Mother-and-daughter dresses still popular
Bright stripes and Latin patterns to make summer garments gay
By Maxine Garrison
…
Jimmy Dunn – ‘A star reborn’ in movies
But he’s keeping fingers crossed
By Maxine Garrison
…
Navy Nurse
Stay-at-home tends men evacuated from war areas
By Carol Taylor, special to the Pittsburgh Press
…
Gracie Allen Reporting
By Gracie Allen
Well, I see by the news from London that the English are afraid war conditions have begun to produce gangsters there like we had in this country during the pre-G-man era.
Personally, I don’t think they have anything to worry about. I just can’t picture an Englishman who looks like George Raft flipping a farthing in the air as he says: “Take this bounder for a bit of a jaunt,” and somehow it doesn’t seem as frightening to hear a faultless Oxford accent saying: “I say, old thing, elevate them” as to hear a mug’s voice growling, “Stick ‘em up, rat.”
I predict English gangster pictures will be a flop. They’ll never capture the right flavor with underworld characters by the name of Scarface Algernon, Bugsy Throckmorton, and Pretty Boy Cholmondeley sitting around an abandoned warehouse in their tweeds and sipping tea.
U.S. State Department (January 31, 1945)
Interdelegation dinner meeting, evening, government house
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Stettinius | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Foreign Secretary Eden | ||
| Lieutenant General Schreiber | ||
| and various other members of the two Delegations |
The meeting was “a large formal dinner at Government House” given by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Malta, Lieutenant General Schreiber, in honor of the American and British Delegations.
740.011 EW/1–2745: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, January 31, 1945
Top secret
[Excerpts]
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General information. Winant has been instructed to act in concert with his Soviet colleague in the EAC in approving French proposals regarding equality in connection with the handling of German matters. … The British still insist on the desirability of a tripartite declaration on Denmark but the Department intends instead to send a secret message to the Danish Freedom Council and Danish political leaders praising their assistance to the common cause. … It is understood that Subasic will not leave London until the regency council appointed by the King has been recognized by Tito. The Greek situation is developing normally and it is reported that EAM has accepted the Government’s proposal regarding the composition of the peace talk delegations. … As a result of extreme Soviet pressure, the Czechoslovak Cabinet has decided to recognize the Lublin Committee. … Discussion in EAC of control machinery for Austria will be resumed as soon as instructions are received by the Soviet and French representatives. The British have approved in principle French participation in the occupation of Austria. … Bohlen has a copy of a long memorandum from Mikolajczyk making proposals for the solution of Soviet-Polish difficulties.
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ALLSTATE. HORSESHOE.
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… (This is our fifth message.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. State Department (February 1, 1945)
The British Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister Churchill
Malta, 1 February, 1945
P. M. (A) 2.
Prime Minister
Conversations with Mr. Stettinius
Poland
We found that we were in broad agreement on the necessity for finding a solution and that it was impossible for our Governments to recognise the Lublin Government. Mr. Stettinius stressed that failure to find a solution would greatly disturb American public opinion, and might prejudice the whole question of American participation in the World Organisation.
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I agreed that a “Russian” solution of the question would be very likely to produce the latter result.
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We found that we had very similar ideas on the lines of a possible solution. We should have to stress to Marshal Stalin the unsatisfactory nature of the present state of affairs, with the Soviet recognising one Government in Lublin and ourselves another Government in London. (We, of course, ourselves have the added problem of the Polish forces, acting with ours, who owe allegiance to the London Government). There would be apparent to the world a definite divergence of view on a point of first-rate importance. This would give rise to uneasiness amongst our peoples and would afford valuable material to enemy propaganda.
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The time has probably gone by for a “fusion” of London and Lublin, and the only remedy that we can see is the creation of a new interim Government in Poland, pledged to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit. This would be representative of all Polish political parties and would no doubt include elements from the Lublin Government, from Poles in Poland, and from Poles abroad. There are no good candidates from the Government in London, but if M. Mikolajczyk and, perhaps, M. Romer and others such as M. Grabski could be included, that would make it much easier for us to recognize the new Government, which should be far more representative of Poland as a whole than is the Lublin Government.
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If it would facilitate the realisation of this plan, we should be ready to see the adoption of M. Mikolajczyk’s idea of a “Presidential Council” consisting of such men as the former Prime Minister, M. Witos, Archbishop Sapieha, M. Zulawski and M. Bierut. Such a Council could appoint the new Government.
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If the Russians persist in their present policy, that would only neutralise the efforts of all those in our two countries most anxious to work with Russia.
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There remains the territorial problem. As regards Poland’s eastern frontier, HMG have already agreed with the Russians and announced publicly that this should be the Curzon Line, giving Lwow to the USSR. The Americans may however still wish to press the Russians to leave Lwow to Poland. As regards Poland’s western frontier, we and the Americans agreed that Poland should certainly have East Prussia south and west of Königsberg, Danzig, the eastern tip of Pomerania and the whole of Upper Silesia. The Lublin Poles, no doubt with Soviet approval, are however also claiming not only the Oder line frontier, including Stettin and Breslau, but also the western Neisse frontier.
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The cessions upon which we and the Americans are agreed would involve the transfer of some 2½ million Germans. The Oder frontier, without Breslau and Stettin would involve a further 2¼ millions. The western Neisse frontier with Breslau and Stettin would involve an additional 3¼ millions making 8 millions in all.
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We were prepared last October in Moscow to let M. Mikolajczyk’s Government have any territories they chose to claim up to the Oder, but this was conditional upon agreement then being reached between him and the Russians and there was no question of our agreeing to the western Neisse frontier. It was agreed before we left London that we should oppose the western Neisse frontier. I also think that we should keep the position fluid as regards the Oder line frontier, and take the line that HMG cannot be considered as having accepted any definite line for the western frontier of Poland, since we need not make the same concessions to the Lublin Poles which we were prepared to make to M. Mikolajczyk in order to obtain a solution of the Polish problem. Even the Oder line frontier would severely tax the Polish capacity for absorption and would increase the formidable difficulties involved in the transfer of millions of Germans. We agreed with the Americans that in any event these transfers should be gradual and not precipitate.
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If the Russians refuse to accept any solution such as that outlined above, the present deadlock must continue. That would be bad, but a simple recognition of the Lublin Government would be even worse.
Stettinius-Eden conversation, morning
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Stettinius | Foreign Secretary Eden |
Stettinius and Eden, who were both quartered on board HMS Sirius in Grand Harbor, Malta, went ashore in the early part of the morning and took a walk, during the course of which, it seems, they “discussed some of the problems to be raised at Yalta.”
Völkischer Beobachter (February 1, 1945)
Der Führer sprach
Stimme des deutschen Gewissens
vb. Wien, 31. Jänner (kp.) – Der Führer sprach: „Was immer auch unsere Gegner ersinnen mögen, was immer sie deutschen Städten, den deutschen Landschaften und vor allem unseren Menschen an Leid zufügen, es verblasst gegenüber dem im korrigierbaren Jammer und Unglück, das uns treffen müsste, wenn jemals die plutokratisch-bolschewistische Verschwörung Sieger bliebe.“
Unter keinem anderen Gesichtspunkt lässt sich das Gesetz der Lage erkennen, die wir zu meistern haben. Monate, ja Jahre hindurch ist uns vom Feind vorgerechnet worden, dass er dem deutschen Volk den Tod wünscht – durch leibliche Ausrottung, durch Seelenmord, durch eine Entehrung, deren Brandmal nie auszulöschen wäre. Dieser Krieg ist keine Machtprobe früheren Stils, aus der der eine Partner in gesteigerter, der andere in geschwächter Lebensfülle hervorginge. Es ist ein. Kampf auf Leben und Tod, den Moskau, Washington und London mit dem ausgesprochenen Ziel führen, selbst den Namen Deutschlands auszulöschen. Kein Deutscher fände nach einem Sieg dieser Raubkoalition noch die Möglichkeit zu einem Leben, das Freuden zu verschenken hätte und Aussichten für eine bessere Zukunft böte. Wer nicht schimpflich hingeschlachtet würde, müsste als Sklave einen Marsch antreten, dar ins graue Nichts führt, und was danach noch in einigen Dutzend Kleinstaaten im Herzen Europas lebte, wäre nicht mehr als ein ausgezehrtes und zerbrochenes Geschlecht unter Fremdherrschaft auf Schritt und Tritt.
Es wäre eine gewissenlose Feigheit, wollten wir uns dieser Erkenntnis verschließen. Dass sie uns hart und entschlossen macht, dass aus ihr die sittliche Kraft erwächst, alles zu ertragen, um die Zukunft zu gewinnen, das weiß der Feind sehr wohl. Es konnte nicht ausbleiben, dass sich draußen jene geschickten Macher zu Worte meldeten, die es als unzweckmäßig hinstellten, dem deutschen Volk so offen zu sagen, was man ihm antun zu können hoffte. Es war uns allen aus dem Herzen gesprochen, als der Führer sagte, „dass jeder Versuch, der eine Einwirkung auf das nationalsozialistische Deutschland durch Phrasen Wilsonscher Prägung eine Naivität voraussetzt, die das heutige Deutschland nicht kennt.“ Unser Volk hält sich in diesen Tagen nicht damit auf, unmaßgebliche Meinungen von Außenseitern anzuführen, die beauftragt sind, uns Sand in die Augen zu streuen. Es hat die Lektion von 1919 nie vergessen und hat ein scharfes Ohr für jeden falschen Tonfall. Es weiß, was ihm in Wirklichkeit zuteilwürde, wenn es eine schwache Stunde hätte, und es kämpft nicht nur, um Zeit zu gewinnen, sondern um seinen Anspruch auf Leben, Ehre und Freiheit auf lange Zeit hin unanfechtbar durchzusetzen.
Der Appell des Führers zu gesteigerter Bereitschaft in allen Stücken war die Stimme des deutschen Gewissens. Es geht in diesem gnadenlosen Kampf um alles – und er fordert daher auch das Höchste und Letzte. Aus der Größe der Gefahr, die uns bedroht, ergibt sich der Maßstab für Pflicht und Leistung. „Wir werden auch diese Not überstehen,“ so schloss der Führer, und wir sind in dem opfervollen Ringen gegen den Ansturm im Osten die Vormauer Europas, wie wir schon oft das Abendland gegen die anbrandende Sturmflut aus der Steppe zu schützen wussten. Nicht das äußere Bild der wechselvollen Kriegslage ist hier das Entscheidende, sondern die Willensmacht, die auch schwere Krisen zu überwinden hilft und die kein Leid zu brechen vermag. Es ist die Sache der sogenannten „großen Demokratien,“ sich vor den Geistern in den Staub zu werfen, die sie selbst „aus den Steppen Asiens gerufen“ haben. Unsere Sache aber ist es, unermüdlich zu kämpfen und damit diese Geister der Unterwelt für alle Zeiten zu überwinden.
Diese Willenskraft strahlt in diesem Kampf vom deutschen Volk aus. An ihr wird die Vernichtungswut des Feindes zerbrechen und an ihr werden sich auch andere Nationen aufrichten, die der Krieg der Stalin, der Roosevelt und der Churchill ins Elend stürzte und die heute ratlos und verzweifelnd vor dem Nichts stehen. Nur dann hat auch ihr Leben einen Sinn, wenn das Reich als die schirmende Mitte Europas aus dieser harten Prüfung hervorgeht und mit der Bedrohung seines eigenen Seins auch das Versinken der anderen Völker des Kontinents ins Verderben abgewendet hat.
U.S. State Department (February 1, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| General of the Army Marshall | Major General Hull | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Major General Wood | |
| Major General Kuter | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Lieutenant General Smith | Captain Stroop | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Captain McDill | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Colonel Peck | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Bull | Lieutenant Colonel McRae | |
| Major General Anderson | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Graves |
JCS Minutes
Floriana, February 1, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret
a. Approval of the Minutes of the JCS 184th Meeting
General Kuter requested that the last sentence of the remarks of General Anderson in Item 7 be changed to read: “The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases.”
b. Approval of the Minutes of the CCS 183rd Meeting
General Marshall requested the amendment of his remarks in the third paragraph of Item 1 to read as follows:
General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the minutes of the JCS 184th Meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the discussion.
b. Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the CCS 183rd Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the above discussion and to later minor amendments.
Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773)
General Marshall said that the Secretaries had prepared a draft of the directive to SACMED proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, which showed the amendments agreed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in their previous meeting. General McNarney’s views, which had just been received, indicate that on balance he prefers to have British divisions rather than American divisions transferred to France. Concerning the tactical air force, General McNarney expresses satisfaction with the present air-ground ratio. He considers that a proportionate reduction in fighter-bomber strength should accompany a reduction in the number of divisions. He considers the medium bombers should stay in Italy.
In light of General McNarney’s message and the discussions that have taken place, it seems that no American divisions should be taken from Italy and that the draft directive to General Alexander proposed by the British with the amendments already agreed to by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and agreed in part by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and dispatched to General Alexander, with an information copy to General Eisenhower.
General Kuter proposed that a new paragraph 5 should be added to the directive as follows:
The U.S. Twelfth Air Force, less such units as may be selected by agreement between you and SCAEF, shall be made available for transfer to SCAEF, together with necessary service units.
An appropriate sequence of paragraphs in the directive was then discussed and agreed.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prepared by the Secretaries, as amended during the discussion (Subsequently circulated as CCS 773/1).
Equipment of Allied and Liberated Forces (JCS 1240 and NAF 841)
General Marshall read a brief of JCS 1240 and proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee, subject to the following amendments:
Page 5, delete the last three lines of paragraph 11 and after the word “reviewing” add “NAF 841 again.”
Page 8, line 2, insert the words “already approved in principle” between the words “provision” and “of.”
Page 8, paragraph 9, line 3, after the word “review” delete the remainder of the sentence and substitute therefor “NAF 841 again.”
General Somervell said he felt certain that when the British restudy their requirements for the supply of Greek forces, they would find that they could not meet them. It might then be suggested that the agreed figure of equipment for 460,000 liberated manpower in Europe could be reduced to 400,000 and the equipment for the 60,000 remaining be applied to the requirement for the Greek Army.
After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1240, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall (Memorandum subsequently circulated as CCS 768/1).
Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35, 452/36 and CCS 747/7)
General Marshall said that in CCS 452/35 the British proposed a directive to Admiral Mountbatten. In CCS 747/7 the British propose that transfer of forces from India-Burma to China be subject to CCS agreements. The United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/36 set forth a policy with respect to U.S. resources in the India-Burma Theater.
The point at issue appears to be whether the United States Chiefs of Staff can order transfers of resources when they do not jeopardize British forces engaged in approved operations in Burma or whether every transfer requires agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as proposed by the British. The U.S. proposal as now written appears to safeguard sufficiently the British interests. Under the British proposal the Combined Chiefs of Staff would become involved in lengthy discussions of purely operational matters and the transfer of one air squadron or one Quartermaster company would be the subject for CCS decision unless acceptable to SACSEA.
No compromise should be accepted which involves CCS approval of transfer or requires discussion in the Combined Chiefs of Staff except where the British Chiefs think their forces are jeopardized. The U.S. paper provides clearly for this.
General Marshall recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the approval of the proposals made in the U.S. memorandum in CCS 452/36. By this action both the policy for the transfer of U.S. resources and the directive for Admiral Mountbatten will be approved. The British in their paper state their willingness to discuss means of reducing the time occupied in the discussion of projected moves. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should listen to whatever the British may propose in this respect since these discussions will be necessary when contemplated transfers might place British forces in jeopardy.
The Secretary stated that the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to withdraw their paper, CCS 747/7, if the United States Chiefs of Staff will agree to delete the words “British forces engaged in” in the eighth line of the second paragraph of CCS 452/36, which paper would then be acceptable to them.
Colonel Lincoln said that the proposed British amendment would nullify the intentions of the United States Chiefs of Staff because it would transfer the “jeopardy” from the “forces engaged” to “operations.” While the jeopardy to the forces actually engaged in operations was a factual matter, it would be difficult to determine from the existing circumstances the question of the jeopardy of approved operations, some of which might not yet have been initiated. This was a matter over which there could be considerable difference of opinion. Discussion of such a point was likely to be time-consuming. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British, in lieu of their amendment, the substitution of the word “the” for the word “British” in the same line of the paragraph referred to above.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to adhere to the position outlined by them in CCS 452/36.
Pacific Operations (CCS 417/11)
Admiral King said that this paper was on the agenda for the purpose of reaffirming the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operations for the defeat of Japan. He doubted the possibility of maintaining and defending a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk from bases in Kamchatka alone, but suggested reaffirming the paper for planning purposes.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Reaffirmed their approval of CCS 417/11.
U-Boat Threat (CCS 774 and 774/1)
General Marshall said that CCS 774, upon which action had been deferred at the CCS 183rd Meeting, was the U.S. proposal for the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz for the disruption of the German U-boat program. In CCS 774/1 the British have presented a paper on the U-boat threat during 1945.
Admiral King was of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be obliged to accept the directive proposed in CCS 774 in the light of the British paper which implied that immediate action was necessary. He suggested that the British paper should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
General Marshall drew attention to the fact that the British paper would provoke serious complications in the allotment of tonnage being considered in current shipping studies and would provide the British with arguments for the increase of the figure of 8 percent which had been set for estimated shipping deficiencies. He was merely examining this aspect of the problem in order to formulate some reply to the British if the point were raised.
Admiral King felt that the British paper might be accepted if the acceptance was without prejudice to the shipping deficiencies established in the current studies. He advised against any attempt to revise the percentage figure of assumed losses at this time.
Admiral Cooke suggested that it might be preferable to note the paper and review the deficiencies in sailings at some future date.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of CCS 774/1 and review the percentage of deficiencies in sailings on 1 April 1945.
Strategy in Northwest Europe
In closed session, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept SCAF 180 (Enclosure “B” to CCS 761/3) as amended by SCAF 194, and take note of SCAEF’s dispatch No. S-77211 of 31 January 1945.
Annex
CRICKET 55 (1 February 1945)
Message by General Kuter to General Arnold
1 February 1945
The following letter received this date:
My dear Kuter. Since the British Chiefs of Staff issued CCS 691 about British participation in the very long-range bombing of Japan and the United States Chiefs of Staff replied in CCS 691/1. we have made considerable progress in the development of our VLR bombing potential.
The bombing of the Tirpitz proved that it is possible to increase the all-up weight of the Lancaster beyond our expectations and we now hope to achieve an effective radius of action of some 1,500 miles carrying a useful load of the order of 6,000 pounds with either the Lancaster or with its replacement the Lincoln. We are however carrying on with flight refueling experiments as an insurance.
The rate at which we will be able to bring our Bomber Force into action against Japan cannot finally be determined until we know more about the bases that will be available for our operations and the facilities we can count on at those bases. Assuming that bases are made available I estimate that our first squadrons could be fully operational in the Pacific 7 months after Germany is defeated, and the whole force some 5 months later.
This RAF force will be thoroughly experienced in the technique of night bombing and in sea-mining, and will be capable of dropping the very effective 1,500-pound British mines. I feel that particularly in these respects the Force will be able to make a valuable contribution to our efforts against Japan.
I am anxious to get our plans for the RAF very long-range Force into more concrete form, particularly with regard to the rate of its deployment, the provision of bases, availability of common user items, local defence and the general administrative arrangements for the contingent.
I would like to send the AOC designate of our Force together with a small number of staff officers, over to the United States at an early date in order to make contact with your Air Force authorities and the officers under whom he would be serving, to make as much progress as possible with these arrangements. It would also be helpful if he could visit the Pacific area and learn at first hand something about the operating conditions in that Theatre. Following this visit, I propose that the AOC would return to the United Kingdom to continue with the preparation of his Force. I realize the difficulties of deciding on the exact base facilities that will be available so far in advance, but I am anxious to make a definite start even on a small scale, and would be prepared to initiate planning on the assumption that you would make available to us, say, 4 bases for heavy bombers 6 months after Germany is defeated.
I would very much like to discuss this VLR project with you during this conference, either here or at MAGNETO.
Yours sincerely, Charles Portal.
Anticipating such proposal, I have cleared with JCS a reply which will infer favorable consideration after detailed presentation of desired visit to Theater at proposed conference here or at MAGNETO.
Understand Air Marshal Hugh Pugh Lloyd is AOC designate. Expect to arrange that Lloyd and party of 8 to 10 of his elected staff will arrive Washington after March 1 to spend 2 or 3 days in Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans studying probable course of air war on Japan and then 4 or 5 days in Headquarters XX Air Force for familiarization with means and methods of command and operations of XX Air Force and then visit to XX Air Force base in Mariannas and probably to Luzon.
Expect that 36 squadrons of VLR Lancasters or Lincolns under Lloyd will operate as a unit of XX Air Force.
All discussions will be based on condition that RAF unit will provide own aviation engineers and all services, will build, maintain and operate own bases, will provide all echelons of aviation maintenance and in general will be absolutely and completely self-supporting.
Will tie resurrection of WEARY WILLIE project into same conversation and hope to establish full freedom for our development and operation from French bases and freedom to develop and operate accurately controlled types from UK bases.