America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

1521

americavotes1944

Racial prejudice denied by GOP

New York (UP) –
Republicans today denied that they attempted to stir racial prejudice into the campaign by criticizing the association of the Democratic Party with Sidney Hillman, president of the CIO Political Action Committee, and Communist leader Earl Browder.

Republican National Chairman Herbert Brownell Jr. said:

The attempt to make it appear that the issue of Hillman-Browder control of the New Deal is a race hatred issue is an unwarranted interpretation. It is designed to get the New Deal off the spot on which it has been placed squarely by Mr. Sidney Hillman.

Democratic National Chairman Robert E. Hannegan had charged racial prejudice on the grounds that Republican speakers constantly referred to Mr. Hillman as “foreign-born.”

1522

Editorial: What are we celebrating?

…

1523

Editorial: Will Russia fight Japan?

Will Russia help us lick Japan when the time comes? The question pops up again because of Marshal Stalin’s failure to attend the Québec Conference. His letter, explaining that he was busy with the offensives against Germany, is interpreted by some as needlessly abrupt and lacking in any cordial greeting to the conference.

If there is a cooling off in the relations of the Big Three, that is big news. It is important not only to Tokyo but also to Berlin, which still hopes somehow to wangle a separate peace and thus divide the grand alliance. But we have no knowledge of a serious rift, or of any reason strong enough to cause Marshal Stalin to boycott the Québec meeting if he were free to attend.

On the contrary, Marshal Stalin should set a higher value on Allied cooperation now than ever before. It is paying off for Russia. He would have to be stupid indeed to upset it.

What he wanted most was a “second front,” by which he meant a Western European invasion. For a long time, he – or at least his propaganda agencies – seemed to doubt the often-repeated promises of the Western Allies, particularly because the invasion was not launched as early as he understood from the Molotov meeting in Washington. But since the Moscow and Tehran conferences last fall, there has been a clear agreement on the time and coordination of the western and eastern offensives. Now that the agreement is being carried out so successfully, and with such mutual profit, there is less excuse for misunderstanding.

Likewise, Marshal Stalin has received in abundant measure the American supplies and equipment needed for his summer and fall campaigns. He has spoken enthusiastically of this.

There is difference of policy between Moscow and Washington regarding Eastern Europe. The United States objects to Russia dictating territorial and governmental changes. We have the same objection to a British sphere of influence in Western Europe. Our government and people believe that such a British-Russian domination of Europe would play into the hands of defeated Germany and Fascism, and that it would produce another war. But there is nothing new about this American policy, and it has restrained neither Marshal Stalin nor Mr. Churchill.

This does not change Russia’s stake in the Far East, which is even greater than our own. Japan is a closer and worse menace to Russia than to the United States. Marshal Stalin knows that our Pacific offensive saved him from attack by Japan and allowed him to concentrate on defeating the Nazi invader. Marshal Stalin also knows that Russia, unless she joins in the defeat of Japan, will have Jess voice in the Far Eastern settlement so vital to her.

On the basis of self-interest, which has determined Marshal Stalin’s foreign policy hitherto, it is highly probable that he will join in the war against Jap aggression when Germany is defeated. For him to do so before that time would prolong the European war and sacrifice the best Siberian bases to Japan. That would help the Axis, not the Allies.

1524

Editorial: Twins in the Pacific

Gen. MacArthur says the twin landings in the Palau and Halmahera island groups are the beginning of the Philippine recovery campaign. There was never much doubt about that. Palau is 550 miles east, and Morotai at the Halmahera tip is only 250 miles from the southern Philippines.

But the value of these two new bases, when secure, will not be limited to the Philippine campaign, important as that is. They are keys to a larger Far Pacific strategy, the chief aim of which is to knock out Japan rather than take any particular territory as such.

Control of the Halmahera area can isolate enemy armies in the East Indies estimated at about 200,000 men. That will make the mopping-up operations much easier.

Palau is even more important. The Japs have used it as the administrative and strategic center of all the mandated islands. It – rather than the great Truk stronghold, as first supposed – has been the main outer enemy naval base, his “Pearl Harbor.” Unlike Truk, it cannot be bypassed safely. It must be taken and converted to American use, especially for naval purposes.

This was so obvious to the enemy that no real surprise attack on Palau was possible. Gen. MacArthur in the Halmahera drive could fool the enemy by landing on the relatively undefended Morotai Island, rather than on the larger islands of the group where the Japs expected him. As a result, his victory was swift and cheap. But there was no such soft spot in the Palau group, where the fighting is described as bitter.

The two-pronged thrust in the Southwest Pacific, timed almost to the minute, is new evidence of the high degree of cooperation achieved by Gen. MacArthur and Adm. Nimitz in an area where their commands overlap and in which each is using all types of fighting services.

Though Mindanao in the Philippines is indicated as the next step, the enemy cannot be certain, Maybe at the same time, or sooner, we shall strike north at the Bonin Islands off Japan – or even at Formosa. The Japs would like to know.

1525

americavotes1944

Editorial: Experience

A reader suggests that this is an appropriate time to reprint an editorial of four years ago, since it dealt with a theme that is likewise dominant in this political campaign. The editorial was published in The Pittsburgh Press Oct. 3, 1940 – more than a year before our country entered the war and the big spending began – under the title “Experience.” Here it is:

Franklin D. Roosevelt is the only living man who has had nearly eight years of experience as President of the United States, Therefore, we hear it argued, it is essential that he should have what no other President ever had – a third term.

This is, of course, an argument that will be even more forceful if Mr. Roosevelt, having had nearly 12 years of experience, decides to be drafted for a fourth term. But there’s no denying that, even now, Mr. Roosevelt has had vast experience, including:

  • The experience of spending more money than any other President.

  • The experience of incurring the biggest public debt in this country’s history.

  • The experience of keeping spending always ahead of income, although federal revenue has been almost trebled.

  • The experience of building the federal payroll to record size.

  • The experience of expanding bureaucracy to unprecedented proportions.

  • The experience of declaring more emergencies and exercising more power than any other peacetime President.

  • The experience of seeing new enterprise remain stagnant longer than ever before.

  • And the experience of seeing more Americans unemployed for more years than ever before.

1526

americavotes1944

Taylor: FDR and Philadelphia

By Robert Taylor, Press Washington correspondent

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania –
Republican state campaign planners view Philadelphia as the No. 1 battleground of the Dewey-Roosevelt campaign and a good part of their effort will be devoted to cutting down the Roosevelt majority of the last two campaigns.

Unlike Allegheny County, which gives Democrats local offices and votes Democratic in state elections, Philadelphia is Republican territory. The New Deal sweep never engulfed its city administration or its principal county offices. Philadelphia votes Republican, although by small margins, in state elections.

Of five million potential voters in Pennsylvania, about one million are in Philadelphia and any success in stemming the Roosevelt vote here will enhance the chances of the small but numerous up-state counties of producing enough Republican votes to put the slate in the Dewey column.

The city has a checkered political record. It missed the New Deal bandwagon when it started out in 1932 by giving Herbert Hoover 70,816 majority out of nearly 600,000 votes, while Allegheny County was giving Mr. Roosevelt a majority of 37,500.

City stays Republican otherwise

Philadelphia made up for it later, however, by giving Mr. Roosevelt a majority of 209,876 in 1936, when he carried the state by 663,483, and producing 177,271 votes of the 1940 Roosevelt majority in the state of 281,187.

Meanwhile, the city remained safely Republican for local offices and gave small majorities to Republican candidates for Governor in 1934 and 1938, Two years ago, it split its vote for Governor: 317,962 for Governor Martin and 317,805 for F. Clair Ross – a majority of 157 for Mr. Martin.

Philadelphia’s powerful Republican organization – fed on City Hall patronage, political favors and ample campaign funds – is still intact and unregenerate, despite its inability to stem the New Deal tide in presidential years. Even in depression years, the city administration never sponsored any WPA projects, and remained bitterly anti-New Deal.

The organization’s job will be to counteract, if possible, the demonstrated appeal of the President for the city’s huge total of industrial workers, who are willing enough to go along with the organization in off years, but swing to FDR when his name appears on the ballot.

Pew still putting up money

Against this effort will be a determined campaign by the CIO Political Action Committee to marshal its members and their one-dollar contributions to put the state’s largest city, and fattest vote source, once again in the bag for the President.

The PAC campaign is a new wrinkle for the old organization to cope with, but Republicans are confident of putting as many workers into the battle for votes as the PAC and the Democratic organization combined – and of having as much cash as both of them.

The GOP’s open-handed Joseph N. Pew Jr., oil company executive who lives in suburban Montgomery County, has contributed heavily to past campaigns and, in the last financial reports, the Republican City Committee was heavily in debt to him.

Philadelphia’s vote will be crucial in this campaign, and may decide whether pivotal Pennsylvania swings for Mr. Dewey or Mr. Roosevelt. Political campaigns here, by custom, are organization fights, and this year’s fight promises to be a stiff one.

1527

Perkins: Coal miners want more pay

By Fred W. Perkins, Press Washington correspondent

…

1528

Plot goes to pot and Mr. Huxley to back seat in storytelling

Reviewer thinks author no novelist
By John D. Paulus

…

Paris story entertaining

Reflects bit of city in tasteful way

…

1529

Hopper: Zasu Pitts considered good bet as campaign speaker for Dewey

By Hedda Hopper

…

1530

New play season in doldrums

Money is plentiful but material scarce
By Howard Barnes

…

1531

Ethel Barrymore enthusiastic over new play she’s rehearsing for theater guild

B. Iden Payne to direct show
By Ward Morehouse, North American Newspaper Alliance

…

1532

Kay Kyser keeps his promise not to get ‘bigheaded’ on radio

But his feet forget and swell and doctors restore them to size
By Si Steinhauser

…

1533

Lowly A’s take hand –
Browns regain lead, beat White Sox as Yanks lose

…

Redbirds flutter –
Bruins defeat Cards, 2–1, lead series

…

1534

Russia advocates world return to gold standard

Red professor criticizes Lord Keynes plan for endless credits and no metal exchange

…

1535

Gen. MacArthur wades when boat stalls

Morotal, Halmahera Islands (UP) – (Sept. 16)
An unscheduled stop in the trip ashore to inspect the new beachhead meant nothing to Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

When his landing boat stalled on a small reef 50 yards from shore, Gen. MacArthur perched his gold-braided cap jauntily on the back of his head, jumped in the waste-deep water and waded to the beach.

1536

U.S. State Department (September 17, 1944)

500.CC/9–1744

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, September 17, 1944

Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-FIFTH DAY

In the morning I checked with Ambassador Gromyko to ascertain whether he had received official instructions from his Government indicating that the possible compromise voting formula was unacceptable. He confirmed that he had received such instructions.

A little before noon, as I have told you on the telephone, a small American group had a long discussion with Secretary Hull. Following that I called you on the telephone, at which time we agreed on a proposal for closing down the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks with the Soviets as soon as possible, holding conversations with the British and Chinese immediately thereafter, hoping to limit them to three or four days, and then to issue simultaneously in the four capitals releases indicating the progress made and explaining that there were certain open points which the Governments would have to study in more detail. The release would then explain that the delegations were going home to report to their Governments and that representatives of the three Governments would meet again not later than November 15 to prepare complete proposals which could serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations conference.

I attach a copy of the outline of this proposal which I made to Sir Alexander Cadogan and Ambassador Gromyko at a meeting at 4:00 p.m. They seemed to receive it favorably and agreed to wire home for instructions on it. The [American] Group then drafted two possible communiqués – one intended for issuance at the end of the British-Soviet talks and the other at the end of the British-Chinese talks – inasmuch as Ambassador Gromyko stated that he would have to tell his Government exactly what would be said publicly under this proposal. These are the communiqués which I read to you in our telephone conversation around 9:00 p.m. Copies are attached.

E S

[Annex 1]

U.S. proposal of possible procedure

Suspend the Soviet phase of the conversations.

Begin discussions with the Chinese.

At the conclusion of the Chinese discussions an identical communiqué would be issued by each government to the effect that:
a) Agreement has been reached on a wide range of subjects. The discussions at Dumbarton Oaks have been another instance of cooperation among the principal allies in this war, and a step forward in reaching agreement for the post-war period.

b) Before complete proposals can be placed before the other United Nations as a basis of discussion at a conference, it is necessary for each of the governments to give further consideration to the subject in all of its phases and implications.

c) In the meantime, in order to provide an opportunity for public study and discussion, there is made public a memorandum setting forth the substance of the document worked out at Dumbarton Oaks, except the section relating to voting in the Council. This document should be described as indicating the area of agreement reached so far.

d) Not later than November 15, after the governments have completed their further studies and sufficient time has been afforded for public discussion, representatives of the governments now represented at Dumbarton Oaks would meet again to complete the preparation of proposals which could then serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations Conference.

[Annex 2]

Draft Communiqué

Conversations between the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union delegations in Washington regarding the establishment of a World Security Organization have now been completed. The three delegations are making reports to their respective Governments who will consider these reports and will in due course issue a simultaneous statement on the subject.

[Annex 3]

Draft Communiqué

The Government of __________ has now received the report of its Delegation to the conversations held in Washington between August 21–September ____________ with the Delegations of ____________ on the subject of an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

There is annexed hereto a statement of the tentative proposals which have resulted from the conversations, indicating in detail the wide range of subjects on which agreement has been reached.

The Governments which were represented in the discussions in Washington have agreed that after further study of these proposals, and not later than November 15, they will take the necessary steps with a view to the preparation of complete proposals which could then serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations Conference.

Meanwhile the _____________ Governments, which are already directly and jointly engaged in the suppression of the forces that have disturbed the peace of the world, are resolved to work together for the future enforcement of the terms of surrender to be imposed on the common enemy.

1537 
Lot 60–D 224, Box 56: DO/ConvA/JSC Mins. 13–18

Informal minutes of Meeting No. 15 of the Joint Steering Committee

Washington, September 17, 1944, 4 p.m.
[Extract]
Present: Ambassador Gromyko of the Soviet group;
Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Jebb of the British group;
Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Hackworth, and Mr. Pasvolsky of the American group.
Mr. Hiss also present, as secretary.

In opening the meeting Mr. Stettinius said that he wished to apologize for having called a meeting on Sunday afternoon. He said, however, that he felt it was time for the Committee to take inventory of the situation. He went on to say that an appraisal of the situation reveals that an amazing amount of ground has been covered and that much in the way of agreement has been accomplished except for one obstacle, the question of the right of a state to vote when it is involved in a dispute. He said that as he understood the situation the position of the Soviet Government is that it cannot change its views on this matter.

Ambassador Gromyko replied that when this question had been asked of him at the last meeting of the Committee he had said that the Soviet position was a final one. Sir Alexander Cadogan stated that on the issue of voting in the Council there was no prospect at all of his Government changing its attitude.

Mr. Stettinius then said that he thought that for the benefit of all concerned the record should show clearly that the compromise proposal on this subject, which had recently been drafted and had been given consideration, was a tentative sounding of the respective Governments and had never been proposed or accepted by any of the three Governments.

Mr. Stettinius then went on to say that it seemed to him that there are three alternatives as to the procedure to be followed. He said that, first, the conversations could be terminated with a statement that the three groups have met and have found it impossible to reach agreement. He said that for his part that seemed to be an unthinkable solution. He said that, as he had remarked at the last meeting of the Committee, civilization as we know it and the entire future of the world depend upon the three powers remaining side by side in peace as in war. He said that he felt that means must be found for adjusting the positions of the three powers so that an international organization will be possible.

The second alternative procedure would be to publish the document as agreed to and to refer it to a general conference of the United Nations, leaving open the question of voting in the Council. He said he understood that Ambassador Gromyko could not agree to such an alternative.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he thought such a course would not be practicable, that it would be necessary to have prior agreement among the three powers. He said that he was expressing merely his own opinion. Mr. Stettinius asked whether his statement also represented the official view of the Soviet Government. Ambassador Gromyko replied again that he was simply stating his own view.

Mr. Stettinius then said that the third alternative would be to finish the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, each group reporting to its own Government. The Governments could then study the results of the labors of the groups and a further meeting could be held thereafter. He said that he had a specific plan to this effect to propose but he wished first to inquire whether Ambassador Gromyko and Sir Alexander Cadogan had some other suggestion to make.

Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that it might be profitable to discuss the possibility of a general conference being held with the question of voting left open. Mr. Stettinius said that if such a course of procedure were possible he would like consideration to be given to it. Ambassador Gromyko said that he had no prepared proposal to make and that he would like to hear Mr. Stettinius’ specific plan.

Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he had just seen his Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary. He said that he felt sure that they would not like the first alternative, namely, a mere breaking up of the discussions. He felt that the impression which would be given by such a course of action would not be quite a true one in as much as there has in fact been agreement on a wide range of subjects. As to the second alternative, he said that he believed that his Government would not like that either. He did not feel it would be wise to go into a large conference without prior agreement. He felt that the third alternative is the preferable one. He said that we could say that the groups have not been able to reach full agreement and that they, therefore, were referring the difficulties which had arisen to their Governments for them to study. He said that still another alternative, which he proposed only to knock down, would be to terminate the conversations without making any statement. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that this last alternative would not give a fair impression in view of the fact that so much has in fact been accomplished by the conversations.

Mr. Stettinius said that he was prepared to distribute copies of a memorandum setting forth a specific plan of procedure but that first he wished again to emphasize that the world dream of partnership among the nations is of such overriding importance that a way must be found to accomplish it. He said that he felt that the plan of procedure which he was about to suggest is not itself too good. He said that there will be tremendous adverse speculation as a result even of that course, speculation to the effect that the groups have not been able to agree. He said that everything in his being tells him that some way must be found to reach agreement.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he also felt that it should not be said that the groups had conferred and had been unable to agree. He said that his personal view is that the best thing to say would be that agreement had been reached on many questions relating to a security organization but that consideration of some questions had not been completed. He would say that discussion of these questions would have to be continued among the Governments themselves. He would not say that there had been disagreement; he would say that these questions would be considered at some later time. He said that he was expressing merely a “raw idea” and was not expressing official views on this particular subject.

Mr. Stettinius then distributed copies of a memorandum entitled “Possible Procedure.”

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1538 
840.50/9-1744

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 17, 1944
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

I note from your record of conversation with the Prime Minister on September 14, 1944 that lend-lease aid during the war with Japan will exceed, in food, shipping, et cetera, the strategic needs of Great Britain in carrying on that war and will, to that extent, be devoted to maintaining British economy. Would it not be well to make clear to the Prime Minister at this time that one of the primary considerations of the Committee, in determining the extent to which lend-lease might exceed direct strategic needs, would be the soundness of the course adopted by the British Government with a view to restoring its own economy, particularly with regard to measures taken to restore the flow of international trade? My thought on this, which applies to financial assistance through lend-lease or in other forms, is developed in the last enclosure, of which a copy is attached, to my memorandum to you of September 8, 1944.

C H

1539

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 17, 1944
Top secret

Subject: CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE RECOGNITION BY PRINCIPAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE

In my opinion the time has come to give serious consideration to the question of announcing this Government’s recognition of the de facto French authority as the Provisional Government of France. Of course, the word “provisional” would not be dropped until after general elections are held in France.

I believe that this step is not inconsistent with the policy which we have carefully followed, namely, to refrain from any action which might have the effect of impairing the opportunity of the French people freely to exercise their will in the choice of their leaders.

The following factors suggest the advisability of taking this step at this time.

  1. There is every indication that General de Gaulle has been accepted for the initial period as the national leader in liberated France. This is fully corroborated by reports from our military authorities, who have been in touch with the local population in many parts of France. It likewise does away with the possibility of this Government ever being charged with imposing General de Gaulle on the French people.

  2. There are increasing indications that the resistance groups and others in France have no intention of permitting the establishment of a personal dictatorship under General de Gaulle. The base of the governing authority has already been broadened by the inclusion of numerous representatives of metropolitan resistance. General de Gaulle’s desire to maintain the thread of legal continuity and to work with democratic elements is likewise shown by the appointment of M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate.

  3. The Political Advisor on General Eisenhower’s staff (Eeber) reports that the Committee, with possible occasional changes of individual Commissioners, should be able to maintain control in France until such time as elections can be held.

  4. It will probably be many months before elections can take place owing to the absence of over a million prisoners-of-war and deportees in Germany.

  5. Lack of recognition will make it more difficult for the Committee to maintain the internal stability necessary for the prosecution of the war and orderly rehabilitation of the country.

  6. Our present popularity in France is high. It will suffer if we delay recognition unduly. Many Frenchmen undoubtedly understand and sympathize with our refusal to recognize the Committee when it was established in Algiers, but they will not understand this refusal now that France is largely liberated.

  7. General Eisenhower’s headquarters agree that there is no reason to delay a further degree of recognition from a military point of view.

  8. Recognition would greatly simplify the solution of a number of practical problems of an economic and financial nature.

  9. A number of Governments have already extended recognition to the Committee as the Provisional Government of France and there are indications that the British and Canadians may shortly take this action even if we do not. American prestige would suffer severely if we were to be the only major power withholding recognition.

If you agree to the desirability of taking this step, either of the following two possibilities would present a suitable occasion for the extension of recognition, after consultation and agreement with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

  1. The passage of a vote of confidence in General de Gaulle, and the de facto French authority as presently constituted, by the Provisional Consultative Assembly, established in Paris and broadened to include at least fifty percent of resistance membership.

  2. The setting up, with the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, of zones of the interior, thereby emphasizing the change from a strictly military to a predominantly civilian administration.

C H

1540

Draft of a suggested telegram to be sent by the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin

In the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers before Tehran, the Prime Minister of Great Britain submitted a draft proposing the local punishment of war criminals in the countries and, if possible, at the scenes where their atrocities had been committed. With some small amendments this document was approved and has been published to the world with general acceptance and approval. This document however did not attempt to deal with the cases of the major war criminals “whose offences have no particular geographical localization.” This matter was touched on in conversation at Tehran without any definite conclusion being reached. It has now become important for us to reach agreement about the treatment of these major criminals. Would you consider whether a list could not be prepared of say 50 to 100 persons whose responsibilities for directing or impelling the whole process of crime and atrocity is established by the fact of their holding certain high offices? Such a list would not of course be exhaustive. New names could be added at any time. It is proposed that these persons should be declared, on the authority of the United Nations, to be world outlaws and that upon any of them falling into Allied hands the Allies will “decide how they are to be disposed of and the execution of this decision will be carried out immediately.” Or alternatively, “the nearest General Officer will convene a Court for the sole purpose of establishing their identity, and when this has been done will have them shot within one hour without reference to higher authority.”

It would seem that the method of trial, conviction and judicial sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difficulties of constituting the Court, formulating the charge and assembling the evidence, the question of their fate is a political and not a judicial one. It could not rest with judges however eminent or learned to decide finally a matter like this which is of the widest and most vital public policy. The decision must be “the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.” This in fact was expressed in the Moscow Declaration.

There would seem to be advantages in publishing a list of names. At the present time, Hitler and his leading associates know that their fate will be sealed when the German Army and people cease to resist. It therefore costs them nothing to go on giving orders to fight to the last man, die in the last ditch, etc. As long as they can persuade the German people to do this, they continue to live on the fat of the land and have exalted employments. They represent themselves and the German people as sharing the same rights and fate. Once however their names are published and they are isolated, the mass of the German people will infer rightly that there is a difference between these major criminals and themselves. A divergence of interests between the notorious leaders and their dupes will become apparent. This may lead to undermining the authority of the doomed leaders and to setting their own people against them, and thus may help the breakup of Germany.

We should be very glad to have your views upon this proposal at your earliest convenience. It is of course without prejudice to the great mass of German war criminals who will be handed over for the judgment of the countries where their crimes have been committed.

17.9.44