Maj. de Seversky: Passing the buck
By Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky
…
British planes landed under Nazi noses, brought back underground spy reports
That’s how the Allies knew everything about Germans
By André Lebord (as told to Leland Stowe)
…
McCloy denies White House dictated ruling
Stimson’s aide upset ‘politics’ radio ruling
Washington –
Acting Secretary of War John J. McCloy said today that he personally made the decision to reverse the Army ruling granting the Socialist Party broadcasting facilities on the grounds that President Roosevelt’s Bremerton (Washington) speech was political in nature.
Mr. McCloy, a Republican, said the White House neither expressed any views with respect to the Army’s original stand nor exerted any effort to have the decision changed.
‘Equitable basis’
Mr. McCloy said:
I made the decision myself.
I had nothing to do with the first decision. I thought it well to get rid of that and start on an equitable basis for providing facilities with regard to the prior decision with respect to the Bremerton speech.
There was no White House dictation.
Mr. McCloy said officials of both Secretary Henry L. Stimson’s and Under Secretary Robert P. Patterson’s offices called his attention to the original Army announcement last Friday. This decision granted the Socialist Party shortwave radio time equal to that used by the President in speaking from Bremerton Aug. 12, when he returned from the Pacific.
Made on wrong premise
McCloy said he felt that decision was made on the wrong premise, and that he therefore overruled it. He was, and is, Acting Secretary in the absence of Mr. Stimson and Mr. Patterson. Mr. Stimson, he said, had no knowledge of the matter until it was all over.
A White House official called Mr. McCloy Friday to inquire for information on the basis of the first announcement but expressed no White House views in the matter, he said.
Mr. McCloy said the original decision was reached by Col. Robert Cutler, Mr. Stimson’s coordinator for soldier voting, and Maj. Gen. Frederick H. Osborn, director for Morale Services, without referring the matter to higher authority.
Cautious attitude
Mr. McCloy acknowledged that Col. Cutler customarily took a cautious attitude in interpreting whether a matter was political and indicated he approved leaning over backward in this respect.
Mr. McCloy acknowledged that the new plan announced yesterday, whereby equal broadcast time will be allotted to political parties on a schedule to be announced later, avoided any decision whether the Bremerton speech was political in nature.
Landon backs Governor Dewey
Topeka, Kansas (UP) –
Alf M. Landon, the 1936 Republican presidential nominee, last night urged abolition of government war emergency powers “at the earliest possible moment,” and the election of Governor Thomas E. Dewey as President.
He told Kansas Young Republican leaders:
The temptation is great, whatever party is in power, to continue those vast powers. It is always easy to forget authorized procedure for a shortcut to immediate problems.
Mr. Landon advocated the election of Mr. Dewey “to restore before it is too late our 150-year-old rule of passing the Executive Office around.”
Stokes: Congressmen rudely awakened by Hillman’s testimony on PAC
They learn workers are taking interest; Communism charge angrily denied
By Thomas L. Stokes, Scripps-Howard staff writer
Washington –
Sidney Hillman tried hard in a day’s session with several Congressmen to break down some conceptions about the CIO’s political activities he directs as head of the CIO Political Action Committee and the recently-created National Citizens Political Action Committee.
He seemed to have had some success.
A definite impression from his examination by the House Campaign Investigating Committee is that it is difficult for the average Congressman to understand how a worker in some factory, in his own district or elsewhere, can get really interested in what goes on in Washington and want to do something about it.
An ogre in overalls
The average Congressman is waking up suddenly – and a little resentfully, it appears – to the new political consciousness of workers and its outlet in organized political activity. He doesn’t exactly like it, perhaps because he can’t quite understand it. So, uncomprehending, Mr. Average Congressman strikes back or, in his imagination, creates some sort of ogre that is not at all like the constituent he knew in overalls, Frank or Joe or Bill.
Some Investigating Committee members, particularly Rep. Ralph Church (R-IL), tried to draw a picture of some vast sort of conspiracy by Mr. Hillman and a few others which they are imposing on millions of workers who are following along like sheep.
Hillman’s reply angry
An accusation by Mr. Church that the CIO-PAC indulged in “Communistic records” provoked an angry outburst from Mr. Hillman.
He shouted:
You are trying to prejudice the public mind against us. You have no facts, no facts whatsoever, and that’s what I resent. I will put my record fighting Communism against yours any time. I have always opposed totalitarianism in any form. I am opposed to it in industry.
Mr. Hillman challenged Mr. Church to accompany him before any local union in Chicago and “see whom they support, you or me.”
Case of Dock Williams
Mr. Church questioned Mr. Hillman about the case of Dock J. Williams, a Negro who was removed from the presidency of Local 25 of the United Packing House Workers at Chicago. He said Mr. Williams blamed his removal on his refusal to authorize a union assessment for a $1,000 contribution to the CIO-PAC while it was still accepting funds from union treasuries. He said the case was the basis of a suit now in Superior Court at Chicago.
Mr. Hillman said he knew nothing of the case and suggested it be left to the courts. But he added that he thought it “inconceivable” that Mr. Williams was removed from office because of a controversy over the PAC.
And that Utah resignation
Mr. Church also asked about the resignation of two members of a Utah PAC in connection with political contributions.
Mr. Hillman said the two officials had disagreed with PAC objectives and that Utah PAC leaders “in their excitement” asked them to resign. He said the importance of the case had been magnified by an “organized campaign in some publications to malign the CIO.”
Mr. Church repeatedly referred to a potential PAC fund of $2,500,000 which the committee may receive if all CIO members contribute the requested $1, of which 50 cents would go to the national committee.
All very ‘democratic’
Mr. Hillman replied that “all this talk about millions is propaganda,” and added that the PAC thus far has received only $17,000 from the $1 contributions.
Mr. Hillman explained that the idea of organized political activity, local and national, was outlined by him over several months in visits to 40 states, to workers and representatives of workers, including 300 called together in Mr. Church’s own state. The unions then discussed it themselves and the plan was ratified at a national convention and the expenditure of funds approved. Mr. Hillman thought it all followed the democratic process.
Money in 18 contests
The records of activity and the expenditure of funds in primaries presented by Mr. Hillman should serve to take some of the fright out of Congressmen. The National PAC organization contributed in only 18 Congressional primary contests and did not win in all these. Locally, of course, the CIO was active elsewhere.
PAC spent no money in some contests cited for CIO activity and influence. None was spent in three Alabama contests in which the CIO was given credit for working against sitting Congressmen, including that in which Rep. Joseph Starnes, a member of the Dies Committee, was defeated. The National PAC spent none in the contest against Rep. Richard Kleberg (D-TX), who was defeated.
Fund partly frozen
The Smith-Connally Act, implemented by amendments to the Hatch Act, forbidding contributions to political campaigns by labor unions, has curtailed CIO activities, the House members learned. The PAC had a fund of $671,214 contributed by CIO unions. It had spent $371,086 up to the end of the national political conventions, when it ordered that, except for the remaining primaries, no more of this fund should be spent since union funds are barred in regular election campaigns.
House members also learned these contributions from union members, which Mr. Hillman insisted are purely voluntary, are not swelling in any golden wave. Loans and contributions from union members from July 23, when union contributions were frozen, to Aug. 15 totaled $56,922. Of this amount, $36,983 has been spent which, with the $371,086 previously spent from funds contributed by unions, makes a total of $408,080 spent for political activity.
Lucky to get $3 million
This sum, Mr. Hillman said, was equal to what two families had contributed to the Republican campaign in 1940. He decried stories of many millions to be spent by PAC and NCPAC, which he attributed to propaganda.
NCPAC, which thus far has contributions from the general public of $78,569, has set a goal of $1,500,000 for the campaign, Mr., Hillman thought PAC would be lucky to get that much, which would make a total of $3 million. The Republican National Committee spent $17 million in 1940.
Mr. Hillman told the committee that his union, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, had contributed $5,000 to the campaign for District Attorney by Thomas E. Dewey in 1938. The Dewey organization asked for me, and so obtained contributions from other unions, Mr. Hillman said.
U.S. State Department (August 29, 1944)
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/6
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, August 29, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – SEVENTH DAY
Meetings of the formulation group on General Organization
The formulation group of the Subcommittee on General Organization, meeting Monday and today, has reached tentative agreement on the following aspects of the International Organization:
I. Purposes
To maintain peace and security through effective collective measures for the prevention and suppression of threats to or breaches of the peace; to adjust or settle peacefully disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace; to develop friendly relations among nations; to serve as a center for harmonizing the action of nations for these ends. We and the British agreed that the Organization should achieve international cooperation on economic, social and technical matters, but the Soviet group, while constructively participating in discussion of this point, reserved judgment pending instructions.
II. Principles
The Organization will act in accordance with the following principles: the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states; fulfillment by all members of the obligations assumed in accordance with the basic instrument; settlement of all disputes by peaceful means not endangering peace and security; avoidance of the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with these purposes; and no assistance to a state against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken.
III. Membership
Membership should be open to the United Nations and all other peace-loving states; initial members should be the United Nations (the Soviet group reserves judgment as to whether “the nations associated with them” should be included); states not initial members should be admitted individually after adoption of the basic instrument and in accordance with regulations in it.
IV. Principal organs
An assembly, a council, an international court, a general secretariat, and such additional organs, councils, commissions or agencies as may be found necessary.
Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee
We reviewed and rather promptly reached agreement, with very minor revisions, on the draft statements of the formulation group, summarized above.
The ease and the dispatch with which agreement was reached on these matters was encouraging.
We also agreed easily upon the schedule of meetings to be followed tomorrow and the next day. The arrangements at which we have arrived for considering and disposing of the various matters under discussion seem to be working smoothly and effectively.
Lot 60–D 224, Box 59: Stettinius Diary
Extracts from the personal diary of the Under Secretary of State
Seventh Day, Tuesday, August 29, 1944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Private Talk with Gromyko. After the press conference this morning Gromyko asked if he could have a private talk with me and we went down into the garden and sat by the swimming pool for a half hour. The Ambassador stated he was concerned and wished to discuss several points with me. The question of the ⅔ vote, the Ambassador said, he and his colleagues in Moscow had been greatly pleased with the proposal in the American document with a simple majority vote and that he was now very discouraged over the fact that we had retreated from that and were prepared to agree to a two-thirds majority. He was afraid this would cause great difficulty with his government and hoped we could reconsider our position. I assured the Ambassador we would give the matter further study. He then talked about the voting issue when big powers were involved in a dispute, and stated that he had a firm feeling which was also the official view of his government that the unanimity of the four powers must be preserved and he hoped it would be possible for us to reconsider our position on this matter. I explained to the Ambassador this was a question to which we had given great study, which had been reviewed carefully both with the President and Mr. Hull and that only last night the President had asked me to explain to him that it would cause great difficulty in presenting the plan to the American public if it provided that a party involved in a dispute could vote on its own case. The Ambassador then replied that it was clear this would be a point of actual disagreement but that perhaps we could find some general language to cover it so that it could be dealt with at a later date and that a definite position would not have to be arrived at during these conversations. I emphasized again this would be very disappointing to our government and that I hoped it would be possible to find a solution during the conversations which we could all support. The Ambassador then said he had two other points he wished to make but which he did not consider as important as the first two. On both of these latter questions I got the distinct impression that we should not have much difficulty in reaching satisfactory solutions. The first was the matter of the international air force for which they wished to press. I asked him to explain exactly what he now had in mind on this and he said that they visualized each of the four powers placing at the disposal of the council airplanes and forces which could be used very promptly without the delay of many days which the procurement of authorization from a government would cause. I then said, “Mr. Ambassador, you don’t mean a new uniform with a special insignia on the plane under command of some officer of the council” and he replied “Not at all.” I then went on and said in effect “I understand you mean joint operations with a plane of the RAF and a plane of the Red Army and a plane of the USAF all operating together under same Allied command.” The Ambassador agreed and added that the Soviets think of troops and naval vessels in the same way. I told him that on the question of the authority of the council to utilize these forces on a moment’s notice we would have to study further because by the terms of our Constitution, Senate relations are involved in that position. He replied he understood that and knew we were studying the entire matter.
The Ambassador then stated he was impressed by our arguments relative to an economic and social council and would be available to discuss it in more detail at any time at my convenience. At the close of the conversation, I told the Ambassador I had discussed his statement on the matter both with the President and Secretary. I told him it was the opinion of the American government that the suggestion is out of order and that pressing the point at this time might jeopardize the success of the conversations. I said it was my earnest appeal the Soviet group withdraw the request and added that if the Soviet government had such a thing in mind, it should more properly be presented to the international organization in due course after its creation. The Ambassador was most cooperative and indicated that he had raised the point at the meeting merely to inform us that they had this matter in mind but said he would agree in the present meetings at Dumbarton Oaks there should be no further reference whatsoever to the subject. He added that he would agree to define the initial membership as consisting of the United Nations and the Associated Nations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tea with Cadogan and Gromyko
Immediately after the conclusion of the Joint Steering Committee I took Cadogan and Gromyko to tea in the garden and we had another frank talk. Cadogan inquired of Gromyko how much longer he felt it would take to finish the conversations, volunteering that he (Cadogan) hoped they could be completed by the middle of next week. Gromyko agreed to this and said he could see no reason why we should not end up by the middle of the week.
Gromyko asked Cadogan if he had studied the Chinese plan and Cadogan replied that he had and that there seemed to be nothing in it which would cause difficulty. Cadogan referred to the mention in the Chinese document of the equality of race question.
Gromyko then stated the only points he could see that were really open and might cause difficulty was the question of the two-thirds vote, the question of voting when a big power was involved in a dispute; international air force, the economic and social council, and the military committee. He admitted he had heard from home on all these points but said it was taking him about three days to get an exchange of views between Washington and Moscow.
Cadogan and I both talked very frankly with the Ambassador on the question of a country voting when it was involved in a dispute. Among other things we stressed that such a procedure would be entirely unacceptable to the small nations. The Ambassador refused to recognize the validity of that point or of our other arguments.
Cadogan then stated at lunch to me that he had had the thought we might work on another formula along the lines that the council could be empowered to request such a government not to vote. If that country then insisted on voting we would then know where we stood. After a 45-minute talk, I left as Cadogan had not previously had an opportunity for talking with Gromyko today.
Gromyko seemed most enthusiastic and most encouraged with the way matters were proceeding. Cadogan said facetiously that we would certainly have to speed things along and end up before the collapse of Germany as this just couldn’t occur without his being in at the kill.
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Lot 60–D 224, Box 56: DO/ConvA/JSC Mins. 1–12
Informal minutes of Meeting No. 7 of the Joint Steering Committee
Washington, August 29, 1944, 3:00 p.m.
[Extract]
| Present: | Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Jebb of the British group; |
| Ambassador Gromyko, Mr. Sobolev, and Mr. Berezhkov of the Soviet group; | |
| Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Dunn, and Mr. Pasvolsky of the American group. | |
| Mr. Hiss also present, as secretary. |
At the opening of the meeting Mr. Stettinius referred to the statement which Ambassador Gromyko had made yesterday at the last previous meeting of the Committee with reference to the possible inclusion of the sixteen Soviet republics among the initial members of the Organization. Mr. Stettinius suggested that, in view of a conversation he had had with Ambassador Gromyko on this subject, he wondered whether perhaps reference to the subject might not appropriately be omitted from the minutes of yesterday’s meeting. In reply, Ambassador Gromyko said that he did not feel that it would be necessary to omit mention of this matter from the minutes. In this connection, reference was made to the very limited circulation which is being given to copies of these minutes. The Ambassador went on to say that in making his statement of yesterday on this subject he had desired simply to call the matter to the attention of the other groups and that he does not insist upon discussing the matter further in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations for the purpose of arriving at any decision on this point in these present conversations.
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Lot 60–D 224, Box 56: DO/ConvA/JSC Mins. 1–12
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State
Washington, August 29, 1944
On Monday, August 28, 1944, toward the end of a long and important meeting of the Joint Steering Committee of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations during the American, British and Soviet phase of those conversations, while the group was discussing which nations of the world should be the initial members of the Organization, we explained that we had in mind the same group of United Nations and associated nations which had been invited to attend the Food and Agriculture Conference, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Conference and the International Monetary Fund Conference. There was a good deal of discussion as to the details of this whole question.
There was general agreement that our proposal would be satisfactory. However, just after the discussion on this point appeared to have been concluded, Ambassador Gromyko stated, almost as if he were bringing up a separate and unrelated topic, in a definitely casual manner, that the sixteen republics comprising the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should be included among the initiators. By our manner, Sir Alexander Cadogan and I both indicated our surprise and our anticipation of great difficulty from this proposal.
Sir Alexander said, with casualness equal to that of the Ambassador’s, that he had “no comment at this stage.” He then added that he thought his Government would have to talk to the Soviet Government about regularization of the international position of the Soviet republics (thus indicating a desire to keep the subject separate from the Dumbarton Oaks conversations).
The Ambassador then observed something to the effect that each of the republics had its own separate governmental organization.
The American representatives (Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky were with me) then said, in a quiet and deliberately informal and offhand way, that the American side would have to think about the proposal.
There was no further discussion about the proposal and the Committee proceeded at once, and as if with relief, to discuss the practical matter of the schedule of meetings to be adopted for the next few days of the conversations.
We next discussed a proposed press release and then adjourned without further discussion of any substantive questions.
In reporting the progress of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations to the President on August 28, 1944, at 5:00 p.m., I raised with him, among other things, the above-mentioned request of the Soviet Government. The President stated emphatically that this was a proposal that the United States could under no conditions accept, and he instructed me forthwith to explain to Ambassador Gromyko that this would complicate matters, that it would present untold difficulties, and there would be just as much logic for us to ask for the admittance of our forty-eight states as it would be to admit their sixteen republics.
This morning, Tuesday, August 29, 1944, I went to Mr. Hull’s apartment at 9:00 a.m. to discuss this matter. Mr. Hull stated that he was amazed that such a proposal had been made and that no such question had ever entered the minds of any of us in the American group who had been working on this. I told him that the President had instructed me to explain to Ambassador Gromyko promptly that such a proposal could not be considered by the Government of the United States.
At 11:15 a.m. today, August 29, after the joint press conference of the heads of the three groups, Ambassador Gromyko stated that he wished to discuss a few private matters with me.
We went into the garden at Dumbarton Oaks and the Ambassador raised a number of points about our discussions which have been recorded elsewhere.
At the close of this conversation, I advised the Ambassador that I had discussed the Ambassador’s statement as to the sixteen Soviet republics with the President and the Secretary of State. I said that it is the opinion of the American Government that the suggestion is out of order and that pressing the point at this time might jeopardize the success of our present conversations. I said it was my earnest appeal that the Soviet group withdraw the request and said further that if the Soviet Government had such a thing in mind it should more properly be presented to the Council of the international organization in due course after its creation.
The Ambassador was most cooperative and in effect said:
The reason I raised this point at the meeting yesterday was merely to advise the United Kingdom and the American Governments that we had this matter in mind but I will agree, in our present meetings at Dumbarton Oaks, that there should be no further reference whatsoever to this subject, and I agree that we will define the initial membership as consisting of the United Nations and associated nations.
At the outset of today’s 3:00 o’clock meeting of the Joint Steering Committee, I asked Ambassador Gromyko if it would be agreeable to him to have reference to this matter omitted from the minutes of the Committee’s meeting of yesterday. The Ambassador said something to the effect that what was said was said, but that he would not refer further to the matter during the present conversations. He did, however, indicate that on some other occasion the question would probably be raised again by his Government. It was agreed, in deference to the Ambassador’s position, to let the minutes include reference to this point but it was emphasized that, in accordance with prior general arrangements relating to these minutes, only two copies of the minutes containing this reference would be distributed to the Chairman of each of the three national groups.
I am retaining those pages of the minutes which contain reference to this matter in my office safe at the Department. Until further instructions are issued by me or Mr. Hull, those pages will not be available to anyone. This memorandum (of which there are no copies) will, after being read by Mr. Hull and by the President, also be retained in my office safe.
Reading Eagle (August 29, 1944)
Pegler: French Communists
By Westbrook Pegler
New York –
Reporters in France tell of the execution of French women and men who were deemed to have collaborated with the Nazis and of women shorn as a mark of disgrace. The trials must have been informal and emotional, and there runs through the dispatches a strong suggestion that the Communists of France now are sitting as judges of patriotism to a country which they themselves betrayed in the days of the Phony War and on down to the fall.
In the Herald Tribune, John Chabot Smith, writing from Marseille, says the French Forces of the Interior, after seizing a town, install a local government consisting of the council of liberation or men named by the council. The council, he says, includes a representative from each of the six principal political groups, including the Communist.
That the Communists in France, as here, fight desperately for communism no man will deny. Like the Nazis, they are political fanatics and as cruel, wanton, devious and treacherous. They have so much in common that not long ago before the war some American writers who had studied history in process in Germany were calling the Nazis brown Bolsheviks.
But it is a fact, nevertheless, that they were traitors to France and would have opened the gates from the inside to let the Nazis in without a fight, just as the Communists in the United States did all they could to keep this country unarmed and helpless until June 1941. President Roosevelt himself flatly accused the American Communists of this when he sent a regiment of the Regular Army to Inglewood, California, to drive their terrorists from the gates of one of our most important airplane factories so that the Americans could get to their jobs. Elmer Davis, of the OWI, said that in the absence of more exact information he would regard as a Communist anyone who opposed our rearming program prior to Hitler’s attack on Russia, but changed overnight when the Berlin-Moscow alliance broke.
To refresh our memory of the conduct of the American Communists during that time, we may refer to the files of some of the House organs of the CIO unions which were then (and remain today Communist fronts), controlled by clever and indefatigable Communist minorities. The Daily Worker is another reliable reference.
The Communists in France were worse than useless in the French Army facing the Germans. They not only wouldn’t fight the Nazis, but they made more ghastly the desperate position of those Frenchmen who did fight and many of whom died. They were saboteurs in the factories and ports and collaborationists in far more deadly and tragic ways while there was still a chance of survival than those who, during the long dark night since the fall, lost hope of rescue and simply submitted.
French politics has been so horribly corrupt and confused that even before the war few Americans had the confidence in their judgment to boast that they understood. But undoubtedly there were Royalists and Fascists of varying degrees who saw the situation as a choice between fascism and communism and, after the collapse, went fascist or collaborationist.
But there was one certainty during all that time down to the collapse. The communists were active, aggressive traitors who stabbed their own country in the back just as surely as Mussolini did, and only after the foul deed was done and the Nazis were in, suddenly turned patriots because Russia, their spiritual homeland, was in danger. Their purpose was not to rescue France but to help Russia by harassing the Nazis in France.
That such people should now be able to hound and condemn and execute others, even though some of the accused actually were traitors, is a hideous irony and an injustice to the American and British fighters who drove the Germans out. For these American and British soldiers, too, were betrayed by the Communists and now find French Communists exploiting their victory.
It will not be so, apparently, but surely these traitors, too, should be called to trial. Instead, we find them participating in the control of the nation they helped the Nazis to humiliate and torture beyond respect of recovery within that term which President Roosevelt calls the foreseeable future.
Völkischer Beobachter (August 30, 1944)
Völkerbeglücker unter sich
London verlangt Abberufung des Roosevelt-Vertreters bei Eisenhower – Entrüstung in den USA
…
Innsbrucker Nachrichten (August 30, 1944)
Feindkräfte zwischen Paris und Reims aufgefangen
Schwere Kämpfe um Châlons-sur-Marne – Briançon zurückerobert – Sowjetangriffe in harten Panzerkämpfen abgewehrt
dnb. Aus dem Führerhauptquartier, 30. August –
Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt:
Nachdem unsere Divisionen starke, bis zu siebenmal wiederholten Angriffen des Feindes aus seinen Seine-Brückenköpfen nordwestlich Paris in harten Kämpfen aufgefangen hatten, setzten sie sich befehlsgemäß auf neue Stellungen nach Nordosten ab. Die Stadt Rouen wurde nach Zerstörung der Hafenanlagen und sonstiger militärisch wichtiger Objekte aufgegeben.
Zwischen Paris und Reims wurden die nach Norden angreifenden starken nordamerikanischen Kräfte in erbitterten Kämpfen zum Stehen gebracht. Im Südteil von Soissons sind heftige Straßenkämpfe entbrannt. Südlich der Marne erreichten motorisierte feindliche Verbände im Vorstoß nach Osten die Gegend von Châlons-sur-Marne, um das schwer gekämpft wird.
Im Rhonetal wiesen unsere Flankensicherungen zahlreiche feindliche Angriffe von Osten her ab. Eine größere Anzahl feindlicher Panzer wurde vernichtet. Im Alpengebiet westlich der französisch-italienischen Grenze wurde die Stadt Briançon nach hartem Kampf mit französischen Terroristen und amerikanischen Aufklärungskräften wieder in Besitz genommen.
Schnellboote versenkten in der Nacht zum 30. August westlich Dieppe einen feindlichen Zerstörer. Im gleichen Seegebiet vernichteten Kampffähren und Sicherungsfahrzeuge der Kriegsmarine einen britischen Zerstörer der Hunt-Klasse, der nach schwerer Detonation auseinanderbrach.
Das „V1“-Vergeltungsfeuer auf London dauert an.
In Italien fanden größere Kampfhandlungen nur im adriatischen Küstenabschnitt statt. In den Vormittagsstunden wurden hier heftige Angriffe des Gegners verlustreich für ihn abgewiesen.
In Rumänien scheiterten Angriffe der Sowjets bei Buzau und im Bistrizatal. Die dazwischen über die Pässe des ungarischen Grenzgebietes vorgedrungenen feindlichen Kräfte wurden an mehreren Stellen im Gegenangriff zurückgeworfen. Schlachtfliegerverbände griffen sowjetische Kolonnen auf den Karpatenpässen mit Bomben und Bordwaffen erfolgreich an.
Im Weichselbrückenkopf westlich Baranow blieben wiederholte Angriffe der Bolschewisten erfolglos.
Nordöstlich Warschau sowie zwischen Bug und Narew fingen unsere Truppen erneute von Panzern und Schlachtfliegern unterstützte Angriffe der Sowjets in harten Panzerkämpfen auf.
Im Nordabschnitt brachen mehrere Angriffe des Feindes westlich Modohn und nordwestlich Dorpat verlustreich zusammen. In der Nacht waren Truppenansammlungen und Bereitstellungen der Sowjets in den Räumen von Modohn und Dorpat Angriffsziele unserer Kampf- und Nachtschlachtflieger.
Nordamerikanische Bomber griffen die Städte Mährisch-Ostrau und Oderberg sowie ungarisches Gebiet an. In der Nacht führte die britische Luftwaffe erneut unter Verletzung schwedischen Hoheitsgebietes Terrorangriffe gegen Stettin und Königsberg. Einzelne feindliche Flugzeuge warfen außerdem Bomben auf Berlin und Hamburg. Luftverteidigungskräfte schossen bei diesen Angriffen 82 viermotorige Terrorbomber ab.
Ergänzend zum heutigen OKW-Bericht wird gemeldet:
Zwischen Bug und Narew haben sich eine Kampfgruppe der 7. Infanteriedivision unter der Führung von Oberst Weber und die Schwere Panzerabteilung 507 unter Führung des Ritterkreuzträgers Major Schmidt durch unerschütterliche Standfestigkeit und schneidig geführte Gegenstöße besonders ausgezeichnet.
Eine Jagdgruppe unter Führung von Hauptmann Lang schoss in Westfrankreich seit Invasionsbeginn 100 feindliche Flugzeuge ab und zeichnete sich auch bei Tiefangriffen gegen den Feind besonders aus.
In der Bretagne hat eine vom Feind eingeschlossene Stützpunktbesatzung der Luftnachrichtentruppe unter Führung von Oberleutnant Sasse wochenlang schwersten Angriffen weit überlegener Kräfte in heldenhaftem Kampf standgehalten und die viermalige Aufforderung zur Übergabe abgelehnt.
U.S. State Department (August 30, 1944)
740.00116 EW/8–3044
Press Statement by the Secretary of State
August 30, 1944
The Polish Government has communicated to this Government details of the unprecedented brutality with which the Germans are acting against the unarmed and helpless civilian population of Warsaw. This communication states that without regard for age or sex, tens of thousands of innocent men, women, and children are being herded into concentration camps where, under appalling conditions of want, they are being tortured and left to die.
We have repeatedly warned the Germans of the certain consequences of inhuman acts of this character. Those guilty of the present outrages against the civilian population of Warsaw will not escape the justice they deserve.
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/7
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, August 30, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – EIGHTH DAY
Meeting of the Special Military Subcommittee
a) Provision of forces
The Subcommittee, meeting for the first time this week, resumed its discussion of the nature of forces to be provided for enforcement action. Admiral Willson submitted for the American group a formula which would obligate each state to maintain, in accordance with a general agreement, a stipulated quota of air, sea and land forces in readiness for immediate movement upon receipt of an order from the Council. A warning order would indicate at what time these forces would come directly under the command of the Council. Our formula was agreeable to the British but the Russians asked whether it would exclude an international air force corps under direct control of the Council. Our view was that the American formula was more comprehensive than the Soviet proposal because sea and land forces, as well as air forces, as provided for under the agreement, would be subject to control of the Council when and as required. The Soviet group asked for a few days in which to consider the American proposal.
b) Composition of the Military Committee of the Council
The British set forth their view that the four principal powers should be continuously represented on this Committee, presumably by representatives of their respective Chiefs of Staff, Representatives of other states would be associated with the Committee as occasion arose on a basis to be determined later by the Committee and the Council. The American and Soviet groups were in general accord with this proposal, subject to later agreement upon exact language.
Meeting of the Subcommittee on General Organization
The Subcommittee on General Organization, meeting for the first time this week, discussed but did not undertake to reach agreement on the questions which follow. Ambassador Gromyko explained that the Soviet group would be able to contribute little to the discussion because they had not given much previous consideration to these questions.
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Should amendments to the basic instrument be binding on dissenting states?
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Enforcement of obligations over non-member states.
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Has a non-member of the Council a right to vote on special questions affecting its interests or should it merely have a right to be heard?
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Nomenclature.
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Should the Council be “in continuous session”?
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Director-General’s right to call the attention of the Council to threatening situations.
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Character of the Secretariat.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (August 30, 1944)
Communiqué No. 144
Allied forces, continuing their sweep beyond PARIS, have crossed the AISNE and the MARNE rivers. In the upper MARNE valley, mopping-up is in progress in VITRY-LE-FRANÇOIS, and our troops have reached MARSON and LÉPINE, southeast and east of CHÂLONS-SUR-MARNE. Other units are less than one mile south of CHÂLONS on the west side of the river.
CHÂTEAU-THIERRY, on the MARNE, has been occupied, and our armored units have moved north to take SOISSONS and established a bridgehead across the AISNE at PONT-ARCY, 14 miles to the east. Other troops are advancing through the area between the MARNE and the AISNE, north of MEAUX and CHÂTEAU-THIERRY.
In the PARIS area, advances have been made through the northeastern outskirts of the city beyond LE BOURGET and MONTMORENCY, and further west, elements have cleared the FORÊT DE SAINT-GERMAIN and moved northward to a point less than two miles south of PONTOISE.
The bridgehead across the SEINE in the vicinity of MANTES-GASSICOURT has been further enlarged to the north and to the east beyond MEULAN. Contact was made with troops from the bridgehead to the north.
Advancing from the VERNON bridgehead, our troops pushed across the PARIS–ROUEN road to the town of ETREPAGNY and from there to the village of LONGCHAMPS. The PARIS–ROUEN road was also cut near the village of ECOUIS by troops from the LOUVIERS bridgehead. In the evening, contact was established between these two bridgeheads.
Southeast of ROUEN, our forces advanced in the face of persistent opposition and captured the village of BOOS, some five miles from the center of ROUEN. In the CAUDEBEC area, fighting was heavy, but the FORÊT DE BROTONNE was cleared and the whole of this loop of the river is now in our hands.
In BRITTANY, hard fighting continues at BREST as Allied forces close in slowly on the port.
Air operations yesterday were restricted by weather.
Fighter and fighter-bombers attacked enemy rail and road movement over a wide area in the LOW COUNTRIES, western GERMANY and in FRANCE as far south as LYONS. Large numbers of locomotives, railway cars and motor transport were attacked successfully, and 20 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground near BRUSSELS. Six of our aircraft are missing.
U.S. Navy Department (August 30, 1944)
Communiqué No. 539
Pacific and Far East.
U.S. submarines have reported the sinking of 17 vessels, including two combatant ships, as a result of operations against the enemy in these waters, as follows:
- 2 destroyers
- 3 small cargo transports
- 3 medium cargo transports
- 1 medium tanker
- 6 medium cargo vessels
- 1 small cargo vessel
- 1 small tanker
These actions have not been announced in any previous Navy Department communiqué.
CINCPAC Press Release 537
For Immediate Release
August 30, 1944
Ventura search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four attacked Paramushiru Island in the Kurils and several enemy vessels discovered near the island on August 27 (West Longitude Date). One of the Venturas obtained a direct hit on a medium tanker, setting it afire. Another Ventura bombed a large cargo ship at Suribachi, causing a heavy explosion, while a third attacked an enemy patrol vessel. One Ventura was damaged in an engagement with three enemy fighters. On the same day, two 11th AAF Liberators sank an enemy patrol vessel and badly damaged another near Paramushiru. Neither Liberator was damaged.
During the night of August 27‑28, Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands was attacked by 7th AAF Liberators which bombed the airfield. Two enemy fighters were airborne but did not attempt interception. In a second strike on August 27, 7th AAF Liberators attacked Pagan Island, causing fires. Fighter planes bombed and strafed Pagan on August 28.
Nauru Island was attacked on August 27 by Ventura search planes of Group 1, Fleet Air Wing Two.
The airfields at Moen Island in Truk Atoll were bombed by 7th AAF Liberators on August 28. Seven enemy fighters intercepted our force and damaged one Liberator, but all of our planes returned.
Mitchells of the 7th AAF attacked Ponape Island on August 28, while Corsair fighters and Dauntless dive bombers conducted further neutralization raids against Mille and Maloelap in the Marshalls on the same day.
The Pittsburgh Press (August 30, 1944)
Yanks beyond Reims in race for Belgium
Only scattered Nazis oppose U.S. push on German Rhineland
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer
Across the Aisne River, U.S. troops today drove toward the Belgian border, as Allied forces northwest of Paris linked their bridgeheads (1) for a drive toward the robot bomb coast and the Germans reported the evacuation of Rouen. In the drive across the Aisne, U.S. forces reached Laon (2), while to the east U.S. columns pushed beyond Reims and were within 90 miles of Germany (3).
SHAEF, London, England –
Two U.S. tank armies, racing unchallenged over the last miles of the invasion roads to Germany and Belgium, stormed into Laon and the cathedral city of Reims today, while Berlin admitted that its troops had abandoned the medieval town of Rouen, guarding the robot bomb coast of northern France.
Powerful armored spearheads of the U.S. 1st and 3rd Armies punctured the Aisne River line on at least two points and were reported fanning out over the rolling farmlands beyond Reims, Laon and Châlons-sur-Marne.
Only scattered and disorganized Nazi rearguards barred the path of the American armor in their sweep for the Rhineland, and official reports indicated the Yanks were moving at a speech that could carry them to the Belgian border within a day or two.
Beyond Reims and Laon, U.S. spearheads were 30 to 35 miles from the borders of Belgium, while other U.S. columns pounding eastward from Châlons were 95 miles or less from Germany.
Planes plaster foe
“We are now witnessing the preliminary phase of the Allied advance on Germany in which the enemy forces are being methodically dissected and forced into isolated corridors, even as we press onward,” United Press writer Henry T. Gorrell said in reporting the sensational sweep of the U.S. armies through the Aisne and Marne Valleys.
U.S. riflemen poured swiftly through the breaches crated by their plunging tank spearheads, while swarms of Allied warplanes ranged before them to bomb and strafe the retreating enemy.
Simultaneously, British, U.S. and Canadian forces linked their bridgeheads across the Seine above Paris into a solid 50-mile front and swung forward 25 miles beyond the Seine to drive an armored wedge between Rouen and Beauvais.
Capture Neuf-Marché
The Allies, smashing directly at Amiens and the heart of the bases from which German robot bombs have been showering down on London, captured Neuf-Marché, 25 miles east of Rouen and 15 miles west of Beauvais.
There was no confirmation of the Berlin report that Rouen had been evacuated, and Allied headquarters said latest advices from the front told of bitter fighting on the approaches to that fortress town.
On the U.S. 1st and 3rd Army fronts east of Paris, however, official and enemy reports agreed that the twin American offensive was making spectacular strides over battlegrounds where hundreds of thousands of men fought and died in 1918 to take and hold a few yards along the Marne and Aisne Rivers.
Drive across Seine
Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s 3rd Army tanks and riflemen drove across the Marne at Épernay, pushed 13 miles northward to Reims and then swept on more than 10 miles beyond that historic town to cross the Aisne at Neufchâtel.
Simultaneously, Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges’ 1st Army veterans stormed up from captured Soissons, across the Chemin des Dames, one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War I, and on into Laon, 12 miles above the Aisne. Unofficial but apparently correct reports said Laon was captured and that the Yanks had driven on beyond the city.
The region between the Marne and the Aisne had been reported one of the stronger outer bastions guarding the invasion roads to Germany, but today’s sweeping progress indicated the enemy had abandoned it almost without a fight.
Sedan and the Ardennes Forest, through which the German armies poured in 1940 to collapse France, were wipe open to the American thrust northeast of Soissons, and the Argonne Forest, on the road to Alsace-Lorraine, was 25 miles or less from Gen. Patton’s spearheads beyond Châlons.
A German Transocean News Agency broadcast said the Americans had reached Saint-Dizier, 85 miles from the German border, but claimed they had been driven back by Nazi counterattacks.
Stiffer resistance was encountered in the Seine bridgehead area above Paris, however, and official reports said the Germans were fighting a stubborn rearguard action there.
Claim evacuation
A German communiqué announced that Nazi forces had evacuated Rouen, on the Seine 65 miles northwest of Paris, after destroying all harbor installations and “other objectives of military importance.”
The Germans apparently pulled out of Rouen, where Jeanne d’Arc was burned at the stake in the public market square May 30, 1431, to escape encirclement by Allied armies closing in from the south and east in a drive toward the robot coast.
The fall of Rouen was expected to speed the Allied march on Le Havre, 45 miles to the west, and Dieppe, 37 miles to the northwest.
Capture Longchamps
Another Allied column captured Longchamps, 20 miles north of the Seine and 47 miles from Amiens, so-called capital of the robot coast. British forces were believed spearheading the drive toward the robot platforms, spurred by the knowledge that the sooner they capture them, the sooner the rain of death on their families in southern England will cease.
London newspapers bannered reports that massed Allied tanks were converging on the robot bases, including some from which the Germans were reported preparing to hurl rockets each containing 10 to 20 tons of explosive against Britain.
Front dispatches disclosed that Gen. Hodges’ U.S. 1st Army had taken over the drive northward toward Belgium from Gen. Patton’s 3rd Army.
After capturing Château-Thierry, Soissons, Belleau Wood and other hallowed ground over which their fathers fought and died in World War I, Gen. Hodges’ forces poured across the Aisne River in great strength and stabbed northward to Laon, four-way railway junction 19 miles above Soissons, and 28 miles northwest of Reims.
Both Laon and Reims lie on the main trunk line running west from Amiens over which the Germans have been moving a major proportion of their robot bomb components from factories in the Rhineland.
Gen. Patton’s forces smashed across the Marne at Châlons and captured Lépine, 4½ miles to the east and a little more than 50 miles southwest of Verdun. Marson, eight miles southeast of Châlons, also fell, bringing Gen. Patton’s men approximately 90 miles from the borders of Germany itself.
Broadens wedge
Broadening his wedge aimed at Germany, Gen. Patton likewise seized Vitry-le-François, 18½ miles southeast of Châlons, and Piney, 15 miles east of Troyes.
U.S. infantry also cleared virtually all areas in and around northwest, north and northeast of Paris and advanced to within a mile of Pontoise, 18 miles northwest of the capital.
U.S. forces drove 13 miles north from their Mantes crossing 25 miles northwest of Paris and reached Magny-en-Vexin.
Capture Éragny
Other Allied troops captured Éragny, 25 miles northwest of Mantes.
Only two small loops south of the Seine now remained to be mopped up.
Allied headquarters announced that 92,000 Germans had been captured in northern France by the Allies from Aug. 10 to 25, while a field dispatch estimated German losses in killed, wounded and prisoners since D-Day at upwards of 250,000 men.