Reading Eagle (August 25, 1944)
Pegler: Roberts Commission issues
By Westbrook Pegler
New York –
The subtle nature of the executive order defining, but also limiting, the duties of the Roberts Commission in its investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster, may have escaped most of the people at the time when the report was published, only 16 days after the attack. The whole country was still stunned. The people wanted information but were willing to concede that many details could not be revealed just then without advantage to the Japanese. Therefore, attention centered on the commission’s sketchy and restricted version of the facts and its conclusions. The preamble evoked no comment, but that preamble, nevertheless, shows that the executive order was a self-serving document so written as to preclude any criticism of the civilian authorities in Washington, including President Roosevelt, the Commander-in-Chief.
The preamble says, “The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide basis for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army and Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy,” and if so, who was responsible?
If President Roosevelt had committed any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment, the commission was not authorized to “provide basis for sound decisions” on that score. He was not of the Army or Navy personnel.
But although the commission had no mission to pass judgment on the conduct of civil authorities in Washington, it did presume to report that the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy had fulfilled their obligations. The report says the Secretaries of War and the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.
The report does not fully demonstrate that this actually was so, and it certainly leaves doubt that Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were thoroughly warned of the “significant implications.” Moreover, it says flatly that the last warning to these commanders, “indicating an almost immediate break in relations,” dispatched from Washington at 6:30 in the morning of Dec. 7, 1941, Honolulu Time, was not delivered until after the attack, which came at 7:55, one hour and 25 minutes later.
The delay is attributed to “conditions beyond control of anyone concerned” but the warning is evaluated as only “an added precaution,” which still would have come too late to be of substantial use. Yet, the fact remains that the two commanders were still under restraints, forbidden to adopt a state of preparation that might have caused alarm among the civilians.
The limitation of the Roberts Commission’s field of inquiry so as to exclude examination of official conduct in Washington obviously blocked access to historic facts which are an important part of the whole story, and should be the property of the people. And, although the commission had no right to pass judgment on Kimmel and Short, considering that it was instructed only to provide a basis for sound decisions, it nevertheless went beyond that limitation in convicting these two men of dereliction. The preamble does not say who was to make those “sound decisions” after it had provided the basis for them. Possibly the public was to make the “sound decisions.” But in that case the commission’s conviction of the two officers, the vindication of the three secretaries in Washington and the implied vindication of the President, were prejudicial to Kimmel and Short and politically favorable to Mr. Roosevelt. The conclusions were gratuitous in two respects, first in exonerating civilians whose conduct was not within its scope. Second, in condemning men who had not been placed on trial or even served with charges according to law.
The report becomes a political issue in a presidential year because it has been introduced into the campaign by Senator Truman, the running mate, on the Democratic ticket, of the President who might be shown by history to have had a share of the responsibility.