America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, September 16, 1944
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 680/2

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs Of Staff at the “OCTAGON” Conference

The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at OCTAGON Conference is submitted herewith:

I. Overall objective
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.

II. Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.

Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications.

e. Continue the offensive against Germany.

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources, to assist other cobelligerents to the extent they are able effectively to employ this assistance against the enemy Powers in the present war.

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.

IV. Execution of the overall strategic concept

DEFEAT OF GERMANY

Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe
Prior to the launching of OVERLORD an air plan was developed by the Supreme Commander in preparation for and in support of OVERLORD, and in April 1944, control of the air operations out of England of all the air forces involved, including the Strategic Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command, passed to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. We have now decided that the special conditions which made it desirable that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force should control all forces operating out of the United Kingdom no longer carry their original force. We have therefore agreed that the control of the Strategic Bomber Force in Europe shall be exercised by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A directive (CCS 520/6) has accordingly been issued to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

Operations in Northwest Europe
The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has reported (Scaf 78) on the course of operations in France and the Low Countries and has given us a review of his future intentions.

The Supreme Commander’s broad intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. He considers his best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the West lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since he is convinced that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The Supreme Commander’s first operation will be to break the Siegfried Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this his main effort will be on the left. He will then prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany.

We have approved General Eisenhower’s proposals and drawn his attention (Facs 78):
a. To the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany, as opposed to the southern, and,

b. To the necessity for the opening up of the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in.

Operations in Italy
We have examined a report by General Wilson (Naf 774) on operations within his theater. Insofar as the battle in Italy is concerned, he considers that operations will develop in one of two ways:

a. Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap (and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass) leaving a small force to clear up northwest Italy, or,

b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal; in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until spring of 1945.

We have agreed:
a. That no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known;

b. That the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results of General Alexander’s present offensive and of a German withdrawal in northern Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower.

c. To inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use in the Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean he should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible, and not later than 10th October. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander accordingly (Fan 415).

Operations in the Balkans
General Wilson considers that a situation can be anticipated in which the bulk of the German forces south of a line, Trieste-Ljubljana-Zagreb and the Danube, will be immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are exhausted, in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be liquidated by Partisans or the Russian forces. We have noted that as long as the battle in Italy continues there will be no forces available in the Mediterranean to employ in the Balkans except:
a. The small force of two British brigades from Egypt which is being held ready to occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of relief and establishment of law and order and the Greek Government.

b. The small land forces in the Adriatic which are being actively used primarily for commando type operations.

Command of “DRAGOON” forces
Command of the DRAGOON forces operating from southern France has been transferred as from the 15th September to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Facs 76).

Adjustments of the ground and air forces on which the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be required are dependent on the development of the campaign in Italy.

Logistic support for the DRAGOON forces will for the present continue to be supplied from the Mediterranean area.

Machinery for coordination of United States-Soviet-British military effort
Some two months ago Marshal Stalin in conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow suggested that improvement should be made in the system of military coordination between the USSR, U.S. and the United Kingdom.

We have examined the possibility of improving the coordination with the USSR and have instructed the heads of the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow to initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff with a view to the setting up in Moscow of a Tripartite Military Committee consisting of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the United States Chiefs of Staff and of the British Chiefs of Staff.

We have instructed them to make it clear that this Committee will be purely consultative and advisory, with no power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff and the Russian General Staff and further, that it must be military in its character and not impinge upon the work at present being done by the European Advisory Commission such as civil affairs, et cetera.

In our instructions we have stressed that to eliminate the delays now existent in dealings between the Russians and the United States and British Military Missions, it is essential that the Russian representative on the Committee should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the United States and British sides, the heads of the present missions would represent the United States and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible to his own Chiefs of Staff.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Overall objective in the war against Japan
We have agreed that the overall objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

b. Ultimately invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

Operations in the Pacific Area
We believe that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end our plans should retain flexibility, and provision should be made to take full advantage of possible developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner of short cuts. We propose to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of naval and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly land campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against the enemy ships will be continued. Very long-range bomber operations against Japan Proper will be continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established in the Marianas and from those to be seized in the future. The air forces in China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and will also provide the maximum practical support for the campaign in the Pacific.

Pursuant to the above, the operations in the Pacific Theater are being conducted to effect the reconquest of the Philippines and the opening of a seaway to China.

We have noted that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, will require the allocation of resources. In planning production these requirements will be borne in mind.

British Empire participation in the Pacific
We have agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific, with the understanding that this Fleet will be balanced and self-supporting. The method of the employment of the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific will be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances.

We have invited the British Chiefs of Staff to put forward, as a basis for planning, an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air Force will be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.

Canadian participation is accepted in principle.

Operations in Southeast Asia
We have agreed that our object in Southeast Asia is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date, it being understood that operations to achieve this object must not prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging base at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.

We have approved the following operations:
a. Stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China;

b. Operation DRACULA.

We attach the greatest importance to the discharge of the task under paragraph 29 and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945 and with a target date of 15 March. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, it is our intention to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945. Our directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia is attached. (See Annex)

Redeployment after the end of the war in Europe
We consider that the whole problem of the redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe, including repatriation, needs combined study in order to assure the optimum use of the resources involved, including personnel and cargo shipping, and to make certain that the forces required for operations against Japan will reach the theater of war at the earliest date. We have accordingly instructed the combined staffs in consultation with the combined shipping authorities to study and report on this problem, submitting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff such questions as may require decision before completion of the study.

Duration of the war against Japan
We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. This date is necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.

We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ccsmap.0916

For disarmament, policing and preservation of order:
a. The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

b. The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz-northern border of Hessen-Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

c. Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.

d. American area to have in addition access through the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British-controlled area.

e. Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date.

F D R
W S C

Annex

Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command

Your object is the destruction or expulsion of all Japanese forces in Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging post at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.

The following are approved operations:
a. The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route, and the attainment of overland communications with China.

b. Operation DRACULA.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the effective discharge of the task under paragraph 2a and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15th March.

If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, noon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral Leahy Foreign Secretary Eden
General Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
General Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
General Ismay
Major General Laycock
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Hollis

McFarland minutes

September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret

Report to the President and Prime Minister

At the request of the President, Admiral Leahy read out the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 680/1) paragraph, by paragraph. A number of amendments were proposed and agreed to. These are incorporated in the final report (CCS 680/2).

In addition to the agreed amendments, comments on the report were made as follows:

Operations in Italy
a. Paragraph 11
The Prime Minister suggested that the alternative developments in the operations in Italy postulated by General Wilson were rather too rigid. There might be many shades between the rout of General Kesselring’s forces and the ability of the Germans to effect an orderly withdrawal. Paragraphs 11a and b would present a better-balanced estimate if paragraph 11b was amended to read “b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not at present seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Unless the enemy’s resistance is markedly reduced, difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during the winter would prevent another major offensive until spring 1945.”

b. Paragraph 12
The Prime Minister asked that the precise implication of the statement “that no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known” might be made perfectly clear. For example, it would be quite unacceptable if paragraph 12a was intended to cover an offensive only as far, say, as the Rimini Line. He assumed that the offensive contemplated would include domination of the Valley of the Po.

General Marshall said it was his understanding that General Alexander’s present offensive included invasion of the Valley of the Po.

Admiral Leahy agreed.

c. Paragraph 12c
The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation to Admiral King for his offer to provide an amphibious lift for possible operations against the Istrian Peninsula.

Admiral King said that after taking part in operations in the Adriatic, these landing craft would be required to proceed to the Southeast Asia Theater for DRACULA. It was therefore of the greatest importance that General Wilson should submit his plan for the Istrian operation and a decision be taken not later than 15 October. He pointed out that there were certain other craft now in the Mediterranean which were urgently required for the Pacific.

The Prime Minister agreed that it was of the utmost importance that the matter be settled promptly.

General Laycock confirmed that the additional craft referred to by Admiral King would not be wanted for the Istrian operation.

Overall objective for the war against Japan
d. Paragraph 21
The Prime Minister said he thought it quite possible that a heavy, sustained and ever-increasing air bombardment of the Japanese cities might cause Japan to capitulate. People could stand heavy bombardment only so long as they could hope that sooner or later it would come to some endurable end. There could be no such hope for Japan and all they could look forward to was the prospect of an ever-increasing weight of explosive on their centers of population.

e. Paragraph 23
With reference to the term “the opening of a seaway to China,” the Prime Minister said that he assumed this meant the seaway from the United States. He did not contemplate a sea route being opened from the south, for example, through the Sunda Strait.

Admiral King agreed with the Prime Minister’s interpretation on this point.

f. Paragraph 26
The Prime Minister said that the Canadian Government was anxious for some assurance in principle that their forces would participate in the main operations against Japan. The Canadian Government would prefer that their forces should operate in the more northerly parts of the Pacific, as their troops were unused to tropical conditions.

It was agreed that a paragraph accepting Canadian participation in principle should be inserted in the report. (See paragraph 27)

General Arnold pointed out that the necessity for securing suitable bases for all the forces that would be operating in the Pacific might require employment of Canadian forces in the tropics.

g. The discussion then turned to the operations in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to Operations CAPITAL and DRACULA. As regards CAPITAL**, the Prime Minister** said that, while he accepted the obligation of securing the air route and attaining overland communications with China, any tendency to overinsure in this operation would have the effect of ruling out DRACULA, which he and the British Chiefs of Staff were particularly set on carrying out before the monsoon of 1945.

h. At this point the Prime Minister read out a note on the provision of forces for Dracula (see Annex I) in amplification of which he made certain suggestions about the timing of the movements of forces from the United States. If the United States authorities could see their way to assisting the operations in Burma with one or two divisions it would be better to move two divisions from the later schedules of the United States Army transportation to Europe than to take two divisions from General Montgomery’s Army which was now actually fighting. This would bring additional troops more rapidly into action against the Japanese without withdrawing any of those already fighting in Germany. He did not ask for a decision on these proposals there and then but asked if the United States Chiefs of Staff would examine his suggestion.

General Marshall undertook to examine the Prime Minister’s proposals. He said, however, that there was only one light division available and this had been reorganized and allocated to the European Theater at the special request of General Eisenhower. Every division in the United States was already allocated either to General Eisenhower or to the Pacific. The last divisions for the European Theater of Operations were scheduled to sail either the last week in January or the first week in February. The only way of providing United States divisions for Burma was by taking them from approved allocations. In this connection he said General Stilwell was desirous of having an American division assigned him; in fact, he wanted two if he could get them.

i. Continuing, General Marshall said that he had recently learned of an impression that the increase in the requirements for DRACULA had been brought about by pressure from United States authorities. After a thorough inquiry he had found that this impression was groundless. No United States authorities had advocated any such increase.

At the President’s request, General Marshall outlined certain developments with regard to the Chinese forces. The Generalissimo contemplated withdrawing the “Y” Force across the Salween unless General Stilwell advanced on Bhamo with the Ledo Force. No replacements had been provided for the Salween Force, which had now dwindled to 14,000 men. A note had been sent by the President to the Generalissimo pointing out the consequences of the proposed action and stating that the Generalissimo must accept full responsibility therefor.

Redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe
j. Paragraph 30
The Prime Minister pointed out that our shipping situation would be greatly eased after the defeat of Germany by the cessation of the convoys. Lord Leathers had said that we should be able to get an additional lift of between 40 and 50 percent. The ships would be faster on passage with a much quicker turn-round at the terminal ports.

Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
k. Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed on a provisional demarcation of zones of occupation in Germany. The details and implications would be required to be worked out by the experts. [An addition to the report which covered this matter (CCS 320/27) was read out and agreed.]

ANNEX I: Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
l. Admiral Mountbatten’s directive was agreed, subject to certain minor amendments.

The Conference: Instructed the Secretaries to revise the report in the light of the amendments approved by the President and Prime Minister and to circulate it as an approved document.

Location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany

The President inquired whether any suggestions had been put forward for the location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany. Was this to be in Berlin or elsewhere?

Mr. Eden said that this question was under examination by the European Advisory Commission. From the administrative point of view Berlin seemed to be the best place.

Communication of the results of “OCTAGON” Conference to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

The Prime Minister said that he would like to add to the communication to Marshal Stalin a word on the political dangers of divergencies between Russia and the Western Allies in respect of Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia.

The President said that as the communication was purely military in character and purported to give the results of the OCTAGON Conference, he thought it would be better if political matters were omitted.

The President and Prime Minister approved the terms of the communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as set out in Enclosures “A” and “B” respectively of CCS 681/2.

Release of information on “MULBERRY”

The Prime Minister said that it had been suggested to him that the time had now come when information could be released to the press about MULBERRY. The development of the artificial harbors had been largely a British enterprise and he would naturally have liked to let the public know about them as soon as the information could safely be released. He had now been informed, however, that Admiral King thought that the release of information about MULBERRY might be helpful to the Japanese and might not permit full advantage being taken of these inventions in the war against Japan. The Prime Minister said he fully accepted Admiral King’s view and there would consequently be no release of information to the public about MULBERRY at present.

“OCTAGON” Communiqué

The Conference: Agreed on the terms of a communiqué to be issued to the Press that same afternoon (see Annex II).

Memorandum by the USCS

Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 687

Release of amphibious craft from “OVERLORD” to other theaters

The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the dispatch of the following message to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force:

Accelerated operations in the Pacific and prospective plans for SEAC require earliest practicable withdrawal of amphibious craft especially LSTs from European Theater. Having due regard for your requirements for buildup until adequate port facilities become available and considering limitation on the use of these craft in the near future due to weather, Combined Chiefs of Staff desire you review the situation carefully with the object of early release of amphibious craft from OVERLORD. Early report in this matter is desired.

Communiqué to the Press

Quebec, September 16, 1944

The President and the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff held a series of meetings during which they discussed all aspects of the war against Germany and Japan. In a very short space of time, they reached decisions on all points both with regard to the completion of the war in Europe, now approaching its final stages, and the destruction of the barbarians of the Pacific.

The most serious difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for marshalling against Japan the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy.

The British Paymaster-General to the Secretary of the Treasury

Quebec, 16th September 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary, As you suggested, I am sending this note so as to clarify the meaning of the phrase “or sold for profit” in the record of the conversation between the President and the Prime Minister on September 14.

According to my recollection, you explained that it merely meant that our Government should not sell Lend/Lease goods for more than the price at which they are entered in your books plus a reasonable allowance for transport and similar charges. I should be grateful if you could let me know whether this is correct.

Though I do not know whether we are informed about the price at which Lend/Lease goods stand in your books – thanks to your generous desire to keep the dollar sign out of Lend/Lease – I feel sure that we habitually keep well within this limit and that we shall therefore find no difficulty in meeting the President’s wishes in this respect.

May I also take this opportunity of telling you how much I enjoyed seeing you at Quebec and how very grateful I am for all the kindness you showed in your dealings with such a novice as

Yours very sincerely,
CHERWELL

Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret

Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence

His Majesty’s Government are in full accord with the directive to Admiral Mountbatten which makes him responsible for executing the stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China. Having regard however to the immense losses by sickness (288,000 in six months) which have attended the Burma campaign this year, they are most anxious to limit this class of operation, the burden of which falls almost wholly upon the Imperial armies, to the minimum necessary to achieve the aforesaid indispensable object. For this purpose, they are resolved to strain every nerve to bring on the Operation DRACULA by March 15, as by cutting the Japanese communications the enemy will be forced to divide their forces. Decisive results may be obtained in a battle north of Rangoon, and the pursuit by light forces from the north may be continued without serious cost.

It is essential to provide five or six divisions for DRACULA. The 6th Airborne Division from England and a British-Indian division from Italy will start at the earliest moment irrespective of the state of the European war. It will not however be possible to withdraw any further forces from Europe before the end of organized and coherent German resistance. Admiral Mountbatten hopes by certain adjustments of his reserve divisions to withdraw two or even three divisions from the forces now facing the Japanese on the Burma front, for use in DRACULA. It would be of very great assistance to His Majesty’s Government if the United States could place at their disposal for Operation DRACULA two United States light or ordinary divisions. Whether these divisions should come into action on the northern Burma front or whether they should go straight to the Operation DRACULA is a matter for study in time and logistics, observing that we have six months in hand before DRACULA D-day.

If such a provision were made, we should feel certain of being able to achieve DRACULA in time to limit the wastage to the British Imperial armies in the north and to clean up the Burma situation before the next monsoon. The destruction of the Japanese in Burma would liberate a considerable army, which could immediately attack Japanese objectives across the Bay of Bengal at whatever point or points may be considered to be most beneficial to the common cause and most likely to lead to the rapid wearing-down of Japanese troops and above all air forces.

If on the other hand we are not able to carry out Operation DRACULA, His Majesty’s Government would feel they had been exposed to unnecessary sacrifices through persisting in operations ravaged by disease, and also their whole further deployment from India and Burma against the Japanese in the Malay Peninsula, et cetera, will be set back until 1946. Thus, the averting of a double disaster depends upon the certainty that we can execute DRACULA by March 15 and, having regard to the very heavy losses we have sustained and are liable to sustain, we feel fully entitled to ask for a measure of United States assistance.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Quebec, September 16, 1944
Top secret

Mr. President. I return the Memorandum you gave me about Italian Colonies.

The Foreign Office would like to treat this as an official communication if you would allow us to keep a copy of it.

It seems that the usual broad and substantial measure of agreement exists between us, but we should like to look into the details more closely.

W S C
16.9.44

740.0011 EW/9-1644: Telegram

The Chargé near the Polish Government-in-Exile to the Secretary of State

London, September 16, 1944
Secret
US urgent

Poles 102. Premier Mikołajczyk has requested me to transmit the following appeal of the Council of National Unity in Warsaw addressed to the President, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, dated September 15th and received in London today:

On the forty-fifth day of the struggle of the people of Warsaw for the freedom of the capital and of Poland, witnessing the first signs of effective assistance in the form of air cover and dropping of arms and food, the Council of National Unity affirm that this has brought great relief to Warsaw.

The Council of National Unity stress the inflexible will of the people of Warsaw and of Poland to fight the Germans unto the end for the freedom and independence of Poland. To carry on this fight it is indispensable to supply the soldiers of the home army. The Council of National Unity therefore fervently appeal for continuous dropping of arms, ammunition and food, for permanent air cover to be organized and for the bombing of German concentrations and military objectives. The enemy is attacking the city with continuously reinforced formations. The lack of quick and effective succor may cause a catastrophe.

Mr. Mikołajczyk indicated that he was conscious that the arrangements made for lending assistance to Warsaw through the American shuttle service and through British planes from Italy had been impeded by weather conditions recently but felt he must underline the continued urgency of assistance as reflected in the foregoing message.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin

Quebec, September 16, 1944
Top secret
Priority

Number 66, top secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.

In our Conference at Quebec just concluded we have arrived at the following decisions as to military operations.

Operations in North West Europe
It is our intention to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and penetrate into the heart of Germany. The best opportunity to defeat the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since it is there that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defence of these essential areas. The northern line of approach clearly has advantages over the southern and it is essential that we should open up the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in. Our main effort will therefore be on the left.

Operations in Italy
As a result of our present operations in Italy
a) Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana gap; or

b) Kesselring’s army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event we may have to be content with clearing the Lombardy Plains this year.

Our future action depends on the progress of the battle. Plans are being prepared for an amphibious operation on the Istrian Peninsula to be carried out if the situation so demands.

Operations in the Balkans
Operations of our air forces and Commando type operations will continue.

Operations against Japan
We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in all theaters, with the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese homeland.

Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.

ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang

Quebec, September 16, 1944
Top secret
Priority

Number 68, from Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President. Top secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and resources against Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in Southeast Asia.

  • First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To this end we have devised courses of action and are taking vigorous steps to expedite the redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of Germany.

  • Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral Mountbatten in north Burma to provide additional security for intermediate air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. All these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, and by adequate air supply. Small-scale amphibious operations on the Arakan coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Ledo Road with accompanying pipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your forces.

  • Third: Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to prepare a large-scale amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal to be undertaken as soon as developments in the European Theater will allow the necessary resources to be made available.

  • Fourth: We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, including the opening of a seaway into China.

ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL

President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang

Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
Priority

WH Number 64, from the President for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

After reading the last reports on the situation in China my Chiefs of Staff and I are convinced that you are faced in the near future with the disaster I have feared. The men of your “Y” forces crossing the Salween have fought with great courage and rendered invaluable assistance to the campaign in North Burma. But we feel that unless they are reinforced and supported with your every capacity you cannot expect to reap any fruits from their sacrifices, which will be valueless unless they go on to assist in opening the Burma Road. Furthermore, any pause in your attack across the Salween or suggestion of withdrawal is exactly what the Jap has been striving to cause you to do by his operations in Eastern China. He knows that if you continue to attack, cooperating with Mountbatten’s coming offensive, the land line to China will be opened in early 1945 and the continued resistance of China and maintenance of your control will be assured. On the other hand, if you do not provide manpower for your Divisions in North Burma and, if you fail to send reinforcements to the Salween forces and withdraw these armies, we will lose all chance of opening land communications with China and immediately jeopardize the air route over the hump. For this you must yourself be prepared to accept the consequences and assume the personal responsibility.

I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area in East China with possible catastrophic consequences. The Japanese capture of Kweilin will place the Kunming air terminal under the menace of constant air attack, reducing the hump tonnage and possibly severing the air route.

Even though we are rolling the enemy back in defeat all over the world this will not help the situation in China for a considerable time. The advance of our forces across the Pacific is swift. But this advance will be too late for China unless you act now and vigorously. Only drastic and immediate action on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of your long years of struggle and the efforts we have been able to make to support you. Otherwise, political and military considerations alike are going to be swallowed in military disaster.

The Prime Minister and I have just decided at Quebec to press vigorously the operations to open the land line to China on the assumption that you would continue an unremitting attack from the Salween side. I am certain that the only thing you can now do in an attempt to prevent the Jap from achieving his objectives in China is to reinforce jour Salween armies immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your forces. The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in our decision and in the continued efforts the United States proposes to take to maintain and increase our aid to you. This we are doing when we are fighting two other great campaigns in Europe and across the Pacific. I trust that your far-sighted vision, which has guided and inspired your people in this war, will realize the necessity for immediate action. In this message I have expressed my thoughts with complete frankness because it appears plainly evident to all of us here that all your and our efforts to save China are to be lost by further delays.

ROOSEVELT

Tripartite luncheon meeting, 1:45 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt The Earl of Athlone Prime Minister Mackenzie King
Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone
Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden

Mackenzie King’s notes indicate that he had a conversation at lunch with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Eden, concerning the advisability of convening the proposed international conference on world organization on October 30, just a week before the presidential elections in the United States. Mackenzie King spoke of the opposition there would be from small countries, including Canada, to any appearance that the great powers were “seeking to control the world in the organization of its affairs.” Churchill referred to the disagreement with Stalin on the duties and powers of the Council of the proposed organization in settling disputes, especially with regard to a Soviet right to a veto even in disputes to which the Soviet Union was a party. Eden records that Churchill explained to Roosevelt at this meeting why Eden could not accept the President’s invitation to visit Hyde Park.

The Pittsburgh Press (September 16, 1944)

JAP CIVILIANS FLEEING PHILIPPINES
Leathernecks advance toward key airdrome in invasion of Palaus

Army troops march almost unopposed through Morotai Island, south of Philippines
By Frank Tremaine, United Press staff writer

Bulletin

Tokyo radio reported today that civilians are being evacuated from Davao on Mindanao Island in the Philippines. The Tokyo broadcast said evacuation started in “good order” Sept. 9 after a U.S. carrier task group began a series of air attacks against Mindanao. Tokyo indicated the civilians were fleeing from the city into the northern part of the island.

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii –
U.S. Marines, supported by heavy fire from warships and planes, battled their way through strong Jap tank and artillery fire today to expand their Palau Island beachhead.

On the other end of the American offensive arc around the Philippines, Army infantrymen attacking the Halmaheras made an almost unopposed march through Morotai Island.

The Marines on Peleliu Island hammered out a beachhead of nearly 1½ miles and closed in on the principal Jap airdrome in the Palau group, 560 miles east of the Philippines.

Despite heavy fighting, in which the Japs brought up tanks, artillery and mortars and attempted several counterattacks, a communique by Adm. Chester W. Nimitz said U.S. casualties on Peleliu Island were “light.”

The Marines found the going tough on Peleliu, which is less than six miles long and two miles wide, but Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s infantrymen, who landed simultaneously in the Halmaheras, found no organized resistance on Morotai, 250 miles south of the Philippines.

300,000 Japs bypassed

Gen. MacArthur said his invasion forces had taken “all objectives” and engineers already had begun construction work at Pitu Airfield at the southwestern tip of the 700-square-mile island.

United Press writer Ralph C. Teatsorth, who went ashore with U.S. troops at Morotai, said the landing was made without opposition, on two beaches less than a mile apart. Pitu Airstrip, only 1,000 yards from the beachhead, fell quickly.

The twin invasions, only 500 miles apart, under the closely-coordinated leadership of Adm. Nimitz and Gen. MacArthur, were believed to have bypassed 300,000 Jap troops in the Central and Southwest Pacific.

Thirty to forty thousand of them were in the Palau Islands, and observers said Japan may attempt to move some of these onto Peleliu, although such an operation would involve the use of barges within range of warships.

Aims for airfield

Big ships’ guns and carrier planes maintained a steady bombardment of the enemy defenses, but Maj. Gen. William S. Rupertus, commander of the Marine forces, seemed to be getting field artillery ashore to speed up the operation.

Gen, Rupertus’ immediate objective was the Peleliu Airfield, which has two runways, each 4,200 feet long. It is only large enough for fighters and medium bombers but could be lengthened to accommodate heavy bombers.

The Japs were fighting desperately with mortars and artillery in an effort to hold off the Marines, members of the 1st Division, veterans of Guadalcanal.

Adm. Nimitz said the Japs made several counterattacks supported by tanks shortly after the landing but were thrown back. The Japs threw sporadic mortar and artillery fire onto the landing beaches in a futile attempt to stop the invasion.

Carrier-based aircraft from VAdm. Marc A. Mitcher’s fast task force supported the immediate landing by bombing, strafing and firing rockets into installations behind the beaches, and also hit gun positions at the northern end of the island. One plane and four flight personnel were lost.

Adm. William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet, of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and carriers, patrolled the waters off the Palaus to frustrate any attempt to bring. in reinforcements.

The missing Japanese Navy, however, was not expected to make an appearance because of the potent array of American fighting power.

Gen. MacArthur, whose planes have long been raiding the Palaus in conjunction with Central Pacific bombers, disclosed in his communiqué that Far Eastern Air Force patrols had again hit the island group. The time and the extent of the attack were not given.

Of the Morotai campaign, Gen. MacArthur said it “has progressed according to plan,” with land and carrier-based aircraft continuing to support the ground forces.

His statement that “all objectives” had been achieved, indicated a rapid extension of control over the coastal areas held by scattered Jap troops. Beside the unfinished Pitu Airstrip, the soldiers also seized Gila Peninsula, on the southwest corner of Morotai, and the communiqué added that no organized Jap ground reaction had developed so far.

Adm. Nimitz, meanwhile, announced that Army and Navy bombers from the Aleutians raided Shumushu and Paramushiru in the Kuril Islands Tuesday and Wednesday night. while Army Liberators hit Iwo Jima, in the Volcanos, with 52 tons of bombs Wednesday.

Japs reinforce Philippines

By the United Press

The Japs acknowledged for the first time today that U.S. forces had made successful landings on Peleliu and on Morotai Islands.

An Imperial Headquarters communiqué, broadcast by Tokyo radio, said “fierce fighting” was taking place on both islands.

Another Tokyo broadcast indicated that the Japs were rushing preparations against an invasion of the Philippines. The dispatch said the city of Davao, on southeastern Mindanao less than 300 miles from Morotai, had been elaborately fortified.

Tokyo radio said Prime Minister Gen. Kuniaki Koiso had announced that Japan will launch a great offensive in the “near future” and Adm. Naokuni Nomura, former Navy Minister, had been installed in a “certain important post.”

Koiso’s announcement did not say where or how the offensive would be made, although he claimed it would show Japan’s determination “to crush Britain and America.”

In connection with Nomura’s new job, Tokyo radio announced that VAdm. Nichitara Tezuka had been named Chief of the Navy Aviation Headquarters.

Yanks pour through gap blasted in Siegfried Line

500-mile Allied front surges eastward from Holland to Switzerland
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer

Siegfried forts captured almost without struggle

Defenses overrun in combined assault by infantrymen and dynamiting engineers
By Henry T. Gorrell, United Press staff writer

British advance on Adriatic Front

Battle for airfield near Rimini, Italy

Hurricane deaths reach 27; damage exceeds $40 million

Crops hit hardest but thousands of buildings are destroyed along coast

americavotes1944

Democrats told ‘we could lose’

Hannegan warns against complacency

Baltimore, Maryland (UP) –
Democratic National Chairman Robert E. Hannegan admitted last night that complacency on the part of party members might result in the defeat of President Roosevelt at the polls in November.

Mr. Hannegan told the Democratic Clubs of Maryland that “in spite of all the help our cause is getting from the public utterances” of the Republican candidates, “I am still ready to point out to you candidly that we could lose in November.”

Asserting that the name of President Roosevelt “already ranks with the names of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and Wilson.” Mr. Hannegan blasted Republican presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey as the GOP’s “high man in the making of accusations that blow up in his face.”

A ‘natural’ procedure

Mr. Hannegan said:

In view of the Republican presidential candidate’s past training and experience, this is to be expected. It is quite natural that he should follow the principle: When in doubt, prosecute.

The Democratic chairman charged that the Republican platform was “a museum piece straight out of the collection of Herbert Hoover” and that Mr. Dewey’s plan for dealing with national problems, especially that of unemployment, was “the way of Herbert Hoover.”

Answer Dewey’s charge

Mr. Hannegan asserted that Mr. Dewey’s charge that the Roosevelt administration planned to hold men in the Army after the war to prevent another depression “could scarcely have been calculated to add to the morale of the men now in uniform and fighting their country’s battles.”

He said:

The purpose of that [the administration’s] plan is not only to get all the unneeded fighting men out of the Army at the earliest possible time, but to do something that Mr. Dewey may not have thought of – that is, to go about it in the fairest and most democratic way. To decide on the order of this mustering out, the Army consulted the men themselves.

Labor and industry muster forces for wage shutdown

Battle lines drawn on reconversion issue; WLB arranges hearings

In Washington –
Three-man board to supervise war surplus

House and Senate group reaches truce