America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

1420

U.S. State Department (September 15, 1944)

Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/22

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, September 15, 1944

Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-THIRD DAY

Because Sir Alexander Cadogan was called to Quebec to confer with Prime Minister Churchill (on matters other than the Dumbarton Oaks conversations), no official meetings were held today.

Various members of the American group took advantage of the suspension of meetings to confer with one another and examine latest drafts of various documents.

Members of the secretariat took advantage of the delay to catch up with preparation of minutes and other papers. The latest draft of the document, based upon changes agreed to by the joint formulation group at its meeting yesterday afternoon, was copied and distributed to participants in the conversations.

Marshal Stalin’s reply to the President’s message on voting procedure was received. I sent a wire to the President quoting the exact text of the formula now under study.

At 4:00 p.m., Messrs. Long, Hackworth, Pasvolsky and I met with you for a 40-minute roundup discussion on the open questions.

1421

Roosevelt conversation with the Archduke Otto of Austria, 5:00 p.m.

Present
President Roosevelt
Archduke Otto

Roosevelt had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons the Archdukes Otto and Felix, her lady in waiting, and Miss Tully. The following paper is a translation made in the Department of State of a memorandum prepared by the Archduke Otto regarding his conversation with Roosevelt on this occasion:

Right at the beginning Roosevelt remarked that today they had been working over the maps and had noted (namely, he and Churchill) that Austria and Hungary would of all countries undergo the least territorial changes. The situation was unclear only where Transylvania was concerned because there were differences of opinion between the Russians and the Rumanians in that respect, and “we don’t know much about it.” Immediately following this he remarked “that our main concern is now how to keep the Communist out of Hungary and Austria.” This was extremely important to them, especially Hungary.

The remainder of the conversation was rather disjointed, as is the custom with R., and each problem was touched upon repeatedly. The following is a summary of what was said on the various points:

HUNGARY. This was evidently one of the cardinal issues of the conversation. R. kept coming back to this problem time and again. Apart from the President’s personal sympathy for Hungary, the main reason for this is probably the hope of making Hungary a bulwark against Russia. He stressed that he wished Hungary would make an unconditional surrender only to the Americans and British. If this were done, Hungary could be saved from communism. Hungary would surely receive mild terms. Military operations are now being planned which are designed to make it possible for the Hungarians to establish liaison with the civilized Allies. In the course of the discussion, R. took up the idea of having the Hungarian envoys act as transmitters of his proposal for Hungary. Specific mention was made of Apor, whom he would approach through Myron Taylor. His former sympathy for Horthy had been forfeited through the latter’s weakness and senility. He was very receptive to the idea that we might perhaps be helpful to him with respect to Hungary’s surrender. It was also agreed that I would immediately send him a message for the Hungarian government. He also asked in detail about Béla Kun, concerning whose atrocious deeds he was well informed. Attempts had also been made to prejudice him very strongly against Mihály Károlyi, but obviously he does not know much about him.

RUSSIA. It is evident that the relationship between R. and the Russians is strained. While the President emphasized that he liked Stalin personally – although he said a little later that he was “untrustworthy” and deceitful (my personal impression: the praise of Stalin was merely a gesture to put a little damper on our joy, and so was not genuine) – the President was bitterly critical of the men around Stalin. All the men around Stalin were old Bolsheviks whom one could not trust. There was a general interest in keeping the Russians away as far as possible. R. seems to have been particularly disgusted by Russia’s handling of the Bulgarian question. It is obvious that the Anglo-Saxons were tricked by the Russians. From all of R.’s remarks it is quite evident that he is afraid of the Communists and wants to do everything to contain Russia’s power – naturally short of war.

POLAND. R. is in an ill humor about Poland. Apparently there is a disposition to yield there. Sharp criticism of the Warsaw revolt, which was launched without consulting the Allies.

AUSTRIA. Austria’s independence will be restored and efforts will be made to protect the country from Bolshevism. The question whether Austria would want to form a federation with South Germany was raised at the Conference, but R. said that this should be left to the Austrians themselves. He thought that the Austrians would not care for that. When he asked for my opinion, I said that Austria would primarily wish to associate with the Danube countries, especially Hungary, but if Hungary were to fall into the hands of the Russians, Austria might consider a union with Catholic South Germany on the condition that Vienna would be the capital. German, R. remarked at this point, would be divided into three parts, North, West, and South Germany. R. apparently had no knowledge of the Hull Declaration. He shared our opinion that an uprising would be far too premature at this time. The question of the Austrian underground did not seem to interest him greatly. He seems to think that the underground is so strong that nothing needs to be done for it except supply it with arms at the last moment. South Tyrol was discussed with him. He is sympathetic to our efforts. It is not clear, however, whether anything has been done in this respect. He has reports from Italy about the present Italian government: they are relatively unconcerned about any territorial questions regarding Austria, they are interested in only one thing: they want to keep Trieste. He has proposed, and the proposal seems to have been accepted, that Trieste, Pola, and Fiume become free ports under international guarantee and administration. (The same régime, by the way, is also planned for the German ports.)

VATICAN. Understanding for the power of the Holy See. An interesting item is a report by Myron Taylor that Stalin had offered Rome, as the price of an understanding, to bring about a merger of the Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

YUGOSLAVIA. R. stresses once more, as in previous conversations, that Yugoslavia is in his view an unnatural state. It should be transformed into a federation. Whether that would be done he did not say. Said: Poor Peter is in a very bad shape.

MISCELLANEOUS. Marked sympathy for Leopold of Belgium. – In view of Brazil’s weakness he will propose to the United Nations the establishment of American or United Nations bases in Dakar or the Cape Verde Islands. – Is very angry at Argentina. – Beneš or Czechoslovakia was not mentioned at all. – Made the remark that Stalin had harassed Churchill constantly at Tehran.

1422

Morgenthau-Leahy conversation, about 5:00 p.m.

Present
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
Admiral Leahy
Miss Tully

Morgenthau’s diary entry reads as follows:

While I was waiting for the President between five and six, I was sitting there talking with Grace Tully and Admiral Leahy joined us. He said that they had only settled that afternoon what part of Germany the English would go into, and what part the USA should go into. In the morning when I arrived at twelve, the President was sitting alone in his room with three different colored pencils and a map of Europe, and he then and there sketched out where he wanted us to go and where he wanted the English to go, and by that I mean our Armies. He had before him a map of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which he said was terrible. According to Admiral Leahy, this afternoon the President showed Churchill his map, and got what he wanted. When I let Leahy read the memorandum on the Ruhr and the Saar, he was very happy because he said that the English were going to occupy the Ruhr and the Saar and they would have to carry this thing out.

1423

The Secretary of the Treasury to the President

Quebec, September 15, 1944

Memorandum for the President

In regard to proposal for Lend Lease to France, my recommendation is that for the time being we postpone taking any action.

H M Jr.
Approved: F D R

1424

The Under Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, September 15, 1944

Supplementing yesterday’s wire on voting procedure, it may be helpful for you to have before you the exact text of the formula which is now being studied by the three governments as a possible solution.

You will note the size of the majority vote is left blank. The Russians want 51 percent and the British want two-thirds.

The result of adopting this procedure would be that consideration and recommendations with regard to pacific settlement of disputes referred to in numbered paragraph three above would be taken without the vote of the party to the dispute even if that party happens to be a permanent member of the council and that consideration and decisions as to enforcement action of any kind would require the unanimous consent of all the permanent members of the council, whether or not one of them is involved.

In view of the fact that this, if accepted, would represent a substantial concession to the Soviet point of view, we feel that we would be justified in trying to obtain their consent to the two-thirds majority vote.

Could we have your views as soon as convenient, both as regards the formula in the text and the size of majority vote?

E S

1425

Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, about 6:00 p.m.

Present
President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau

Morgenthau’s diary entry reads as follows:

…I got in about six o’clock and stayed until after seven-thirty… He was completely relaxed, and the conversation was entirely on the week’s work.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Late in the afternoon in my discussion with the President, to my surprise he told me that Leahy had been favorable to my plan. The President said that he had withheld bringing up this question of where our Armies should go because he wanted to get Churchill in a good humor and he wanted everything else settled.

… I asked him what he meant about the suggestion of having the United Nations meet the end of October, and he said that he felt it had taken much too long to bring up the League of Nations after World War I, and he wanted to do this in October. So I said, “Well, it makes good window dressing for the campaign,” and he said, “Yes.” His idea is to have it about the 27th of October and run through and after election.

During my conversation with the President – I think it was in the morning – I said, “Look, Mr. President, now that we have this Ruhr and Saar stuff straightened out, the thing should be presented to Stalin, and I think if Stalin knew how we felt you would find he would act much better.” The President said, “Well, I will have Harriman come back and explain it to him, and let him go back and sell it to Stalin.” “Listen,” I said, “Harriman can’t do this. You ought to send me.” I said, “I get along very well with the Russians, and you could check with Stalin as to whether I do or whether I don’t.” The President said, “Oh, I have far too important things for you to do around Washington. I can’t spare you for a thing like this.” I said, “Well, it would only be a matter of 10 days.” He thought a minute and said, “Well, it might take two weeks,” and he seemed to like the idea…

The other amazing thing that happened was he turned to me, when Grace Tully brought in a telegram in the afternoon addressed to her asking her to try to find out what happened on the French Lend-Lease, and said, “You let Harry know that we are not going to do it,” …

1426

Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting, 7:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Lord Cherwell

Morgenthau and Cherwell discussed the words “or sold for profit” which had been inserted in the record of the Roosevelt-Churchill discussion of lend-lease on September 14.

1427

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
1428

The Secretary of War to the President

Washington, September 15, 1944

Memorandum for the President

Since the meeting with you on September 9 attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself, I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany. There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other memoranda. I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory – this is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.

The point of difference is not one of objective – continued world peace – it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.

If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.

The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims – it would be a crime against civilization itself.

This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive many millions of people of the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suspect the validity of our spiritual tenets and question the long-range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.

The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people’s lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.

I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England’s need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.

The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.

I plead for no “soft” treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.

I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944, the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.

HENRY L STIMSON
Secretary of War

1429 
Lot 60–D 224, Box 59: Stettinius Diary

Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State

Twenty-third Day, Friday, September 15, 1944

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conversations with the Secretary
As soon as I heard that the cable from Stalin on voting had been received I called the Secretary. I explained to him that while Stalin did not back away from the expressed Soviet opinion he did not close the door. The Secretary seemed encouraged. I sent him a copy of the text as soon as we received it.

Mr. Hull had just talked to the President, who had confirmed that the meeting in Quebec was breaking up tonight and that Eden was flying back to England tonight. Mr. Hull said Cadogan would return directly to Washington.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Meeting with the Secretary
I met with the Secretary in his office this afternoon to bring him up to date generally. He was very disturbed because Mr. Long had been in and given him the impression that there was a great amount of dissension and differences of opinion among members of the American delegation. I told him this was completely wrong and suggested that we have Long in to go over the ground with him. We then had a forty-minute meeting with Long, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky present. Mr. Long backed down completely from his position when I explained clearly that yesterday I had canvassed the American group as to their position on the compromise formula and that with the exception of reservations by Bowman and Cohen, they were all united that it was the thing to do, if it was acceptable to the Russians. Pasvolsky, Hackworth and I all then expressed the opinion that there was nothing to be excited about. Long seemed apologetic for having brought the matter up.

Pasvolsky expressed his view that the Russians may accept this formula and that it would be acceptable to us. I made it completely clear to the Secretary that the three Governments had received it only for study on an informal tentative basis and that no one had made a commitment on it.

The Secretary was very definite that we could not exclude the Associated Nations from original membership as it would result in a very bad effect in Latin American relations. The Secretary, answering my memorandum of the 13th, indicated definite opposition to the British proposal of qualification based on contribution made, on the election of non-permanent members of the Council.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1430

Log of the President’s Visit to Canada

Friday, September 15

At 12:00 o’clock, Noon, the President met in conference with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan.

At 1:00 p.m., the President lunched at the Citadel together with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Cadogan, Mrs. Churchill and Mr. Law. Prime Minister King dropped in on the group after lunch and joined in conference discussions that lasted until 3:00 p.m.

The President had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons Archduke Otto and Archduke Felix and her Lady in Waiting, Countess Kerssenbrock, and Miss Tully in his quarters at the Citadel at 5:00 p.m.

At 6:00 p.m., Secretary Morgenthau called on the President and was in conference with him until 7:15 p.m.

Dinner at the Citadel was at 8:00 p.m. The President dined with Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan. After dinner the motion picture Wilson and a Navy film of the recent air fighting at Saipan were shown at the Citadel. Mrs. Churchill attended with the President but Prime Minister Churchill could not attend because of a scheduled British conference. This was a lengthy motion picture program and was not concluded until past midnight. The President retired immediately after the movies.

1431

Völkischer Beobachter (September 16, 1944)

Grenzenloser deutscher Angriffsgeist schuf:
Sprengboot als neue Waffe

Wieder ein Beispiel der Erfindungsgabe und technischen Wendigkeit unserer Seekriegführung

…

1432

Bewährung unserer Einzelkämpfer –
Vernichtungswille bis zur Selbstaufopferung

…

1433

Massenmord und Sklaverei?

Alle Nachkriegspläne der Feinde gipfeln in dem Wunsch, die deutsche Volkssubstanz zu zerstören. Das möchten sie durch Verschickung von Arbeitssklaven und Ausmordung erreichen.

World Review, bekannte US-Zeitschrift, vom 10. Dezember 1942:

Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach bedeutet unser Sieg die Tötung von 500.000 jungen Deutschen, entweder durch ein summarisches Kriegsgericht oder ohne eine solche Zeremonie.

Observer, London, 7. Mai 1944:

Die Sowjetunion hat ihren Plan unterbreitet, die gesamte deutsche Armee als kriegsgefangen zu erklären und zu Arbeitergruppen neu zu organisieren. Diese haben in der Sowjetunion Zwangsarbeit zu leisten. Dieser Plan ist vom Sowjetbotschafter in London, Gusew, in Vorschlag gebracht worden.

Daily Sketch, London 22. August 1944:

Mehrere kleine europäische Emigrantenregierungen folgen jetzt dem Beispiel Moskaus und verlangen Aufnahme der Klausel in den Waffenstillstandsvertrag, daß Deutschland ebenfalls Arbeiter zum Aufbau ihrer Städte zur Verfügung stellt. Die Forderung von vier dieser Exilregierungen allein stellt sich bereits auf 500.000 Mann.

Eugen Vargas, Professor in Moskau, Erklärung, wiedergegeben in der US-Zeitschrift Newsweek, September 1943:

Die Sowjetunion wird verlangen, daß zehn Millionen deutscher Facharbeiter zehn Jahre lang in Rußland Zwangsarbeit leisten.

Das sind keine müßigen Betrachtungen von Außenseitern. Die Sowjets haben 1939 zwei Millionen Polen nach Sibirien verschleppt und größtenteils umgebracht, dazu Hunderttausende von Letten, Litauern und Esten, nachdem sie ungezählte Angehörige der Ostvölker hingemordet hatten. Für England ist die leibliche Vernichtung anderer Völker Tradition, erhärtet durch Hungerblockade und Bombenterror. Die Yankees haben die Indianer ausgerottet. Hinter ihnen allen lauert die jüdische Mordgier.

Im Kampf mit diesen Feinden geht es um Leben und Sterben des deutschen Volkes. Kein Opfer ist zu groß, um diesen Kampf siegreich zu bestehen und die feindlichen Versklavungspläne zuschanden zu machen.

1434

Führer HQ (September 16, 1944)

Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

Der Schwerpunkt der Kämpfe im Westen lag gestern im Raum südlich und südöstlich Aachen. Mit zusammengelassen Infanterie- und Panzerkräften versuchte der Feind dort, über Stolberg nach Nordosten durchzubrechen. Nachdem der Gegner unter stärkstem Materialeinsatz zunächst geringen Geländegewinn erzielen konnte, brachten ihn unsere Gegenangriffe zum Stehen. 27 feindliche Panzer wurden dort abgeschossen. Südlich Aachen bis in den Raum südlich Nancy scheiterten zahlreiche, oft mehrfach wiederholte feindliche Angriffe. Besonders erfolgreich waren unsere Abwehrkämpfe im Raum von Vesoul, wo der Feind bei seinen vergeblichen Angriffen hohe Verluste erlitt.

In dem völlig zerstörten Brest leistet unsere tapfere Besatzung trotz schwersten feindlichen Feuers und andauernder Luftangriffe dem immer wieder anrennenden Gegner verbissenen Widerstand.

Die Hafenstädte an der südenglischen Küste lagen auch am gestrigen Tag ohne Unterbrechung unter dem Feuer unserer Marineküstenbatterien.

Bei dem bereits gestern gemeldeten Angriff britischer Schnellboote, auf ein deutsches Geleit nördlich der westfriesischen Insel Texel wurden nach abschließenden Meldungen Insgesamt drei feindliche Boote versenkt.

An der italienischen Südfront setzte der Feind im Raum nördlich Florenz seine Durchbruchsversuche während des ganzen Tages in verstärktem Maße fort. Gegenüber dem zähen Widerstand unserer Divisionen gewann er nur geringfügig Boden. Die Einbruchsstellen sind abgeriegelt. Auch an der adriatischen Küste verhinderten unsere Truppen erneut den vom Feind erstrebten Durchbruch auf Rimini.

In Südsiebenbürgen warfen deutsche und ungarische Verbände den bei Torenburg und am Mieresch vorgedrungenen Feind zurück. In den Ostkarpaten scheiterten mehrere sowjetische Angriffe.

Bei Sanok und Krosno zerschlugen unsere Divisionen wiederum die mit starken Kräften geführten Durchbruchsversuche der Bolschewisten, 27 sowjetische Panzer wurden abgeschossen.

Nordöstlich Warschau warfen Truppen der Waffen-SS und ungarische Verbände eingebrochenen Feind zurück.

In den Räumen von Bauske, Modohn und Walk setzten die Sowjets, unterstützt durch Panzer und Schlachtfliegergeschwader, ihre heftigen Angriffe fort. Unsere Divisionen vereitelten in erbitterten Kämpfen, Seite an Seite mit lettischen Freiwilligenverbänden und in hervorragender Zusammenarbeit mit starken Kräften der Luftwaffe, alle feindlichen Durchbruchsversuche. Eingebrochener Feind wurde in sofortigen Gegenstößen zurückgeworfen. 87 feindliche Panzer wurden vernichtet, Jäger und Flakartillerie der Luftwaffe brachten 92 sowjetische Flugzeuge zum Absturz.

Im Seegebiet vor der nordnorwegischen Küste wurden durch Marineflak, Sicherungsfahrzeuge und Bordflak eines deutschen Geleits vier feindliche Flugzeuge abgeschossen und ein sowjetisches Schnellboot versenkt.

In der vergangenen Nacht richteten britische Bomber einen Terrorangriff gegen Kiel. Einzelne feindliche Flugzeuge warfen Bomben auf Berlin.

1435

Supreme HQ, Allied Expeditionary Force (September 16, 1944)

Communiqué No. 161

Allied troops are now thrusting eastward along the 500 miles from the SWISS frontier, south of BELFORT, to the Channel Coast around the SCHELDT Estuary.

Near the SWISS border, Allied troops advancing from southern FRANCE have made further progress since contact was established near DIJON with patrols from our forces operating to the north. The enemy is fighting stubbornly from prepared positions to protect the southern hinge of his withdrawal movement towards the BELFORT GAP. Northeast of VESOUL, we have advanced several miles against increasing resistance.

Elements have pushed to the vicinity of FAYS-BILLOT and south of the town an enemy column was attacked and destroyed. Northwest of DIJON we have reached MONTBARD in the BRENNE valley without meeting serious opposition.

CHATENOIS, six miles from NEUFCHÂTEAU, has been captured and units are in the vicinity of MIRECOURT.

In the MOSELLE Valley, our troops have entered NANCY and EPINAL. Fighter-bombers were active against enemy transportation in the MOSELLE Valley.

In northern LUXEMBOURG, east of ST. VITH, our advance has continued against strongly-held pillbox defenses.

Allied troops closing on AACHEN from three sides are meeting stubborn opposition. MAASTRICHT has been liberated and our troops have moved beyond the city.

Fighting continued throughout yesterday in our bridgeheads over the MEUSE–ESCAUT and a number of enemy counterattacks were beaten off. The coastal areas north of the ALBERT CANAL are being steadily cleared of enemy.

Fighter-bombers hit enemy transport in HOLLAND. Ships and shore installations at BRESKENS, FLUSHING and ELLEWOUTSDIJK on the west SCHELDT were attacked by medium and light bombers.

1436

U.S. Navy Department (September 16, 1944)

CINCPAC Communiqué No. 119

During September 15 (West Longitude Date), U.S. Marines made some additional gains against strong opposition on Peleliu Island and captured the airfield at the southern end. The enemy has launched several strong counterattacks against our positions but has been thrown back each time.

An attack begun by our forces on the early morning of September 15, preceded by aerial bombing and naval gunfire, resulted in steady advances through well-organized defenses in depth. This attack was supported by artillery, tanks, naval gunfire, and bombing. Several enemy tanks were reported destroyed. Our troops had counted more than 1400 enemy dead by nightfall on September 15. Severe fighting continues.

Carrier aircraft continued to give close support to our ground forces throughout September 15. Enemy troop concentrations, gun positions, and supplies were bombed. Carrier planes also bombed airfield installations at Babelthuap, the northernmost island in the Palau Group. Several fires were started by strafing.

Seventy‑two tons of bombs were dropped on Dublon and Moen in the Truk Atoll by Liberators of the 7th Army Air Force on September 14. Five enemy planes intercepted our force and one Liberator was damaged. The enemy planes were driven off with probable damage to one. Anti-aircraft fire was meager. On the same day Mitchell bombers of the 7th Army Air Force bombed Ponape Island in the Carolines.

Paramushiru in the Kurils was bombed by 11th Army Air Force Liberators at night on September 12. Anti-aircraft fire was meager and all of our planes returned. Venturas of Fleet Air Wing Four attacked Paramushiru on September 14, setting fire to several buildings. Intercepting enemy aircraft damaged one Ventura. Two of the interceptors were probably damaged. All of our planes returned.

Pagan Island was attacked on September 14 by Thunderbolts of the 7th Army Air Force. Gun emplacements were hit with rockets and strafed. One plane was damaged by anti-aircraft fire.

Gun emplacements at Wotje Atoll were bombed on September 14 by Corsairs of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. Meager antiaircraft fire was encountered.

A single search plane of Fleet Air Wing Two strafed and damaged two enemy sailboats at Lemotrek Island, east of Woleai, on September 14. Another search plane of Fleet Air Wing Two on routine patrol near Iwo Jima on September 14 sighted two large landing craft escorted by a fighter plane: Both landing craft were strafed and the enemy plane was shot down.

1437

U.S. State Department (September 16, 1944)

Memorandum approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 320/27

Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany

Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by [to] the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

For disarmament, policing and preservation of order:

The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz–northern border of Hessen–Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.

American area to have in addition access through the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British controlled area.

Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date.

1438

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:15 a.m.

Present
Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Roberts
General Marshall Brigadier General Bessell
Admiral King Brigadier General Everest
General Arnold Brigadier General Lindsay
Lieutenant General Somervell Captain Burrough
Lieutenant General Handy Captain Fife
Rear Admiral Cooke Captain McDill
Rear Admiral McCormick Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral Duncan Colonel Lincoln
Major General Fairchild Colonel Benner
Major General Kuter Commander Clark
Major General Wood Lieutenant Colonel Pasco
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Graves

Joint Chiefs of Staff minutes

September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret

Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany

Admiral Leahy said that a decision had been reached on the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany. He presented a memorandum which he had prepared for presentation to the British. He had outlined the British and United States areas and had included remarks on the necessity for access to northwestern sea ports and passage through the British-controlled area.

General Marshall said that, in his opinion, it would be desirable to specify one port that would be controlled by the United States.

Admiral King concurred.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy as to the sufficiency of a single port, General Marshall replied that one port would be enough provided the United States had complete control of it and the port had sufficient capacity to handle approximately 10,000 tons of supplies daily.

Admiral King suggested that Bremen and vicinity be proposed for United States control.

General Marshall proposed that an additional paragraph be included in the memorandum as follows: “Control of the port of Bremen and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the commander of the American zone.”

Admiral Leahy suggested that in view of General Marshall’s amendment it would be desirable to insert in the next to the last paragraph the words “in addition” after the word “have” in the first line thereof.

General Arnold felt that some reference to the source of the Soviet area boundaries should be included for identification.

Admiral Leahy said that the question of Soviet boundaries had already been settled by agreement, and mention of it would not be appropriate in this paper.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum proposed by Admiral Leahy, as amended during discussion, and agreed to its presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 320/26)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Situation of the Chinese forces in the China-Burma-India Theater

General Marshall read a message from General Stilwell outlining the military situation in the Chinese areas of operation. The situation appeared to be extremely unfavorable and unless the Chinese took immediate remedial steps, there would be reverses of far-reaching proportions.

General Marshall said he had reported the situation to the President. Pie read a message which he had prepared for the President to dispatch to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek outlining the consequences if immediate steps were not taken to rectify the unfavorable military situation, and requested the comment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the message from the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek proposed by General Marshall.

1439

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:00 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell General Ismay
Lieutenant General Handy Admiral Noble
Rear Admiral Cooke Lieutenant General Macready
Rear Admiral McCormick Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Fairchild Major General Laycock
Major General Kuter
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Hollis
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes

September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret

Approval of the minutes of the 175th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 175th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also approved subject to later minor amendments.

“RANKIN” planning in the Mediterranean Theater (CCS 684)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 684 (The directive to General Wilson was dispatched as Fan 418).

Release of amphibious craft from “OVERLORD” to other theaters (CCS 687)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 687 (The message to SCAEF was dispatched as Facs 81).

Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany (CCS 320/26)

Admiral Cunningham suggested that any naval disarmament measures for U.S. controlled ports should be under the U.S. naval member of the Central Control Commission.

Admiral King agreed with this proposal. American control of the port of Bremen would have to include American control of a suitable area for disembarkation and staging.

Admiral Cunningham agreed. He suggested that the American area should also include Bremerhaven, some 40 or 50 miles down the river. Bremerhaven was, he understood, the port where large ships had to berth.

General Somervell said that the U.S. troops would probably also have to be supplied through the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. It might well be desirable to set up an Inter-Allied Navigation Commission to control the Rhine.

General Marshall suggested that the Combined Administrative Committee might be instructed to work out the logistic details involved in the decision taken with regard to zones and the consequent maintenance of U.S. and British forces in the zones.

Certain minor amendments were then proposed to the statement of policy contained in CCS 320/26. These were accepted.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the proposals in CCS 320/26, subject to the minor amendments agreed in discussion. (The amended paper, as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, circulated as CCS 320/27.)

b. Agreed that any naval disarmament measures for Bremen and Bremerhaven would be under the U.S. Naval Commander of the Central Control Commission.

c. Agreed to refer CCS 320/27 to the Combined Administrative Committee for examination of the logistics problems involved.

Situation in China

General Marshall informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram recently received from General Stilwell. The Japanese were advancing on Kweilin, if indeed they had not already captured it and were therefore only 460 miles from Kunming, the China end of the air route. Further, no Chinese replacements were being provided for the Salween forces and the Generalissimo was threatening to withdraw these forces altogether if the Ledo forces did not advance to Bhamo. The Generalissimo had not yet agreed to place all Chinese forces under the direct control of General Stilwell which he had been pressed to do for some two months.

General Marshall then informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram which had been sent to Chiang Kai-shek by the President urging early and vigorous action.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of a telegram read to the meeting by General Marshall, which the President had sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, stressing the need for action to remedy the situation in China in general and on the Salween front in particular.

Communiqué for release to the Press

Sir Hastings Ismay suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might wish to propose to the President and Prime Minister a paragraph dealing with the military points of the Conference for incorporation in the final press release. He presented a draft for consideration.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the text of a short note containing suggestions as to the military substance of any communiqué that the President and the Prime Minister might wish to issue to the Press on OCTAGON.

Concluding remarks

Sir Alan Brooke, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, said he would like to express warm appreciation to the United States Chiefs of Staff for their helpful cooperation in reaching agreement on the problems which had been before them.

Admiral Leahy, in expressing thanks to Sir Alan Brooke, said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were most grateful for the helpful attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff in overcoming the minor difficulties which had initially existed.