Kreis von Pressevertretern in Berlin befasste sich Reichspressechef Dr. Dietrich mit der zurzeit tagenden Dreierkonferenz, wobei er insbesondere das Schlagwort von der Organisation des Weltfriedens einer eingehenden Betrachtung unterzog und die Tatsache beleuchtete, dass Plutokratie und Bolschewismus die Keimzellen ewiger Kriege sind.

So führte der Reichspressechef aus:

Im Schwarzen Meer, wahrscheinlich auf einem Kriegsschiff, sitzen zurzeit drei Männer zusammen, die wir als die Hauptkriegsschuldigen und größten Kriegsverbrecher aller Zeiten kennen. Sie haben erklären lassen, dass sie sich auf dieser Konferenz zwei Ziele gesetzt hätten:

Sie wollen erstens das deutsche Volk durch ein Agitationsmanöver zur Selbstaufgabe bewegen und zweitens der leichtgläubigen Menschheit die Herbeiführung des ewigen Friedens versprechen.

Das deutsche Volk zur Kapitulation und damit zur Selbstauslöschung zu überreden, ist ihnen in den vergangenen Jahren nicht gelungen und wird ihnen auch jetzt nicht gelingen. Das zweite Hauptziel dieser Konferenz wirft die Frage auf, welche Legitimation gerade diese drei Männer besitzen, vom Frieden zu reden. Nur allzu oft hat die Rauhe Wirklichkeit ihre Versprechungen schon entlarvt. Vor der Unbestechlichkeit der Tatsachen in den „befreiten“ Ländern sind ihre tönenden Worte von der Garantie der Staaten und Selbstbestimmung der Völker, von Friede und Wohlstand, von Freiheit und Völkerbeglückung vor den Augen der ganzen Welt zusammengebrochen.

Schon immer dienten den Plutokraten und Bolschewisten moralische Schlagworte und billige Redensarten dazu, dass in einer Zeit härtesten Kampfes und schwerster Opfer Worte des Friedens eine gangbare Münze zur Täuschung der Massen sind. Es ist heute eine geschichtliche Tatsache, dass das Wort von der Unteilbarkeit des Friedens, das unsere Feinde 1939 ständig im Munde führten, nur dazu gedient hat, den Ausbruch des zweiten Weltkrieges herbeizuführen. Es war jene berüchtigte These, dass der kleine lokale Konflikt notwendig die ganze Welt erfassen und in Brand setzen müsse. Alle Einsichtigen haben damals vor diesem gefährlichen verbrecherischen Schlagwort gewarnt, die Welt, die jetzt in Flammen steht, wird sich dessen erinnern. Eine gleiche Warnung ist heute am Platze, weil wiederum hinter ihren Phrasen in Wirklichkeit die Triebkräfte des Krieges stehen.

Das Gesetz des Kapitalismus ist der Rhythmus der Krise des Konflikts und der sozialen Spannung, aus der es am Ende keinen friedlichen Ausweg mehr gibt. Den Kapitalismus begleitet der Fluch eines vergangenen Zeitalters. Er kann in der Zukunft nur noch das Chaos erzeugen. Die Zerrüttung der Weltwirtschaft, die wir nach Versailles erlebt haben und die den zweiten Weltkrieg vorbereitete, würde ein Kinderspiel sein, verglichen mit dem wirtschaftlichen Inferno, das ein Sieg der kapitalistischen und imperialistischen Staaten heute heraufbeschwören würde.

Das innerste Wesen des Bolschewismus anderseits ist der Zug nach unten. Moskaus Sieg über Europa würde zwangsläufig eine unaufhörliche Kette blutiger Kriege nach sich ziehen, so lange, bis alle Völker der Erde dem Elend unterworfen und auf die niedrigste Stufe der Lebensform und das tiefste soziale Niveau der menschlichen Gesellschaft herabgedrückt wären.

Kapitalismus und Bolschewismus können nicht die Träger des Friedens sein, weil sie die Brutstätten der Kriege sind. Mit Recht schrieb in diesen Tagen der stellvertretende Vorsitzende der britischen Labour-Partei: „Der wirtschaftliche Imperialismus der USA wird innerhalb einer Generation den dritten Weltkrieg bedeuten“ und im englischen Unterhaus fiel in der Debatte über Griechenland das prophetische Wort: „Wir säen die Saat für zukünftige Kriege.“

Das wirkliche Ziel für das die auf der Konferenz Versammelten kämpfen, ist also nicht – wie sie sagen – eine Welt des Friedens, sondern umgekehrt die Verewigung des Krieges! Was sie der Menschheit bringen wollen, ist nicht die Palme dauerhaften Friedens, sondern die Geißel ewigen Krieges!

Sie haben 1939 so lange vom unteilbaren Frieden gesprochen, bis sie den totalen Krieg herbeigeführt hatten. Und wenn sie heute von Organisation des Weltfriedens sprechen, dann bereiten sie in Wirklichkeit den Weltkrieg in Permanenz vor!

Von diesen sich aus den geschichtlichen und logischen Feststellungen zwangsläufig und unwiderlegbar ergebenden Tatbeständen werden Roosevelt, Churchill und Stalin mit Sicherheit nicht sprechen, wenn sie jetzt als die Herolde des ewigen Friedens vor die Öffentlichkeit treten. Diese furchtbaren Wahrheiten werden sie verborgen halten hinter ihren Reden, Kommuniqués und falschen Friedensbeteuerungen, die sie verbreiten lassen.

Wenn sie wirklich von Friedensabsichten erfüllt wären, dann müssten sie feierlich erklären, dass „Friede auf Erden“ nur möglich ist in einer Welt, in der die Vereinigten Staaten ihren kriegsprovozierenden weltwirtschaftlichen Imperialismus aufgeben und sich stattdessen der Beglückung ihres eigenen Volkes zuwenden: dass der Weltfriede nur möglich ist in einer Welt, in der England den von ihm unterjochten großen Völkern in Indien, Arabien und der übrigen Welt die Freiheit und Souveränität zurückgibt, dass niemals Friede auf Erden sein wird, solange innerhalb aller Völker eine fremde, zersetzende Rasse eigene, verbrecherische Ziele verfolgt.**

Ein wahrer Friede ist nur denkbar, wenn die kapitalistische Ausbeutung ebenso unmöglich gemacht ist wie die bolschewistische und deren blutgierigen alles zerstörenden Instinkte. Er ist nur möglich in einer Welt, in der die plutokratischen Vorrechte und die wirtschaftlichen Privilegien beseitigt sind, in der die gleichen Bedingungen des Aufstieges für alle arbeitenden Menschen und Völker gelten.

Wenn es den drei Kriegsverbrechern Ernst wäre mit Ihren Schwindelparolen, dann müssten sie vor aller Welt auch feststellen, dass äußere Verträge des Friedens gar nichts nützen und nur eine Täuschung sind, wenn die bolschewistische Taktik der terroristischen Aushöhlung der Staaten von innen heraus jederzeit ihren blutigen Marsch zur Welteroberung antreten kann; dass die Vernichter der europäischen Kultur nicht ihre Erretter sein können und dass diejenigen, die mit den Bolschewisten paktieren, der Welt nicht den Frieden, sondern den blutigsten Terror bringen werden.

Solange die Welt solche Erklärungen aus dem Munde derjenigen nicht vernimmt, die von Propagandaphrasen überfließen, werden die Menschen um den Frieden betrogen sein!

Das Zeitalter des Friedens beginnt erst, wenn die Triebkräfte der bisherigen Kriege aus der Welt beseitigt sind. Nicht aus den schon so oft katastrophal gescheiterten bankrotten Friedensparolen der Vergangenheit, sondern aus den neuen fortschrittlichen Ideen unserer Zeit, die das Gegeneinander der Nationen in die Bahn für und miteinander lenken, wird der kommende Friede unter den Völkern erstehen. Wie alles wahrhaft Große muss er unter schwersten Opfern errungen und mit äußerster Hingabe erkämpft werden. Mit dem Bollwerk des europäischen Kontinents steht und fällt der Friede der Welt.